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Preface
Early in 1951 a group of interested members of the faculty of The
University of Michigan Law Scho?l conceived the idea of a research
project, the purpose of which would be to investigate the principal
unique legal problems being created and likely to be created in the future by peaceful uses of atomic energy. The group planned the preparation and publication of a series of manuscripts which might ultimately emerge as one or more printed volumes dealing with the legal
problems affecting this new form of energy. Many phases of the subject were scrutinized, including the rule-making and licensing powers
of the Atomic Energy Commission, the censoring of scientific information, liability for radiation injuries to persons and property, patent
rights, state regulatory activities, imd other areas of possible interest.
In July 1951 the Michigan Memorial-Phoenix Project, the University's major program of research in all phases of peaceful uses of the
atom, made a substantial grant in support of the proposed study of legal
problems. The law faculty group, consisting at the outset of Professors
Samuel D. Estep, William ]. Pierce, and the undersigned, organized
and embarked upon the program. Later Professors Eric Stein and
William W. Bishop were added. A small research staff was recruited
and the studies were commenced, beginning with an intensive examination of the legislative history of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946.
In the summer of 1952, an Institute on Industrial and Legal Problems of Atomic Energy was organized and held in the Law Quadrangle
in Ann Arbor. This proved to be one of the earliest of the many conferences held in this country resulting from the development of atomic
enterprise, and it served to give very great stimulus to the research
work being carried on within the staff of the Law School. The proceedings were published by the School and were widely distributed.
In 1956 a second summer conference was held, this time a "workshop," with a prepared agenda and working papers distributed in advance to the invited participants, who included not only lawyers but
also engineers, A. E. C. staff members, scientists, health officials,· and
economists-a truly "inter-disciplinary" undertaking. The objective
was to elicit concentrated thinking and interchange of ideas between
knowledgeable people concerning atomic legal problems, and to precipitate these ideas in concrete form for the guidance of those responsible for current legal developments in the field. Again, proceedings
were published and were widely distributed.
v
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Throughout the years manuscripts on various phases of the subject
have been prepared by the research staff or by the members of the faculty engaged in the project. Little by little the materials, which now
emerge as this volume entitled Atoms and the Law, took shape in
manuscript ·form. Principal interest finally centered on tort liability
for radiation injuries, workmen's compensation for such injuries, federal statutory and administrative provisions regulating atomic activities, state regulation of atomic energy, and finally, in the later years, the
international aspects of the subject. These became principal headings
in the volume which is now being published.
As the project unfolded, those of us who were participating in it
became increasingly impressed with the feeling that here was something
unique in legal research, for we were engaging in a task that involved
not only frontiers of the law but also one which was ever so closely interwoven with the science and technology of tomorrow. In carrying out
the project, it became necessary for us to proceed as far as possible to
master a new scientific field, one with a new vocabulary and a radically
different set of concepts. This certainly enhanced interest in the task,
not to mention increasing the difficulty of carrying it forward. In
addition, it afforded us an even more fascinating prospect, namely, the
possibility of creation of a center for legal studies related to the new
technological world, with its great variety of new facets-automation,
water resources problems, aviation, etc., thus to make our contribution
in providing the legal framework to facilitate the adjustment of scientific advances to the social order of which we are a part.
The acknowledgements which we should make to those who have
helped in the preparation of this volume are almost too numerous to
mention. On the financial side we have already mentioned the Michigan Memorial-Phoenix Project, which made the initial grant-in-aid,
and whose Director, Dean Ralph A. Sawyer; and Assistant Director,
Professor Henry J. Gomberg, have been continuously helpful and encouraging. We have also received most generous support from the
Detroit Edison Company, whose President, Walker L. Cisler, has led
the way in the field of private atomic enterprise; from the William W.
Cook Endowment Fund of the Law School; and from the Ford Foundation, whose grant-in-aid made in 1958 has not only helped with the
completion of this volume but has made possible the continuation and
broadening of the Law School's program of atomic legal research.
Finally we must mention the most encouraging support of several of
our loyal alumni who .have been attracted by the project and have
wished to contribute to it.
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Acknowledgements must also be made to the many who have contributed to the research and preparation of. the manuscript for the
volume. Those of us who assume responsibility. on the title page could
never have completed the task without the participation of Professor
Eric Stein and his one-time United States Department of State associate, Bernhard G. Bechhoefer, who wrote the chapter on the International Atomic Energy Agency; Courts Oulahan, now on the legal
staff of the Atomic Energy Commission, who wrote on the Commission's administrative procedures; and Professor Horace W. Dewey, a
graduate of the Law School, now in the Department of Slavic Lan-·
guages of the University, who wrote the chapter on Soviet atomic
developments. Then there has been the valued contribution of the several research assistants who have worked on the project-Rinaldo L.
Bianchi, John W. Birchall, Mrs. ·Mimica Janez, Frederick Juenger,
Lawrence P. King, Charles D. Olmsted, Ivor M. Richardson, Michael
Scott, and Marvin 0. Young. Finally, credit must be given for the
skillful and diligent assistance of those who helped prepare the manuscript for the printer-Miss Alice J. Russell, Assistant Editor, Michigan Legal Publications; Miss Sharon Greene; and Mrs. Jean Hershenov. This has truly been a team project, and each member of the
team has served faithfully and well.
·One unique and worthy by-product of the Law School's Atomic
Research Project is the extent to which those who have been engaged
in it have been called upon to take active parts in outside activities related to the atomic age. We have participated in Congressional hearings
on atomic matters; in activities of American Bar Association and State
Bar committees; in the Power Reactor Development Company's Fermi
Reactor, now under construction near Monroe, Michigan; in the drafting of state regulatory legislation on the subject; in the activities of
the Fund for Peaceful Atomic Development; in the offering of a seminar as a part of the Law School curriculum; and in giving innumerable public addresses to all manner of groups, legal, lay, and technical.
These by-product features have added interest and value to the task,
and in a very real sense have, we believe, given us the opportunity to
render some statesman-like service on one of the unique frontiers of the
current scene.
A principal difficulty confronting us at all times has been the velocity
with which changes have taken place during the period. New technical developments, new statutes, and even new concepts have followed
one another in rapid succession-some of them even during the recent
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weeks during which the manuscript has been in the printers' hands.
This kaleidoscopic nature of the scene has made it impossible to keep
the manuscript completely current with respect to all details, but it has
seemed wiser to publish while the manuscript is reasonably timely than
to lose the advantage of timeliness in the interest of technical perfection. Notwithstanding the difficulties, however, the task has been rewarding, and we hope the end result will make a worthwhile contribution to a fascinating new field.

E. BLYTHE STASON, DEAN
The University of Michigan Law School
Ann Arbor, Michigan
June 27, 1959.
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PART I
TORT LIABILITY AND
RADIATION INJURIES

Chapter I
ORIGIN AND TYPES OF RADIATION INJURIES
A. Introduction

We are in the midst of a revolutionary technological development
that may be as profound as the Industrial Revolution of the 19th
century. Although peaceful employment of atomic energy has been
comparatively meager to date, scientists, industrialists, economists,
and many others have already recognized its potentiality. The failure
of the 19th century legal profession to accommodate the law to the
changes of the Industrial Revolution was a principal contributory cause
for ·the creation of statutory workmen's compensation. The 2oth
century legal profession must move much more quickly to guide the
adjustment of the law to this ·new revolutionary source o£ energy. The
profession must be prepared to modify existing rules and to assist in
the formulation of new doctrines to meet the unique problems which
are certain to arise. 1
The development of peacetime uses of atomic energy undoubtedly
will have some of its greatest impacts on that portion of the law dealing
with personal injury and property damage, usually denominated tort
law. It is the purpose of this study to analyze the possible impact of
this new technological. revolution on this branch of the law.
Before the lawyer can consider the changes, major and minor, that
will have to be made, he must acquaint himself with the basic scientific
facts and theories of atomic energy. He must know something of the
uniqueness of this source of energy if he is to understand its effect on
the legal system. To handle the tort cases that will arise the lawyer
will be required to master a new vocabulary, including such unfamiliar
terms as neutrons, electrons, protons, positrons, isotopes, half-lives, and
ionization, not to mention the anti-proton and the neutrino. Therefore, before analyzing the effect of atomic energy on the rules of law
governing tort liability, we shall discuss some of the basic characteristics and technology of atomic energy and its potentiality for causing
injuries to persons and property.
1 Some have argued that traditional tort rules will adequately meet the challenge
of atomic energy. Becker and Huard, "Tort Liability and the Atomic Energy Industry," 44 Geo. L. ]. 58 (1955).
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B. The Scientific Background
The theories of nuclear physics which are generally accepted today
by scientists are nevertheless theories only. Like all other scientific
theories we may find someday that they are somewhat inaccurate, or
at least incomplete. Nevertheless, the atomic theory of matter does
seem to explain many phenomena of nature with reasonable satisfaction, and it is possible to use the theory to develop truly startling
practical techniques for industry, medicine, and research. Furthermore, accepted theories are certainly sufficiently useful to enable the
lawyer to evaluate the possible effect of the new atomic techniques on
the general principles of tort law.
I.

Atomic Structure

According to present-day understanding, all matter is made up of
infinitely small atoms which are, in turn, mostly empty space with a few
subatomic particles of· much smaller size. Each element has its own
particular number of these particles. The principal components of atoms
are neutrons, protons, and electrons. At the core or nucleus of an atom
are found protons, which are positively charged particles, and neutrons,
which are particles without electrical charge. Negatively charged electrons move around the nucleus in orbits with diameters about Io,ooo
times that of the nucleus. In stable atoms the number of electrons
matches the number of protons of the nucleus. This numerical correspondence provides an electrical equilibrium since the protons and
electrons neutralize each other. The neutrons are already electrically
neutral and thus do not affect the equilibrium. There is, however, a
limit to the number of particles which can be contained in the nucleus
of an atom of a particular element. Overstuffing of the nucleus will
produce instability, and the atom will discharge the surplus in the form
of various types of radiation, all more or less harmful to human tissues.
The atoms of the various .elements are identified in several ways.
One is by reference to the combined number of protons and neutrons
in the nucleus. This number is referred to as the mass number and is
the atomic weight of this element. Atoms are also identified by the
number of protons within the nucleus. This is the atomic number of
the element. The chemical properties of an atom, on the other hand,
depend upon the number of orbital electrons. However, as already indicated, the number of electrons in an atom is equal to the number of
protons. Therefore, atoms with the same atomic number, as distinguished from mass number, always form the same chemical element
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and react chemically in exactly the same way for all practical purposes.
Frequently we find atoms with the same number of orbital electrons
(also with the same number of protons or atomic number) but a different number of neutrons in the nucleus. We speak of these as different isotopes of the same chemical element. These terms can be
understood best by reference to specific elements.
The simplest element of all is hydrogen which has one proton and
one orbital electron. It is consequently the lightest of all elements and,
in its most common form, has a weight, or mass, of approximately
one. The heaviest naturally occurring element is uranium, with an
atomic weight (mass number) of 238, derived from 92 protons (atomic
number 92) and 146 neutrons in its nucleus. Between these two naturally occuring elements 90 others are found, varying in atomic weight
according to a "periodic scale." In addition, science has thus far
produced by artificial means certain other so-called transuranic elements which are even heavier than uranium. They are neptunium
(93 Np 239), 2 plutonium (94 Pu 239), americium (95 Am 241),
curium ( 96 Cur 242), berkelium ( 97 Bk 243), and californium
(98 Cf 244), and recent newspaper articles report still two more in the
ascending series. All of these artificial elements are unstable.
One orbital shell, housing one electron, is found around the nucleus
of the hydrogen atom. Moving up one place in the periodic scale, we
find helium, an atom which has two protons and consequently needs
two electrons to attain a state of electrical equilibrium. According to
atomic theory, two electrons will fill the capacity of the innermost
electron shell. The saturation of the orbital shell causes helium atoms to
enjoy a state of absolute repose, and thus helium is an inert gas.
The next atom on the scale (lithium) has three protons in the nucleus
and thus requires three electrons .for stability. One orbital shell being
filled, a new shell must be used to house. the new electron. The capacity
of the second shell is eight electrons. Lithium, therefore, is an element
with but one electron in a shell eager to harbor eight. Consequently,
chemically speaking it tends to combine readily with atoms of other
elements. Moreover, since orbital connections between lithium atoms
are favored by their structure, lithium is a solid notwithstanding its
low atomic weight.
After saturation of the second shell, a new one will be started, and
so on until seven shells have been formed for the heaviest elements.
2 The first number represents the atomic number and the second the atomic mass or
weight.
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The several shells are capable of absorbing different numbers of electrons. For example, the fourth outer shell builds up to eighteen electrons, the fifth up to thirty-two, the sixth up to eighteen, etc. As each
orbital shell is filled to capacity, there is a recurrence of elements with
similar characteristics in the form of inert gases. A single electron in
a new shell will produce a recurrence of an alkali metal such as lithium .
. When a shell hungry for new electrons cannot procure them by
nuclear reactions, that is, by their reception jointly with the acquisition
of new protons in the nucleus, an atom will eagerly resort to chemical
reactions to fill its needs. Combinations will take place, forming molecules of various chemical compounds. For example, hydrogen atoms,
with but one electron in an orbit capable of supporting two, will tend.
to link with any atom whose outer shell can accommodate another
electron. Oxygen is such an· atom and readily joins with hydrogen to
form a molecule of water.
Neutrons, or . electrically neutral particles, resulting from a combination of protons and electrons, can be present in various numbers
in the nuclei of the atoms of the same elements. It is due largely to
the activities of neutrons; under varied stresses as we shall see, that
nuclear reactions take place and radiations are emitted.
2.

Atomic Radiation .~

An unstable nucleus strives for stability in a number of ways, any
one of which can be'the source of injurious radiation. These include
( 1) alpha emission, (2) beta emission, ( 3) positron emission, and
(4) K capture. Radiations also take the form of gamma rays. The
reaction of neutrons on matter also results in radiation.
Alpha emission is the ejection of an alpha particle from the nucleus.
An alpha particle consists of two protons and two neutrons bound
together. 8 An atom subject to alpha emission loses four units of its
weight number and two units of its positive electrical charge. This loss
of two or more protons changes the atom to one of an element lower
on the atomic scale. This method of radioactive decay is called alpha
radiation and is confined almost exclusively to very heavy atoms fouud
in nature, such as uranium, thorium, and radium.
.
Beta rays are really not rays but are particles and consist simply of
electrons ejected from the atom at ·extremely high speeds. The ejection
of an electron only does not alter the atomic mass number of the
a Helium nuclei are made up of 2 protons and 2 neutrons.
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nucleus, but may involve a change in the atomic number. This latter is
likely to happen when excess neutrons are present in the nucleus. An
excess neutron tends to eject an electron and turn into a proton. This
additional proton in the nucleus changes the atom to an element one
higher on the atomic scale. Where two or more neutrons turn into
protons, several transmutations may occur. This process is spoken of
as beta decay. Beta radiation is the most common mode of decay of
radioisotopes.
At this point it is interesting to note that beta decay often is initiated
when the nucleus of a heavy atom (high on the atomic scale) undergoes alpha emission (i.e., giving off particles consisting of two neutrons and two protons). The new nuclei thus formed are apt to have
too many neutrons. The conversion of neutrons to protons, by emission of electrons (beta particles), will follow in the struggle for stability. This means that both alpha particles and beta rays may emanate
from the same ·source.
Positron emission is another stabilization process which is encountered when protons are in excess in the nucleus. A positron has
the same order of mass as an electron, but possesses a positive charge.
It is formed when the proton, which has a far larger mass than the
electron, attempts to bring electrical balance into the atom's structure
by turning into a neutron, which is electrically neutral. If enough
energy is present in the nucleus to allow this transformation, a positron
is ejected without material alteration of the atomic mass and with the
loss of a unit of positive charge. \Vhere not enough energy is present,
the nucleus reaches stabilization by the so-called "K capture" method.
K capture is essentially the capture of an electron by a surplus proton. The first electron shell is known as the K orbit, and the second
one as the L orbit. The captured electron usually comes from the K
orbit, but occasionally from the L. The acquired electron is absorbed
by the excess proton and a neutron is formed. Stabilization through
positron emission or K capture may be followed by emission of gamma
radiation.
Gamma rays are not subatomic particles, but rather electromagnetic
waves like heat, light, and X-rays. Gamma rays travel at the speed of
light and have, in general, shorter wave lengths than X-rays. ·Because
of this shorter length, they have considerably greater penetrating
power. Gamma rays usually are the product of energy changes in the
nucleus of the atom and often follow emission of beta particles, while
X-rays are the product of energy changes in the inner electron shells
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of the atom, usually as a result of bombardment by beams of electrons.
The netttron is another source of injurious radiation. If ejected
from the nucleus of an atom, as, for example, in the operation of a
nuclear reactor or in the detonation of an atomic bomb, neutrons become highly dangerous. They have great penetrating power and can
make other substances radioactive.
Each of the foregoing types of radiation can be injurious to persons
or property under certain circumstances. This study will be concerned
with the legal aspects of damage from such radiations to both property
and persons, but only insofar as such damage occurs in the course of
peaceful uses of atomic energy. No consideration will be given to the
damage caused by atomic bombs to either persons or property.
It should also be remembered that at present we are still talking
about incompletely formulated and partly proven theories of atomic
energy. The technology is continuously advan~ing. New discoveries
are being made--new theories evolved. The lawyer will have to keep
abreast of new developments for they may have an impact on such
legal problems as causal relation, proof, damage, and the other matters
with which the profession must deal.

C. Radiation Injuries
1.

Historical Background

Several generations ago miners of pitchblende in Czechoslovakia died
of pulmonary ailments at a rate thirty times greater than that of the
general population. Modern medicine has since identified the ailment
as lung cancer. It is believed that the inhalation of radioactive radon,
a gas emanating from the disintegration of component substances of
pitchblende, caused the cancerous growths and the consequent greater
incidence of mortality among the miners.
But unawareness of the possible harmful effects of radiation persisted. When radium was discovered, the early workers with this element, out of ignorance, carried this source of radioactivity on their
persons and as a result suffered injuries. The first manifestations of
injury were usually erythema or reddening of the skin.
The use of X-rays in early stages of development claimed its share
of victims and helped focus attention on the severe menace to human
health inherent in radioactivity. Typical of the manner in which technicians and scientists discovered the damaging effects of X-rays is the
case of a doctor who had frequently exposed his hands to X-rays in the
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course of his experiments. The skin of his hands developed erythema
aggravated by intense itching. Soon the skin became tough, pigmented, and glossy. Despite use of all medical remedies then available,
an ulcerous area of his hand developed a malignancy. Even amputation
failed to prevent death. Many other scientists and technicians have
died of similarly induced cancers.
Possibly the best known of the early cases of injuries to employees
caused by radioactivity are those of the radium dial painters of New
Jersey (1917-24). Eighty women were employed to paint watch dials
with luminous paint containing a small amount of radioactive material.
The painters pointed the bristles of their brushes with their lips to keep
them fine enough for their work. Each time they touched the bristles
with their lips they ingested some of the radioactive substance used to
make the paint permanently luminous. Many of these women developed
anemia and bone tumors and died with symptoms of radium poisoning. Several years elapsed before it was discovered that radioactive
material had been causing severe damage to blood-forming cells, thus
precipitating the diseases. A sorrowful case stemming from the dialpainting episode was brought to court by a woman painter who began
to experience symptoms of radium necrosis twelve years after she left
the company's employment. She died shortly after bringing the action,
but, in any event, the two-year statute of limitations had barred her
claim. ·
The most spectacular cases of radiation injuries to date are those
caused by the detonation of two atom bombs over Japan during World
War II. The full extent of radiation injuries suffered in those two
explosions is not known as yet. The whirling cloud of radioactivity
released by the bombs must have contaminated a sizable area, but the
most seriously contaminated victims, those in the proximity of ground
zero, were killed by the blast or heat effects of the explosion, and thus
the radiation effects could not be traced in all of their ramifications and
ultimate consequences.
One of the most recent cases of radiation injuries, one having international repercussions, arose from the exposure of Japanese fishermen,
following a hydrogen bomb test conducted by the United States in the
Pacific. In this instance there was also property damage in the form
of contamination of fish as well as the vessels of the fishermen.
In contrast with numerous cases of personal injury, about the only
evidence we have of early appreciation of property damage arising
from radiation is the effect of radiation on photographic film. Roentgen
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apparently shielded his equipment, not to protect himself, but to prevent his film from fogging. This well may have saved him from the
personal injuries that other early scientists experienced.
_While We.have learned much about the dangers of atomic radiation
and how to guard against injuries to persons and property, as is clearly
indicated U:ly the almost phenomenal safety record of federal atomic
energy o~ions, it seems perfectly certain that there will be many
instances of injury to persons and property as a peacetime industry develops an'd widespread use of radiation sources becomes common! It
is necessary, therefore, that the lawyer who handles such cases have a
thorough&1tnderstanding of the mechanics of radiation injury.
2.

Ionization

According to current theories, atomic radiations (chiefly alpha, beta,
gamma, and neutron) cause damage to humans and to other living
tissues and materials because of their so-called "ionizing" effect. Ions
are atoms or molecules in an electrically excited state and are created
when the electrical balance of an atom or molecule is upset by the gain
or loss of an electron. If an atom loses one electron, it is left with a
p<>sitive charge and becomes a positive ion. For example, a proton is
a hydrogen atom with the single orbital electron removed, leaving a
positive hydrogen ion with a single unit of charge. An alpha particle
is an atom of helium whose two orbital electrons have been removed,
leaving a positive helium ion wtih two units of charge. The resultant
positive ion and the free electron are commonly referred to as an ion
pair. However, it is possible to have a negative ion formed when in
some manner an atom or molecule picks up an extra electron from
another atom or molecule. The resultant negative and positive ions
are also referred to as an ion pair. The injury potential of radiation is
usually put in terms of the number of ion pairs it will create in passing
through a given length of material, such as living tissue.
Alpha particles which carry positive electrical charges and beta
particles which carry negative electrical charges cause ionization in
substantially the same manner. Being electrically charged, when moving through. matter they exert electrical forces which ionize a small
fraction of the atoms or molecules along their paths. The kinetic energy originally possessed by the alpha or beta particle is transferred to
the atom or molecule hit or particle ejected.
• For>example, an explosiQn involving radiation hazards occurred in a New York
City laboratory of the Sylvania Corporation in July 1956.
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The maximum depth to which an alpha or beta particle can penetrate
depends upon its energy and mass as well as the nature of the material
through which it passes. The charged particle, as it passes through
matter, loses a fairly uniform amount of energy each time it creates an
ion pair. 5 A larger mass or a greater quantity of energy in a particle
causes a greater amount of ionization, The depth of penetration of the
particle into a particular m~terial varies inversely with the density of
that material. This can be illustrated by comparing the ionizing power
of alpha and beta particles.
Because the mass of the alpha particle is more than 7,000 times that
of the beta particle it has been found that, whereas an alpha particle will
produce about so,ooo to 100,000 icm pairs per centimeter of air at atmospheric pressure, a beta particle of the same energy will create only
about 30 to 300 ion pairs per centimeter. However, being much smaller
and faster, the beta particle has a range of nearly a thousand times that
of the alpha particle so that. the total number of ion pairs created would
be approximately the same. S. · This follows from the fact that it normally takes just about 32.5 electron volts of energy to create an ion
· pair, whether it comes from ;m alpha or beta particle or other source
of energy.
From the standpoint of injury from radiation it is perhaps more important to think in terms of how much material it takes to completely
absorb the ionization potential of alpha and beta particles, because this
determines what shielding is required to prevent ionizing radiation or
how deep the penetration .will be into a given material, e.g., animal
tissue. In air an alpha particle will have a range of from one inch to
three and one-half inches, while the ionization. from a beta particle will
be reduced to zero in from four inches to forty-three feet, in each case
the exact penetration depending on the energy of the particular particle.
In water or paper or animal tissue .004 inches (or four mils) will stop
essentially ail alpha particles and two mils will stop most alpha particles. Some beta particles will be stopped by such thicknesses and even
the most powerful naturally occurring ones will be stopped by something like two inches of animal tissue. It should also be mentioned that
positive beta particles, called positrons, act like negative beta particles
but have an additional characteristic. They tend to combine very quickly
with an electron on the outer orbit of some atom; and when they do so,
5 32.5 electron volts for every ion pair formed. Glasstone, Sourcebook on Atomic
Energy 131 ( 1950).
8 Glasstone, Principles of Nuclear Reactor Engineering §2.29, p. 65 (1955).
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energy in the form of annihilation radiation (similar to gamma rays)
is given off.
Gamma rays differ from alpha and beta particles in at least two
important respects. In the first place, they are rays and not particles :
they are like heat and light in this respect. (X-rays, bremsstrahlung,
and annihilation radiation, though not coming from nuclear transitions, are so much like gamma rays, differing really only by reason of
lower energies, that a description of gamma ray characteristics will
suffice to cover them as well.) The second important distinction between gamma rays and alpha and beta particles is that the rays are not
electrically charged. From the standpoint of injury to persons or
property the most important consequence of these characteristics is that
gamma rays are absorbed exponentially in passing through matter.
This means it is theoretically impossible to shield against all gamma
radiation. However, it is possible to reduce ga~ma radiations to the
point where they are relatively unimportant.
The reactions of gamma rays upon absorbing material which produce ionization, directly or indirectly, are several in number and are
too complex to be described adequately in this brief discussion. Sufficiently important to merit mention, however, are three factors. The
first is the photoelectric effect (which is most important for low energy gamma rays interacting with material of high atomic mass). This
consists of the transfer of the whole gamma ray photon energy to an
electron which is ejected from the atom. This electron acts as a beta
particle and has an energy equal to the excess energy of the gamma
ray photon over that necessary to overcome the binding energy holding
the electron to the atom. When the photoelectron is ejected, another
electron from an outer orbit takes its place in the atom and this transition in turn gives off X-rays of low energy which in turn may cause
the ejection of an outer orbit electron. In this way the whole energy
of the gamma ray photon is absorbed.
The second method by which the gamma ray affects target material
is the Compton effect, a process in which the gamma ray photon makes
an elastic collision (bouncing, like two billiard balls colliding). with
an outer electron of the absorbing material. Some of the photon's energy is retained and part is transmitted to the electron. The photon
itself is scattered or deflected from its original path. The Compton
effect is most significant in the case of gamma rays of the middle
ranges of energy. There is no absorption of the gamma ray but only
a decreasing of its energy.
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As the energy of the gamma ray photon increases, the photoelectrical
and Compton effects diminish, and the third method of interaction,
pair production, occurs. When high energy photons pass near the
nucleus of an atom, the photon is absorbed, and an electron-positron
pair is created. These particles travel in a forward direction, and their
absorption takes place in an exponential manner, theoretically never
being I007o complete.
While the penetration range of gamma rays is much greater than
alpha or beta particles and cannot be given definite limits because of
the exponential absorption, it is possible to utilize a practical thickness
of shielding which will reduce gamma radiation to apparently insignificant proportions. For example, in water alpha particles of 1-Mev 7
will penetrate .0004 centimeters, beta particles of 1-Mev will penetrate
·39 centimeters, while 1-Mev gamma rays will go through 70 centimeters before the energy is reduced to one per cent of the original
energy. In general, the higher the energy the greater the thickness of
a given material needed to reduce the gamma rays to a given fraction
of their original energy. Likewise, the greater the density of the absorbing material the less thick need it be to absorb a given fraction of
the original energy. ·
Neutrons are like alpha and beta. particles in that they have massthey are particles. However, they are like gamma rays in that they are
electrically neutral and have very high penetrating power. Apparently,
the neutron does not cause ionization directly, but it can do so indirectly
by causing alpha and beta particles and gamma rays to be emitted which
in turn will cause ionization as already indicated.
Neutrons come from several sources. If a natural alpha emitting
element, such as radium or polonium, is mixed with one of the light
elements, such as beryllium, boron, or lithium, neutrons of varying but
fairly high energies are emitted. Gamma rays of intermediate energies
can cause the emission of neutrons of uniform energies when interacting with the nuclei of certain elements, particularly heavy hydrogen
(deuterium) and beryllium. However, the principal source of neutrons is found in the chain reaction in a nuclear reactor in which atoms
of uranium or other fissionable material are broken apart with a resultant emission of neutrons in large quantities.
Neutrons generally react with the nuclei of atoms in two ways :
abs()rption, in which the neutron penetrates the nucleus and causes other
particles to leave, and scattering, in which the neutron remains free
T Mev

is the symbol for

I

million electron volts. I d. at §I.so, p.

IJ.
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after collision with a nucleus but transfers to it some of its energy.
The details of neutron reactions are too complex for statement here, 8
but some basic knowledge is fundamental for the lawyer who is to
engage in the legal problems of atomic enterprise.
The absorption process takes place principally with so-called slow 9
or thermal neutrons and may result in at least four phenomena. An
alpha particle or a proton may be ejected, though this occurs only
rarely, happening only with a few isotopes of low mass number; gamma
rays may be emitted; or fission may take place. Gamma ray emission
is the most common of the four. In all four reactions it is believed that
when the neutron is first captured by the nucleus of the target material
a new isotope of the same element is formed, which is then in a highly
excited state. Very shortly the new nucleus either expels a particle
(alpha or proton), emits gamma rays, or fissions (breaks into two or
more parts).
,
·
·
When a neutron is absorbed, the new isotope (same number of protons and electrons and therefore the same chemically but with a greater
atomic weight or mass number) is quite often radioactive. The isotope
may not only go through beta decay but also may give off gamma rays.
This means that when material undergoes neutron bombardment. damage can ensue as a result of the beta and gamma radiation. From the
standpoint of injury to living tissue it should be noted that hydrogen
which is so prevalent in such tissue readily absorbs neutrons. This
absorption process makes neutron bombardment very dangerous to living persons and animals. It also means, however, that water with its
high hydrogen content serves as an effective shield to protect personnel
from neutron radiation damage.
Fast neutrons react with target material largely by way of scattering
or fission, not so often by particle ejection or gamma ray emission.
(A reaction of the latter sort takes place with oxygen, however, and is
important since air and water are often used as coolants and both contain oxygen.) Scattering can be either elastic or inelastic. In inelastic
scattering the neutron is absorbed, a neutron of lower energy is
emitted, and the excess energy is emitted as gamma ray photons. This
type of scattering is more likely to occur in the case of high energy
neutrons. Parenthetically, it is also true that inelastic scattering in
material of low mass number results from gamma radiation only if
8
9

Even if it could be assumed that the writers fully understood what is now known.
Even slow neutrons travel more than a mile per second.
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the gamma ray energy is high. This means that light elements such
as water or paraffin are the best moderators for slow neutrons.
Elastic scattering takes place when the neutron collides with the
nucleus but is only slowed down, not absorbed, and some of the energy
is transferred to the target nucleus. By this process the neutron is
gradually reduced in velocity and finally becomes a slow or thermal
neutron. The energy level at which it becomes a thermal neutron is
dependent on the temperature of the target material, hence the name
thermal.
The rate at which nuclear reactions from neutron bombardment
takes place is dependent on the number of neutrons, their velocity, and
the amount and kind of target nuclei. Only with certain amounts of a
few elements do we have the proper combination of factors necessary
to sustain a so-called fission chain reaction. Other elements, such as
boron and cadmium, instead of fissioning absorb neutrons readily and
can be used to control the fission process in reactors. Still others, such
as deuterium, beryllium, and carbon (or graphite) are used as moderators because they slow down neutrons very effectively. The low neutron
absorption characteristic of aluminium, zirconium, and stainless steel
makes them particularly suitable structural materials for reactors.
The chain fission reaction is a special kind of fission in which there
are enough excess neutrons from the fission process and enough target
material to make possible a continuous series of fission reactions. When
this right combination is present we have what is usually called a
nuclear reactor. When a reactor is in operation-the chain fission process taking place-:-there are many. radiation hazards immediately present. In addition to the neutrons and gamma rays already described as
resulting directly from any fission reaction, there are also delayed neutrons and gamma rays. Botl). apparently are the result of decay of
radioactive isotopes which are formed when fission takes place. One
of the most important sources of possibly harmful radiation from
nuclear reactors is found in these isotopes. For example, there are more
than eighty different fission fragments created when thermal neutrons
bombard uranium 235, and nearly all such fragments are radioactive.
Each of these eighty lead, through a decay process, to the formation of
other radioisotopes, so that more than 200 such isotopes are present
shortly after fission takes place. Most of them emit gamma rays and
beta particles, and the half-lives of these radioactive fragments range
from a small part of a second to a million years.
The great variety of radiations resulting from fission makes the re-
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actor shielding problem a very complex and difficult one to solve,
especially if economy of construction is a factor, as it certainly will be
in industrial applications. As a practical matter any shielding that will
stop the neutrons, both fast and slow, and the gamma rays, will be
enough to stop alpha and beta particles and even the protons that may
be ejected. However, shielding is subject to many complications, involving much more than just the reactor core of fissionable material.
The reactor coolant very well may become contaminated, and it must be
carefully shielded. During chemical processing of spent radioactive
fuels account must be taken of the highly radioactive character of the
fission fragments, and adequate shielding must be provided. As neutrons
and gamma radiations pass through the shielding material, they will
react with and cause further nuclear reactions in the shield itself, just
as in the core of the reactor. Such reactions caused by fast neutrons
towards the outer edge of the shield are particularly dangerous. It
should also be remembered that a material which will either capture
slow neutrons or slow down fast ones or absorb gamma rays will not
necessarily serve to shield against all three types. The determination
of the proper combination of shielding materials for a given reactor
is the task of the trained specialist.
All of these radiations either directly or indirectly cause ionization of
the material through which the radiations pass. In respect to damage
to human tissue, Glasstone has the following to say :
18.7. Little is yet known of the exact mechanism whereby
ionizing radiations produce their effects, although several experimental researches are in progress with the hope of throwing light on this problem. The number of ions formed in
the body, and presumably the number of molecules affected,
by radiation may be quite small, yet the result can be fatal.
It is known that the radiations affect the individual cells of
which the body is composed, possibly by destroying the enzymes that determine their particular functions. In brief, all
cells contain protoplasm, consisting of a central body, or nucleus, suspended in a viscous liquid medium, called the cytoplasm. The cell as a whole is surrounded by a membrane
through which pass the salts, sugars and so on, required for
its maintenance. Within the nucleus is the substance chromatin which, at the times of cell division, forms the chromosomes; the latter, whose number and shape are characteristic
of each species, carry the hereditary factors.
18.8. There are reasons for believing that the proteins present
in the chromosomes are particularly sensitive to the ionizing
influence of radiations . . . . Even if the details are not un-
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derstood, the over-all effects on the cell are well known;
among the results observed have been the breaking of the
chromosomes, swelling of the nucleus arid of the entire cell,
destruction of the cell, increase in viscosity of the protoplasm, and greater permeability of the cell membrane. The
broken cells and other biological debris tend to clog the capillaries and so interfere with the circulation of the blood.
18.9. In connection with the behavior of individual cells it
has been noted that the process of cell division, known to biologists as mitosis, is delayed by exposure .to radiation. Frequently the new cells that are formed are unable to undergo
mitosis, so that their number does not increase. It is possible
that this effect, together with cell destruction referred to
above, underlies the use of gamma radiation for inhibiting the
proliferation of the cancerous cells in malignant tumors. . . .
There is, however, a curious paradox in this connection, which
emphasizes the difficulty in understanding the biological ef- ·
fects of radiation. While controlled treatment with gamma
rays can stop cancerous growth, continued exposure to radiation in excess of certain limits may cause a cancer to be
formed.
18.10. Unfortunately, the animal body has not developed an
instinctive defense against radiation as it has against heat and, ··
to some extent, against ultraviolet light. Consequently, there
can be severe radiation damage without any realization at the
time on the part of the subject. The nature and extent of the
symptoms which develop later may vary with the individual.
They depend on the type of radiation, on the depth to which
the radiation has penetrated, on the extent of the body exposed, on the amount of radiation absorbed, and also upon
whether the exposure was chronic, that is, repeated or prolonged so as to lead to a cumulative effect, or acute, that is,
received in one large dose. All types of excessive exposure to
radiation appear to have one factor in common; there is invariably a delay, which may be weeks, months or years,
before the final, and worst, effects become apparent. 10
The specific long-range effects of ionization in humans may encompass any one or more of the following: genetic damage, sterility,
fetal damage, cancer, leukemia, leukopenia, cataracts, bone necrosis,
epilation, shortened life span, and death. Erythema, or reddening of
the skin, or "burn," varying in intensity with the amount of exposure,
is a short-range .effect. In severe cases, erythema is followed by blistering and formation of lesions.
With respect to property damage a distinction should be drawn
1o Glasstone, Sourcebook on Atomic Energy 502 (1950).
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between things that. are living and inanimate materials. Vegetable and
animal life, being made up of living reproducing cells and tissues, are
apt to suffer various types of injuries from ionization in about the
same fashion as humans. Materials, such as steel, which are not made
up of living cells, can also be affected by ionization but the effect is
almost always non-permanent. Nuclear scientists have found that the
heavier particles, such as neutrons, protons, and alpha particles, may
upset ·the molecular structure of such materials as a result of elastic
coll.isions. These effects can usually be removed by raising the temperature of the materiaJ. In some cases changes in the molecular structure
may even prove beneficial. As in the case of ionization, scientists do
not yet agree on the explanations for these changes. In the case of nonmetallic materials such as plastics the effects of radiation can be very
harmful, as is the case with most organic materials. This fact raises
special problems in utilizing lullricants and special materials for component parts of nuclear reactors. It should also be remembered that
exposure of materials to a high neutron flux may create radioactive
isotopes. This may be harmful but may also be very helpful under
certain circumstances when a particular isotope is desired.
Certain radioactive substances, in addition to the harmful effects
produced by the emission of alpha, beta, or gamma rays, cause damage
because of their deleterious che~ical effects. Plutonium, uranium, and
isotopes of various other elements have poisonous effects on humans
or animals, quite aside from their radioactive properties. Likewise,
certain of the substances are very corrosive, particularly at high temperatures. But these qualities present lawyers with nothing uncommon
or mysterious in tort litigation and need no special consideration.
3· Measurements of Radioactivity
Lawyers handling radiation cases must also familiarize themselves
with the scientific concepts and terminology concerning the amounts
and rates of radiation given off by radioactive isotopes of the various
elements. An understanding of these is essential to an evaluation of the
risks incurred and the existence of negligence, if any, in atomic energy
activities. The most important terms are radioactive half-life, biological half-life, curie, and roentgen.
All of the radioactive isotopes, whether naturally existing (such as
uranium 235 or 238, thorium 232, and radium) or artificially created
(such as uranium 233 and plutonium 239), gradually change to some
stable isotope or element by the discharge from the nucleus of either
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an alpha particle (a helium nucleus) or a beta particle (an electron),
or in the case of some artificial isotopes by emission of positive beta
particles or positrons. This radioactive decay takes place at a given
rate which is different for each radioactive isotope. This rate of decay
is usually expressed in terms of the radioactive half-life, i.e., the time
it takes for one-half of the radiation activity to dissipate or decay.
Isotopes are known to exist whose half-life is about a millionth of a
second and also some whose half-life is billions of years. For example,
thorium 232 has a half-life in the billions of years, while thorium 233
has a half-life of twenty-three minutes. It is· also important to remember that radioactive decay takes place in an exponential fashion;
i.e., one-half of the radioactivity is emitted in the first half-life; then
one-half of the remaining activity (or one-fourth of the initial activity)
decays in the next equal half-life period; one-half of the remaining
activity (or one-eight of the initial value) decays in the next half-life;
etc. After seven half-lives I/I28 (less than I%) of the· initial activity
remains. The radioactive haff-life of a particular isotope is important
in determining the amount of radiation received by tissue or other
materials. The length of exposure multiplied by the rate of decay of
the isotope (half-life) determines how much has been received in a
particular case.
The radioactivity present in a particular material is usually measured in curies. One curie is the number of nuclei that disintegrate
(decay) in one second in a gram of radium, i.e., 37 billion per second:
If a sample of some radioactive material disintegrates at this rate it
is said to have an activity of one curie. A millicurie is I/I,ooo of a
curie and a microcurie is I /I ,000,000 of a. curie. The terms kilocurie
(I ,ooo curies) and megacurie ( I ,ooo;ooo curies) are used to indicate
the activity in large amounts of radioactive material.
The relationship between radioactive half-life and the total radiation
given· ofF by any particular material is shown by the fact that it takes a
larger quantity of a slowly decaying material to give off one curie of
radiation in a given time than it does in the case. of a fast decaying
isotope.
In determining the permissible amounts of radiation (curies) to
which persons or living tissue may be .subjected, or the dam,aging effect
of ionizing radiation received, use will be made of ~nother term.~hich
lawyers must understand, the roentgen. Th~ roentgen is the amount
of X-ray or gamma ray radiation that will. create in a given amount
of dry air at standard temperature and pressure, ion pairs carrying a
given quantity of electricity.
·
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This dosage unit is really a compromise because the actual biological
damage process is complex and little understood, but the roentgen is
the dosage unit used in view of the prevailing opinion that biological
damage to the living organisms is due mainly to ionization caused bv
radiation. The radiation dose represented by the roentgen indicat;s
only the total amount of X or gamtl)a radiation absorbed. The dosage
rate is the amount of radiation (i.e., roentgens) absorbed in a given
time, e.g., a second or an hour. It should be mentioned that the. absorption ability of air varies with the energy of the radiation so that the
roentgens of energy received from a given source vary with the intensity of the source as well as with the amount of material in the
source. The strength of such a source is usually expressed in rhm, i.e.,
the quantity of a given source of gamma rays that gives off one roentgen per hour in air at a distance of one meter.
If the roentgen is translated into energy, it is found that each gram
of dry air absorbs 83.8 ergs for each roentgen of radiation. In different
materials the amount of energy absorbed per gram per roentgen,
however, is different. For example, one gram of soft tissue absorbs
93 ergs and one gram of bone absorbs I so ergs or more, as compared
with 83.8 for air. But the dose in roentgens expresses a constant not
dependent on the nature of the material exposed to radiation or the
amount of energy which this material absorbs. It should also be noted
that the ionizing effect of a given source of radiation falls off inversely
with the square of the distance from the source, a fact which makes
considerable separation from radioactive sources important in protection against radiation hazards. The actual determination of dosage and
dose rates is a complex problem to be left to the scientists.
Since the roentgen is a measuring unit only for the ionizing effect
of X and gamma rays, other terms are used to denote the effects of all
types of radiation, including alpha and beta particles and neutrons.
Rep (roentgen equivalent physical) is one such term and means the
dose of any nuclear radiation that results in 83 ergs of energy being
absorbed in one gram of tissue. Recently this has come to be used to
indicate absorption of 93 ergs in tissue to make it equivalent to gamma
absorption in tissue rather than air. Obviously, however, it does not
hold for bone absorption (I so ergs).
A new dosage unit was adopted in I953, the rad. It means the
absorption ·of IOO ergs per gram of material imparted by ionizing
radiation at the point of interest. It differs from the rep in that it does
not describe the material absorbing the dose. (The rep is eighty-three
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or ninety-three ergs absorbed by tissue.) In soft tissue, however, the
rad is about equal to the rep.
Because neither the rep ncir the rad (measures of amount absorbed)
describe the biological effect of absorption in a particular material
another term has been coined, rem (roentgen equivalent man). This
expresses the amount of rads or reps received but in terms of the
relative biological effect a given amount of ionizing radiation would
have in particular tissue. The biological effect will differ greatly depending on the nature of the radiation. For example, those ionizing particles
which cause more ionization per unit of travel along their path (such
as alpha particles) generally have the greater biological effect. This
effect is compared to the biological effect of X-rays of a certain energy,
and the resultant quantity is called the relative biological effect or RBE.
This RBE varies with the kind of tissue or organism receiving the
radiation, the rate at which the particular amount of radiation is received, and the kind and amount of biological effect. For purposes of
determining the. amount of radiation protection needed these variables
are in practice reduced to a single value of the RBE for different
effects of a specific type of radiation, i.e., the RBE which is the highest
under the circumstances. Using these values for the RBE, roentgens
or reps or rads can be converted to rems.
4· Personal Injuries
Although the manner in which radiation causes personal injuries,
the types of injuries, and the doses required to cause specific injuries.
are not yet fully understood by scientists, some of the factual data that
will be important to lawyers have been identified. As we shall see,
some of this information leads to the con<;lusion that the task of the
lawyer is going to be a difficult one when he attempts to prove that a
specific injury was caused by a given exposure to ionizing radiation
of all or part of the human body, or that it was even caused by radiation at all.
a. Radiosensitivity
One complicating factor in framing workable legal rules for peaceful
uses of atomic energy is ·the difference in susceptibility to radiation
injury not only among individuals, but also among age groups. Moreover, there are susceptibility differences between particular organs and
tissues in the human body. It is estimated, for example, that a dose
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of 400 roentgens is lethal for about one-half of the population. 11
Likewise, some of the tissues and organs of the body will endure extensive exposure before harmful results appear, whereas other parts
are easily damaged by comparatively low amounts of radiation. Although the reasons for the differences in radiosensitivity are not known,
it seems clear that certain tissues and organs such as lymphoid tissue
and bone marrow where blood constituents are produced, the mucose
membrane lining the.stomach, and the reproductive organs are the most
sensitive. On the other hand, nerve cells, muscle tissue, and fully
grown bone are among the least sensitive. The skin, liver, and kidneys
have an· intermediate sensitivity.
b. Whole Body Exposure
Another variable in determining the effects of irradiation of the
human body is that of whole as against partial body exposure. When
only particular organs or parts of the body are exposed, a person or an
animal can normally withstand many times the dosage of radiation
that usually would be lethal if administered to the whole body. Indeed,
this is fortunate, for it means that the destructive power of radioactivity
can be localized and utilized to treat a variety of pathological conditions.
In sufficient concentrations radiation may be used to destroy deseased
tissue such as that found in malignant growths. As much as 5,000
roentgens may be used to treat a small skin cancer whereas exposure of
the whole body to even one-tenth of this amount would kill most people.
When the entire body is exposed to radiation, a very complex problem
arises of trying to determine the total effect. Since various parts of the
body have differing degrees of radiosensitivity a certain dose of radiation
over the whole body will probably affect some parts very seriously and
others not to any discernible extent. Despite all of the complexities and
uncertainties, scientists up to very recently have pretty generally agreed
that a weekly whole body exposure of 0.3 roentgen or rem per week is
a permissible upper limit for repeated exposure. It is true that recently
certain geneticists have concluded that no dosage is too small to increase
the likelihood of genetic damage and also to shorten the life span of the
exposed person. In 1957 the National Committee on Radiation Protection recommended that for occupational conditions the maximum permissible accumulated do.~e. in rems, at any age equal five times the
number of years beyond age eighteen, provided that no annual increment
u

An average chest X-ray· would probably administer a dose of about
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exceed fifteen rems. For the entire population, the maximum permissible
dose to the gonads from all sources of radiation, including medical and
other man-made sources, and background radiation, is not to exceed 14·
million rems per million of population over the period from conception
up to age thirty and one-third of that amount in each decade thereafter.
These permissible dose figures take account of another characteristic
of radiation exposure which seems to be true whether we are considering
either whole body or only partial body exposure-namely, that, in general, a given amount of radiation will cause less damage if spread over
a longer period of time. Overexposure occasioned by daily relatively low
intensity radiation is called chronic, while overexposure by a relatively
large dose received in a short time interval is called acute overexposure.
It seems clear that all types of radiation overexposure, whether
chronic or acute, and whether of the whole or only part of the. body,
have at least two effects in common. In both cases there seems always
to be a delay, whether of weeks, months, or years, before the final and
the worst effects manifest themselves. Likewise it seems clear that in
sufficient quantities overexposure can cause any of the specific types of
damages discussed later in this chapter.
· Aside from these specific injuries, however, there is a rather partiCular set of reactions of the human body to acute whole body overexposure. The reactions of the body to such exposure usually appear in
four phases : ( 1) nausea, vomiting, and general lassitude, such as experienced by patients undergoing intensive radium or X-ray treatment
(sometimes called "radiation sickness") ; ( 2) a phase of relative wellbeing lasting from a few days to a few weeks depending on the severity
of the radiation dose; ( 3) a period of intense reaction including
prostration, loss of appetite, loss of weight, rapid heart action, fever,
bleeding of the gums and loss of hair, lasting from days to weeks or
until death occurs in severe cases; and ( 4) a period of gradual recovery
lasting up to six months. Any acute overexposure is accompanied by the
same significant changes in the blood cells found in cases of chronic
ove.rexposure.
, c. Cumulative Effect
Another complicating factor in atomic radiation cases is the cumulative effect of overexposure. Such ari effect is suggested by the preceding
discussion and very definitely plays a part in the determination of the
permissible or tolerance dose, presently set at 0.3 rem per week.
Many radiation effects are believed to be of a threshold character;
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that is, unless the dose is more than a certain minimum, no injury will
result. This is consistent with the fact that all life on the earth is continually bombarded by radiations from cosmic rays, from radioactive
material always present in air and water, and from radioisotopes, such
as carbon 14 and potassium 40, always present in the human body without any apparent or obvious resulting harm. The assumption is that
exposure up to certain levels of intensity, at least for certain parts of the
body, is offset by the powers of recovery of the body which are great
enough to preclude cumulative damage.
It seems quite clear, however, that in certain cases there definitely is a
cumulative effect such that damage that would not result from a single.
small dose will occur if that small dose is repeated often enough. For
example, a recent report of the National Academy of Sciences on radiation injury makes the categorical statement that there is no dose too
small to have a genetic effect or to shorten the life span. Our knowledge
about such cumulative effects and under what circumstances they occur
is quite incomplete at the present time, but the ramifications in radiation
injury cases are obvious. For example, one exposure, which by itself
falls within permissible limits, may make subsequent seemingly permissible exposures quite damaging. Accordingly, full knowledge and
records of past exposures will be required in order to prevent really
harmful exposures which otherwise appear to be perfectly within permissible limits. Again, once an individual has received the maximum
permissible accumulation of radiation, essential X-ray exposure for
medical purposes may be foreclosed because of the serious risk of total
overexposure.
d. External and Internal Radiation Hazards
The harmfulness of radiation depends not only upon the radiosensitivity of the individual or the various tissues affected and the nature and
dosage of exposure, but also upon the type of radiation and its immediate location in respect to human tissues. Some sources of radiation
may create little hazard if located outside the body but may be highly
dangerous if within the body. Therefore, lawyers who are to be involved
in atomic affairs must understand the factors involved and methods of
radiation protection that are available if they are properly to handle
personal injury cases involving radiation.
( I )

External Sources

As explained earlier, .alpha and beta particles have only slight penetrating power. Consequently if the alpha or beta source is outside the
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body, no observable harm results from the alpha radiation, and even
from high energy beta radiation the damage will usually be limited to
severe skin burn. However, it shoul<;i be remembered that both alpha
and beta activity is often accompanied by gamma ray emission.
Gamma rays from external sources are very dangerous, particularly
if they are so-called hard gamma rays (i.e., rays that have a very high
energy). As pointed out above in the discussion of gamma rays, they,
like X-rays, are absorbed in an exponential manner and thus theoretically
can travel through any thickness of material, including body tissue. Not
only do gamma rays create electrically excited nuclei which may upset
the biological balance within body tissue, but also they cause the emission
of electrons or beta particles inside the body which in turn cause ionization. Such beta particles released in close proximity to internal tissues
can do great damage to radiosensitive organs and tissue that would
never be endangered by such particles from an external source.
Neutrons, though they do not cause ionization directly, do cause considerable biological damage indirectly. If the neutrons are of the socalled slow type, most of this damage is caused by their capture by
hydrogen and nitrogen nuclei which are plentiful in living tissue.
Capture of neutrons in hydrogen nuclei produces gamma ray photons
some of which will cause ionization in surrounding tissue and some of
which escape from the body. Capture of neutrons by nitrogen nuclei
also causes emission of protons which, like alpha particles, dissipate their
energy in a short distance but the ionization is very substantial. The
reaction of slow neutrons with other material in the body seems relatively insignificant.
If the neutrons are fast, i.e., of high velocity, a somewhat different
sequence of events takes place. Most of the energy from such neutrons
is lost in elastic collisions with hydrogen, oxygen, carbon, and nitrogen
atoms found in the body tissues. The target atom acquires kinetic energy
which is then lost by elastic collisions with other atoms, by ionization,
and by excitation. If fast neutrons hit nitrogen 14 atoms, protons may
be ejected, as explained above, and carbon 14 may be formed which is
itself a beta emitter. If the collision with nitrogen 14 is accompanied by
sufficient energy, alpha particles will also be emitted. All of these reactions take place within a short distance from the nucleus hit by the fast
neutron. Fast neutrons after a sufficient number of collisions lose
energy and become slow neutrons.
In considering the biological damage caused by neutrons it is important to remember that the secondary effects will very likely take place
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deep in the body, particularly if fast neutrons are involved, for neutrons,
like gamma rays, lose their energy exponentially; they are not stopped
by the skin as are alpha and beta particles. Neutrons are particularly
harmful because hydrogen is such an important and abundant element
in the body and is such an excellent absorber of neutrons. It is also
important to remember that while most of the ionizing energy from
slow neutrons comes from gamma rays emitted from neutron absorption
by hydrogen, the greatest biological effect is probably caused by the
nitrogen-proton reaction. This is because the whole energy of the proton
is absorbed very close to the point of origin, while gamma rays are absorbed at considerable distances or may even escape the body without
absorption. The RBE (relative biological effect) of protons may be
ten times greater than the RBE of gamma radiation.

( 2) Internal Radiation
As previously stated, so far as known, biological damage from radiation is caused by ionization and is the same whether the radiation is
internal or external in origin. However, the effects from specific types
and sources of radiation can vary greatly depending on whether the
source is internal ~r external. This results from the fact that certain
chemicals have a tendency to concentrate in certain body tissues. Account must also be taken of the fact that radiation from outside the
body is reduced in strength to a greater or lesser degree as it passes
through the body tissues.
Radioactive material may enter the body through the processes of
breathing, eating, or drinking such materials or through cuts and abrasions. As is true with external sources, the quantity of material ingested
is an important factor in determining the dose received. However, there
are several factors relating to the dose actually received from an internal source which are not present when the source is external. Exposure to external sources can be terminated by simply removing either
the source or the person to a safe distance. However, once a source is
located within the body, exposure is continuous until the quantity of
radiation is depleted either by radioactive decay in accordance with
known rates (usually measured in radioactive half-lives) or by biological elimination (such as through urine, feces, or perspiration). The rate
of elimination is measured by the biological half-life, which means the
time required for natural processes to eliminate one-half the quantity
taken into the body. By combining the radioactive and biological halflives an effective half-life is determined, i.e., the time required for the
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initial amount of radioactivity to be reduced to one-half its initial value
by both elimination and radioactive decay. For example, cesium has a
radioactive half-life of thirty-seven years but is readily eliminated by
the body, having a biological half-life of about fifteen days. Plutonium,
on the other hand, has not only a very long radioactive half-life but also
an extremely long biological half-life.
Another factor that determines how much of a radioactive material
the body retains is the method of introduction into the body. As an example, iodine (including radioactive iodine I 3 I which is commonly
used) entering the digestive tract has a retention rate of nearly 100%.
Plutonium 239, on the other hand, if taken into the digestive tract is not
absorbed nearly so readily as it is if it is drawn into the lungs. Strontium
go, however, has about as great a retention rate as plutonium 239 in air,
but nearly twice the rate of plutonium 239 if taken into the digestive
tract. Natural uranium is similar to plutonium 239, being retained only
slightly if in water but much more so if in air.
As important as the retention rate in determining the biological damage that will be caused by an internal radiation source is the distribution
of the source in terms of types of tissues or organs to which the source
is attracted. The concentration of distribution is also significant. Taking examples again, iodine I3I localizes almost entirely in the thyroid
gland. Because radio-iodine localizes in .such a small part of the body,
the permissible quantity that can be ingested before the level of overexposure is reached is very much less than in the case of radioactive
sodium 24, which is distributed rather uniformly throughout the body.
Another important factor is the location of any concentration in relation to vital tissues or organs. Uranium 233, plutonium 239, strontium
go, and calcium 45 (all radioactive isotopes) concentrate in the bones
where they can radiate the very sensitive blood-forming marrow. Moreover, they are retained for very long periods, although there has been
some success in the use of zirconium to speed the biological elimination
of plutonium.
In comparing external and internal radiation the type of radiation involved must also be considered. As we have seen, alpha particles and
even beta particles originating outside the body are not especially
dangerous. They have very little if any internal effect because both are
quickly absorbed by the skin; Gamma rays and neutrons,. however, have
great penetration powers. If alpha or beta sources are taken into the
body, a very different effect is noted. In such cases the radiation is
totally absorbed close to the source (alpha much closer than beta, of
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course), and this may well be very close to, if not actually in, a vital,
highly radiosensitive organ. Gamma rays from internal sources, however, may actually pass through the tissues without absorption, and in
any event their harmful effects will be distributed much farther from the
source and, therefore, more widely throughout the body than those resulting from internal alpha or beta radiation.
From the foregoing, it is obvious that safety procedures must take
account of the great differences in possible biological damage caused
by .external as compared with internal radiation. Lawyers handling
radiation injury cases must be familiar with the factors creating these
differences in order to determine the existence of overexposure and
evaluate the possibility and extent of damage suffered by the injured
person. Moreover, the evolution of technology in this area will have to
be examined continually by lawyers who are concerned in one capacity
or another with radiation injuries.
e. Specific Personal Injuries
So far we have discussed generally the damaging. effect of ionizing
radiation and the nature of radiation hazards. Since the lawyers of the
atomic age will be involved with fact situations in which specific injuries
are alleged, the principal known types of injuries warrant mention.
Once again, we wish to emphasize that little is currently known about
the manner in which radiation causes injury, and undoubtedly future
scientific experimentation and research will reveal many features of
radiation damage that are either unknown or but little understood today.
( 1)

Genetic Damage

Today biologists generally agree that our inherited characteristics are
determined by the genes which we inherit from our parents. These
submicroscopic units singly and in combination are believed to control
such physical characteristics as color of hair and eyes, baldness, size,
mental ability, etc. Genes in turn are strung together in microscopically
visible threads of material called chromosomes which exist in human
body cells in forty-eight similar but not identical pairs. Twenty-four
chromosomes come from each parent and roughly they match each other.
The genes found in the reproductive organs of the parents seem to be
the essential ones in determining hereditary characteristics in the offsprmg.
In general, the genes present in the fertilized egg do not change as the
cells divide and as the mature human body develops. However, changes
in the genes can take place as the result of exposure to heat, to some
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chemicals (e.g., mustard gas), and to radiation. If the change is permanent, it is called a mutation. If an ordinary body cell mutates, this
change is passed along to other similar body cells by cell division, but it is
not passed on to the children. If, however, the mutation occurs in a
sperm or egg cell, the child resulting from the sperm or egg will inherit
the mutated gene. Even the non-inherited mutation can have genetic
effects such as reduced life span and reduced reproductive capacity, but
the major genetic effect arises from inheritable mutations. It should also
be mentioned that mutations can occur in the chromosomes.
Genes may be either dominant or recessive in the sense that if the two
genes, one from each parent, that control some physical characteristic
are not similar, then one, being more powerful, dominates the other,
although such domination is not wo% complete. A recessive gene
characteristic will manifest itself fully only if both genes are recessive.
The fact that mutant genes are usually recessive in character is very
significant in considering the genetic effects of radiation.
Being recessive, mutated genes do not ordinarily become apparent,
particularly in early generations. This means that the genetic effect will
be difficult, if not impossible, to prove in a legal sense, though scientists
agree radiation does cause mutations. Since the recessive gene is not
wo% dominated, however, it will manifest itself partially in every child
of every generation carrying it. This manifestation may be in the form
of shortened life span, reduction in fertility, or in any of the multitude
of ordinary human ailments including susceptibility to disease. This
means that the mutated gene will affect many more individuals than if it
were dominant. If dominant and if involving a vital function or organ,
it is likely to result in death or total inability to procreate. Genetically
speaking, therefore, the recessive mutant gene has a very great impact
indeed.
Scientists do not agree as to the exact mechanism by which ionizing
radiation causes mutations, 12 but they are agreed ( 1) that radiation does
increase the possibility of a mutation, ( 2) that mutations, including
spontaneous mutations (naturally occuring from cosmic rays and
natural radiation perhaps), are almost all harmful, ( 3) that any radiation increases the possibility of mutations no matter how small the dose,
and ( 4) that mutation is a cumulative effect of radiation not dependent
on a given dosage rate such as 0.3 rem per week. This last conclusion
means that all radiation received by a particular person from the time
12 One theory holds that radiation produces toxic substances affecting the gene;
another says ionization breaks the chemical bond in the gene ; and a third says radiation breaks the chromosomes into parts and an imperfect reunion is made.
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of his conception until all of his children are born has possible genetic
effects by increasing the probability of mutations which will be passed
on to all of his descendants. In America, ·on the average, each child's
parents have been living for thirty years at the time of birth so geneticists use thirty years to determine the impact of mutations on the
population as a whole.
From natural background radiation, it is estimated that the average
person receives 4·3 roentgens in thirty years. -Medical X-rays add three
more roentgens over a thirty-year period for the average person. Atomic
weapons testing at present rates adds between .02 and .5 roentgens in
thirty years.
Several responsible geneticists. have concluded that from thirty to
eighty roentgens of radiation per person would double the present rate
of mutations. To make this somewhat more understandable in human
terms, if doubling of the mutation rate occurreq, some geneticists calculate that instead of 2,ooo,ooo children having genetic defects in each
generation (there are roughly xoo,ooo,ooo persons in each generation
in this country), 4,000,000 children would have such defects. It is said
that even a ten roentgen exposure of the whole population ultimately
would create soo,ooo more mutation defects per generation. Other
geneticists say that a ten roentgen dose to the gonads of the whole
population would cause a total of s,ooo,ooo mutants in our population.
These are rough estimates, of course, but they indicate the potential
danger.
From these calculations the Committee on Genetic Effects of Atomic
Radiation of the National Academy of Sciences urges that our general
population should not receive more than ten roentgehs to the reproductive organs between conception and age thirty, this in addition to
background radiation, but inclusive of radiation from medical X-rays.
The committee also recommends that no one person receive more than
fifty roentgens prior to age thirty and not more than an additional fifty
roentgens from age thirty to age forty.
The problems posed for the legal profession in the area of genetic
effects call for more than the mere application of familiar principles of
tort law. Some imaginative thinking is indicated.
( 2) Sterility
Radiation may produce sterility by causing degeneration of the cells
in the layers of the epithelium in the testes from which spermatozoa
develop. In females, although no gross changes in the ovaries seem to
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occur, the ova will not develop normally after exposure, and the incidence of miscarriages and premature births increases.
The existence of damage in the form of sterility is ascertainable at an
early date after overexposure. A case of sterility from radiation has
already reached a court, but it was dismissed prior to trial when the
claimant's wife happily developed pregnancy, a fact which served both to
deprive the plaintiff of damages and to prevent any testing of familiar
legal presumptions.
Overexposure can cause either temporary or permanent sterility, but
the likelihood of the latter is slight. Generally, a dose large enough to
cause permanent sterility would be lethal. Exposure resulting from the
atom bomb explosions in Japan caused many cases of temporary sterility
among the population, but the vast majority of the victims have returned to normalcy. The presence of other causes of sterility, such as
malnutrition or disease, make accurat~ computations difficult.
( 3) Fetal Damage
Another type of injury which may result from radiation overexposure,
particularly in the use of radiation in medical therapy, is fetal damage.
Recent experiments upon mice exposed to radiation have shown that
various kinds of abnormalities result from exposing mouse embryos to
X-rays. The type of abnormality is influenced by the size of the X-ray
dose administered and the state of development of the embryo. Exposures as low as twenty-five to fifty roentgens have been shown to have
an effect upon certain physical characteristics of the mice. 18 However,
gross monstrosities in human beings are not considered too probable
since a severe overexposure is more likely to result in fetal death or
miscarriage. Certain experts believe, however, that radiation therapy of
the pelvic area during pregnancy may cause microcephalic idiocy, and
before any such therapy is administered, the condition of the woman
should be ascertained and the risks appraised. 14 Fetal injury from
chronic expo~ure to small amounts of radiation seems to be unlikely,
although lack of sufficiently complete statistical information makes impossible the formulation of positive conclusions.
(4) Cancer
Cancer is another possible injury emanating from overexposure to
radiation, although paradoxically radiation is also one of the brightest
18

XI Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

18o

(June 1955).

u Behrens, "Cumulative Effects and Permissible Dosage Limits of Ionizing Radia-

tions," Atomic Medicine 135 (New York: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1949).
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hopes for cancer cure today. The paradox stems from the fact that the
ionizing radiation destroys both cancer cells and normal cells, and hence
selective exposure may stop the cancerous growth.
Some of the earlier cases of radiation cancer involved severe hand
burns from repeated exposure of X-ray technicians. The skin became
dry and cracked, and the fingernails developed ridges and became brittle.
Upon the cessation of radiation exposure, this condition disappeared,
only to develop into cancer after the lapse of a long period of time
marked by the absence of further symptoms. Much of the evidence of
radiation-induced tumors has been derived from experiments upon mice
and rabbits, the experiments showing an increased incidence of lung,
ovarian, and breast tumors in animals exposed to radiation. The cause
of cancer is still a mystery, yet the results of the experiments upon
animals are considered worthy of extrapolation to man, with the conclusion that the irritation produced by overexposure can produce malignancy. Although the cause of cancer is not fully known, there is no
question that such malignancy is one of the radiation injuries with which
the law will have to contend.
( 5) Leukemia
Leukemia is the presence of an excessive number of leucocyte or
white cells in the blood, and it may be caused by radiation damage to
the blood-forming organs. Because of the subtleness of its onset, leukemia is considered by many to be an even worse menace than cancer.
Victims frequently are unaware of the presence of the malady until it
has reached an advanced stage at which cure is impossible. Leukemia is
a type of disease which is likely to result from chronic whole body irradiation over a long period. Available data shows an incidence of
0.53% leukemia mortality among physicians, as compared to 0.39%
among the general population. 15 Other studies reveal the incidence
among radiologists to be almost nine times that of other physicians. 16
From materials presently available, it would seem that the current state
of knowledge concerning leukemia is comparable to that concerning
malignant cancer. Thus, like cancer·, leukemia is regarded as one of the
likely results of excessive irradiation, although the exact manner in
15 Henshaw and Hawkings, "Incidence of Leukemia in Physicians," 4 ]. National
Cancer Institute 339 ( 1944). See also Report of Committee on Pathological Effects
of Atomic Radiation, National Academy of Sciences, p. 35.
16 Ulrich, "The Incidence of Leukemia in Radiologists," New England ]. Med. 234
{I94l}).
.
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which it is brought about is unknown. All that can be said is that without the overexposure the victim might have developed the disease, but
his overexposure also may have been the cause or a significant contributing factor. The chief basis for deducing that cancer and leukemia
result from radioactive exposure lies in the fact that chronic irritations
seem to be a factor in the incidence of such malignancies, and ionizing
radiation is a powerful irritant.
( 6) Leukopenia
Another disease with a high rate of incidence under conditions of
overexposure to ionizing radiation is leukopenia, a deficiency of leucocyte [white] cells in the blood. This condition is more likely to appear
immediately following extreme overexposure to radiation, although it
can also be produced by chronic overexposure to smaller quantities of
radiation. Its victims are highly susceptible to infection and are unable
to throw off minor diseases.
Little statistical evidence is available relating to the incidence of
leukopenia in occupations dealing with radiation as compared with other
groups of the population. Animal experiments as well as instances in
humans, however, seem to provide adequate evidence that radiation
exposure can cause leukopenia.
( 7) Damage to Bone Marrow
Severe damage to the bone marrow c;:an also result from overexposure
to radiation. Bone marrow damage usually results from total body irradiation but may also appear after local irradiation. Bone marrow is
particularly radiosensitive and tends to become gelatinous after excessive
radiation. Since most of the blood constituents are manufactured in the
radiosensitive bone marrow, the effect of overexposure is quickly transmitted to the blood, and damage to the blood supply is followed by
deleterious effects upon ·the body as a whole. In fact, hemological
changes may prove to be one of the earliest and most effective symptoms
for diagnostic study in detecting overexposure to radiation. 17 Mature
blood cells, after leaving the marrow, and even if they are not damaged
by radiation, have a limited life span and must be replaced. Red blood
cells seem to have a life span of about 125 days; platelets and granulocytes reputedly have a life span of about three to five days; and lymphocytes usually live only for a few hours. Unless these cells are replaced
17BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 457:941 (1956).
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promptly, damage can be severe. Sufficient information is not yet avail~
able to explain the reasons for damage to the bone marrow, but it is
certain that such damage occurs and that the production rate of blood
cells by the marrow is affected. There is evidence to support the view
that chronic exposure to even small amounts of radiation will cause
damage to the bone marrow, but apparently little is known about the
minimum dosage tending to cause damage. Individual differences in respect to radiosensitivity doubtless bring about variations in the dosage
necessary to cause damage.
It should also be mentioned that radiation of bones seems to retard
growth of epiphysis in immature bones. This may produce serious results in children subjected to radiation. Bone sarcoma may appear in
even mature persons after· chronic overexposure.
( 8) Cataract
Cataract, an opaque condition of the lens of the eyes, is another injury caused by overexposure to ionizing radiation. Since the only cases
on record are those of cyclotron workers and the atomic bomb victims
in Japan, cataract is often regarded as the result of .radiation damage
caused by neutrons. However, X-rays and gamma rays will also produce cataract, although neutrons seem to be about forty times as effective. The development of a cataract does not necessarily result in per~anent loss of vision, for the opaque lens may be surgically removed. 18
However, the damage is severe, and the victim is permanently handicapped. Findings in Japan have led to the conchtsion that where radiation has induced the formation of the first stages of a cataract, the
cessation of over-exposure will stop further progress of the disease and
surgical removal may riot be required. The exact manner in which
cataracts are produced is not yet known, nor is there evidence of the
exact effect of radiation upon the eye.
( 9) Epilation
The loss of hair was a common consequence of radiation among the
Japanese survivors of the atomic bomb. This loss occurred mainly on
the head, probably because it was more exposed to the bomb burst and
thus absorbed more radiation. About thirteen days after exposure, the
hair fell out in large quantities. This continued for about two weeks. In
18 Some of the cyclotron workers in California had cataracts removed. After surgery, reasonably effective vision was apparently restored.
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a few months the hair began to return, and in no case was the epilation
permanent.

( 10) Other Injuries
On the basis of animal experiments, some scientists believe that ionizing radiation, as a result of accumulated effects over the years, is responsible for shortened life span. Professor G. Hoyt Whipple, pathologist of the University of Rochester, in a paper delivered at the Nuclear
Engineering and Science Congress in December 1955, asserted, on the
basis of animal experiments, that the exposure of a human being to 3/10
of a roentgen per week for a thirty-year period could reduce the life
span as much as three years.
There is also the possibility of other injuries to organs of the body,
such as the kidneys, the liver, the brain, etc., as the result of ionizing
radiation, even without development of actual disease. Injuries to these
organs in swine and cattle exposed to radiation during the atomic bomb
test at Bikini, and in overexpbsed Japanese victims, bear out this possibility, although exact knowledge as to the physiology of such injuries is
at present lacking; One very likely effect of general bodily radiation injury is a distinct reduction in the resistance to disease.
f. Conclusions
Continuous research is being conducted in the biological science~ on
the types and causes of radiation injuries. Undoubtedly, new discoveries
will be made that will increase man's knowledge of radiation hazards and
the methods of treatment. However, this rather cursory examination of
personal injuries from radiation indicates several unique hazards that
are not encountered in typical industrial activities. Among the more
significant features that lawyers must contend with in the atomic age
are the following: ( 1) knowledge of the nature of injuries is still very
limited; ( 2) there are differences in the radiosensitivity of individuals
and of specific parts of the body; (3) the cumulative effect of radiation
m~kes it difficult to place responsibility for an injury on any particular
person or activity; ( 4) the differences in the effect of external and internal sources, as well as in the kind of ionizing radiation, raise difficult
questions of proof; and (5) injuries may not be discovered until many
years after exposure to radiation.
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S· Property Damage
Not only may humans suffer severe injury from exposure to radiation, but also property may be damaged in a rather spectacular fashion.
All living matter, including plant, aquatic, and animal life, can suffer
many of the injuries already described in respect to personal injuries.
Furthermore, some of these injuries may eventually result in injuries
to persons. For example, if a cow eats radioactive material which is retained in the flesh and is then eaten by humans, the personal injuries
previously described in conjunction with ingested radioactive material
possibly may arise.
Property may be injured by the disposal of radioactive materials into
sewer systems and streams, or by dumping them into the oceans of the
world. The recent report of the Committee on Effects of Atomic Radiation on Oceanography and Fisheries of the National Academy of Sciences warns of the potential dangers to marine resources from such disposal techniques~ Apparently all ocean water wherever located and at
all depths eventually finds its way around to all of the ocean surfaces
throughout the world. Conceivably, radioactive material can be assimilated by algae in the water, which may subsequently be eaten by fish
which will retain the radioactive isotopes. It is not difficult to envisage
the loss that would result if a downstream fishery caught and canned
a large number of fish contaminated by radioactive materials, especially
if the radioactive content were sufficiently high to necessitate removal
from the market by public health althorities to preclude human ingestion.
The fact that a particular radioactive element will be perpetuated regardless of chemical combinations through which it may pass raises
special legal problems because of the remoteness, both in time and space
from the original wrongful act, of injuries that may result.
Growing crops, irrigated with water contaminated by radioactive
wastes, may also be damaged as a result of radioactive materials being
absorbed and retained. They may even be rendered inedible ·or unmarketable. Crop damage can also result from the absorption of radioactive materials from the air. This might happen, for example, when
an atomic reactor is air-cooled and the discharged coolant is unduly
radioactive. In one instance a person living in an area near a plant making use of atomic energy was able to trace its location because the air
was polluted with waste products which descended upon the plant life in
the surrounding area, leaving small speckled marks on it. Because the
spots always appeared on the same side of the plants, he was able to deduce the location of the atomic energy installation. If such radioactivity
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descended regularly over an area where crops or flowers are grown, it is
conceivable that their value might decrease even though the amount of
transferred radioactivity might not be sufficient to affect the health of
subsequent consumers.
Injuries to nonliving matter are of a different nature. Exposure to
neutron radiation may cause a machine, for example, to become so radioactive that it cannot be used for its intended purpose without being a
hazard to humans. In some cases, the half-life of the resulting radioisotopes may prevent use of the irradiated article for thousands of years.
Because of the frequency of its occurrence, damage to unexposed
film by exposure to radiation warrants special mention. Gamma radiation will readily penetrate the packaging of unexposed film. It then
transfers its energy to the film emulsion, thereby activating it as though
by light. This kind of damage has occurred to film shipped in a railroad
car or other conveyance together with a quantity of radium, the rays
from which rendered the film unusable. Film damage has even been
caused by the atomic bomb tests in Nevada. Radioactive materials "fell
out" over a wide area, feeding a river, the water of which was used in
the production of strawboard. It is reported that the strawboard was,
in turn, consigned to the Eastman Kodak Company for use in packaging
film and that the contaminated packaging exposed the film.
Another type of property damage which may occur as a result of accidental contamination of an area with radioactive materials is the
rendering of the area unsafe for human habitation or cultivation,
thereby reducing land values. Such contamination may result from
various causes, such as the crash of a plane carrying radioactive materials, 19 an accident to a truck carrying radioactive materials, etc. The
latter situation actually arose on one occasion in the southwest. The
community petitioned Congress for sufficient funds to contruct a new
highway by-pass around the area. More severe contamination could
result from a "burn up" or "melt down" of a nuclear reactor although
the safety precautions tend to minimize the possibility. While a burn
up is not of the same explosive quality as an atomic bomb, it could
nevertheless destroy the reactor plant and scatter radioactive materials
over the surrounding area. No burn up of major proportions has occurred to date, and safety measures for the control of reactors are constantly being improved. Such a catastrophe must, however, be cont9 The Civil Aeronautics Board does, however, require packaging designed to withstand quite severe shocks.
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sidered within the realm of possibility, since there have been accidents
in reactor operations, even though short of a major burn up.
This very brief discussion of types of property damage caused by
radiation is not intended to be exhaustive, but merely suggestive of the
possibilities. However, it does illustrate that atomic energy presents
several unique tort liability aspects since the creation of· a radioactive
material may initiate a series of continuing property and personal injuries that are almost beyond the range of present experience.
D. Sources of Radiation
We have hitherto discussed some of the basic scientific data concerning the structure of the atotn, the types of radiation, and the hazards of
radiation. It seems rather clear that the dangers of radiation cannot be
separated from the processes which make nuclear energy so promising
as an energy source and as an industrial and research tool for the welfare of mankind. Therefore, a summary discussion of the sources of
natural and artificially created radiation seems appropriate.
1.

Particle Accelerators

High energy particle accelerators, popularly known as "atom
smashers," produce radiation while operating and may also make target
mater:ials radioactive. Primarily used in scientific research, cyclotrons,
synchrotrons, betatrons, cosmotrons, bevatrons, etc., are used to accelerate subatomic particles to tremendous velocities. Only electrically
charged particles, such as protons, alpha particles, beta particles, and
deuterons (the latter being the hydrogen nucleus with a neutron added),
can be employed by the machines. The charged particles are set in motion in a complex machine utilizing the simple principle of reversing the
electric charges in two separate sources, between which the particles pass.
The particles, alternately attracted and repelled, move circularly during
their journey toward the target atoms. Reversing a charge millions of
times per second causes these atomic projectiles to acquire speeds approaching that of light. The impact on target atoms, depending on the
total energy of the projectiles, and on the type of particle utilized, produces changes which manifest themselves in the form of artificial byproduct isotopes, some of which may be radioactive. In addition, excessive energy is dissipated in the form of gamma radiation, and additional
radioactivity may be given off in the form of dislodged neutrons. However, particle accelerators are extremely expensive to build and operate,
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and they produce relatively meager amounts of radioisotopes. Therefore, except to those in the immediate vicinity! they have not proved to
be a hazardous source of radiation.
One practical application of the accelerating principle is in the artificial
production of X-rays. The ordinary X-ray tube is used to produce electrons, to accelerate and direet them, and to cause the bombardment of a
suitable metal target. Because an electron is a very light particle, it is
readily deflected by orbital electrons surrounding the target nucleus.
The consequent excitation of the electronic structure of the target atoms
causes the emission of the X-rays.
2.

The Fission Process

Although high energy accelerators made possible man-made radio. isotopes, it was the demonstration of the fissionable nature of the uranium atom which really ushered in the atomic age. The fission process has
made the mass production of more than 1,000 varieties of radioisotopes
virtually a matter of routine.
In 1939 Otto Hahn and Fritz Strassman in Germany proved that
barium was produced by bombarding uranium with neutrons. Other
scientist's immediately predicted that neutron bombardment of uranium
caused the uranium nucleus to fission with the release of tremendous
amounts of energy. Professor Enrico Fermi o{Italy also suggested the
possibility that in splitting the uranium nucleus, neutrons were emitted
which would cause the fission of other uranium nuclei, thereby creating
a chain reaction. During World War II the chain reaction theory was
proved by the construction of the first nuclear reactor under the
abandoned football stadium at the University of Chicago. .
In a reactor utilizing fissionable ur;mium 235, an independent neutron
source is employed to release the initial supply of neutrons. The impact of
the neutrons causes the uranium 235 atoms to split into fragments, forming a number of other elements, releasing both heat and still more neutrons (since lighter elements can house fewer neutrons). Some of the
free neutrons go forth to strike still other U 235 atoms, which also split
with like consequences. This sequence of events repeats itself over and
over again as long as there is fissionable material present in the reactor
in so-called "critical mass" quantity, or until certain other control devices are used to slow down or to stop the reactions. Insertion in the
reactor of neutron-absorbing substances, such as cadmium, will serve
this purpose.
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Fission has made the neutron a very common nuclear projectile.
Neutrons are produced in great quantities as a byproduct of the fission
process, and they come forth with tremendous energies. "Fast" neutrons can be utilized in the production in atomic reactors of great quantities and varieties of radioisotopes at reasonable cost. During the
fission process a vast amount of radiation is released, and shielding must
therefore, be provided to create a barrier between the reactor core and
operating personnel.
The atoms of various elements resulting from the breaking up of
fissionable uranium are called fission "byproducts"; they are the "ashes"
of the atomic furnace and are mostly radioisotopes of lighter elements.
But, in addition, radioisotopes of an especially selected element can be
produced in a reactor by placing a sample of such element within the
core to become a target for the neutrons liberated during fission. When
a neutron strikes a nucleus, it may be absorbed, ~hus forming a heavier
isotope of the same element. Thereafter, the nucleus may have surplus
energy, in which case it will emit gamma rays until it becomes stable. If
the new nucleus is incapable of retaining the additional neutron as such,
it may undergo beta decay. Further stages of transmutation occur, several in number and characterized by different types of radiation, before
the decaying process terminates with the formation of a stable isotope
or element.
This ability of nuclear reactors to cause transmutation of elements is
utilized to turn U 238 into highly fissionable plutonium which is also
capable of sustaining a chain reaction. This process has greatly enhanced the reserves of nuclear fuel available to mankind because U 238
is 140 times as plentiful in nature as is U 235. The transmutation is
accomplished by using properly moderated "spare" neutrons coming
from the fissioned U 235 atoms to strike and add their weight to a
quantity of U 238 placed in the reactor core for the purpose. The addition of a neutron to U 238 causes it to become U 239 which, being highly
radioactive, will quickly emit an electron and then, having an excess proton, become neptunium, an element of atomic number 93 and atomic
weight 239. Neptunium is similarly highly radioactive; it will eject an
electron and become plutonium because of the excess proton. Plutonium
is a man-made element with ninety-four protons and 145 neutrons. It is
highly fissionable and has a long half-life. Furthermore, it is possible
to produce a quantity of fissionable plutonium 239 which exceeds the
quantity of U 235 consumed.
Recently it has been· demonstrated that another fissionable isotope
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of uranium (U 233) can be created from thorium by similar means.
As a result of its experiments, the Atomic Energy Commission has
announced that a thorium reactor can breed more fuel than it burns.
This announcement has been characterized by Dr. Alvin M. Weinberg,
Director of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, as the most important
announcement of the Commission in connection with its five year reactor development program. 20 This conclusion is based upon the fact
that thermal neutrons can be employed to convert thorium into U 233
whereas fast neutrons are essential to produce plutonium from U 238.
A fast-neutron breeder reactor is extremely difficult to control and cool,
but a thermal reactor does not present the same engineering difficulties.
Therefore, thorium presents very attractive possibilities in the development of breeder reactors which can increase substantially the quantity of
fissionable material available for atomic power.
3· The Fusion Process
Another process which may eventually be employed to create radiation is the fusion, or thermonuclear, process. Instead of splitting a heavy
nucleus as in the fission process, the fusion process involves the merger
of two light nuclei to form a heavier nucleus. This process also is
accompanied by the release of large amounts of energy including heat
and radiation. Although the process has been used in the so-called
hydrogen bomb, techniques for controlling the process in reactors have
not yet been devised.
In January 1958 the Atomic Energy Commission and the United
Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority announced significant progress in
the research program aimed at controlling the hydrogen fusion reaction.
The reaction itself may involve the merger of two atoms of deuterium,
hydrogen with a mass of twice light hydrogen, to form a triton. Triton
is the nucleus of a triple-heavy hydrogen atom called tritium. The reaction may also involve the merger of deuterium and tritium to form
helium. In either process a small proportion of the mass is· converted
into energy. ·Deuterium is available in enormous amounts in the oceans
of the world, but tritium must be man-produced from lithium. There
are two major obstacles to producing power by fusing either the nuclei
of deuterium or a deuterium-tritium mixture. First, a tremendous
temperature is required to cause the reaction, and secondly, there are
serious difficulties in creating a container that will hold the· hydrogen
20 Weinberg, "Power Reactors," Editors of Scientific American, Atomic Power 36
(1955).
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gas after it has reached the required temperatures. It is estimated that
a self-sustaining deuterium fire requires a temperature of 370,ooo,ooo
degrees centigrade which is twelve to eighteen times the temperature of
the sun's interior. A deuterium-tritium fire would probably require a
temperature of so,ooo,ooo degrees centigrade, but tritium can only be
produced from the supplies of lithium available in nature. The recent
announcement has evidenced success in containing the reaction by the
use of a magnetic field and temperature as high as 6,000,000 degrees
have been reported, but only for infinitesimal periods of time. The
magnetic field creates what is known as the "pinch effect," the gas being
pinched· into a narrow column within a container so that the hot gas is
prevented from touching the walls of the container and losing its energy.·
Although no major: breakthrough has occurred in the thermonuclear research projects, a significant beginning has been made and further prog.
ress can be expected.
The fusion process promises to have several advantages over the fission process. Recoverable uranium and thorium supplies are limited, but
deuterium supplies seem inexhaustible. In addition, thermonuclear
processes offer the possibility of producing electricity directly without
the intervention of the costly process of producing electricity from heat
through a heat-exchange system. Finally, in contrast to reactors using
the fission process, thermonuclear reactors give promise of being extremely safe. The possibility of serious accidents because of failure of
parts or mistakes by the operator are considered negligible. Moreover,
there are no waste products which may be spread about in the burn up of
a fission reactor and which create handling and disposal hazards. However, a fusion reactor may produce intense neutron radiation necessitating adequate shielding, The neutrons probably could be used to produce radioisotopes for commercial and research usage.
4. Natural Radiation
A complicating factor, growing in importance with the increase of
scientific information about cosmic and natural forces, is the natural or
background radiation which may also be a contributing source of radiation injuries. Man.is continuously exposed to the natural radiation coming from the nuclear decay of elements composing the earth's surface
and from outer space. To some extent the ground we walk on is radioactive; the food we eat and drink is radioactive; the air we breathe is
radioactive. The AEC has reported that:
As scientists team to detect and measure nuclear radiation,
they learn that we are constantly being exposed to radiation
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from a variety of sources in the air, water and the earth. A
number of radioactive substances occur naturally, and they are
widely distributed in the earth's crust. It is estimated that a
layer of soil one foot thick and one square mile in area will
contain on the average, more than one gram of radium, 3 tons
of uranium, and 6 tons of thorium. In addition, cosmic rays
constantly bombard the earth. Cosmic .rays and the nuclear
radiation from uranium, thorium, radium and other radioactive materials in the earth's crust and in the air constitute
what is called background radiation.
Background radiation varies in intensity depending upon
time of day, altitude, and the geology of the area, and to a
minor extent, latitude. For example, at sea level in the Northeastern part of the United States, about 6.5 cosmic-ray particles per minute cross a horizontal surface one square inch in
area. At 15,000 feet above sea level, about 5 times that number
will be observed, and at 55,000 feet elevation the rate is about
75 times that at sea level.
Rainfall also may increase background radiation. The exact
mechanism causing this increase is unknown, but it is believed
that either the falling rain droplets absorb the minute radioactive particles naturally occurring in the air or the downward
air flow accompanying rainfall blows these particles toward the
earth's surface. Background radiation may increase as much
as 10 fold as a result of rain or snow.
Alpha, beta, gamma and cosmic radiations are included in
"background" but because of the penetrating properties of the
latter two, they are the principal components to be considered.
Human beings receive between 8o and 8oo milliroentgens
( o.o8 to o.8 r) per year from natural background sources.
Since radioactive materials are widely distributed in the
earth, air and water, it is not surprising that they occur naturally in the tissues of human beings, animals and plants. Radioactive isotopes of such essential elements as carbon and
potassium are incorporated into body tissue along with common stable forms. Water from many natural sources contains
traces of radium, which accumulates in the skeleton once it is
taken into the body. The radioactivity normally present in tissues is minute and not harmful to health, but it may be measured in the laboratory. 21
As in the case of man-made radiation, the impact of natural radiation
on individual cells which compose the body is definitely harmful, but
whether the damage is repaired or not is, as yet, uncertain. However,
the fact that natural radiation may cause damage further complicates
problems of proving radiation injuries.
21

AEC, Thirteenth Semi-Annual Report 94-95 (1953).
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E. Conclusion
This very brief sketch of nuclear processes and of the nature and
effect of radioactivity has been set forth in the belief that it constitutes
essential technical background for a proper understanding of the unique
legal problems confronting the lawyer in the atomic age. Once again we
repeat our original brief caveat: the technology in this new field is not
yet fully understood in many particulars, and the continually increasing
knowledge of the atom will make more definite and certain the exact
nature of radiation damage. Therefore, the lawyer must keep abreast
of the expanding body of pertinent knowledge regarding atomic energy.

Chapter II
THE GENERAL IMPACT OF ATOMIC ENERGY
ON TORT LAW
The purposes of this chapter are : (I) to acquaint the reader with the
importance of atomic energy to society by describing some of the more
important of its peaceful applications; ( 2) to describe how peaceful
uses of atomic energy may result in injuries to persons and property;
and (3) to suggest the legal problems that lawyers must deal with when
advising clients of liability problems or trying tort liability cases in the
atomic age. Analysis of the legal problems and possible solutions will
be included in subsequent chapters.
A. Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy
Any account of the peaceful applications of atomic energy is bound
to become out-of-date rapidly because of the new discoveries that are
being made almost daily. However, the potentialities of atomic energy
in industrial, medical, agricultural, and research pursuits already are
sufficiently well known to make it clear that atomic energy will play
an ever-increasing role in society. The peaceful uses presently employed
can be classified roughly into three major categories: (I) the use of
the fission chain reaction process in reactors for the production of heat
energy and radioactive isotopes; 1 ( 2) the use of sources of radioactivity
where the radioactivity itself is employed for specific purposes; and (3)
the use of radioisotopes as a tool or a research instrumentality. Each
of these uses, as we shall see, involves certain hazards that may cause
injuries to persons and property.
I.

Reactors and Their Hazards

The discovery of method~ of ha~nessing the atom has revolutionized
thinking on the problem of supplying the energy needs of modern society. It has been estimated whereas one pound of coal can produce
about 1.4 kilowatt hours of electricity, one pound of uranium could~ if
fully consumed, release enough heat to produce 3,700,000 kilowatt hours
1 The fusion process apparently has tremendous possibilities as a heat energy and
neutron source, but since the technologic aspects apparently have not been solved, the
fusion process will not be discussed.
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oi electricity and is equivalent in heat energy to about 1,320 tons of coal.
In the United States, which is extremely wealthy in conventional fossil
fuel resources, including coal, oil, and gas, the availability of nuclear
energy derived in the fission process means that we can measure our energy resources in terms of centuries rather than a few generations. For
portions of the world less well endowed with fossil fuel resources, the
fission process makes possible the attainment of a standard of living
previously thought impossible. The discovery of a means of using the
fusion process to produce peacetime power would increase the magnitude of available energy sources to an even more astonishing degree.
Clearly we can expect an ever-increasing utilization of nuclear energy
as a power source throughout the world even in the United States where
an abundance of comparatively cheap fossil fuels will make it difficult
for nuclear power plants to compete economically, especially during the
research and development stages. In fact, the Atomic Energy Commission has recently issued licenses for the construction of privately financed
atomic energy power installations in the New York, Detroit, and Chicago areas.
To date, the truly dramatic potentialities of the controlled chain reaction in reactors designed to produce electricity have overshadowed many
other possible practicable uses. Reactors may be employed to space heat
buildings and residences, to propel ships, locomotives, and airplanes, to
supply heat in many industrial pursuits such as the manufacture of cement and brick, to produce radioactive and other chemicals, to test materials, to act as blast furnaces in the reduction of ores, to treat diseases,
and undoubtedly to accomplish many other tasks that are yet to be envisaged. The imposing array of methods of commercial exploitation of
the fission process puts the legal profession on notice that it will within
the next decade be required to handle innumerable legal problems involving atomic energy.
Assuming, as we must, that nuclear reactors are destined to become
commonplace, lawyers must become acquainted with the technological
processes involved to ascertain whether or not existing rules of tort law
can be applied in cases of civil liability arising from reactor situations,
or whether reactors will necessitate revision of the conventional rules of
law. Without doubt, so. far as the law is concerned, the unique feature
of reactors is that they present a continuous threat to persons and property unless the utmost precautionary measures are taken. 2 The fission
2 The .fusion process, if it .can be controlled, apparently would not present as great
hazards as encountered in the fission process.
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chain reaction process involves the release of large quantities of all types
of ionizing radiation which, as described· in Chapter I, .can have extremely deleterious effects on all forms of life and property. Therefore,
one of the most important technological problems in reactor construction and operation has been that of providing essential safety for employees and the surrounding community. Moreover, the fission process
creates a sizable number of radioactive waste materials that create
secondary hazards and even perhaps greater danger in the long run.
Although all reactors have in common the purpose of utilizing a controlled fission process, they vary substantially in design depending upon
the manner in which they are to be utilized. Furthermore, several possible techniques may be employed for the same utilization. For power
purposes alone, several different designs have been constructed or are
in the process of construction and still others are yet in the planning
stage. Reactor technology is still in its infancy, and it is not to be expected that in the years immediately ahead any single design will have
proved its superiority over others. Reactor designs can be classified in
many ways : ( 1) by the types of fissionable material used ; ( 2) by the
speeds of the neutrons, either thermal (slow) or fast; ( 3) by the types
of moderators (materials used to reduce the speed of the neutrons);
( 4) by the coolants used to maintain heat levels; ( 5) by the structure of
the reactor cores (heterogeneous if the fissionable material is placed in
the reactor core in units separated by moderators and coolants and
homogeneous if the fissionable material is uniformly mixed with the
moderator in the reactor core with the coolant surrounding the core) ;
( 6) by the chemical and heat reactions that occur in the reactor cores ;
and (7) by the ability of the reactor to produce fissionable material in
the' process of consuming fuel (breeder reactor). A single reactor design may incorporate several of these features. Obviously, a most important consideration for commercial reactors is the cost of the various
types.
Up to the present time water and sodium-cooled reactors have played
the predominant roles in American power reactor development. Actual
experience is largely confined to thermal (slow neutron) water-cooled
types. With Atomic Energy Commission financial assistance, Westinghouse has constructed a pressurized-water reactor for the Duquesne
Light Company at Shippingport, Pennsylvania. Another type of watercooled reactor, but one in which steam generation is permitted to occur
in the .r-eactor core (experimental boiling water reactor), has been developed by Argonne National Laboratory, and it has recently been re-
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ported that the reactor operated at more than twice design capacity.
Another type of water-cooled device is the homogeneous reactor being
developed by the Oak Ridge National Laboratory. An experimental
sodium-cooled graphite-moderated reactor, built by North American
Aviation, Inc., became ·critical in 1957. General Electric Company and
Pacific Gas & Electric Company have cooperated in the development
of a boiling water reactor at Pleasanton, California which also became
operative in 1957. The Atomic Energy Commission has already constructed one fast neutron experimental breeder reactor and is in the
process of constructing a sodium-cooled experimental breeder reactor
at the National Reactor Testing Station in Idaho. And, finally, the
Commission has issued construction permits for three large power reactors.8 Oth~r reactor concepts for which experimental work is being
completed are an organic-moderated reactor and a liquid metal-fuel
reactor. In addition, several low energy research reactors which are air,.
or gas-cooled have been developed.
·
Among the important factors to be considered in selection of a particular reactor for power purposes are: (I) safety in operation and in
changing fuel elements; ( 2) economy in cost of fuel elements; (3)
economy in cost of fuel reprocessing necessitated by efficiency-reducing
contamination during the fission process; ( 4) reliability for continuous
operation ; ( 5) reliability of essential materials in withstanding nuclear
forces; and ( 6) heat-producing potentialities. Each of the major reactor
types has specific advantages and disadvantages for the production of
power on the basis of current experience. Therefore, in view of technological problems involved, selection becomes a question of judgment.
During the present initial development stages, the choices must be made
largely in the absence of conclusive technological data. The lawyer advising clients engaged in atomic power reactor projects must evaluate
the possible legal consequences of any particular selection.
The pressurized-water reactor seems to be the most highly developed
technologically, but a considerable amount of information regarding
specific features of the reactor remains classified. Nonetheless, on the
basis of published data it would appear that pressurized-water reactors
present several serious hazards, many of which are also inherent in other
reactor designs.
3A boiling water reactor (180,000 electric KW) is now under construction by the
Commonwealth Edison group near Joliet, Illinois; Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y.
is building a pressurized water reactor (275,000 electric KW) at Indian Point, N.Y.;
Power Reactor Development Co. is constructing a fast breeder reactor (100,000 electric KW) at Monroe, Michigan. For the more complete details of the reactor program
see AEC Semi-Annual Reports.
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Since the pressurized-water reactor has been successfully operated in
the submarine U. S. S. Nautilus and is being used in the first large size
central-station nuclear power plant in the United States at Shippingport,
Pennsylvania, it may be of assistance to sketch the principal technological problems and hazards involved. The Shippingport reactor employs fifteen to twenty tons of uranium, slightly enriched in the uranium
isotope 235. The reactor core contains closely spaced, zirconium-clad
fuel elements arranged in a cylindrical shape six feet in diameter and
seven and one-half feet high. The core and the water which acts as the
moderator-coolant are housed in a pressure vessel, thirty-three feet high,
twelve feet in diameter, with the plate of the vessel being eight and onehalf inches thick with a one-quarter inch cladding of stainless steel.
Pressure in the vessel will be about 2,000 pounds per square inch which
means that the water can reach a temperature of nearly 640° F before
boiling. Therefore, the fuel elements cannot have a surface heat temperature in excess of 6oo° F. Three different heat exchange systems
(steam generators) will be operated at once, with a fourth to be constructed as a standby. In each system water will have to be pumped at
the rate of 16,000 gallons a minute to remove the heat. The reactor
vessel and the heat exchangers are enclosed in strong gas-tight containers, located underground in concrete and steel vaults. The containers act as shields against radiation hazards and minimize the possibility
of radioactivity escaping in the event an accident occurs.
Although it would appear that excess neutrons created in the fission
process could be used to create new fissionable material from the nonfissionable fertile uranium 238 so that the fuel elements could be used
almost indefinitely, this is not the case. During the fission process, the
new atoms which are the "ashes" or "waste products" of the nuclear
furnace accumulate, and they tend to absorb the. neutrons so that the
chain reaction cannot be sustained. Also, radiation causes the fuel
elements to undergo changes both in size and in structure. Therefore,
when approximately one per cent of the fertile material has been consumed, it will become necessary to change the fuel elements and remove
the waste products. The Shippingport reactor will be a major test of a
system of removing fuel elements while maintaining the entire reactor
under pressure. If in removing the elements, pressure falls, so that the
water reaches its saturation (boiling) point at a lower temperature,
serious disrupture of the reactor core may result in its disintegration
with a possible release of radioactivity within the plant. In addition, if
the underground chambers are breached, radioactive products may be
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released in the atmosphere or into the subsoil, thereby endangering the
surrounding community. In such delicate operations, it is not difficult
to envisage the possibility that an accident may result in several persons
being subjected to damage suits, including the reactor designer, the
manufacturer of the mechanical apparatus for removing fuel elements,
and the contractor who built the underground chambers, as well as the
owner-operator of the facility.
Nearly all of the "ashes" of a nuclear furnace are radioactive, emitting both beta and gamma radiation. About eighty different radioisotopes are created in the fission process, and in the decay process the
number increases to about 200 in a relatively short period of time. The
half-lives of these radioisotopes vary from a few seconds to several
years. Therefore, methods must be devised to protect personnel when
spent fuel elements are removed and during the reprocessing of the fuel
elements. Remote controls are therefore essential to the handling of the
fuel elements. After removal, the fuel elements are stored under water
for as long as 100 days. During the "cooling" period, short-lived isotopes decay sufficiently to make them an insignificant hazard in the
separation process. Those isotopes with very long half-lives· are insignificant because of their slow rate of decay. Despite the "cooling"
period, however, the fuel elements, because of the isotopes of intermediate half-lives, remain highly radioactive. Therefore, in separating
the fission products from the fuel, utmost safety precautions must be
taken. If the reactor power installation does not have its own processing
facilities, spent fuel elements must be transported in sealed and shielded
containers to other establishments. If, in transport, a container is broken
and persons are exposed to the radiation, thereby causing injury, a question arises as to who is liable-the carrier, the reactor owner-operator,
the contractor hired to handle packaging, the manufacturer of the container, or all of them. By contracting out this function, can the reactor
owner-operator absolve himself from part or all of the liability?
Because of the serious health hazard, waste fission products cannot
be disposed of in the same manner as wastes from other industries. The
wastes may be in liquid, gas, or solid form and, depending on the processing, may have different levels of radioactivity. Liquid wastes, which
constitute the bulk of the material, are usually stored in underground
·tanks. As reactors bt:come more commonplace, suitable storage sites
will diminish in number, and accordingly this method of disposal is not
considered very satisfactory. "The volumes of stored waste accumulated
by· 1980 · are. estimated at 20 x 107 gallons, by 1990 at 6o x 107
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gallons and by 2000 at 240 x 107 gallons." 4 Furthermore, the radiation may create high temperatures in the liquid wastes and thereby cause
them to become so corrosive as to cause breaches in the containers.
Moreover, there is the problem of tankage leakage occurring because of
deterioration of the material of the tank or as a result of geological
changes resulting, for example, from an earthquake. If there is leakage,
it may seep into rivers that supply water to communities or into individual wells. Therefore, extreme caution must be taken on a purely geological basis in selecting sites. Again, problems of marshaling proof to
impose liability in the event of injury may become difficult. The problems are complicated by the fact that injury may not occur until years
after the waste products were originally stored. If some of the waste
products can be converted to useful purposes, a desired end that seems
a reasonable possibility, some of the waste disposal problems may be
eliminated or at least minimized.
Gaseous wastes are generally discharged into the atmosphere through
high stacks. No significant hazard 5 is created if the spent fuel has
"cooled" for a considerable period, and if meteorological conditions are
satisfactory for the dilution of the radioactive gases in the atmosphere.
If meteorological conditions are adverse, however, dangerous quantities
of gaseous wastes may endanger persons and property in the vicinity.
Another hazard is found in the possibility of the air in a processing facility becoming contaminated by absorbing small particleS of liquid or
solid radioactive wastes .. Since this can present a serious problem, all air
expelled from the plant is filtered. To reduce this hazard, the processing
vessels are usually maintained under air pressure less than atmospheric
in order to minimize the escape of radioactive material into the air.
Solid wastes consist of substances that have been contaminated in a
reactor or fuel processing facility, including those that have settled from
liquid wastes. Some radioactive components and equipment can be satisfactorily decontaminated, but in other cases it is not possible or desirable
to do so, and therefore it is usually buried in the ground. This creates
some of the same dangers as underground storage of liquid wastes. On
the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, some solid wastes are being buried at sea.
~National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council, "The Biological Effects of Atomic Radiation," p. 104 (1956).
6 Maximum permissible concentration levels in the atmosphere should be established
in the light of future discharge rate possibilities according to the Committee on
Meteorological Aspects of the Effects of Atomic Radiation, National Academy of
Sciences, National Research Council; "The Biological Effects of Atomic Radiation,"
p. 61 (1956).
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However, for inland facilities, the cost of transporting solid wastes may
be prohibitive. Thus, the reasonableness of the various methods of disposal may vary in accordance with plant location.
Throughout the entire fuel reprocessing operation two hazards are
present. One is caused by the highly radioactive nature of the materials
and the other arises out of the fact that the amount of fissionable material at a given point may become critical so that a fission chain reaction
occurs. To protect personnel, adequate shielding against radiation must
be provided. All process vessels, equipment, pipelines, valves, etc., must
be leakproof and shielded. The equipment particularly must be properly
designed and manufactured with excellent workmanship to reduce repair and maintenance problems. If maintenance is required, it can be
handled only by those using remote control devices or entering the area
after the equipment has been sufficiently decontaminated to avoid serious
hazard. To avoid a chain reaction, which would cause serious damage
within and possibly outside the plant, concentration of materials in any
single vessel must be limited and separate vessels must be kept apart by
an adequate distance. Since most of the operations in a fuel reprocessing plant are inaccessible to humans, remote control instrumentation is
essential to handle the operation and to sample the materials at the various processing stages. A failure to install proper instrumentation or
perhaps a failure in the instrumentation itself may result in the escape
of highly radioactive materials into the atmosphere or in a concentration
of fissionable materials which would cause a chain reaction.
In addition to fuel reprocessing problems, reactor technology also
encounters a series of difficulties in connection with the fabrication and
cladding of the fuel elements, the type of moderator used, the materials
used in the reactor structure, and the type of coolant.
Uranium, other fissionable materials, and fertile source metals (such
as thorium) react rapidly with oxygen ; and also at high temperature
water has a particularly corrosive effect on these materials. Since fine
chips or lathe turnings are a serious fire hazard if exposed to the air,
fabrication of uranium metals must be. carried on in a vacuum or in an
atmosphere of inert gas. Moreover, the fuel element in the reactor must
be clad with a corrosion resistant material to prevent attack by air or by
a water coolant and to prevent the escape of fission products and plutonium produced in the fission process. The cladding must possess nuclear properties that will not interfere appreciably with the fission process. Aluminum has been widely used as a cladding material in research
reactors since it readily retains fission products. However, aluminum is
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violently attacked by water at high temperatures. Therefore, it is not
very suitable for power reactors since higher temperatures are more
efficient in steam generation. It is for this reason that the Shippingport
reactor fuel elements will be clad with zirconium which has suitable
nuclear properties as well as a high resistance to corrosion. Even for
zirconium the maximum safe surface temperature in water is only approximately 66o° F, so that a maximum operating water temperature
of only about 560° F is poss,ible. Nevertheless, this compares favorably
with the maximum permissible surface temperature with aluminum of
400° F. Neither aluminum nor zirconium is satisfactory for a sodiumcooled reactor which is to operate at very high temperatures. Stainless
steel seems to be about the only present possibility for this purpose even
·though it captures neutrons at a higher rate than either aluminum or
zirconium.
Another problem in respect to cladding is its removal when reprocessing the fuel. Aluminum dissolves easily, but stainless steel and zirconium are fairly difficult to remove. It may be possible that more effective mechanical methods can be devised for the purpose ; but because of
high-level radioactivity, this will have to be done by remote control.
Because of the importance of the cladding, it can readily be seen that
an error in the thickness or in the purity of the Cladding material can
cause damage of very serious proportions. Erroneously using aluminum
cladding in fuel elements to be operated at too high a temperature for
the metal could result in the disintegration of all or part of the reactor
core, with a resulting release of large quantities of highly dangerous
radioactive gases and particles. Similarly, running a reactor at high
temperature levels approaching levels where the cladding disintegrates
in an attempt to reach the maximum steam generation capabilities could
result· in an accident of catastrophic proportions. On the other hand,
stainless steel jackets erroneously made thicker than necessary for the
purpose may seriously impair the efficiency of the reactor because of
excess absorption of neutrons. Careful engineering design is essential;
and errors of judgment may, in the event of accident, give rise to legal
liability.
Other materials employed in reactors must also be chosen carefully.
As noted in Chapter I, radiation can cause ionization of materials which
may lead to chemical changes (particularly when they are interactive
with water or organic materials) so that materials also suffer "radiation
damage." Changes in the moderator, such as graphite, may affect the
operation of the reactor; but relatively little is known about the nature
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of the injuries to such materials or how they can be prevented. To add
to knowledge in this area, the Atomic Energy Commission has constructed a materials testing reactor at Arco, Idaho. Non-metals also are
affected by radiation, so lubricants and non-metallic parts of electrical
equipment, control rods, containers, and seals, etc., may be adversely
affected. Therefore, metals, as well as solid lubricants, such as graphite
or molybdenum, must be used wherever possible. Where organic
materials such as oil must be used, exposure to radiation should be
minimized.
Apparently the only substances which may be used as moderators are
ordinary water, heavy water, beryllium, and graphite. Ordinary water
must be absolutely pure since impurities capture neutrons and may become radioactive, endangering the cooling system of the reactor as well
as causing corrosion of metals. However, water has a relatively low
boiling point so that pressures must be kept high if the generation of
steam is to be prevented. As we noticed, in the Shippingport reactor
pressures of approximately 2,000 pounds per square inch will be necessary. This is a substantial figure, about equivalent to the pressure at
nine-tenths of a mile under the ocean, so difficulties are involved in
fabricating and constructing the reactor vessel. Heavy water is much
more expensive than is ordinary water, but it has better nuclear properties. However, it, too, boils at a relatively low point; so high pressures
are essential for power production purposes. Both ordinary and heavy
water suffer decomposition when exposed to radiation, and hydrogen
and oxygen gases are released. Since these are explosive, they have to
be removed and recombined. In the homogeneous reactor there is even
greater decomposition because fission products are formed within the
uranium-water solution. Beryllium has excellent nuclear properties but
has been reported as susceptible to corrosion in water. There is evidence
that, if the metal can be more highly purified, this may increase corrosion resistance. However, beryllium itself is a poison and constitutes a
serious health hazard, so extraordinary precaution must be taken to prevent inhalation or ingestion. Graphite has been widely used as a
moderator, but it is affected by nuclear radiation and reacts with oxygen
at high temperatures. Therefore, in respect to moderators a difficult
choice must be made, with all three factors of engineering suitability,
safety, and expense being involved.
For power production, reactors have as a primary function the production of heat energy. Theoretically, extremely high temperatures,
which provide the greatest efficiency in steam generation, are available in
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the fission process. Modern conventional steam boilers, for example,
operate at steam temperatures of about 1050° F. At high temperatures,
however, uranium metal changes in size and shape to an extent that
would seriously disrupt the reactor. Therefore, the temperatures sustained within the reactor must be carefully controlled to prevent distortion of the elements and to guard against the reactor's getting out of
control.
To use the heat produced in the reactor and to maintain proper heat
levels, a coolant must be circulated through the reactor and through a
heat exchanger in which steam is produced. The coolant should have
adequate heat-transfer capabilities, not be susceptible to radiation damage, and not seriously interfere with the neutrons during the fission process. The coolant must be pumped continuously to prevent heat levels in
the reactor core high enough to cause the reactor to "burn up" with the
resulting release of radiation. An undue temperature rise in even a small
portion of the reactor may be disastrous, so the reactor must be equipped
with automatic safety devices which can shut down the chain reaction
when necessary. However, some heat fluctuation is inevitable, and therefore the design of the controls presents difficult problems. 8 A failure in
the safety devices could have tragic consequences. Similarly, all the
pumps, heat exchangers, valves, etc., must be absolutely leakproof and
undergo rigid testing so that chances of a failure are reduced to the very
mmtmum.
As a coolant, air does not have good heat-transfer properties, and at
high temperatures oxygen may cause damage to moderator, cladding,
and structural materials. However, in research reactors, or reactors used
to produce plutonium, where high temperatures are not essential, air can
serve as a satisfactory coolant. Such air must be discharged through
high stacks because of the contained radiation, but under unsatisfactory
meteorological conditions hazards may develop. Hydrogen has good
. heat-transfer properties but constitutes a serious hazard because of its
explosive qualities. Helium also has good coolant characteristics, but
because of its high cost and lighter-than-air quality it must be kept
within leakproof vessels. ·
·Ordinary water seems particularly well-suited as a coolant because of
its low cost and because of its suitability as a moderator. However, the
water must be extremely pure, and it presents certain difficult problems
because of its corrosive effect particularly at and above its boiling point,
6 A recent report from the Argonne National Laboratory indicates that the fast
breeder reactor may be very difficult to control.
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which is relatively low. Therefore, high pressures must be used. Heavy
water is even better as a coolant because of its nuclear properties, but
it is extremely costly. Liquid metals, such as sodium, may also be used
because of their good heat-transfer qualities. However, sodium is very
difficult to handle because of its explosive quality if it comes in contact
with air or water. Moreover, sodium becomes highly radioactive when
subjected to neutron bombardment, a fact which increases the shielding
problem. Furthermore, sodium may solidify in the cooling system when
the. reactor is shut down and this necessitates auxiliary heating equipment. In the second submarine-type reactor, sodium was to be used as a
coolant;.but it was to flow through mercury, which in turn would flow
through the heat exchanger to produce steam. In this way, the hazard
that would be created (if leak should occur and the sodium should
contact the water with a resultant explosion) was to be minimized.
However, because of leaks in the system the reactor was not accepted,
and a Nautilus-type reactor was installed in the submarine. As in other
instances in nuclear reactor design, compromises must be made and
undoubtedly economic considerations will play a major role in commercial reactor ventures.
Reactors, like many other types of furnaces or engines, must have
control mechanisms. In the case of reactors, however, largely because of
the nature of the fuel, several difficult problems are encountered in devising methods of starting the fission process, increasing power to the
desired level, maintaining the desired level, and shutting down the reactor. At least the critical amount of fissionable material necessary to
sustain a chain reaction must be present. This critical mass depends
upon the fuel, reactor design, leakage, etc. Moreover, since heat and fission products cut down the number of available neutrons, the amount of
fuel placed in the reactor must actually exceed the critical size. Since a
chain reaction builds up very rapidly and a too rapid increase in power
can be dangerous, the obvious answer is to control the rate of the chain
reaction process. The different methods that might be employed to control the chain reaction involve either the diminution or removal of fuel,
or the moderator, or the reflector (a blanket of material which scatters
neutrons back into the reactor core), or the addition of a neutron absorber. Boron and cadmium capture neutrons very effectively. Accordingly, control rods made of these materials may be inserted and withdrawn from either the reactor core or the reflector to control the chain
reaction. Absorber rods, however, cause a high loss of neutrons. For
some purposes natural uranium might be used as an absorber and at the
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same time to produce plutonium, or materials might be used that would
create marketable isotopes.
Not only are there different control mechanisms, but several different
types of controls are needed in a reactor. To start the reactor, control
rods called "shim-rods" are usually removed from the reactor core.
Since the growth of the chain reaction must be closely regulated, shimrods should be designed so that they cannot move at high speed. Once
the reactor has reached the proper power level, "regulating rods" are
necessary to control rapid, variable changes. These should be capable
of rapid movement but over small distances so that dangerous increases
in the neutron flux are not possible. The design should be such that complete withdrawal due to an operator's error or failure of any automatic
controls would not permit an upsurge in power levels and a possible
"burn up." As fuel is depleted and as fission products accumulate, regulating rods may be completely withdrawn .. Further depletion or poisoning necessitates withdrawal of a shim-rod to maintain power levels, but a
regulating rod must then be reinserted to the extent that a shim-rod is
removed. Therefore it may be necessary to have a system of interlocking the two types of rods. Another type of control is provided by "safety
rods" which are used to shut down the reactor quickly in the event of an
emergency. They must move very rapidly. By using different drive
devices, shim-rods may also be used as safety rods. Finally, "back-up"
safety devices are necessary for extreme conditions, such as an earthquake, when the safety rods may not move. In some reactors, back-up
safety is supplied by boron shot or liquid absorbers which can be quickly
placed in holes in the reactor. In homogeneous reactors, "dump" valves
can be used to pour the liquid off into vessels having subcritical size.
All of the various controls can be designed to operate automatically as
well as upon push-button control by the operator. Where the human factor is involved a failure of the operator to notice changes in the reaction
as shown by the instruments may result in a serious accident. Recently
an operator of one of the experimental reactors at Arco, Idaho, failed
to understand oral instructions and started control devices in operation
which were not adequate to prevent an accident. Apparently once the
inadequate control mechanisms had started their movement, it was
impossible to change to other methods. Where the controls are automatic, a failure of the measuring devices which start automatic control,
or a failure in the automatic control mechanism itself, could result in a
rapid upsurge in heat which would melt the reactor core and cause the
release of dangerous quantities of radiation.
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Because of the magnitude of the radiati"on hazard in the operation of
reactors, extreme precautions must be taken to protect both employees
and the general public. As a safeguard for the general public, reactors
are usually located in exclusion areas. The AEC Advisory Committee
on Reactor Safeguards has recommended that the exclusion area for a
reactor capable of producing 250,000 kilowatts of heat power should
have a radius of approximately five miles. This may be modified depending on the inherent safety features of the reactor and special construction features. For example, the Shippingport reactor will be housed
in an underground chamber, and the experimental submarine reactor
was located in a gas-tight steel sphere. In selecting reactor locations, the
population density, geological conditions for disposal of wastes, and
meteorological conditions must all be considered.
Some of the most serious problems of radiation safety are encountered in respect to the operating personnel. As indicated in Chapter I, the biological effects of radiation are not as yet fully understood,
but it is known that radiation can cause several types of personal injury.
The National Committee on Radiation Protection has established maximum exposure limits for humans, maximum radiation levels in air and
water, and maximum limits of radioisotopes that may be accumulated
within the body. To assure that the maximums are not exceeded continuous radiation monitoring is essential. Personnel should have· individual monitoring devices so that if any employee receives unusual doses
of radiation, measures can be taken to avoid further exposure in excess
of the maximum. In certain cases radioactivity in the thyroid gland,
where radioiodine accumulates, should be measured. In some cases
analysis of the urine and feces shouid be made to determine if radioisotopes are being ingested. All areas around the reactor should be monitored to determine the amounts of radioactivity on surfaces and within
the air. If radioactivity is high, protective clothing and masks should be
worn or remote control systems should be introduced. Outside the plant,
there should be continuous monitoring of the air and plant life to determine :whether or· not hazards are being created. There are several
types of monitoring instruments that can be employed. A failure of
these instruments to record properly could result in the continuance of
operating procedures that endanger both personnel and the community
by allowing radiation to exceed the permissible levels.
To protect personnel and also to permit the satisfactory operation of
the reactor control instruments, it is essential that the reactor be shielded.
However, as we noticed in Chapter I, neutron and gamma radiation

IMPACT OF ATOMIC ENERGY

59

cannot be reduced to zero because neutrons and gamma rays are exponential in nature. Therefore, the problem is one of reducing these
rays to safe levels. For mobile reactors, such as in aircraft, shielding because of its bulk presents a major problem. Accordingly, in aircraft design other technical considerations may take precedence over the lowest
possible radiation levels.
Shielding should be capable of slowing down fast neutrons and ab-'
sorbing gamma radiation (for which heavy elements are best suited),
moderating slow neutrons (hydrogenous substances perform well), and
capturing neutrons without producing high-energy gamma radiation
(for- which boron appears to have exceptional qualities). The same
material may perform all three tasks. Iron has been extensively used as
a suitable heavy element. Lead is particularly capable of absorbing
gamma radiation and slowing down neutrons, but it has not been widely
used as reactor shielding because of its low melting point and its softness,
making it unsuitable as a structural material. Ordinary concrete is very
effective for moderating slow neutrons, but it is not satisfactory as a
shield because of the absence of heavy elements. However, heavy elements, such as iron turnings or mineral barytes (largely barium sulfate)
may be used in the concrete instead of sand and gravel, making an
effective shield. To reduce the size of concrete shielding, the incorporation of boral, a combination of boron and aluminum, seems to be promising. At the present time, a shield of concrete and heavy elements appears
attractive because of its low cost, but experimentation with air-water,
lead-water, or ceramic shields may prove fruitful.
In the shielding process, other difficulties are encountered where instruments, controls, and beam holes for inserting materials for producing radioisotopes must penetrate the shield. The various instruments
and pipes may require further shielding to reduce the amount of radiation to which personnel are exposed. When experiments are being conducted, or fuel elements are being handled, mechanical or human reactor
controls must be carefully coordinated. Possibilities of leakage must
be checked continually, and personnel must be carefully trained to avoid
contact with radiation beams.
Although we have explored only superficially the technological problems of reactor design and operation, it seems clear that the slightest
human or mechanical errors may create conditions that endanger personnel and the surrounding community. The magnitude of possible
injuries is astounding. A release of large quantities of radiation may
result in all the types of personal radiation injuries discussed in Chap-
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ter I. A whole city may have to be evacuated and decontamination processes used. In some cases, decontamination would not be satisfactory,
and therefore the contaminated articles would have to be removed or
that particular location may become uninhabitable until radiation naturaily diminishes to safe levels. The accidental contamination of a community's water supply alone could cause untold personal injuries and
disrupt the entire economic life of the community. There can be no
doubt that a major reactor accident could cause damages measured in
the millions and hundreds of millions of dollars. This magnitude of
potential damage litigation is apparently not encountered in other industrial pursuits.
2.

Radiation Sources and Their Hazards

The development of the nuclear reactor brought with it a very important byproduct-radioisotopes. For the first ,time a neutron source
of sufficient power was available to produce radioisotopes of many different elements in abundance and at low cost. The physical phenomena
of radiation, even that derived from relatively rare and enormously expensive radium, was early recognized as being extremely important in
industry, medicine, agriculture, and other pursuits. When, after World
War II, the government permitted purchase of radioisotopes produced
in its reactors, a whole new technology was immediately stimulated, and
innumerable practical uses of radiation have been developed. In fact, it
is principally in the uses of sources of radiation to accomplish specific
purposes that commercial exploitation of atomic energy has occurred
in the United States, although reactors planned or in construction will
soon change this. The estimated savings through process and quality
controls in industry alone have been estimated as being at a rate of $400
million annually. Moreover, new radiation devices which have considerable promise are being rapidly developed, and the number of industrial users (now approximately I ,600) can be expected to increase
in the years to come with resulting major contributions to the economy.
First we will discuss some of the current and potential uses of radiation
sources, and then we will proceed to review the nature of some of the
hazards to persons and property arising therefrom.
Thickness and Density Measuring Devices. By measuring the change
in intensity of a beam of radiation it is possible to determine variations
in the thickness or density of material through which the radiation beam
passes. Typically, in gages employing radioactivity, the radiation source
is stationary and is placed on one side of the material. On the other side
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is placed a geiger counter, ionization chamber, or other device which can
measure the changes in the radiation. These gages have been particularly
useful in industries producing sheet materials,- such as steel, aluminum,
copper, brass, plastics, paper, film, and tape. Radioactive thickness
gages have advantages over mechanical gages. Because no mechanical
contact is required, it is_ not necessary to stop or cut rolling sheet material
to insert the gage. If the material to be measured is too hot, too soft, or
easily marred by handling, radioactive gages have a further advantage.
Moreover, radioactive gages are more sensitive and give higher precision
than mechanical gages. In addition, they are easily adapted to automatic
controls which can even be used to adjust the rollers thus permitting
automatic correction of the defect.
Because radioactive thickness gages require no interruption of production, permit narrower tolerances to be maintained (thereby saving
material), and can be used with automatic control devices to correct
errors, their use means substantial savings· in many industries. For
example, the amount of rubber needed to· make a safe tire reaches a
limit beyond which quality is not improved by additional material. Surplus rubber was formerly used as a safeguard but with radioactive gages
exact amounts can be readily measured and savings have ensued without
sacrifice of quality. Radioactive thickness gages may also be used to
measure the thickness of plating or of abrasives, such as sandpaper, with
similar advantages and consequent savings. Further possibilities exist
in the measuring of the density of solids and liquids, such as oil,
chemicals, soap chips, etc.
The radioactive material which is incorporated into the gage is usually
placed in a sealed metal container which has at least one area which is
so designed that the radiation can pass through at the desired level of
intensity. Necessarily, the container must be inspected regularly to see
that no radioactive materials have escaped to contaminate surrounding
equipment. In practice, the gages are sometimes sold outright by the
manufacturers, but in many instances the radiation source is rented so
that the supplier retains title. The supplier of rented radiation sources
also undertakes the responsibility of inspecting. The manufacturers
have in some instances sold the radiation source without such service
where the user has the necessary equipment and experience to handle
the health and safety problems connected with the gages.
Similarly, liquid level gages can be used in many industries to locate
substances in containers that are closed and hence inaccessible. The
location of the level depends upon recording the intensity of a beam of
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radiation. When the liquid, the height of which is being measured,
comes between the source and the detector, there is a sharp decrease in
the detector's radiation. Or in the alternative, radioactive floats are
introduced into the liquid, and their radioactivity is detected from outside the wall. The point of radioactivity reveals the level of the liquid.
Radiography. Radiographic testing which is used to inspect the internal structure of metal castings, welds, etc,, is not a new technique.
X-ray machines and radium sources were previously used, but the availability of large quantities of high energy radiation sources such as cobalt
6o has made it economically feasible to undertake more extensive radiographic testing. The testing process consists of placing a radioactive
source on one side of the specimen to be tested and a photographic film
on the other. The film when developed reveals any flaws or cracks in the
specimen since more radiation will penetrate the areas of defect and
cause greater exposure on the film. Radiocobalt is approximately onefiftieth as expensive as radium and it has a greater gamma ray generating capacity for its weight. Cobalt sources can be machined to any shape
before they are made radioactive by exposure to neutrons within a
reactor. However, radiocobalt must be clad prior to usage because it
tends to flake after exposure to neutron bombardment.
Medical Uses. Radioisotopes and radiation sources have considerable
promise for therapeutic uses by the medical profession. X-ray machines
and radium have, of course, been employed for a number of years.
Radioactive iodine and phosphorus have also been available as specialized therapy tools in very limited quantities for the few scientists having
access to particle accelerators. Today, however, over Boo varieties of
radioisotopes are available in substantial quantities for medical use.
Availability is no longer a problem.
One therapy technique makes use of the destructive qualities of radiation. The radiation is directed at diseased tissue to destroy the undesirable cells. However, healthy tissues located near the diseased tissues
are also in danger of destruction, so the process must be cautiously
handled. The radiation may be supplied from a source external to the
body, it may be placed within the body near the diseased tissue, or a
radioisotope may be injected in the body when the particular isotope has
a tendency to concentrate chemically in the particular diseased organ.
If reliance is placed on the selectivity of a particular isotope for certain
body tissues, the half-life of the radioisotope is important. Too long a
half-life may result in the continuation of radiation which damages
healthy tissue long after the diseased tissue has been .destroyed. Like-
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wise, the biological half-life or rate of elimination from the body is
important in such use of radioisotopes, as was explained in Chapter I.
Considerable research is still needed before the therapeutic techniques
now used experimentally can become standardized.
As an external source, cobalt 6o, a very powerful gamma emitter, is
replacing radium because of its low cost and less hazardous nature. The
radioisotopes currently used most extensively internally are radioiodine
131-, a gamma emitter, and phosphorus 32, a beta emitter. Because
iodine is naturally attracted to and retained by the thyroid gland, radioiodine can be used for some of that gland's disorders. Hyperthyroidism,·
or excessive hormone secretion of the thyroid with disabling symptoms,
has been checked, if not cured, by radioiodine. Cancerous growths in
the thyroid can be treated by the radiation from radioiodine. Angina
pectoris has been relieved by radioiodine, apparently because it eases the
load on a diseased heart by slowing down the activity of the thyroid.
Radiophosphorus, which has an affinity for bone marrow, will radiate
the blood-forming tissues and decelerate the production of blood cells.
Administration of radiophosphorus has provided relief to patients
afflicted with an oversupply of red cells (polycythemia subra vera) and
has controlled, though not cured, the oversupply of white cells (leukemia).
Sterilization of Food and Drugs. Radiation sources can also be used
to sterilize foods and drugs .. Microorganisms present in pharmaceutical
products and items intended for human consumption can, if desired, be
completely exterminated, but the quantity of radiation needed for the
purpose increases greatly as lower forms of life are attacked. Absolute
sterilization may require a dosage as high as approximately two million
roentgens. The danger inherent in using this amount of radioactivity
in foods and drugs is appare.nt when we consider that approximately
400 roentgens constitutes a lethal dose for at least half of the human
population. Apprehension has been expressed about the possibility of
inducing subtle changes in the irradiated food or drug materials which
could not be detected by ordinary chemical and physical means. The
hazards in this respect do not arise from radioactivity as such, but from
its side effects, such as the creation of pathogenic conditions or toxicity.
However, short of sterilization, pasteurization of foods and drugs by
means of ionizing radiation can be accomplished by much smaller doses
of radioactivity. In pasteurizing a product most of the pathogenic bacteria are killed, but not all. Intensive experiments are being carried on
to achieve practical results in this area. It has been reported that in
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England irradiated onions and potatoes have already been supplied to the
submarine crews of the Royal Navy. The United States Army is carrying on a $s,ooo,ooo research program along this line.
The advantage of either sterilizing or pasteurizing by the use of
radiation consists of accomplishing these goals without significant increases in temperature. Consequently there is the possibility of treating
products that are heat-sensitive, protecting them from deleterious
changes produced by heat sterilization, or from change of taste or other
quality that might result therefrom. Packaged meats, canned milk, dried
eggs, ice cream, and other mixes may be cited as examples. The sterilizing or pasteurizing operation is normally applied after packaging, thus
eliminating the possibility of contamination after radiation, a very important advantage.
Cold sterilization of penicillin or other antibiotics, medical supplies,
and sanitary products, bandages, sutures, etc., can also be effectuated;
plasma and other blood components are made to last longer and the likelihood of transmitting contagious disease is reduced. Beneficial effects
can be produced by sterilization of hormones, vitamins, antibodies, and
other products. Fruits, vegetables, and beverages can also be treated to
increase appreciably their shelf-life.
Static Eliminators. The hazards of static electricity, which is produced by friction, can be eliminated by the use of ionizing radiation.
Static charges occur in manufacturing operations of sheet plastic, paper,
motion picture film, in coffee . plants, in leather fabrication, in flour
milling, and in many fine grinding operations. Automatic processes may
be reduced in efficiency or even impeded by static electricity. The cutting
of filmy materials, or the carding and warping of textile fibers are examples. Even more serious is the possibility of building up large electrostatic fields sufficient to give off sparks and thus create fire hazards in
explosive atmosphere, such as that formed in industrial works using
inflammable fluids or explosives, or that of a hospital operating room.
Radioactive sources can be used to ionize the air surrounding the point
of origin of a static charge. The ions in the air are attracted to surfaces
of opposite signs, and the charge is neutralized.
Exploration for Oil. The oil industry has found in the use of radioactive sources a more efficient means of exploring the bowels of the
earth. A portable neutron source, usually a mixture of radium, polonium, and beryllium is lowered into the bore-hole of the well, along with
a detecting device. To prevent the detector from being directly activated
by neutrons from the source a shield is interposed. The operation con-
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sists of making readings of radioactivity reflected from the surrounding
matter the nature of which is to be determined. Dry strata absorb the
neutrons, but when neutrons encounter hydrogen atoms, many of them
are "scattered back" and are revealed by the detector. A counter measures
the activity, and electronic devices relay the information to the surface.
The presence of either water or oil is shown by the hydrogen content
thus revealed, and electrical conductivity tests are used to complete the
identification. The use of radiation has revealed the existence of large
reserves in many fields long believed exhausted.
· Agricultural Uses. The ability of radiation to induce changes in the
hereditary features of plants and animals has been turned to advantageous use by science. Neutron irradiation of chromosomes and genes
produces mutations that are frequently harmful, but occasionally beneficial changes are induced. This fact has already led to the production of
rust-resistant oats and better barley, wheat, and corn. A variety of
peanuts has been produced which is leaf-spot resistant and yields about
thirty. per cent more quantity per acre. A radiation-caused mutation in
penicillin mold has made possible a much greater producing type. The
radiation doses needed to bring about mutations are much larger than
amounts lethal to humans and animals. In the process a minute portion
of the total number of specimens show good mutation. The others are
discarded as useless. It is for this reason that plant and seed irradiation
is more practical than animal activation. Amounts of radioactivity large
enough to produce mutations would have to be administered to large
numbers of animals, and a considerable number of them would have to
be sacrificed to obtain the favorable mutations in some of them. Nevertheless, radiation is currently being used on poultry to increase egg production.
Again, atomic energy offers at least partial relief from this country's
three billion dollar yearly loss of agricultural yield due to insects. Low
energy radiation renders various species of insects sterile, thus facilitating their eradication. Similarly radiation may be employed in the control
of weevils and other insects in stored produce, in the elimination of insect contamination in consumer packages of grain products, and for
coating underground cables to inhibit mold and fungus growth. It has
recently been suggested that railroad cars equipped with radiation
sources be moved about the country during critical crop stages to reduce
crop damage due to insects and spoilage.
Miscellaneous Uses. Brief mention should also be made of certain
other uses of radioactivity which indicate the important role that it will
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play in the everyday life of the future. The use of cobalt 6o gamma rays
to vulcanize rubber by radioactivity, instead of heat, shows promise of
improving resistance of rubber compounds to oil impregnation and increasing their serviceability under high or low temperature conditions.
Radioactive devices for the scientificalty correct measurement of time
are expected to be used in navigation, communication, and related research, such as the study of variations in the rate of rotation of the
earth. Conversion of sea water to fresh water may someday be brought
to pass by use of radiation. Large-scale catalysis of chemical reactions
is envisioned. Radioisotopes have been found to have useful applications
in ventilation and air conditioning where they can minimize or eliminate
hazards from explosions in ducts conveying finely ground materials.
Better means of processing plastics, increasing their temperature resistance, and adding to their strength can be achieved by the use of
atomic energy.
.
Phosphorescent or fluorescent materials, activated by radioisotopes,
make excellent luminous compounds, and the stock pile of fission products increases the availability of colors, of degrees of brightness, and of
longer-lived materials. They can be used on instrument dials, road signs,
advertising structures, ~nd as safety markings for buildings and mines.
For example, when disruption of electrical power interrupts normal
service, luminous signs might be used to guide personnel to safety.
Ionization of the air-fuel mixture may be used to improve the performance of internal combustion engines, for flame propagation is believed to depend in part on the agitation of the gas molecules. Because
ions are agitated atoms or molecules and can be created by radiation, a
long half-life isotope in a combustion engine may well improve the
efficiency of low octane fuel and prevent knocking.
Another probably common future use of radiation sources, based on
the same principle as that employed in logging oil wells, is the determination of the density of the soil upon which structures or highways are to
be built, and the amount of moisture in it. Simplification of construction
procedures and improvement of quality and safety features in the building of highways, airport runways, or earth dams can be achieved by this
means. Neutron sources and detectors will be used but will function on
the surface instead of at considerable depths as in the case of oil wells.
The tests will be conducted at intervals along the path to be used.
Paul Weidlinger, a consulting engineer of the American Spciety of
Chemical Engineering, suggests that powerful radiation could be used
to rearrange the molecules in wood so that the result would be a stronger
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and more durable product. Better plywood could thus be provided for
houses, boats, and industry. The structural members of the material
would be much thinner and lighter, and yet they would be stronger and
more elastic. Fire resistance could be increased to the extent of eliminating the necessity of fireproofing and the cumbersome, expensive accessories that come with it. Exploiting the ability of hard radiation to
cross-link molecules, the plywood industry might be enabled to forego
the use of glues. According to Mr. Weidlinger, enormous pressures may
be used to cross-layer thin veneers, and heat action may cause the extrusion of natural lignin, while the application of hard gamma rays may
cause the molecules to join without raising the temperature. This
process would permit the processing of building materials into various
shapes and would truly be like taking the substance apart and completely
reassembling it.
Innumerable other possibilities for the use of radiation, such as in
batteries or for space heating of homes, have been suggested and are
being investigated. Undoubtedly many other uses will be developed that
will make the total contribution of radiation to the economy of possibly
startling proportions. Therefore, we can expect radiation sources to
become even more commonplace in the relatively near future.
It must always be remembered, however, that utilization of radioactive sources creates hazards to persons and property because of the damaging effect of ionizing radiation. Recently, as pointed out in Chapter I,
a group of prominent scientists has concluded that any radiation, no
matter how small, is damaging to the living and perhaps more importantly to the descendants of the living. Therefore, users of radiation
must exert all efforts to reduce radiation hazards.
The number of ways in which the use of radiation may result in damage is almost unending, but some deserve particular mention. The transportation of radioactive materials from their point of origination to
refiners and suppliers and eventually to consumers involves unusual
hazards. Not only must carrier personnel be protected by shielding, but
also protection must be afforded persons who are near the transportation vehicles, such as passengers or the casual passersby or persons working in buildings near railroad sidings where boxcars transporting radioactive materials happen to be resting temporarily. A train or airplane
accident may cause rescuers to be subjected to damaging radiation if the
container has been broken by the impact of the wreck. Persons so exposed will not know of their injury until possible corrective measures
may be too late. Therefore, radioactive materials should be transported
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in the most secure fashion and notices of a possible hazard should be
conspicuous.
Radiation sources are, of course, a hazard to personnel in the immediate vicinity. Areas of high radiation levels must be blocked off or
personnel unwittingly will be absorbing harmful radiation. Location
within buildings but close to public passageways may cause harmful
exposure to children playing outside the factory. The uninformed petty
thief may carry home an extremely dangerous radioactive source unless
the materials are carefully guarded and inventoried. A plant explosion
or fire may break the container, scattering the radioactive material.
Police and firemen who come to assist in putting out the conflagration
may be exposed. 7 Plant visitors or even trespassers, such as children,
must be excluded from access to the source so that the radiation beam
will not be directed at themselves or others in the vicinity. This very ·
incomplete list of possibilities suggests the desirability of free use of
exclusion areas with an abundance of warning devices and notices.
Radiation injuries may also occur because of the cumulative effect of
radiation, although the particular exposure is below safe maximums, as
is also pointed out in Chapter I. For example, an employee may have.
undergone radiation during therapy and then received additional radia•
tion at work because of the impossibility of perfect shielding against
gamma radiation. Or a patient may have been given radiation treatments by one doctor and then given further radiation for possibly another ailment by a second doctor. In both cases the amount of radiation
at any one exposure would have been considered safe, but a cumulative
radiation injury may occur. This suggests that monitoring of personnel
should be continuous and perhaps every individual in the community
should have a complete accurate record of exposures so that cumulative
radiation can be ·estimated and damage avoided. Registration on a
national basis was actually recommended by the Committee on Genetic
Effects of Atomic Radiation of the National Academy of Sciences. 8
The erroneous shipment of a gamma source when the consumer has
requested a beta source could lead to innumerable injuries because of the
vast differences in· required shielding. Radiation injuries to persons
and property may result from leakage in containers. Radioactive materials may be accidentally shipped to consumers of articles produced in
the factory using radiation sources. Radioisotopes may be acci~entally
thrown into sewers which empty into streams from which water is taken
7 E.g., the explosion in the Sylvania Laboratory in New York City.
s National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council, "The Biological Effects
of Atomic Radiation," p. 28 (1956).
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for drinking or industrial uses. If a film processing plant used water
containing radioactive materials, the film would be damaged. Disposing of radioactive materials in dumps that may later be the site of buildings may eventually result in injury to the occupants. When the radiation level is no longer sufficient for the particular use but is still harmful
to human life, adequate methods of disposal must be found or the same
hazards may develop as in the case of disposal of the waste products
created in the fission process. The possibilities for injuries seem interminable, and unusual hazards are ·encountered because of the unique
nature of radiation whereby injuries are suffered without the immedi-'
ate interposition of the human sense perception.
In conjunction with use of radiation sources, it should be noted that,
although potential hazards are created by their use, failure to use radiation techniques may similarly create hazards that may result in legal
liability.· For example, a crucial casting for a mechanical device that has
not been tested by radiography may break causing injuries to persons
and property. Similarly, drugs or blood plasma not sterilized by radiation may seriously infect patients. Furthermore, it is entirely possible
that radiation usages may become so standardized in certain industries
that a failure to take advantage of them may be evidence of negligence
in any litigation based upon injuries caused by the product.
In judging what radiation hazards are unacceptable, the hazard must
always be weighed against the great benefits which can come from the
use of atomic energy mechanisms.
3· Radioactive Tracers and Their Hazards
Radioisotopes have already been used in large quantities in tracing
experiments and techniques in biology, industry, medicine, and agriculture. Since the beginning of the United States Atomic Energy Commission's post-World War II program thousands of shipments have
been made to thousands of institutions in this country and abroad.
Moreover, the federal government is financing an extensive research
program with laboratories at Brookhaven, Argonne, Los Alamos, Oak
Ridge, Rochester, Arco, and other places.
Because of the radiation they emit, inconceivably minute quantities
of radioisotopes can be detected by very sensitive instruments. A socalled ".labeled" or "tagged" atom, i.e., a radioactive isotope of a given
chemical" element, as explained in Chapter I, is identical in its chemical
behavior with its non-radioactive sister atoms. It can be "traced"
through a series of chemical or physical reactions even in the presence of
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great quantities of non-radioactive atoms of the same substance or of
different substances. Complex and mysterious biological and industrial
processes can be better understood by the use of proper radioisotopic
tracer materials. Isotope labeling establishments are curr~ntly supplying
numerous tagged compounds, such as sugars, organic acids, amino acids,
pigments, alkaloids, proteins, and others. Medicinaf plants are being
grown in an atmosphere of radioactivity to produce labeled drugs.
There are, of course, limitations upon the practital use of tracers,
and often a radioisotope of suitable degree of activity or half-life is not
available. For example, no usable radioisotope of oxygen, nitrogen, or
aluminum has been produced, or the amount of an isotope needed for a ·
certain tracer application may be too 'large to be safe. Moreover, the
process of synthesizing the radioisotope into a compound posses'sing
physical and chemical properties identical with the material under study
is sometimes impos'sible or impractical. Despite these difficulties, how.:.
ever, tracer techniques are widely used and highly successful. · The
equipment needed for utiliza1ion of tracers is not expensive; the cbst of
the radioisotopes themselves is low, and important additions to knowledge may be made by their utilization. Their possible· usefulness for·
known processes and for many not yet envisaged has caused authorita..:
tive sources to hail them as one of the most significant contributions to
the welfare of man so far derived from atomic energy, perhaps the most
useful discovery since the microscope.
A brief account of some of the more important current applications
of tracer techniques will reveal the importance of radioactive tracers to
society.
Tracers in the Oil Industry. The oil industry has found profitable
uses for radiotracers. After a period of use the walls of a pipeline may
become encrusted with wax. Special scrapers, with a number of blades,
are driven through a pipe by compressed air to remove obstacles and
accumulations. If a scraper sticks in a pipe instead· of emerging at the
other end, its location is difficult to determine. To facilitate identification of the spot, a source of cobalt 6o in an aluminum container is attached to the scraper. A geiger counter outside the pipe registers a response to the gamma rays· emitted by the cobalt even through several
feet of earth, and thus locates the scraper.
Gasoline, diesel oil, stove oil, or oils of different qualities may be
shipped successively through the same pipeline, and it is necessary to
spot with accuracy the interfaces between any two substances as shipped.
If a small quantity of radioactive material is injected into the line at the
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interface, geiger counters placed at the desired cut off points indicate the
arival of a new substance by signaling the radioactivity. Operators can
then turn valves to direct the new shipment to its proper tanks. The advantage of the tracer technique is that it accurately locates the interface
and measures the extent to which the adjacent materials have intermingled in the pipeline. The amounts of radiation needed for this and
similar strictly tracing functions are not particularly hazardous provided
proper care is exercised in handling the radioactive materials themselves.
_A.gain, tracershave contributed to making oil well drilling safer and
simpler. The use of acids in wells to render limestone or sandstone formatiqns permeable is often necessary, but it has been a hazardous and
time-consuming operation for the reason that thousands of feet of tubing had to be removed and disjointed to install accessory equipment for
acidizing purposes. Radioiodine now reveals the level of the acid, which,
by applying ·pressure according to instructions received from readings,
can be kept at the bqttom of the well without danger ofcorroding tubings or the casings of the wen.
· Metal Wear Testing. A process has been developed for measuring
the wear of engine parts and comparing the performance of different
lubricants and fuels. It is ~ased on a weight loss system and is a quick
and effective procedure. Under previous practices, an engine would be
run for a long time, even months; then it would be dismantled a11d the
weight of the parts being tested would be compared with their weight
before the test. Using the "tagged atoms" procedure, piston rings or
other parts can be irradiated in a reactor, placed in the engine, and the
engine started. At any desired time interval, the oil may be drained off,
and a geiger counter used to determine the amount of radioactive metal
worn off in the operation. Accurate testing is possible without the expensive and time-consuming dismantling otherwise required. I~ is asserted that better engine oils have been produced as a by-product of this
speedy and precise method of testing.
The same technique can be applied to tools of many kinds to appraise
their resistance and predict the duration of their life. Cutting tools may
be made radioactive in ~ reactor. During their use microscopic fragments of metal are worn off and intermingled with the metal chips of
machined pieces. The radioactivity of the wastes determines instantly
the wear of the tool. Previous methods required extended wearing of
the tool to test. it effectively.
Foods and Food Processing. By means of radiotracers simpler and
more reliable methods of toxicological evaluation of ingredients are
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open to the food industry. Food additives, whether for flavor, color, and
texture, or as a preservative, must be harmless. Radioactivation of
such additives, or proper labeling with a radioisotope, allows the rese~rch staff of the industry to follow the absorption, distribution, storage, and excretion of ingested foodstuffs. Any abnormalities in the
metabolic process such as excessive accumulation .or distribution may
reveal nutritional hazards and call for discontinuance of a practice or
the substitution of a safer chemical.
Again, it often happens that food processors are interested in knowing the .rate of water penetration into food products. Experimental
samples· are processed with radioactive water, and radiographic tests
are made which indicate the water distribution at different stages. This
technique has assisted the manufacture of better products.
Even the much debated effects of smoking may be investigated by
the use of radioactive tracers. A tobacco company has reported that it is
conducting experiments to determine the disposition of the several ingredients of tobacco that are inhaled. Different constituents of tobacco
are tagged and followed in the pathways inside the body. The distribution and rate of elimination thus observed may reveal important facts
about the pathogenic effect of certain tobaccos or some of their constituents.
The contributions of tracing techniques to the improvement of many
agricultural processes and to the expansion of knowledge concerning
agricultural practices have been outstanding and are undergoing constant expansion. It truly can be stated that imagination and ingenuity
can extend the use of radioactive tracers to cover most areas of human
activity.
The efficiency of conversion of feed into meat by animals can be
determined by tracing. The effect of adding certain elements may lead
to better feed products. The utilization and elimination rate of feed
components may reveal the cause of a diet deficiency and suggest ways of
restoring pastures to a high nutritional value or of rendering valuable
an area. of supposedly little worth. Experiments with tracers reveal
whether inadequate growth in animals is due to low dietary intake or to
the intake of adverse food elements.
The use of tracers has revealed to science the processes of synthesis
of foods and the degradative reactions that occur rapidly within the
body. Earlier beliefs are being replaced by more adequate understanding. Advances in dietetics have been made possible by nutritional studies
based on tracing techniques.
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The mineral components of certain feed supplements have been followed in their paths through an animal system. To satisfy animal needs
for small amounts of iodine, iron, copper, cobalt, zinc, etc., such substances are placed in "salt blocks" scattered around pastures. The use of
radioisotopes reveals that certain minerals are being leached out without
reaching the animal. This discovery has led to the manufacture of
blocks containing water insoluble compounds. The effects of fluorine
on calcium metabolism in animals has been studied with the use of tracer
isotopes to measure the rate of bone growth and to determine the amount
of fluorine, if any, to be used in water. Experiments have shown that
the growth in the bone structure of animals supplied with a high fluorine
content in their diet is only half that of the growth registered by animals
that are fed a normal or low amount of fluorine. This discovery even
has implications for use of fluorine to retard tooth decay in humans.
Again, a substance called thiouracil shows great growth promoting
possibilities and can be fed to pigs, poultry, and other farm animals to
improve the efficiency of feed utilization. A drawback consists of the
fact that thiouracil depresses the function of the thyroid gland and may
even be deleterious to humans feeding on animals fattened on a thiouracil diet. Experiments have shown that if the substance is withheld from
the diet of animals for two or three days befor.e they are slaughtered
for human consumption, no significant amount is retained by the time
they reach the market. This knowledge was gained by the use of radioactive iodine as a tracer s~udying its uptake by the thyroid· gland when
mixed with thiouracil. As a result of these demonstrations, the Food
and Drug Administration has approved thiouracil as a satisfactory diet
ingredient.
Agricultural Uses. Radioactive tracers have disclosed much valuable
information on the rate of plant uptake of commercial fertilizers.
Tracers reveal under what conditions and at what stage of a growing
cycle fertilizers should be applied for best results. Phosphates, tagged
with radiophosphorus, permit discovery of the portions of phosphorus
der~ved from the soil and the portions coming to the plant from fertilizers. Thus it has been found that corn takes up phosphorus from
applied fertilizers in its early stages, but that later the uptake is principally from natural phosphorus deeper in the soil. Tobacco growers have
introduced savings as a result of the knowledge that phosphates spread
at the surface have little value for their crops.
Radiotracers can also be used to evaluate the natural fertility of the
soil. The inhibiting effects of certain mineral components of the soil can
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be assessed. It has been learned that a fertilizer may be good for a certain year, but that it will be harmful to a future type of crop in the system of rotation. This has furnished valuable guidance for growers in
the selection of their rotating crops. Dr. Walter F. Libby, a member of
the United States Atomic Energy Commission, has estimated that proper
utilization of radiation sources and radioisotope tracers in agriculture
could save upwards of $2oo,ooo,ooo per year by reason of improved
methods and materials.
Photosynthesis, the process by which plants store sunlight and turn
it into chemical energy, is the basis of all life on earth, and it is slowly
unfolding its mystery through the aid of radioactive tracers. The hopedfor dream of researchers is the artificial reproduction of the photosynthesis cycle which would make possible the production of organic
foodstuffs from inorganic materials-from water, carbon dioxide, and
solar energy. This would .even tend to obviate the. necessity of complete
reliance upon soil and plant life as the source of food supply as we know
it now.
Tracers in Medicine. Great strides have been made in medicine with
the use of r:adioisotopes as tracers. Radioiodine and radiophosphorus
have proved most useful. When radioiodine is administered to a patient in a solution of water-the so-called "atomic cocktail"-it will
quickly tend to concentrate in the thyroid gland. If the iodine taken up
by the thyroid is less than the normal amount, cancer of the gland may
be suspected; if too much concentration is registered, the gland may be
overactive and need treatment. A detecting instrument placed over the
gland signals the amount of radioactivity and tells the skilled technician
much that the doctor needs to know.
A new method of cancer diagnosis which utilizes tracing techniques
has been ·inaugurated. It has been found that certain substances tend to
concentrate in areas of overactive metabolism such as cancerous tissues.
This fact has been exploited by injecting radioisotopes into the system
and detecting the point or points of higher concentration of radioactivity. This technique helps to pinpoint the location of the tumor and may
reveal the malignant nature of many kinds of growth.
Radiocarbon and radioiron have yielded useful information about
anemia and diabetes. The reason for overproduction of. white cells in
leukemia sufferers is· better understood as a result of the use of tracers.
For example, tracers have revealed that the white cells in leukemia patients are deficient in zinc.
Radioisotopes disclose the distribution of drugs in the body. They
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also facilitate studies of blood flow by taking advantage of the fact that
the time employed by the blood to circulate between two given points can
be determined by injecting radiomaterial at one point and determining
the time of its arrival at the other.
During a surgical operation it is often vital to know the amount of
blood lost by the patient. An accurate method is afforded by the intravenous injection of radioiodine. The dilution of the radioisotope in a
sample of blood extracted after sufficient time. for mixing has elapsed;
reveals the prese11t blood volume. Blood preservation studies have been
aided by the use of radiochromium. tagged red cells. The life processes
of red cells are studied ·in this manner.
The hazards connected with the utilization of radioactive tracers are
substantially similar to those involved when using radiation sources:
However, in tracer techniques only small amounts· of low energy materials are needed, and consequently the degree of hazard is not as great.
Moreover, tracer techniques are usually employed by highly experienced
personnel who are fully knowledgeful of the dangers. In industrial applications of radiation sources untrained employees are more likely to
be utilized.
Once again, as with radiation. sources, a failure to use radioisotopes
as tracers may create hazards. If a fertilizer or drug is tested with the
new tracer techniques, injuries may be avoided. A failure to determine
possible dangers in a product by using the tracer technique may be evidence of negligence in some instances. Therefore, although injuries
may result from employing radioisotopic tracers,· other injuries may
occur by not taking advantage of their value as a research and testing in·
strument.
B. General Tort Liability Problems

In reading the foregoing discussion of the scientific aspects of atomic
energy, its peacetime uses, and the potential hazards, lawyers without
doubt have reviewed in their minds the legal principles applicable to
litigation in the tort liability field. We shall now briefly describe some
of the legal problems that we feel may be arising in the future with considerable frequency, and in the succeeding chapters we shall analyze the
more important rules of law currently applied in the tort and workmen's
compensation fields and discuss possible solutions for specific problems
unique in connection with peaceful uses of atomic energy.
it should be especially emphasized that there will be an important interrelationship between the law and atomic energy. In other words, the
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law will affect atomic energy operations, for the lawyer will be obliged
to advise his clients to pursue certain courses of action to avoid certain
legal consequences. At the same time atomic energy will affect the law by
stimulating the development of new legal principles to the new technology, either by the courts or legislatures, or both.
Perhaps the most crucial question is what general rules of tort liability
will or should be applied to atomic energy activities. Should the ordinary rules of negligence apply? Or should rules enforcing strict liability
as in the case of an "ultrahazardous" enterprise be applicable? Should
the same rules, negligence or strict liability, be applied to reactor operation as to the use of radiation sources or radioisotopes? As we mentioned earlier, the failure of the common law to adapt itself to industrial
injury problems led to the enactment of statutory workmen's compensation. If common law rules are not again to be superseded, this time by
statutory rules in the area of atomic energy enterprise, careful consideration must be given to the evolution of judge-made common law. Or
perhaps it may be found that, in some aspects at least, only statutory
solutions will serve adequately to adjust atomic energy to the law. If,
in judicial proceedings to impose civil liability, negligence must be found
before the one who causes the damage is obliged to respond in damages,
individual members or, indeed, the whole of society will bear a greater
direct risk and burden. If strict liability rules are applied, a restricted
part of society, i.e., atomic energy enterprise, must bear a greater direct
economic burden, either through payment of claims or through increased
costs of insurance. These economic burdens may, of course, be passed
on to the general public in the form of increased prices for the product of
such enterprise. In many instances, however, the potential economic
burden may deter entrepreneurs from undertaking atomic energy activities. The nature of the general rules of law to be made applicable will
also have its effect on the safety measures to be used in atomic energy
operations. If strict liability is imposed, entrepreneurs will doubtless
take the utmost precautionary measures which, of course, will increase
the economic costs of utilizing atomic energy, undoubtedly retarding its
development to some extent.We have already seen that reactor operation, radiation sources, and
the storage and disposal of radioactive wastes all involve unusual hazards that might be characterized as ultrahazardous in nature. We must
ask ourselves many questions. What effect, if any, should be given to
governmental approval of the operation as set forth in the form of
atomic energy licenses ? Should or does such approval l?reclude the
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courts from applying strict liability rules, particularly when the operation
has been carefully inspected from the standpoint of health and safety
by federal or state authorities? What is the effect of federal approval on
state authority? Should liability be imposed for injuries to trespassers
in view of the unique hazards? Should visitors and licensees be required
to assume radiation risks? Should liability be imposed where an "Act
of God," such as an earthquake or tornado, has caused injuries by
spreading radioactivity throughout a community? Do workers "assume
risks" such as possible_ genetic damage?
The scope of potential liability based upon the applicable principles of
tort law will have an effect on the type of business organization that may
be used in atomic energy pursuits. If strict liability is imposed, it may
encourage the establishment of separate corporations to handle atomic
energy, legal entities divorced from business organizations already
established in industry. Should use of a corporate device with limited
assets be permitted in so hazardous a field? Should minimum insurance coverage be required by' law? Lawyers in the atomic energy era
will be called upon to assess all legal possibilities and undoubtedly will
be asked to give advice that will protect investors to the greatest possible
degree against possible tort claims. At the same time cognizance must
be taken of the legitimate claims of individuals and groups who may be
injured by atomic energy activities.
In addition to the problem of the general rules of law to be applied to
atomic energy, there are a number of specific problems that may arise.
In determining the location of an atomic energy facility,· consideration
must be given to the potential hazards and to the desirable exclusion
area. Even before a plant is constructed, nearby inhabitants and landowners may seek to prevent the construction by seeking injunctions on
the theory that the plant will be a nuisance. Some may seek to enjoin
the construction while others may seek damages on the theory that the
plant destroys property values. ·what will be their measure of success?
What will be the effect of zoning ordinances in trying such cases? What
will be the effect of licensing by the Atomic Energy Commission? Will
use of underground chambers or gas-tight steel spheres reduce the success of what is by some called "nuisance" litigation? Lawyers must
analyze these questions in the light of local rules of law as well as federal
laws and regulations, not to mention international legal principles, to
advise properly when plant locations are being selected.
A number of individuals and industrial organizations are currently
engaged in designing nuclear reactors and atomic energy devices and in
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supplying consulting services in the atomic energy field. In the current
stage of-technological development, the alternatives have yet to be tested
conclusively, so designs must be selected in the absence of conclusive
data. What liability may be imposed on designers and consultants if the
installation causes injuries? Once one type of installation or process
is proved to be safe, what effect will this have on the area of choice if
negligence claims are to be avoided? Can consultants and designers immunize themselves from liability? Should they be allowed to do so? For
what kinds of injuries should they be liable? Should they he liable only
to those in the immediate vicinity of a nuclear accident, or should they
be liable to the film manufacturer who happens to purchase cardboard to
package film that was made with water into which radioactive materials
had leaked? When are the injuries so remote that liability should not be
imposed?
The construction firms and manufacturers of equipment used in
atomic energy facilities also face possible tort ·litigation. Should or
will the building contractor be held liable to persons injured due to
slight defects in construction that permit leakage of radioactive materials? Should negligence rules be applied or strict liability rules?
Should or will the manufacturer of equipment used in reactor or radiation devices be liable for injuries resulting from defects in the product?
Does it make a difference if the manufacturer did not know his product
was to be used in a reactor and the defect would have caused only minor
damage, or perhaps none at all, if the equipment had been used in a
conventional industrial operation? For what kinds of injuries should
contractors and manufacturers of equipment be held liable? If a radiation source is rented, what should be the liability of the owner for injuries resulting from accidents? What is the effect of assuming an obligation to inspect radiation sources on the liability of the user and of the
inspecting firm? Can liability be avoided by contract terms or by disclaiming any warranties in respect to products ?
What should be the liability, if any, of the owner-operator of a reactor
who sells radioisotopes to others who negligently or accidentally cause
injuries to persons and property? Because of the dangerous nature of
the product must the seller investigate and ascertain the capacity of the
purchaser to use the product safely? What is the effect of the securing of
a license to use radioactive materials from the Atomic Energy Commission? Would the seller be liable if he sold radioisotopes to a person
not having a license? Can possible liabilities be avoided by any legal
techniques? If reactor-owners are liable foF. immediate injuries caused
by products sold to others, are they equally liable for remote injuries
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where there has been a chain of intervening events with the possible lapse
of a number of years?
.
Not only are there problems regarding specific rules of liability to be
followed but also there are a number of problems arising out of the
peculiar nature of radiation injuries'. Since the plaintiff is required to
sustain the burden· of proof in litigation, he must first prove that his
condition resulted from radiation, and thereafter he may find it very difficult to prove that his injury was caused by radiation from a particular
source. Many of the same injuries occur even in the absence of radiation, and thus there is the problem of the multiple cause or cumulative
effect of radiation. Should the burden rest on the atomic energy user
to prove that radiation did not cause the injury? If the burden of proof
is placed on the atomic energy user, can he ever avoid liability even under
negligence rules? If the burden of proof is made minimal for injured
persons, will this create a convenient vehi<;le for nuisance litigation by
any person having any complaint in an area where there has been the
slightest rise in radiation levels? Should new rules governing the burden
of proof be developed for atomic energy tort cases? What kinds of
monitoring records should be kept to defend possible future injury
claims? How can injured persons receive damages when classified data
is involved which cannot be introduced as evidence? Should special
courts capable of receiving security information be established? Or
should the government assume liability when it prevents the introduction of the evidence necessary to prove an injured person's case?
What claims can be made by a person who has received radiation
damage only because of its cumulative nature when all of his exposures
were below safe levels? Can he recover froin only the person who caused
the exposure to go above the maximum permitted before cumulative
effects begin? Or are all who contributed to the cumulative effect liable?
Should every person be required to keep his own personal exposure
record so that employers and doctors can rely on the record in subjecting
an employee or patient to radiation? Can victims of degressive genetic
damage seek damages from those who exposed their ancestors to harmful radiation?. Should society bear the risk of genetic injuries? What
advice should the lawyer give the atomic energy entrepreneur?
In addition to the problems of proving injury, its cause, and the role
ofthe defendant in causing the injury, other problems arise in respect to
the procedural aspects of trying atomic energy tort cases. One problem
is that of the adequacy of the typical statutes of limitations. When does
the cause of action arise so as to start the statutory period-when the
radiation accident occurs or when a person discovers his injury? If the
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former, what protection, if any, should be given persons who discover
injuries perhaps years later after the statutory period has run? Should a
person who knows he has caused harmful exposures of radiation be required to notify possibly affected persons? If the statutory period does
not commence until injuries are discovered, users of atomic energy will
be called upon to defend against claims years later when witnesses are
dead and evidentiary materials are no longer available. Should users of
atomic energy, because of the peculiar nature of atomic injuries, be required to assume the risks of stale claims?
Other problems arise out of the possible progressive nature of atomic
energy in.juries. A person may receive an exposure which caused temporary sterility as its first noticeable effect. Years later malignancy may
develop requiring amputation of limbs and perhaps death will ensue still
later. If the person sues at the time he discovers sterility, can he attempt
to prove possible future consequences? If he recovers only for the
sterility, can he sue again at a later date when he discovers a malignancy?
If legal rules prevent him from suing twice, should he be advised to delay
damage actions until the latest permissible moment within the statute of
limitations? Should any new rules be developed to handle possible progressive injuries?
Another problem in atomic energy tort litigation arises out of the
complex nature of the subject matter. Are juries equipped to handle
highly technical data or will the technicalities so overwhelm them that
they will be unable to assess the evidence? Will inability to handle the
subject matter lead to verdicts for persons claiming injury or, on the
other hand, for the defending users of atomic energy? Will the judges
be able to give proper instructions dealing with scientific data? What
should lawyers advise clients when faced with determining whether tort
litigation should be tried by the judge or jury? Can hindsight be kept
out of the deliberations in determining negligence and causation issues?
Still other legal problems may arise because of the fact that a release
of radioactive materials does not respect state or national boundaries.
Which law should be applied in determining liability of an owner-operator when radiation has transcended state or national boundaries? What
law should be applied if injuries occur on planes and trains traveling
across state and national lines? The answers are crucial, of course, if
one state follows ordinary negligence rules and the other invokes strict
liability. Can legal devices be used to avoid liability under the law of
other states or nations? Should there be an attempt to obtain uniform
legislation covering atomic energy tort law so that the conflicts problems
will be minimized?
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Many of these problems also will be present in the workmen's compensation field. The same problems of proof, of the statutory time limitations, and of the peculiar nature of atomic energy injuries will be in
evidence. In addition, workmen's compensation statutes will have to be
evaluated to determine if they provide satisfactory coverage for atomic
energy industries. If the state has lists of compensable injuries, radiation injuries must be included. If general categories are set forth in the
statute, they will have to be examined to ascertain if the coverage is as
broad as necessary. Moreover, the scale of benefit payments may have
to be revised to allow compensation for injuries that may not caus.e a
diminution in wage earnings, such as sterility.
These are among the many problems concerned with the tort liability
aspects of atomic energy that have occurred to us. Undoubtedly others
will occur to the reader and still further problems will arise in the future.
Nonetheless, this listing serves to illustrate the problems that must be
evaluated to determine what legal principles will be applied on the basis
of common law concepts. Once these are evaluated, consideration should
be given to changes in the law that should be made, either by the courts
or legislatures, for the satisfactory accommodation of atomic energy in
our society. In the succeeding chapters, we shall discuss the current rules
of law as applied to atomic energy problems, and we shall suggest possible developments for the future.
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Chapter III *
NEGLIGENCE
A. Introduction
1.

Limitations of Discussion

It is not the purpose of this study to cover in detail all of the tort
liability problems that will face those operating in the atomic energy
field. Many, if not the great majority, of the cases in this area will
present typical tort law problems susceptible to solution in the ordinary
way according to the usual rules. ·Established legal scholars have explored and analyzed existing tort rules and have attempted to define and
suggest future developments in the law of torts generally. Our purpose
in writing this volume is not to second-guess these writers. Rather, we
seek .to identify for the lawyer and business man those particularly
troublesome or unique legal problems that will arise out of atomic
energy. In discussing these selected problems it usually will- be necessary
to work not from direct precedent but from the most nearly analogous
cases, including some'on the frontiers of tort law. ·Where established
legal rules would seem to provide inadequate or incorrect answers,
alternative solutions or courses of action, legislative or judicial, will be
suggested.
Not all of the difficult legal problems will be in the areas of negligence, product liability, and strict liability, but the atomic energy
entrepreneur and the lawyer advising him will find that these problems
will be the most unusual and the hardest to answer. In a real sense negligence, strict liability, and product liability cases cannot be separated
into mutually exclusive categories. Nevertheless, it is convenient to
analyze the problems under these separate headings. Questions peculiar
to the. workmen's compensation area will be treated separately, even
though many of the problems arising in the area of negligence will be
present in workmen's compensation cases as 'well. · · · · ·

* The authors wish to acknowledge the research assistance of the following graduate
students at The University of Michigan Law School: Charles D. Olmsted, B.S.F., 1951,
LL.B., 1957, University of Michigan; Michael Scott, B.A., 1952, Cornell University,
J.D., 1958, University of Michigan; Lawrence P. King, B.S., 1950, City College of the
City of New York, LL.B., 1953, New York University, LL.M., 1957, University of
Michigan; John D. Birchall, A.B., 1949, I,L.B., 1952, UniversitY of Michigan; Rinaldo
L: Bianchi, Dottore in Giurisprudenza, 1947, University of :£lisa, A.B., 1951, M.A.,
1953, Wayne University, J.D.; 1955, Univetsity of Michigari.
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There is a serious question as to whether ordinary negligence rules
or strict liability concepts will or should be applied to atomic energy
activities. A discussion of this question will be more meaningful if
there is an understanding of the results that might be reached under
ordinary negligence rules, because the limitations and possible inadequacies of ordinary rules then will stand out in sharper focus. It is for
this reason that negligence rules will be discussed first and the question
of whether those rules or strict liability concepts should govern the
atomic energy area is postponed.
2.

Typical Negligence Analysis

Whether the injury be to persons or property, courts and legal
scholars generally view negligence actions as involving four elements.
To recover damages every plaintiff must establish: ( 1) a duty of the
defendant to use reasonable care, under the circumstances, in his relations with the plaintiff; ( 2) a breach of this duty by the defendant;
(3) causation, both in fact and "proximately"; and (4) a legally recognized loss or damage to persons or property.
Of the four, the problems in causation and damages are the most
peculiar and troublesome when considering atomic energy activities.
Most of the duty problems will not be unique but there are several
troublesome ones to be considered. In analyzing the application of tort
principles as to each of these four elements, the peculiar characteristics
of atomic energy must be kept in mind.
3· Legally

~ignificant

Peculiarities of Atomic Energy Activities

Seldom, if ever, has such a significant scientific development come so
rapidly. The existence of the neutron was not generally thought proved
until 1932; the first reactor did not "go critical" until 1942. Yet nuclear
energy has the potential to cause tremendous changes in our industrial
society, if not throughout the world. There is a vast new science and
technology with which the general public is quite unfamiliar and for
which there are relatively few trained specialists. Even the specialists
admit their science is so new that there are many very important concepts which they understand but vaguely or are not aware of at all.
A man cannot knowingly be negligent in fjliling to utilize a principle
or concept which he does not know exists. This might lead to the conclusion that, since he did not know of a technique that might have
prevented the accident, he was not at fault; lacking fault, in the ordinary
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sense, generally there can be no recovery in a negligence action. On the
other hand, it is also true that when an activity is known to be dangerous it may be negligent to act in that area unless one is extremely
well informed. It is important, from the standpoint of both domestic
development and our position of world leadership, that atomic science
be developed as rapidly as possible. The rules of law should not impede
this progress unduly. Experimentation and boldness, which are necessary for progress, must not be limited by the timidity that almost in. evitably follows imposition of too strict duty concepts or too strict a
standard of negligence.
Additional legal difficulties may well arise from the fact that the
government has surrounded a not insignificant portion of the information and knowledge about nuclear principles with the shroud of secrecy
and the red tape of access permits. The person who wishes to avoid
this time-consuming and expensive procedure may risk an accident that
could have been avoided if all the information known to those persons
working for the government or those having access permits had been
known to him. This secrecy creates the further possibility that some
injury situations may not be susceptible to trial in the ordinary manner
because secret government information may be needed to determine
facts in a particular accident. This has already been a troublesome
problem in some instances.
As pointed out in the technology chapter, the ordinary human senses
are not capable of detecting radiation in most situations. Since a person
may be seriously overexposed to radiation and be unaware of it for
weeks, months, or even many years/ the lawyer is going to face some
difficult problems in radiation cases, especially with respect to the matter
of proof. This fact is going to present some extremely difficult proof
problems.
The general public views nuclear science as mysterious and frightening. This is not surprising when it is remembered that the science is so
new and that it was first revealed to the public by the A and H-bombs.
The veil of government-imposed secrecy and the fact that radiation
cannot be detected by human senses adds to this fear. The consequence
is very likely to be a great increase of cases in the area of mental
disturbance, psychosomatic illness, and nuisance litigation aimed at
preventing operation of atomic energy facilities.
1 N.Y. Times, May 27, 1958, p. 21, col. 4, carries a report of the development of
bone cancer 35 years after exposure to radium poisoning. The 42fld dial worker died
in 1958 at the age of 57, 40 years after exposure. N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1958, p. 31, col. 7.
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Another singular characteristic of radiation is that it is cumulative
in nature. What may be a perfectly permissible exposure ~ay contribute to overexposure w~en added to other radiation, itself either
permissible or wrongful. This characteristic will present some difficult
proof and damage problems, not to mention duty questions of a type
relatively unknown to tort law. It will also have an impact on multiple
causation and joint tortfeasor cases. Difficult problems concerning the
statute of limitations and conflict of laws doctrines also will arise as a
result of this cumulative effect.
Yet another characteristic of radiation is that many of the injuries
caused by it can also be caused by other forces, known or unknown.
Often it will be impossible to determine the specific causal factor for
such conditions as cancer, cataract, and leukemia. In addition, there
are many sources of radiation, such as natural background emissions,
radioactive debris from bomb tests, radioactive. wastes from government operations, and radiation treatment in the course of medical
therapy. The effects on the human body and on property. are indistinguishable from those arising from industrial use of radiation .. This
characteristic of lack of identification. with the particular source will
present some new problems for the lawyer.
It should be note~ also that the causal connection between radiation
and injury both as to amount and type often is speculative in nature.
While scientists in general agree that certain injuries can occur as a
result of overexposure to radiation, and in fact that some types of
damage are caused by even quite small amounts, they cannot as yet state
categorically that a certain amount of radiation in all cases will cause
a certain kind of injury to all persons or even to most persons. For the
most part, the impact of overexposure to radiation might be described
as statistical in nature. The overexposure in most cases increases the
incidence of such damage among a large number of persons and, there.fore, increases merely the chance of injury to a particular. individual.
Another characteristic of radioactive materials is its great flexibility.
As pointed out in Chapter I, there are· several types of radiation with
differing characteristics and -injury potential depending often upon the
particular way in which the person is exposed to the radioactive material. Likewise there are many different kinds of radioacti~e isotopes
of various elements whose length of radioactivity varies greatly.. Perhaps as important legally as any characteristic is the fact that radioactive isotopes of various elements chemically are identical with stable
isotopes of the same element and remain radioactive through 'an kinds

NEGLIGENCE

87

of chemical reactions. Radioactive material, therefore, may remain a
potential hazard for great lengths of time while it is processed through
numerous extremely complicated chemical changes. Probably no other
dangerous material is so insidious in character.
4· Typical Atomic Energy Operations and Tort Liability
Many of the activities in which atomic energy will play a part cannot
even be foreseen. There are several types of operations now in use,
however, as described in Chapter II. Although there may be legally
significant differences between some of these operations, particularly as
to duty and breach questions, the most interesting and most difficult
tort liability problems are common to most or all of the presently
known uses.
Reactor Operations. The question most nearly peculiar to reactor
operations is that of whether strict liability will or should be imposed
upon the licensee. Application of manufacturer's liability rules, such
as when a defective fuel element is supplied, 2 also presents some difficulties. These will be discussed later in the chapters on strict liability
and manufacturer's liability respectively. Assuming application of negligence doctrines, the use of foreseeability or proximate cause to determine the extent of the duty owed by the operator will need to be
analyzed. To evaluate the extent of the duty the lawyer must consider
not only the foreseeability that particular persons or property will be
damaged if there is a reactor accident but also the foreseeability that
specific types of damage will ensue. The cases concerning off-site
liability of a landowner when there are intervening agents, and those
deaJing with remoteness in time and space as they relate to the duty
concept will be helpful in ~nsweririg these questions.
·Little guidance is given by the cases to assist the operator in determining. what specific procedures, if followed, will preclude a finding
that there has been a breach of the duty to use due care. Suggestions
can be made, however, as to some general cautions that should be observed; e.g., an obligation to keep abreast of technological development,
a duty to reduce the hazard by giving warning and possibly providing
rescue or treatment services, 3 a·nd a duty.to make use of new techniques
2 N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1957, p. 37, col. I,. reported worker was accused of deliberate
damage to' uranium slugs manufactured for the government which might have caused
serious hahn.
a For example the AEC has announced a new service to deal with emergencies. AEC
Info. Rei. No. A-127, June 10, 1958, "Atomic Energy Commission To Acquaint State
and Local Officials with Services Available in Event of Radiation Incident."
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made available through radiation. The effect of compliance or noncompliance with government safety standards is of considerable concern to the nuclear industry in determining whether or not the standard
of conduct required of the reasonably prudent man has been breached.
Aiso important is the scope of the duty to use due care as it applies to
other persons such as firemen and policemen who are on the premises
in an official capacity but not pursuant to an invitation of the owner.
Equally significant to the entrepreneur will be the question of whether
or not he will be vicariously liable for the negligence of third persons
both on and off the reactor premises. This includes both transportation
and disposal of waste products. The cases dealing with these questions
will be treated in considerable detail.
Fuel Fabrication and Reprocessing Operations. The legal problems
arising from fuel fabrication and reprocessing operations agai~ involve
manufacturer's liability and strict liability cot:~cepts discussed later.
The questions concerning the use of foreseeability to determine duty
and those concerning the determination of the existence of a breach of
the duty to use due care in reactor operations are equally applicable here.
Potential liability arising out of transportation and disposal of radioactive materials will also be of concern.
Waste Disposal. Many factors must be taken into account in providing for the disposal of radioactive wastes, whether from reactor
operati"ons or from industrial, medical, or research use of radioactive
sources. Geological, perhaps meteorological, and even oceanographic
calculations must be considered along with the physical characteristics
of the waste material. Is it in a gaseous, solid, or liquid form? Is it
soluble in water? Does it undergo chemical reaction with surrounding
materials? Is it a long or short half-life isotope? What type of radiation is involved? Is the radioactive material likely to concentrate if
taken up by plants, or ingested by animals or human beings? Mistakes
as to any of these calculations might cause serious injury to property
or persons. The answer to these questions as they affect duty and breach
problems will not require any different analysis than for reactor and
fuel operations.
Aside from strict liability, the most interesting and difficult question
is : What should be the legal effect of hiring an independent contractor
or the federal government to dispose of the waste material which later
causes damage? In determining liability of the one creating the waste
material, should a distinction be drawn between using the federal government and a private concern? Should licensing of the disposal con-
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tractor by the AEC immunize the producer of the waste material from
liability for the former's negligence? What should be the effect on the
liability of the producer of the material and of the private concern
which carries out the disposal operation if the AEC rules are followed?
If they are not followed? These questions need careful consideration.
Transportation of Radioactive Materials. Again laying aside the
question of absolute liability, normal tort rules surely will provide
answers to many of the questions in transportation cases; e.g., should
the standard of .conduct imposed on the transportation company be
greater or less depending on the method of shipment (air, rail, truck,
water), the route chosen (heavily populated areas, etc.), or the type of
material (long or short half-life, high or low intensity of radiation,
type of radiation such as alpha, beta, or gamma)? Also susceptible to
standard treatment are such questions as: Will the doctrine of foreseeability (or proximate cause) protect the shipper or transportation
company from remote consequences of a release of radioactive materials; to whom is the duty' to use due care owed-persons shipping
other goods, the crews or passengers of the transportation company, the
general public who congregate around an accident, the rescuers, both
official and gratuitous, who come to the scene of an accident; and what
must the carrier do by way of checking the character and crating of
"hot" shipments to avoid a charge of negligence?
Not so easily answered is the question of what steps the transporting
company must take to give warning of the dangerous character of the
material while en route. The significance of compliance with government regulations will be of concern to the carrier, just as for the reactor
operator and processor. The liability standard to be applied when
carrying material somewhat more dangerous than many others is important also. These questions and the most nearly analogous cases are
discussed extensively, since little has been written about them.
Industrial, Medical, and Research Use of Radioisotopes. In most
cases the tort liability problems arising from such uses as that of cobalt
6o for radiography, strontium go for thickness gauges, and iodine 131
for medical diagnosis or therapy either can be dealt with under normal
tort principles or are similar to those suggested before in discussing
reactor and processor operations or transportation and disposal activities. Most of the duty and breach questions fit into the former, while
the effect of government safety regulations and the application of
vicarious liability concepts to disposal operations come within the latter
category.
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The discharge of small quantities of waste material into the air, a
sewer system, or a river will present some situations for which existing
tort printiples do not provide very clear or &a tis factory answers. This
is true of reactor and .reprocessing operations as well as those involving
use of radioisoptopes. These problems will be treated rather fully in
the discussion of multiple causation cases.

B. The Application of Negligence Principles to Atomic Energy Cases
With a few exceptions, such as the Price-Anderson Bill creating a
governm~nt indemnity program and a few other examples . of state
statutes discussed in- Part III in connection with state regulations, there
have been"JIO legislative attempts to solve the tort liability problems involved intatomic energy cases. In the absence of statutory provisions
one must' turn to analysis of tort cases in other areas of analogous
activity, keeping in mind ( 1) that too-strict application of tort liability
may undu1y discourage use of these new materia.ls which promise great
benefits and ( 2) that the hazards are considerable, almost unique, and
of a kind that often give no warning. As mentioned before, this analysis
typically involves a four-fold categorization of the problems, the first
of which is duty, including foreseeability and proximate cause.
1.

Duty---:-Foreseeability and Proximate Cause

A complete treatment of the duty question, of necessity, would involve a long, detailed analysis of the relationship between duty concepts,
foreseeability, and proximate cause, since today most agree that the
latter two terms actually are merely different verbalizations of the same
basic duty concepts. Undoubtedly, the discussion would start with an
analysis of the famous case of Palsgraf v. Long Island R. R. Co.' In
this case a' railroad employee was negligent in assisting a passenger to
board the train, causing the passenger to drop a package to the platform.
The package contained fireworks which, when the package fell, discharged and shook the platform. This caused a large scale some distance away to drop on Mrs .. Palsgraf, who had purchased a ticket for
another train. She sued the railroad, claiming that the negligence of
the employee ,caused her injuries and that the railroad, therefore, was
liable. The opinions of the majority and dissenting justices exemplify
the differences that exist among courts and legal scholars today concerning the scope -of duty and to whom it is owed in negligence cases.
4

248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E.

W(1928).
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As one writer in the field concludes, "The present state of the law is,
then, one of troubled waters, in :which anyone may fish." 5 Professors
Harper and James in their recent treatise indicate that courts and
writers have from time to time taken the position that if defendants
should anticipate that certain conduct is fraught with unreasonable
probability of some harm to somebody, then the duty to refrain from
that conduct is owed to anyone who may in fact be harmed by it. 6 These
writers then add, however, that the view currently prevailing in this
country does limit the duty to do or to refrain from doing a given act
to ( 1) those persons or interests that are likely to be endangered by
the act or omission, and ( 2) harm (to such person or interest) from a
risk the likelihood of which may be by act or omission negligent_7
Because these treatises and the writings of other scholars in legal
journals have discussed so exhaustively the relationship between duty,
foreseeability, and proximate cause, nothing is to be gained by another
treatment here. All seem to agree that, in determining whether defendant owes a duty to protect persons somewhat removed (as to space,
time, or other relationship) against injuries not ordinarily to be expected, the policy determination is the same, regardless of whether
"duty," "foreseeability," or "proximate cause" terminology is used. It
is made by balanc.ing the desirability of compensating injured parties
on one hand against the deterrent effect such recoveries will have on
normal human activity and especially on development in new areas.
The question often boils down to whether the plaintiff should assume
such risks and provide for compensation through his own life, health,
property, or income insurance or the defendants should provide compensation through a public liability policy.
In discussing the legal problems of atomic energy it seems best to
avoid the confusion involved in distinguishing between these three
terms. Regardless of which term is used, courts typically do not insist
that the defendant be legally liable for every single consequence caused
in fact by his negligent act. This is true even when strict liability is
applied, apparently because, as discussed later, certain Classes of persons
and injuries may not be allowed compensation. In analyzing the legal
problems created by a new area of activity which presents a danger of
serious harm to any person, the first question is to what extent will
liability be imposed for all of the harm resulting from this action. It
5 Prosser, Torts 171 (West Pub. Co., 2d ed. 1955) [hereinafter cited as Prosser].
82 Harper and James, The Law of Torts 1018 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Harper
& James].
T /d. at 1018, 1019-
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is toward the solution of this problem as it relates to atomic energy
operations that attention will be directed here. Recognizing that the
trend is toward a system of strict liability, and what Harper and James
describe as a social insurance philosophy of tort liability, it seems perfectly clear that this question will still have to be answered : Just how
far will the responsibility for negligent action be imposed on the
wrongdoer when a reasonably prudent man would think that the person
injured or the injury (as to kind or amount) was quite remote or
indirect?
The great mass of legal writing on this subject apparently can be
reduced· to nine or ten printed pages, if we accept the work of the
authors of the two leading treatises in the area. 8 While Harper and
James point out differences between their interpretation and that given
by Dean Prosser to the PaJsgraf type of case, one cannot help but be
struck by the remarkable similarity of their conclusions. We see nothing
in the atomic energy area which would call for a different analysis of
the scope of duty from that reached in these two treatises. The representative cases discussed in detail in each of these treatises indicate how
far courts will go in extending the scope of duty owed by the person
using radioactive materials.
Perhaps it is attempting to reduce the irreducible, but it seems fair
to say, at least for analyzing atomic energy problems, that there are just
two basic questions : ( 1) is the wrongdoing defendant liable only for
those kinds of injury which would be reasonably foreseeable; and ( 2)
is the defendant liable only to those plaintiffs injured by his wrongdoing whom he reasonably could have foreseen might be injured? The
authors of both treatises conclude that there are differences among the
courts on both of these questions.
As to whether the defendant is liable for unexpected types of injuries
to a plaintiff who reasonably might have been foreseen to be injured in
some way, Prosser states that "most courts agree that there may be
liability for unforeseen consequences, beyond the original risk, to those
within the zone of apparent danger." 9 Harper and James feel that the
matter is left in some doubt when one considers all of the decided cases,
but in general they agree with the broad statement made by Prosser. 10
Among the many cases cited to support this broad proposition is
Rasmussen v. Benson. 11 There the court permitted recovery for all
s Prosser 165-73; Harper & James 1018-27.
Prosser 171.
10 Harper & James 1021 ff. ·
11 135 Neb. 232, 28o N.W. B9o (1938).

9

NEGLIGENCE

93

damages claimed even though one item- was the sickness and death of
the plaintiff resulting from worry over the loss of live stock caused by
the poisoned feed carelessly furnished by the defendant. Another example is the famous Polemis case, 12 where the court found liability
since it was foreseeable that the negligent dropping of a plank into the
hold of a ship might do some damage to the ship even if it was not
foreseeable that it would cause a spark which would then start a fire
which would destroy the ship. There are limits, however, to how far we
can carry this idea. Even Harper and James point out that while it is
negligent to allow a child to have a loaded pistol, liability will not be
imposed for all of the harm which follows. Liability may follow even
though it is not possible to foresee the particular persons that may be
injured, because it is possible to foresee that injuries may occur if the
child discharges the pistol. 18 On the other hand they point out that,
·while it is foreseeable that the child may drop the gun on somebody's
toe or throw it through a window, the gun would be no more dangerous
in this respect than any other object of a similar size and weight. They
concluded that, while we could anticipate injury to some person from
discharge of a firearm and that this would be an unreasonable risk, we
could not foresee any unreasonable risk from dropping or throwing
the gun. It is therefore possible that only certain types of injuries, even
to plaintiffs foreseeably within the zone of danger, will be covered by
scope of duty concepts.
The question of foreseeability becomes much more significant when
considering the second question: to what injured parties must the
plaintiff respond? While the dissenting judges in the Palsgraf case
(and the decisions in a few other cases) seem to take the position that
once the defendant has been guilty of a breach of duty toward some
one person he thereafter is liable for all damages to all parties injured
as a result of that negligence, generally it is agreed that foreseeability,
sometimes phrased in terms of proximate cause, is the criterion by
which the courts determine whether the injury to the particular plaintiff
is compensable. 14 It seems somewhat illogical to use foreseeat='ity to
determine which plaintiffs can recover but not to limit the kind of injury
for which a foreseeable plaintiff can recover. 13 In any event it is clear
u In re Polemis & Furness, Withy & Co., [1921] 3 K.B. s6o.
1s Harper & James 1022.
H Prosser 170, 171 suggests that the majority view in Palsgra£ may not be followed
in most cases. Cf. Harper & James' explanation at 1024-26.
15 Prosser 171, "There appears to be an essential inconsistency in holding that one
who can foresee harm to A is liable for unforeseen consequences to A, and refusing to
hold him for unforeseen harm to B."

94

TORT LIABILITY

that at least in many jurisdictions some limitation will be placed by the
court upon the types of injuries and the plaintiffs who will be allowed
to recover. This determination will be made on the basis of what
reasonably could be foreseen. The lawyer dealing with atomic energy
cases certainly must keep this limitation in mind, but he also must note
the trend toward a greater willingness to hold wrongdoers liable for
more and more of the consequences of their wrongdoing. A few of
these frontier cases will indicate the scope of this trend.
The Tennessee court in 1940 16 allowed the jury to decide the question
of whether it was reasonably foreseeable that when a customer fell on
a defective mat in defendant's store another customer would be hurt in
the rush to come to the first customer's aid. Although the question was
left to the jury, the test still was whether the result was foreseeable.
Two Wisconsin cases show how variable this concept of foreseeability
can be in determining the scope of duty. In 1933 .in E. L. Chester Co. v. ·
Wisconsin Power & Light Co., 11 the Wisconsin court submitted to the
jury the question of whether the particular injury which resulted from
defendant's negligence in allowing gas to escape from a broken valve
in a gas main should have been·anticipated by the defendant. The gas
from the broken main seeped through twenty feet of earth and exploded
under plaintiff's store building, demolishing it. The court submitted the
question to the jury although it recognized that in general all that
needed to be anticipated was some injury to the plaintiff. Again in 1952
in Pfeifer v. Standard Gateway Theater/ 8 the Wisconsin court was
faced with a case brought against the operator of the motion picture
theater for injury suffered by a plaintiff customer who was struck in
the eye by a spitball shot from an unknown source. The alleged negligence was failure to control a group of rowdy hoodlums in the
theater. The court decided that the jury should be left free to determine
whether or not allowing such rowdyism to continue was negligent because it might result in spitballs being projected with injury to persons
such as the plaintiff. The supreme court then went ahead to say that if
the jury found the negligence was a "substantial factor" it would then
be a matter of law for the court to decide whether or not public policy
required that there be liability. In doing so the court overruled the
Chester case to the extent that it allowed the jury to limit liability if it
finds the injury too remote to be reasonably foreseeable.
16

Jackson v. B. Lowenstein & Bros., 175 Tenn. 535, 136 S.W.2d 495 (1940).
211 Wis. 158, 247 N.W. 861 (1933).
18 262 Wis. 229, 55 N.W.2d 29 (1952).
17
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An English case involving a major submarine disaster is a good
example of the use of foreseeability to limit the scope, of duty of a
negligent defendant. In Woods v. Duncan 19 the shipbuilder and its
~ubcontractor were guilty of negligence in painting over some test holes
in torpedo tubes which were designed to show whether or not they were
filled with water. In actions brought by widows of civilians who were
riding the submarine during the test dive the House of Lords held that
the companies were not liable for the deaths that ensued because of the
sinking of the submarine when it filled with water. There were questions of whether the submarine officers who were handling the controls
were intervening agents, and if the doctrine of res ipsa loqititur could
be used to prove causation, but th,e point upon which most of the Lords
agreed was that it was not reasonably foreseeable that painting over a
test hole in the torpedo tubes would result in the flooding of the submarine to the point where it would sink. The majority felt that the
causal relation between the negligence of the defendant and the deaths
was too remote to hold them' liable for the disaster, although it was a
contributing cause-in-fact. They felt that the extraordinary loss of life
was outside the scope of reasonable foreseeability and therefore outside
the scope of duty owed by the defendant.
In Mize v. Rocky Mo1tntain Bell Telephone Co./0 however, the
Montana court felt that the defendants should have anticipated that
their high tension wire might come into contact with an uninsulated
telephone wire which was otherwise harmless. The consequent electrocution occurred at a point many miles distant from the place at which
the high tension wire touched a guy wire running from one of the
telephone poles to the ground.
Somewhat more closely analogous to the situation that may possibly
arise in connection with atomic energy operations are the fire and
stream pollution cases. In an early case the Missouri court held the
defendant railroad liable on the ground that it should have reasonably
anticipated the injury that resulted and that there was no independent
intervening agency which would excuse the defendant. 21 In this case
grass on the right of way of the railroad was negligently set on fire.
The fire burned the grass for a distance of three miles and then apparently died out. A hard wind revived the dying fire the next day,
however, and it finally destroyed the plaintiff's house some five miles
[1946] A.C. 401.
38 Mont. 521, 100 Pac. 971 (1909).
21 Poeppers v. Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry., 67 Mo. 715, 29 Am. Rep. 518 (1878).
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away. The court held the defendant liable, noting that high winds were
not infrequent in the area and should have been anticipated.
In a much more recent case the New Hampshire court made an
interesting distinction that may be applicable to atomic energy situations. In Beard v. Boston and Maine Railroad 22 the court drew a line
between the plaintiffs whose homes abutted the railroad property and
those that were located four to six miles distant from the point where
the fire was started by the negligence of the railroad. The cause of
action arose under a statute imposing strict liability, but on the question
of what plaintiffs were to be protected the court seemed to be using
the foreseeability test. The court said :
. . . [The statute] was not intended to apply to all damages
. . . regardless of the intervening factors of time, distance,
manner of communication and other circumstances which may
vary from fire to fire. 23
Two cases involving stream pollution show the conflict in approach
one finds among the various courts. In Haag v. Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railroad Co. 24 a train loaded with crude oil was involved
in a wreck caused by the negligence of the engineer who failed to
notice a landslide on the tracks. The cars burst and the oil caught fire
and ran into a nearby creek. The plaintiff's house, located several
hundred feet downstream was damaged. The court held that it would
be unreasonable to conclude that the engineer should have anticipated
the burning of the plaintiff's property as a consequence of his negligent
failure to keep a sharp lookout. The court mentioned among other
things that applying liability to the defendant in this case "would be
a severe rule to apply, and might have made the defendants responsible
for the destruction of property for miles down Oil Creek." ~ The court
felt that the flowing stream was an intervening independent agency,
making the cause too remote and hence the imposition of liability unjustified. Three years later a New Jersey court came to the opposite
conclusion 26 on somewhat similar facts. In this case there was a negligently-caused train collision. One of the trains included twenty-five
cars loaded with oil. The oiJ. tanks burst and the contents ignited when
they came into contact with the fire of the locomotive; the oil ran into
a small creek and thence into a larger river and from there to the
2

22

99 N.H. 469, 115 A.2d 314 (1955).
/d. at 471, 472.
24 Bs Pa. 293, 27 Am. Rep. 653 ( 1877).

23

25

I d. at 299·

26 Kuhn v. Jewett, 32 N.J. Eq. 647 (188o).
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plaintiff's building on the bank of the river. Criticizing the H oag
decision, the court used the following language :
. . . [W]here a fire originates in the negligence of a defendant, and is carried directly by a material force, whether it
be the wind, the law of gravitation, combustible matter existing in a state of nature, or other means, to the plaintiff's
property and destroys it, and it appears that no object intervened between the point where the fire started and the injury,
which would have prevented the injury, if due care had been
taken, the defendant is legally answerable for the loss. 27
The so-called rescuer cases have brought forth some of the most
extreme extensions of the foreseeable risk test in determining duty.
Certainly similar situations will arise in the atomic energy area. One
of the classic cases is Hines v. M orrow. 28 There the defendant was
negligent in allowing a mud hole to remain in the highway. The
plaintiff rescuer broke his wooden leg in attempting to tow a stalled
car out of the hole. The wooden leg became stuck in the mud and a
loop in the tow rope caught on the leg causing it to break. The court
said this was foreseeable. Again in Lynch v. Fisher 29 we find another
extension of the foreseeability doctrine. The defendant left a truck on
the highway at night without lighting flares. Another car crashed into
the unlighted truck and caught fire. The plaintiff, in the role of rescuer
of the occupants of the car, returned to the car for a floor mat on which
to put one of the victims. The husband of the victim for whom the
mat was· being procured was temporarily deranged by the accident and
shot the plaintiff in the leg with a pistol. The court held the truck
owner liable because it was foreseeable that a car might crash into it and
that somebody might come to the rescue, even though the particular
co~sequences resulting in injury to the plaintiff could not be foreseen.
The court said this was immaterial.
If this kind of injury is within the scope of duty owed by a negligent
defendant, it is not difficult to conclude that a rescuer of victims in
transportation accidents where radioactive material is being transported
would be allowed to recover for any radiation injuries he received in
attempting to rescue crew or passengers. The courts now seem to hold
that rescuers at least are foreseeable plaintiffs in such situations. 30
An interesting duty concept somewhat related to the rescue cases is
ld. at 651.
236 S.W. 183 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921).
29 34 S.2d 513 (Lud Cir. C.A. 1947).
30 Prosser 173.
27

28
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found in L. S. Ayres & Co. v. Hicks 81 where a boy's finger was caught
in an escalator in the defendant store. The court held that the defend;mt
was liable although there was no negligence in the construction of the
escalator. The defendant was held liable because it was slow in coming
to the assistance of the boy and stopping the machinery so that he could
be released. The court said there was a duty to come to the assistance
of a person who had been injured by an instrumentality under the defendant's control. This case raises a question as to the extent of the
duty resting ~n a person controlling a radiation source who in a nonnegligent, and therefore non-liable, manner exposes another to radiation. Perhaps there is a duty not only to stop the exposure as soon as
possible, but also to see that the victim is at least warned of the need
for specialized medical care. This latter suggestion, of course, is an
extension of the facts in the Hicks case, but even treatment may be
required if it should prove necessary to give immediate and specialized
care to minimize the radiation injury.
The reasoning of the Arkansas court in a case decided ten years ago 82
certainly would· seem to be applicable to situations that can be anticipated in the atomic industry. In this case the defendant, a chemiCal
company, had sold a weedkilling spray to be used in dusting crops with
an airplane. The spray traveled downwind a considerable distance and
damaged the crop on the plaintiff's farm.
will be discussed later, 88
the main concern of the court was as to whether or not the defendant
was negligent in not having conducted research to determine how far
wind could carry its spray. The case,' however, also stands for the
proposition that distance and the intervention of natural forces do not
prevent the imposition upon a defendant of a duty of due care to a
remote plaintiff.
Harper and James emphasize the similarity of the inquiry when
determining what action is so unreasonably dangerous as to constitute
a lack of care and what is the scope of the duty owed. They then
point out:
1

As

Neither inquiry stops with what might be called the physical
range of foreseeable harm, or with mere proximity in time or
space. In both we look to see what natural forces and what
human conduct should have appeared likely to come upon the
scene, and we weigh the dangerous consequences likely to flow
from the challenged conduct in the light of these interven81220 Ind. 86,40 N.E.2d 334 (1942).
s2 Chapman Chemical Co. v. Taylor, 215 Ark. 630, 222 S.W.2d 820 (1949).
8S

See text infra at note 54·
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tions. And in this inquiry foreseeability is not to be measured
by what is more probable than not, but includes whatever is
likely enough in the setting of modern life that a reasonably
thoughtful man would take account of in guiding practical
conduct. Just as this broadening of the quest adds to the risks
which may make conduct unreasonably dangerous, just so
does it add to the range of duty. Dynamite caps carelessly left
accessible to children may be long hidden or taken many miles
before there is an explosion. An automobile made defectively
in Detroit may be sold in Seattle or Miami before it brings
harm. The victim of the explosion or the defect is none-theless within the class to which the duty is owed. u
For each example they cite two cases upholding their conclusions.
The application of this kind of reasoning to atomic energy cases
seems very likely. This means that the peculiarities of atomic energy,
which will cause long delayed injuries, at great distances from the negligent act and possibly occurring after many chemical transmutations,
will not prevent imposition of a duty to use due care toward all those
parties who reasonably could have been foreseen as likely to come in
contact with the radioactive material.
It is the conclusion of the present writers that in those cases where
strict or absolute liability is not applied, atomic energy cases, insofar
as the scope of duty is concerned,· will be decided in accordance with
the normal rules, although the fact situations will call for application
of those rules in somewhat different situations than have been known
heretofore. It seems rather clear that the courts will not impose a duty
on defendants as to all persons that may possibly be injured by radioactive substances negligently released. Whether stated in terms of scope
of duty, foreseeability, or proximate cause, some such limitation seems
very likely. "It is even possible that a court, as a matter of social policy,
will place such a limit on possible plaintiffs so as not to impede unduly
the development of a new industry. It seems equally clear, however,
that the range of plaintiffs to whom the· atomic energy entrepreneur
will be liable is extremely broad, and that time, space, and transformation characteristics of radiation sources will not place any very serious
limitations on the rights of injured persons to recover.
2.

Breach of the Duty to Use Due Care

In establishing his right to recover from a particular defendant the
plaintiff must show not only that the defendant owed a duty to protect
u Harper & James

1019-20.
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plaintiff against the type of injury sustained, but he also must show
that the defendant's actions were negligent in the sense that they did
not meet the standard of conduct legally required in such circumstances.
Frequently in analyzing the breach question courts will use the word
"duty." They may say there is a "duty to use due care," or there is an
affirmative "duty to warn" or to take advantage of new techniques. In
these cases, however, courts are using it to state that the reasonably
prudent man in the circumstances, either would not do certain things
or would do others, and if defendant fails to meet this duty it constitutes a breach of the required standard of conduct. It is not enough, of
course, merely to state that there is such a duty; the standard of conduct must be defined and this is a fact to be found by the jury or the
court if there is no jury. At the appellate level this means that the
inquiry is whether or not there is sufficient evidence to support the
finding below.
a. General Principles Concerning the Standard of Conduct
There have been many attempts to define what is meant by negligence. One of the earliest definitions by a legal scholar states that it is
"conduct which involves an unreasonably great risk of causing damage." 85 The Restatement calls it conduct "which falls below the standard established by law for the protection of others against unreasonable
risk of harm." 86 Harper and James summarize it as failure to do "what
the reasonably prudent person would do under the circumstances.'' 87
Prosser, after quoting the above, along with many other statements by
courts and legal scholars, emphasizes the need for taking particular
circumstances into account when he says, "The conduct of the reasonable man will vary with the situation with which he is confronted. The
jury must therefore be instructed to take the circumstances into account;
negligence is a failure to do what the reasonable man would do 'under
the same or similar circumstances.' " 88
Much has been written 89 about what the reasonable man is and what
constitutes a standard of conduct sufficient to avoid the charge of negligence. Very little of the literature is of any value to the lawyer advisTerry, "Negligence," 29 Harv. L. Rev. 40 (1915).
Restatement, Torts §282 (1934).
37 Harper & James 9(>2.
38 Prosser 125.
sa Prosser uses so pages beginning at Prosser 124- Harper and James use 120 pages,
beginning at Harper & James 8¢. See also dozens of law review articles on all phases
cited in each treatise on various phases of the concept of the reasonable man.
as
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ing clients in the atomic energy business. The questions of whether
defendant or his agents are blind, insane, drunk, of tender years, or
have normal intelligence, memory, and perceptive abilities are not
likely to be involved in radiation cases. In any event it is difficult to
believe that a jury pays much attention to these distinctions lawyers
have concocted to describe that hypothetical person, the reasonably
prudent man, that "ideal-normal" being (if there can be such a
combination). •o
( 1)

Specific Standard Not to Be Found in the Cases

It would be helpful to the atomic energy lawyer if one could distill
from the cases some specific standard of conduct expected of persons
using dangerous material, compliance with which would give immunity
from tort liability. Such analysis would be of great help to the nuclear
entrepreneur in establishing operating procedures. Unfortunately, after
searching literally hundreds o! cases, the writers have found nothing of
any real significance establishing what is the standard expected of the
reasonably prudent man. Certain general cautions will be suggested
which have significance in establishing safety procedures, but it is impossible to state what constitutes due care in general-it always must
be related to the specific facts of each individual situation. The authors
have come to the conclusion, although with disappointment, that the
treatise writers are correct when they state that the proper rule, and the
one that almost always is followed by the courts is that the standard of
conduct legally required "depends upon the circumstances." Prosser
states it as follows: "Although the language used by the courts sometimes seems to indicate that a special standard is being applied, it would
appear that none of these cases should logically call for any departure
from the usual formula. What is required is merely the conduct of
the reasonable man of ordinary prudence under the circumstances, and
the greater danger, or the greater responsibility, is merely one of the
circumstances, demanding a greater amount of care." u He then conto In Herbert, Misleading Cases in the Common Law (2d ed. 1927), cited in Prosser
125, the author characterizes the reasonably prudent man as "this excellent but odious
character [who] stands like a monument in our Courts of Justice vainly appealing to
his fellow-citizens to order their lives after his own example."
41 Prosser 147-48. For cases using language about the high degree of care, see, e.g.,
Read v. Lyons & Co., [1946] 2 All E. R. 471 (munitions factory~ictum); Rakowski
v. Raybestos-Manhattan Inc., 5 N.J. Super. 203, 68 A.2d 641 (1949) (discussed infra
note 175); Merlo v. Public Service Co., 381 Ill. 300, 45 N.E.2d 665 (1942); and Chase
v. Washington Water Power Co., 62 Idaho 298, 111 P.2d 872 (1941), both dealing with
electric utility power lines, discussed infra Chapter IV. See also language in Chapman
Chemical Co. v. Taylor, supra note J2.
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eludes that while some courts talk in terms of degrees of care, really
all they are saying is that the circumstances require somewhat greater
precautions on the part of the defendant, but that it is still the same
standard; i.e., what the reasonably prudent man would do under the
circumstances. Harper and James put the concept in somewhat different terms, but essentially it amounts to the same thing. They conclude
that it is impossible to state in general what will be considered negligent
or not negligent. Instead they say there are three factors which must be
weighed in each case in determining whether or not the standard of
non-negligent conduct was met by the particular defendant in the particular circumstances. These three factors are: ( 1) the likelihood of
harm; (2) the seriousness of the potential injury; and (3) the value of
the interest to be sacrificed. 42 They conclude that the amount of caution
required tends to increase with the likelihood that the conduct will cause
damage to others. They also conclude that the amount of care demanded
will increase with the seriousness of the injury that will result if an
· accident happens.
The first two factors must ·be balanced, though, against the third,
that is, what is sacrificed if we are to avoid the risk created by the
danger. Their conclusions are consistent with those drawn by Prosser
and are aptly summarized by them in a quotation from an old Nebraska
opinion. The case involved injury to children from playing on a railroad
turntable, and the court said :
The business of life is better carried forward by the use of
dangerous machinery; hence the public good demands its use,
although occasionally such use results in the loss of life or
limb. It does so because the danger is insignificant, when
weighed against the benefits resulting from the use of such
machinery, and for the same reason demands its reasonable,
most effective and unrestricted use, up to the point where the
benefits resulting from such use no longer outweigh the
danger to be anticipated from it. At that point the public good
demands restrictions. For example, a turntable is a dangerous
contrivance, which facilitates railroading; the general benefits
reiulting from its use ·outweigh the occasional injuries inflicted by it; hence the public good demands its use. We may
conceive of means by which it might be rendered absolutely
safe, but such means would so interfere with its beneficial use
that the danger to be anticipated would not justify their adoption; therefore the public good demands its use without them.
But the danger incident to its use may be lessened by the use
42 H~rper

& James 930-36.
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of a lock which would prevent children, attracted to it, from
moving it; the interference with the proper use of the turntable occasioned by the use of such lock is so slight that it is
outweighed by the danger to be anticipated from an omission
to use it; therefore the public good, we think, demands the
use of the lock. 48
There are a few situations in which the courts have tried to work
out, as a matter of law, certain standards of conduct which, if met,
will immunize the defendant from a charge of negligence, or, if not
met, will establish negligence. The cases in which anything like a set
of standards has been worked out, however, involve situations-having
no application to atomic energy operations. Usually they have involved
railroad crossing situations, such as the rule to stop, look, and listen.
Sometimes, in automobile or pedestrian cases the courts have laid down
absolute rules defining negligent action. None of these has any application to the complicated scientific and engineering activities which will
be involved in the atomic energy business. Actually, most of the cases
merely state what the defendant did or failed to do, and the jury, or
the court, as the case may be, concluded that this either was or was not
negligent. Since most of the cases speak in these general terms, all that
can be concluded is that what was held to be negligent conduct in any
specific case will be held to be negligent again only if exactly the same
set of circumstances arise. This latter condition means there is no
practical value whatsoever in using these cases to determine whether or
not a person's actions in a new situation meet the legal standard. A
plaintiff has to show only that the defendant's conduct in the particular
circumstances was not up to the prescribed standard; he does not have
to show what would have constituted proper conduct. Courts have been
reluctant to do more than conclude in a particular case that the standard
of due care was or was not met without any real discussion of why
this was so, other than that the reasonably prudent man under the
circumstances would or would not have done it this way. We agree
with the treatise writers that each case turns on its own facts and that
a given set of circumstances seldom if ever arises a second time.
It is true that Mr. Justice Holmes apparently felt that detailed
minimum or maximum standards of conduct could be worked out by
the courts over a period of years as situations occurred and reoccurred.''
' 8 Chicago, Burlington
& Quincy R.R. v. Krayenbuhl, 65 Neb. 889, 903, 91 N.W.
88o (1!)02).
u "A judge who has long sat at nisi prius ought gradually to acquire a fund of experience which enables him to present the common sense of the community in ordinary
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Desirable as this would be from the standpoint of the potential defendant, the conclusion of the treatise writers that this is not what the
courts have done seems justified. While much of the discussion in the
treatises deals primarily with the question of whether it is for the court
or the jury to determine negligence, it seems quite clear that the same
conclusion would be reached whether the judge or the jury makes the
final decision. It is generally agreed, of course, that the jury in the
usual case should make the decision. 45
We see nothing in the atomic energy area to cause the application
of any different rules for the standard of care than the one described
above. The character of radioactive material, both as to its potentiality
for harm and as to the likelihood that harm will result from its use,
does not seem to call for the application of any different rules concerning the required standard of conduct. In some cases, where the material
is very dangerous and well might travel long distances, last a long time,
and expose many people, extraordinary precautions will have to be
taken. Where the danger is very slight surely the courts will find that
much less by way of precautionary steps will be required. Because we
have knowledge of the unusual characteristics of radioactive materials,
however, it behooves the person using them to think seriously about the
degree of risk involved and what precautions can be taken without
undue impediment to the effective utilization of their many beneficial
characteristics.
( 2) Some General Cautions to Observe
Although it is impossible to establish affirmatively what will be considered reasonable, perhaps it will give perspective to the atomic energy
lawyer if we consider what courts have stated about the degree of
caution that must be used if one is to avoid a charge of negligence.
Sometimes courts speak of the need to use a high standard of care, but
they seem to be saying merely that under the circumstances, because the
instances far better than an average jury. He should be able to lead and instruct them
in detail, even where he thinks it desirable, on the whole, to take their opinion. Furthermore the sphere in which he is able to rule without taking their opinion at all should
be continually growing." Holmes, The Common Law 124 (1881).
· • 5 In Detroit & M.R.R. v. Van Steinberg, 17 Mich. 99, 120-21 (1868), Judge Cooley
remarked, "The case, however, must be a very clear one which would justify the court
taking upon itself this responsibility . . . . The difficulty in these cases of negligent injuries is, that it seldom happens that injuries are repeated under the same circumstances ; and, therefore, no common standard of conduct by prudent men becomes fixed
or known."
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substance or situation may be quite dangerous, a reasonable and prudent
man would use greater precautions, not that there is a higher basic
standard of due care. For our purposes there are three groups of cases
indicating at least certain kinds of precautions which might be required
of persons dealing with radiation hazards.
(a) An Obligation to Keep Abreast of Technological Developments-Use of Experts
The concept most likely to be troublesome in atomic energy negligence actions is the requirement that users of dangerous material keep
abreast of available safety techniques and methods of evaluating hazards. This is a new and rapidly developing science about which there is
a great deal to be learned, even as to the fundamentals. Especially for
the users of high level radiation sources within the intermediate range
of radioactive half-lives, it is important to keep up to date as to safety
techniques.
An application of the general idea that one must keep up with the
times is found in the decision in The T. J. Hooper case. 46 The loss
of two coal barges in a storm was held to be the result of the defendant's
negligence in 'not equipping his tug with a radio receiving set which
would have enabled the master to keep in touch with the shore and learn
of the approach of the storm in time to have taken shelter. Judge L.
Hand concluded that radio was a well known device in 1 9~8 and could
have been installed quite cheaply. He reached this conclusion notwithstanding the fact that of all the tug lines, only one used radio receivers
on its boats.
The degree of foresight that may be required in the name of what is
reasonably foreseeable and what is a reasonable device for the prevention of accidents is illustrated by Marsh Wood Products Co. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., a Vlisconsin case decided in 1932. 47 In this case
the construction company (which is now in the business of constructing
atomic reactors) was held liable for the injuries resulting from the
explosion of a boiler tube. The tube had exploded under the pressure of
eighty pounds of steam although it was designed to withstand one
hundred-fifty pounds. Plaintiff's evidence consisted chiefly of the testimony of a university professor of metallurgy. He had prepared samples of the tube for a microscopic examination to discover the texture
46

6o F.2d 737 (2nd Cir. 1932).

Marsh Wood Products Co. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 207 Wis. 209, 204 N.W.
392 (1932).
41
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and structure of the steel and thus to ascertain its soundness. He
testified that his examination of the steel indicated that there were
impurities which well may have caused the rupture. The defendant in
the case selected the highest quality steel available in the industry,
made the usual hydrostatic test at a pressure of a thousand pounds to
determine soundness, and found no leaks. The plaintiff's witness stated
that he thought a microscopic examination was required if one was to
be sure that the steel was sound. He admitted, however, that he knew
of no single manufacturer or seller of tubes who made such an examination during the course of the manufacturing operations. In deciding
whether this evidence justified submission of the question of due care
to the jury the court stated:
Is this evidence sufficient to permit the jury to find that the
failure to i.nstitute the metallographic examination by defendants constitutes negligence? We have concluded that it is
sufficient. lt represents the judgment of recognized experts in
the field as to the requirements of the art in which they are
experts, and it is our conclusion that the jury might accept
the opinions as establishing the reasonableness of instituting
this test and the necessity for its institution in order to discharge a duty of due care. The fact that it was not the practice of tube manufacturers generally to use these tests, and
that such an examination is not incorporated in the specifications of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, or
required or provided for in the Wisconsin Boiler Code, is
certainly strong evidence against the position taken by the
Professors McCaffery and McKay, but it does not dispose of
their evidence as a matter of law. . . . Obviously, manufacturers cannot, by concurring in a careless or dangerous
method of manufacture, establish their own standard of care. 48
In Trowbridge v. Abrasive Company of Philadelphia, 49 plaintiff sued
for damages caused by disintegration of an abrasive wheel. Here again
the defendant followed the practice of the industry and tested only the
centrifugal stress of its products. No test was made of the stress of
vibration and impact or shock on grinding wheels and the possibility of
disintegration from these forces. Again a university professor testified
that adequate equipment for testing these stresses could and should
have been designed for the abrasive industry since there was sufficient
basic knowledge in other industries to make such tests feasible. A
verdict of.$ISO,ooo was upheld.
•8
49

I d. at 218-19.
190 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. I9Sl).
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These cases are very important for our purposes, not only because
they indicate the necessity of making use of the best possible safety
devices so long as they are economically feasible but also because the
cases involved the use of expert witnesses to establish what is a reasonable course of conduct under the circumstances. It is clear that the same
kind of expert witness will be needed in most radiation cases.
It should be remembered in considering this problem that it is not
enough that the defendant use his own best judgment or that he believes
he has acted with reasonable care. Beliefs or desires to act reasonably
are never a defense. 60 It is also true that in general one must comply
with the customary practices of a particular industry or area of activity
to avoid a charge of negligence, and that compliance with those customary standards in many cases will justify a finding that the defendant acted with due care. 61 The cases discussed above make it
perfectly clear, however, that compliance ·with the customs of the
industry will not necessarily be sufficient, 62 but is merely evidence
bearing on the question of 'what circumstances require by way of
reasonable conduct. The cases also clearly demonstrate that, in dealing
with material which calls for extra precautions and special knowledge,
one must take advantage of advice that can be obtained from recognized
experts in the field and that the standard of care usually will be the
standard suggested by the experts. Certainly the cases described above
follow this principle.
One other case warrants discussion at this point, not only because it
indicates the kind of imagination that may be required of a defendant
but also because it illustrates the questions that may arise when expert
witnesses are used. The defendant in Air Reduction Co. v. Philadelphia
Storage Battery Co. 63 furnished tanks of oxygen under pressure to the
plaintiff and provided a manifold to control the release of the gas. Fire
broke out while the oxygen was being delivered through the manifold
and the plaintiff's factory was destroyed. The experts produced by the
plaintiff testified that a steel surface, especially if it was bored, when
exposed to oxygen under pressure created a likelihood of fire. They
also testified that the use of brass, copper, or cast pipe of any material
would reduce the danger. In spite of the fact that the defendant's
experts gave testimony leading to the opposite conclusion, the court
50 The Gennanic, 196 U.S. 589, 25 S.Ct. 317 (1905); Hover v. Barkhoof, 44 N.Y.
II3 (1870); Prosser 124; Harper & James 874, 898.
5 1 See cases cited at Harper & James 978, n. 5·
52 Harper & James 977 ff.; Prosser 135 ff.
63 14 F.2d 734 (3d Cir. 1926).
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upheld the jury's verdict for the plaintiff. This case again indicates the
degree of foresight and the kinds of precaution for which the defendant
may be held responsible. It seems to. be exactly the kind of situation
that may arise in the atomic industry where much is still to be learned
about the science.
This case, of course, deals with a manufacturer's product liability,
and the negligence questions arising in such cases are discussed more
fully in Chapter V. These cases do furnish some general principles,
however, which undoubtedly will control cases that do not involve
product liability. Many of them do illustrate the degree to which the
courts may hold a defendant responsible for following out a line of
research directed toward minimizing the risks inherent in the use of
materials which can cause serious injury. The Chapman Chemical Company case 64 (involving the spread of weedkiller dust for several miles
so as to destroy the plaintiff's crops) and the Pittsburgh-Des Moines
Company case ~ - (concerning the failure of a new design of tank to
hold liquefied gas) illustrate the proposition that, when dealing with a
material known to have a great potential for harm, one is under an
obligation to use extreme caution and explore all feasible means of
reducing the risk of injury.
All these cases demonstrate that it is not enough to have acted in
good faith or to have depended upon the opinion of just any expert.
They also make it clear that when experts differ as to what is a reasonable standard of conduct the defendant probably will have to run the
risk of submission of this issue to the jury. In some cases at least it
will be necessary to go beyond the present custom of the industry in
taking precautions. There is no reason to think these principles, developed chiefly in manufacturer's liability cases, will not be applied to
negligence cases generally. It is recognized that radioactive materials
are dangerous. The publicity that attended the dropping of the original
A-bombs in Japan and the many testings of A- and H-bombs since then
have made the general public aware of the dangerous potential of radioactive materials. No one can plead ignorance of its dangerous qualities.
Since the potential for harm is relatively great, the courts very likely
will find, perhaps as a matter of law, that the handling of even small
quantities of these materials without the advice of experts is negligence.
Certainly a jury would be permitted to so conclude. In fact, this would
5

5 4 St~pra

note 32.
Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Co., 166 F.2d go8 (3d Cir. 1948); Foley v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Co., 363 Pa. I, 68 A.2d 517 (1949).
55
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seem to be justified by the policy decisions which Congress made in
enacting the Atomic Energy Act of 1954-that this material is potentially very dangerous and should be handled with due regard for the
public health and safety.
(b) Duty to Reduce Hazard After Accident-Obligation to Warn and Treat
The above cases, and others noted in the product liability chapter,
deal with what one might call a duty to discover dangers and to evolve
precautionary techniques when using new and hazardous substances.
The law of negligence ordinarily does not impose an affirmative, responsibility upon a person to use all reasonable efforts to save others
from injury or to reduce injury which the person himself did not assist
in creating. The escalator case 56 dealt with a situation where at least
the defendant was responsible for the creation of the machine which
did the injury and which the defendant had invited the public to use.
This kind of case may indicate that the operator of an atomic reactor,
even if he should not be held strictly liable, may be held to a standard
of conduct which will minimize the losses occuring in the event of a
non-negligent discharge of radioactive material endangering persons or
property. While a categorical answer cannot be given, it would not
seem unreasonable for a court to conclude that such entrepreneurs,
should the accident happen and endanger many lives, must take proper
precautions to reduce the resultant injury even though they are not held
legally responsible for the accident itself. This may dictate that the
reactor operator prepare plans to give warning of the danger should it
arise, to cooperate in the evacuation of personnel if this seems wise
under the circumstances, and to direct the decontamination procedures
that may be required should a serious reactor burn-up occur. While the
danger may be somewhat less in other activities involving the discharge
of radioactive material into streams or into the air from other operations, the same basic principle would seem to apply. The user of radioactive materials may be required not only to give warning of the discharge and consequent danger but also to participate in the steps needed
to minimize the resultant injuries. In the event of a serious reactor
incident, it might be best not to warn people of the potential danger
since such warning could cause panic. Certainly attempting the evacuation of a large city within the space of a few hours before a radioactive
~ 6 Supra note JI, where the defendant was held liable for not acting fast enough in
aiding a boy caught in the escalator.
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cloud covers the city might cost more lives than keeping people within
their houses. This is nQt the kind of decision that should be niade by
default, however, on the theory that if one refuses to recognize a danger
it may go away. It should be a decision deliberately reached, in consultation with public officials who would, of course, have to participate
in any such evacuation plan. Even persons who use radioactive materials in industrial or research operations where the potential for harm
is much less should consciously make the same kind of decisions and
work out disaster or accident plans with appropriate public officials,
such as,. city water departments or highway police.
I

(c) Duty to Use New Radiation Techniques
Radioactive material not only has a great potential for harm but also
an even greater potential for good by way of ·assistance in research
efforts. This fact itself creates an interesting problem which might be
described as the other side of the coin. As mentioned above, although
the law ordinarily does not require affirmative action by one not responsible for the creation of a dangerous situation, there are certain
situations in which it recognizes that the relationship between the parties dictates that one of them take reasonable steps to prevent, minimize,
or eradicate a dangerous situation. The most obvious example of this
is the duty of the doctor to take reasonable steps to cure his patient.
Even though he is not responsible for the patient's becoming ill, he is
under an obligation to take such reasonable steps as. other doctors
would take under the circumstances. Most of the malpractice cases have
involved an affirmative action of the doctor which increased the injury.
There seems to be no reason, however, why a doctor should not be held
negligent if he fails to make proper use of new diagnostic or research
techniques which radioactive isotopes make available to him. One cannot foresee at the present time just what uses of radioisotopes will become common practice in the medical profession, but it is not difficult
to predict that many uses will become generally accepted. The use of
radioactive iodine 131 to detect the malfunctioning of the thyroid in a
new infant while still in the mother's womb (thereby preventing cretinism) may be one example that someday will fit in this new category.
The location of brain tumors and the treatment of hyperthyroidism by
the use of such materials certainly is becoming more common, even
though as yet it is not· so well established in .the medical community
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that it would be considered a lack of professional skill to fail to use it.G 7
The situation here contemplated is more like the case where a patient
goes to a doctor under the assumption that he needs treatment, and the
doctor makes a faulty diagnosis. Kuhn v. Banker 58 comes close to
illustrating this affirmative duty. There the doctor properly set part of
a broken femur bone in the patient and a union apparently formed. The
doctor was held guilty of negligence, however, for failing to use an
X-ray photograph to determine the reason for the patient's complaint
at a later time that there was a grinding sensation in her hip where the
broken bone was located. The court clearly suggested that the attending
physician was negligent in failing to use an X-ray photograph in these
circumstances. The court held, however, that since no evidence was
offered to show that the ultimate failure of the break to heal was caused
by the failure to diagnose the case correctly there was no proof of
proximate cause; therefore the directed verdict for the defendant was
upheld. There are a number of other cases in which the court held in
one way or another that failure to use X-rays as a diagnostic technique
would constitute negligence under the proper circumstances. 69
Even though the defendant is in no way responsible for the plaintiff's
dangerous position, these cases perhaps support the proposition that,
because of the status relationship (in this case that of doctor-patient),
the defendant is obliged to take account of new devices, information, or
techniques which will make those services more adequate for the needs
of the plaintiff. This responsibility might arise in connection with the
designs, architectural plans, or scientific advice 60 used in a building,
machine, or material going into the construction or operation of a
reactor. Notwithstanding the fact that the malpractice cases indicate a
very broad range of permissible judgment in which the professional
person will not be held liable for a wrong judgment, it is possible that
the courts may hold that the service must be rendered with imagination
and with some ability to foresee the usefulness of new techniques.
57 See T. J. Hooper case, supra note 46 (tug company liable for loss of barges in
storm for failure to install radios) ; Marsh Wood Products Co. case, supra note 47
(storage tank manufacturer liable for failure to use metallographic surveys of boiler
tube steel) ; and a case reported in the N.Y. Times, June IS, I9SS, p. 63, cols. I, 2, in
which a California couple initiated suit against Cutter Laboratories and a local retail
distributor as a result of their four-year-old son's contracting polio after vaccination.
Gs I33 Ohio St. 304, I3 N.E.2d 242 (I938).
G9 115 A.L.R. 298 ff. (I938).
so Prosser I32-33 cites dentists, attorneys, engineers, accountants, druggists, X-ray
operators, oil well shooters, threshers, and restaurant operators as other skilled trades
where one must use a certain minimum of skill and knowledge.
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Radiation as a source of energy or as a research tool surely will present
many such possibiliti~s.
In discussing the standard of conduct required, Prosser makes one
statement which might be interpreted as indicating the existence of an
affirmative duty not unlike the kind suggested here.
In many situations, a failure to disclose the existence of a
known danger may be the equivalent of misrepresentation,
where it is to be expected that another will rely upon the appearance of safety. The surgeon who remains silent when he
discovers he has left his tools in the patient's anatomy, the
landlord who leases defective premises, the landowner who
permits a licensee to enter without warning of hidden perils,
the seller or supplier of a chattel who fails to disclose its dangerous nature or its concealed defects, each may be liable to
the person with whom he deals, or to others to whom harm is
to be expected through that person's reliance. 61
Again, in discussing the duty concept Prosser points out from other
cases that when a person voluntarily assumes a certain relationship to
others, there may be the duty of affirmative conduct. After stating that
in mos-t 'of these cases the person held liable had made the situation
worse than it was before, Prosser says:
In four cases involving gratuitous repairs by landlords, any
such requirement has been rejected, and the defendant has
been held to the obligation of reasonable care in his undertaking, although the ·plaintiff'has not been further endangered,
misled or deprived of other help. 62
Although these statements, and the ca.Ses cited iri support of them,
do not go quite as far as is suggested in our analysis above, recently
they have been interpreted by the 4th Circuit C9urt of Appeals in a
very broad manner. The decision comes rather close to the· kind of
affirmative duty we are suggesting. In· Union Carbide & Carbon Corp.
v. Stapleton, 68 the court held the defendant corporation liable for failing
to inform the plaintiff employee that a routine medical examination
had indicated an inactive tuberculosis spot on his lung. After stating
that there was no evidence that the tuberculosis which the employee had
throughout the period of his employment was caused in any way by the
fault of the company or the company doctors (there was no assertion of
malpractice nor of negligent failure of the company to carefully select
61

Prosser 146,

62

ld. at 187.

63

237 F.2d 229 (6th Cir. 1956).
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a qualified physician), the court held the company liable for not having notified the employee of these periodic. findings of an inactive
tuberculosis spot. Finding that the disclosure could have been made
mo_st conveniently by personnel other than the doctors who made the
examination and that the information was of a sort which they certainly could have given to the employee, the court said :
Failure of the appellant to disclose to Stapleton what its
records showed his condition to be was clearly a violation of
its duty to exercise ordinary care for his safety. By remaining
silent, the appellant permitted Stapleton to rely upon a tacit
assurance of safety despite its k!J.owledge of the existence of
danger . . . , . To warn Stapleton of a known but hidden defect on its property would have been appellant's clear duty .
. . . Its duty to warn him of the known but hidden danger
here was no less clear. 64
Admitting the validity of the company's argument that it was under no
obligation to make a physical examination and that it should not be
penalized for voluntarily undertaking more than its legal duty, the
court nevertheless said :
But, when it undertook to do so, Stapleton was entitled to and
did rely on the expectation that he would be told of any
dangerous condition actually disclosed by that examination.
The appellant was therefore liable for injury to Stapleton
caused by its negligent omission to advise him of his tubercular cbndition. 65
The court relied upon the statements from Prosser quoted above, but
this does not seem completely justified. The case, however, indicates a
situation in which a status condition quite unrelated to any obligation
to give aid to or protect the plaintiff in the way contemplated nevertheless may impose a duty upon the defendant to take some kind of affirmative steps to give any knowledge he has of potential dangers. The
court's emphasis upon the reliance of the plaintiff that a dangerous condition would be reported to him suggests the possibility that an unexpected affirmative duty may result from status conditions that at first
glance would not seem to require any action by the potential defendant.
This reasoning might be applied to all who use radioactive material
which exposes another even though such users were not legally liable
for the exposure itself.
64
65

/d. at 232.
/d. at 232-33.
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b. Effect of Statutory or Administrative Rulings

The liability of a person handling radiation sources cannot be determined fully without a consideration of the impact of statutory and
administrative health and safety regulations. The number and scope of
such statutes and regulations, both federal 66 and state, 67 is considerable.
These rules and regulations will have considerable effect on the decision
as to whether or not the defendant has been negligent.
All of the writers on the subject seem to agree that this problem
breaks down into two kinds of cases: ( 1) those in which the statutes
specifically provide civil liability for a breach of the statutory standards
or the administrative regulations issued thereunder; and ( 2) those in
which the statute provides only a criminal penalty or simply prohibits
action with an injunctive type of enforcement that in no way deals specifically with the problem of tort liability of the violator. 68 For our
purposes there is no need to discuss the first· category because the
federal statute dealing with health and safety matters in atomic energy
contains no provisions on possible civil liability from a failure to comply
with one of the health and safety regulations of the AEC. There is one
catch-all penalty provision, however, making it a crime to violate any
of the regulations of the AEC. 69 This certainly would include safety
regulations. All other criminal penalty provisions very clearly are directed at violations involving danger to national security. 70 In this respect the federal statute is like the Federal Food and Drug Act, 71 not the
Federal Safety Appliance Act. 72 A reading of the entire legislative
history of the Atomic Energy Act of. 1954 has produced not a single
Infra Part IV.
Infra Part III.
Restatement, Torts §§285-86. See generally Morris, "The Relation of Criminal
Statutes to Tort Liability," 46 Harv. L. Rev. 453 (1933); Morris, "The Role of Criminal Statutes in Negligence Actions," 49 Col. L. Rev. 21 (1949); James, "Statutory
Standards and Negligence in Accident Cases," II La. L. Rev. 95 (1951); Notes, 32
Col. L. Rev. 712 (1932); 19 Minn. L. Rev. 666 (1935); 13 Com. L. Q. 634 (1928);
27 Va. L. Rev. 240 (1940); 15 Brooklyn L. Rev. 246 (1950). See also Lowndes,
"Civil Liability Created by Criminal Legislation," 16 Minn. L. Rev. 361, 367 (1932).
89 Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 703, Chap. 18, §223, 68 Stat. 191, 958.
10 I d. at §§221, 222, 224-31.
71 See Kaplan, "Variations on a Single Theme-The Impact of the Pure Food
Statutes on Civil Liability," 13 Food Drug Cosm. L. J. II (1958).
7 2 Harper & James 994, n. 1, citing statutes and cases. There is not even an indirect
indication of a legislative attempt to provide a standard of conduct for civil damage
cases such as that in the legislative history of the Federal Safety Appliance Act and
the provision that any employee injured as a result of a violation of the safety requirements of the act should "not -be deemed to assume the risk thereby occasioned."
88

87
88
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reference to the question of the effect of federal health and safety regulations on civilliability. 78 Nor is there anything in the legislative history
or the provisions of the Price-Anderson government indemnity amendment which gives any hint whatsoever of a congressional intent on this
question. 74 We are presented, therefore, with the second situation :
What will be the effect of federal health and safety regulations on civil
damage suits arising in the atomic energy areas subject to federal regulation? The same general rules apply to a violation of a state statute
(and regulations issued pursuant thereto) if violation is made criminal
or subject to administrative enforcement, but nothing is. said about civil
liability.
In a sense all of the federal health and safety standards are administrative in character as are many of the standards set up under state
statutes, so it is important to. note the distinction that some courts draw
between statutory and administrative standards. Some give greater
weight to statutory standards, yet all writers on the subject seem to
agree that the important issue. in both cases is whether to apply a rule
of "negligence per se" or one of ortly "evidence of negligenct;." ~ This
same distinction is observed when considering cases in different states
when both are dealing with only statutory standards. The real issue in
most cases is whether violation of a standard, whether statutory or
administrative, is "negligence per se" or only "evidence of negligence." 76 For our purposes, therefore, hereafter the distinction between
statutory and administrative standards is ignored exc,ept where it is
mentioned specifically.
One further major point should be kept in mind when considering
this problem. Although most of the cases have dealt with the question
of whether failure to comply with a statutory standard imposes absolute
or is only evidence of negligence, there is
liability, is negligence per
another group of cases, which the defendant pleaded complhmce with
· the statute or administrative standard as proof, either conclusive ·or
presumptive, that he has met the requirement of acting as a reasonably
prudent man under the circumstances. As pointed out later, this possibility has considerable significance for the person handling radioactive
materials.·
7

in·

se,

TS Probably the equivalent of 5,000 pages in an ordinary book when hearings are included. There are some references to health and safety matters but nothing referring
to this question.
n Insurance amendments discussed infra at end of Part III.
11 Morris articles, mpra note 68; Harper & James 987-1014.
76 Harper & James IOII, n. 57, and Morris, "The Role of Administrative Safety
Measures In Negligence Actions," 28 Tex. L. Rev. 143, 145 (1949).
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(I) Failure to Comply

Except in a few odd or anomalous cases which all writers criticize,
mere proof that the defendant (or the plaintiff where contributory
negligence is pleaded as a defense) has failed to comply with some
regulatory or administrative rule of conduct and that the plaintiff has
suffered injury is not sufficient to establish a breach of the standard of
conduct which constitutes negligence. 77 There must, of course, be a
cause-in-fact relationship between the defendant's action and the plaintiWs injury. This is true in every negligence case regardless of whether
or not there has been breach of a statutory requirement. Almost all
courts agree that no weight should be given to the fact that the defendant breached a statutory standard if the standard was not established to protect the particular class of persons that includes the plaintiff,
or if the standard was not created to guard against the particular injury
suffered by the plaintiff. The leading case in this area is Goriss v.
Scott 78 where the court refused to hold that the defendant's violation
of the statute requiring carriers by water to provide separate pens for
stock was any evidence of negligence in caring for the sheep which
were washed overboard in a storm. It was clear that the act was
directed at keeping sheep or cattle from being exposed to disease on
their way into the country.·
In many American cases this doctrine has been applied in situations
arising under various types of regulations. Examples are, statutes controlling the length of time that trains may obstruct crossings, regulations determining where motor vehicles may stop or park when the
regulations are directed at traffic problems such as delay and congestion
but are not intended to prevent collisions, provisions requiring licenses
for automobile drivers or physicians where the driver or physician
actually was competent and met the normal standards of conduct even
though he had no license, or Sunday laws which are meant either to
observe a religious day or provide a day of rest but not to prevent
vehicles which may be involved in accidents from going on the highway,
or to prevent business men . from fraudulently misrepresenting goods
that they sell. 79 While the policies underlying statutes setting up such
standards of conduct occasionally are very narrowly construed, in genThe odd cases are cited by Harper & James g6, nn. 6, 7, 8.
[1874] L.R. 9 Ex. 125.
79 Prosser 157-58; Harper & James 1002-1004- For a recent case, see Permenter v.
Milner Chevrolet Co., 91 S.2d 243 (Miss. 1956) (defendant left keys in car and thief
ran into plaintiff some distance away).
77

78
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eral the courts give them rather broad construction so long as the hazard
actually created comes within the general scope of the harm legislated
against and there is a cause-in-fact relationship between the defendant's
breach of the standard and the plaintiff's injuries. A recent English
case 80 illustrates this liberal interpretation trend. The statute required
that roofs in mines should be made secure. Apparently it was directed
at preventing injuries from falling roofs. In this particular case the
cause of the injury was somewhat different. Before the plaintiff came
to the place of injury the roof had fallen, and the pile of debris caused
the cart in which he was riding to be derailed. The House of Lords
overruled the Scottish court's decision which held that this was a different kind of harm from that intended to be covered by the statute.
The House of Lords thought that the statute was directed toward
preventing personal injury generally; therefore, since the failure to
shore-up the mine roof properly was the cause of the plaintiff's injury,
the defendant lost his argument to the effect that the obstruction on the
road was too remote from the negligent ·breach of the statutory standard. There are many American cases which would accord with this kind
of broad construction of the statutory purpose in setting up a standard
of conduct.
The other generally recognized requirement in treating violation of a
statutory standard as negligence is that the person injured must fall
within the class of persons meant to be protected by the statute. A good
example is a statute which makes illegal normal business activity on
Sunday. If a train running on Sunday kills a cow on the tracks, the
mere fact that the statutory prohibition against running trains was
breached is not sufficient to allow the owner to recover damages from
the railroad. An even more graphic example of this proposition, perhaps, is the statute which requires that trains blow whistles when approaching crossings. Even if the whistle is not blown and a cow is
killed, it seems rather clear that the statute was not intended to warn
cows. Another example is the blackout statute enacted for the protection of the public at large and not for an air-raid warden attempting to
put out a light showing in violation of the statute. 81 This statutory
purpose limitation is also applicable to the issue of contributory negligence, at least in most courts today. 82
There is another kind of case in which violation of a statutory standso Grant v. National Coal Board, [1956] 1 All E.R. 682.
8 1 Cases are collected in Prosser 154. Harper & James 1004.
s2 Harper it James 1004.
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ard will not be taken as evidence or proof of the defendant's negligence
toward the plaintiff. While there is some difference of opinion among
writers as to the exact theory for this exception, 83 there is general
agreement that the courts will excuse certain violations of statutory
st~ndards. Some of the cases involve situations where the defendant
was not at fault and yet violated the statute, such as, in driving on the
highway at night without tail lights which had gone out under circumstances beyond the driver's control, or driving on the lefthand side of
the street where is was impossible to meet the statutory standard of
driving on the right because of temporary obstruction, or when an
emergency arises not within the control of the defendant and the only
reasonable course of action is to do something in violation of the
statute, or taking some precautionary measure that is even better than
that required by the statute even though the statute itself is not complied with.
A very interesting excused-violation argument was made in Ursprung
v. Winter Garden Co. 84 The regulation of the superintendent of buildings, requiring a guard around an elevator shaft, had not been published
since there was no legal requirement for publication. The court excused
the defendant on the ground that there was no proof that he knew of
the existence of the code. One writer suggests that there are real possibilities for more frequent use of this kind of defense. 83
One of the distinctions most often discussed is whether violation of
the statutory or administrative standard is negligence per se or only
evidence of negligence. Writers seem to agree 86 that the weight of
authority still is in favor of negligence per se. There is a very respectable minority, however, which holds that it is only evidence of negligence, and there is some indication that the trend of authority is in this
direction. 87 The reasons for and against each rule are presented very well
by Harper and James. 88 For the most part, writers who have given
serious consideration to the problem agree that the rule should be one
of evidence of negligence only. When one takes into consideration the
number of exceptions that must be worked out by the courts when they
supposedly follow a negligence per se rule, the evidence of negligence
sa Prosser 158; Harper & James 1004 et seq.
183 App. Div. 718, 169 N.Y.S. 738 (1918), discussed in Morris, supra note 76 at 151.
Morris, supra note 76 at 146-47.
8 6 Early writers thought this; see Prosser 161; Harper & James 997; Morris, supra
note 76 at 146-47.
8 7 Harper & James 1013. But see contrary suggestion by Kaplan, supra note 71 at 47.
88 Harper & James 997-1001.
84
85
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only seems the preferable one. Undoubtedly one of the reasons why
some writers take this position is because the negligence per se rule
often defeats the plaintiff when he is accused of contributory negligence
on the ground that he violated some statutory standard. It is true that
the negligence per se rule often imposes liability on the defendant or
prevents the plaintiff from recovering in a situation where the viol~tion
is without fault or negligence in any realistic sense.
As mentioned before, the fact that the standards may be administrative rather than statutory does not change the result except in some
jurisdictions. As Morris indicates in his excellent article, 89 there are
several jurisdictions in which it is held that violation of administrative
regulations is negligence per se. He points out that actually the difference between the rule of negligence per se and the rule of evidence
of negligence only probably is of little significance in most cases. As
long as violation can be considered evidence of negligence it is admissible, and this is as far as the plaintiff's lawyer usually needs to go
because it allows him to submit the case to the jury. It is quite unlikely
that jurors will make very much of the subtle distinction between the
two rules. Morris even suggests that as a matter of trial technique
plaintiffs' lawyers, except in the most extreme cases, ought to avoid
asking an instruction calling for negligence per se rules to be applied.
His theory is that this does not really change the jury's attitude and it
does run the risk of a reversal on appeal if the appellate court follows
the rule that violation is only evidence of negligence rather than negligence per se.
It is safe to generalize that the practical result in most cases is that
violation of a statutory or administrative standard makes a prima facie
case of lack of due care. This leaves open the possibility that the defendant may be able to show in his particular case that the violation of
the rule should not be considered negligence, .as suggested later in discussing the validity of administrative rules. It is our opinion that
defendants should be forced to accept the burden of showing affirmatively why their failure to comply with the administrative regulations
should not be treated as negligence in the particular case. Although some
writers on the subject avoid using the prima facie case terminology in
drawing their conclusions, in effect they reach an equivalent result. The
Minnesota court in the recent case of Lynghaug v. Payte expressly applied the prima facie rule where a car owner had unknowingly failed
to keep his muffler in such condition as to prevent the escape of carbon
se Morris, supra note 76.
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monoxide into the interior of the car, as the statute required. The
court said:
In the absence of excuse or justification, liability follows as a
matter of law if, upon proof of violation, the negligence is the
proximate cause of the injury. The burden of going forward
with the evidence and establishing excuse or justification or
such other defense as may be available shifts to the defendant.90
It should be remembered, of course, that adopting the prima facie
case rule cuts both ways; while in many cases it will help the defendants
avoid liability by allowing them to show why their action was not negligent in spite of the violation of the rule, in other cases it will help the
plaintiffs avoid a defense of contributory negligence per se when they
violate some administrative or statutory rule of conduct. Harper and
James even go so far as to suggest that where the rule is one of negligence per se a double standard ought to be used. so that it is only evidence of negligence when used against a plaintiff to show contributory
negligence. 91 Their avowed position, that all tort law ought to be
regarded as a method of compensating as many plaintiffs as possible
and distributing the risk of injuries as widely as possible, is probably
their real reason for wanting to eliminate the negligence per se rule.
Dean Prosser agrees with their conclusion that the rule should be evidence of negligence only. 92
The evidence of negligence rule allows a greater degree of flexibility
so that account may be taken of individual differences between cases.
Such a rule certainly will cause much less theoretical difficulty for
courts when they are faced with the cases which have given rise to the
many exceptions to the rule of negligence per se. Also it seems eminently more satisfactory in a fast developing field such as atomic
energy where statutory and administrative standards are likely to become quickly outmoded and inadequate.
Attacking Administrative Regulations
The federal standards of conduct applicable to atomic energy activities are all administrative in form rather than statutory. The same is
true of most of the state standards. Nevertheless consideration should
be given to the possible diff~:rences between the rules applying to the two
90 247 Minn. 186, 195-96,

76 N.W.2d 66o ( 1956).
Harper & James 999, 1000, n. 21. Cf. Prosser 163, n. 92. See also cases collected
in Anno., 58 A.L.R.2d 68o ( 1958).
92 Prosser 162, n. 83.
91
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·kinds of standards, i.e.} statutory and administrative. One of these di fferences is that departure from statutory standards found in criminal
laws may result in imposition of a type of absolute liability. No such
cases have been found where the violation is of administrative standards
only. 98
The most significant distinction between the two, however, is that the
defendant sometimes may attack the soundness of an administrative
standard. There are a few statutory standards so ridiculous (e.g.} a
six m.p.h. speed limit) 94 that a court might not enforce them. For the
most part, though, once a statute which includes a specific standard has
been enacted, no court will undertake to reverse the judgment of the
legislature as to what is the proper standard of conduct. This is not
quite so true where the standard is established by an administrative
regulation.
When an administrative ruling has been violated, a good argument
can be made in a damage suit that it is invalid or unsound on grounds
other than those suggested thus far as excuses for non-compliance.
Morris gives an excellent statement of the argument. 95 When an attack
is made upon the validity of an administrative safety rule in a proceeding to enforce it, the question decided by the court is quite different than
when its validity is attacked in a damage suit. In a proceeding to enforce the rule it can be argued that the measure is so unreasonable as
to. be arbitrary and therefore invalid either because it is not authorized
by the statute or because it is unconstitutional. Courts iri such cases,
however, .will not invalidate the measure so long as an honest and
reasonable administrator might adopt such a rule. A considerable degree of discretion is left to the administrator in such cases even though
it tpight be proved quite easily that a sounder measure could have been
promulgated. On the other hand, in a damage-suit based upon proof of
negligence because of violation of an administrative safety rule, expert
witnesses might agree that the particular safety measures taken by the
particular defendant were actually better precautions than those prescribed by the administrative rule. They at least might testify that the
administrator's rule was not the general standard of safety adopted by
those who deal with the matters which were the subject of the lawsuit.
To make the violation of an administrator's rule under such circumstances absolute proof of negligence in a damage action seems quite
unjustifiable.
Morris, supra note 76.
Prosser 154, n. J.
95 Morris, supra note 76 at 152 ft.

98
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Another factor that influences courts when the administrative regulatory program is being enforced directly is concern that the upsetting
of one rule may weaken the whole regulatory program and make the
administrative process quite ineffective. This consequence does not
follow from a holding in a particular damage suit that a particular
violation of the administrative rule does not constitute negligence per se.
Finally, it should be noted that when there is a direct action to enforce
an administrative rule it nearly always involves a specific determination
by the administrative agency that the particular defendant actually has
violated the regulation. On the other hand, in a damage suit based upon
violation of the regulation, the administrator typically will have made
no specific ruling that the defendant's conduct was a violation of regulation. It is not nearly so easy for the court as for the administrator to
take into consideration the possibility that there was practical compliance with the administrative regqlation. To this may be added the
argument (also applicable when making violation of a criminal statute
negligence per se) that in the administration and enforcement of statutory or administrative regulations, the prosecutor or administrator can
use common sense in deciding ·whether the particular action of the defendant under the particular circumstances really amounted to a violation in substance of the statute or administrative standard of conduct.
There is no similar restraint on a plaintiff who is making use of the
violation to prove the defendant's negligence, since his only desire is
to recover damages in the particular case.
Notwithstanding the foregoing possible arguments there is in fact
very little actual authority allowing such attacks to be made upon administrative rulings. On the other hand Morris failed to find any cases
holding that defendant's proof of the unreasonableness of the administrative ruling is inadmissible. 96 The possibility of using such a defense
in an atomic energy case should not be overlooked by counsel. In an
area that has developed as rapidly as has the technology of atomic
energy, it would not seem at all unlikely that with new developments a
sounder safety measure might be found than the one promulgated by
the administrative agency on the basis of prior information. If competent experts can demonstrate the greater soundness of the new practice followed by the particular defendant, there would seem every reason
to hold that the defendant's conduct was not negligent even though he
was in violation of the administrative regulation.
98

I d. at 154-55·
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Invalid Statute or Administrative Regulation
Another matter that arises in connection with the use of violation of
either statutory or administrative standards of conduct as proof of negligence is the use to be made of such rules or standards of conduct when
the statute or administrative order itself is 'held invalid. All writers
seem to agree 97 that if the standard of conduct is invalidated because it
is so arbitrary as to be a lack of due process, or is not authorized by the
statute, the regulations should not even be admitted as evidence~ On the
other hand, it is also true that the statutory or administrative standard
may be invalidated on a ground that in no way attacks its validity as a
general statement of the conduct to be expected of a reasonably prudent
man under the circumstances. The invalidity·may be because of failure
to observe some procedural requirement for the enactment of a statute,
or some technical procedural flaw in adopting the regulation. If the contents of the regulation have been made generally known or at least are
known to the particular defendant at the time he acted, all seem to agree
that the safety standard should be admitted at least as evidence of
negligence.
Effect of Federal Pre-emption
One other possible ground for invalidity of a state standard, not
mentioned in any of the cases nor by writers in this field, is that of
federal pre-emption. There may be several reasons for finding that
pre-emption invalidates a state rule, and its use as evidence of negligence should depend perhaps on the reason. Pre-emption rriay be found
because of an actual conflict between the federal and state standards.
On the other hand it may arise from the federal government's taking
over a general regulatory area even though the specific federal regulations have not been adopted and made effective yet. If the latter is the
case, the probative value of the invalid state·imposed standard as evidence of negligence is not diminished, although it may be if there is
an actual conflict between the two governmental standards. 98
A closely related consideration is involved when the administrative
regulation, while valid, has no application to the particular defendant.
This happened in a California case, Polk v: City of Los Angeles,99
where the plaintiff was killed while trimming trees, when he came into
contact with a worn spot in the insulation of the line of the defendant
I d. at 152. Prosser 16o, n. 66, 162, n. 81; Harper & James 1001-14.
See discussion of federal pre-emption generally, infra Part III, Chapter V, Section E and specifically discussion infra under damages in nuisance. See also infra discussion in text at note 699 fl.
99 Polk v. City of Los Angeles, z6 Cal.2d 519, 159 P.2d 931 ( 1945).
97

98
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power company. The company apparently had not followed the practice
of making frequent and thorough inspections of its lines as required by
the regulatory commission which controlled such practices on the part
of privately owned power companies. The company was city owned and
therefore not within the jurisdiction of the commission. On appeal the
court assumed for purposes of argument that there was no authority of
the commission over this power company but nevertheless held that the
standard of care set down in the commission's regulations was admissible to prove the standard required of all similar utilities.
Standards Set by Unofficial Bodies
A question not unrelated to those discussed above arises when the
defendant has departed from the standards set down by a national
safety group. In the area of radiation hazards there is such a committee,
the National Committee on Radiation Protection and Measurement,
which has been very effective over a long period of years in the promulgation of radiation safety rules. 10° Certainly the safety regulations suggested by this national committee should be received in evidence on the
negligence question. There is precedent for this in several cases in
which the National Electrical Safety Code published by the United
States Bureau of Standards has been received in evidence to prove departure from a reasonable standard of conduct. 101 In the usual case,
violation of the code suggested by the national committee probably
would be accepted by the jury as rather conclusive proof of negligence.

(2) Compliance as Proof of Non-Negligent Conduct
Governmental safety standards have significance in tort actions not
only when they have not been complied with but also when they have
been followed by one accused of negligence. Many of the considerations
already discussed as important in determining the effect of non-compliance are equally applicable when compliance is asserted as proof of nonnegligent action. In addition, while the leading treatises almost ignore
the problem, 102 Morris has made an excellent general analysis of this
aspect of the problem both as to criminal statutes 103 and administrative
100 For references to the
of Part III, Chapter s.
1o1 Morris, supra note 76
102 Prosser 163, 164 and
aspect of the problem.
103 Morris, "The Role of
21, 42 (1949).

recommendations of this committee, see infra notes 139-43
at 157.
Harper & James 1014 devote one short paragraph to this
Criminal Statutes in Negligence Actions," 49 Col. L. Rev.
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regulations. 104 Nevertheless, the matter will be so vital in radiation
damage actions that consideration of the application of these general
concepts to radiation cases is warranted here. Extensive administrative
regulation of safety matters at both the federal and state levels already
exists, and most users are willing to abide by them. Use of compliance
to show non-negligence should be very frequent.
In considering the effect of such standards it is important to keep in
mind that most of the safety measures dealing with radiat~on hazards
involve a judgment based on the balancing of society's interest in the
rapid development of this promising new field against the known fact
that injuries to specific persons and genetic damage generally are analmost inevitable result of any use of radiation. 105 Likewise important
in considering the weight to be given to compliance is the fact that the
development of new knowledge is very rapid in this field as indicated
by the substantial reduction in the maximum permissible exposure
standard in recent years. 106 In the light of these facts, what significance
should be attached to compliance with governmental safety standards
in tort actions ?
It is not possible to reduce all of the cases to a set of simple rules,
generally accepted and sufficiently complete to answer even most of the
cases likely to arise. Nevertheless, a few general statements can be made
with considerable assurance. One is that in many cases courts have accepted compliance with a criminal statutory standard as more or less
conclusive proof that the defendant did not act negligentiy. 107 On the
other hand, numerous cases have held that a criminal statute states only
a minimum standard and, therefore, it always is possible for the plaintiff to show that compliance with this standard does not meet the standard of conduct dictated by negligence rules. 108 The same is true of administrative regulations. 109 Again, as indicated before in the discussion
of failure to comply with such standards, it seems to be agreed generally
that proof of compliance with criminal statutory or administrative
standards certainly should be accepted as some evidence of having used
due care but that it ought not to be accepted as conclusive proof. Existing treatments of the subject do not discuss the effect of compliance
with a civil statutory standard but there would seem to be no reason for
Morris, supra note 76 at 157 ff.
See supra Chapter I, subsection on genetic damage.
1oe See Part Ill, Chapter V, subsection C.
107 Morris, supra note 103. See also cases cited in sources cited infra note 108.
tosJd. at 45, n. So; Harper & James 1014. n. 66; Prosser 164, n. 1.
too Prosser 164, n. 2.
104

10s
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treating this case differently from that in which there is non-compliance.
Possible distinctions were discussed in the last section and are applicable
here.
The present writers feel that, in general, compliance with governmental radiation regulations should be accepted in negligence cases as
evidence of having acted reasonably but should not be used as conclusive
proof because there are too many variables in such a rapidly developing
field. We would apply this rule generally to civil statutory and administrative regulations as well as criminal. Because there has been so little
written about the significance of compliance with administrative regulations, it will be helpful to examine some representative cases. We also
suggest that there are certain radiation situations in which compliance
should be treated as conclusive proof of non-negligence.
In an Arkansas case, Southwestern Gas & Electric Co. v. Deshavo, 110
a telephone company and a power company wer~ found to have acted
with due care in the construction of their lines. Farmers felled a tree
where the lines crossed, however, and caused the telephone line to become charged. When sued by a telephone operator who received a shock
while using the line, the companies argued that they had complied with
the utility regulations for the construction of intersecting lines and
could not be held liable. The court held that once compliance was shown
the burden was on the plaintiff thereafter to prove that particular acts or
conditions created by the companies amounted to negligence. This
seems to treat proof of compliance as establishing non-negligence unless
something other th.an the mere creation of the condition by the defendant is shown. There are many general radiation regulations of this
same sort, both state and federal, so there are many situations in which
the rationale of the Arkansas case could be used by one defending a
suit for'negligent injuries to another person.
An interesting use of compliance with administrative regulations was
made by a plaintiff to meet a claim of contributory negligence in Rinehart v. Woodford Flying Senice, Inc., a West Virginia case involving
a landing accident at a local airport. 111 While a flying contest was being
conducted at a local airport the usual landing rules had been changed.
The defendants contended that the plaintiff's pilot, under the circumstances, should have circled the field until he saw how the planes were
110 199 Ark. 1078, 138 S.W.2d 397 (1940). Cf. Merlo v. Public Service Co., supra
note 41 and Chase v. Washington Water Power Co., St,pra note 41.
111 122 W.Va. 392, 9 S.E.2d 521 (1940). The reverse twist is also shown by a recent
English case, Marfin v. United Steel Co., [1957] 1 W.L.R. 104.
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landing and taking off. The court found, however, that the plaintiff's
pilot had complied with the ordinary regulations dealing with landings
and, therefore, he had acted correctly and was under no duty to deviate
from these regulations and observe local conditions to determine that a
different practice for landing was being followed. The court even rejected the defendant's offer of testimony of officials of the federal government, whose regulations the plaintiff· had followed, to show the
meaning of the regulations in such situations. The court said the
regulations were not ambiguous and the plaintiff was justified in following them. Compliance here amounted to a rule of conclusive proof.
Opportunities to use this type of reasoning should arise often in radiation cases where someone has been exposed to radiation but in a situation where the amount of radiation received, or the circumstances in
which it was received, does not violate applicable health and safety
regulations. The compliance can be argued to prove reasonable conduct
by the defendant, or a lack of contributory negligence by the plaintiff.
Perhaps of greater significance for the reactor operator are cases like
Johnson v. Maine Central Railroad,112 where a government commission
had directed the defendant railroad to place warning signs and a flashing signal in a certain way at a particular grade crossing. The commission also had regulated the speed of trains· over this crossing and the
defendanf had complied with all the orders. The court approved the
directed verdict for the defendant railro'ad; stating that· the administrative instructions and the compliance with them was conclusive
proof of the use of due care. The analogy is very close to that of areactor license, which the AEC, with the advice of its Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, issues only after determining that the
location, construction, design, and proposed operating procedures of
the plant are such as to provide the necessary protection of the public
health and safety. In respect to these matters; the government agency
makes an express finding, in a specific case, concerning a designated
radiation device or use of radioactive material to the ·effect that the
defendant's actions are consistent with due regard for public health and
safety. If the reasoning of the Maine court should be followed, there
could be no finding of negligence in design and operation plans:
Cases such as Panama Mail Steamship Company v. Davis/ 18 also
illustrate the rationale that may be used in some radiation situations. In
this case public health service officials had inspected the ship after fumi112
118

141 Me. 38, 38 A.2d 884 (1944).
79 F.2d 430 (3d Cir. 1935).
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gation by poisonous gas and certified that the holds were safe. A stevedore ordered into the holds by the ship's officers was injured because
one of the holds actually was not safe. The circuit court held that judgment for the stevedore was erroneous because the steamship company
reasonably had relied upon the health officials' pronouncement that t~1e
holds were safe. Much reliance was placed upon defendent's good faith
and acceptance of the health officials' determinations as justification for
finding the company not negligent.
These cases do not present a situation quite like that arising from the
fact that the AEC has made the radiation exposure for government
contractors' employees considerably stricter than the old standards
which still are applicable to licensees operating their own facilities. It
seems clear that the reason for the delay in imposing the stricter standards on licensees is to give them a reasonable time in which to adjust
their safety programs. Here, then, is a case where expert opinion indicates that the safer course is to reduce exposure limits; yet, on balancing
all the equities, stricter standards should not be imposed at the present
time on private licensees. In view of our present lack of knowledge as
to exactly how damaging small doses are likely to be over a long period
of time, the Commission's exposure regulations cannot be said to fix
definitively the point at which radiation becomes unacceptably dangerous. The Commission's finding, however, apparently is a deliberate attempt to balance such factors as the dangers, the necessity for promoting development, and the expense of safety precautions. Taking into
account all the interests involved, the standards admittedly are a reasonable compromise._ In most cases at least, there will be a reliance by the
defendant upon the standards established by the government agency.
On the other hand, it is known that there is very good opinion that a
stricter standard is a safer course of conduct. Where the AEC has
made a deliberate judgment on the specific issue of maximum exposure
levels, it may be that this is a case in which a judge should hold that
compliance with the requirement is conclusive proof of compliance with
a reasonable standard of conduct. 114 For a state court not to accept such
a determination by a federal agency in an area where the federal body
has the powers to issue rules and regulations may be considered unconstitutional state action because of federal pre-emption. 115
In general, however, it is important to recognize that mere compli114 Such a view is suggested in Morris, supra note 103. Harper and James criticize
this view.
115 See Part III, Chapter V, subsections E2b(1) (a) (i) and (ii)
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ance with a statutory or administrative standard often should not be
treated as conclusive proof of due care. There are cases 116 indicating
that in a particular situation it should have been clear to the defendant
that bare compliance with a statutory standard or administrative regulation is not what a reasonably prudent man would do under the circumstances. Undoubtedly, this would be true if the defendant's radiation expert was aware of the fact that the administrative regulations
clearly were too lax or that they did not fit the particular situation. This
will be true as our knowledge of radiation increases and we discover
new dangers not known at the time the pertinent administrative regulations were issued. It seems quite likely that in this kind of case the new
and higher standard of care, agreed on by experts in the field, will be
applied. Similarly, certain emergencies might arise as to a particular
employee or member of the public whose previous exposures made any
further exposure inadvisable. Such exposure as permitted by the general
regulations might be negligence in these circumstances.
Administrative Silence
·
Another situation closely related to this limitation is the case where
an attempt is made to use the fact that the administrative rules are
silent on the point as evidence of the fact that a particular safeguard is
not needed. There will be cases, of course, in which a failure of the government agency to order a safeguard to be taken is a deliberate decision
that it is not needed. There will be other situations, however, in which
silence merely means that the point has not been considered and, therefore, it has no significance in determining whether or not due care requires such action: This idea is exemplified in one of the leading railroad cases, Grand Trunk Ry. v. lves, 117 involving the question whether
the absence of a crossing flagman constitutes negligence on the part of
the railroad. The-commissioner was authorized to require crossing flagmen but had not ordered one at the particular crossing where the accident happened. Apparently, the situation at the crossing was such that
it was quite reasonable to think that a flagman would be needed. The
court held that the commissioner's order which did not include a direction for the employment of a flagman could not be accepted as an administrative determination that one was not needed. In many cases the
mere fact that the administrator has passed on some aspect of a particular installation does not mean that he has passed ·on all aspects.
It also is possible that the administrator's regulation may not take
11 6

Prosser 164; Harper & James 1014.
u.s. 408. 12 S.Ct. 679 (I8gi).

117 144
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account of a particular situation that may arise. This is illustrated by
a case in which a power company, although it had conformed to the
clearance rule of the National Electric Code, had not given warning
about an installation that was dangerously close to some construction
work which its employees knew about. The company was found to be
negligent notwithstanding its compliance with the Electric Code. 118
There would seem to be no reason why the same rule would not apply
in the case of a statutory or administrative ruling concerning radiation
safety.
There also are cases in which the plaintiff has been allowed to attack
the soundness of an· administrative rule, compliance with which is used
by the defendant as proof that he used due care. 119 This is quite like
permitting the defendant to attack the soundness of a standard when
the claim is made that his non-compliance is proof of negligence. On
the other hand, if the regulation is attacked because of a lack of jurisdiction over a particular defendant, this should not make invalid its
use as evidence of what is reasonable. So long as the regulation sets up
a reasonable standard of care for this type of situation the court well
may hold that the defendant is still entitled to a verdict because he has
proved compliance with the standard of care expected of a reasonably
prudent man; i.e.} by showing compliance with the administrative
standard. 120
c. The Care Owed to Licensees and Others
The liability of owners and ~ccupiers of land to various classes of
persons who come on the land is a question about which there is considerable confusion as to analysis and terminology as well as conclusions in decided cases. 121 As some of the opinions in recent cases and
all the legal writers point out, the old arbitrary distinctions drawn between licensees, trespassers, invitees, the public, and employees are not
very helpful in the decision of actual cases. The cases support the general conclusion that even as to trespassers the old familiar rule of no
duty to use due care so long as the defendant takes no affirmative action,
is being modified, imposition of liability depending upon the kind of
trespasser and whether or not there is some kind of expectation of con118

Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Whitescarver, 68 F.2d 928 (5th Cir. 1934).

us Morris, supra note 76 at 164

ld. at 165.
Prosser 445-62; Harper & James 147o-1505; Keeton, "Personal Injuries Resulting
from Open and Obvious Conditions," 100 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 629 (1952); Anno., 55
A.L.R.2d 525 (1957).
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tinued trespass. Certainly as to licensees the rule seems to be shifting
toward imposing somewhat greater liability on the owner of the land.
There are many cases, however, in which the courts even today draw
a rather fine line between the standard of conduct owed to a licensee
and that owed to an invitee, particularly if the invitee is on the premises
because of some possible pecuniary benefit to the occupier of the land.
There is nothing unique in the atomic energy situation which calls for
any different analysis from that already available in the literature. To
the extent that the courts of the state in which an atomic energy installation is located draw the lines sharply or not at all for most purposes,
the same should and probably will be done in cases which involve radiation injury.
There are two situations, however, in which applicability of existing
rules to radiation injury cases may impose some unusual standards of
conduct on the atomic energy entrepreneur. His lawyer should be particularly careful to take account of these possibilities in planning the
·
owner's course of action.
Duty to Warn
One of these involves the duty of the owner or occupier of land to
give warning concerning unusual types of hazards that may not be detected or observed by the visitor or the danger of which the visitor
might not be expected to appreciate. As to these hazards there seems
little reason to believe that the courts will make any substantial distinction between licensees and invitees as such. They are much more likely
to decide the cases on the basis of whether, under the particular circumstances, the defendant acted unreasonably in not notifying the visitors
of the specific danger. 122 Most of the cases which have dealt with this
problem have involved situations much more mundane than radiation
hazards. Nevertheless, the rationale of these decisions seems quite applicable to radiation cases.
A typical example is a 1951 Delaware case, Maher v. Voss. 123 There
the injured woman was an invited guest in the home of the plaintiff. In
going to get her coat in what she thought was a closet she injured herself when she fell down a stairway. The defendant's motion to dismiss
on the ground that the plaintiff was a licensee only and that therefore
no affirmative duty was owed to her was denied. The court said that
the ·old and familiar rule of non-liability did not apply even to a gratuitous licensee if the defendant knew of the dangerous condition and had
122
1 28

Harper & James 1473; Prosser 459·
46 Del. 418, 84 A.zd 527 (1951).

TORT LIABILITY

132

reason to believe that the licensee might not discover the condition or
realize the risk. The court also said that it would be negligent for the
possessor of the land to permit the guest to remain on the land without
making the condition reasonably safe or warning her about it. The
court then concluded :
The complaints in these cases charge that defendants' negligence consisted of a failure to warn Mrs. Maher of the true
nature of the "closet," which is averred to be a grave hazard
to one ignorant of its character, when defendants should have
known that their guest might be entrapped by it. Under the
rules stated above, it cannot be said that the complaints are so
clearly defective in showing actionable negligence as to warrant a dismissal thereof. 124
The court concluded that it could not say as a matter of law that it was
beyond the "realm of reasonable foreseeability" that the guest would
not realize the danger or appreciate its real extent.
Assumption of Risk
Keeton, in his excellent article, 125 points out the second situation to
be noted by the nuclear lawyer. He warns that even as to dangers that
are realized by the plaintiff there are cases in which failure to act upon
his knowledge of the danger still will not constitute contributory negligence so as to prevent recovery from the defendant. He points out
that in these cases the assumption of risk argument no longer constitutes a defense for the possessor of land. He says:
The idea is sometimes advanced that, for relief to be denied,
the full extent of the danger must be as open and obvious to
the plaintiff as it is to the defendant. Apparently, therefore,
the mere fact that the plaintiff is in a position to be aware
of the existence of an appreciable chance of falling is not sufficient to deny relief if the defendant was in a better position
to understand the full extent of the damage. It is doubtful
that this idea has been fully utilized. It would seem generally
that proprietors ought to know more in most instances about
the dangers of a particular kind of construction or a particular type of floor than most users and that there would be very
few cases where recovery would be denied as a matter of law
on the ground of assumption of risk. 126
The applicability of this doctrine in atomic energy cases seems quite
likely. Whether in a particular case it will be found that the plaintiff did
at 423-24·
Keeton, sr~pra note
126 ld. at 647, 648.

124Jd.
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or should have realized the full extent of the risk may depend on
whether or not he is experienced and knowledgeable as to radiation hazards. Certainly there are likely to be many visitors who will be in no
position to understand the nature or extent of the hazard present.
Under the rules suggested by these cases probably it will be a jury question as to whether defendant acted with reasonable care in failing to
give any warning at all or in giving the kind of warning he did. One
result might be reached as to a physicist or nuclear engineer and another
to a sightseer or other guest who has no knowledge of radiation hazards. This would be particularly appropriate since the ordinary senses
of man do not detect the presence of danger by sight, sound, smell, or
touch in the usual radiation case. Moreover, as heretofore pointed out
in the discussion of radiation technology, what may be a dangerous or
harmful dose to one person may not be to another, and the visitor may
be in no position to make such a distinction. For example, consider the
presence of a visitor who is a pregnant woman. It is well known that
irradiation of the embryo during the gestation period creates a significant possibility of serious injury. Depending on the circumstances,
including the amount of radiation to which such a visitor might be exposed accidentally, it might be safer for the occupier of land where radiation sources are present to deny access to women of pregnable age. 127
Warning to Public 0 fficials
In considering the duty to warn visitors, those concerned with radiation hazards should take into account the problem of liabiiity to public
employees who come on the property as a matter of right but not in any
realistic sense at the invitation of the landowner. There are many persons in this class-postmen, meter readers, inspectors, firemen, policemen, etc. For our purposes, the obligations owed to firemen and policemen present the most interesting legal questions.
While the physical danger presented by the situation in Shypulski v.
Waldorf Paper Products Company 128 is quite different from the hazards inherent in radiation. exposure, the reasoning of the court would
seem to be equally applicable to the case of a fireman fighting a fire on
premises where radiation hazards are present. During the course of inspecting the defendant's building to make sure the fire had been extinguished entirely, a concrete block wall in the factory collapsed and
seriously injured the plaintiff fireman. The plaintiff alleged that the wall
was so constructed that it could not withstand lateral pressure in any
127

Infra note xo68.
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232 Minn. 394, 45 N.W.2d 549 (1951).
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amount, that it therefore constituted a trap which was dangerous to
anybody in the warehouse, and that these facts were known to the defendant. All during the time the firemen were present there also were
present officers, agents, and employees of the defendant company
observing the actions of the plaintiff and other firemen. After rejecting
the old analysis which placed firemen and similar persons in the category of licensees or perhaps even trespassers rather than invitees, and
accepting the Prosser thesis 129 that such persons have a status sut
generis,. the court then said :
Since firemen have the unique status just described, it follows that the duties owed to them may properly be unique.
. . . Even the rule that firemen must accept premises as they
find them has been described by this court as being a hard
rule. It is apparent that both in Minnesota and elsewhere the
trend of decisions is to avoid extending these harsh rules beyond their present limits, and, at least, in the case of the "wilful or wanton" rule, the tendency is to whittle it away with
exceptions. At the same time, a respectable body of authority
has developed to support the rule that firemen are entitled to
be warned of hidden dangers known to the landowner or occupant. . . .
Certainly, no meritorious reason can be advanced to justify
the view that a property owner, with knowledge of a hidden
peril, should be allowed to stand by in silence when a word of
warning might save firemen from needless peril. The burden
of a duty to warn of hidden perils falls lightly upon the landowner in comparison with the cost of his silence, which is frequently measured in the lives and limbs of firemen and in the
sorrow and suffering of their families. Although firemen assume the usual risks incident to their entry upon premises
made dangerous by the destructive effect of fire, there is no
valid reason why they should be required to assume the extraordinary risk of hidden perils of which they might easily
be warned. Two courts at least have held that firemen do not
assume such risks, and, for the reasons already stated, we
regard that holding as sound. . . .
In spite of the recognized split of authority on the question
presented in this case, we believe that the better rule by far
is that landowners and occupants alike owe a duty to firemen
to warn them of hidden perils where the landowner or occupant has knowledge of the peril and the opportunity to give
warning. 180
1 29

Prosser 400-62.

1ao Supra note 128 at 397-402.
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The court approved the overruling by the lower court of defendant's demurrer to the complaint and held that the complaint stated a cause of
action.
One of the cases cited in support of its ruling by the Minnesota court
is a very interesting New York Court of Appeals opinion, Jenkins v.
JIJ-321 W. 37th St. Corp.} dealing with responsibility of the landowner
to give warning to firemen of unusual hazards. 131 The plaintiffs were
~ew York firemen who were seriously injured when gasoline which
had collected in a closed basement room exploded as the firemen were
fighting a fire in the room. The first explosion, which started the fire,
occurred when the building superintendent was in the room, and he also
was present when the firemen arrived and entered the building. The
gasoline apparently had seeped into the sump pump in defendant's subbasement from storage tanks in a neighboring building through an old
underground rivulet. There was no suggestion that the defendant was
in any way negligent in creating the dangerous ·condition. The superintendent had known of the condition, however, and had warned his
superiors of the strong odor of gasoline. The court stated that the presence of small quantities of gasoline ordinarily would not constitute an
unusual hazard, but that its presence in a closed room in which a fire
was burning did constitute a situation which the jury might find to be
an unusual hazard. The court concluded :
If such a danger existed to the knowledge of the defendant or
its agent, the defendant was under a duty if it had opportunity to give warning of the peril. . . .
This affirmative proof, together with the undisputed fact that
while the superintendent was in the sub-basement an explosion
had occurred, warranted a finding by the jury that.defendant
or its agent in charge had notice of the unusual hazard into
which the firemen unknowingly walked. Opportunity to warn
the plaintiffs of the peril might be inferred by the jury from
the fact that the superintendent was on the premises when
the firemen arrived and knew of their arrivaP 32

The court ordered a new trial, however~ because of an error in· the admission of evidence concerning impeachment of the testimony of a
witness.
This type of case, involving an unusual type of hazard, is to be distinguished, however, from the kind of case where the hazard even from
181284 N.Y. 397, 34 N.E.2d 503 (1940). For a quite similar case involving gas, see
Kentucky & W.Va. Power Co. v. Stacy, 291 Ky. 325, 164 S.W.2d 537 (1942).
132 Jenkins v. 313-321 W. 37th St. Corp., supra note 131 at 401, 402.
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a dangerous substance such as gasoline could not be considered unusual.
For example, everyone knows that gasoline tanks in a burning car are
likely to explode, 138 or that structural conditions of a building (such as
a porch) may become dangerous with natural deterioration or improper
construction and may cause injury. A court may find that such danger
is not an unusual hazard from an inherently dangerous substance. 1a. It
also is possible that a court will hold in such cases that, if the gratuitous
licensee is actually aware of the peril he may not recover, as a recent
New Jersey case held. 135 The Minnesota court, however, recently held
that merely because a dangerous condition might be open and obvious
during daylight hours, this fact does not immunize the owner from a
liability if at other times, such as darkness, the dangerous condition
would not be obvious, provided that the owner had reason to believe
that the licensee might come on the premises under such circumstances.136
Applying these principles to radiation cases, while distinctions may be
made, depending on the intensity and type of radiation sources present
in the building, in the usual situation it would seem quite likely that the
court would find that radiation materials constitute an unusual hazard,
particularly since their presence will be known only if there is warning
or if the fire department furnishes its fire fighters with radiation detection instruments. Actually, during the course of fighting a fire, it is
quite possible that even if the fire itself does not release radioactive
material from its proper containers (such as thickness gauges, experimental equipment or supplies in research laboratories, or possibly even
from a reactor container) the firemen themselves in the course of fighting the fire may cause the radioactive material to spread. This may
create serious hazards, at least to those fighting the fire, if not also to
others in the vicinity. It is our opinion that under these circumstances
it is very likely that courts will hold that there is a duty to give fair
warning.
Moreover, the character of the danger is such that the techniques of
protecting personnel from radiation hazards will require sufficient advance notice to prepare the fire fighters for the unusual situation. It
would not be surprising to find a court saying that the owner of the
183 Gannon v. Royal Properties, 285 App. Div. IJI, 136 N.Y.S.:zd 129, aff'd 309 N.Y.
819, 130 N.E.2d 616 (1954).
13• Anderson v. Cinnamon, 365 Mo. 304. 282 S.W.zd 445 (1955). See also Dotson v.
Haddock, 46 Wash.2d 52, 278 P.2d 338 (1955).
185 Taneian v. Meghrigian, 15 N.J. 267, 104 A.zd 68g (1954).
136 Malmquist v. Leeds, 245 Minn. 130, 7I N.W.2d 863 (1955).
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property had to go further than simply giving notice at the time of a
fire to the firemen who arrive at the scene. The radiation danger present
at a fire is illustrated by the explosion a few years ago in the Sylvania
plant in Bayside, New York. 187 It would seem not unreasonable torequire users of radioactive material to keep fire departments advised of
the presence of the radioactive material. Undoubtedly it would be wise
for fire departments to plan for the emergencies which may arise from
the existence of radiation hazards. That the obligation to give adequate
warning is not to be lightly regarded or easily discharged by the defendant is indicated by a New York case, Schwab v. Rubel Corporation,188 in which the plaintiff was allowed to go to the jury on the question of whether the warning given by defendant's employees was
adequate when all he did was to warn one of the firemen of the existence
of a dangerous dismantled elevator shaft. The court held that it was
for the jury to decide whether warning one fireman was sufficient or
whether more should have been warned.
The rule is usually stated as requiring the warning which a reasonable and prudent person would give under the circumstances. It usually
is suggested that it is not realistic to require that the danger be called
to the attention of everyone fighting the fire. This would place too
heavy a burden upon the defendant. 189 It also would be wise as a general
precaution to post conspicuous warnings of potential radiation hazards,
at least in the dangerous areas of the building, if not throughout the
building. In emergency situations, such as is the case when fire occurs,
this quite likely would not be considered sufficient, but the court might
hold that this much at least is required for purposes of warning not only
inspecting firemen, policemen, or similar officials, but also visitors to
the. premises, whether licensees or invitees.
In view of the above cases the person having possession of radioactive materials would be well advised to control very strictly the persons
1 87 For an extensive report concerning this 1956 fire caused by the double explosion
of thorium, see N.Y. Tim"s, July 3, 1956, p. I, col. 2, and p. 15, col. 2; July 4, 1956,
p. 37, col. I; July 7, 1956, p. 33, col. 4; July II, I956, p. 54. col. 5; and July 12, I956,
p. 51, col. 3·
188 286 N.Y. 525, 37 N.E.2d 234 (1941).
1 89 Moscow Tire & Rubber Co. v. Lansinger, IS Ohio App. 310, aff'd Io8 Ohio St.
377, 140 N.E. 770 (1921). A general warning by way of a manager's shout, "Get out
of here," was held insufficient to meet this standard in Lamb v. Sebach, 52 Ohio App.
362, 3 N .E.2d 686 ( 1935). A recent case beautifully exemplifying the need for labeling
dangerous material is United States v. Marshall, 230 F.2d 183 (9th Cir. I956); a
sheriff was hurt while helping fight a fire in a tank car which had not been labeled to
indicate its dangerous contents.
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allowed in the vicinity of the radioactive material and the conditions
under which such presence is permitted.
d. Decided Radiation Cases and the Standard of Conduct
Except for cases where a doctor is charged with malpractice in treating patients, very few cases have dealt with radiation injuries specifically. Our discussion of the breach of the duty to use care would not
be complete, however, without a consideration of these few. \Vith the
rapid growth of the use of radioactive isotopes in medical diagnosis and
treatment the rules of law applied by the courts in malpractice cases involving the use of X-rays will assume increasing importance. In addition, even the malpractice cases may prove useful as analogies in other
radiation injury situations.

( 1) Medical Malpractice Cases
The courts apparently agree that the use of X-rays for medical purposes is to be governed by the same principles that govern physicians
and surgeons in general. There is no reason to believe that a different
standard will be applied if the radiation source is a radioactive isotope
rather than an X-ray machine. 140 The statement of the general rule in
Lett v. Smith is fairly representative:
"A person undertaking the use of X-rays is held to the
same measure of responsibility as in administering other
forms of medical treatment. He impliedly contracts with the
patient that he possesses the ordinary skill and learning of
members of his profession and that he will exercise reasonable skill, care and diligence in his treatment." 141
Perhaps the statement by Justice Rutledge in Christie v. Callahan is a
somewhat more informative statement of the rule.
The physician is not an insurer of health. He undertakes only
for the standard of skill possessed generally by others practicing in his field, and for the care which they would give in
similar circumstances. He must have latitude for play of reasonable judgement, and this includes room for not too obvious or gross errors according to the prevailing practice of his
craft. Generally the standard must be shown by experts and
uo The only non-X-ray case we found was Hubach v. Cole, 133 Ohio St. 137, 12
N.E.2d 283 (1938).
1416 La. App. 248, 26o (1927), adopting the statement in 13 A.L.R. 1414 See also
Nance v. Hitch, 238 N.C. I, .13, 76 S.E.2d 461 (1953), and Facer v. Lewis, 326 Mich.
702, 711, 40 N.W.2d 457 (1950).
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so must the departure from it. But there are cases in which
the result of medical or surgical treatment, considered in the
light of the circumstances attending and following it, may
warrant an inference of negligence. 142
This statement is made immediately following one recognizing that
the advantages are with the physician, particularly when he is a specialist, because other physicians are reluctant to testify against their colleagues in negligence cases.
: As pointed out by the court in Kuttner v. Swanson 148 the rule means
that the doctor must have knowledge reasonably to be expected of a
man of his profession and must use that knowledge carefully in the
particular case.
Use of New Ideas
While no cases have been found which actually turned on the point,
courts occasionally have referred to the fact that a physician must use
the ordinary care and skill of his profession, "giving due consideration
to modern advance and learning." 144 Usually this is not a critical issue
because it is assumed that ordinary care involves use of new knowledge
generally known to the profession. Certainly one cannot read the many
X-ray cases based upon malpractice charges in which the plaintiffs have
succeeded without concluding that in most cases the finding of negligence was based upon the failure to use new knowledge developed over
the years. By implication these cases seem to hold that a failure to take
account of new developments constitutes a lack of due care~ If it is true
that failure to take advantage of new techniques such as X-rays for
diagnosis of fractures is negligence, 145 there is no reason why the opposite should not be true. As new information is gained as to the situations for which radiation cannot be used safely, doctors should be found
negligent if they ignore this new knowledge.
Geographical Standards
A question more closely related to the obligation to become familiar
with new developments is whether it is justifiable to use a local rather
than a national standard for measuring reasonable professional skill.
Many statements in the cases of the general rule concerning the requisite professional care and skill are to the effect that the standard is the
142

124 F.2d 825, 828 (App. D.C. 1941).
59 Ga. App. 818, 820, (1939), cert. den., 2 S.E.2d 230.
144 Hazen v. Mullen, 32 F.2d 294, 296 (App. D.C. 1929), quoting from a non-X-ray
case, Clayton v. English, 23 F.2d 745, 748 (App. D.C. 1927).
14 5 See cases cited Harper & James g68, notes 16, 17, and also cases cited in 1958
General Digest, Am. Dec. System, on failure to use X-rays.
148
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care used by persons of equivalent training "in the local community." 146
Yet in none of these cases was the question carefully considered by the
court. Some cases, however, indicate that locality is not to be considered
and it is submitted that this is the better view for the courts to adopt, at
least in radiation cases. The court in King v. Ditto 147 did not state that
locality is not a fact, but it did hold that in this particular case compliance with local standards did not prevent a finding of negligence. The
reasoning of the court in the more recent case of McElroy v. Frost is
preferable in the light of general information about radiation and particularly because of the development of specialization and the use of
journals. to keep practitioners up to date. The court there said:
The medical testimony relative to the nature, extent and
cause of plaintiff's injuries has been set out above. It is true
the witnesses were not from the same community but, with
one exception, the medical evidence in plaintiff's behalf came
from specialists in their particular field. It is a matter of common understanding that a proper method of treating human
ailments by X-ray would not vary from place to place or state
to state. What is the best practice in one place likewise would
be the best in another. This reasoning is the basis of the decision in Giles v. Tyson, Tex. Civ. App., 13 S.W. 2d 452,
cited by defendant, wherein it is expressly held than an expert
in the use of X-ray can testify to what is proper use thereof,
since such proper use would be the same whether in New
York or Texas. Such reasoning provides a complete answer
to the argument advanced in this respect. 148

Standards for Specialists
In addition to the geographical factor, a further question arises as to
whether or not the specialist in radiology will be expected to use more
skill than the average practitioner if he is to avoid a charge of negligence. The court in Kuttner v. Swanson 149 seems to reject this contention. The contrary was specifically held by a Canadian court in McCaffrey v. Hague, the court stating:
.
It is clear from the evidence that the defendant miscalculated the dosage; it was of too high intensity and too long exposure. This finding is on the defendant's own evidence. A
146 See Lett v. Smith supra note 141; Nance v. Hitch, supra note 141; Blankenship
v. Baptist Mem. Hosp., 26 Tenn. App. 131, 144. 168 S.W.2d 491 (1942); Wemett v.
Mount, 134 Ore. 305, 315, 292 Pac. 93 ( 1930) ; Kuttner v. Swanson, supra note 143 at
819; Harper & James 969, n. 18.
147 142 Ore. 207, 215, 19 P.2d 1100 (1933).
us 268 P.2d 273, 279, 28o (Okla. 1954).
t4o Supra note 143 at 821.
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higher degree of skill is required from one who holds himself
out to be a specialist as the defendant did. . . .150

Use by General Practitioners
Closely related to this question is that of whether or not the use of
radiation by the general practitioner constitutes negligence. In McElroy
Frost/ 51 one expert even testified that X-ray treatment was too dangerous for a general practitioner to use. He testified that it was not justified in the treatment of a skin disorder of the scrotum until other
tjeatment had failed. With the increase in medical specialization this
will become a growing problem, even though general practitioners will
resist attempts to limit their right to practice any medical technique.
tertainly at this stage of development in the use of radioisotopes and
with our growing knowledge of the proper use of X-rays, much can be
said for the contention that only radiologists are trained to determine
the proper dosage and take the proper precautions to safeguard against
overexposure. 162 With the development of new techniques for reducing
the damaging effect on tissue from radiation, it is important to make
use of experts who will keep up with all developments. 158
Even if there is no requirement that only experts should handle
radioactivity, there can be very little doubt that the trend toward increased specialization will have an effect upon the standard of care and
skill to which the general practitioner must conform. There are two
reasons for this. First, the writing and teaching of the specialists, who
generally are responsible for new developments, inevitably cause the
accepted standard of care to change. Second, there is an obvious tendency on the part of plaintiffs in malpractice cases to call upon specialists
to testify as expert witnesses. In no case have we found that a defend-

v.

uo [1949] 2 W.W.R. 539, 542. See also Eatley v. Mayer, 10 N.J. Misc. 219, 158 Atl.
4II (19J2).
tn Supra note 148.
152 Our private conversations with radiologists lead us to believe they generally think
so and many competent internists apparently do refer such treatment cases to radiologists.
as See N.Y. Times, March 9, 1958, p. 41, col. 2, wherein it was reported that radiation poisoning may be curbed by chemicals, if given victim soon enough; and N.Y.
Times, Aug. 13, 1958, p. I, col. 3, reporting that pills (AET compound) capable of
halving the biological effects of a radiation dose may be available soon for experimental
use on humans. See also N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1958, p. 39. col. I, reporting possibility
that parathyroid extract may be helpful, especially if taken just before exposure to
radiation. The French report they have had success using bone marro-w transplants,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1959, p. 4, col. 3. See examples of new developments of information as to internal dose, soil disposal, drinking water, neutron detection techniques, and
laundering of protective clothing, reported in Health Physics, Vol. I, No.2, Sept. 1958.
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ant general practitioner was permitted to challenge testimony on the
ground that the witness was a specialist, not a general practitioner.
Where expert witnesses have been challenged successfully the reason
given is that they did not practice in the same geographical area as the
defendant. Even this geographical distinction now seems to be vestigial
with respect to the use of X-rays and radium. Theoretically the expert
witness is supposed to testify regarding the general and accepted practice in the profession which is the standard to which the physician must
conform, but it would be unrealistic to assume that his testimony will
be unaffected by his special knowledge. It also would be unrealistic to
ignore the fact that the jury is more likely to be impressed by such testimony than by that of other general practitioners. These influences
would seem to indicate that, out of the mechanics of trial procedure,
there may come a substantive change in the standard. The general practitioner well might be advised against undertaking irradiation treatment
for the more serious ailments in the vital areas of the body, unless
referral to a specialist is not feasible.
On the other hand it is perfectly clear that considerable room must be
permitted for differences of opinion or judgment so long as reasonable
care has been used in making that judgment. The court in Butler v.
Rule rejected the contention that in the use of an X-ray machine the
highest degree of care should be exercised, and quoted the following
language with approval :
.
·
"The law thus requires a surgeon to possess the skill and
learning which is possessed by the average member of the
medical profession in good standing, and to apply that skill
and learning with ordinary and reasonable care. He is not
liable for mere error of judgment provided he does what he
thinks is best after a careful examination. He does not guarantee a good result, but he promises by implication to use the
skill and learning of the average physician, to exercise reasonable care, and to exert his best judgment in the effort to bring
about a good result." u•
In that case the decedent received X-ray treatment of a twelve-month
sarcoma on the left groin because surgical treatment was no longer possible. The X-ray treatment resulted in a third-degree burn that was very
painful and death followed in three months. The court reversed the
judgment for the plaintiff because of the trial court's instructions concerning the high degree of care.
Again, in Hazen v. Mullen 155 the court decided that a carefully
154
1 55

29 Ariz. 405, 416, 242 P. 436 (1926).
Supra note 144.
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formed judgment that a bold course of intense X-ray treatment was required did not constitute a lack of due care. In this case X-ray treatments were administered over a ten-month period, arresting a dangerous condition that would have led to death. The only alternative was an
extremely difficult operation. Although the disease was cured, plaintiff
suffered X-ray burns as a result of the treatment. The court reversed a
judgment for the plaintiff on the ground of insufficient evidence to support a verdict of negligence since the defendant doctor reasonably could
have concluded that bold measures were needed to treat a dangerous
condition. Apparently medical authorities agree that very aggressive
treatment for serious illnesses sometimes is called for in spite of the
fact that X-ray burns may result. A malignant growth treated too
lightly may become somewhat immune and later doses will have to be
much greater if they are to be effective. 158
There is an additional protection for medical practitioners in a malpractice case. The courts usually take the position that the area of discretion and judgment is broad enough to include the right to follow a
given treatment procedure so long as there is a respectable minority of
competent doctors that would follow it even though another procedure
would be followed J>y a majority of practitioners. m
·
Contracting for Higher or Lower Standard
In some circumstances, for example when the doctor gives express
assurances that specific results can be achieved, the doctor may in effect
contract for a higher degree of care and become almost an insurer.
Thus in a California case the doctor was held to his assurances that no
scar would result from the use of radiation treatment of swollen glands
on the plaintiff's neck. 158 The moral for the expert is, "Do not make
promises as to results."
Equally significant is the converse possibility that a patient may contract to relieve the doctor of the risk of a negligence action where the
doctor warns the patient of the danger involved in the use of repeated
X-ray treatment. In one case, Gross v. Robinson/ 59 after three attempts
156 Dunlap, "Medicolegal Aspects of Injuries from Exposure to X-Rays and Radio·
·
active Substances," 11 Mo. L. Rev. 137 (1946).
1 51 Blankenship v. Baptist Mem. Hosp., supra note 146 at 148; Wemett v. Mount,
supra note 146 at 313; and Harper & James !)69, n. 20.
158 Crawford v. Duncan, 61 Cal. App. 647, 215 P. 8o (1923). The only real defense
was when the two year statute of limitations began to run. See also Stewart v.
Rudner, 349 Mich. 459, 84 N.W.2d 816 (1957), where the court said a contract was
made to use caesarian section delivery and failure to do so made the doctor liable for
damages for a stillborn child. If our understanding of obstetrics is right the case was
very shaky on the causation question, which was not· even discussed by the court.
159 203 Mo. App. n8, 218 S.W. 924 ( 1918).

144

TORT LIABILITY

to take X-ray pictures with a defective machine the doctor warned the
plaintiff of the danger of further exposures. Nevertheless, being requested by the patient to take a diagnostic picture, further exposures
were made and serious injury resulted. The court intimated that in
proper circumstances the patient might assume risks but that in this
particular case he did not assume the risk that the doctor would be negligent. The court concluded that there was evidence that the doctor was
negligent in not realizing that his machine was faulty and that repeated
use created ~a serious danger.
Some General Ca.utions-Accurate Measurements and Records
Just as is the case with breach of duty generally, few specific precautions can be suggested to avoid the charge of negligence in the use of
radiation. It seems perfectly clear from such cases as McElroy v.
Frost/ 60 however, that treatment and even diagnostic use of X-rays
(the same standard surely will be applied to the. use of radioisotopes)
has become a very exacting science in which guess work and approximation are not sufficient. In that case the court found it significant that the
defendant physician used an ordinary yardstick to measure the distance
between the patient and the machine and an old alarm clock to time the
exposures rather than the automatic devices available on other machines. The court likewise criticized the fact that the defendant often
left the patient unattended during treatment periods. According to expert testimony, the exposure of the scrotum to 246o roentgens was
enough to cause permanent sterility and the development of a fatal
cancer.
One positive precaution that would seem to be indicated for a physician who uses radiation in the treatment of patients is indicated in
Thomas v. Lobrano. 161 The plaintiff sustained extensive injuries, diagnosed as "bilateral auxiliary chronic radiodermatitis" (burned armpits).
The facts were somewhat complex but the failure of the defendant
physician to keep an accurate record of doses and times of exposure
played a very significant role in the conclusion of the court that the evidence of negligence clearly was sufficient to support the jury's judgment for the plaintiff. With respect to the failure to keep adequate
records the court said :
It is a matter of common knowledge that the use of x-ray
treatments is highly dangerous and it follows that the careless
or inefficient administration of x-ray therapy is susceptible of
16 0
161

Supra note 148.
76 S.2d 599 (La. App. 1954).
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disastrous consequences. It is true that Dr. Lobrano contends
that records are relatively unnecessary to his administration
of x-ray therapy. We not only question the correctness of this
assertion but we are convinced that the record of the instant
case is completely destructive of any claim of justification for
such a conclusion. In the light of the established fact that the
x-ray department of the Sanitarium accommodates an average of between 20 to 40 patients per day for photographs and
treatment, we think the failure of the physician in charge of
the department to maintain and avail himself of proper information which should be reflected by adequate records is
a dangerous practice. . . .
. . . We think the defendant has failed to discharge this burden and to clear himself of the charge of negligence which is
predicated upon his failure to have kept complete and accurate
records of the treatment of the patient, Mrs. Thomas. 182
In malpractice cases some difficulty in determining whether the
proper standard of conduct has been followed undoubtedly arises from
the fact that cases all too frequently fail to distinguish between the
various aspects of a physician's duty. A doctor must first diagnose the
patient's condition, then must determine and recommend treatment;
and, finally, the treatment must be administered. The courts tend to
refer to a general standard of care and skill, and allow considerable
latitude for errors in judgment, regardless of which part of the physician's function has occasioned the injury in the particular case. While
the courts so far have not differentiated between diagnostic and therapeutic uses of X-ray, it would seem well for them to do so.
Distinguishing Diagnostic and Treatment Uses
As more is learned about the dangerous attributes of radiation, the
medical profession is beginning to develop humility with respect to its
use and to recognize that in most if not in all cases radiation should be
used as a treatment device only by radiologists. In many cases the use
of radiation for treatment by a general practitioner probably should be
considered as negligence. Moreover, while radiation levels generally are
not as dangerous in diagnostic uses as in treatment techniques, it still
is unwise to make any unnecessary use of radiation.
For both diagnostic and treatment purposes it is becoming more important that the operator be expert in the use of new equipment and
techniques to obtain the maximum results with the minimum of exposure. This again probably should lead eventually to a rule that it is
negligent for a general practitioner to use radiation except at quite low
1e2

/d.
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levels or when the particular technique for a specific condition has been
thoroughly standardized.
Standards for Operation of Equipment
In any event, the very liberal standard 168 applied when considering a
doctor's judgment or discretion should not be used in considering operation of such dangerous equipment. It is one thing to say that a doctor
should not be too quickly second-guessed as to a diagnosis or a decision
on a course of treatment. It is quite another to say that he should be
given great. discretion in deciding how to operate the equipment to
achieve the desired results. Radiologists are becoming much more exact
in determining the amount of radiation needed to achieve certain results and how the radiation should be applied so as to do the least possible damage. The loose manner in which X-rays and other radiation
sources frequently have been used in the last thirty years has come
under criticism by the medical profession itself. It has begun to take
note of the necessity of avoiding unnecessary exposure even to diagnostic X-rays. In each case considered judgment should be made of
whether or not the need for information outweighs the dangers involved in subjecting the patient to radiation. 164
Hypersensitivity to Radiation
One other aspect of the X-ray malpractice cases may have significance in radiation injury cases arising from the use of radioisotopes for
medical and other purposes. Frequently the defendant physician contends that the injury to the patient resulted, not from a lack of due care,
but because of the hypersensitivity of the particular patient to X-rays.
In nine of sixteen cases collected in a recent A.L.R. annotation, 165 this
defense was held to be inadequate. The fact that it was successful in
seven indicates it may be available in a proper case. 166
The Wisconsin court in Nelson v. Newell 167 placed an important
limitation upon the use of hypersensitivity as a defense. The defendant
physician offered the hypothesis that hypersensitivity of the patient
might explain the injury that resulted from the X-ray treatments, but
1sa Harper & James g68,

969.

Hodges, "Health Hazards in·the Diagilostic Use of X-Ray," 166 ].A. MA. 577,
583 (1958).
165 41 A.L.Rzd 329 (1955).
166 The seven cases where the defense successfully asserted hypersensitivity were in
states which do not use the res ipsa laquitur doctrine in such cases. The other nine
were in states which apply res ipsa loquitur. The courts did not always discuss the
relationship between hypersensitivity and res ipsa loquit11r, however. This relationship
problem will be discussed later in the section on proof problems.
167 195 Wis. 572, 217 N.w: 723 (1928).
164
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he did not offer evidence that the particular patient was especially sensitive. The court stated that if a finding of negligence could be set aside
merely on the speculation that the patient might be hypersensitive, malpractice cases involving the use of X-rays could never be successfully
prosecuted.
In Hess v. Rouse 168 another possible limitation upon the use of
unusual susceptibility as a defense was indicated. The court noted that
experts testified to the effect that hypersensitivity usually appeared
after the first or second treatment but in this particular case the burns
did not appear until after the third treatment. The court concluded that
hypersensitivity was not the cause of the burns. Moreover, the court
accepted testimony that lack of hypersensitivity could be assumed even
though the first exposures were to other parts of the body.
In Lewis v. Casenburg 169 an expert testified that not only does hypersensitivity appear after the first one or two treatments but also that
the likelihood of a person being hypersensitive to radiation was very
slight. Under the facts of the case, however, hypersensitivity as a defense did not seem persuasive in view of the fact that 161 separate Xray treatments of the patient's abdomen had been given by the defendant. On· the other hand, the court in Kuttner v. Swanson 170 held that
the jury was authorized to find that plaintiff had an idiosyncrasy of
peculiar susceptibility on the basis of evidence that the three doses
administered were not enough to produce injury in the absence of idiosyncrasy. Again, in Nance v. Hitch 171 the court attached significance
to the testimony of an expert to the effect that individual idiosyncrasy is
a factor with respect to X-ray burns and that the only way to determine
whether a patient has unusual susceptibility is to burn him. This testimony was a persuasive factor in the court's decision to reject the
use of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur; one cannot assume safely that
a burn necessarily indicates. negligence, the court concluded.
One other fact should. be pointed out in ~onnection with the cases involving a defense of hypersensitivity. Those in which hypersensitivity
has been asserted success fully are in general more recen~ than those in
which it was.unsuccessful, the former being decided mostly in the past
thirty years while the others were prior to 1930. The trend, therefore,
may be in favor of the defense, but a possible explanation is that in22 S.W.:zd 1077 (Tex. Civ. App; 1929).
157 Tenn. 187, 7 S.W.2d SoB· (1928).
17,0 Sttfrra note. 146.
111 Supra note 141.
16s
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surance companies are not defending malpractice cases unless the
chance of success is very good.
(2) Radiation Injuries Not Involving Medical Malpractice
There are at least three non-malpractice radiation injury cases which
deal with the problem of a breach of duty to use due care. Each of them
deals with the liability of an employer to an employee who received
radiation injury. They are especially important, therefore, to the atomic
energy entrepreneur in assessing his legal responsibilities where radioactive material is being used.
The first is Vallat v. Radium Dial Company/' 2 where the plaintiff
alleged that in 1929 she was employed by the defendant as a radium
dial painter. She claimed that the defendant took no safety precautions
with respect to particles of radium dust in the atmosphere where she
worked and that she inhaled and swallowed 'these particles, which
produced anemia, rarefaction of the bones, alveoli of the jaws, and
other disorders. The complaint charged that the illnesses resulted from
a violation of an Illinois statute (typical of those found in many states)
providing that employers "shall, for the protection of all employees engaged in [peculiarly hazardous]. .. work or process, adopt and provide reasonable and approved devices, means or methods for the prevention of such industrial or occupational diseases as are incident to
such work or process." The State Departm~nt of Factory Inspection
was authorized to promulgate rules and require compliance with these
standards.
The defendant company filed a motion for judgment on the ground
that the occupational disease act was unconstitutional because it failed
to set up an intelligible standard of duty and therefore violated the due
process clauses of the state and federal constitutions. The company also
contended that the act violated the separation of powers concept of the
state constitution because it unlawfully conferred legislative powers
on the State Department of Factory Inspection. Further, the defendant
supported the motion for judgment by arguing that plaintiff had neither
a common law nor a statutory remedy because the complaint showed on
its face that she was not an employee of the defendant when the disease
became manifest, and, finally, it was claimed that the suit was not filed
within two years after the ·cause of action accrued.
The court invalidated the statute on the ground that the phrase
"reasonable and approved devices, means or methods for the prevention
172 JOO

Ill. 407,

I¢

N.E. 456 (1935).
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of such industrial or occupational diseases as are incident to such work
or process" did not meet the requirements of due process of law. These
words were held to be vague and indefinite, not furnishing an intelligent
standard of conduct to be observed by the employers. The court also
concluded that the delegation to an official of the power to define words
not of common knowledge is unwarranted and void. Today it is unlikely that many state courts would hold this a violation of the separation of powers concepts, and certainly the delegation of authority is no
violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Federal Constitution. 178 While the Illinois court confused the two issues, the question of a standard definite enough to give sufficient notice
to meet a due process requirement is treated much more liberally (or
loosely) today than formerly, particularly in connection with administratively enforced statutes. The opinion of the court is not clear as to
whether the Department of Factory Inspection had actually prescribed
standards of conduct to be followed by employers in such cases as involved here. If the standards were laid down before the time of employment of the plaintiff as a radium dial painter, then there could be no
question of notice, but simply one of whether or not there was a lawful
delegation of legislative power.m So long as notice of a specific standard of conduct is given by the administrator before any liability attaches, there usually is no problem of notification. It seems quite unlikely that today such a case would be decided on these grounds, and
hence the case is not particularly significant in connection with prospective radiation injuries.
The next case is far more significant for the atomic energy entrepreneur. If it should be followed by other courts, it might mean that
compliance with nationally recognized radiation standards in effect
constitutes a prima facie, if not a conclusive, defense against a charge
of failure to use due care. This case is Rakowski v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., decided in 1949 by the New Jersey Superior Court. 115 The
11a Separation of power in the states is only a question of republic form of government and is a non-justiciable issue. See discussion in Jaffe, "An Essay on Delegation
of Legislative Power: II," 47 Col. L. Rev. 561, 581 ff. (1947). On republican form
of government, see Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1, 12 L. Ed. 581 (1849); Pacific States
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 32 S.Ct. 224 (1912).
174 Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 64 S.Ct. 66o (1944) is a perfect example
of such a case (involving price regulations during World War II). Comment, 53 Mich.
L. Re.v. 264 (1954) is the most complete collection and analysis of various factors to
be considered that was found. See particularly 27o-72.
175 5 N.J. Super. 203,68 A.2d 641 (1949), certif. den. 3 N.J. 502,70 A.2d go8 (1949).
An award of $52,8oo was given to an Australian worker whose leg had to be amputated
because of radiation burns received from a small radioactive capsule carried in his
pocket for 6 days. Atomic Industrial Forum, April 1958, p. 27.
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plaintiff was employed by the defendant in the X-ray department to
operate a fluoroscope to test rubber belting for defects. The controls for
the fluoroscope were in a room separated from the machine, and the
pl~intiff viewed the operation through a lead glass window. Evidence
submitted by the defendant indicated that the construction of the room
and the operation of the machine were such that the radiation which
could be received by an operator even with the door open was substantially less than the permissible dosage for such installations under accepted national standards, including that of the American War Standard Safety Code for Industrial Use of X-ray. Tests made before and
after the suit was commenced revealed that at no time was the maximum radiation in the room where plaintiff worked more than one half
of the suggested permissible dose of 12.5 milliroentgens per hour for
an eight-hour day and a six-day week. Plaintiff alleged that prior to her
employment she had enjoyed good health and in fact passed the physical
examination necessary for. employment in the defendant's plant. She
also alleged that although she was only twenty-five years old, after
commencing to operate the machine she underwent ·a premature menopause and. suffered telangiectasis in the central portion of her face, a
condition which manifests itself by showing the fine superficial capillaries and giving an appearance of premature aging. Expert witnesses
called by the plaintiff testified that her condition was attributable to the
absorption of X-rays that penetrated the room in which she worked.
The experts set up their own standard as to what would be reasonable
care under the circumstances, a standard which apparently was considerably different from that set up by the American Standards Association. The plaintiff charged that the trial court erred in directing a
verdict ·for the defendant, claiming that she had made a prima facie
case. In stating the general rule concerning the degree of care required,
the court said :
It is the general rule that the mere fact that an instrumentality may become dangerous to others does not constitute its
possessor an insurer against injury that may result therefrom.
Liability for negligence in respect to dangerous instrumentalities, as liability for negligence generally, arises from the
failure to use due care. A higher degree of care is required in
dealing with a dangerous agency than in the ordinary affairs
of life or business which involve little or no risk. The law
exacts of one who puts a force in motion that he shall control
it with a skill and care in proportion to the danger created
and with appliance~ which, in view of the circumstances, are
reasonably safe. In other words, the essential requirement of
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due care under the circumstances necessarily implies that the
care required to prevent injury to others in using a dangerous
instrumentality is a great or high degree and every reasonable
precaution suggested by experience and the known dangers of
the ~ubject ought to be taken. 176
In other words, a man of ordinary prudence when using a dangerous
machine. must take greater precautions. As the court stated it, quoting
from an earlier case:
"Rather does it mean the exercise of that degree of care, of
that manner of fulfillment of duty, which comprehends a circumspection, a foresight, a prevision which has due and
proper regard to reasonably probable contingencies." 177
The court also approved the following language:
"Every peril, it is safe to say, including such as are termed
'latent' or 'hidden,' need not be discovered, since liability for
negligence in keeping a dangerous instrumentality is not absolute. If, however, common experience has demonstrated that
dangers lurk in the method adopted or in the instrumentality
maintained by a person, he rests under the obligation of ascertaining the peril and taking precautions to avoid injury therefrom." 178
The court, nevertheless, held that defendant's motion for a directed
verdict was properly granted, because, even under the proofs submitted,
there was insufficient evidence to support a jury verdict that defendant
was negligent even though he was dealing with a dangerous instrument.
Since the testimony revealed that the defendant's construction, installation, and operational techniques complied with the generally accepted
standards, and since the defendant used a competent and recognized
radiation expert who had advised the two room installation, all necessary
precautions had been taken for the reasonable safety and protection of
the operator of the machine. The court said that plaintiff's experts
could not use a standard of their own but should have shown that the
defendant's installations and operations were not in conformity with
the "standard practice in the industry." The court concluded that a contrary rule "would mean that industrial concerns would be subjected to
the mere caprice of juries, and held accountable for actionable negligence regardless of whether they adopted a recognized standard of installation or not." 179 In effect this is tantamount to a rule that compli/d. at 207. [Emphasis added.]
/d. at 2o8. See also same idea expressed in cases discussed supra at note 40.
I d. at 2fYJ.
179 /d. at 210.
178

177
17 8

152

TORT LIABILITY

ance with established codes concerning radiation means that there can
be no inference of negligence on the part of the defendant, even if it
should be accepted as true that the plaintiff's injuries were caused by the
X-rays that penetrate the room in which she worked. The court did not
co~sider the question of whether the industry standard was sufficiently
high, it merely assumed it and refused to accept the standard asserted
by plaintiff's experts.
If this view should be followed generally in radiation cases, it would
make the problem of tort liability a much easier one to solve. The opinion of the court, however, may be contrary to the views of treatise
writers;. they are inclined toward the view that proof of compliance
with a safety code, whether established by unofficial experts in the field
or by statute or official administrative rulings, should be treated merely
as evidence of use of due care. 180
Moreover, from the opinion in the Rakowsk~ case one cannot conclude without question that the court is holding that compliance with
such a safety code is conclusive for the defendant. This is a fair implication from some of the language used, but the plaintiff rested her case
solely on the testimony of experts as to what they would regard as a
reasonable standard. So far as the opinion indicates, no attempt was
made to show directly that compliance with the accepted standard would
not meet the standard of what a reasonably prudent man would do
under the circumstances, although this is implied rather clearly by the
testimony solicited from the plaintiff's experts. It might be possible for
plaintiff in a subsequent case involving similar compliance to show that
the code promulgated by the National Committee on Radiation Protection is somewhat out of date and, therefore, compliance with it
might not amount to reasonable care. The recent establishment by the
Atomic Energy Commission of a standard of exposure for its own employees of roughly one third of that which is still permitted for employees of licensees raises this possibility. The AEC apparently thinks
that the lower dosage probably should be adopted from the standpoint
of the workers' safety. Nevertheless, on balancing the interests of
society in developing the atomic energy industry against admittedly
only a possible danger from such low level radiation, the higher level
is considered reasonable. All things considered, too much reliance
should not be placed on the Rakowski case, although it is an important
precedent.
The third case in point is Kress v. City of Newark, decided in New
1so Supra Section B, 2 a.
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Jersey in 1950. 181 In this case the plaintiff was the employee of the
Newark City Hospital where she worked at first as a maid and later in
the X-ray department, where she helped prepare patients for photographing. After several years in this task she was assigned to the development room, and until 1941, some eight years after she was- first employed, her exposure to X-rays was minimal. In 1942, however, the
plaintiff was asked to become an X-ray technician. She received no for~al training, "learning" by watching other technicians whom she
as~isted. After a relatively short period of observing she was given a
portable X-ray machine to be used in the wards. She was furnished no
portable safety screen and frequently stood across the table from the patient in such a manner that she also would be exposed. While taking
d~ntal X-rays she often held the film in place herself. This occurred as
many as sixty times a week over a period of several years, during which
time she received no warning of the danger inherent in the X-ray beam .
.A· blood count was never taken during this period, except once on the
occasion of an operation. Only once, in 1944, did a doctor suggest that a
monitor film be attached on her uniform. On development the film
·showed presence of X-rays. It was not until a year or two later, however, that plaintiff noticed spots on her hand which she showed the chief
of the X-ray department. In August, 1946, the plaintiff's finger accidentally was torn open and a biopsy was made by a doctor in another
New York hospital. She ceased working in the X-ray department at that
time, and was referred to a doctor who confirmed a diagnosis of skin
cancer. Further operations were performed in later years, and, finally,
in 1949 the whole surface of her hand down to the tendon sheet was
removed. Prognosis at the time of the trial was that amputation would
probably have to follow, with no guarantee that the cancer would be
arrested. One of the experts in the case was Dr. Arthur Mutcheller, a
biophysicist and radio-physicist, specializing for twenty years on the
effect of radiation upon living material. He testified that standard practice in the use of portable X-ray machines called for a protective screen
for the operator. He stated that in taking dental X-ray pictures the
standard procedure was to use a lead screen, and to prohibit holding
the film in place by the technician.
The lower court sustained defendant's motion to dismiss on four
grounds : ( 1) plaintiff had failed to sustain the burden of establishing
181 9 N.J. Super. 70,74 A.2d 902 (1950). A statement reported in N.Y. Times, February 20, 1959, p. 10, col. 4. indicates hospital operators of radiation sources are not well
enough protected.
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defendant's negligence; (2) she was guilty of contributory negligence;
(3) a municipality can only be liable for "affirmative wrongdoing";
and (4) a charitable institution is not liable for the negligence of its
agents. On the first two grounds the court on appeal held that there
was sufficient evidence to raise a question properly to be decided by the
jury. On the third ground, the court decided that if the jury found that
the city put the X-ray machine into operation without a lead screen,
without giving adequate instruction to the plaintiff as to the dangers,
and without periodic use of monitor film and adequate protective gloves
and apron, then the city was clearly "an active wrongdoer." The court
felt that· this was quite like cases involving unguarded holes and ditches
where proper safeguards are not taken, and quoted with approval the
opinion recorded in the Rakowski case. As to the fourth ground, the
court held that a hospital was not a "charitable" institution with respect
to the plaintiff, who was not a beneficiary of the charity but an employee
of the hospital.
Conclusion
In a field developing as rapidly as atomic energy, particularly as to
our knowledge of the injurious effect of radiation, it would be most
unfortunate if statutes, administrative regulations, or decisional rules
should develop hard and fast lines as to what is or is not a reasonable
standard of conduct. Some dramatic discovery, for example some
simple chemical or drug which will either give considerable immunity
or considerably reduce the aftereffects of radiation exposure/ 82 could
be important in determining whether or not the conduct followed by
the defendant in a particular case meets the standard of reasonableness.
Some such discovery might reduce dramatically the risks involved in
temporary, fairly high radiation exposure, or make it perfectly reasonable to expose persons to higher levels of radiation if the new techniques were used.
The converse is equally true. If new concepts and techniques are
found, an employer or other user of radioactive materials should not
be allowed to adhere stubbornly to a code previously promulgated and
accepted in the industry. This variable standard of conduct will not be
quite as comfortable for the defendant as would be the official pronouncement. He would like to know exactly what standard of care will
be considered reasonably prudent action. Nor will it be as good for the
plaintiff who would like to be able to prove his case merely by showing
non-compliance with official standards, yet it would seem more nearly
182

See supra note 153.
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fair in individual cases. A defendant's reasonableness should be judged
by taking into account the techniques, new as well as old, which are
available for reducing the hazard or preventingthe aftereffects of exposure. This is important, for example, in a case such as the recent Oak
Ridge. accident where at least one worker was reported to have received
188
320 rads.
It might become standard practice to have employees who
undertake these operations during which serious exposure would result
in the event of an accident take such pills as may prove to be effective
in reducing the injurious consequences of exposure. Compliance or noncompliance with industry safety codes certainly should be given weight,
and in most cases perhaps should constitute prima facie, if not conclusive, proof, when no evidence to the contrary is introduced. Courts,
however, should avoid a rigid rule and decide individual cases on the
basis of the specific evidence produced.
As suggested in the Lobrano case, 184 due care probably requires the
user of radioactive material to keep accurate and detailed records of his
operations. Not only doctors 'and radiologists, but also other users of
radioactive materials should keep such records. Often it will prove helpful to the defendant himself. Certainly, it seems a necessary requirement to protect the potential plaintiff because without such information
it becomes very difficult for him to prove injury from radiation at a
particular time and from a particular source, except in the most obvious cases such as when third degree burns result. Possibly a rule requiring the keeping of careful records should be adopted and combined
with the res ipsa loquitur doctrine so as to make failure to keep such
records a prima facie case of negligence. This is discussed later in connection with res ipsa loquitur. 185
(3) The Use of Expert Testimony
Running through all of the radiation cases so far discussed is a common problem. How does one prove that the defendant .in the particular
case did or did not meet the standard of conduct of a reasonably prudent man under the circumstances? Must expert testimony be used or
will lay testimony serve the purpose? Harper and James state the general rule as follows :
Except for malpractice cases (against a doctor, dentist, etc.)
there is no general rule or policy requiring expert testimony as
18s

Infra Chapter IV at note 125.

18~ Supra

note 161.

185/nfra discussion in text beginning at note 1146, particularly at notes 1234-35.
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to the standard of care, and this is true even in the increasingly broad area wherein expert opinion will be received. On
the other hand, any given matter may conceivably be so far
out of the range of general experience that a jury will not be
allowed to decide upon the reasonableness of an actor's conduct
without the aid of expert testimony which at least explains to
the layman the esoteric problems and the possibility and practicability of precautions. ***Courts could very easily expand
the area in which expert testimony is required to establish the
standard of conduct, but the tendency has been instead to resolve doubtful questions in favor of allowing the jury to decide the issue of negligence without its aid. 186

One situation in which the courts have not resolved doubtful ques- ·
tions concerning the need for expert testimony in favor of enlarging the
jury's sphere is when a doctor is accused of malpractice. There may be .
cases where "negligence is so grossly apparent that a layman would
have no difficulty in recognizing it," 187 but in general the plaintiff must
use experts to show a lack of reasonable professional skill.
In a recent case, Facer v. Lewis, the Michigan Supreme Court said:
Although we have held that leaving a sponge in a wound is
not good medical practice and does not require the testimony
of expert witnesses to establish this fact, the proper or improper use of X-rays does require the testimony of experts. 188
In this case the defendant doctor used X-rays to treat the decedent for
warts on his foot. The patient suffered a radiation burn severe enough
to cripple him and he sued for damages charging defendant with negligence. Upon his death his administratrix was substituted as party plaintiff. The only expert testimony offered by the plaintiff was to the effect
that in X-ray treatment procedure intensity, time and distance are important factors in determining the proper dose. The only evidence indicating negligence was that of decedent's son describing what the defendant had done in treating his father's foot. Defendant moved for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the ground that only an expert can establish negligence in such a case. In approving the trial
court's granting of the defendant's motion the court said:
Although laymen generally are acquainted with the fact
that X-rays are destructive and may result in burns or other
Harper & James 966-67.
Harper & James 968 (quoting from 7 Wigmore, Evidence §2090 (3d ed. 1940))
and cases cited at n. 15. To these should be added Ballance v. Dunnington, 241 Mich.
383, 217 N.W. 329 (1928), where the court said that the exposure period was such
that "even the merest tyro would know was improper." Even the defendant admitted it.
188 Facer v. Lewis, supra note 141 at 713.
186
187
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serious conditions, yet the testimony of plaintiff's own medical witness was such as to clearly demonstrate that an X-ray
treatment for warts involves questions of skill, judgment and
practice beyond the knowledge of laymen and upon which a
jury would need the advice of experts to determine whether
or not the claimed acts of defendant were improper. We believe the facts in the case at bar are such that the questions
of negligence became exclusively for expert testimony. 189
A Mississippi decision, Waddle v. Sutherland/ 90 appears at first
reading to reach a contrary result. After X-ray treatment by the defendant of the plaintiff for eczema his leg had to be amputated because
of radiation burns. Both sides presented expert testimony and in addition the plaintiff testified as a witness in his own behalf, apparently describing acts and circumstances concerning the final treatment tending
to show an overdose of X-ray because of overlapping. 191 The plaintiff
also testified that defendant stated at the time of his last treatment that
this was going to be a strongt;r dose than he had previously given. The
plaintiff's wife testified that the defendant doctor told her that they
would probably have to amputate both of his legs and that the doctor
blamed himself for the bums, not his assistant: "it was his mistake and
not hers." The trial court instructed the jury that, in deciding whether
the doctor treated the plaintiff in a "proper manner and with ordinary
care and skill," and whether there was any negligence on the part of the
defendant in the use of the X-ray machine, they could consider only the
testimony of those "who themselves possess the skill required to administer such treatment and qualify themselves as expert in such treatment. . . ." The trial court's verdict was for the defendant doctor.
The supreme court reversed, using the following language :
By the instruction given appellee, copied above, the court
told the jury, in effect, that ·in considering and deciding the
issues of fact, they were confined alone to the evidence of the
experts. By this instruction the court necessarily excluded
from the consideration of the jury, not only the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur embodied in the two instructions given appellant, but also the evidence of both appellant and his wife,
to the effect that appellant's injuries were the result of a third
189

I d. at 714.

156 Miss. 540, 126 So. 201 (1930).
Overlapping results when the operator fails to keep the beam sufficiently narrow.
To avoid unnecessary exposure of the good tissue, particularly at the surface, repeated
deep therapy X-rays are focused on the deep spot from different surface angles. If the
beam is not narrow there will be overlapping and therefore unnecessary exposure of
the surface which can lead to serious burns.
19 0

191
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degree bum, which fact he had admitted to appellant's wife,
along with the statement that such bum was the result of his
fault, and not that of Miss Satterfield, his assistant.
. . . In a case depending upon expert testimony alone such
instruction would be proper; but this is not that kind of a
case. This is a case where there is nonexpert testimony, as
well as expert testimony bearing on the issues. The effect of
this instruction was to tell the jury not only to disregard the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur embodied in two of appellant's
instructions, but also to disregard the evidence of both appellant and his wife. 192

It is also important that the plaintiff's testimony was in addition to that
of his own expert witnesses.
Laying aside the fact that Michigan does not apply res ipsa loquitur
to this type of case while Mississippi does, it is possible to reconcile
these cases on a ground that well might be a satisfactory basis for determining when expert testimony is required and when it is not. If the lay
testimony goes only to a description of events occurring during a treatment and to reporting comments made by an attending physician or his
assistants, there is only the question of probative value to be attached to
the evidence. But if the lay witness attempts to show that this action
constitutes lack of careful and prudent attention by the doctor because it
is not in accordance with the care and skill ordinarily expected of a doctor under these circumstances, this would seem to be outside the area of
knowledge of a non-expert witness, unless it is a situation where the
"merest tyro" could determine that ordinary care and skill was not
used. The court in Butler v. Rule seems to make just this distinction,
although the only expert testimony there was to the effect that the treatment was given as the defendant testified and that it was proper. Because there was conflict as to how far the machine was placed from the
patient the court said:
However, if there was evidence as to the manner in which
defendant administered the treatment in conflict with his testimony, and tending to show that in some essential the treatment was not given as defendant stated, the expert testimony
to that extent would fail, and a question of fact for the jury
arise. 193
The judgment for the plaintiff was reversed, however, because the instructions to the jury were based upon the wrong standard of care.
19 2
1 93

Supra note 190 at 550, 551.
Supra note 154 at 412. ·see also supra note 140.
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In Christie v. Callahan all the expert witnesses testified that the treatment, if given by the defendant doctor as described by him, was reasonable. Nevertheless, the jury had found the doctor to be neglige~t. The
majority of the court of appeals stated:
The jury must have found that the treatments were not given
exactly as Dr. Merritt testified they were, and that, unfortunately, he gave more than the amount proper for treatment of
pilonidal cyst. . . .
The opposing view appears to be based on the theory that
negligence in X-ray treatments can be shown only by direct
and positive testimony of X-ray specialists to specific acts of
negligence taking place in the course of the treatment. A
burden so heavy is not required either by the general law of
negligence or by the Sweeney case. Generally speaking, direct
and positive testimony to specific acts of negligence is not required to establish it. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient,
either alone or in combination with direct evidence. 194
The majority concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support the
jury's finding that the defendant had been negligent.
Where the only question is whether or not the actions of the defendant doctor met the accepted standard of reasonable care and skill under
the circumstances, surely it would be proper to insist on expert testimony. When this is the case, a statement by the California court in
Bennett v. Los Angeles Tumor Institute indicates the typical judicial
attitude: "The,question as to whether there has been a breach of this
standard of care is one which can be resolved only by the testimony of
experts." 195
Where testimony by experts creates a conflict as to what is a proper
course of treatment in a particular case, the opinion of the court in the
Blankenship case is typical. _The court said:
In view of this divergence of opinion among the specialists it
cannot be said that it should be left to a jury of laymen to
determine which method of treatment is right, which would
be the effect of saying that the court erred in directing a verdict for the defendant Hospital in this case. 196
Later in the same opinion the court said :
As long as there is room for an honest difference of opinion
among competent physicians, a physician who uses his own
194

Supra note 142 at 839.

102 Cal. App.2d 293, 2g6, 227 P.2d 473 ( 1951).
196 Supra note 146 at 142. Not to be confused, however, with the case where action
did not conform to either school or they both agree on this point, W emett v. Mount,
195

supra note 146.
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best judgment cannot be convicted of negligence, even though
it may afterward develop that he was mistaken. . ..
And where there is a difference of opinion among physicians or surgeons with reference to the treatment to be given
in a particular case, a physician will not be held liable for malpractice if he follows the course of treatment advocated by a
considerable number of physicians of good standing in his
community. It would not be competent for a court or jury in
such a case to say that a physician who followed either of said
different methods of treatment was negligent. 197

On the other hand, in Simon v. Kaplan the court said that where
expert testimony for the plaintiff and the defendant was in conflict, it
would not set aside the jury's verdict for the plaintiff because, "in these
circumstances we are not warranted under the law, in disturbing the
verdict of the jury." 198 The decision of the majority in the Christie
case, 189 allowing the jury to decide the question .of negligence, did not
really involve a question of the doctor's judgment being a reasonable
one. The attack was not on the opinion of the expert witnesses for the
defendant but on the accuracy of the defendant doctor's statement as
to what was done. It might be argued, however, that the doctor also was
accused of not using proper treatment and the court did allow the
jury's finding to stand.
Another problem concerning the use of expert witnesses may prove
very important in atomic energy cases. It is the training and experience
that qualifies a person as an expert on radiation injuries. The general
rule certainly is that stated by the court in Young v. Stevens:
Appellant's first point is that it was error to permit certain
expert testimony to be given by witnesses who were licensed
physicians. The questions had to do with X-ray and the like,
and the argument is that because these physicians did not hold
themselves out as specialists in that branch of the profession
they were not competent to testify thereon. It is well established that having qualified as medical doctors they are competent to testify on all medical subjects upon which they claim
sufficient ability to express an opinion. The qualification of an
expert is for the determination of the trial court and such
determination will not be disturbed where the ruling is supported by evidence. . . .200
Supra note 146 at 144.
321 Ill. App. 203, 210, 52 N.E.zd 832 (1944).
100 Supra note 142.
2oo 132 N.J.L. 124, 126, 39 A.zd 115 (1949).
101
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As to the weight to be given to testimony of various expert witnesses,
however, the fact pointed out by the court m Thomas v. Lobrano is
true:
It has been well and soundly established with reference to
the evaluation of the opinion testimony of expert medical
witnesses that the conclusions of qualified specialists in the
various fields of medicine are entitled to greater weight than
that accorded the opinions of general practitioners. 201
In deciding this question of the use of expert testimony, it is most
important that the court take into account the distinction previously
suggested 202 between the operation of radiation equipment and deciding
whether or not to use it for diagnosis and treatment. The proper way
in which to use the radioactive source or technique has now been developed into a fairly complex science in which the amount of voltage,
size of the opening, type of shielding, and the distance from the machine to the affected area are all important calculations that can and
must be made with considerable accuracy. Unless the person using the
equipment is prepared to make the calculations and to use the machines
with expert care, he ought not to attempt it, even though he is a licensed
physician. In addition, in determining what is due care, a court should
not accept loose practices followed in a particular local community. As
is indicated by the court in the McElroy case, 203 knowledge of the use
of radioactive sources is nation-wide and there would seem to be no
reason to allow local practices of a small group, even of licensed physicians, to vary from the standard now generally accepted throughout the
country.
Even more important in the atomic energy cases will be the question
of whether persons not licensed to practice medicine should be allowed
to testify. Since a great deal of our knowledge in this area is being developed by experts who are not licensed physicians (biologists, physicists, chemists, and others with similar scientific training), it would
seem quite ridiculous for the courts to refuse to recognize the validity
of opinion testimony given by such persons, especially in non-malpractice cases. Although the question was not litigated specifically, such nonphysician experts were allowed to testify and their testimony given
great weight in several recent cases. 20 ' The court in the Rakowski case,
Supra note 161 at 614.
See discussion supra at notes 173, 164.
203 Supra note 148.
204 Kress v. City of Newark, supra note 181 at 74 (bio-physicist and radio-physicist
201
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apparently allowed non-medical experts to testify for they refer to the
plaintiff's "medical and expert witnesses." 205 In addition, non-medical
experts participated in establishing the standards which were promulgated by the American Standards Association and admitted as evidence
in the case.
( 4) Conclusions
The general impression one gets from reading the radiation cases is
that there is a growing tendency among the courts to recognize that it
has become general knowledge among informed people that the use of
radiation is something to be undertaken only if due consideration is
given to the substantial dangers inherent in its use. The courts are beginning to recognize that the use of such materials has developed into a
fairly exact science as far as measurement and production techniques are
concerned. It also is true that the courts apparently are insisting that
recognition be taken of new advances by any one who uses such material, whether he be a doctor or an industrialist. It is not suggested,
however, tliat courts will hold doctors liable for errors in judgment as to
the amount of radiation necessary to cure diseases or in drawing fine
lines as to how much radiation can be risked, all things considered. Certainly the reasonable-man standard would require the advice of radiation experts in most cases, at least at the time of setting up the plan of
operation and installing the radioactive source or operational technique.
In the light of the rapid development of specialized knowledge in this
area, it also would seem that there are some instances, both in the area
of medical practice and that of industrial uses, where radiation should
not be used without the supervision of a person fully qualified in the
field. This would be true in the operation of a nuclear reactor as well as
in many other cases involving less severe radiation hazards. The better
part of valor would be to use the expert-the reasonably prudent man
will. Our suggested model state statute accepts this premise. 206
specializing in effects of radiation cin living tissue) ; Henslin v. Wheaton, 91 Minn. 219,
221, 97 N.W. 882 (1904) (a professor of physical sciences specializing in electricity);
Lamme v. Ortega, 267 P.2d 1115, 1118 (Colo. 1954) (radiology-physicist and expert in
use of X-ray machines). See also La Porte v. U.S. Radium Corp., 13 F. Supp. 263
(D.C.N.J. 1935) (court referred to non-medical experts needed in radiation field).
2 0 5 Supra note 175 at 211. The opinion does not state this fact specifically but it is
clear that the experts must have been non-doctors.
zo6 Infra Part III, .Chapter VI.
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3· Vicarious Liability for Negligence of Independent Contractors
a. Introduction and Limitations of Discussion
Remembering that radioactive material is uniquely insidious not only
because it gives no warning to the usual human senses but also because
in many cases its hazard continues for many years and in some cases
centuries, and finally because the radiation source cannot be turned off
like a machine, the owner or operator surely will consider seriously the
possibility of immunizing himself from some of the consequent tort
liability. One of the ways in which immunity may perhaps be obtained
is through the use of independent contractors for certain operations.
Therefore, consideration must be given to the concepts of vicarious liability.207 It does not fit well into either duty or breach analysis and is
treated separately here although admittedly both duty and breach ideas
are involved.
Vicarious liability is a very broad subject. It covers the whole ambit
of principal-agency, master-servant, independent contractor, and joint
enterprise. Many aspects of vicarious liability would seem to present no
significant problems in atomic energy situations, at least in the sense of
being unique or unusually troublesome. For example, the rules of
master-servant will not be changed for radiation cases. The same is
true as to joint enterprise questions.
The use of independent contractors, however, will create troublesome questions. Yet even within this area there are many questions
which present no peculiar problem for our purposes; e.g., where to
draw the line between an employee and an independent contractor. The
distinction between an independent contractor and an employee is not
nearly so significant as it once was in tort cases. The important question
today seems to be not whether the negligent person was an employee or
an independent contractor but, assuming he was an independent contractor, whether his negligence will be imputed to the one who hires
him. Without question the old immunity said to follow automatically
from hiring an independent contractor {who by definition was not
within the control of the other contractingparty) now has so many exceptions that it is scarcely recognizable as a general rule. This is quite
consistent with the general trend toward extending liability, such as in
2 0 7 Prosser 350 ff; Harper & James 1361 ff; early Annot., 23 A.L.R. 984-II35 (1923).
For California cases, see Comment, 44 Cal. L. Rev. 762 (1956), and for West Virginia
cases see Brown, "Liability for the Torts of Independent Contractors in West Virginia," 55 W.Va. L. Rev. 216 (1953).
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product liability cases to be discussed later, 208 and the extension of liability of the independent contractor himself for injuries taking place
after his work has been accepted but caused by conditions created by his
negligence which he reasonably could have foreseen might cause injuries to a third party. 209 This trend is also discernible in cases involving
the liability to be imposed on the employer for the negligence of an independent contractor. It should not be assumed, however, that all distinctions will be ignored and that the independent contractor's negligence will always be imputed to the other party. In this regard the
English courts evidently have been moving in the direction of expanded
liability more rapidly than have American courts. 210 On the other hand,
there have been some moves in Parliament recently to reverse this trend
although English legal writers have criticized this attempt. 211
b. Liability of Owner or Occupier of Property
Once an independent contractor relationship has been found, one of
the most frequently litigated questions deals with the liability of an
owner or occupier of land for the negligence of an independent contractor whose work on the premises causes injury to others. It is in this area
that the courts are moving most rapidly toward looking upon the independent contractor almost as an, employee of the owner and holding the
latter liable for negligence of the former. Typical of this trend is a recent Wisconsin case, N echodomu v. Lindstrom, 212 which held the owner
of a building liable when an independent contractor doing construction
work on the property allowed a young child to place his hand in a mixing machine in which there were exposed, revolving blades. This decision is somewhat unusual for even in cases where courts find that an
independent contractor was performing a duty which can not be deleInfra Chapter V.
Annot., 58 A.L.R.:zd 865 (1958), particularly at 8g1 ff. The cases cited clearly
bear out the conclusion stated in the annotation. A striking example of imposing such
liability is Roush v. Johnson, 139 W.Va. 007, 8o S.E.:zd 857 (1954), where a faulty
installation of electrical connections caused the electrocution of a moving company employee long after the installation was made.
210 Prosser 358, citing Chapman, "Liability for the Negligence of Independent Contractors," soL. Q. Rev. 71 (1934).
211 Munkman, "Liability for the Acts of an Independent Contractor," 107 L. J, 245
(1957). A recent English case certainly moving in this direction, but which could be
explained under some of our American decisions requiring the owner to see that reasonable precautions are taken, is Balfour v. Barty-King, [1957] I Q. B. 496, noted 1957
Camb. L. ]. 132.
212
26g Wis. 455, 6g N.W.2d 6o8 (1955), noted 28 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 128 (1955).
2os
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gated by the owner, the latter is not responsible for what is usually
termed "collateral negligence," meaning that some specific part of the
operation being performed by the independent contractor was not unusually dangerous nor unexpected. A carpenter using a hammer, saw
and nails in the usual way is an example. It is arguable, however, that
in the Wisconsin case the job required the presence of this mixing machine so the danger was inherent in the job, not just incidental or "collateral" to it. In one sense, however, this is true of all "collateral negli. gence" cases. Whether or not "collateral negligence" terminology is
used, the basic question remains : Is this the kind of action for which
the independent contractor only should be held liable, or is the nature
of the negligence and the activity of the independent contractor so essential a part of the job desired by the owner, the kind of accident so
foreseeable, and the danger so unusual that immunization of the owner
should not be allowed ? 218
Certain activities generally are carried out by an independent contractor and are thought to be'delegable, for example, transportation of
passengers by taxi, or the use of ordinary carpenter tools to do routine
jobs in which the risk is not too great.
The cases involving independent contractors working on the property
of the other contracting party have become so numerous that annotations usually group them under separate headings for each part of
building and construction work; e.g., excavation and refill work, 214
demolition work, 215 excavation that affects adjoining realty, 218 and
awnings, 217 to mention only a few. It has even been argued in a recent
Michigan case, Cary v. Thomas, 218 that such liability ought to carry
over to the ordinary home owner. In this case a home was fumigated
by an independent contractor who was competent and carefully picked
by a home owner who undoubtedly had no expertise in such matters.
Two dissenting judges would have held the defendant liable because
the danger was great. The plaintiff was a water softener serviceman
who was overcome by cyanide gas when he entered the home after the
independent contractor failed to block all the entrances by posting
21s Prosser 359-62; Harper & James 1395-1410; and particularly Smith, "Collateral
Negligence," 25 Minn. L. Rev. 399 (1941).
214 33 A.L.R.2d 7 (1954).
2u I d. at 89.
2t6Jd. at 111. See Annot., 24 A.L.R.2d 288 (1952) for liability where the independent
contractor. sets a fire and negligently allows it to spread.
211 34 A.L.R.2d 486, 493 (1954).
21 8 345 Mich. 616, 76 N.W.2d 817 (1956). One of the dissenting justices was Smith,
supra note 213.
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notices. Pttre Oil Co. v. Lassing 219 is another recent case in which the
independent contractor concept gave immunity from liability. An independent repairman working on gasoline pumps at a filling station negligently flipped a lighted match into the gasoline tank bin. This is a good
illustration of an instance in which a court places considerable emphasis
on whether or not the contractor is really independent and therefore not
subject to the control of the employing party as to methods of performing the task.
Significant for our purposes are two types of casei concerning work
by independent contractors on the owner's property in which the courts
often hOld the owner liable for the contractor's negligent actions. The
first type deals with damage caused during construction, repair, or
maintenance which are not a normal part of the day-to-day operation
of the business. "Collateral negligence" 220 is the term used in construction and repair cases to state the policy question of whether or not to
impute the contractor's negligence to the employer. In the second type of
case, concerning harm done in the course of the normal day-to-day
operation of the owner's business, the question is usually put in terms of
"non-delegable duty." 221 Writers and courts often use a third phrase,
"inherently or intrinsically dangerous," 222 to state the policy question.
Actually, in all these cases the same test should be used to determine the
liability of the employer for the independent contractor's negligence,
when the employer himself could not be considered as having acted
negligently within the ordinary standards. The policy question in each
situation is whether to allow the employer to shift the tort responsibility
to an independent contractor or to insist that the employer remain responsible for any negligence, even that of the independent contractor.
The activities of an independent contractor which will be the non-delegable responsibility of the employer are those which are appropriately
described as involving "unusual danger" rather than being "inherently
dangerous" or involving "collateral negligence." The phrase "nondelegable" merely states the court's conclusion that the activities involve
"unusual"' hazard.
By the word "unusual" it is meant that the risk of harm is somewhat
222 F.zd 886 (6th Cir. 1955), noted 24 Tenn. L. Rev. 268 (1956).
Prosser 361 ; Harper & James 1410; Smith, supra note 213.
221 Prosser 359; Harper & James 14o6.
222 Prosser 36o; Harper & James 14o8. See language of "unusual danger" in Olah
v. Katz, 234 Mich. 112, 117, 207 N.W. 892 (1926), and Scales v. Lewellyn, 172 N.C.
494, 497, 90 S.E. 521 (1916). See also cases collected and distinctions made in 23
A.L.R. 1016, particularly at 1084 (1923) and 21 A.L.R. 1229 (1922).
219
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greater than normal either because the harm is relatively serious or extensive, involves danger to a great many persons, or is of a unique or
unexpected type.
It should be understood that this discussion concerns the liability of
the employer for the negligent acts of the independent contractor, not
for the negligent acts of the employer himself. In many situations the
employer himself may be negligent, such as, (I) in failing to use care in
selecting a competent independent contractor, ( 2) in failing to give an
independent contractor the necessary information to avoid unnecessary
danger, (3) in failing to prepare properly for the independent contractor's operation, or (4) in failing to meet all the statutory standards
or administrative regulations which may govern a particular operation
while it is still clearly within the control of the employer. The only
situation of significance in atomic energy operations is that in which
the employer is Qeing held for the negligence of the independent contractor although the employer himself has not been negligent in any of
the respects just mentioned. ·
It also is assumed here that the nature of the operations is such as not
to be classed as "ultra-hazardous" within the doctrines of absolute or
strict liability. 228 Liability in the cases here discussed, and as limited
above, should be determined by deciding whether or not the activities are
somewhat out of the ordinary; if so; they are "non-delegable" and the
owner is liable for the independent contractor's negligence.

(I) For Operations Performed on the Premises

During Construction
It seems quite unlikely that many cases will arise in which harm from
radiation hazards will occur during _construction, repair, or maintenance operations. Certainly during the construction of a reactor there
is no radiation hazard until the building is completed and all component
parts have been carefully tested. Even in the repair and maintenance
operations for which an independent contractor is likely to be called,
radiation hazards are not always present because often such periodic
maintenance activities will have to be carried on only after the radioactive material has been removed. For accidents happening at the construction, repair, or maintenance stage and not involving radiation
hazards, there is no reason to believe that the principles to be applied in
atomic energy cases will differ from other situations. To the extent
22s

This problem is discussed infra Chapter IV.
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that radiation hazards are an integral part of the contractor's operations, such as if an independent contractor is called in to do a repair job
and makes us_e of radioactive material to make radiographic inspections
of machinery, or if he is called in to do a clean-up job after radioactive
material has been accidentally released in the area, 224 it is likely that the
court will classify this kind of activity as "inherently dangerous," or,
as we would say, the kind of activity which involves "unusual" hazards.
If this is the case, responsibility for these operations will be nondelegable.
Excavation cases are good examples of situations in which courts
have drawn lines in terms of the degree of danger from the excavation.
If it is of such a character and in such a place that unless unusual precautions are taken there is a substantial risk of a passerby falling into
it, the courts conclude the duty to use due care is non-delegable. If, however, the excavation is made in a remote location where visitors are not
expected, the duty may be delegated and the independent contractor's
liability will not be imputed to the employer. 225 The same distinction is
drawn in the cases involving demolition of buildings. 226
An excellent example of this distinction is the decision by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Whalen v. Shivek. 221 The plaintiff
was killed while walking on a sidewalk adjacent to the building where
the independent contractor was engaged to remove the parapet at the
top of the building. The contractor did not construct a barrier on the
sidewalk below, and his employees negligently allowed a piece weighing
about two hundred pounds to drop on the plaintiff. Finding both the
tenant and the owner of the building liable, the court said:
We recognize that the principle with which we are concerned does not apply to cases where the danger does not come
from work performed with proper skill and care, "but comes
only from an unskilful or negligent act of the contractor or
his servants, even if a lack of skill or care on the part of some
of the persons engaged in the business reasonably may be expected.". . . . But we are of opinion that a finding was warranted in this case that the removal of the parapet by the contractor, in the circumstances disclosed here, involved work of
such kind that it would probably cause injury to persons using
2 2 4 Eg., Tracer Labs, Inc., was called in to clean up after an accident in the Texas
plant of another company using radioisotopes under license from the AEC. A.E.C. Release No. 1213, Nov. 6, 1957.
225 33 A.L.R.:zd 7 (1954), especially 52 ff.
226[d. at 89.
22 7 326 Mass. 142, 93 N.E.2d 393 (1950).
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the sidewalk below unless special precautions were taken .
. . . [The court then distinguished a previous case involving
repair of a chimney where a brick fell onto the sidewalk as
follows.] The work there involved consisted in taking bricks
off of the chimney for a few feet and relaying them. What
happened, the court said, was "a mere detail of the work"
arising from negligence which was not a probable consequence of the work. A different case is presented here where
the contractor was engaged in removing from a building
bordering on a public sidewalk a parapet containing blocks
weighing approximately two hundred pounds and in a state
of disrepair. 228
There are literally dozens of cases of this nature but the reasoning and
result of Whalen v. Shivek exemplify the modern attitude of the courts.
Certainly, if a radiation hazard is at all significant it seems quite likely
that courts will find that the use of such material even during construction, repair, or maintenance operations involves the kind of unusual
hazard for which the owner will continue to be liable even if the only
negligence in the ordinary sense is that of the independent contractor.
This will be true even though the operation does not amount to an
"ultra-hazardous" activity such as to result in strict liability. A distinction is drawn between such activity and the less hazardous operation
which nevertheless possesses sufficient potentialities for harm to others
so that it can not be delegated to an independent contractor, thus relieving the operator from liability.
The same reasoning is the basis for the holding in most jurisdi~tions
that the owner who hires an independent contractor to excavate for a
building is liable for the negligence of that independent contractor in
not properly shoring up the excavation so as to give the necessary
lateral support for abutting buildings. The courts always refer to this
as a type of work in which it is readily foreseeable that a substantial
risk of harm is involved unless special precautions are taken. In such
cases, if the independent contractor is negligent, the owner who hires
him will also be liable even though otherwise the owner is not careless. 229 Probably if radioactive material is used, at least if it is sufficient
in quantity and intensity to present a substantial risk, the operator himself will be held liable for the negligence of an independent contractor.
A recent opinion in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Fegles
/d. at 151.
Law v. Phillips, 136 W.Va. 761, 68 S.E.2d 452 (1952), and other cases annotated
in 33 A.L.R.2d III, 131 (1954).
22s
22 9
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C onst. Co. v. McLaughlin Const. Co. 230 illustrates the possible criteria
that may be used by a court in deciding whether to hold the employer
liable for the negligence of an independent contractor. In this case the
prime contractor, rather than the owner of the land, was held liable for
the negligence of a sub-contractor. The sub-contractor's employees
allowed hot rivets to fall on timbers and other inflammable material
being used by another contractor doing a different job on the premises.
In holding the contractor liable for the sub-contractor's negligence,
the court said :
An. employer or primary contractor is liable for injuries
caused by the failure of an independent contractor to exercise
due care with respect to the performance of work which is
inherently or intrinsically dangerous. "An employer may not
divest himself of the primary duty he owes to other members
of the community by contracting with others for the performance of work, the necessary or probable result of which is injury to third persons." . . . This exception places an absolute,
nondelegable duty upon the employer to see that all reasonable
precautions shall be taken during the performance of the
work to the end that third persons may be adequately protected against injury.
Work not inherently dangerous under some circumstances
may be inherently dangerous under other circumstances.
Thus, construction work near a street or sidewalk may, by
reason of proximity to the street or sidewalk, be inherently
dangerous. Riveting, while not inherently dangerous under
all circumstances, becomes inherently dangerous if done over
men and materials where no protection is afforded the men
and materials below. 281
There is no reason to· assume that radioactive materials being used by
an independent contractor in the course of construction, repair, or
maintenance are less dangerous than "hot rivets."
During Normal Operations
The cases that are much more likely to arise involve radiation hazards which cause harm as the result of the normal operation of the
owner, even though the negligence that makes it possible for the radiation to cause harm is that of an independent contractor. Liability probably will be imposed on the owner and operator of the reactor regardless of whether or not the negligent act was committed by the building
230 205 F.2d 637 (9th Cir. 1953). (An interesting early case allowing delegation in
conducting a fireworks display is Deyo v. Kingston Consol. R.R., 88 N.Y.S. 487
(1904).)
231 I d. at 640.
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contractor who constructed the reactor tank, the supplier who furnished
defective cores, the architects who designed the building, the repairmen
who were negligent in repairing piping that carried radioactive material, or the installers or repairers of the ventilation system which filters
out radioactive particles before air is discharged into the atmosphere or
water into the river. Even though we assume that the operation of a
reactor, or the use of a radiation source for radiography or of radioactive isotopes in research or industrial processing will not be classified
as ultra-hazardous/ 82 such activities, at least where the danger is at all
significant because of type or amount, will be considered to create an
ususual hazard and will therefore be non-delegable. Consequently, the
owner probably will be vicariously liable for the negligence of the independent contractor. Within the class of non-delegable duties Prosser
lists such matters as the duty of a carrier to carry its passengers in
safety and to maintain safe railroad crossings, or of a municipality to
keep its streets in repair or to refrain from obstructing a public highway, or of an employer to provide employees with a safe place to work.
Concerning the line to be drawn between the non-delegable and the
delegable duties, he states :
It is difficult to suggest any criterion by which the non-delegable character of such duties may be determined, other than
the conclusion of the courts that the responsibility is so important to the community that the employer should not be permitted to transfer it to another. 288
Harper and James, in commenting upon the line to be drawn between
delegable and non-delegable or inherently dangerous and non-inherently
dangerous activities, say:
At present the line is a ragged and irrational one somewhere
between the two extremes. Several. factors have been suggested as significant, but closer examination of their significance proves disappointing. Thus an operation's threat to
highway travel has been thought important; and indeed the
duty of care owed to travelers with respect to adjacent premises, or work done in the highway itself, may not be delegated. Nor perhaps may the obligation of care in working on
scaffold over the sidewalk. On the other hand the duty of
care in driving automobiles and trucks along the highway is
fully delegable though this operation presents an infinitely
greater threat to travelers than do premises or structures near
or over the highways. 2 u
See infra Chapter IV on strict liability.
Prosser 359·
284 Harper & ] ames 1409.
282
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The opinion of the Kentucky court in Brown Hotel Co. v. Sizemore, 285 in which the hotel was held liable for injuries to the plaintiff
when he fell into a manhole negligently replaced by the coal company
delivery man, illustrates the typical approach of courts which apply the
non-delegable duty concept. The court said :
The courts are quite uniform in holding that there is an
affirmative duty of seeing that a coal hole or similar servitude
is properly guarded or protected when being used, and, as
well, that the covering has been safely replaced; that the owner
or possessor cannot absolve himself from liability or avoid
performance of the duty by leaving it to another, such as the
deliveryman of coal. The owner or possessor cannot receive
the benefits of having the coal company use the chute to supply him with coal and at the same time renounce all interest or
concern as to the condition it is left in, which may be to the
manifest jeopardy of persons using the public thoroughfare
being caught in the trap of an open hole or insecure covering.236

*****

The displacement evidently was not obvious or apparent at a
casual glance. But we do not think that fact excuses the defendant. The basis on which liability of the Hotel Company
was submitted in the instruction was whether the Hotel Company should have discovered the loose lid within the interval
of time. The correct basis should have been whether the Company exercised ordinary care and vigilance to discover the
condition. The instruction was perhaps more favorable to the
defendant than it was entitled to. It is not to be overlooked
that the burden had shifted to the defendant to justify its
non-action. The jury was authorized in law to find as a fact
that the defendant was guilty of negligence. 237
The rationale of the court seems to be that where the public generally
is so likely to be endangered by a negligent act of an independent contractor on a public way abutting the owner's property, the owner will
be held liable for the contractor's negligence if the act is not done carefully; the situation is not ultra-hazardous nor normally hazardous, it is
unusually hazardous. The unusualness of the hazard here is two-fold:
there is a great likelihood that someone wiii be hurt from such negligence and the number of persons who wiii be exposed to danger in a
public way is great.
235

303 Ky. 431, 197 S.W.2d 9II (1946).

236 I d. at 436.
237 /d. at 439·
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A recent lower court case in New York, Thibault v. City of New
Y ork/ 88 illustrates another situation in which a court is likely to find a
non-delegable duty, even though the danger does not affect the public
generally nor create a hazard for a large number of persons. Only a
small group of employees was endangered but the hazard was unusual
in the sense that severe harm was likely to result, in this case death by
electrocution. The contracting company which installed an overhead
electric line for a city elec_tric trolley bus system and the city itself were
both held liable for the electrocution of a lineman resulting from faulty
installation of insulators. In concluding that both the city and the
contractor were liable, the court said:
Whatever the cause, it is clear the failure to inspect and remove it proximately produced the accident, and the jury so
found. It seems to me that neither the City nor the contractors could escape the obligation for thorough inspection.
Though an electrical installation is a hazardous undertaking
to workers and public. alike, concededly neither of these
parties inspected the insulator which, being defective, added
to that hazard. The contractors plainly convenanted with the
City. . . that such equipment would be free of defects. They
could reasonably anticipate that its own linesmen would be
exposed to danger while making mechanical adjustments.
They also knew that the City would energize the system to
make the test runs. Their admitted failure to inspect and remove the dangerous device therefore constituted active negligence on their part .
. . . Clearly the City's act of energizing the lines for test
run purposes, without its own prior "full and minute inspection", as . provided for by. Contract Article 29, and with
knowledge that mechanical adjustments would thereafter be
made, also constituted active negligence.
. . . sound public policy demands that he who authorizes
a basically hazardous work be vigilant regardless of who performs it and whether or not he voluntarily participates in or
controls its operation. . . . The logical corollary to this rule
is that in the course of basically hazardous work positive
care be exercised by the owner even though he be promised
indemnity by the person authorized to perform it. 239
154 N.Y.S.2d 338 (1956).
at 342-43. [Emphasis added.) A similar duty was placed on the federal government for the death of an electric power lineman kiiied as the result of the government
employee's failure to see that an independent contractor doing rehabilitation work turned
off the current before the men climbed the poles. Pierce v. United States, 142 F. Supp.
721 (E.D. Tenn. S.D. 1955). To be distinguished is the problem of a general contractor's liability for negligence of a sub-contractor under an express indemnity agreement
with the owner; City of Polytechnic v. Redmon, 217 S.W. 730 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919).
23 8

239/d.
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In effect the court is saying it is negligence not to inspect the work done
by an independent contractor. If this is "active negligence" then it is a
non-delegable duty situation.
Burns v. Vaughar£ 240 may be another example of a case imposing
vicarious liability on an owner of land. In this case a farmer hired an
airplane pilot to dust crops with 2, 4-D. The defendant admitted that he
knew that the dust was dangerous but claimed that he had taken care to
instruct the pilot not to release the dust if there was any wind. The
owner defendant nevertheless was held liable for the damage that resulted to other crops on adjoining land in spite of the fact that he tried
hard to stop the pilot after a breeze came up but did not succeed in time
to prevent the damage. The court said that the jury could find from this
evidence that the owner was negligent notwithstanding the precautions
he had taken to warn the pilot and to stop him once a breeze arose. The
court does not refer to the pilot an an independent contractor but the
situation is one in which it is likely that the pilot was not an employee
and the court states that the basic facts are similar to those in a previous
case in which it seems quite likely that the pilot was an independent
contractor. 241 This case, if actually it involved an independent contractor, goes even further than cases which hold the owner of land
liable for injuries resulting from construction work where objects fall
on public sidewalks rather than on the. owner's own property. The
damage occurred at a point more than a mile distant from defendant's
land, not immediately adjacent to it. Nevertheless, liability is imposed
because the activities are being carried out on the owner's own property, and the injuries result quite directly and almost simultaneously
with the performance of the operations themselves.
The use of radioactive materials on one's own property is likely to be
at least as "unusually hazardous" as uncovered man-holes, power lines,
or 2, 4-D.
(2) For Operations Performed off the Premises
The on-site cases discussed above make it rather clear that the user
of atomic energy, even if his operations are not "ultra-hazardous," will
240
216 Ark. 128, 224 S.W.2d 365 (1949). See annotation on liability for damages of
all kinds arising from crop spraying, 12 A.L.R.2d 436 (1950). That such duties cannot
be delegated, see cases collected at 440, including another Arkansas case.
241 Chapman Chemical Co. v. Taylor, 215 Ark. 630, 222 S.W.2d 820 (1949). At 639
the court said the dusting was done "by an aviator whose regular business it was to
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be held responsible in damages to persons injured through the negligence of independent contractors who carry out operations in the
premises. These operations often will involve "unusual hazards" and,
therefore, will be non-delegable. In reaching this result the courts have
ignored the independence of the contractor and the consequent inability
of the owner to control the contractor's employees except by telling
the contractor to have his employees do things a certain way or stop
work altogether. Liability has been imposed on the employer or owner
regardless of how responsible the independent contractor was and
whether or not he was able financially to respond for damages. The
theory of the cases is that the duty simply is not delegable because the
operations present an unusual hazard. Logically, therefore, argument
can be made that the concept of non-delegable duty also should be applied to off-site operations involving unusual hazards. On this question,
however, the answer is not nearly so clear. Legal literature and judicial
opinions considering the question apparently are almost non-existent.
Will or should the user, such as a reactor operator, be allowed to immunize himself from liability for certain operations, such as transportation of radioactive material, fuel fabrication, or disposal of radioactive waste products, by hiring an independent contractor ? The
question posed assumes that the one hiring the services is not dealing
with "ultra-hazardous" activities and in every other respect has acted
as a reasonably prudent man would act. It is assumed that due care has
been used in the operator's designs, requests, and specifications, as well
as in giving notic.e of the dangerous nature of the commodity, in handling the material including preparation for shipment, in complying
with all statutory requirements and administrative regulations, and in
carefully selecting a competent independent contractor. Once the activity is found to be unusually hazardous, in determining the vicarious
liability of the user or owner, should it make any difference whether
the operation is performed on or off the premises? The dearth of treatment of the problem may indicate that all lawyers assume vicarious
liability should not be imposed or perhaps it only means that plaintiffs'
lawyers have not seen the logical possibility of applying the modern
trend to off-site cases. The answer to this policy question will be very
important to those engaging in atomic energy activities, and it should
take into account the effect of liability or non-liability on wise development of nuclear enterprise.
dust crops. . . ." It stated that the operator had engaged in crop dusting for
from Florida to California and from Mexico to Canada.
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(a) Decided Cases
( i) Transportation

The only recent case found which possibly deals with the liability of
a shipper for the negligence of a carrier is Pope v. Edward M. Rude
Carrier Corp./ 42 decided by the West Virginia Supreme Court in 1953.
The plaintiff was injured when dynamite exploded while being carried
on a public highway by a contract carrier which was licensed and regulated by the Interstate Commerce Commission. Both the carrier and the
shipper, DuPont, were sued. The court held that neither the shipper
nor the licensed regulated contract carrier which transported high explosives were carrying on a nuisance, and the doctrine of strict liability
was not applicable. In holding both the shipper and the licensed and
regulated contract carrier not to be subject to nuisance or strict liability
doctrines, the court reasoned :
The manufacture and the shipment of dynamite and its transportation by carrier are lawful and essential business enterprises. High explosives, such as dynamite, are valuable, important and necessary articles of commerce and industry.
Without their manufacture and transportation for many essential uses the economy of the nation would be restricted and
impaired. There is no allegation that either defendant in
manufacturing, shipping or transporting the dynamite before
or at the time of the explosion violated any provision of any
law of the United States or of this State or any valid regulation imposed by the authority of either of them, or that the
design or the construction of the equipment used was faulty
or improper, or that there was any delay in transporting the
shipment or any undue stoppage in the movement of the truck
or any storage of the dynamite which would imperil the safety
of the public or subject the dynamite to any unnecessary hazard which would cause it to explode. m
In holding the manufacturer and shipper of high explosives subject to
the same kind of liability as the carrier, the court cited American Jurisprudence to the effect that "The same rule that applies to the carrier in
the transportation of explosives, namely, that it is not an insurer
against injuries, but is liable only for negligence, applies also to the
shipper." 244 The court therefore dismissed the first and third counts,
based on nuisance and strict liability theories respectively, as to both the
licensed contract carrier and the manufacturer. The second count, how242

138 W.Va. 218, 75 S.E.2d 584 (1953).

I d. at 226.
2 44 !d. at 243; 22 Am. Jur. 203 (1939).
243
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ever, alleged that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applied because explosives if properly handled ordinarily do notexplode. The court held
that this was not subject to demurrer even if no specific acts of negligence were alleged.
If this case should be accepted as good authority it would mean ( 1)
shipping and transporting a dangerous explosive is neither a nuisance
nor an ultra-hazardous activity, even though the manufacture or storing of it may be, so negligence rules govern; and ( 2) if a masterservant relationship exists, the shipper may be liable for the negligence
of the carrier and res ipsa loquitur may be applied. The language of the
opinion clearly implies that unless the shipper is· guilty of negligence
himself there is no liability even if the carrier (including common as
well as contract according to the opinion) 245 is negligent; but this is
not a holding in the case. The lower court certified the question of
whether or not the relationship of independent contractor existed but
the supreme court held that each count contained an allegation that the
relationship of master-servarit existed and this had to be accepted on
demurrer.
The language to the effect that a shipper's liability is only for negligence is made even more doubtful as authority for refusing to apply
vicarious liability principles because the concept of unusual hazard was
not even mentioned. Its usefulness is reduced further by the fact that
the only authority cited is the quotation from American Jurisprudence.
The quotation itself is nothing but a repetition of an earlier statement
in Lawyers' Reports Annotated which says :
. . . [I]t has been held that a shipper of crude petroleum is
not bound to so protect and guard it that harm therefrom
shall come to no one, but his duty is performed by providing
a suitable vehicle, able to encounter the usual risks of transportation. 246
Even this statement is based upon a single case, Goodlander Mill Co. v.
Standard Oil Co./ 41 in which the shipper was excused from liability
for a fire resulting from overflowing oil caused by a leaky valve since
the consignee of the oil in operating the valve was an intervening agent.
The court said :
The shipment of such an article of commerce casts upon the
shipper a certain duty to the public,-that of providing a
suitable vehicle for the petroleum in all respects adapted to
I d. at 242.
1916B L.R.A. 730.
247 63 Fed. 400 (7th Cir. 1894).
245
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the purposes of carriage, and able to encounter the usual risks
of transportation, so that the petroleum in its transit should
not be exposed to danger of ignition from causes incident to
its transportation, reasonably to be anticipated. We think that
to be the true limit of the shipper's duty, and that duty, as it
appears to us in this case, was properly discharged. The petroleum was contained in a tank impervious to fire. The shipment reached its destination in safety. The case is not like
that of the shipment of explosives, the character of the shipments being concealed. [Citations omitted.] Here the contents of the tank were declared by the peculiar construction
of the car. The properties of the petroleum were known to
the consignee and to the public equally with the defendant.
They are a matter of common knowledge. There was here no
disguise and no concealment. 248

The court in another part of the opinion emphasized the fact that defendant's negligence in connection with the valve was not the proximate
cause of the fire because of the delay in time and remoteness in. space
between the negligent act and the accident.
If accepted at face value, the language quoted indicates that so long
as the dangerous material is plainly marked and so packaged that it can
withstand the ordinary strains of shipment, no liability will be imposed
upon the shipper. Surely vicarious liability for the negligence of the carrier would not be imposed either. In light of recent trends in tort law,
however, this case is of doubtful value as a precedent, except in West
Virginia. The intervening agent and lack of privity arguments used by
the court are not consistent with the trend today. The emphasis upon
remoteness in time and space likewise is not consistent with current concepts. In addition, radioactive materials may be differentiated from
crude oil and be found to present an unusual hazard.
Unfortunately no other recent transportation cases have been found
clearly dealing with the vicarious liability of a shipper. All other discussions and cases dealing with a shipper's liability involve negligence of
the shipper himself, such as in failing to meet packaging, notification,
or marking requirements. 249 Even these cases almost always concern injury to employees of the carrier, not to the public generally. The West
Virginia opinion, therefore, is not a satisfactory precedent on the
question of a shipper's liability for negligence of an independent carrier.
248 !d. at 404. The Deyo case, supra note 230, denying vicarious liability in shooting
fireworks is probably also explained by its vintage-before the more liberal (loose)
modern trend.
2 49 See cases discussed and cited in 22 Am. Jur. 203 (1939) and rgr6B L.R.A. 730.
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Joseph R. Foard Co. v. Maryland/ 50 decided in 1914, may be another
off-site transportation case. An explosion occurred on the chartered
vessel Alum Chine while it was being loaded with dynamite by an independent contractor stevedoring company hired by the charterer. Suit
was brought against the stevedoring company and the charterer for the
death of several men and for damage to ships and other property in the
vicinity of the Alum Chine. The explosion was found to have been
caused by the negligence of the foreman of the stevedoring company.
The charterer was found to have hired a competent company to do the
loading and the court refused to impose vicarious liability, although
plaintiffs argued that the work was inherently dangerous and therefore
non-delegable. The court stated :
The rule that responsibility is on the independent contractor alone does not apply when at the inception of the
undertaking a man of ordinary reason should know that in
the natural course of thit:Igs the work would certainly or probably result in injury to another, unless some distinct and definite precautions be taken, although the details of the work be
done with due care; as, for example, guarding a hole dug in
the street, or protecting buildings close to blasting operations
from rocks which would probably strike them, or protecting a
wall when excavating by it. But the exception does not extend
to work which could be surely performed with safety upon
the sole condition that due care be exercised in the details of
its execution.
Applying this rule, the Munson Company [the company
which hired the stevedore company to load the vessel] is not
liable. Loading dynamite, gasoline, gunpowder, naphtha, and
other inflammable or explosive substances is necessary to commerce and is not a nuisance. [Citations omitted.] There was
no distinct and definite precaution to be taken, so as to make
sure that due care in the details of the work would make it
safe. It was not disputed that dynamite may be loaded with
perfect safety, if adequate care be taken against concussion
and heat. There was no danger of either, except from the details· of the work, and therefore the independent contractor
alone was liable. 251
Neither this opinion nor that of the lower court m considers the question of whether the arrangement was a bare-boat (demise) charter, in
which the charterer takes over all management and operation functions,
2 50
251
252

219 Fed.

827

(4th Cir. 1914), affirming 213 Fed. 51 (D.C. Md. 1914).

I d. at 833-34-

Maryland v. General Stevedoring Co., 213 Fed. 51 (D.C. Md. 1914).
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or a charter of affreightment, in which the owner continues in possession and is responsible for all operations. 2 G8 Where there is any dispute
as to which type of charter is involved, however, the courts lean to affreightment, 2G4 and in such cases liability for injuries to third persons
ordinarily is imposed on the owner, not the charterer.m If this was the
type of charter in the Foard case it lays down a rule of no vicarious liability in an off-site situation involving the handling of dangerous material because the accident happened on property owned and legally
controlled by another. On the other hand, if the boat was legally in the
possession and control of the charterer, it simply is an on-site situation
in which the court refused to find that an unusual hazard was involved.
Perhaps the case means that in determining the vicarious liability of an
employer for the negligence of an independent contractor no distinction
is to be drawn between on-site and off-site cases. The way in which the
lower court opinion describes the policy question involved certainly
makes no such distinction. 258
Robinson, Admiralty 594 (1939).
/d. at 597·
2UJd. at 614.
256 Supra note 252 at 86-87: "To them the Foard Company seems called on to pay'a high price for a very trifling error of judgment. On the other hand, if the decree
here made shall be affirmed above, all that the Foard and the Stevedoring Companies
have will make good to the libelants but a fraction of what they have lost. It is no
comfort to them to tell them that dynamite is necessary to modem industry. Few of
them had an appreciable interest in shipping the dynamite to the Isthmus. Many of
them had none at all except that which they shared with everybody else. What happened at Communipaw and to the Chine shows how widespread disaster an explosion
of dynamite may cause. That they should bear the loss does not seem fair to them. It
is natural that they should feel that every one who had a part in causing the dynamite
to be stowed on the ship should be liable to them. On the other hand, what has been
said shows that it does not seem to be in accordance either with natural justice or with
settled.legal principles to make every one who has any part in the handling of the dy-.
namite answerable for all the consequences of an explosion, although he was not in
fault either in person or through some one for whom under the ordinary rules of law
he must answer. It may be that some day the law will be so moulded that more exact
and complete equity may be done. Public opinion has apparently come to the conclusion that workmen should be indemnified against the pecuniary consequences of accidents
suffered by them in the course of their employment. Hereafter a step further may be
taken. It may then seem justto, compensate all persons who without fault of their own
suffer from industrial accidents. Such a policy may be wise. Even if it be, courts would
·not be now justified in holding liable for the consequences of the accident him who
directs the shipment o.f an explosive or who knowingly and willfully takes any part in
such shipment or permits it having power to prevent it. Whether indemnification shall
be given at all, and if so how, is a complex problem. It is for the Legislature to work
out. In this case the court may not impose the burden upon either the city or upon any
person or corporation who w;1s no more directly responsible for the explosion than was
the Munson Line."
258
254
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Williamson v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co./ 51 decided in 1954, perhaps should be treated as an off-site transportation case. A tree-trimmer was hired by the defendant telephone company to prepare the way
for erection of telephone wires. He was negligent in driving his employees from work one day,· causing the plaintiff to be injured. The
court found that the tree-trimmer was an independent contractor and
refused to hold the telephone company liable. This case, however, although it involves off-site transportation, is not very good authority on
the vicarious liability que-stion. The defendant's material was not being
shipped and was not the cause of the injuries. More importantly, driving a car today, although an inherently dangerous operation in one
sense, hardly classifies as one presenting an unusual hazard as the concept is used in the vicarious liability cases.
(ii) Other Cases Involving Off-Site Activities
The question of ·vicarious. liability for the negligence of an independent contractor may arise in off-site activities other than transportation. An injured party may seek to impose liability upon the person
who hires another to carry out such off-site activities on the same basis
discussed already in connection with both the on-site and transportation cases, namely, the activity presents an unusual hazard and liability
for negligence cannot be avoided by delegating the operation to another.
The. policy considerations influencing the courts seem to be the same.
These cases illustrate how shadowy the line between on-site and off-site
cases can become once it is determined that the specific activity has been
requested by the employer of the independent contractor.
In Scales v. Lewellyn, 258 the defendant city raised the street grade,
cutting off access to several houses, including the one in which the
plaintiff was a tenant. The city hired an iqdependent contractor to raise
each of the houses, this operation of necessity not being performed on
city property. The negligence of the contractor in shoring up the porch
of the house where the plaintiff lived caused the latter's injuries, Although the court held that the city was not liable because the operation
was not inherently dangerous and presented no unusual hazard, the
opinion rather clearly implies that if it had, liability would have been
imposed.
Judge Learned Hand; in Person v. Cauldwell-Wingate Co., 259 in
2 57

258
259

265 S.W.2d 354 (Mo. 1954).
Supra note 222.
176 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1949).
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determining whether or not a contractor should be held vicariously
liable for the negligence of an independent sub-contractor, clearly applied the same test as used when the owner is sued. The plaintiff's husband, an employee of another contractor, was killed because of the prior
negligence Of the sub-contractor in stringing high tension wires. The
plaintiff argued that the main contractor was liable because it was an
inherently dangerous operation which was non-delegable. Judge Hand
said:
In such cases the law imposes the duty of inspection upon the
owner or contractor in invitum, and forbids him to delegate it,
just as it does when a statute or an ordinance directly imposes
such a duty. Often the factor which appears particularly to
determine "the inherent danger" is the proximity of the work
to a highway, since it is then more likely that any mischance
will do harm, but these are merely instances of the general
doctrine. Nor are the decisions anomalous which hold that the
duty to inspect upon such occasions does not extend to matters "collateral" to the work itself. These do not concern the
;existence of the duty to inspect, but the extent of the inspection required. 260
·
Judge Hand concluded that if the jury found the sub-contractor liable,
it "might also find the Contractor liable." 261 This seems to be holding
that the employer cai:mot avoid liability .for the negligence of an independent contractor when ususual hazards are involved, at least if an
inspection would have· discovered the dangerous condition, since surely
Hand was not suggesting that the law question. of whether or not to
impose vicarious liability was for the jury.
In some older cases involving the laying of pipelines, 262 pipeline
companies which hired independent contractors to carry out certain
operations were not held vicariously liable for the negligence of the independent contractors which caused h1juries either to employees of the
contractor or third persons. In both cases the operations, if performed
negligently, could and did create a quite hazardous situation. These
might be considered on-site cases in the sense that the pipeline companies undoubtedly had easements to use the adjoining property during
2 60
261

I d. at 240.
Ibid.

262 Holt v. Texas-New Mexico Pipeline Co., 145 F.:zd 862 (5th Cir. 1944) (Negligence of independent contractor in using dynamite causCd employee of another contractor to be injured); O'Hara v. Laclede Gas Light Co., 244 Mo. 395, 148 S.W. 884
(1912) ·(A sub-contractor was alleged to have been neiligent in piling pipes for use in
building a pipeline, causing injury to a third party).
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their construction work. Perhaps the same explanation could be applied
to the Person case on the theory that the contractor had temporary control of the property during the construction period, although in the
Person case the army camp property itself was owned by the government. In none of the three opi.nions, however, is any distinction between
on- and off-site cases discussed. 263
In Doran v. Flood 264 vicarious liability was held applicable to the
building contractor who hired another to haul timbers to be used as
piles to the building site. The death of plaintiff's son resulted from the
negligence of the hauler as he was dragging the timbers along the
streets to the site, clearly an off-site situation. The court held that the
owners who had contracted to have the building constructed were not
liable because they had nothing to do. with procurement of the piles. The
principal contractor would be liable vicariously, however, if his understanding with the hauler was to drag rather than truck the timbers
through the streets. The court said :
Those who have work, dangerous in itself, and requiring
particular care, dpne, cannot shield themselves by letting it out
to others without providing for the necessary care. If these
defendants had contracted for dragging these logs along the
streets as they were dragged, and so dragging them caused
the injury, they would, without doubt, be liable. Letting the
hauling for that distance at that price, to a person not a common carrier, who had no trucks or connection with facilities
for doing it otherwise than by dragging, would have some
tendency towards showing that the understanding with the
defendants was that it was to be done by dragging, as it was
done. 285
The court specifically withheld judgment as to whether or not liability
would be imposed if the arrangement were found to permit the hauler
to choose a method other than the one way contemplated. The one contemplated happened to be unlawful because of a city ordinance prohibiting such operations. The case can be interpreted to mean that vicarious liability is imposed only when the arrangement in effect controls
the mann~r in which the independent contractor is to work. Yet apparently the only control was the price paid, which was so low as practically
to limit the methods to the one used, which was unlawful and negligent.
There was nothing in the contract specifically allowing the employer to
control the method.
See also similar case discussed in connection with on-site cases, s11pra note
47 Fed. 543 (Cir. Ct. S.D. N.Y. 1891).
265 I d. at 544263
264

230.
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The question of whether or not to impose vicarious liability on the
employer has arisen in a series of logging operation cases when an independent contractor has been hired to transport the logs to the mill of
the employer. In one, McDonell v. Rifle Boom Co./ 66 such liability was
imposed for much the same reason applied in Doran v. Flood. 261 The
terms of the arrangement were such that the operations could be carried on only in the manner actually used by the contractor. The employer was held liable when the logs being handled by the independent
contractor jammed and caused the river to flood plaintiff's land. To
meet the conditions imposed by the contract the river operations had to
be carried out in this manner and the court imposed liability on the mill
owner on the theory that for practical purposes it had not relinquished
control. Although it had no power under the contract to control the contractor's operations directly, it had done so effectively because of the
performance required of him by the contract. Cl~arly this is an off-site
situation in which vicarious liability is imposed, yet the reasoning of
the court, as in the Doran case, is remarkably like that used in the onsite cases discussed above. 268 The similarity is particularly marked in
the cases involving spread of fire from one piece of property to that
owned by the plaintiff, 269 it being impossible sometimes to determine
whether it was an on-site or off-site situation. 210
71 Mich. 61, 38 N.W. 681 (1888).
Supra note 264.
2 68 See discussion in text supra notes 224 to 241.
269 Cases are collected in Annot., 24 A.L.R.2d 241, 288 ff. (1952). The opinion of
the court in St. Louis & San Francisco R.R. v. Madden, 77 Kan. So at 91-92, 93 Pac.
586 (1go8), is typical: "We find no difficulty in determining that the work of burning
the fire-guard was a part of the operation of the road. The company could not, therefore, absolve itself from the liability by letting out the work to an independent contractor, for the reason that it owed to the plaintiff an obligation, placed upon it by the
law, to respond in damages for all injuries by fire thus caused; and for the further
reason that it employed a dangerous agency which in the experience of every one required that precautions be taken to prevent damage to the property of others. Thus a
second duty was cast upon the railroad company not to cause the work to be done,
either directly by its employees or indirectly by a contractor, without seeing that precautions were taken to prevent the escape of fire and consequent injury to the property
of plaintiff. Neither of these obligations, or duties, could be avoided by delegating the
performance of the work to another."
2 70 See, for example, John L. Roper Lumber Co. v. Hewitt, z87 Fed. 120, 122 (4th
Cir. 1923). The owner of land hired an independent contractor to carry out a logging
operation knowing that inflammable debris would collect along the railroad right of
way over which the logs were carried. Fire, set in the negligently accumulated debris,
spread to neighboring land and the landowner was held responsible. The court reasoned: "In our view, the work which defendant contracted to have done was of that
character commonly described as intrinsically or inherently dangerous, and, if this be
266
2 67
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Other logging cases, 271 however, indicate that vicarious liability will
not be imposed when the independent contractor floating logs down
river to the hiring company's mill is not so narrowly limited in his
methods or timing by the performance terms of the contract. The courts
concluded that the operations (which were off-site, though this was not
discussed in the opinions) were sufficiently separate to justify denying
liability. Plaintiffs argued that floating logs was inherently dangerous
but the courts did not accept the contention. The courts, however, did
meet squarely the basic policy question involved in all independent contractor vicarious liability cases; i.e., are the operations distinct enough,
is the danger not too unusual, is the economic value to society of this
activity sufficient to allow the emp~oyer to immunize himself against
tort liability by hiring competent independent contractors for certain
operations?
A similar result in another early off-site case was reached by the
Washington court in Johnston v. Seattle Taxicab & Transfer Co. 212
Here the sub-contractor, in removing dirt from the main operation, set
up a counter-weight sled device to help his horses keep the wagons
loaded with dirt from running down hill too fast. The plaintiff was
inju·red when the taxicab in which he was riding struck this device.
Again the court found that the operations of the independent contractor
were not controlled by the principal contractor and so refused to impose
liability on him for the former's negligence. The court said that the
inherently dangerous exception did not apply because placing the drag
in the street did not relate to the actual performance of the work contracted for but only to the manner of its performance. 213
In Woodard v. A. F. Coats Lumber Co., 214 the Oregon court used
true, it follows, we think, that the contractee may not, under such circumstances, let
the work to others to ·do, and avoid liability in case it is negligently done; for where
danger to the property or person of others is likely to attend the doing of the work, the
liability of the contractee is not avoided by committing it to someone else to do. Under
the circumstances as they here obtained, defendant owed the duty to the owners of
neighboring property to see that the work was carefully performed, and that proper
means were adopted by which the consequences of the negligent accumulation of combustible material on the right of way would be avoided; in other words, to see that the
mischief which would likely occur did not occur by removing the danger or otherwise
adopting such precautionary measures as experience has shown to be necessary under
like conditions."
2n Carter v. Berlin Mills Co., 58 N.H. 52 (1876); Town of Pierrepont v. Loveless,
72 N.Y. 2II (1878).
21285 Wash. 551, 148 Pac. 900 (1915). This case comes closer to the on-site situation since the injury occurred closely adjacent to the main operation on adjoining land.
unlike the logging cases.
278 ld. at 557.
274 97 Ore. 302, 191 Pac. 668 (1920).
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much the same reasoning when plaintiff, a fisherman, sued for damages
to his nets caused by oil which leaked from a barge which had sunk
while being operated negligently by an independent sub-contractor. The
barge had been hired to carry defendant's wood but oil was left in the
bottom of the barge from previous operations for other persons. Finding that the barge company was an independent contractor and that
towing barges was not "inherently dangerous or liable to inflict damage
upon another," 275 the court refused to hold the lumber company liable
for the negligence of the tug operator.
Although the logging and the Johnston and Woodard cases might
be considered as transportation cases, the injuries resulted not from the
dangerous nature of the commodity being transported but from the way
in which the independent contractor carried out his operations. Unless
the particular method of operating is specified by the contract or is indirectly dictated by the terms of the contract, the courts generally refused to impose on the employer vicarious liability for the negligence
of the independent contractor, even though the operations certainly
involved as unusual hazards as many of those in on-site cases where
such liability was found. These cases illustrate the possibility that courts
will find certain operations sufficiently separate to permit the employer
to avoid liability for the independent contractor's negligence in carrying
on operations having considerable hazard potential. They all, however,
are rather old cases.
(iii) Waste Disposal Operations
The problem of vicarious liability for an independent contractor's
negligence surely will arise to trouble the atomic energy producer or
user when it comes to disposing of radioactive wastes or "garbage." It
is perfectly clear that in the light of the dangerous nature of radioactive
material there is a real obligation ·of the user to take special precautions
to insure proper disposal. Recognizing the unusual character of such
material, surely the courts will say that due care requires that greater
precautions be taken than an! required for ordinary waste disposal
procedures. In most cases such wastes certainly will be considered as
dangerous as empty five gallon shellac cans 276 or oil filters, 217 and so
at 3o8.
Salas v. Whittington, 77 Cal. App.2d 90, 174 P.2d 886 (1946). A shellac can
exploded when put in fire by a small boy who had found the can in a trash pile used
in common by defendant and the boy's parents. Defendant held liable.
277 Justice v. Amherst Coal Co., 101 S.E.2d 86o (W.Va. 1958). Defendant dumped
oil filters in a trash pile which he knew was frequented by children. Defendant was
held liable for injuries to child hurt when filters exploded.
275/d.

276
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cannot merely be tossed into the trash pile, literally or figuratively. On
the other hand, if care commensurate with the dangers is used, authority exists denying recovery to an injured party even when the w~ste
material is dangerous explosives. 278
Assuming, however, that a person such as a reactor operator is careful to choose a competent chemical processor or disposal agent who has
been licensed by the AEC and meets his packaging and notification responsibilities, but the disposal operation is done negligently, will the
operator be liable vicariously? The number of cases found which deal
specifically with off-site disposal actually can be counted on one hand,
once cases involving a negligent owner or employer are excluded. 279
Even as to these, factual distinctions are not difficult to make; three
deal with garbage and one with sewage.
The Garbage Cases. The case of Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Ry. v.
Chenault 280 involved the disposal of cattle killed in a train wreck on the
defendant's road. The railroad's roadmaster contracted with a butcher
to remove the d~ad cattle to the butcher~s pasture some two or three
miles out of town. The butcher assured the roadmaster that this was
far enough away so as not to,bother anyone. The butcher's pay for disposing of the cattle was the hides of the eighteen head. The butcher
placed the cattle in his pasture but close enough to the plaintiff so that
they becaiJ1e a nuisance. The court permitted damages to be recovered
for the nuisance in spite of the claim by the railroad that the butcher
was an independent contractor who had undertaken to dispose of the
carcasses so as not to create a nuisance. The courts total discussion of
278 Ford v. United States, 200 F.2d 272 (10th Cir. I9S2), and Iokepa v. United
States, ISS F.Supp. 394 (D.C. Hawaii, I9S8). Both involved explosives left after the
property had been thoroughly searched by the federal government. for unexploded shells
and other weapons used during war-time training maneuvers. The properties at the
time of the explosions no longer belonged to the government. In each case the court
found that the government had conducted its decontamination searches carefully and
was not to be held liable.. There was no dependence in either case upon the doctrine of
Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. IS, 73 S.Ct. 9S6 (I9S3), that the government,
under the Federal Tort Claims Act, had not submitted to suits for injuries resulting
from discretionary acts of government officers. It might also be argued that there was
an element of assumption of risk in each case since the people occupied or used the
property knowing of its prior use but the reasoning of the court in neither case based
its decision on this idea.
279 Liability is imposed if the owner is negligent himself in garbage or refuse disposal
operations, Annot., IS6 A.L.R. 714. 734 (I94S), or is negligent in supervising how
others use the city disposal site, City of San Antonio v. Mackey, 14 Tex. Civ. App. 210,
36 S.W. 700 (18¢).
28 0 31 Tex. Civ. App. ss8 (1903).
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the policy involved and its reasons for deciding that the railroad was
liable is as follows :
It was due the public by appellant to dispose of the carcasses
so as to prevent a nuisance, and this duty could not be delegated to someone else, and appellant thereby escape liability.
It was responsible for the acts of Phillips in failing to properly dispose of them. 281
On a motion for additional conclusions of fact, the court stated that
they found the following:
I. Defendant exercised ordinary care in selecting E. J.
Phillips as a suitable person with whom to contract for the
removal of the carcasses.
2. Phillips employed his own means and facilities in removing the carcasses from the defendant's right of way near
Garland to his pasture remote from said right of way. He
was an independent contractor, provided it was possible as
a matter of law for the defendant railway company to create
such a relation in the disposition of such cattle. 282

Fourteen years later the Alabama appellate court had occasion to
decide a remarkably similar case, Southern Ry. Co. v. Robertson. 288
The plaintiff sued the defendant railroad for creating a nuisance by
putting the carcass of a dead animal so close to the plaintiff's residence
that the odors of decay were more than barely perceptible. The railroad's defense was that an independent contractor, not the railroad or
any of its employees, was responsible for creating the nuisance. After
stating that there were two exceptions to the general rule of nonliability for the acts of an independent contractor-one, inherently
dangerous work and two, where "certain duties" are owed-the
court said:
The common intent of the defendant and Cornett was to rid
the defendant's premises of a nuisance that would result
from having the carcass on the defendant's premises, and in
accomplishing this result, a nuisance was created, to the annoyance and hurt of the plaintiff, so, assuming that Cornett
was an independent contractor, the defendant would be liable. . . .
Negligence of the defendant is not an essential element in
an action for damages resulting from a nuisance; the action
is founded on the wrongful act in creating or maintaining a
281/bid.
282 I d. at 559.
2 8
8 16 Ala. App. ISS (1917).
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nuisance-in this case, in creating it. . . . The application
for rehearing ignores the principle that the defendant owed
the plaintiff a duty not to create a nuisance on his premises.
If we should grant the contention that the defendant could
avoid liability by employing an independent contractor in
such cases, then by employing an irresponsible insolvent who
could, with impunity, violate the rights of a third party
the rule of law imposing a duty on a principal would be
rendered futile and useless. 284
The court then stated that the question of fact was for the jury, in
any.event, as to whether Cornett was an agent or an-independent contractor of the defendant railroad.
Courts probably will not ignore completely the fact that the injured
plaintiff often will be suing a public utility or other large corporation
which is covered by an insurance policy and the government indemnity
program. On the other hand, the applicability of these cases to the
atomic energy problem we have posed is not clear. In the Chenault
case it is possible to interpret the brief statement of facts and conclusion of the court as meaning that there was in fact an agreement between the roadmaster and the butcher as to where the carcasses were
to be removed, and that the roadmaster was negligent in failing to investigate personally and determine that this disposal site did not create
a nuisance. Even the Alabama case might be read as involving an
agreement between the defendant's foreman and the independent contractor as to where the carcass was to be placed. If this is true, then
these cases come much closer to McDonell v. Rifle Boom Co./85 involving an independent contractor hired to float logs down a stream.
In that case the court held the company liable for the negligence of the
independent contractor since to carry out the terms of the contract, he
was forced to do the very thing which caused the injury.
Even if this fact is not read into either of the cases, some important
distinctions should be recognized before applying them to the disposal
of radioactive waste material. In neither case was the independent contractor licensed or controlled in any way by a governmental agency.
Likewise, there was no evidence of special qualifications or expertise
in disposal operations, though admittedly there is not much special
knowledge needed in disposing of dead animals. In addition, while
dead animals may create a hazard to health, for the most part the hazard is one of obnoxious odors only. In the case of radioactive waste
at 156.
Supra note 266.

284/d.
285
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materials there is a health and safety danger to property and particularly to persons. The danger may be great and it usually will last a
greater length of time than the smell of a decaying carcass. These
cases, however, deal with the disposal of waste material which is
usually classified as garbage, a term sometimes used to describe the
fission products of the atomic energy business.
The third garbage case, Kuehn v. City of Milwaukee/ 88 presents a
situation somewhat closer to the problem of disposing of radioactive
waste materials. The commissioners of public works for the city of
Milwaukee hired a contractor to dump all garbage and refuse collected
within the city in Lake Michigan at some point not less than fifteen
mile from the city. A right to suspend the work or to let it to somebody else in case of "improper or imperfect performance" was reserved by the city. The court held that this did not give the city the
power to direct and designate the dumping place, and, therefore, the
city was not liable for damages when on two occasions the garbage
dumped by the independent contractor was carried by the ordinary
currents and movements of the lake waters to the spot where the plaintiff's fish nets were located, damaging the nets. The court said:
It requires no citation of authorities to show that, if the
act which caused the damages was the work of an independent contractor, the city is not liable. Whether the person
whose act caused the damages was, in legal contemplation,
an independent contractor, is sometimes debatable on the
facts. The test is, Had the defendant the right to control
the conduct of the person doing the work, as respects the
mode and manner of doing it, in the particular complained
of? 2s1
There are several difficulties in using this case to answer our waste
disposal problem. In the first place, it was decided in 1896 before many
courts developed the idea of inherently dangerous material and nondelegable duties. Certainly the dependence of the court upon the independent contractor analysis with no recognition of the non-delegable duty principle makes it doubtful authority, even though it is true
that unless garbage is properly disposed of and particular care taken
in the disposal operation there will be very undesirable results both as
to odors and health hazards. In Kuehn v. City of Milwaukee it resulted in damage to property only. Perhaps more important is the fact
that the court, after holding the city not liable because an independent
28 6
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contractor was used, said that if the commissioners of public works
had used their own employees in this work the city still would not be
liable, "for it is a public service, as distinguished from a corporate
duty. In that respect, it is like the fire, health, or police departments of
cities." 288 A different result might have been reached if a private concern were disposing of its own wastes.
One other case was found in which there at least is some language
concerning the power to contract away liability for disposal of waste
material. In People v. City of Los Angeles/89 several outlying cities
had contracted with the City of Los Angeles to dispose of their sewage. It was disposed of in such a way that, when swept back to shore,
it caused damage to the beaches along the ocean. The court said :
A primary obligation rested upon appellants to dispose of
sewage accumulating within their respective boundaries,
and an equally binding obligation rested upon them to dispose of the sewage in s~ch a way that it would entail no injury to other parties. And appellants cannot relieve themselves by contract with other municipalities of their primary
obligation imposed upon them by law [The contract with
Los · Angeles is irrelevant.] . . . There rested upon appellants a bouQden duty to dispose of their sewage in such a
manner as not to bring injury or damage to others. It therefore follows, that the fact that the screening plant and submarine tube at Hyperion are owned, maintained and controlled by the city of Los Angeles does not relieve appellants
of responsibility for the admitted public nuisance sought to be
abated, if they contributed thereto. 290
The fact situation seems analogous, the language denying immunity
from liability is strong, and the case is the most recent found. The difficulty for present purposes is that it was not only an action by the
state rather than by a private individual but also it was an action
merely to abate a nuisance, not to recover damages. Even as to abatement of the nuisance, the only liability sought to be avoided was a duty
to contribute toward the construction of a new disposal system for the
whole area which would treat the sewage adequately and prevent pollution of the ocean and beaches. The case involved the question of
whether the outlying cities had to help Los Angeles finance a new
plant, or could insist on their original contract. The language was
I d. at 266.
83 Cal. App.2d 627, rSg P.2d 489 (1948).
2uo I d. at 643. [Emphasis added.]
288
289
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directed to this liability, not the quite different one involved in a
damage action by a private person harmed by the pollution.
In the event an injury is claimed to have been caused by radioactive
waste, it will be very difficult to identify not only the particular radioactive material but also the person or independent contractor who
handled it. Therefore, as the use of radioactive materials becomes
more widespread, it will become increasingly important to attain centralized control of disposal operations. At the present time most disposal operations are under the control of the Atomic Energy Commission. 291
(b) Conclusions Concerning Off-Site Operations
Existing cases do not give a very satisfactory answer to the question of whether or not vicarious liability will be imposed on the employer for the negligence of an independent contractor handling radioactive wastes in off-site situations. Courts do differ on the policy conclusion to be drawn in individual cases, both on and off-site, but they
all are peculiarly uncommunicative as to precisely why in a particular
case the hazard is or is not unusual enough to preclude delegation of
liability. Proper development of this new industry, however, is dependent to some extent upon the answer to this question. The authors
suggest that the answer should depend upon two factors ; the degree
of unusualness of the hazard created, and the distinctness of the operation delegated to the independent contractor, both considered in the
light of what effect a rule of non-delegable duty will have on development of the industry and what effect a rule of delegable duty will have
on the public possibly subject to the hazard created. The following
conclusions are suggested by the authors.
The transportation of radioactive materials, whether by land, water,
or air, undoubtedly will create some considerable risks, possibly to
the passengers and employees of the carrier, to the property of shippers, or even to the general public should an accident occur. The extent of the hazard will vary greatly from case to case, depending upon
the intensity and type of the radiation as well as whether it is in the
form of a liquid, gas, or solid. Surely liability should not be imposed
upon the shipper as a general rule and perhaps never so long as he is
careful in all respects, including the choice of a competent, licensed
common earner.
291 The AEC is not given i!lrisdiction over some radioactive materials such as radium
and radioactive isotopes produced other than in reactors.
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The question is not whether someone must assume liability to compensate for negligently caused injuries but rather, is it to be imposed
upon the shipper or carrier? Undoubtedly a competent, lice~sed
common carrier will carry normal public liability insurance coverage
and there would seem to be little reason for breaking down the
traditional dividing line among various industrial operations. Traditionally one of these has been that between transportation and other
phases of business activities. If an accident caused by the negligence
of the carrier should release radioactive materials, the hazard to
other property ordinarily would be much less than that created by the
shipment of other kinds of materials regularly transported on common carriers. Explosives, dangerous chemicals, and various highly
inflammable materials have a much greater destructive potential as to
property than will radioactive materials in many if not most cases. Decontamination in every situation will not be possible but in many it
will be quite feasible to remove the radioactive material with no substantial injury to the property itself.
When the number of persons possibly endangered and the extent
and seriousness of the injuries that might result are considered, the
same result should be reached as to personal injuries arising from
shipment of such materials. The danger of personal injury from
shipment of ordinary explosives and inflammables in the usual case
will be much greater, both as to numbers and seriousness of injuries.
In fact, except for the possibility of ingesting radioactive materials
into the human body, it is doubtful that the risk is nearly as great.
With adequate labeling/92 increased public awareness of the nature of
radiation hazards, and particularly with special training for rescue
personnel, injury to great numbers of persons through accidental release of radioactive material should be less likely than in the case of
carrier wrecks involving explosives, dangerous chemicals, and inflammable material. In general, the risk is no more unusual, if as much so.
When the negligence of the carrier is the sole cause of the accident,
the number of persons and the extent of injury caused by inhalation
or ingestion of radioactive material does not warrant breaking down
the desirable separation of responsibilities in business operations
which allows some activities to be carried on by independent contractors. This is the case particularly when the carrier is licensed by the
federal government and its activities in transporting such material
will be regulated closely with relation specifically to the health and
292

On the duty to label, see supra note 139.
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safety problem. A rule imposing vicarious liability would tend to
cause shippers to transport their own material and more danger to the
public might be created than if use is made of carriers who have
enough business in such shipments to acquire the necessary special
knowledge and take the required precautions to protect the public.
Administration of health and safety rules will be less difficult than
if there are many persons engaged in shipment operations. If a carrier were not so licensed and controlled a different result perhaps is
justified, but even here if a competent ·and financially responsible carrier is selected, it is doubtful that the traditional line between transportation and other business activities should be broken down.
Fabrication of fuel elements and similar activities related to work on
the radioactive material before it is shipped to the ultimate user should
be treated in the same way as transportation cases so far as the vicarious liability question is concerned. This conclusion is limited to harm
from accidents that occur while the independent' contractor is working
on the product; it is not meant to apply to injuries which occur after
the user has started to make use of the material in his regular operations. The question of the user's liability for a defect resulting from
the supplier's negligence and of the supplier's liability for such defects
after the material reaches the ultimate user surely will be governed by
the usual rules. 293
Although no very closely analogous cases were found on this problem, those found (all quite old) suggest that vicarious liability would
not be imposed, 294 except possibly where the contract in effect dictates
the method to be used by the independent contractor. ~ The modern
trend in general to expand liability in negligence situations may lead
more plaintiffs to assert the unusual hazards idea in off-site cases. It
is likely, therefore, that courts will have to decide whether to impose
vicarious liability on the employer for the independent contractor's
negligence. The policy justification for forcing the user of the material
(e.g., the reactor operator) to supervise personally all of the supplier's
plant operations to guard against negligence is questionable.
At the present time, the reactor operator apparently does not make
his liability insurance effecti~e untii he is ready to operate the reactor.
In addition, apparently the AEC does not yet require the fuel fabricator to take out financial protection under the indemnity amendments
29

293 See discussion of enterprise liability, infra Chapter V, and cases concerning liability of a landowner for defective construction discussed supra note 227.
294 Cases discussed in text supra at notes 258-75.
2os See cases discussed in text supra at notes :264, :266.
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to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. 296 The consequence of these two
facts is that the government indemnity program does not cover . the
fuel fabricator's operations; nevertheless, vicarious liability should
not be imposed on the reactor operator if he uses due care in selecting
the fabricator. The hazard involved in fuel fabrication operations is
not nearly as great as that arising from the accumulated fission products resulting from reactor operations. The fabricator's public liability
policy, even without the government indemnity program, should
cover any liability that would result and should provide adequate compensation for damages imposed. If coverage is not adequate, the solution should be to require financial protection and give government
indemnity coverage, not shift responsibility for the independent supplier's negligence to the reactor operator. If it is shifted, participation
in atomic energy activities by the relatively small user who is interested in industrial or research uses, not reactors, probably will be
discouraged considerably. The small operator, perfectly capable of abiding by safety requirements and meeting financial protection responsibilities for his own small operation, undoubtedly would not be equipped
or want to supervise the plant operations of a supplier, nor would
he feel justified in assuming liability for injuries to the supplier's employees or third parties injured through the supplier's negligence. The
risks involved in fuel fabrication are not so unusual as to justify adoption of a rule of liability having this effect.
If the fuel reprocessing operator is negligent, however, the hazard could be considerably greater, though the operation is as distinct
as that of fuel fabrication. Reprocessing operations often will involve great quantities of highly radioactive fission products with great
potential for harm. In this respect these operations raise the same considerations presented by reactor waste .disposal activities and should
be treated in the same way.
Even disposal and reprocessing operations generally should be considered a separate function. The entrepreneur who creates the necessity for disposal or reprocessing should not have to assume vicarious
liability for the negligence of the reprocessor or disposal concern. The
most impelling reason for this legal result is that there is so much to be
gained by centralized disposal operations carefully controlled or even
conducted by the federal government itself through the AEC or its
contractors. It would be very unwise to adopt a rule which would lead
individual entrepreneurs to undertake the disposal operation them298

See discussion of federal indemnity legislation, infra, in text at notes 1265 ff.
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selves. If they are to be held liable for the negligence of the disposal
contractor, however, they will tend to do just this. Because it is desirable to concentrate materials in preparing them for disposal and to
dispose of them in designated places, it would seem that creating a
separate and distinct disposal operation is the best solution. Where an
entrepreneur contracts with a disposal company which has been specifically licensed 297 and approved by the AEC with particular care
directed to the question of preserving the public health and safety, it
is best that only this company, or the federal government if it carries
out the operation itself, be liable. So that the public which might be
damaged by the negligent disposal operations can have the benefit of
the indemnity program, however, the AEC should license such persons, req1tire them to show financial responsibility and sign imJemnification contracts so as to bring the $soo,ooo,ooo government indemnity coverage into effect.
.
There may be reason to impose upon the atomic energy user full
responsibility for all operations carried on by his own employees or on
his own premises by independent contractors; the trend of recent cases
makes this result very likely in a radiation case. On the other hand, it
would seem that reprocessing and waste disposal operations are sufficiently distinct and so closely regulated by the AEC that our tort liability rules should recognize them as distinct. If this is not done the
small atomic energy operators will be seriously deterred from continuing in the field even though their specific activities create no unusual hazards (either in terms of number of people exposed or the kind
of exposure involved) and do not call for a high financial protection
requirement.
An additional reason for separating such functions for purposes of
tort liability is to avoid some extremely difficult proof problems. The
complications of proving whose radioactive material does specific damage are considerable. The disposal operator often will mix the material
from several users making it impossible to tell whose was responsible
for what injury. This might lead to making all who contributed some
material liable for all damages from any of it and this is too much for
most small operators. Instead the law should allow compartmentalization to the extent suggested, even as to tort liability rules.
The authors do not suggest, however, that a manufacturer of radio297 E.g., American Mail Lines, Ltd., has been licensed to dispose of waste products
from the Boeing Airplane Company operations. Very specific limitations on the disposal method are imposed by the license. AEC Press Rei., July 31, 1958.
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active material should not be held on a product liability basis as discussed in Chapter V. Neither do they mean to suggest that the user
of the material should be immunized from injuries that occur during
his use of the material even though the injury results from negligence
of a supplier. He should be responsible for seeing that proper materials
and proper procedures are used in his own operations. It also seems
perfectly reasonable to hold the user to a standard of conduct which requires him to be extremely careful not only in his preparation of such
materials for reprocessing, transporting, or disposing but also in labeling and giving adequate notice and in selecting competent licensed
contractors.
So long as strict liability is not imposed upon all atomic energy
operations, (and it should not since many of them are not even as
hazardous as some normal business activities) and so long as there is
careful governmental control directed specifically toward protecting the
public health and safety, some compartmentalization of tort liability as
well as operational activities should be allowed where it seems perfectly
natural and useful and is not adopted solely to avoid liability. Such ~
rule should aid considerably in the development and diversification
of atomic energy activities. When and if, as seems likely, separate insurance companies write atomic energy risk policies, it will become
very important to decide which persons having contact with the particular material alleged to have caused damage are to be held liable. At
the present time, since there are two separate insurance funds furnishing two separate insurance coverages for atomic energy hazards, the
question may still be important. While the government is the only
source of recovery if the damages go above the financial protection
requirements set by the. AEC for a particular operator, it is important
to determine who is to be held liable up to the point where the government does take over. As insurance operations and the whole atomi~
energy. business fall into more normal, standardized business patterns,
it will be quite important that recognition be taken of this vicarious
liability problem. Perhaps a legislative solution should be adopted. In
our opinion it would be desirable to allow some compartmentalization
along the lines suggested.
In deciding whether to apply the "inherently dangerous" or, as we
prefer, the unusual hazard concept to fuel reprocessing or waste disposal operation, at least one line should be drawn-between cases
where the injured person is a member of the general public and those
in which the injured person is an employee of the independent con-
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tracting company carrying out one of these distinct operations. The
same distinction is applicable also to transportation and fuel fabrication cases. A radiation accident that occurred at Oak Ridge recently illustrates the kinds of situations that will arise as greater use is made
of radioactive materials. 298 Eight employees of the plant received significant exposures to radiation, one as much as 320 rad. The exposure
occurred when a critical mass was created accidentally during handling
of enriched uranium in the form of a slurry.
There will be similar types of accidents in all of the operations
which we suggest are distinct, with the possible exception of transportation. It may be entirely satisfactory, as a matter of policy, to impose
vicarious liability on the landowner for dangerous conditions which
cause injury to the employees of an independent contractor if the negligence creates an unusual hazard, such as is found in the construction
cases. Surely, however, there is no policy justification for applying
such rules to a . fabrication, transportation, reprocessing, or disposal
operation employee whose injury results solely from the negligence of
his own employer. His injuries certainly should be and in some cases
would be covered by workmen's compensation carried by his employer.299
Where the user has carefully selected a licensed operator for one of
these distinct activities and has been careful to give the necessary information and to properly label material so that the independent contractor is advised of the dangers involved, the best position would
seem to be not to impose vicarious liability upon the user for damages
caused by the independent contractor, even when the injury is to innocent third parties. In any event, surely there is no justification for
holding the user vicariously liable for negligent injuries to employees
of an employer-independent contractor.
This is a quite different problem from that involved in the product
liability and construction cases where a manufacturer who is negligent
in producing or building some article is held liable after the product
has been turned over to other persons for their sale or use. 800 In those
cases the person is being held liable for damages caused by his own
negligence, not for the negligence of another party carefully selected
and duly licensed to carry out a particular function by a governmental
agency charged with regulating the very problem of health and safety
298 The facts of the incident are set out, infra, Chapter IV at note 125.
299 See discussion of workmen's compensation, infra, Part II.
soo

See discussion of enterprise liability, infra, Chapter V.
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vyith which we are concerned. There seems little reason to shift responsibility for these distinct operations or to encourage attempts by .the
employer to control the independent contractor's operations far renwved from the employer's own operations.
4· Damages-Interests Protected
a. Introduction - Limitations on Discussion Theory of Compensation

General

Some aspects of the damage problem typically are treated as part of
the duty concept, so1 while others usually are discussed after the other
three elements-duty, breach, and causation-have been shown. Prosser does not consider it a separate question; to the extent that he discusses it he does so in connection with individual types of action. 302
On the other hand, the general theory of damages in negligence actions is treated as a separate problem by Harper and James. 803
In part, this difference of opinion undoubtedly arises from the fact
that frequently a court's determination of whether or not to allow
compensation for a particular kind of injury is tied up with proof
difficulties, real or imaginary. Courts will often cite the difficulty in
attaining reasonable certainty of proof as a reason for denying recovery for certain kirids of injuries. In dealing with the underlying
policies, it will help our analysis if the damage question is separated
into two parts: ( 1) what types of injuries will be considered compensable, assuming that causation can be proved, or, in other words, what
kinds of interests will the law of negligence protect by allowing a
damage action against a person who has invaded another's interest;
and ( 2) what kind of proof should a court consider, or let the jury
consider, in determining (a) whether· the particular defendant has
caused injury to the plaintiff, and (b) the extent of this injury. In
resolving these questions a social policy determination must be made
as to what interests should be protected by our legal system against
negligently caused harm. Some of the injury situations arising from
overexposure to radiation will be decided unjustly if present proof
difficulties are used to deny any recovery for invasion of a particular
interest. Fortunately the trend seems to be away from any arbitrary
limitation upon compensable interest; it is in the direction of treating
so1 Harper & James 1028 ff; Prosser 174 ff.
302 E.g., Prosser 40 (mental disturbance), 56 (trespass), 416 (nuisance), 566 (misrepresentation), 593 (libel and slander), 765 (injurious falsehood).
so3 Harper & James ch. 25 at 1299.
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the proof problem as a matter of procedure, not as a matter of limitation upon the types of interest protected against negligent invasion. 804
Not all radiation injuries will present unique damage considerations; in fact, many will not. In determining whether or not to allow
recovery in tort actions it would seem to make little difference whether
the loss was caused by radiation or by fire, explosion, automobile accident, or scalding by hot liquid. If personal property is destroyed the
usual rule of allowing the value of the property before the accident,
less any salvage value,S 06 surely will be used. In personal injury cases
loss of earnings and even of earning capacity, medical and similar
expenses arising from the injury, and pain and suffering will be compensable in the normal way when the loss arises because of overexposure to radiation. 306 Several types of radiation injury, however,
are relatively unknown in tort litigation or present damage issues in
such a way that the serious inadequacies in current damage concepts
are dramatically revealed. These latter types are our concern here; they
include ( 1) prenatal-both post-conception and genetic, ( 2) sterility
and related incapacities, (3) increased susceptibility to disease (latent in juries), ( 4) shortened life span, and ( 5) several miscellaneous
injuries such as inability to continue in a chosen field of work, psychic
injuries, and lost business profits because of the proximity of a reactor or other radiation operation. The difficult proof matters will be
discussed in the following section; but we feel proof difficulties should
not determine whether a type of interest should be protected in general.
In a specific case,lack of proof may call for denial of recovery.
This analysis is oriented specifically toward radiation cases, but the
problems are basic to tort litigation generally; and it is our hope that
a fundamental contribution will be made to achieving a more realistic
and therefore satisfactory concept of damages. Legal· scholars have
written relatively little on this general subject, yet it is extremely important. It would seem to be one of the remaining frontiers of development in the law. 807 The discussion of damages that follows in
this and in the next section on proof should be of interest to all law304 Prosser I74-7S; Harper & James 1028-29. Both condemn use of proof problems
as a basis for denying recovery for prenatal injuries. The same is true for mental disturbance and to some degree as to lost profits from injury to property. See Harper &
James IJOS.
30G Harper & James IJIG-11.
soo See generally id. at 1316-23.
307 See the foreword by Wright to the symposium of articles on "Damages for Personal Injuries," in 19 Ohio St. L.J. ISS (1958).
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yers who deal with tort problems. The policy decisions to be made are
extremely important, not only to interested parties, such as potential
plaintiffs and defendants, but also to society as a whole because the
group may suffer from any serious diminution in the value of persons or property. The manner in which our legal system distributes
this loss may even have a considerable impact on our economy. We
have attempted to identify these problems, to analyze the most nearly
analogous cases, and to suggest policy solutions.
Rightly or wrongly, in dealing with negligently caused injuries, the
Anglo-American system generally has adopted the principle of allowing
c'ompensating, not punitive, damages. As Harper and James put it:
What then is compensation? The primary notion is that
of repairing plaintiff's injury or of making him whole as
nearly as that may be done by an award of money. The
"remedy [shotild] be commensurate to the injury sustained." "[W]hoever does an injury to another is liable in
damages to the extent of that injury." Sometimes this can
be accomplished with a fair degree of accuracy. But obviously it cannot be done in anything but a figurative and essentially speculative way for many of the consequences of
personal injury. Yet it is the aim of the law to attain at
least a "rough correspondence between the amount awarded
as damages and the extent of the suffering," or other intangible loss. 308
The appropriateness of applying the compensation .theory of damages to tort cases in general and to radiation cases specifically is assumed in the following discussion and also when making suggestions
for more adequate solutions. So long as tort law provides damages
for negligent injuries, compensation seems to be the best theory to
adopt, even though measuring the amount of damages to be awarded
is very uncertain in many cases. Radiation injuries will not present
different considerations as to these matters; but we will point out
where existing law, at least as applied to nuclear accidents and often
as applied in tort cases generally, does not give results which are a
logical or. fair application of the compensation principle. Decided cases
too often illogically deny recovery for injury to an interest which is no
different from an interest for which in another type of case recovery
is allowed. On the other hand, double recovery is in effect allowed in
other cases because the courts have failed to recognize that two claims
for damages supposedly ·for different interests of different victims
308

Harper & James

1301.
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actually, to some extent, are duplicating claims. This is particularly
true in the area of personal injuries as will be pointed out in discussing the rights of parents and next of kin under wrongful death and
survival statutes. The overlapping nature of the claims should be
recognized and duplication of awards avoided. Although it should be
as complete as possible, only one recovery should be allowed to each
victim for each injury.
b. Prenatal Injuries-Post-Conception and Genetic
The social policy involved in the question of whether to allow damages for injuries to unborn children is one which the greatly accelerated use of radiation will bring into very sharp focus. Until the last
ten years there were very few claims for compensation involving injuries received by the child while being carried by the mother and almost every case denied recovery. Since 1949, however, the number of
cases has increased and there has been a dramatic shift toward recognizing that the interest of the embryo or foetus, is a legally protected
one. Moreover, legal scholars have begun to comment on this problem. 809 There is need for more adequate analysis and a resolution of a
number of uncertainties as to damages arising during this post-conception period. More important, legal periodicals have contained no discussion whatsoever 810 and no reported opinion has been found that deals
in any way with the problem of genetic damage. 811 Yet scientists are
unanimous in their opinion that exposure to radiation causes genetic
damage, at least in that it increases the risk of genetic mutation. To
understand adequately the legal concepts that will be applied to the solution of the genetic damage problem, it also is important that a careful
analysis be made of the existing cases and legal principles which are applied to the non-genetic, prenatal, post-conception injury cases.
In discussing whether the unborn will be protected against negligent
8°9 See Harper & James 1028-31. See also Frey, "Injuries to Infants En Ventre Sa
Mere," 12 St. Louis L. Rev. 85 (1927); Muse & Spinella, "Right of Infant to Recover
for Prenatal Injury," 36 Va. L. Rev. 6u (1950); McBride & Norvell, "The Extension
of Tort Liability in the Field of Pre-Natal Injuries," 26 Ins. Counsel ]. 148 (1959);
Notes, 50 Mich. L. Rev. 166, 167 (1951); 35 Cornell L. Q. 648 (1950); 63 Harv. L.
Rev. 173 (1949); 48 Mich. L. Rev. 539 (1950); 34 Minn. L. Rev. 65 (1949) ; [1951]
Wis. L. Rev. 518; 10 A.L.R.2d 1059 (1950); 39 Cornell L. Q. 542 (1954); 8 Vand. L.
Rev. 521 (1955); 27 A.L.R.2d 1256 (1953). Further, see Seavey, Book Review, 45
Harv. L. Rev. 209 (1931); Note, 51 Mich. L. Rev. 312 (1952).
ato Only discussion found is reference to problem in Workshops on Legal Problems
of Atomic Energy 25, 27 (U~ of Mich. Law School 1956).
su See discussion infra notes 374-75.
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invasion by another, it is assumed that the plaintiffs have established,
either under the rules of strict liability or of negligence, that a duty
was owed to the parent and that the duty was breached. It also is necessary to prove causation even though in many cases this will present
real difficulties. There already is general agreement among experts,
however, that overexposure to radiation will result in some kind of
injury. This certainly is true as far as injury to the foetus itself is concerned, sufficient radiation giving rise to the possibility of microcephalic idiocy. In addition, irradiation of the parents' gonads followed
by the birth of a deformed child shows causal relation with sufficient
probability to satisfy existing rules. Even if this were not the case, as
our knowledge of radiation exposure and genetic damage increases, it
may well prove possible to satisfy the causation-in-fact requirement.
Nevertheless, there is no reason to deal with proof of causation
(which undoubtedly will present difficulty in genetic damage cases) if,
as a matter of social policy, it is decided unwise to allow damages for
invasion of this interest. It seems more logical, therefore, to discuss
the question of whether this is an interest to be protected, prior to a
discussion of the problems of proof as they relate to causation.
If justification is needed to support the proposition that the court
ought first determine whether there will be any recovery at all (rather
than to assume that the proof problem is too difficult), it can be found
by looking at the opinions in states where the cause of action is always
denied. In only three decisions on the subject, so far as we have discovered, has the court concerned itself with proof of the causal relation between the act complained of and the resulting damage to the
foetus. 312 In the others the courts either assumed that the proof problem was too difficult without in any way analyzing or even suggesting
what the difficulties would be or how the proof problem differed from
that arising in other tort actions, or else decided there should be no
such substantive right without discussing the proof problem. Practically all of the cases treat the substantive right question as different
and separate from the causation question.
s12 Valence v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 50 So.2d 847 (La. App. 1951) (woman
jolted in bus accident and medical testimony showed no causal connection so no recovery); Durivage v. Tufts, 94 N.H. 265, 51 A.2d 847 (1947) (court found no evidence
of causal connection to fright from assault by defendant since no medical testimony
offered, and there was evidence child died from measles or pneumonia) ; Montreal
Tramways v. Leveille, [1933] 4 ·D.L.R. 337 (fall from tramway by mother and clubfooted child born ; found to be supported by enough evidence to go to jury which held
for plaintiff).
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(I) Injury to the Embryo or Foetus

For purposes of discussing the question of whether or not damages
should be awarded for injury to the child while in the mother's womb,
several important distinctions should be made, although courts seldom
have made them. The first is to distinguish between the right of the
child, or his estate, and that of his parents. In discussing the rights
of all plaintiffs the existing cases fall into two additional categories:
(I) those allowing recovery in certain fact situations; and ( 2) those
denying recovery under all circumstances. Within jurisdictions allowing recovery, a further distinction must be made between three kinds
of cases: (I) where the foetus was viable (able to survive if delivered) at the time of impact of the force set in motion by the defendant
and the child lives for some period of time after birth, no matter how
short, ( 2) where the foetus is viable at the time of impact but is born
dead, and (3) where the embryo is not viable ·at the time of impact
but is born alive showing an injury resulting from the impact. To be
completely consistent a fourth category should be established, i.e.,
where the embryo is not viable at the time of impact and is born dead,
although no case on this point has been found.
{a) Rights of the Child
All but one 818 of the writers start their discussion of the problem
with the I884 Massachusetts case, Dietrich v. Northampton,S 14 in
which the opinion was written by Justice Holmes. Five years previously, however, the Iowa Supreme Court, in Kansz v. Ryatt-,315
decided that a husband could not sue a defendant physician for producing his wife's miscarriage, the plaintiff contending that he was
damaged by being deprived of offspring by the miscarriage. The court
said:
Regarding, for the purposes of this case, the rights of the
father as to an infant in ventre sa mere to be the same as
though the offspring were in life-a point that we do not
determine-he cannot recover for injury to such offspring
except for the loss of services resulting therefrom. Addison
on Torts, 907. Plaintiff does not and cannot claim for loss
of services of an unborn child. Whether he could have
claimed for future services to be rendered after the birth of
s1s Ramsey, "Liability for Prenatal Injuries," 1956 Ins. L.
A.L.R.:zd Io69 (1950).
814 138 Mass. 14, 52 Am. ~ep. 242 (1884).
315 51 Iowa 232, I N.W. 485 (1879).

J. 151, 152. Also 10
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the child we need not consider, for no such claim is found in
the petition. We may suggest that such a claim for damages
would be based upon very remote and uncertain consequences
of the act complained of. It is hardly probable that it would
be allowed by the law. 818
As the court decided the case it does not involve the rights of the
child but rather those of the parent for loss of services, a quite different question to be discussed later. The court's suggestion as to the
remoteness and uncertainty of the consequences of the miscarriage for
damages of this kind, however, is indicative of the kind of concern
that has caused some courts to deny recovery even to the child.
It was Holmes' opinion in the Dietrich case, however, that undoubtedly set the pattern of judicial decision in this country until 1949,
when suddenly the decisions started going the other way. In denying
recovery to the administrator of the child assumed to have lived a
few minutes after a premature birth caused by a defect in the highway
of the defendant town, Holmes wrote:
. . . [I] f we should assume, .irrespective of precedent,
that a man might owe a civil duty and incur a conditional
prospective liability in tort to one not yet in being, and if we
should assume also that causing an infant to be born prematurely stands on the same footing as wounding or poisoning, we should then be confronted by the question raised by
the defendant, whether an infant dying before it was able
to live separated from its mother could be said to have become a person recognized by the law as capable of having a
locus standi in court, or of being represented there by an
administrator. . . .
The Pub. Sts. c. 207, §9, . . . punish unlawful attempts
to procure miscarriage, acts which of course have the death
of the child for their immediate object; and, while they
greatly increase the severity of the punishment if the woman
dies in consequence of the attempt, they make no corresponding distinction if the child dies, even after leaving the
womb. This statute seems to us to shake the foundation of
the argument drawn from the criminal law, and no other
occurs to us which has not been dealt with.
Taking all the foregoing considerations into account, and
further, that, as the unborn child was a part of the mother
at the time of the injury, any damage to it which was not
too remote to be recovered for at all was recoverable by her,
we think it clear that the statute sued upon does not embrace
the plaintiff's intestate within its meaning; and have not found
818

/d. at 234. (Emphasis added.)
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it necessary to consider the question of remoteness or the effect of those cases which declare that the statute liability of
towns for defects in highways is more narrowly restricted
than the common law liability for negligence. 817

In his usual succinct but also obscure-as-to-meaning style, Holmes
does not make clear exactly what his reason is for denying recovery,
except to deny the validity of the analogy to criminal law and property
law (where potential rights of the unborn are recognized). It would
seem that the main thrust of his opinion is that until the child is born
no person in .being is hurt. His opinion did not consider the question
0 f remoteness.
There is one further suggestion in Holmes' opinion which has received little attention in later cases or discussions of the problem but
which should not be ignored. This is that the child is a part of the
mother until actual birth, which Holmes suggests might give the
mother grounds for a damage action.
·
Courts which deny recovery, even when the child lives and suffers
a serious defect resulting from a prenatal injury, differ as to the reasons for doing so. The following would seem to be a fair summary
of the various grounds that have been or could be suggested to deny
recovery: ( 1) there is no common law precedent allowing recovery,
or precedent in a particular jurisdiction denies recovery so that denial
must continue to be the result under the doctrine of stare decisis; 818
(2) any unborn infant is a part of its mother and has no separate
juristic existence until it is born alive; therefore, there is no duty of
care owed to it prior to birth; 819 ( 3) the causal relationship between
Supra note 314 at 16-17.
Squillo v. New Haven, 14 Conn. Supp. 500 (Super. Ct. 1947) ; Dietrich v. Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884), f'eaff'd in Cavanaugh v. First Nat'l Stores, Inc., 329 Mass.
179, 107 N.E.2d 307 (1952) and Bliss v. Passanesi, 326 Mass. 461, 95 N.E.2d 206
(1950); Newman v. City of Detroit, 281 Mich. 6o, 274 N.W. 710 (1937); Buel v.
United Railways Co., 248 Mo. 126, 154 S.W. 71 (1913); ovef'ruled, Steggall v. Morris,
363 Mo. 1224, 258 S.W.2d 577 (1953); Stemmer v. Kline, 128 N.J.L. 455, 26 A.2d 489
(1942); Ryan v. Public Serv. Co-ordinated Transp., 18 N.J. Misc. 429, 14 A.2d 52
(Sup. Ct. 1940); Berlin v. J. C. Penney Co., 339 Pa. 547, 16 A.2d 28 (1940); Morgan
v. United States, 143 F. Supp. s&> (D.C. N.J. 1956) (applying Pennsylvania law);
Rimpa v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 37 Erie 267 (Pa. C.P. 1952); Jacketti v. Pottstown
Rapid Transit. Co., 67 Montg. Co. L.R. 37 (Pa. C.P. 1950); Gorman v Budlong, 23
R.I. 169, 49 Atl. 704 (1901).
8 19 Stanford v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 214 Ala. 6n, loS So. s66 (Ig26);
Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900) and Smith v. Luckhardt, 299 Ill. App. 100, 19 N.E.2d 446 (1939), both overruled, Amann v. Faidy, 415
Ill. 422, ·H4 N.E.2d 412 (1953) (allowing cause of action); Drabbels v. Skelley Oil
Co., 155 Neb. 17, so N.W.2d 229 (1951); Drobner v. Peters, 232 N.Y. 200, 133 N.E.
81T
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the negligent act and injury being too difficult to prove and the possibilities of pure speculation creating so great a danger of a fraudulent
or fictitious claim, it is unfair, and perhaps impracticable from the
standpoint of overloading the courts, to allow recovery for such
claims; 820 (4) to recognize a cause of action of an unborn infant
raises the spectre of an action by the child against the mother for her
negligence, 821 to which might be added the related problems of contributory negligence of the mother and assumption of risk by the
mother in her relations to the defendant. 322
As the Table of Cases appended at the end of this section indicates,
slightly more than one-half of the fifty jurisdictions in this. country
have faced the question in some form. 823 Considering all the cases decided in this country, the very clear preponderance of authority is now
in favor of allowing recovery, at least where the foetus is viable at the
time of the injury and is born alive. Legal writers are practically
unanimous in approving recovery for prenatal injuries 824 but they fail
to consider the question of who ought to recover for invasion of what
567 (1921) and Nugent v. Brooklyn Heights R.R., 154 App. Div. 667, 139 N.Y.S. 367
(2d Dep't 1913), both overruled, Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 6g1
(1951) (recovery allowed); In re Roberts' Estate, 158 Misc. 6g8, 286 N.Y.S. 476
(Surr. Ct. 1936); Mays v. Weingarten, 82 N.E.2d 421 (Ohio App. 1943), overruled,
Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, IS2 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E.2d 334 (1949) (recovery
allowed); Lipps v. Milwaukee E. Ry. & L. Co., 164 Wis. 272, IS9 N.W. 916 (1916) ;
Walker v. Great Northern Ry., 28 L.R. (Ir.) 6g (18g1).
3 2 0 Krantz v. Cleveland, Akron, Canton Bus Co., 32 Ohio N.P. (n. s.) 445 (1933)
no longer the law in Ohio as a result of Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, supra
note 319; Magnolia Coca Cola Bot. Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 78 S.W.2d 944
(193S); Lewis v. Steves Sash & Door Co., 177 S.W.2d 3SO (Tex. Civ. App. 1943).
321 Implied in Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, su.pra note 319.
322 Suggested in so Mich. L. Rev. 166, 168 (19SI).
s2s Twenty-seven jurisdictions have faced the problem.
324 Prosser 174 ff; Harper & James 1028-31; Anderson, "Rights of Action of An
Unborn Child," 14 Tenn. L. Rev. ISI (1936); Barry, "The Child en Ventre sa Mere,"
14 Austl. L. ]. 3SI (1941); Winfield, "The Unborn Child," 4 U. of Tor. L. J. 278
(1942); Cason & Collins, "May Parents Maintain an Action for the Wrongful Death
of an Unborn Child in Missouri?" IS Mo. L. Rev. 211 (19SO); Comment, "Tort Liability for Prenatal Injury," 24 Tul. L. Rev. 43S (19SO); Note, "Tort Actions for In. juries to Unborn Infants," 3 Vand. L. Rev. 282 (19SO); Muse & Spinella, supra note
309; A. A. White, "The Right of Recovery for Prenatal Injuries," 12 La. L. Rev. 383
(19S2); Ramsey, supra note 313; Lambert, Reviews of Leading Cases, 19 NACCA
L. J. 230 (19S7); McBride & Norvell, "The Extension of Tort Liability in the Field
of Pre-Natal Injuries," 26 Ins. Counsel J. 148 ( 19S9) ; noted, 32 Va. L. Rev. 1203
(1946); 63 Harv. L. Rev. 173 (1949); 48 Mich. L. Rev. 539 (19SO); so Mich. L.
Rev. 166 (19SI); 39 Cornell L. Q. 542 (19S4); 29 N.Y.U. L. Rev. IIS4 (1954); 14S
A.L.R. 1104 ( 1943) ; 10 A.L.R.2d 634, 639 ( 19so) ; 10 A.L.R.2d 1059 ( 19so) ; 27
A.L.R.2d 12s6 (1953).
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interest. Whether only the child, only the parent or next of kin, or both
the child and survivors ~hould recover is not considered, leading to
the possibility that double recovery will be allowed, the existence of
wrongful death and survival statutes compounding the confusion. As
suggested later, it is very important to differentiate between the recovery of the child and that of others such as parents; but the cases
do not do so, being content to decide generally there should be recovery for prenatal injuries or there should not.
The argument that there is no common law precedent in other
jurisdictions no longer is a valid one when the question of whether or
not to allow recovery is raised in a jurisdiction which has not had
occasion to consider the matter. Actually several courts have refused
to follow stare decisis where previous decisions in that jurisdiction
denied recovery. As the New York Court of Appeals said in the 1951
case of Woods v. Lancet, 825 in overruling an earlier decision denying
recovery:
What, then, stands in the way of a reversal here? Surely,
as an original proposition, we would, today, be hard put to it
to find a sound reason for the old rule. Fallowing Drobner
v. Peters (supra) would call for an affirmance but the chief
basis for that holding (lack of precedent) no longer exists.
And it is not a very strong reason, anyhow, in a case like
this. Of course, rules of law on which men rely in their
business dealings should not be changed in the middle of the
game, but what has that to do with bringing to justice a tortfeasor who surely has no moral or other right to rely on a
decision of the New York Court of Appeals? Negligence law
is common law, and the common law has been molded and
changed and brought up-to-date in many another case. Our
court said, long ago, that it had not only the right, but the
duty to re-examine a question where justice demands
828
it. .
The court then continued in answer to the charge that such changes of
the law were for the legislature:
The same answer goes to the argument that the change
we here propose should come from the Legislature, not the
courts. Legislative action there could, of course, be, but we
abdicate our own function, in a field peculiarly nonstatutory,
when we refuse to reconsider an old and unsatisfactory
court-made rule. Perhaps, some kinds of changes in the com825

Supra note 319.

828

ld. at 354·
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mon law could not safely be made without the kind of factual investigation which the Legislature and not the courts, is
equipped for. . . . [referring to the study' of the Law Revision Commission] The report, itself, contained no recommendations for legislation on the subject but that apparently
was because the commission felt that it was for the courts
to deal with this common-law question. 827
In the Woods case the plaintiff alleged injuries received during his
ninth month in his mother's womb. The court held that the foetus at
that ~ime had a separate 'existence.
As to the "separate existence" argument, at least in the case of a
viable· foetus, both legal writers and the majority of courts have now
carried over the analogies from the criminal law and property fields
(where separate existence for some purposes is recognized). They say
that'medically there is a separate being and there is no reason why injury to this being should not be treated separately from that of the
mother. There are many recent cases expressly rejecting the no separate existence objection to recovery. 828
Kelly v. Gregory 829 is the one decision squarely holding that, if causation can be shown, a negligent defendant will be held liable for in.,
juries sustained during the third month of pregnancy and, therefore,
probably while non-viable. The court felt that the decision of the Court
of Appeals in Woods v. Lancet 830 should be applied whenever there is
"biological separability," which the court held could be clearly demonstrated as beginning at conception.
Kelly v. Gregory was cited by the Georgia court in Hornbuckle v.
Plantation Pipe Line Co. 831 In the Hornbuckle case it was held that
827

I d. at 355-56.
Myers v. Stevenson, 125 Cal. App.2d 399, 270 P.2d 885 (1st Dist. 1954); Prates
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 19 Conn. Supp. 487, n8 A.2d 633 (Super. Ct. 1955); Tursi
v. New England Windsor Co., 19 Conn. Supp. 242, III A.2d 14 (Super. Ct. 1955);
Tucker v. Howard L. Carmichael & Sons, 2o8 Ga. 201, 65 S.E.2d 909 (1951); Rodriquez v. Patti, 415 Ill. 496, II4 N.E.2d 721 (1953); Amann v. Faidy, supra note 319;
Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901 (Ky. App. 1955); Cooper v. Blanck, 39 So.2d 352
(La. App. 1923); Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 197 Md. 417, 79 A.2d 550 (1951);
Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365,38 N.W.2d 838 (1949); Rainey v. Horn, 221 Miss.
269, 72 So.2d 434 (1954); Steggall v. Morris, supra note 318; Woods v. Lancet, supra
note 319; Jasinsky v. Potts, 153 Ohio St. 529, 92 N.E.2d 8o9 (1950); Williams v.
Marion Rapid Transit, supra note 319; Mallison v. Pomeroy, 205 Ore. 690, 291 P.2d 225
(1955); Montreal Tramways v. Leveille, sttpra note 312; Smith v. Fox, [1923] 3
D.L.R. 785.
829 282 App. Div. 542, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696 (1953).
330 Supra note 319.
331 212 Ga. 504, 93 S.E.2d 727 (1956).
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the trial court properly overruled a general demurrer to a petition
for relief which simply alleged that defendant's negligence caused
prenatal injury to the plaintiff; there was no allegation that the foetus
was viable at the time. The Chief Justice in the Hornbuckle case concurred in holding that relief should be granted for prenatal injuries
but only if the embryo was "quick." "Quick" is to be distinguished
from "viable" because it demands only separate existence that can be
recognized but not that the embryo be able to survive if born. Fearing
that carrying the cause of the action back to a point of time before
the embryo is quick will make the courts a "dumping ground for faked
and fraudulent suits," the Chief Justice concluded:
If a baby can sue for injuries sustained five seconds after
conception, as the majority rules, why not allow such suits
for injuries before conception, even unto the ·third and
fourth generations ? 832

He concluded that it should be a matter of proof in each case upon
the facts and not a matter of law as to when the baby becomes quick,
although this might take place prior to four months after conception.
The reduction to an absurdity argument of the Chief Justice is particularly interesting because it raises the very problem that radiation
exposure of potential parents clearly creates, a subject that will be discussed below under genetic damage.
One other jurisdiction possibly rejects the viability distinction, allowing recovery when the injury in received before viability. The Maryland court, in Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch,ssa seems to suggest that the
dividing line ought not be viability (capability of life separate from
the mother), but rather whether the child is quick, in the sense that it
can be recognized medically, i.e., when the embryo is a separate life
within the mother. The court said:
Some of the later cases attempt a distinction between a
child which is viable and one which is not. . . . This is an
apparent effort to correct the early doctrine that the child is
a part of the mother by bringing it more in line with known
medical facts. Children. are frequently born prematurely and
live. And at times they have been removed from a dead
mother and have survived. At some period in their growth
they reach a stage where they can live apart from their
mother. But, from a medical point of view, a child is alive
within the mother before the time arrives when it can live
8S2

ass

!d. at 5o6.
197 Md. 417, 79 A.2d 550 (1951).
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apart from her. If it is injured at a time when, according to
Blackstone it is "able to stir in the mother's womb" there
would seem to be just as logical a basis for allowing it to recover, as if it were injured after it had reached the period in
its growth when it could be removed from the mother and
live. In both cases it is alive, and in both cases there has occurred an injury to a living human being for which the responsible party should be made liable. 834
Legal writers agree that the distinction of viability is an artificial
one, and it would seem that the same holds true as to the distinction of
being quick or recognizably a separate being. It is difficult to justify
any such line when a causal relationship between exposure to radiation
during any stage of pregnancy and an injury manifested after birth
can be proved. In such cases as microcephalic idiocy, for example, the
greatest danger from radiation arises during the first three months of
pregnancy. 335 Medical evidence makes a very strong case for ignoring
the distinction, an artificial one at best. 838 Nevertheless, the lawyer
predicting his client's potential liability· must fake account of this distinction because it still may be· followed in many jurisdictions.
While the reasons given for making the distinction between a viable
and a non-viable foetus are usually stated in terms of whether or not
there is a separate being, the real reason for this distinction until recent years has been a fear that it is too difficult to prove that a woman
is pregnant when the blow ·is struck unless the foetus has developed
sufficiently to be viable. This, however, really goes to the difficultyof
proof of causation, still another objection to allowing recovery. Today,
however, proving the existence of an embryo should not prove much
of an obstacle. With modern tests for pregnancy, it seems quite unrealistic for a court to say there is no way of proving a separate entity
that can be hurt until the child can be detected by the mother herself
or until the child could live if separated from the mother. Even the
assumption that a normal pregnancy lasts for 280 days after the last
menstrual period is a more correct generalization than many assumptions upon which rules of l;:tw are based in other areas.
As previously suggested, one of the most obvious cases for allowing
8 Bf

I d. at 438.

Infra note 360. Denial of recovery in general criticized, see Prosser I74-75; Harper & James I028-3I.
33 6 All cited supra note 324. See particularly 48 Mich. L. Rev. 539 (I950); so Mich.
L. Rev. I66 (I9SI); Cason & Collins, supra note 324. See also Dunlap, "Medicolegal
Aspects of Injuries from Exposure to X-Rays and Radioactive Substances," I I Mo. L.
Rev. I37 (I946).
8 35
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damages arises when radiation exposure occurs during the first two or
three months of pregnancy. 881 This indicates the unrealistic arbitrariness of the distinction between the viable and the non-viable foetus. It
is not meant to suggest, however, that under all circumstances the
foetus should be treated as a separate entity for tort liability purposes.
For example, as is suggested at the end of this section, particularly as
to contributory negligence and assumption of risk, there may be occasion for not treating the foetus as separate. Nevertheless, the argument against recovery based upon absence of separate identity is unrealistic, and, · in addition, will involve the court in a very difficult
proof problem in trying to determine when the embryo becomes viabl~.
The possibility of applying contributory negligence or assumption
o.f risk concepts is important in some cases because it makes unaccept.,able the argument given by practically every writer on the subject, 888
that the analogy from criminal law and property cases involving unborn infants should be applied in tort recovery ·cases. In addition, the
theories of recovery are different. So long as criminal law is based
upon an odd mixture of "an eye for an eye" and "deterrence-byexample," it has no justifiable application in connection with liability
for negligence, which by definition involves unintentional injuries. If
the theory of negligence recovery is one of compensation, then the
policy decision should be directed to the question of whether or not
this is the kind of injury for which compensation ought to be given
and, if so, to what extent.
In connection with proving causation, the speculative character of
the actual conclusion to be drawn from the evidence presents some
difficulties. We do not go so far as many writers have done and suggest that there is no relationship between the difficulty of proof of
causation and the granting of a right to damages. It seems best, however, to separate the two. There are instances in which the causal connection will be easy enough to prove, some of which already have
arisen in litigated cases. 889 In others, present scientific evidence points
to a very clear causal connection, as could be true in the case of exposure to radiation during .the first few months of pregnancy. 840 In
such instances no court ought to lay down the broad proposition that
the causal connection never is going to be sufficiently demonstrable to
Infra note 300.
See articles listed supra note J24. See also text discussion infra at notes 392 ff.
S89 Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, supra note 319; Korman v. Hagen, 165 Minn. 320,
206 N.W. 6so. (1925).
uo Infra notes 300, 363.
88 7
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justify a cause ot action. In addition, there is no reason to believe that
the rapid progress of the last decade or two in scientific research will
be slower in this area than in others. Particularly in radiation cases,
surely the present drive for rapid development of atomic science will
lead to much greater certainty in the area of causal relationships. The
law must remain flexible in order to take account of such developments. If the facts of a particular case present too speculative a causal
relationship to submit to the jury, the courts can always handle the
problem by withholding the case and directing a verdict for the defendant. Legislatures, if they so desired, could establish a higher standard of proof for such cases.
One answer to the causation argument which ought to be deemed
almost conclusive has never been mentioned. If the problem of proof
is not too difficult to allow the criminal prosecution of a person for injuring an embryo (not viable), even for murder if the infant lives
sometime after birth and then ·dies, then surely· the law should not
hesitate to impose some degree of responsibility on the negligent person who causes the same kind of injury. It would be an odd result if
our traditional concern to protect the person accused of a serious
crime, should be reversed in these cases and the greater protection be
given to one charged only with damage liability. If causation cannot
be proved in a tort liability case with sufficient certainty to allow a
cause of action, surely this kind of speculation ought not to enter the
picture wheri imposition of the death penalty is sought for murder in
a criminal case. By the same token, if it is felt just to subject an accused to a criminal trial on the theory that causation can be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt, surely we ought to go that far in civil
liability cases. At least difficulty of proof should not be a deterrent.
This is not meant to suggest that the social policy factors which determine whether to allow an action for invasion of another's interests
are the same in each of the cases, but it is to suggest that the causation
problem is no different. 841
Perhaps in prenatal injury cases a higher burden of proof should be
imposed, but recovery should not be denied altogether merely because
proof of causation in some cases will be difficult.
Another obstacle to recovery was suggested by the court in Allaire
841 On difficulty of causation, see e.g., Amann v. Faidy, supra note 319; Valence v.
Louisiana Power & Light Co., supra note 312; Durivage v. Tufts, supra note 312;
White, supra note 324 at 402-403, suggesting no great increase of cases since allowing
recovery. Contributory negligence defenses may call for a different result in some
case, supra note J38.
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v. St. Luke's Hospital/ 42 i.e., if recovery were allowed it would be
unjust where the mother was contributorily negligent or had assumed
the risk. This argument should not be used as a reason for denying
recovery where there has been no negligence or assumption of risk by
the mother and where the defendant's negligence clearly has been
proven to be the cause of the injury to the embryo or foetus. If a line
should be drawn to immunize the tortfeasor from liability where the
mother is negligent, this is no reason to deny recovery in all cases.
Often the courts which allow recovery in prenatal injury cases will
"clinch". their argument as did the court in a recent Connecticut case 543
by stating the general principle of the common law that there should
be no wrong without a remedy and that natural justice demands that
damages be allowed in these cases. This argument really goes to the
basic policy question underlying all tort cases : Is this the kind of injury
for which the law ought· to allow compensation.? These are not arguments or reasons for granting recovery. They are merely statements of
the basic policy issue of whether or not compensation is to be allowed.
Later we suggest that possibly distinctions should be made and lines
drawn depending on the type of injury and the surrounding circumstances.3H
(b) Rights of Next of Kin Under Death Statutes
The theory of some death statutes is to permit the cause of action to
survive the death and allow damages to be recovered to the extent that
the decedent would have been able to recover for injuries had he lived.
These typically are called survival acts. Others, often called wrongful
death acts, allow particular surviving relatives to recover damages
caused to them by the death itself. It is clear, therefore, that if the
particular jurisdiction follows the Massachusetts rule and does not
allow a child to recover for prenatal injuries even when born alive, no
action can be brought under the survival death statutes. The theory of
the wrongful death act logically could still be applied to allow recovery
but it seems most unlikely iri such jurisdictions and no cases have been
found. On the other hand, if the child is born alive and then dies as a
result of prenatal injuries inflicted by a negligent defendant, there
8 42 Supf'a note 319. See also concurring opinion in Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, supra
note 333.
845 Tursi v. New England Windsor Co., supra note 328.
84 4 See suggestions infra iri text at section B4(3).
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would be no difficulty under existing survival statutes in those jurisdictions which allow recovery by a living child for prenatal injuries.
If the injured child is stillborn, however, ·only a few jurisdictions
have ruled specifically on the question of whether or not damages can
be recovered under a wrongful death act. 345 Some courts have refused
to broaden the application of the wrongful death statute when the child
is not born alive, although recovery would be allowed if the child lives
for a short period after birth. 846 Under the decided cases this is a
distinction lawyers must take into account in advising their clients.
Harper and James suggest that while this is an arbitrary line, it is perhaps the fairest and most practical place to draw the line." 347 It is
arguable that so drawing the line actually is attacking the validity of
wrongful death statutes on the unstated premise that tort recovery
ought to be for compensation and not for vengeance. It would seem
that various philosophies of tort law get badly confused at this point
and that perhaps we need a new approach, if necessary by statute, to
answer the policy question as to what kind of prenatal injuries should
be compensable and to what extent compensation should be taken from
the wrongdoer. In formulating this policy it is advisable to take into
account the rights of the parents as well.
(c) Rights of Parents Other Than Under Death
Statutes
As suggested above, the first case in the common law countries dealing with the problem of prenatal injuries was the Iowa case, Kansz v.
Ryan, 848 which really involved the right of the parent to recover dam34 ~ Delaware, Kentucky, Mississippi, Minnesota, New Hampshire, and South Carolina; infra Table of Cases at end of this section. For cases involving wrongful death
actions generally, see 10 A.L.R.2d 639 ( 1950). Many courts have permitted recovery
under such statutes where the child is born alive and then dies. See Table of Cases
infra.
346 Norman v. Murphy, 124 Cal. App.2d 95, 268 P.2d 178 (1954); In re Logan's
Estate, 156 N.Y.S.2d 49 (Surr. Ct. 1956) (letters of administration refused); In re
Scanelli, 2o8 Misc. 8o4, 142 N.Y.S.2d 411 (Surr. Ct. 1955) (letters of administration
refused); Muschetti v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 208 Misc. 870, 144 N.Y.S.2d 235 (Sup.
Ct. 1955) ; In re Roberts' Estate, supra note 319 (letters of administration refused).
See also West v. McCoy, 105 S.E.2d 88 (Sup. Ct. S.C. 1958), denying recovery and
reserving question if born alive. Cf. Butler v. Manhattan Ry., 143 N.Y. 417, 38 N.E.
454 (1894) (action for loss of services where injury caused miscarriage of non-viable
foetus not maintainable because pecuniary loss is too remote and speculative).
847 Harper & James 1031.
348 Supra note 315. No English case has arisen. Salmond, Torts 389-90 (nth ed.
Heuston 1953); Clerk & Lindsell, Torts 92 (uth ed. 1954) say damage action would
not lie; see other foreign cases cited at ·234· "Injury to an Unborn Child," 83 Sol. J.
185 (1939).
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ages not for the child but for himself. The plaintiff's claim in that
case as stated by the court was that the plaintiff was "deprived of offspring by defendant's act." The court said very distinctly that the
father could not recover for injury to an offspring except for the possible loss of services, and this had not been requested. The court suggested that a claim for loss of future services would probably be too
remote and speculative.
Again, in the Dietrich case 849 Holmes made the comment that, "as
the unborn child was a part of the mother at the time of the injury,
any damage to it which was not too remote to be recovered for at all
was recoverable by her. . . . " 850 This is only dictum, but it is a rather
clear suggestion that there is nothing by way of theoretical obstacle to
the mother's recovery, and that the only limitation would be one of
remoteness. Later cases have dealt more specifically with the rights of
parents.
The Alabama court in Snow v. Allen 351 deait with two aspects of
the recovery that a mother possibly may have if her child is killed
because of prenatal injuries. The charge was made that the defendant
doctor had crushed the sku]] of the infant while still inside the mother's
womb, causing the infant to be stillborn or to die immediately upon
birth. The defendant demurred to the complaint and the court said :
As we see it, the defendant does not properly interpret the
plaintiff's .complaint as regards the averments as to death of
plaintiff's infant. As we construe the complaint, no recovery
of damages is sought on account of the death of the child,
but for the pain and anguish suffered by the mother on account of its death, occasioned by the negligence of the defendant. If the mother was caused to suffer physical pain by
reason of the kiUing of the unborn child, occasioned by the
negligence of the defendant, no one, we assume, wiii argue
that she could not recover in this action for such pain; and,
likewise, if on account of the negligent destruction of the
child, in its delivery, the mother also suffered distress of
mind, a recovery could be had for such mental anguish. This
is just what the plaintiff claims in the complaint with reference to the killing of her unborn child.

* * *

However, were we to accept the defendant's construction
of the complaint, it would by no means foiiow that the complaint was subject to any grounds of demurrer assigned
849 Supra note JI4sso I d. at 17.
as1227 Ala. 615, 151 So. 468 (1933).
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thereto. So long as the child is with the mother's womb it
is a part of the mother, and for any injury to it, while yet unborn, damages would be recoverable by the mother in a ·
proper case. [Citing Dietrich v. Northampton]. . . .
We are of the opinion that the mother, in an action against
the attending physician, may recover, in one and the same
action, damages for all injuries sustained by her, by reason
of-proximate result of-the negligence of the physician
in and about the parturition of the infant, including the
death of the infant, before it is severed from the mother,
provided, of course, such death was due to the negligence
of the physician. ~
8

2

The court in this case seems to be saying that the mother can recover
for her own mental anguish arising from the loss of a child and, in
addition, can recover for damages to something that was a part of her
prior to birth, the unborn child.
In several cases actions for prenatal injuries have been brought by
parents to recover for loss of services or for medical expenses, but the
courts have denied recovery. They considered the action to be derivative of the child's right to sue and in these jurisdictions the child had
no such right; therefore, the parents lost their claims. 353 For example,
in Prescott v. Robinson, 854 a pregnant woman was injured in a highway collision caused by the negligence of the defendant, and she later
gave birth to a deformed child. The New Hampshire court, in affirming the trial court which had overruled defendant's demurrer to the
complaint, said that it was perfectly natural for a pregnant woman
after an injury to experience mental distress arising from the fear of
an abnormal birth and that this fear was "proximately caused" by the
defendant's negligence. The court then said:
Her ability to be delivered of a· normal and healthy child was
jeopardized, and her grief and apprehension before the birth
on account of what the probable or not unreasonable effect
would be upon the child is not a remote consequence of the
alleged negligence of the defendant. It was her right to produce a healthy child; and if by the defendant's negligence
her enjoyment of that right was diminished or violated, her
mental distress for the unnatural result to be expected was
352
353

I d. at 618-19.

Stemmer v. Kline, supra note 318; Ryan v. Public Serv. Coordinated Transp.,
supra note 318; Nugent v. Brooklyn Heights R.R., supra note 319; Rimpa v. Sears
Roebuck & Co., supra note 318.
354 74 N.H. 400, 69 Atl. 522 (1908), approved later in Durivage v. Tufts, supra note
312 at 268.
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an element of damage for which she should be compensated,
as well as her disappointment at the birth of a deformed child.
[While the mother cannot recover for the injury to the
child itself]. . . the mother's anxiety before the birth of the
child, in view of the reasonable probability that the defendant's act will cause her to produce an abnormal child, is peculiarly an element of damage to her. 555

The court also concluded, however, that:
The fact that the plaintiff will undoubtedly suffer great
disappointment during her lifetime, occasioned by her continual observation of her child's deformity and its probable
suffering, though in some sense caused by the defendant's
negligence, is a misfortune for which the law can afford no
compensation in an action for negligence. . . . The deformity of a crippled child and its suffering may be an everpresent cause of disappointment to its parents, and their lives
may be made miserable thereby; but they can obtain no redress
on that ground against the person whose negligence was the
cause of the child's condition. ~
3

6

The court felt that where the act causing the injury is merely a negligent one, compensation for the lifetime of disappointment is too"remote, secondary, and speculative." 357 The mother could recover for
losses peculiar to herself, of course, but not for mental anguish after
birth.
In general, the right of the mother to sue for her mental anguish
resulting from fear of an abnormal child is well recognized, including
her physical and mental suffering resulting from the miscarriage itself. In cases which support the Ne~ Hampshire distinction, however,
she may not recover for the death of the child or for her mental anguish because of the deformed nature of the child after birth, remoteness usually being given as the reason. 358 It also seems to be well recog/d. at 462.
/d. at 464-65.
357 /d. at 465. The same distinction is made in Gagnon v. Rhode Island Co., 40 R.I.
473, 476, 101 At!. 104 (1917).
358 Thomas v. Gates, Iz6 Cal. I, 58 Pac. 315 (1899); Powell v. Augusta & Summerville R.R., 77 Ga. 192, 3 S.E. 757 ( 1886) ; Kansz v. Ryan, supra note 315 (suit by
husband for deprivation of offspring; dicta to the effect that loss of future services is
not a compensable element); Big Sandy R.R. v. Blankenship, 133 Ky. 438, II8 S.W.
316 (1909); Sullivan v. Old Colony St. Ry., 197 Mass. 512; 83 N.E. 1091 (1go8);
Tunnicliffe v. Bay Cities Con. Ry., 102. Mich. 624, 61 N.w: II (1894); Prescott v.
Robinson, supra note 354; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Cooper, 71 Tex. 507, 9 S.W..
598 (1888); Webb v. Snow; 102 Utah 435, 132 P.2d II4 (1942); Bovee v. Danville,
355

356
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nized that neither parent may recover for loss of services or loss of
prospective earnings of the child or for loss of companionship withthe
child. 8 ~ 9

(d) Radiation Cases
There are two decided cases in which prenatal injury was alleged t~
have resulted from the negligent use of radiation in the treatment of
the pregnant mother. In Smith v. Luckhardt 860 the defendant doctors
incorrectly diagnosed the condition of the plaintiff's mother as a
tumor and administered six X-ray treatments of forty-five minutes
each over a period of four months. The child was born permanently
crippled and feeble-minded, developing to the mental age of two years
although living to a chronological age of thirteen. The action was instituted for the child shortly before his death. The Illinois Appellate
Court dismissed the action on defendant's motion. It cited the Allaire
case as binding authority that damages could not be recovered for pre- ·natal injuries, 361 although it recognized that there were very good
arguments for allowing recovery in such cases. The Illinois Supreme
Court has since joined the present majority of jurisdictions which
allow recovery. 862
The other case is Stemmer v. Kline, decided in New Jersey in
1942.868 Here again the plaintiff's mother was subjected to X-ray treatment by defendant physician for a tumor which plaintiff alleged could
have ·been identified as an embryo by a complete examination. The
plaintiff was prematurely born and described as a microcephalic idiot
who could not walk, talk, hear, or see. The jury found that this condition was caused by the X-ray treatments. On appeal the judgment for
plaintiff was reversed, ten judges to five, although one of the majority
agreed with the dissenting group that the cause of action should be al53 Vt. 183 (188o); Malone v. Monongahela Valley Traction Co., 104 W.Va. 417,
140 S.E. 340 (1927); Annot., 145 A.L.R. II04 (1943); Annot., 10 A.L.R.2d 639, 640
(1950).
a59 Ibid.
860 299 Ill. App. 100, 19 N .E.2d 446 ( 1939).
861 Supra note 321.
362 Amann v. Faidy, supra note 319. The court said at 434: "In rejecting the contention upon which the defendant now insists, this court pointed out more than a
hundred years ago, 'that if we are to be restricted to the common law, as it was enacted at fourth James, rejecting all modifications and improvements which have since
been made, by practice and statutes, except our own statutes, we will find that system entirely inapplicable to our. present condition, for the simple reason that it is more
than two hundred years behind the age.' Penny v. Little, 3 Scam. 301, 304."
36 3 Supra note 318.

220

TORT LIABILITY

lowed for prenatal injuries but joined in the decision reversing the
trial court because it admitted evidence which he felt was inadmissible
under the New Jersey rules. The court also refused to allow the
parents to recover for expenses they alleged were caused by the alleged
malpractice because it was dependent on the claim of the injured party,
the child; the child having no cause of action, the parents' cause must
fail.
There is no reason to believe that these results would be reached,
however, in the seventeen jurisdictions which currently recognize a
cause of action for prenatal injuries at least in the case of a viable
foetus. Viability probably would not be a factor in the Luckhardt case
because the treatments were given between the fourth and seventh
month after conception and this is after the foetus usually is considered viable. It is not made clear in the Stemmer case just when the
treatments took place, although the third and last one was given just
six weeks prior to birth. Actually, the cases of microcephalic idiocy
arising from radiation treatment to pregnant women are perfect examples of cases where the viability distinction is harsh and unrealistic.
There is some persuasive evidence that sufficient radiation during the
first two or three months of pregnancy may cause microcephalic
idiocy. 36* If this is so, it is the very case in which recovery should be
allowed, if it is to be allowed in any case.
With the rapid expansion in the use of radioactive materials and
radiation machines for medical treatment and also for various industrial uses, it is not difficult to predict that the number of radiation cases
involving pregnant women will increase. The doctor will have to be
careful not only in his use of X-ray treatments in the abdominal area,
but also in his use of radioactive isotopes for diagnosis or treatment of
other parts of the body. Such uses well may create hazards which will
affect the pregnant woman since elimination of radioactive isostopes
takes place primarily through the normal elimination channels, in close
proximity to the developing embryo. In addition, there will be a problem in the case of women being employed in establishments where it
is possible for them to receive, even on a temporary emergency basis,
a considerable amount of radiation. While there may be no apparent
harm to the mother, there may be injur,y of the embryo. The harm apparently occurs if there is radiation at any time beginning immediately
so• Conversations with very competent radiologists confirm this fact though none
knew of an authoritative written collection of such cases. Specialists in gynecology
now recognize the necessity. of minimizing exposure of pregnant women because of
genetic damage as well as abortions. N.Y. Times, Oct. II, 1958, p. Cn, col. 2.
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after conception. The administrative problem for employers desiring
to make use of women in radiation establishments is obvious. Addi-·
tiona! cases may arise from accidental exposure of visitors in places
where radiation sources are present. When a nuclear accident discharges radioactive material over a well-populated area it is very likely
that some women in the area will be pregnant. If they later give birth
to deformed children, they may be able to show sufficient causal connection to establish that radiation was responsible. In the light of the
clear trend of the cases toward a recognition of the right to recover
fo~ prenatal injuries, not only where viable but also regardless of
viability, it seems not unrealistic to predict that the viability line will
be discarded, at least in cases where causation is clear. If damages for
fear of giving birth to a deformed child are permitted, as in several
of the cases set out above, this ·could become a very sizeable problem.

( 2) Genetic Damage
Up to the present time no cases have arisen involving a claim for
genetic damage. By genetic damage we mean injury manifested in a
descendant's abnormality but resulting from injury to the genes or
chromosomes of a parent or a more remote ancestor who has been exposed to radiation (or some other force) between the time of the ancestor's conception and the time when he ceases having children. Damage
to the parent will be considered in the next section on "sterility." As
pointed out later, 865 any force which causes a mutation for practical
purposes can be considered as injurious because almost all mutations
are deleterious. Scientists seem to agree that exposure to radiation at
any time from conception to birth of a child causes genetic damage.
There also seems to be general agreement that no matter how small
the dose of radiation the effect is a cumulative one, although there is
some recent evidence to the effect that there may be less genetic damage
if a given amount of radiation is spread over a longer period of time. 366
In the face of such unanimous opinion and in view of our ever increasing knowledge of the cause and effect of genetic damage it would
be carrying the concept of blindfolded justice too far if the law simply
refused to recognize that a problem exists. If it should be decided, as a
matter of social policy, that it is unwise to allow recovery for genetic
damage, it ought to be a decision arrived at after full consideration of
alf the factors involved, and not on the basis of an ostrich approach
86 5
866

Infra discussion at notes 1072-79· See also Chapter I, supra.
Infra discussion at notes 108o-84.
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which assumes that if the problem is not recognized it does not exist. In
the present state of development of knowledge about the cause and
effect of genetic damage, the causation proof problems which the plaintiffs will face are great, but it is submitted that the question of whether
or. not to allow genetic damage at all is the first question to be answered.
There are two reasons why difficulty of proof is not a satisfactory reason for refusing recovery generally for genetic damage caused by radiation. First, even in the present state of knowledge and in view of the
requirements of probability which the law currently employs in tort
actions, there will be cases where it is perfectly conceivable that causation can be proved. This will be considered later in the section dealing
with proof problems. 367 Secondly, genetics is a developing science. With
the great impetus that has been given to research in this area by a recognition of the dangers from radioactive fall-out, it would be most unfortunate if damage recovery concepts were frozen at the present state
of scientific knowledge. While the proof problem as it relates to causation in radiation cases cannot be ignored in making this decision, any
more than it can in connection with post-conception prenatal injuries,
there would seem to be enough evidence already to warrant an assumption that in some cases t.lte causation factor can be proved. If this is
true then the law must face squarely the problem of whether or not to
allow recovery for genetic damage resulting from negligent exposure to
radiation.
In States Now Denying Damages for Prenatal Injuries. From the
above analysis of the present attitude of the various state courts on the
general question of prenatal injury, it is clear that in most jurisdictions
where that question has been answered negatively no recovery will be
allowed for genetic damage unless legislation is enacted, or unless the
courts regard the problem of genetic damage as calling for somewhat
different analysis than has been applied heretofore. The answer in the
eight jurisdictions which do not allow recovery for prenatal injuries
under any circumstances is perfectly clear-there is no reason to believe
that recovery will be allowed for genetic damage because proof problems certainly are more difficult than in post-conception cases. 888 In
the other four jurisdictions which incorrectly have been classified by
judges and writers as states in which recovery is not allowed for prenatal injuries, 369 the answer is not so clear. The cases decided so far in
Infra discussion following note 1079·
See Table of Cases at end of this section.
889 Nebraska, Oklahoma, $outh Carolina, Wisconsin. See Table of Cases at end of
this section.
387
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in these four jurisdictions involved situations where the injured foetus
was not born alive or was not viable; therefore, these decisions give no
answer as to what the courts would do if a c~se were presented where
causation was shown, and a child, viable at time of injury, was born
alive and lived for some time. For purposes of determining the possibility of recovering genetic damages, we would classify these three
jurisdictions with those jurisdictions in which the result is uncertain,
although the chances for recovery in these states might be thought to
be somewhat less than in states which actually have decided that prenatal injuries are recoverable in some circumstances.
In States Now Allowing Recovery for Prenatal Injuries. Of the
seventeen jurisdictions 870 in which recovery has been allowed for prenatal injuries, in predicting what may be done with genetic injuries,
account must be taken of certain distinctions. The distinction as to
whether the child is dead at birth or lives for a time thereafter would
not seem to present any different problems when the injuries are genetic
in character. This damage apparently either can. be of the kind that
causes death of the foetus while still in the mother, or it can manifest
itself in children born alive with some abnormality. Conceivably the
mutation could be beneficial or at least not harmful, so that no damages
should be awarded. We can see no tenable policy distinction to be
drawn between pre-conception and post-conception prenatal injury cases
so far as deciding whether recovery ought to be allowed for death of
the foetus itself. Of the seventeen jurisdictions in which recovery has
been allowed, only two have clearly held that viability of the foetus is
not important. 871 In most of the other jurisdictions where recovery has
been allowed, either the facts of the cases or the language of the court
makes it clear the court is allowing damages only when the foetus is
viable. 872 To the extent that this remains a requirement for prenatal injuries during the post-conception period it may be assumed that there
can be no recovery for genetic damage because by definition this is
damage that arises before conception. For the same reason a relaxation
of the requirement to one that the child merely be "quick" in its
mother 873 will not suffice to permit recovery in a genetic damage case.
Effect of Separate Legal Entity Argument. Most of the argument in
the cases and law review discussions on the question of recovery for
See Table of Cases at end of this section.
Discussion supra at notes 329-35.
872 See cases listed in Table of Cases at end of this section permitting recovery.
878 Supra note 333 and suggestion of concurring justice in Hornbuckle case, supra
note 331.
87o

871
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prenatal injuries deals with the question as to when a child developing
in its mother becomes a separate legal entity or "person" for purposes
of tort liability. Practically all arguments by law review writers and
those courts which have allowed recovery in recent years contrary to
the earlier majority view have emphasized the fact that we now know
that before birth and even before viability or quickness the embryo has
an identity of its own which is, in some degree, separate from its
mother's. To the extent that attention continues to be focused upon
separate legal entity, there will be no right of recovery for genetic damage. Even with our limited knowledge of the science of genetics, we
know it is not until the chromosomes of the mother and father are
joined in a fertilized egg that a particular set of genes from each forms
what will ultimately become a child. If the irradiated person does not
have children or if the mutated genes are not passed on to the offspring
at the time of conception, there has been no really important damage
to the descendant. It seems very certain, therefore, that conception is a
crucial point in determining potential damage. It is not possible to argue
realistically, therefore, that there is an entity before conception. Most
courts, even in jurisdictions where recovery is allowed for prenatal injuries to viable children born alive, probably will hold that there is no
tort because there is no "person."
Scientifically this does not make sense, however, for if the geneticists
are right (and they all agree), genetic damage can result from preconception radiation of the parent, and the mutation that results may be
passed on to the child and manifest itself as a disabling deformity or
organic inadequacy many generations later. In some cases causal connection can be ascertained on the basis of present scientific knowledge;
in the future, as our knowledge of genetics increases, undoubtedly
proof of causation will be possible in a greater number of cases. To the
deformed child it certainly makes no difference whether his deformity
was caused by radiation of his parent before conception or of his
mother after conception. He lives with the deformity and should or
should not be allowed recovery in a damage action on the social policy
ground that we can or cannot afford to burden with such damage actions a growing industry so vital to our future, or can or cannot afford
to let injured persons suffer uncompensated injuries. The decision
should not be on the basis of whether irradiation occurred before or
after conception. In asserting this we do not mean to imply that the
proof of causation difficulty will be solved easily or that it will be solved
at all in the great majority of cases. In those cases where causation

NEGLIGENCE

225

can be shown, however, it is important to answer the question, Should
society allow recovery ?
In those jurisdictions where the courts, in allowing prenatal injury
recovery, clearly have taken note of new scientific developments establishing the separate identity of the embryo, they may follow scientific
discoveries one step further and hold that so long as causation can be
proved, compensation should be allowed, even though the radiation
causing the abnormality occurred before conception. The growth of the
law of prenatal injury has necessitated persuading the courts to accept
scientific knowledge concerning both the identity of the embryo and
the possibility of proving causation.
The Social Policy Considerations. If the next step is taken, however,
it should be done only after a full consideration of the social impact of
allowing such recovery. Undoubtedly, courts when faced with problems
of genetic damage may use the "proximate cause" formula to find that
the defendant owes no duty to the unborn. It certainly cannot be a question of foreseeability, because both as to post-conception and pre-conception prenatal injuries from radiation, it is clear that irradiation of
either parent in the pre-conception period and irradiation of the mother
in the post-conception period foreseeably will cause damage to the potential or actual embryo. Any limitation in the name of proximate
cause, therefore, really will be a disguised policy judgment to the effect
that negligent defendants should not be held responsible for this kind
of injury. It is an arguable position but should be made openly and
knowingly, not hidden behind the camouflage of proximate cause or a
blanket rule against recovery merely because in many cases the proof
problem will be difficult.
Decisions Bearing on Genetic Da'I'J'W,ge. Only two cases have been
found which seem to contain even the remotest implication concerning
the allowance of genetic damage. One is the brief comment by Chief
Justice Duckworth in his concurring opinion in the Hornbuckle case
where he asserted that if a baby could sue for injury occurring immediately after conception, as he felt the majority had ruled, "why not
allow such suits for injuries before conception, even unto the third and
fourth generations?" 314 His remark in this ease clearly indicates that he
would not allow recovery for genetic damage; rather, he would draw
the line at the time when the child becomes quick in its mother.
The other case, Morgan v. United States,S 76 is so remarkably analo8 74 Supra note 332.
m 143 F. Supp. 58o (D.C. N.J. 1956).
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gous to the genetic damage situation that it is most unfortunate it arose
in a jurisdiction (Pennsylvania) in which no recovery is allowed for
prenatal injuries under any circumstances. In this case the mother alleged that she was negligently given a blood transfusion "of an improper or unsuitable type" while in defendant's army hospital in February, 1952. In June, 1955, the mother was delivered of a baby boy whose
health allegedly was impaired because of the transfusion of improper
blood two and a half years earlier. Causes of action were brought for
damages to the mother, the child, and the husband and father. The
court disposed of the mother's claims on the ground that the two year
statute of limitations ran out in February, 1955; the action was not
begun until January, 1956. The court's reason for dismissal of the
action for damage to the child is not completely clear. It first seemed
to state that the statute of limitations also called for the dismissal of
the action for damages to the child as well. The court then said :
When the tortious conduct occurred William Morgan had not
yet been conceived. He was then neither a viable foetus nor
en ventre sa mere. The alleged tort occurred in Pennsylvania.
Whether a cause of action accrued to William Morgan is
governed by the law of that State. 876
The court cited the Berlin v. /. C. Penney, Inc. case in which the Pennsylvania court denied recovery in a prenatal injury situation. 371 Here
the federal district court apparently rests its decision on the rule of no
cause of action for prenatal injuries. The court concluded that because
the claim of the father for injuries to the mother and to the child was
derivative, it must fall with the first two causes of action. If this case
had arisen in a jurisdiction where recovery is allowed for prenatal injuries, the court would have been forced to decide whether a cause of
action for pre-conception injuries is to be permitted and a precedent for
genetic damage cases might have been established.
The blood transfusion case is very likely to be the forerunner of
many cases that will be brought to the courts as the result of extensive
use of radioactive materials. In several accidents workers have been
exposed to sufficient radiation to increase substantially the risk of
genetic mutation. 378 More significant in number, however, will be those
Id. at s&t.
339 Pa. 547, 16 A.2d 28 ( 1940).
.
878 See description of accidents, infra Chapter IV. In addition, several persons unknowingly were exposed to significant quantities of radiation when a source was carelessly lost and it was some time before its loss was discovered. BNA, Atomic Industrial
Rep. 4: 419, 4: 444 ( 1958). The exposures at the Y12 accident were 365, 339, 327, 270,
878
8 77
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cases arising from the use of radioactive material or radiation sources
for medical treatment, 379 and from the discharge of a large quantity of
radioactive material over a heavily popuiated area. If a substantial reactor burn-up should occur and radioactive material be dropped over a
city, the possibility of claims by parents, either for the increased possibility that their children will have deformities, or for deformities that
actually show up in children later conceived, is not inconsequential and
is a problem not to be dismissed lightly.
(3) Some Suggestions Toward a Solution
The proper solution of the problems that have been suggested in connection with pre- and post-conception injuries from radiation is not
easy to determine. A comprehensive attack on the problem should be
carried out by a group of lawyers representing all types of interests in
tort litigation, with the advice and consultation of scientists and other
experts to check the validity of assumptions that lawyers too often
blithely (or blindly) make. It may be that atomic energy will open up
an opportunity to the legal profession to do a really imaginative and yet
practical job in the handling of tort cases, something that will be better
than our present hit and miss system with its fabulous recoveries in
some cases and its niggardly awards in others, quite out of proportion
to the relative suffering in the respective cases. Much of the present system is good and must be retained, but some of it is bad, and atomic
energy cases may present the legal profession with the opportunity to
try some experiments that will have application in other cases as well.
The following ideas and suggestions are presented as a starting point
toward a proper solution.
In making these suggestions it is assumed that causation can be
proved with reasonable certainty, a problem to be considered later in
the section on proo£.3 80 One other assumption is made, i.e., the injury
results from action by the defendant which was not intended to bring
harm to the persons injured, either as a typical intentional tort or in
236 and 68 r. Health Physics, Vol. I, No. 2 at p. 208 (Sept. 1958). See general description of genetic damage, supra Chapter I. One study of exposure to radar beams
in World War II concluded there was no hazard; N.Y. Times, June 26, 1958, p. 22,
cols. 6, 7·
379 Many of the malpractice cases involve X-rays, .and probably could have included
such a damage claim. Specialists in gynecology as well as radiologists now. recognize
the necessity of minimizing exposure of pregnant women. N.Y. Times, Oct. II, 1958,
p. Cn, col. 2. Cf. Contrary statement reported N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1958 p. E9, col. 6.
sso Infra discussion beginning at note 1072.
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the sense of wanton disregard of consequences. These assumptions
seem fair; for no matter what the system of compensation, the problem
of proof of causation and the prevention of fraudulent or purely specula~ive claims will always be present but are no more bothersome, m
some cases at least, than in many other types of damage cases.
(a) Post-Conception Injuries
The common law cases are confusing and the results reached seem
inadequate and based upon an uncritical analysis, not only of scientific
knowledge but also of the underlying social policy considerations involved. Too often the results indicate a failure to apply the compensation theory we assume in negligence cases generally. They also show a
failure to distinguish sharply between the rights of the injured child,
the next of kin under death statutes, and of parents for damages other
than under the death statutes.
( i) Recovery by Child

If the child is born alive and lives at least until after the trial, recovery
should be allowed. Damages should include the extra expenses which
will be required because of theabnormality and for a period extending
through the whole life expectancy of the child determined as of the
time of trial, taking into account any shortening of the period because
of the abnormality. The compensation theory logically (and correctly)
does not permit recovery for the full life expectancy without taking into
account the abnormality. Either as a separate item of damages or as an
element of the extra expenses award, an amount should be included to
provide for really adequate rehabilitation to the extent it is possible to
correct the defect or provide some substitute for the ability impaired
by the deformity.
Determining whether to allow recovery for pain and suffering and
mental anguish of the child and if so in what amount is somewhat more
difficult. Undoubtedly an amount should be allowed to provide for good
medical treatment including whatever is available to reduce pain and
suffering as much as possible. In many cases, however, nothing should
be awarded to the child for humiliation and similar mental anguish. The
microcephalic idiot who has none of the normal senses cannot suffer this
type of injury. In general, a mentally alert child with some other abnormality probably does not suffer from humiliation and related feelings
during the first few years. If the child lives long enough and is able to
sense humiliation because of the deformity and the defect is such as to
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cause the normal person humiliation, a good case can be made for allowing something for mental anguish, but there is much to be said for
applying here also the suggestion that recove~y for such damage~ be
limited in amount. 881
In awarding damages to the child who lives, the concern about finding a separate legal entity should be forgotten and the distinctions
based on "viability" and "quick" should be eliminated. Except possibly
for the difficulty of proving causation, there is no policy justification
for such distinctions. if a child has to live with a deformity it matters
not to him that it happened before or after he was quick or viable in
his mother's womb, as the case may be in a particular jurisdiction. He
is now an injured legal entity which should be sufficient.
Even as to proof of causation, in the light of present medical knowledge and techniques, the difficulty is not sufficiently greater in the one
case than the other to justify basing a distinction upon this factor.
Probably it is more difficult to determine whether the quick or viable
condition exists than it is to determine whether the mother is pregnant.
If it is felt that the difficulty of proof is such that the danger of spurious, fraudulent, or speculative claims is great; the legislature by enactment or the judge by decision can control this by making the burden
of proof somewhat higher, if this is felt to be necessary. Certainly, if
the prosecution is allowed to prove causation beyond a reasonable doubt
in such cases in criminal suits, there is little reason to deny the plaintiff
at least the same opportunity in a tort action.
Perhaps it is not amiss to re-emphasize our position that these damages should be awarded to the child and not to his parents. The necessary accounting and trustee arrangements are available already by common law rule or by statutory provisions.
If the child is stillborn or dies before trial, results under existing doctrines are quite unrealistic in some respects. If stillborn, surely the child
gains nothing from an award for mental anguish or pain and suffering.
Such an award cannot help the child, but only the survivors. The allowance of damages in several jurisdictions 882 is unjustifiable under a compensation theory. If the child is born alive but dies before trial, recovery
for the child's mental anguish or pain and suffering, allowed in even
881 Plant, "Damages for Pain and Suffering," 19 Ohio St. L. J. 200 (1958). The
author of the comment in 22 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 538 (1955) suggests setting an arbitrary
limit on recoveries under wrongful death statutes for death of children.
882 Infra Table of Cases at end of this section. Delaware, Kentucky, Minnesota,
Mississippi, and New Hampshire apparently permit such recovery even when the child
is stillborn.
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more jurisdictions, 383 again is unjustifiable because survivors are the
only beneficiaries. Any recovery by beneficiaries should be in their own
right, not because of the suffering of the child now dead.
To the extent that there were extra expenses incurred in delivering or
caring for the child until its death, including those for medical treatment to reduce pain and suffering and for rehabilitation efforts, if any,
recovery should be allowed. Once the child dies such recovery cannot
benefit him but these efforts in his behalf should be encouraged and
those who have incurred the expenses should be recompensed by the
wrongdoer. Whether the claim is in the name of the now dead child or
by the parents, if they incurred the expenses as ordinarily would be the
case, is not important ; the suggested limits on recovery are.
(ii) Recovery by Next of Kin Under Death
Statutes
Application of survival and wrongful death statutes to prenatal injury suits cannot be justified, except possibly in one situation.
Survival statutes are based on the theory that the estate of the deceased should be awarded the amount which the deceased could have
recovered, had he lived. Perhaps recovery is justified in the case of
property damage but not when the award is for pain and suffering or
mental anguish. The deceased's suffering is not lessened by knowledge
that some money will pass on through his estate, even assuming the
deceased lives long enough to realize the significance of the possibility.
If recovery is allowed under a survival act, the artificial argument about
whether there is a separate legal entity who had a cause of action must
be revived. It also may be necessary to make the artificial distinction
between the case where the foetus dies before birth and that in which
he survives birth, if only for an instant, since a cause of action can
vest in an instant. 884 As applied in non-intentional tort cases, at least in
the prenatal injury situation, the results reached under survival acts
have more of an element of vengeance or at best of a windfall than of
compensation. Nevertheless, applied with strict logic, recovery would
be allowed if the death occurs in a jurisdiction which would allow recovery if the child survived the trial and if the child lived for at least a
moment, or if the foetus is considered as legally alive even before
birth. 885
Six states; see Table of Cases at end of this section.
See Harper & James 1031.
ssG Connecticut, Louisiana, ·and New Hampshire. -See Table of Cases at end of this
section.
ss8

SS4
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~Vrongful death statu.tes generally allow recovery to a specific and
limited group of persons who ordinarily suffer financially from the
death of a close relative such as a parent or child because they have been
deprived of a source of financial support. The Delaware, Kentucky,
Minnesota, Mississippi, and New Hampshire courts 386 can assert a possibly tenable, theoretical justification for allowing recovery under a
wrongful death statute. Practically speaking, however, recovery is not
justified under these statutes either. Certainly no person really begins
to depend on a conceived but unborn child, or even on one already delivered and living, until many years later when there is some indication
of earning capacity and a desire to support relatives. If the child is
handicapped, no such expectations of support should develop. There is
no real likelihood of receiving financial support from even a healthy
child these days when raising children ordinarily costs much more than
they can earn until they are grown and away from home. The uncertainties even then are great. This is considerably different from the position of a spouse or child or·even parent who actually has come to expect financial support from a grown father or mother, son or daughter.
The only possible exception to the suggested denial of recovery under
death statutes arises in the event a deformity or incapacity resulting
from prenatal injuries manifests itself only after the child has grown
and accepted support responsibility, and others have depended on such
support. Perhaps in this case recovery under a wrongful death statute
is justified, although the statute of limitations conceivably could make
recovery impossible if the time of the original injury is used to determine when the cause of action arose.
We submit that results under existing death statutes are unrealistic
and that a new statute should be enacted to prevent their use in prenatal injury cases. A statute should be adopted fully protecting the injured child, those who incur expenses to help him while living, and poss·ibly those who, not knowing of the incapacity, reasonably have come
to depend on the injured child for financial support where the manifestation of the injury is long delayed.

(iii) Rights of Parents
So far as the mother's rights are concerned, the decisions seem fairly
satisfactory insofar as they allow recovery for all of her own injuries
resulting from the impact, including those arising from the birth and
its aftereffects to the extent they are caused by defendant's negligent
ass Supra note 382.
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act. 881 If we could start anew we would have serious doubts as to the
advisability of unlimited recovery for the mother's mental anguish during pregnancy and after the impact for fear of having a deformed child,
unless it manifests itself in some type of recognizable disability to continue normal activities. This problem, however, is not different from
mental anguish recovery in other types of negligence actions and perhaps all that can be hoped for is some kind of limitation on maximum
recovery in such cases. 888 On the other hand, the arbitrary rule that
there can be no recovery for the mental anguish which a mother suffers
as she watches over and takes care of a deformed child probably is unfair. LOoking at the matter from the standpoint of compensation and
rehabilitation, paying her a large sum of money just so she can buy a
fur coat or a new house is not justified, but if her mental anguish seriously interferes with carrying out her normal activities, something
might be said for a type of recovery which is so controlled that it would
have to be used for rehabilitation, including psychiatric treatment if
necessary.
To the extent that the parents are put to unusual expenses in caring
for the abnormal child, they should be allowed to recover a compensatory award, assuming that there is no duplicating award allowed to the
child or his estate as suggested in discussing the rights of the child.
The rights of the parents arising from the loss of the expected or alre~dy born child are discussed in the next section on sterility and related
injuries.
( iv) Conclusions
The one fundamental principle to keep in mind is that while a full
recovery should be allowed for all interests injured to the extent money
damages can in some way make amends, duplicating recoveries should
be prevented. It is important to keep separate the rights of the child
while he is living, the rights of close relatives in certain exceptional
cases, and the rights of parents in their own right but not that of the
child; otherwise duplication is likely. Certainly there is a need for
changes in survival and wrongful death statutes and development of a
whole new approach to granting damages for prenatal injuries.
(b) Pre-Conception Injuries
If the science of genetics develops to the point where causation can
be proved, logic would seem to call for recovery for pre-conception in887
88 8

See cases discussed supra note 358.
Supra note 381.
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juries on the same grounds suggested for post-conception injuries in
radiation cases. The concept of a separate legal entity should not be an
obstacle if compensation is accepted as the theory for tort recovery. So
long as the defendant is protected against unreasonable claims by placing a substantial burden of proof upon the plaintiff, there is no reason
to immunize the wrongdoing defendant from liability for actual injuries
which result from his negligence.
·
There is one problem connected with genetic damage, however, which
is much more serious than in the case involving post-conception prenatal
injury. The injury from radiation to the embryo in the mother's womb
will manifest itself within the lifetime of the child later born. This in
itself is a long period of time and presents some serious problems under
existing statutes of limitations. In the case of genetic damage, however,
these problems are much more serious for such injuries transmit themselves through succeeding generations. Assuming that thirty years is
the normal length of a generation in this country, it could easily be 150
or 200 years before an injury manifested itself in the form of a mutation. Such cases, however, do not present the problem in sharpest focus.
At the end of so long a period no human defendant will be alive and
under the laws of incorporation in most states even a corporate defendant is likely to be legally dead. In addition, proving causation at this
late date probably would be impossible for the plaintiff. The case most
likely to arise, and the one which should be the basis for legal rules, involves the birth of a child with manifestations of genetic mutation
within the same or a second generation. This is not unlike post-conception injuries to an embryo which is later born and lives a relatively normal length of time. The period will be longer but not inordinately so.
The rules suggested for application to prenatal injuries should be
extended to cover genetic damage if the manifestations occur within
the first or perhaps the second generation.
(c) Common Problems
The statute of limitations problems raised by these cases are common
to many, if not to most, radiation injury situations. In most jurisdictions it is necessary that a whole new scheme of limitations be developed
to take care of radiation injury cases whether they be post or pre-conception prenatal injuries, or other types of injuries such as leukemia,
bone cancer, etc. Statutes usually require actions for negligence to be
brought within a very short period, e.g., two or three years. If we treat
the time of injurious impact as the time when the cause of action arises,
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as seems to be indicated in the Morgan 889 and LaPorte 890 cases, 1t 1s
clear that genetic damage cases cannot be brought within the statutory
period. Most cases will involve radiation exposure more than two or
three years before the deformity shows up. Even in post-conception prenatal injury cases many of the disabilities may not appear within the
periods of limitation. An example of this would be the occurrence of
leukemia which may not show up for several years after birth.
In addition, it seems clear that there is room for substantial improvement in the system of remedies and compensation in tort cases of the
character here under consideration. Certainly the atomic energy or radiation injury cases are going to strain our present system very greatly,
especially if we are concerned with compensation and not vengeance. It
is possible that we may need to adopt principles similar to the splitting
of causes of action found in certain European countries, or we may
need to adopt some kind of a "wait and see" doctrine for tort cases.
Perhaps emphasis should be placed on paying the expenses of rehabilitation and treatment rather than on mental anguish and pain and suffering awards. These suggestions apply generally to radiation cases and
will also be discussed later. 391
One other troublesome problem common to both pre- and postconception prenatal injuries concerns contributory negligence and assumption of risk on the part of the parent. Prosser in his usual pithy
way summarizes the possibility of imputing the negligence of the parent
to the minor child in the following language :
In 1858, in a still more unfortunate English case, it was
held that a small child injured through the negligence of a
railway company was barred from recovery by the contributory negligence of a grandmother who was in charge of the
child at the time. This barbarous rule, which denies to the innocent victim of the negligence of two parties recovery
against either, and visits the sins of the fathers upon the
children, was accepted in several American states, but is now
overruled everywhere except in Maryland, Maine, and perhaps Delaware. The "agency" of the parent to look after the
child is of course the barest fiction, and the fear that the parent may profit by his own negligence is now removed by the
power of the court to put the proceeds in trust for the
child. 892
889
890
891
892

Morgan v. United States, supra note 375.
La Porte v. U.S. Radium Corp., 13 F. Supp. 263 (D.C. N.]. 1935).
See recommendations i1~fra following note I 123.
Prosser

301.
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Harper and James are not quite so disturbed but agree that the negligence of the parent should not be imputed to the child. 393
References to the matter of the mother's negligence are found in a
few of the prenatal injury cases. As pointed out before, the possibility
of the child suing the mother for her negligence was used by the Illinois
court in the Allaire case 394 as a reason for denying all recovery for
such injuries. On the other hand, in Rainey v. H orn,395 the court
pointed out that in Mississippi, as in most jurisdictions, 396 a child cannot sue its mother. Another reference is found in the Missouri case of
Kirk v. Middlebrook, 891 this time to a question involving assumption of
risk. Both lawyers assumed that the right of action was in the mother
and not the infant and the court apparently held that the mother could
contract away damage rights arising from injury to the foetus. The
language seems to suggest that if the action had been that of the child,
the mother could not contract it away. These are all of the references
to the question found in the cases. Prosser and Harper and James are
not referring to prenatal injury cases in their comments on contributory
negligence. Obviously significant differences exist between applying contributory negligence and assumption of risk doctrines to cases of injuries to living children and to cases of prenatal injury.
The first distinction to note is that both the parents (particularly the
mother) and the child may have claims. Surely so long as contributory
negligence and assumption of risk doctrines are used in negligence
cases generally, these should be defenses to any action by the parent for
injuries to his interests as distinguished from those of the child.
Whether such defenses arising from the actions of the negligent
parent should be applied to defeat the child's own rights against third
parties is a somewhat more difficult question to answer; but here again
they probably should be applicable, in contrast to the result where a living child is hurt. It does not seem as "barbarous" to apply the defenses
to a child still in its mother's womb, or still to be conceived. Even if the
injured foetus is born alive but dies within the first five or ten years of
his life, recovery from a negligent defendant in effect will help the parents themselves rather than the child for they will be caring for him
during this period in almost all cases. Yet_ the condition was partly the
Harper & James 127o-71.
Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, supra note 319. See concern suggested by writers
in 29 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1154, 1157 (1954); Note, 35 Va. L. Rev. 618, 626 (1949).
395 221 Miss. 269, 281, 72 So.2d 434 (1954).
396 Prosser 675-76, although he disagrees with the rule.
897 201 Mo. 245, 285-86, 100 S.W. 450 (1907).
893
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result of their own contributory negligence. The unborn or unconceived
child seems too closely connected with the parents to deny defendants
the right to use contributory negligence or assumption of risk as a
'defense, even if the child lives to a mature age with some serious
deformity.
This position is not inconsistent with the argument that the embryo
or foetus is a separate entity and should be allowed to recover for prenatal injuries. Separate existence should not govern application of
these defenses. The burden of extra expenses and rehabilitation in such
cases should be born by the parents, so long as contributory negligence
is used in negligence cases generally.
In any event, assuming the parent is advised fully of the risks involved, no rule should be adopted which will embarrass in any way the
doctor or the expectant mother or potential parent in deciding to use
radiation in the course of medical treatment of the parent, even though
this admittedly creates a risk of injury to the embryo or foetus, either
directly or because of mutated genes.

TABLE OF CASES-PRENATAL INJURIES
I. States Allowing Recovery Under Some Circumstances
I. If Viable at Time of Injury and Born Alive
CAUFORNIA:

Myers v. Stevenson, I25 Cal. App.:zd 399, z,o P.:zd 885 (ISt Dist. I954)
(Injuries during delivery and born alive; specifically provided for by amendment to statute following Scott case).
Scott v. McPheeters, 33 Cal. App.2d 629, 92 P.2d 678 (3d Dist. 1939)
(Injuries at birth and born alive; construing code provision as creating
separate existence of foetus for personal injury as well as property rights).
CONNECTICUT :

Prates v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 19 Conn. Supp. 487, u8 A.2d 633 (Super.
Ct. I955) (Child viable and lived for five days; wrongful death action).
Tursi v. New England Windsor Co., 19 Conn. Supp. 242, III A.2d I4
(Super. Ct. I955) (Viable at time of injury and born alive).
But see: Sq11illo v. City of New Haven, I4 Conn. Supp. 500 (Super. Ct.
I947) (Action not allowed); Marden v. Enterprise Industries, Inc. (unreported) (Hartford Co. # 90013, I95I) (Action not allowed).
DELAWARE:

Worgan v. Greggo & Ferrara, Inc., I2B A.2d 557 (Del. Super. Ct., I956)
(Viable at time of injury and apparently killed before birth; administrator
sued for damages).
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA :

BonJJrest v. Kotz, .65 F. Supp. 138 (D.C., D.C. I946) (Injury at birth and
born alive, the court emphasizing that child was viable).
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GEORGIA:

Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipe Lilt.e Co., 212 Ga. 504, 93 S.E.2d 727 (1956)
(Injury six weeks after conception and apparently born alive; concurring
justice saying should have to prove that quick in mother).
Tucker v. Howard L. Carmichael & Sons, 2o8 Ga. 201, 65 S.E.2d 909
(1951) (Injury three hours before birth, nothing being said about being born
alive but language leans this way).
ILLINOIS:

Rodriquez v. Patti, 415 Ill. 496, II4 N.E.2d 721 (1953) (Injuries while
en ventre sa mere; controlled by Amann case).
Amann v. Faidy, 415 Ill. 422, II4 N.E.2d 412 (1953) (Injury while m
ventre sa mere and born alive court assumes; wrongful death action. Overrules Allaire case).
Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, rB4 Ill. ·359, 56 N.E. 638 ( 1900) (Action
not permitted but overruled by Amann case).
Smith v. Luckhardt, 299 Ill. App. roo, 19 N.E.2d 446 (1939) (Born
microcephalic idiot as result of X-ray treatments of mother from third to
seventh month of pregnancy; action not permitted on ground controlled by
Allaire case).
'KENTUCKY:

Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W .2d 901 (Ky. Ct. App. 1955) (Viable child
injured and born dead; wrongful death action allowed).
LouisiANA:

Cooper v. Blanck, 39 So.2d 352 (La. App. 1923) (Civil code read as
allowing wrongful death action for viable foetus born alive).
MARYLAND:

Damasie'Wicz v. Gorsuch, 197 Md. 417, 79 A.2d 550 (1951) (Born alive
and apparently not viable; test apparently is whether is quick).
MINNESOTA:

Verkmnes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949) (Injury at
birth killed mother and foetus; wrongful death action allowed without mention of living even for moment).
Korman v. Hagen, 165 Minn. 320, 2o6 N.W. 650 (1925) (Allowing recovery without considering problem; injury _forty-eight hours before birth
and born alive).
MISSISSIPPI :

Rainey v. Horn, 221 Miss. 269, 72 So.2d 434 (1954) (Injury during delivery and stillborn; wrongful death action allowed).
MISSOURI:

Steggall v. Morris, 363 Mo. 1224. 258 S.W.2d 577 (1953) (Viable at time
of injury and born alive ; wrongful death action allowed).
Buel v. United Railways Co., 248 Mo. r26, 154 S.W. 71 (1913) (Action
disallowed but overruled by Steggall case).
NEW HAMPSHIRE:

Poliquin v. MacDonald, 135 A.2d 249 (N.H. 1957) (Viable
injury and stillborn; wrongful death action permitted, provided
find that viable).
Prescott v. Robinson, 74 N.H. 460, 6g At!. 522 (r9o8) (Held
no cause of action for deformed child born alive; distinguished
case).

at time of
on remand
mother had
in Poliquin
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Durivage v. Tufts, 94 N.H. 265, 51 A.2d 847 (1947) (No cause of action
for unborn because no medical testimony showing causation; distinguished
in Poliquin case).
NEw YoRK:
Kelly v. Gregory, 282 App. Div. 542, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696 (1953) (Injured
during third month of pregnancy and born alive; carrying Woods v. Lancet
to before viable).
Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349. 102 N.E.2d 69r (1951) (Injured in ninth
month and born alive ; overruling Drobner case).
Drobner v. Peters, 232 N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567 (1921) (Action not allowed,
overruled by Woods case).
Nugent v. Brooklyn Heights R. R., 154 App. Div. 667, 139 N.Y.S. 367
(2d Dept. 1913) (Action not allowl!d but overruled too).
Banas v. City of Syracuse, 204 Misc. 201, 125 N.Y.S.2d 490 (Sup. Ct. 1953),
aff'd, 282 App. Div. 826, 122 N.Y.S.2d 532 (Right to sue recognized but must
be brought against municipality within prescribed time; regardless of excuse
or inability, cannot be maintained otherwise).
OHIO:

Jasinsky v. Potts, 153 Ohio St. 529, 92 N.E.2d 8o9 (1950) (Injured during
eighth month and born alive; wrongful death action allowed).
Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, 152 Ohio St. II4, 87 N.E.2d 334 (1949)
( lnj ury in seventh month and born alive) .
Mays v. Weingarten, 82 N.E.2d 421 (Ohio App. 1943) (Action denied but
surely overruled in Williams case).

OREGON:
Mallison v. Pomeroy, 205 Ore. 690, 291 P.2d 225 (1955) (Viable at time
of injury and born alive).
CANADA:

Montreal Tramways v. Leveille, [1933] · 4 D.L.R. 337 (Viable when injured and born alive; based on civil code provision given broad interpretation).
Smith v. Fox, [1923] 3 D.L.R. 785 (Action for prenatal injury will lie but
must await birth of child, apparently alive).
2. Not Viable but Born Alive
GEORGIA:

Hornbuckle case, supra (Very broad language covering any time after
conception; child actually six weeks along)..
MARYLAND:

Damasiewicz v. Gor.rt~-Ch, supra (Says viability bad test, but suggests when
"comes alive" in mother, apparently meaning when "quick").
NEW YORK:
Kelly v. Gregor·y, supra (Injury during third month, court saying separability begins at conception).
3. Viable at Time of Injury but Born Dead
DELAWARE:

Worgan v. Greggo & Ferrara, Inc., supra (Language indicates administrator of viable infant can sue if does not survive the accident).
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KENTUCKY:
Mitchell v. Couch, supra (Viable and born dead and wrongful death action
allowed).
MINNESOTA:
Verkennes v. Corniea, supra (Viable and no mention of being alive after
birth; wrongful death action allowed).
MISSISSIPPI:
Rainey v. Horn, supra (Death during delivery; wrongful death action
allowed).
NEW HAMPSHIRE:
Poliquin v. MacDonald, supra (Viable and stillborn; wrongful death action
allowed).
II. No Recovery Allowed
I.

No Recovery in Any Case
ALABAMA:
Birmingham Baptist Hospita.l v. Branton, .2I8 Ala. 464, n8 So. 741 (I9z8)
(No death act cause by father for child dying after birth from prenatal
injuries, the damages to it,. if not too remote, being recoverable by mother).
Stanford v. St. LO'Uis-San Francisco Ry., 2I4 Ala. 6n, 1o8 So. 566 (1926)
(Lived for short time and action for damages denied to it, mother having
right to any damages).
Snow v. Allen, 227 Ala. 6IS, ISI So. 468 (1933) (Court said if complaint
is interpreted as claiming damages for injury to viable foetus then this item
is recoverable by mother, though court reads complaint as for mental anguish
·for loss of child as well as injury to herself in delivery).
MASSACHUSETTS:
Cavanaugh v. First Nat'l Stores, 329 Mass. 179, 107 N.E.2d 307 (1952)
(Viable and hom alive).
Bliss v. Passanesi, 3.26 Mass. 461, 95 N.E.2d 2o6 (I950) (Viable and apparently born alive but died soon thereafter).
Dietrich v; Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (I884) (Court assumes that hom
alive at fourth or fifth month of pregnancy and states that any damages to
infant not too remote to be recovered at all can be recovered by mother).
MICHIGAN:
Newman v. City of Detroit, 28I Mich. 6o, 274 N.W. 710 (I937) (Viable
and hom alive).
NEW ]ERSEY:
Stemmer v. Kline, I28 N.J.L. 455, z6 A.zd 489 (I942) (Viable and born
alive, last X-ray treatment of mother only six months before birth).
Ryan v. Public Seru. Co-ordinated Transp., I8 N.J. Misc. 429, I4 A.2d 52
(Sup. Ct. I940) (Born alive, time of injury not stated).
PENNSYLVANIA:
Morgan v. United States, 143 F. Supp. sSo (D.C. N.J. I956) (Child not
even conceived at time of blood transfusion and under Berlin case, infra, no
recovery in Pennsylvania for prenatal injuries).
Berlin v. J. C. Penny Co., 339 Pa. 547, I6 A.zd 28 (I940) (Apparently born
alive, no time of injury given).
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Rimpa v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 37 Erie 267 (Pa. C.P. I9S2) (Viable and
born alive; followed Berlin case. supra).
Jacketti v. Pottstown Rapid Transit Co., 67 Montg. Co. L.R 37 (Pa. C.P.
I9SO) (Apparently born alive but no time of injury given).
Kine v. Zuckerman, 4 Pa. D. & C. 227 (I924) (Action permitted for viable
foetus born alive; presumably overruled by Berlin case, supra).
Contra: Von Elbe v. St!ldebaker-Packard Corp., Io6 Pittsburgh Legal J.
2I9 (I9S8) (Born alive and recovery allowed regardless of inability, although
whether non-viable at time of injury not stated.)
RHonE IsLAND:
Gorman v. Budlong, 23 R.I. I6g, 49 Atl. 704 (I90I) (Viable and born alive) .
.TEXAS:
Magnolia C. C. B. Co. v. Jordan, I24 Tex. 347, 78 S.W.2d 944 (I93S)
(Viable and born alive).
Lewis v. Steves Sash & Door Co., 177 S.W.2d 3SO (Tex. Civ. App. 1943)
(Controlled by Magnolia case, supra,· viable and born alive).
IRELAND:
Walker v. Great Northern Ry., 28 L.R. (lr.) 6g (I8gi) (At least quick
and born alive; court deciding that no duty owed by carrier to unborn child
since the agents did not know of existence of foetus ; a contract case so not
deciding trespass case but difficulty of proof question noted by one judge).
2. No Recovery If Stillborn, but Reserving Question If Born Alive
NEBRASKA:
Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co., ISS Neb. 17,
but stillborn).

so

N.W.2d 229 (19SI) (Viable

OKLAHOMA:
Howell v. Rushing, 26I P.2d 2I7 (Okla. I9S3) (Simply following Drabbels
case, supra, not Verkennes, supra; born dead).
SOUTH CAROLINA:
West v. McCoy, IOS S.E.2d 88 (Sup" Ct., S.C. I9S8) (Quick but not viable
at time of injury and stillborn. Reserving question if viable and born alive).
3. Recovery Denied If Not Viable, but Reserving Question If Viable When
Injured
WISCONSIN:
Lipps v. Milwaukee E. Ry. & L. Co., I64 Wis. 272, IS9 N.W. 9I6 (I9I6)
(Non-viable and court expressly reserves question where viable, suggesting
there are "cogent reasons" for contrary rule in that case; born alive).

II. Actions Under Wrongful Death and Survival Statutes
I.

Recovery Allowed Under One or Both When Born Alive
CoNNECTICUT:
Prates v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., supra (Recovery under both).
IlLINOIS:
Aman.n v. Faidy, supra (Apparently wrongful death only).
LoUISIANA:
Cooper v. Blanck, supra (Recovery under both).
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MISSOURI:

Steggall v. Morris, supra (Apparently wrongful death only).
NEW HAMPSHIRE:

Poliquin v. MacDonald, supra (Seems to be survival action).
OHIO:

Jasinsky v. Potts, supra (Apparently wrongful death only).
2.

Recovery Permitted Even Though Stillborn
DELAWARE:

Worgcm v. Greggo & Ferrara, Inc., (Language indicates administrator of
viable infant can sue for damages even though stillborn).
KENTUCKY:

Mitchell v. Couch, supra (Wrongful death action permitted).
MINNESOTA:

Verkennes v. Cor11iea, supra (Wrongful death action permitted).
MISSISSIPPI:

Rainey v. Horn, supra (Death during delivery; wrongful death action
allowed).
NEw HAMPSHIRE:

Poliquin v. MacDonald, supra (Viable and stillborn; wrongful death action
permitted).
3. No Recovery Permitted Only Because Stillborn, Otherwise Allowed
CALIFORNIA :

Norman v. Murphy, I24 Cal. App.2d 95, 268 P.2d I78 (I954) (Wrongful
death action).
NEw YoRK:

In re Logarn's Estate, I56 N.Y.S.2d 49 (Surr. Ct. 1956).
Muschetti v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 208 Misc. 870, 144 N.Y.S.2d 235 (Sup.
Ct. I955).
In re Scanelli, 208 Misc. 8o4, 142 N.Y.S.:zd 4II (Surr. Ct. 1955).
In re Roberts' Estate, I58 Misc. 6g8, 286 N.Y.S. 476 (Surr. Ct. 1936)
(Decided before Woods v. Lancet, supra, but still followed as to stillborn in
Logan's Estate, supra).
4· No Recovery When Stillborn in Jurisdictions Where No Decisions on Rights
If Born Alive
NEBRASKA:

Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co., supra (Viable but stillborn).
OKLAHOMA:

Howell v. Rtuhing, supra (Simply following Drabbels case, supra, not
Verkennes case, st~Pra; born dead).
SouTH CAROLINA:

West v. McCoy, supra (Quick but not viable at time of injury but stillborn,
expressly reserving question if viable and born alive).
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c. Sterility and Related Injuries Involving Loss of Children
The type of radiation injury most closely related to genetic damage is
impairment of procreative function caused by irradiation of the reproductive organs. Nevertheless, it is a quite separate injury for sterility
injures the parent and not future generations. Exposure to radiation
possibly will increase so greatly the chances of a deformed child being
produced that the potential parent may decide as a matter of conscience
to avoid propagating a line of defective descendants. He would feel
deprived of procreation powers with the same effect as if he were ac-tually sterile. In either case the question arises as to whether or not
compensation should be awarded to a person who has been made sterile
by radiation or as to whom the likelihood of genetic damage is so great
that he should refrain from having children. The only actual case
known to involve solely the claim of sterility caused by overexposure to
radiation never was brought to court, for at about the time the suit was
to be filed the claimant's wife became pregnant, and the cause of action
vanished because of the legal presumption. In general it is believed that
sufficient whole body radiation to render a person permanently sterile
will prove fatal. Radiation limited to the area of the reproductive organs might not prove fatal, yet might create permanent sterility. Temporary sterility may occur but damages seem so unsubstantial that consideration seems unwarranted.
While no cases exactly in point have been found, the nearest analogies indicate what the courts might do if sterility is proved to have been
caused by radiation and to be of sufficient duration to constitute a serious impairment of the victim's power to propagate. The discussion is
limited to the inability to have children and is not meant to include the
separate problem of impotency. 898
( 1)

Decided Sterility Cases

Allowance of Damages for Sterility Caused by Ordinary Physical
Injuries. There has been very little discussion of the problem of sterility
which does not affect in any way the ability to have sexual intercourse
but which does deprive the person, and his or her spouse in the ordinary
case at least, of the ability to have children. One of the earliest cases
found which deals directly with the question of whether the inability
to have children is an element of damages in a tort action is Denver &
sos See Annot., 23 A.L.R.zd 1378 (1952) on loss of consortium of husband or wife.
Walker, The Law of Damag~s in Scotland 585-86 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Walker]
doubts recovery should or would be allowed in Scotland or England.
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Rio Grande Ry. v. Harris} where the plaintiff was injured by a gunshot
of an employee of the railway in such circumstances that the attack
was a tort. The court said : .
·
One of the consequences of the wound received by the
plaintiff at the hands of the defendant's servants was the loss
of the power to have offspring-a loss resulting directly and,
proximately from the nature of the wound. Evidence of this
fact was, therefore, admissible, although the declaration does
not, in terms, specify such loss as one of the results of the
wound. The court very properly instructed the jury that such
impotency, if caused by the defendant's wrong, might be considered in estimating any compensatory damages to which
the plaintiff might be found, under all the evidence, to be
entitled. 399
While the court here speaks in terms of impotency it is clear that it is
referring also to the inability to have offspring as an element of damage. It is also true that even if this were the kind of assault which justifies punitive as well as compensatory damages, the punitive were
separated from the compensatory. The loss of the power of the plaintiff
to have offspring was dealt with by the court as part of the compensatory damages. Of course, the case involved what would be termed an
intentional tort but the court did not mention this fact in discussing the
question of whether or not the loss of the power to have offspring was
an element in the damages to be allowed.
An equally distinct statement of the opposite position is found in
Landwehr v. Barbas} arising in New York in 1934. Factually the case
is different, but the court considered the same problem. The per curiam
majority opinion was as follows:
The loss of opportunity of childbearing, due to physical injuries of a husband caused by the negligence of a third party,
has never been recognized as giving a cause of action to a
husband or wife against the wrongdoer. There are so many
elements of doubt and conjecture in connection with the birth
of children that it cannot be said that the wrong is the proximate cause of the loss. If the complaint be construed to mean
that because of the injuries the husband has become sexually
impotent, the wife has no cause of action. 400
The dissent was a vigorous one and, after pointing out that the wife's
action really was for the loss of consortium, continued:
We have recognized the right of the wife to recover compensation for the loss of her husband's attentions, caresses, af899
400

122 U.S. 597, 6o8, 7 S.Ct. 1286 (1887).
270 N.Y.S. 534. 535 (1934).
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fection, exclusiveness; then why not for the loss of her right
to motherhood within her marriage contract? Surely this loss
transcends all the others. For its loss through the tort of
another, she is entitled to such compensation as the law can
afford. 401
The dissenting judge does not state what the "law can afford."
The only case found involving exposure to radiation which deals with
the problem of sterility is McElroy v. Frost, 402 discussed before. In that
case the plaintiff was awarded damages in the amount of $29,125 because the negligence of the doctor in treating his scrotum with X-rays
resulted ·in atrophy of the testicles, extensive dermatitis, and a condition
which ultimately would develop into a fatal cancer. In describing the
injury the court stated that "the effect of the treatment on the plaintiff
would be to render him sterile," but said nothing else about damages for
sterility, though upholding the verdict.
A large number of cases have dealt with the childbearing ability of
women who have been in accidents resulting in injury to the pelvic
region. While most of them do not speak in terms of sterility as such,
the cases are analogous and pertinent to the extent that the damages
allowed include an element for the loss of the ability to have children.
An early Alabama case, Alabama Great Southern R. R. v. Hill, contains
an effective presentation of the argument in favor of allowing damage
recovery for injury to a woman's ability to have children. The court
said:
The objection to the testimony of Dr. Drennen, to the effect that plaintiff's injuries were of such character as that
child-bearing would be thereby rendered perilous to life, is
untenable. It may be that she might never have married, even
had she not been injured; or that, marrying, she might have
had no desire to bear children ; or even that, desiring issue, she
might not have had any, as is argued by counsel; but these
considerations can exert no influence on the question. It is to
be assumed that every physical endowment, function and capacity is of importance in the life of every man and woman,
and that occasion will arise for the exercise of each and all of
them. And to that extent to which any function is destroyed,
or its discharge rendered painful or perilous by the wrongful
infliction of personal injury, is the party complaining entitled
to damages. We can, in other words, conceive of no physical
injury, wrongfully inflicted, whether entailing pain only, or
4ot
402

!d. at 536.
Supra note

148.
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disfigurement, or incapacity, relative or absolute, to perform
any of the functions of life, which may not be made the predicate for compensation in damages. 408
The injury to childbearing functions was only one element, there being
other injuries as well as pain and suffering, but the court upheld a verdict for $8,ooo. If the language of the court is to be taken literally and
applied generally it, of course, would support an action for tortious injury to either a man or woman which created an inability to have
children.
In a number of other cases the loss or impairment of the ability of an
injured woman to have children has been an important element in the
damages allowed; for example : (I) $20,000 was allowed to a twenty
year old wife whose head was creased slightly by the defendant's negligently fired bullet, resulting in shock, miscarriage, and later an operation causing sterility; 404 (2) also $7,500 to a thirty-five year old wife
whose negligently caused miscarriage prevented her from conceiving
thereafter without a serious surgical operation to which the court said
the woman need not subject herself in order to reduce damages, the court
saying, "That the loss of fecundity is a proper element of damage in a
personal in jury case is undoubted. . . ." ; 405 ( 3) $9, I so awarded a wife
injured so as to require a serious operation with inability to do housework, the court saying, "The loss of the power of child bearing is certainly an element of damage to be taken into consideration· by the jury,
as much so as an injury to any other part of the human body, and the
question as to whether or not the injury is the reasonable and probable
consequence of the negligent act, is a question of fact for the jury"; 406
(4) awards of $2,500 and $7,500 to husband and wife, respectively,
where the wife's genital organs were injured by tortiously caused miscarriage, the sum later being reduced to $I,500 and $4,000, respectively, because there was no evidence that the condition was permanent,
the court clearly implying that if there were sufficient evidence the higher
amounts would have been approved; 407 (5) $I7,500 for wife and
$2,500 for husband mainly for sterility of wife caused by wrong
blood check/08 and (6) $I5,ooo for the wife and $I2,500 for the husAlabama Great Southern R.R. v. Hill, 93 Ala. 514, 519, 9 So. 722 (1890).
Empire Oil & Refining Co. v. Fields, 188 Okla. 666, 112 P.2d 395 (1940).
405 Potts v. Guthrie, 282 Pa. 200, 203, 127 At!. 6os (1925).
4 06 Normile v. Wheeling Traction Co., 57 W.Va. 132, 14o-41, 49 S.E. 1030 (1905).
407 Geller v. Riccuci, 10 N.J. Misc. 239, rs8 At!. 754 (1932).
•o8 Berg v. N.Y. Society for Relief, 136 N.Y.S.2d 528, 550 (1954).
40 3
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band where the baby was born dead from injuries caused by the defendant's negligence, the court saying:
There can be no doubt at all that there could be a recovery
for a result of an accident which might cause sterility, or
which might otherwise prevent parents from having children.
If, as the result of actionable negligence, a husband or a wife
should be so injured that either, in the future could not expect to produce children, surely this would be taken into consideration as an item of damage. It necessarily follows, we
think, that when parents are actually expecting the arrival of
a child, and they are deprived of the fruition of that great expectation by the actionable negligence of someone else, they
may recover from the tortfeasor as an item of damage for
that particular loss. 409
·
In another group of cases in which the ability to bear children was
either impaired or made impossible, substantial recoveries up to as much
as $85,000 were allowed, though in these cases the loss or impairment
of the ability to bear children either was only mentioned or else the
other damages were very serious, 410 and probably would justify the
total award without considering inability to have children. Such inability was a major item of damages in the previous group of cases.
On the basis of these cases which deal directly with the loss of ability
to have children it seems clear that the majority of jurisdictions will
allow recovery for sterility caused either to a man or a woman by exposure to radiation if the exposure is the result of defendant's negligence or if the doctrine of strict liability is applied to his operation.
One should not draw a conclusion on this question, however, without
taking into account an equally clear majority view on a closely related
question which leads to the opposite conclusion.
Valence v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., so So.2d 847, 849-50 (La. App. 1951 ).
Suburban Transit Corp. v. Malone, 156 F.2d 422 (4th Cir. 1946) (plaintiff, 32
years old, was rendered incapable of bearing children in the ordinary manner and was
awarded $33,125) ; Hider v. Gelbach, 135 F.2d 693 (4th Cir. 1943) (medical testimony was in conflict as to whether plaintiff could safely bear children, but other injuries were present and a verdict of $14,000 was not excessive) ; Shriver v. Silva, 65
Cal. App.zd 753, 151 P.2d 528 ( 1944) (3 year old plaintiff suffered, among other injuries, damage to pelvis impairing childbirth and $4,000 verdict was allowed to stand);
Melton v. Fraering Brokerage Co., 31 So.2d 884 (La. App. 1947) (second and third
degree burns made skin inelastic creating great difficulty in childbearing for unmarried
18 year old plaintiff; $12,000 verdict for suffering, disfigurement, and disability not
excessive); Duvall v. T. W. A., 98 Cal. App.2d 106, 219 P.2d 463 (1950) (childbirth
would threaten wife's life; husband awarded damages).
409
4 10
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( 2) Cases Denying Recovery for Mental Suffering
from Loss of Child
As pointed out in discussing the damages that parents could recover
for injuries to the embryo_ or foetus resulting in stillbirth, it was stated
that almost all cases denied recovery of damages for the mental anguish
and grief that the parent suffered after the birth of the child, even
though mental anguish of the mother during pregnancy after the injury
from fear of death or deformity in the unborn child was a permissible
item. 411 The language in an early Texas case states the argument
against recovery found in most of the cases :
We do not think the death of the child before birth and the
grief or sorrow occasioned thereby can be an element of damages in this character of suit. If it is made to appear from the
testimony that Mrs. Cooper suffered more physical pain,
mental anxiety and alarm on account of her own condition
than she would have done if Dr. Keating had been in attendance upon her, and the failure to secure his services is shown
to be due to the want of proper care on the part of defendant's
servants [the telegraph company], whose duty it was to deliver the message, a fair and reasonable compensation should
be allowed for such increased pain and mental suffering; but
the death of the child, the bereavement of the parents and
their grief for its loss can not be considered as an element of
damages. Such damages are too remote; they are the result
of a secondary cause, and ought not to be allowed to enter
into a verdict. This is not an action under the statute by the
parents for the death of a child, and if it were, injury to the
feelings of the parents could not be a basis of recovery by
them. 412
The Michigan court in Tunnicliffe v. Bay Cities Consol. Ry. also
concluded that the trial court was wrong in allowing the jury to consider as an element of damages the loss of "the society, enjoyment, and
prospective services of the child." 413 The court said that the jury should
not attempt to compensate for the sorrow and grieving of the mother.
An opinion of the New York Court of Appeals in Butler v. Manlulttan
Ry. reached a similar conclusion in the same year and stated the objections to allowing such damages in a manner that has caused its opinion
to be quoted more frequently than any other. The trial court had permitted the jury to consider damages resulting from depriving the plain411
412
413

Supra discussion in text at notes 351-58.
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Cooper, 7I Tex. 507. 51 I-!2, 9
ro2 Mich. 624, 629, 6r N.W. II (1894).

s.w.

598 ( r888).
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tiff of prospective offspring. The Court of Appeals held this to be erroneous:
The difficulty of finding any safe basis upon which to estimate
the pecuniary damages in such cases, has been frequently adverted to by the courts. Whether the infant would have lived
to an age capable of rendering service, and whether the continued life would be a pecuniary benefit or burden, and the
numerous contingencies which may affect the value of the
life make the ascertainment of such value by a jury, in a great
degree, a matter of speculation and conjecture. But where the
inquiry relates to the value of the life of a child cut off in infancy, there are some material facts capable of proof, which
may be placed before the jury and which afford some aid in
estimating the pecuniary loss suffered by parents or other relatives. The age and sex of the infant may be proved, its mental
and physical condition, its bodily strength, and generally
whether there was the apparent promise of a continued or useful life, or the contrary. The speculation which, in the present
case, the jury were permitted to make had not even these safeguards, slight as they are. They were allowed to estimate the
pecuniary interest which a husband had in the chance that an
embryo, not yet quickened into life, would become a living
child. The sex could not be known, and if born alive, the infant might have been destitute of some faculty, or so physically infirm as to have made it a helpless charge. There are no
elements whatever upon which a jury could base any conclusion that a pecuniary injury had been suffered by the plaintiff from the loss of the unborn child, and this inquiry should
have been excluded from the consideration of the jury as too
remote and speculative to form an element in the recovery.
Where a wrong has been done from which pecuniary injury
has resulted, or where injury is the natural or probable result
of a wrong, the injured party is not remediless, although the
extent of the injury is not capable of precise proof. The jury in
such a case may fix the damages within reasonable limits, as
best they may. Actions for defamation or involving recovery
for pain or_ suffering are examples. But where damages
claimed are neither the probable result of the wrong nor capable of proof, they cannot be awarded by the jury. It is not in
the interest of justice to extend the field of speculation in jury
trials beyond its present limits, and to sustain the ruling in
this case- would go beyond what has been hitherto sanctioned
by the courts. 414
u• Butler v. Manhattan Ry-., 143 N.Y. 417, 421-22, 38 N.E. 454 (1894).
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A Missouri appeals court in Finer v. Nichols stated the matter somewhat differently but also emphasized the speculative character of such
damages.
But though a recovery may be had by the mother to the extent
mentioned, the loss of the offspring itself is not to be considered as an injury to her. As the basis of a recovery on the part
of the parent for the death of a child by the negligent act of
another is the value of the service of the child to the parent
during minority, a recovery for the loss of a prospective offspring, it is said, would extend the field of damage into the
realm of mere possibility. Of course, the loss of the anticipated society of the prospective child and mere matters of
sentiment which attend such misfortunes are too remote for
consideration by the courts as a basis for monetary compensation, though the law be humane in its policy and purpose. 415
While there are some cases which seem to indicate a contrary result,416 the cases generally still follow the views expressed in the excerpts just set out. 411 Most of these cases, however, were decided before
1940 and the law has been changing generally on the question of damages and particularly as to mental anguish. In 1955 the Washington
Supreme Court upheld as not erroneous the instruction, "which included, as a factor of damages, the continuing worry and anxiety of
respondent wife up to the time of the trial." us contrary to the general
rule that mental anguish of the mother because of the condition of the
child after birth is not compensable, even though anxiety after injury
but before birth is. 419 McCormick states in his treatise 420 that the general rule (in 1935) is to deny recovery for loss of the child's companionship or mental anguish suffered by the parent, though he indicates
that Nebraska 421 and Wyoming 422 apparently make the "subtle refinement" of allowing .only the "pecuniary loss" sustained by the parents
41 5

Finer v. Nichols, 158 Mo. App. 539, 548-49, 138 S.W. 889 (19II).
Cooper v. Blanck, 39 So.2d (La. App. 1923) and Snow v. Allen, 227 Ala. 615,
151 So. 468 (1933), supra Table of Cases after prenatal section.
417 See cases collected 145 A.L.R. 1104, 11o6-09 (1943), and 10 A.L.R.2d 639, 640-41
(1950). 4 Sutherland, Damages §1252 (4th ed. 1916).
418 Fink v. Dixon, 46 Wash.2d 794, 799, 285 P.2d 557 (1955).
419 See generally discussion of prenatal injury, suPra previous section. Allowing
for anguish before birth, Meeks v. Zimmerman, 223 Ark. 503, 505, 266 S.W.zd 827
(1954), and Champagne v. Hearty, 76 So.zd 453, 455 (La. App. 1954), but denying
later anguish, Duncan v. Martin's Restaurant, 106 N.E.2d 731, 734 (Ill. App. 1952).
42 0 McCormick, Damages 352 ( 1935) [hereinafter cited as McCormick].
42 1 Dow v. Legg, 120 Neb. 271, 231 N.W. 747 (1930).
42 2 Coliseum Motor Co. v. Hester, 43 Wyo. 298, 3 P.zd 105 (1931).
41 6
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because of loss of the child's companionship, not for mental anguish
itself.
\Vhen the courts hold, as almost all do, that the sorrow from loss of
the prospective child is too remote they are holding that this is an item
of damages for which our legal system, as a matter of policy, should
not allow recovery. The nature of the loss, however, is exactly the same
as in cases where a person loses the physical ability to procreate children
(sterility), yet recovery is allowed in the latter situation. The fact that
there has been other physical injury to the mother in the sterility cases
is not a satisfactory distinction because typically there also is other
physical" injury to the mother when a miscarriage results in loss of a
prospective child. If in one case social policy calls for denying recovery
to a parent who cannot have the child he had hoped for, it does in the
other case also. Likewise if the policy dictates allowing recovery in one,
it does in the other.
(3) Claims Under Death Statutes for Grief, Loss of
Society, and Comfort
In analyzing the liability that would or should be imposed for sterility,
account also must be taken of another line of cases dealing with a very
closely related problem where considerably more authority can be found
allowing recovery for loss of the child's society and companionship.
These cases arise under death statutes of one kind or another where the
decedent is not a minor. The great weight of authority apparently holds
that, under death statutes, the sentimental value of the deceased to the
next of kin, the grief or mental anguish of the statutory beneficiaries,
or the loss of comfort, society, and protection are not proper items to be
considered in assessing damages, twenty-seven state supreme courts
having decided cases denying recovery for one or more of these
items. 428 At the same time, in Virginia, West Virginia, Louisiana, and
Florida parents are allowed to recover for their mental pain and suffering resulting from the death of the minor. In Florida recovery for
such damages is specifically authorized by statute.m
Most statutes say nothing about what losses caused by the death are
compensable to next of kin, but most courts limit recovery to pecuniary
423 Annot., 14 A.L.R.2d 485, 495-500 (1950) lists Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Mississippi,
Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Washington,
and Wisconsin.
4 24 See Annot., 14 A.L.R.zd 485, 496-97 ( 1950).
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losses such as of prospective support. Loss of companionship-the only
loss caused by sterility-is not compensable. The most significant cases
under the various death statutes are those in several jurisdictions which
have allowed the parents to recover for the loss of "comfort, society,
and protection." Some of the very jurisdictions that do not allow recovery for sentimental value of the decedent to the next of kin, do allow
it for "comfort, society, and protection." The cases, however, do not
make it clear just what part protection plays in recovery or what the
relationship is to the loss of services and other financial benefits that
might be derived from a child. At least seven states have permitted recovery for loss of "comfort, society, and protection." 425 All of these
cases are based upon the rights of beneficiaries under some type of death
statute, typically wrongful death statutes patterned after the one
adopted in England. 426 The statutory language is such as to leave it to
the court to decide what type of losses should be considered compensable.
The decision of the Supreme Court of Utah in the relatively recent
case of Van Cleave v. Lynch 427 summarizes rather well the position
taken by those courts which have allowed damages under wrongful
death statutes. In approving an instruction of the trial court to the jury
that "you should also take into consideration the financial loss to the
plaintiff of the boy's comfort, society and companionship," the Supreme
Court said:
The theory that a parent should receive compensation only for
actual loss of earnings of a child killed by the negligent acts
of another, has not only been obliterated by time and social
changes, but by sound reasoning. Since a right of action is
granted for wrongful death, if mere earning capacity were the
criterion for measuring the amount of recovery, then in the
case of the wrongful death of a hopelessly crippled child
·through the negligence of a defendant it could be claimed
with some semblance of reason that no recovery at all should
be allowed, because the parent bringing the suit would be better off financially as a result of the death by being relieved of
the obligation to support one who would always be financially dependent. While children still frequently contribute to
the support of their families, their status in society cannot
be measured merely in terms of what they are able to do for
425 /d. at 498-500. California, Hawaii, Idaho, Louisiana, Mississippi, Utah, and
Virginia.
4 2 6 Lord Campbell's Act, Fatal Accidents Act of 1846, 9 & 10 Viet. c. 93· For a
history of this type of statute see Prosser 709-10.
427 109 Utah 149, 166 P.zd 244 (1946).
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the financial aid of their parents. In many cases the cost of
rearing children far exceeds all possible earning capacity.
Nevertheless children are sought, not for their financial possibilities, but for love, companionship and ha.ppiness which
transcend all financial considerations.
In the final analysis there is no actual quid pro quo for
wrongful death. The loss of a loved one cannot be measured
with any degree of exactness, although the right of action
granted for wrongful death provides indemnity only in terms
of money. While earning capacity in some cases might be an
important element, it is not the only element; and as a relative
matter, it may shrink in importance as the age of the person
is considered either by reason of greatly advanced age or by
childhood when earning capacity is absent. While the instruction given in this case relative to measure of damages is not
a model instruction and does not entirely accord with our
views, we conclude that there is· no reversible error! 28

The court in no ""·ay emphasizes the language "financial loss" found
in the trial court's instruction so one is uncertain as to whether this is
an attempt to attach a monetary value to the comfort, protection, and
sense of security which parents might feel in contemplating the prospect
of a child, once he is of age, taking care of them in their old age or in
an emergency, or whether it is simply an attempt to equate in monetary
terms the sentimental value of the companionship of the children. 429
One gets the feeling in reading the Utah opinion, however, that it is
the latter that is being compensated. A $10,000 general and $345
special damages award was upheld although the child was only six
years old when killed.
The jurisdiction in which there has been the greatest development in
this type of recovery and the rules to govern it is California.m Attempts by the California court to place some limit on the recovery for
this element of damages have not prevented substantial verdicts for
this item alone. 431
. Jurisdictions which do not allow recovery for prenatal injuries because there is no legally recognized injury of course cut off any rights
4~8

/d. at 161-62. (Emphasis added.)
Supra notes 421, 422.
48° See Annot., 14 A.L.R.2d 485, 499, 500 (I 950).
481 Where deceased was- age 5, $I8,soo was awarded in Tyson v. Romey, 88 Cal.
App.2d 752, 199 P.2d 721 ( 1948) ; awards of $5,000 each were made where deceased
were 8 months and 6! years old, respectively, United States v. Guyer, 218 F.2d 266, ·:z69
(4th Cir. 1954); se~ also Wytupeck .v. City of Camden, 25 N.J. 850, 136 A.2d 887
(1957). Walker 582-85, .636, indicates only very moderate awards are given for very
young children. See also id. at· 591-92.
429
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of personal representatives under survival statutes. They also deny recovery to parents or other statutory beneficiaries under wrongful death
statutes. 482 The same is true in Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Wisconsin,
where courts have held that there can be no recovery by parents under
wrongful death statute when the foetus is born dead. 483 If recovery
should be allowed in these three states when the injured foetus is born
alive, perhaps a survival act suit would be permitted if the child died
before trial. In those jurisdictions where a cause of action has been
allowed under the wrongful death statute where the foetus was born
dead, the only question raised was whether or not a cause of action existed, and no indication was given of what elements would enter into
the recovery if causation were proved. 434 No indication is given as to
the permissibility of a survival action.
Some obvious distinctions between the kinds of rights discussed
above can be made. It seems quite unrealistic to expect any court to extend any concept of person under the wrongful death statutes to cover
the genes in the potential mother or father and the organs in each which
produce the gene-carrying material, so there can be no recovery in the
name of the child not yet conceived. The theory of a survival type of
death statute, that the wrongdoer pay the next of kin what he would
have had to pay the deceased had he lived, is different from the right of
the parents to recover for the mental anguish or perhaps more importantly the loss of society and companionship of the child. Nevertheless,
in the usual case, the next of kin are going to be the parents or other
very close relatives. Therefore, anything above the loss of prospective
support from the child (which in the case of children under ten surely
is minimal in the light of the cost of raising children under modern
economic conditions) is really going to be granted on the basis of loss
of society and companionship.
If this is true, then the law ought not to reach a different result when
the action is brought under a death statute than when it is brought by
the parents themselves to recover for the sentimental loss of the society
or companionship of the child. Recovery ought to be allowed or denied
for this kind of sentimental loss on the basis of social policy, not on the

a

4B 2 See Table of Cases supra at end of prenatal injury section. Some courts clearly
decided this since the actions were based on such statutes where the child died before
suit was brought. Others denying an action to a surviving injured child surely would
reach the same conclusion.
433/bid.
48 4 Minnesota, Mississippi, and Kentucky. See Table of Cases supra at end of prenatal injury section. For a general discussion of survival and wrongful death statutes
and the theories underlying them see Prosser 705-19.
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basis of whether or not we can find a separate legal entity in whose
name the cause of action can be brought. When an older child dies, recovery may be premised on a real pecuniary loss in the form of expected
financial help, but when a small child dies the recovery in reality is for
sentimental loss. It is submitted that loss for sterility, aside from pain
and suffering attendant on the physical injury causing sterility, in
reality is for loss of a prospective child.
(4) Some Suggestions for Revision of the Law of
Damages
As suggested before/ 35 the law of damages ansmg from death is
badly in need of an over-all revision. The treatment of inability to have
children and loss of children is simply another example of how artificial,
if not downright absurd, distinctions have become in this area. 436 If
parents are permitted to recover for loss of society and companionship,
as clearly they are in some of the cases discussed above, then recovery
should be allowed when the capacity to have children has been impaired
through the negligence of another. On the other hand, if recovery is
to be denied in one case, so also should it be denied in the other.
One obvious distinction can be made, of course; in cases of sterility
there has been an actual impact on the body of the plaintiff parent,
clearly physical in nature even if caused by radiation. This is not true,
however, where the loss by way of sentimental value is because of the
post-natal death of a child, or even while in the mother's womb so far
as the father is concerned. This is also not true for the mother when
the child is killed after birth. This distinction might be used by courts
in loss of children actions, as it is in cases where mental anguish is
allowed where there is physical impact on the plaintiff but not where this
is absent. In sterility cases caused by radiation there will be impact, but
this is not always true in other cases of inability to have children. In
any event it would seem to be an artificial and unrealistic distinction. If
anything, parental suffering from loss of society and companionship of
an existing child is more realistic and provable than much of the mental
anguish for which recovery is allowed in cases where there has been a
slight impact. 487 The pain and suffering and loss of society, companionship, and comfort of the child is surely much less remote in these circumstances than in the case where a prospective parent has been made
sterile. Yet, if anything, the existing cases would seem to allow recov4 35
436
4 37

See text discussion beginning at note 382. See also Prosser 719.
See all of the distinctions in Annot., 14 A.L.R.2d 485 (1950). See Prosser 6g2-93·
See discussion of psychological injuries infra at note 594·
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ery for sterility but not for the loss of society, companionship, and
comfort of the child. If one takes an over-all view of the damage problem, it would seem to make more sense if the law were just the opposite.
One possible additional reason for allowing damages in sterility
cases, which is not present where the loss is of a child actually conceived
or already born, is the loss of capacity to reproduce. Even this distinction is not a tenable one in most cases. Where the parent is beyond the
age of reproduction, which might be the case so far as the mother is
concerned, the loss of the child is in effect deprivation of the right to
have one's own children. In addition, it is arguable that so far as the
companionship of children is concerned, the loss is exactly the same, if
not more real, when it concerns a child already born rather than one
possibly to be conceived in the future. The only additional damage to
the plaintiff in the sterility case is the possibility that this will make the
person undesirable as a potential mate in marriage. 438 The possibility
of adoption may mitigate even this damage. It sometimes is difficult to
arrange adoption legally, of course, but it also may be very difficult to
conceive and give birth to a child, not to mention keeping him alive and
healthy. Certainly, if any damages are to be allowed at all for sterility
they ought to be limited to the factor of decrease in marriage potential
and not for loss of potential companionship and comfort of children,
unless the law also is ready to grant parents bereaved by the death of an
existing child the same kind of recovery.
Whether to allow recovery for loss of companionship of a child, existing or potential, raises a very serious social policy question of
whether our society can afford to absorb the economic burden of a loss
not only speculative but little assuaged by money. A new hat or a new
car· seldom has any real effect on as serious an emotional shock as is
involved in the loss of children. If recovery is to be allowed for this loss
it ought to be allowed in all situations which actually raise the same
considerations, and the suggestion of placing some kind of maximum
limit, at a very low level, on this element of damages would not be
amiss. 439 The lawyer, in predicting what the courts and juries will do in
actual cases, however, must not lose sight of the fact that the right to
438 See Carter, "Assessment of Damages for Personal Injuries or Death in the Courts
of Common-law Provinces,'' 32 Can. Bar Rev. 713, 725 (1954), pointing out when this
is an allowable item. Such recovery has been allowed in Scotland, Walker 6o1, citing
cases. Such damages were denied in City of Amarillo v. Rust, 45 S.W.2d 285, 290
(Tex. Civ. App. 1932) on the particular facts, 12 year old girl and only scars, but
there was a clear implication that damages might be awarded where impairment is
clearer.
439 See Plant, supra note 381.
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have children of one's own blood is an interest highly regarded in our
society and Joss of this interest constitutes an invasion of the body of
the plaintiff parent or potential parent. It therefore would not be surprising if courts and juries continued to allow the incapacity to have
children, quite separate from the physical damage and pain and suffering involved in the accident causing sterility, as a recoverable item of
damage in tort cases and at the same time continue to deny recovery
to parents for their mental sufferings, including loss of companionship,
where the tort has caused death of an already born child. It is submitted, however, that pecuniary recovery for the death of a child does
not fit very comfortably into a compensatory theory of damages.
There should be a considerable increase in such cases with the expanded use of radiation. Exposure of potential parents undoubtedly
will occur in such amounts that thereafter in all good conscience they
ought to refrain from having children because of the real danger of
genetic mutations. There is the additional possibility of sterility itself
being caused directly by radiation. Here again radiation cases will give
the law an opportunity to take a more comprehensive, over-all look at
the varied and conflicting rules concerning damages which have developed in separate types of cases, all in splendid isolation from each
other and without adequate realization on the part of the legal profession of the similarity, if not complete identity, of the social factors
underlying the various situations. Perhaps the explanation for the lack
of cases dealing with the separate problem of sterility is that lawyers
have just assumed, as the Alabama court did, 440 that since the power to
have children is a normal attribute of human beings, any loss of this
power is a compensable injury. This uncritical assumptive type of reasoning is at least partly responsible for the unsatisfactory state of present rules as to damages. A beginning should be made in working out
more logically consistent patterns of damage recovery than exist at
present. The relationship between sterility, the rights of the parents for
loss of children, and causes of action under the death statutes is. one of
the areas where much more satisfactory analysis needs to be made of
the underlying social policy questions involved in defining damages. It
fits into the whole pattern of the growing trend of recovery, sometimes
in very large amounts, for damages for mental disturbance. Any solutions to problems here suggested should not be worked out in isolation
from these other more general problems of mental disturbance. We
make the above suggestions as a starting point toward such a study.
440

Supra note 403.
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d. Increased Susceptibility to Disease
One of the attributes of a healthy human body is a considerable
power to resist disease, though this ability differs among individuals
and even within the same individual from time to time under varying
circumstances. One of the possible results of overexposure to radiation
is a reduction in the ability to resist diseases. 441 Actually, there are two
aspects of increased susceptibility to disease, at least in radiation cases.
One is the increased susceptibility to a specific disease such as leukemia, cataract of the eye, or cancer of the bone. As to this type of injury the normal rules of damages provide some answers which are
sometimes adequate where the injury or disease appears within the
statute of limitations and before trial. Very little has been said even in
court opinions, however, about whether or not an increased risk that a
specific injury will develop at a future date is a compensable item of
damages. The question is, does a present predisposition to a particular
disease or. injury warrant compensation, and if so to what extent?
The second aspect is even more difficult to handle under existing
cases; this is whether or not an increase in general susceptibility to all
diseases is a compensable item of damages in a tort case. It may prove
to be true that as a person accumulates radiation exposure he increases
his susceptibility to disease generally by lowering his normal resistance.
This latter aspect has escaped the· attention of legal writers and court
opinions have ignored it almost as completely, probably because it is
very unlikely in most cases. It will be present to some degree, however, in
most cases involving overexposure to radiation. Some possibly analogous cases and concepts give a little indication of what the courts will
do with these two problems when they arise. As is so often the case in
tori litigation, damage questions are lumped together into one over-all
judgment. Even where individual items entering into the total judgment are enumerated, there usually is no separate treatment by the
court of whether the future possibilities are compensable because the
court is satisfied that the existing injuries, where serious, justify the
verdict and do not call for overruling the judgment' as excessive.

( 1) Non-Radiation Cases
(a) Cases Involving Recurrence of Existing Injury
Some courts in non-radiation injury cases have considered the problem of a possible subsequent disease or injury not manifested at the
Hl

See discussion inff'a at notes

IIoo-I 103.
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time of the trial. For example, in Mooney v. McCarthy/ 42 while the
court reversed the judgment for the plaintiff because of a problem concerning apportionment between two defendants, it seems to have allowed, as an item of damages, the possibility of a later recurrence of
tuberculosis. The court said:
The evidence regarding her injuries was such that defendant
requested the court to charge the jury, in substance, that
there was not sufficient evidence upon which they could find
that there would be a recurrence of the tubercular trouble and,
therefore, if their verdict was for plaintiff, they should not
consider such condition as an element of damages, and to its
failure so to do excepted. . . .
[The doctor testified that] . . . he had not yet "any positive opinion that it (the disease) has begun to be active, but
more a very definite fear that it may begin" ; but he testified
that such fear was based on his judgment and experience. He
testified, too, on cross-examination, that he had no definite
evidence that a pulmonary change had taken place, and that
whether or not one would was entirely speculation. But in
answer to the next question, which was : "Q. It is merely a
matter of speculation, she may start getting better any time
or start getting worse any time, that is about the way it is?"
he modified his previous answer thus : "I would say more a
matter of judgment than just a rank speculation." . . .
It thus appears that while some of the doctor's testimony,
standing alone, supports defendant's claim, taken as a whole
it does not. Although he did not state positively that it was
his judgment that there would be a recurrence of the disease,
the evidence clearly justified the inference that such was his
belief. . . . Undoubtedly the verdict included damages for
future disability due to a recurrence of the tubercular condition.448
·
Here the court approves as one item of damages susceptibility to a future
specific disease.
Again a lower California court in 1957 upheld a verdict of $2,500 for
injuries in the nature of a severe sprain or strain of the muscles in the
plaintiff's shoulder and neck sustained when she fell in defendant's
building. The court included as one justification for affirmance the
statement : " [ S] he would have intermittent episodes of muscle trouble
for a long time with the probability of its being permanent." 444 Here
again, as in the Mooney case, the expert testimony as to the likelihood
442

107 Vt. 425, 181 Atl. 117 (1935).
.
Handley v. Capital Co., 313 P.2d 918, 922 (Cal. App. 1957).

ua /d. at 428-29.
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of future injury was based on a judgment concerning a physical condition already existing and the possible future injury would be a continuation or recurrence of this same specific injury.
In upholding a $2,500 verdict for the plaintiff the Nebraska court in
another recent case said :
There is evidence that plaintiff suffered a severe cerebral concussion of the brain and that pain, suffering, and disability
could normally first manifest itself within a period of years
after the accident. There is evidence that plaintiff had an abnormal blinking or twitching of one eye, which the medical
witnesses could not rule out as not being caused by the concussion. The evidence shows that plaintiff not only might
show manifestations of damage to his nervous system for a
period of years in the future, but there was evidence that he in
fact was manifesting such damage at the time of the trial. 445
This could be treated as allowing evidence of only increased future
severity of a presently manifested injury.
The Minnesota court in a very recent case also had occasion to consider future injuries not yet manifested and upheld them as an item
of damage in the following language : ·
While there was no testimony that she was permanently injured, there was substantial opinion evidence to the effect
that a disc injury such as she sustained would in all likelihood
cause future difficulties and pain; and that, because of the
weakened condition which usually remains in the area where
such an injury occurs, there was a strong possibility of its
recurrence here. . . . Based on such testimony, the trial
court charged the jury that plaintiff might recover "for any
future pain and suffering * * * which you have found is reasonably certain she will endure in the future." While Dr.
Gingold conceded that there was no present indication that
plaintiff would suffer a recurrence of the disc injury, his
opinion that there was a strong likelihood of recurrence, based
upon the history of such cases generally, as well as his testimony with reference to the present arthritic condition of
plaintiff, would seem sufficient to justify the instruction complained of.
. . . While he stated on cross-examination that in any particular case, including plaintiff's, he could not say with positive
certainty that there would be such a recurrence unless there
was an opportunity for closer examination of the injury
through surgery, nevertheless it is clear from the sum total
445

Eden v. Klaas, 89 N.W.2d 74, 81 (Neb. 1958).
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of his testimony that he was reasonably certain there would be
a recurrence here. 446

Here a rather specific future injury could be treated by the jury as one
item of recovery. Again, the injury was a recurrent one, not a different
one. The damages were awarded, however, for injuries that would
manifest themselves later; recovery was allowed for likelihood or increased susceptibility.
(b) Cases Involving Injury of a Type Different
from Current Injury
In a Nebraska case, Schwarting v. Ogram, 441 a $15,000 judgment
was upheld as not excessive and one of the items of damages was a
prediction of a future injury that had not yet become apparent but
which might result from injuries to the head. The court did not discuss
the question of the validity of including this future development but
did point out in justifying the verdict:
. . . [I]t was testified that, as a result of these conditions,
traumatic epilepsy will develop, all as a result of this accident, and that this condition is permanent and cannot be
cured ; that the trouble with her ear is due to a change in the
brain tissues that has come from a contraction of the scar
formed at the basal skull fracture. One physician testified that
she is progressing towards traumatic insanity. 448
This is approval of a specific future injury, not increased susceptibility
to diseases generally. The future injury was only one item of damages
among several.
In a case involving a severe burn to a metal worker through a fellow
worker's negligence, the North Carolina court said:
It is assigned as error that the court permitted the physician
to state that the character of the plaintiff's wound was such
that a sarcoma, or eating cancer, was liable to ensue. We recognize the general rule that an expert physician testifying to
the consequences of a personal injury should be confined to
probable consequences, but in this instance we do not think
the physician indulged in pure speculation. . . . The word
"liable" is defined as "exposed to a certain contingency more
or less probable." . . . The word was used by the witness in
the sense of probable, and was doubtless so understood by
the jury. 449
Derrick v. St. Paul City Ry., 89 N.W.2d 629, 633-34 (Minn. 1958).
123 Neb. 76, 242 N.W. 273 (1932).
us !d. at 87.
449 Alley v. Charlotte Pipe & Foundry Co., 159 N.C. 327, 330, 74 S.E. 885 (1912).
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Here a specific future disease was one of several items of damage, but
the evidence was allowed and probably influenced the jury somewhat
in determining the amount of the award.
In both the Nebraska and North Carolina cases the holdings go further than the previous ones in that the future injury was not just a
recurrence of an existing injury but rather was of a new kind.

( 2) Radiation Cases
In two of the eases discussed in connection with breach of the standard of conduct the courts apparently included as an item of damage the
future possibility of cancer occurring as the result of X-ray injury. In
the case of Gross v. Robinson/50 the Missouri appeals court said that
the testimony of the expert witness that an X-ray burn " . . . would
probably become malignant," was properly considered. Likewise in
McElroy v. Frost 451 the supreme court approved evidence indicating
that the X-ray burns of the plaintiff's testicles ultimately would develop
into a cancer of a fatal type.
One other case involving radiation burns has dealt with the possibility of a future disease. In Coover v. Painless Parker, Dentist 452 the
California appellate court upheld the verdict of $10,250 for damages resulting from X-ray burns caused by overexposure during dental X-ray
photography. The defendant contended that the amount was excessive
among other reasons because the evidence admitted as to the possibility
of future development of cancer was wholly conjectural. The court said:
While the actual condition of cancer may have been conjectural and uncertain, the record contains positive evidence that
a condition actually exists which makes this dread disease
much more likely. We think this predisposition in itself is some
damage, and when caused by the wrongful act of another it
is an interference with the normal and natural conditions and
rights of the other, which must be held to be a real and not a
fanciful element of damage. The necessity of constantly
watching and guarding against cancer, as testified to by the
physician, is an obligation and a burden that the defendant
had no right to inflict upon the plaintiff. m
Supra note 159 at 121.
Supra note 148.
452 105 Cal. App. no; 286 Pac. 1048 (1930).
450
451

4 5 3Jd. at us. (Emphasis added.) See also O'Connell v. Westinghouse X-Ray Co.,
16 N.Y.S.2d 54 (1939), reversed on contributory negligence grounds, 24 N.Y.S.2d 268
(1940), reversed and remanded for trial :z88 N.Y. 486 (1942).
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This is the only radiation case found which seems clearly to have
considered the justification for allowing recovery for predisposition
only and then allowed recovery, because the courts in the Gross and
McElroy cases merely mention the evidence of predisposition and approve its admission without discussion. In each case the amount
awarded apparently was fully justified by other very serious injuries.
In all three cases the future injury was a specific one, cancer, but
in a real sense it was not a recurrence of an existing condition. On
the other hand, it was a development from an existing compensable
injury, the X-ray burn.
In none of the cases discussed did the court consider how probable
or certain a future injury must be to justify recovery.
(3) The Standard of Proof Required to Prove Future
Injury
The doctor's testimony in the Coover case included the following
answer to a question as to whether or not Mrs. Coover might be in
danger of a cancerous growth:
I do not say that she has a cancerous growth, she does not,
but a cancer may develop on this area-it is common. . . .
On this senile skin not infrequently develops new growths,
little neoplasm, warty growths, and from these warty growths,
the carcinoma develops; sometimes that is a year, sometimes
it is two years-sometimes it is three or four years before
they develop. 454
The doctor was allowed to testify as to a condition that only ~'may
develop" but the opinion does not indicate that the court was giving
serious consideration to how probable the occurrence of the future
injury must be.
Two other cases involving future injuries give some indication of
how certain proof of the future injury must be. One is Light v. Foreman, m decided rather recently in the sixth federal circuit. The court
upheld a $sr,soo verdict against an objection that the plaintiff doctor
had testified to the ~'loss of earning ability at some time in the future
when appellee would become unable to continue his present employment because of injury to the first sacral nerve root, which would probably become worse over a period of years and cause complete inability
to work." Against defendant's objection that such damages must be
454
455

/d. at IIJ-14. (Emphasis added.)
238 F.2d 817 (6th Cir_- 1956).
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shown with "reasonable certainty" the court said that the witness's
testimony could not be treated as a conjecture, and "The fact that it
dealt with future probabilities does not make. it incompetent." 456 The
court's ruling allows evidence of a specific future injury disability to
be considered by the jury.
The Louisiana appeal court in Guillory v. Lemoine apparently approved the lower court's allowing of about $2,500 of the verdict because of the severe fracture of the skull which umight [emphasis added]
cause trouble in the future." The expenses had been $1,91 I and the
award of $2,500 was considered sufficient by the trial court since it felt
that "there is very little, if any, permanent disability." m Perhaps the
court is approving reducing the amount of recovery proportionate to
the degree of certainty that the injury will occur.
A much less liberal attitude in a non-radiation case was expressed
by the Vermont court in Howley v. Kantor/ 58 where the plaintiff's witness, a doctor, testified that an abnormal growth in plaintiff's left breast
was caused by the blow and· stated that in his judgment, ·taking the
situation as found on physical examination, it would "run about eighty
per cent cancerous." The doctor also testified that "as it stands it may
be one as well as the other," and "what it is at this stage is pure speculation." The court held that it was erroneous to refuse the defendant's
request to charge the jury that the evidence was not sufficient to justify
a finding that cancer existed and that they should not consider it as an
element of damages.
To support such a claim, the evidence must be of such a character that the jury can find that there is a reasonable certainty
or a reasonable probability that the apprehended future consequences will ensue from the original injury. Consequences
which are contingent, speculative, or merely possible are not
entitled to consideration in ascertaining the damages. . . .
The record before us does not disclose any opinion of the
medical witness as to the probable future development and result of the plaintiff's breast condition. His answer, "run about
eighty per cent. cancerous," does not have the effect claimed
for it. The witness did not say that in his opinion the chances
are eighty per cent. that the growth is cancerous, but, rather,
as is clearly indicated, that from his experience and the history
of other cases injury to the breast producing tumor developed
about eighty per cent. cancerous.*fi9
456 !d. at 818. The two cases cited for the latter proposition do not really support
the conclusion.
457 87 So.2d 798, 802 (La. App. 1956).
458 105 Vt. 128, 163 Atl. 628 ( 1933).
459 !d. at 133.
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This clearly is denying recovery for the predisposition to cancer, contrary to the suggestion in the Coover case. It seems to be placing the
emphasis upon whether or not the cancerous condition actually exists
at the time of trial.
The test apparently applied by the courts in these few decided cases
is similar to that applied in determining whether to allow the jury to
consider future pain and suffering as an element of damages for
physical injury. There has been a considerable difference of opinion
among courts in the United States as to whether, in considering future
pain and suffering, the test should be one of "reasonable certainty" or
"reasonable probability," there being a thousand opinions dealing with
the point. 460 It surely is fair to question whether the difference between
reasonably certain and reasonably probable has any significance for a
jury, the distinction being rather subtle at best. The application of this
same test in predicting future injuries (not pain and suffering) is well
illustrated in a recent New Jersey opinion in Budden v. Goldstein.m
The case involved a hernia, negligently caused by the defendant, and
the expert testimony included speculation as to what possibly might
happen when a person had a hernia, some of the possibilities, though
not likely, being fairly serious. The court felt that the testimony allowed
too much speculation.
In the admeasurement of damages, it is well known that no
recovery can be allowed for possible future consequences of an
injury inflicted by a wrongdoer. . . . In order for suggested
future results to be includible as an element of damage, it
must appear that they are reasonably certain or reasonably
probable to follow. . . .
The A. L. R. annotation, supra, indicates that many of the
authorities throughout the country use the expression "reasonably certain" or "reasonable certainty" as the test and
consider "reasonably probable" or "reasonable probability"
inadequate and erroneous; others accept the latter statement.
Our cases do not seem to have dealt specifically with the question of whether the two have the same significance in relation
to quantum of proof, and so may be used interchangeably. It
seems to us that in a resolution of the conflicting interests involved, reasonable probability is the just yardstick to be ap460 Annot., 81 A.L.R. 423 (1932), a long annotation listing at least 1,000 cases on
the problem, not all of which have been read by the present authors. For a recent
case on pain and suffering, see Denco Bus Lines v. Hargis, 204 Okla. 339, 229 P.2d
56o (1951), where the court said it could award for such future pain and suffering "as
may be established by the e~idence." (at 342).
461 43 N.J. Super. 340, 128 A.2d 730 (1957).
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plied. Basically, our view comes down to this: a consequence
of an injury which is possible, which may possibly ensue, is
a risk which the injured person must bear because the law
cannot be administered so as to do reasonably efficient justice
if conjecture and speculation are to be used as a measure of
damages. On the other hand, a consequence which stands on
the plane of reasonable probability, although it is not certain
to occur, may be considered in the evaluation of the damage
claim against the defendant. In this way, to the extent that
men can achieve justice through general rules, a just balance
of the warring interests is accomplished.m ·
A similar result was reached in a recent Wisconsin case where the
doctor testified, "All I can say is there is a possibility." The court
said that to justify the assessment of damages for future permanent
disability "it must appear that such continued disability is reasonably
certain to result from the injury complained of." 463
( 4) Conclusions
(a) When a Specific Injury Is Feared
Although few decisions have dealt specifically with predisposition
caused by radiation, it may be predicted with some assurance that,
where a specific type of injury such as leukemia, cataract, or bone cancer can be predicted as resulting from a specific exposure to radiation,
there will be recovery, at least if there is expert testimony indicating
either a reasonable certainty or a reasonable probability of occurrence.
The existence of other present compensable injuries should not be required although none of the cases found involved only future injury.
There would seem to be no justification for applying the stricter standard of proof that is generally applied to the mental disturbance or
mental anguish cases where the courts have been so concerned with
the possibility of fraudulent claims. If the future injury is of a physical
rather than mental nature, and likelihood of occurrence is proved by
competent medical testimony as to probability, the usual rule of "more
probable than not," used in negligence cases as to present injuries,
should apply. If reasonable probability, or perhaps the stricter test of
reasonable certainty, indicates that something higher than eighty per
cent certainty is demanded (as apparently required in Vermont), 464 this
puts an unreasonable burden on the plaintiff. Unless the law is to adopt
462

/d. at 346-47.
Kowalke v. Farmers Mutual Automobile Ins., 88 N.W.2d 747, 756 (Wis. 1958).
464 See Howley v. Kantor, supra note 458.
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some insurance scheme whereby the defendant is charged in accordance
with the probability he has created, even if it is less than fifty per cent,
as is suggested in the discussion of proof of causation, 465 then in the
case of potential future injuries it might be better to adopt simply the
preponderance of probability as the test.
The one other possibility is to adopt the idea suggested in the Coover
case, that damages could be awarded for an existing predisposition to
a future injury, the assumption being that the amount of damages
would be greater or less as the predisposition to the future disease or
injury is greater or less. The difficulty with all of the existing tests is
that they inevitably either lead to windfalls for those plaintiffs who
are awarded damages but do not develop the injury or disease later on,
or unfairly penalize other plaintiffs where the likelihood of future injuries is not great but the injury actually does develop. This is inherent in our present system of damages, where recovery is based on
an ali-or-nothing philosophy, and a line must be drawn somewhere
between one hundred per cent certainty and one chance in a billion.
(b) When Future Injury Is Only Increased Susceptibility to Disease Generally
All of the cases discussed above deal with the possibility of a specific
injury occurring in the future. They in no way indicate whether recovery would or should be allowed where the possibility is not the development of some specific injury or disease but is simply the reduction
of the ability of the body to fight off diseases in general, whether it be
the common cold, pneumonia, or any other disease, common or rare,
communicable or not. The Coover case 466 is not authority for recovery
for this item of damages. It dealt with the predisposition to a specific
injury, i.e., development of cancer in the area which had suffered the
X-ray burns. In addition, the likelihood of such development was
great, according to the testimony, possibly even sufficient to satisfy the
reasonably probable or reasonably certain rule. The language of the
Nevada court in Murphy v. Southern Pacific Co! 61 is probably in the
same category as that found in the Coover case. The plaintiff's leg was
hurt in a train accident and varicose veins later developed in his leg.
The jury found that the varicose vein condition resulted from the leg
Infra, recommendations discussion following note 1123.
Supra note 452.
467 31 Nev. 120, 101 Pac. j22 (1909).
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bruises and awarded $7,500 damages. In upholding this verdict the
court said:
So, if a physical injury, the result of negligence, leaves the
constitution of the injured person in a broken and shattered
condition, creating an increased susceptibility to a particula:r
disease, and that disease follows, although after a considerable
lapse of time, and death results from it, the person or corporation inflicting the injury may be liable, if, in the opinion of the
jury, the injury, and the sickness and debility following it,
concurred in and contributed to the attack of the particular
disease which finally carried the injured person off!68
The court, however, here speaks of the "constitution" of the plaintiff,
apparently referring to the general condition of health rather than a
particular part of a body such as injured skin as in the Coover case.
In allowing a $4,000 verdict to stand, the Arizona court in Coppinger v. Broderick 469 held that future pain and suffering of the injured person was a proper item of compensation and said:
The apprehended future consequences of an injury, in other
words, should be reasonably certain. They are seldom or
never suspectible to anything like absolute accuracy of calculation. From their very nature, they must be measured by a
rule more or less flexible. The injuries may be so serious as
to indicate that the person injured will suffer pain the rest of
his life, and yet the restorative processes of nature may in an
unexpectedly short time heal the wounds. The injuries, on the
contrary, may seem trivial, but progressively undermine the
constitution of the injured person.m
The court at the end of its opinion concluded that the jury's verdict
was not excessive in the light of the evidence and said, "That her general health was affected and that she will probably suffer. throughout
her life as a result of the blow and shock seems evident." 471 Here again
the court speaks of the "constitution" of the injured person and of her
"general health." No reference is made at all to a specific injury that
might result.
A similar kind of reference to the general effect on health is found
in Foster v. Donora Southern R. R.'112 where the federal district court
found $25,000 not excessive since the residual pain would call for
•as !d. at 126, quoting from I Thompson, Negligence §154 (1901). (Emphasis added.)
37 Ariz. 473, 295 Pac. 78o (1931).
470 !d. at 476. (Emphasis added.)
411 /d. at 479m 144 F. Supp. 297 (D.C. Pa. 1956).
469
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treatment over an extended period of time and there is evidence "sufficient to support the conclusion that plaintiff's pain will continue for
the remainder of his life, with a strong probability of his physical condition deteriorating." 478 The court here again seems to be accepting
deterioration in general physical condition as an item of damages which
will support a very substantial verdict.
The case of Caylor v. Virden,m decided by the Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit perhaps is pertinent here. The plaintiff had been
forgotten by the doctor and stayed under the treatment machine for
three and one half hours instead of the fifteen minutes that should
have been the maximum period. He got panicky and stumbled out of
the room after falling off the table when no one answered his calls for
help. The court concluded that the jury was· justified in saying that
he may have received a physical injury while he was under the X-ray
machine, not just mental anguish and shock. He had testified that
"Everything made me nervous and I was just nervous and everything
bothered me. I don't know how to explain how I knew I was nervous
nor how the nervousness demonstrated itself." 475 The court considered
this testimony sufficient to justify the denial of defendant's motion for
summary judgment. In its opinion the court said:
The mere fact that plaintiff may not have been able to explain the nature of his alleged injury is not, we think, proof
that he suffered no physical injury. He was apparently a well,
robust man when he was placed on the operating table with
this X-ray machine trained on the growth on his cheek. 476
In other words a general deterioration in health was sufficient to support a verdict for the plaintiff.
Along the same line is language found in Alley v. Charlotte Pipe &
Foundry Co., referred to above. 477 This was a case in which the testimony was to the effect that plaintiff's wound was such that a cancer
was likely to ensue. The court also said :
We think the evidence competent also as tending to prove
acute mental suffering accompanying a physical injury. The
liability to cancer must necessarily have a most depressing effect upon the injured person. Like the sword of Damocles,
he knows not when it will fall. 478
m /d. at 2g8. (Emphasis added.)
4 7 4 217 F.2d 739 (8th Cir. 1955).
475 /d. at 743·
476 Ibid.
477 Supra note 449·
478 /d. at 331.
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These cases do not specifically hold that increased susceptibility to
disease is a recoverable item. They do, however, indicate recovery is
permissible for the kind of mental suffering likely to accompany the
possibility of a future injury when there has been overexposure to radiation. 479
Taken as a whole, the cases discussed indicate that evidence of increased susceptibility to a specific disease (and perhaps to diseases generally) is at least admissible provided the necessary degree of certainty
is shown. While none of them deal specifically with the question of a
motion to strike such evidence, the opinions lead one to conclude that
such a motion should be denied. The cases also fail to indicate whether
a specific instruction to the jury permitting them to consider such an
injury as a separate item of damages is permissible, but statements by
the courts in many of the opinions makes it fairly clear that this is
permissible.
One general caution, however, should be kept in mind in considering
these cases. Many hold th:_.tt such evidence does not invalidate a verdict
of a substantial amount without holding specifically that it is permissible to consider it anything but a make-weight in granting general
damages. Nevertheless, the general tenor of many of the opinions is
such as to indicate that a substantial award can be made for increased
susceptibility as a separate item of damages at least if a specific future
injury is shown.
Until more is learned about the scientific aspects of the matter, it is
impossible to predict what a court will do when presented with the claim
of a person whose overexposure to radiation increases his chances of
future disease. If such overexposure should mean that he will be twice
as susceptible to <;ommon colds or other virus infections, or will be
twice as susceptible to pneumonia or some other serious disease, should
his present predisposition be a recoverable item of damages? If not, the
future injury will likely not result until the statute of limitations precludes his right to sue the defendant, 480 certainly a most unfair result
from the plaintiff's standpoint.
On the other hand, to allow full recovery for future injury when the
chances are only fifty or seventy-five per cent is unfair to the defendant
if the future injury actually does not arise. As to this problem, however, the radiation cases present nothing more unrealistic or unjust
than those cases in which the future possibility of pain and suffering or
479
480

See, e.g., the Benjamin .Zawacki case, infra Chapter V at section I
Infra note 1038.

2
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physical injury is allowed as a collateral item to damages for existing
injuries. This again demonstrates that we need to re-evaluate our
damage solutions in tort cases and develop a scheme which handles the
probability question more adequately. 481
e. Shortened Life Span
Another injury that can result from overexposure to radiation is a
shortening of the life expectancy of the person so exposed, a type of
injury closely related to decrease of resistance of disease. In many
cases the contracting of a disease that a person otherwise might not
have suffered may either cause death itself or sap some of the body's
vital energy causing death at an earlier age than otherwise would be· the
case. The radiation problem has somewhat different dimensions, however, for there is responsible scientific opinion to the effect that one almost can equate the number of days, weeks, or years that a man will
lose from his normal life span to the amount of radiation exposure he
has had.m It even is asserted by some that every exposure to radiation
reduces the life span to some extent, and that its effect is cumulative so
that if a person is exposed negligently to radiation he has enough respectable scientific opinion at the present time to go to the jury on the
question of whether he has lost a week, month, year, or decade from his
life. When these cases are brought to court, will recovery be allowed
for this type of injury? On this question there is more authority than
for some of the other injuries previously discussed.
In analyzing the problem account should be taken of several different possibilities, although courts seldom have done so. A person may be
exposed to sufficient radiation to cause death almost immediately, although this is rather unlikely. 483 More likely, in the case of exposure
to a lethal dose of radiation, is death within a period of a few weeks
during which time the prospective decedent, if told the facts, would be
perfectly aware that he was going to die. In this case it would be almost
inevitable that death would occur before trial to recover damages for
the injuries. A case that will arise much more frequently is that in
which the amount of irradiation is sufficient that experts could testify
with some degree of certainty that the person exposed would live a
shorter life by days, weeks, months, or years, depending upon the
Infra reconunendations following note 1123.
Infra discussion at notes 1085-93.
488 Supra Chapter I at section C 4
A recent accident at Los Alamos caused the
death of a worker in less than 48 hours. BNA, Atomic Industry Rep. 5: 74 (1959).
481
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amount of radiation received. In deciding what recovery to allow, if
any, a court should take account of tl:ie possible distinction between (I)
the economic loss in the form of lost wages which the injured would
have received had he not been overexposed, and ( 2) the damages which
he should be allowed because something of considerable value to him,
i.e., his expectation of continued life, has been taken away. As to wages
lost a difference should be made perhaps between recovery for (a)
diminution in wages earned while he lives and (b) the wages lost for
the period after his death but which he would have earned had his life
not been shortened. One other most important set of distinctions must
be kept in mind, i.e., the differences between the damages to be awarded
to the injured party in his own right, those damages due his estate
under the survival statute, and those to his beneficiaries in their own
right under the typical wrongful death statute aimed at compensating
persons who were dependent on and could reasonably expect to be supported by the injured party. Actually, the courts do not always seem to
have kept these distinctions in mind.
In the following analysis, however, unless the contrary is mentioned
specifically, each case discussed deals with the element of shortened life
span as separate from any other item of recovery, although this element
may be awarded as only one item among many. Recovery in some cases
may be allowed for shortened life span under a survival statute, but in
each case it includes a separate item for shortened life unless otherwise
indicated. Sometimes suit has been brought by the victim but he dies
before trial, and sometimes death has occurred immediately after the
accident but the victim is considered to have a cause of action which
survives. In none of the cases cited as supporting recovery for shortened
life span is recovery for this element made a substitute for lost wages
or medical expenses during the period of survival or for pain and suffering during this period. Neither is recovery for losses by beneficiaries
under wrongful death statutes affected by a shortened life span award,
except where this is clearly indicated in a few cases.
The most frequent shortening of life span injury arisirtg from overexposure to radiation is a reduction of a few months or years in the
normal life span, e. g., the victim will now die at 65 instead of 67, assuming nothing else happens. The overexposure causes premature ageing. Most of the decided cases deal with situations in which the shortening is much greater than this but it is essential to analyze what the
cases say about shortening of life as a separate item of recovery for it
is a difference in degree only.
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With the advent of extensive use of radiation it seems important to
look at this subject and determine what relief should be afforded to
various interested parties. It would seem that the difficulty will be particularly acute in radiation cases because the shortened life span may be
the only item of compensable injury, thus differing from the usual
personal injury action in which ordinarily there will be physical damage of a nature sufficiently ascertainable to justify a substantial award
quite aside from the loss of enjoyment of a full life. Particularly when
the injury leads to the possibility of future pain and suffering, which
is a compensable item in most jurisdictions,m the significance of allowing recovery for the mere loss of life expectancy has not been too
important. If such expectancy becomes . the only substantial item of
damage, however, it will then become extremely important. While in
some ways the subject involves metaphysics and religion more than it
does the law, nevertheless, the legal question certainly will be raised
more often in the United States than heretofore, and the law will have
to make a decision as to whether or not to allow recovery for such an
invasion of the human body. In any event here again is exemplified the
great need for a thorough and comprehensive re-evaluation of our old
concepts of damage recovery in tort eases. The confusion in results
reached in the cases also exemplifies the great significance of really determining what our theory of damage recovery is to be. 485
The subject has been one of fairly recent development and most of
this development has taken place in England and Canada. For this reason it seems important to observe what some of the Commonwealth
countries have done with it before looking at the relatively few cases
that have arisen in the United States.
(1)

English Cases

There is a considerable difference in theory between the English and
Canadian approach to the matter of damages for shortened life span
and that followed by the courts in the United States. Nevertheless, in
terms of practical consequences in dollar awards in damage actions the
difference in result may not be so great as the difference in theory would
seem to indicate.
The first English case squarely dealing with damages for reduced life
Infra discussion beginning at note !)82.
Jaffe, "Damages for Personal Injury: The Impact of Insurance," 18 Law &
Contemp. Prob. 219, 221 (1953) says, "[T]he crucial controversy in personal injury
torts today is not in the area· of liability but of damages."
484
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expectancy is Flint v. Lovell 486 decided in 1935. The plaintiff, seventy
years old, was injured in an automobile accident. The trial court found
that for his age he was a man of vigor and vitality, with a life expectancy before the accident of seven or eight years, that he was in excellent health, yet that, as a result of the injuries, he probably would die
within a year. The trial court was clear that the plaintiff had lost the
prospect of an enjoyable, vigorous, and happy old age which medical
testimony showed might have gone on for a number of years. £4,000
damages were awarded for the loss of these years. On appeal to the
Court of Appeal, Lord Justice Greer held that "under the rules as to
measure of damage laid down in Hadley v. Baxencfule the plaintiff's
claim to damages on the ground that his life would be shortened was
one on which he is entitled to succeed." 487 Lord Justice Slesser also
found no reason why the shortening of life should not be considered in
the assessment of damages, but Lord Justice Roche felt that evidence
of shortening of life should be permitted only for the purpose of showing the seriousness of the injuries; consequently, the award of £4,000,
he thought, was excessive and should have been limited to £3,000.
Roche's view was never followed in England, but it bears a striking
similarity to the American rule. As an interesting collateral fact, it may
be noted that three years later, in another case, 488 the House of ·Lords
was informed that plaintiff Flint was still living, contrary to the prediction of his expert medical witnesses.
For a short time after Flint v. Lovel/ 489 was decided it was not clear
whether recovery for shortened life span was dependent upon the injured person being aware of the fact his life expectancy had been shortened and also upon his being alive at the date of the action. In Rose v.
48.6 [ 1935] I K.B. 354 ( 1934). Smith, in his article, "Psychic Interest in Continuation of One's Own Life: Legal Recognition and Protection,'' g8 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 781,
790 (1950), asserts that the point was involved in an earlier case, Phillips v. London
& South-Western R.R., 5 Q.B.D. 78 (1879). The trial court in the Phillips case at
8o instructed the jury that "an active, energetic, healthy man is not to be struck down
almost in the prime of life, and reduced to helplessness with every enjoyment of life
destroyed and with the prospect of a speedy death, without the jury being entitled to
take that into account, not excessively, not immoderately, not vindictively, but with
the view of giving him a fair compensation for the pain, inconvenience and loss of
enjoyment which he has sustained. Then, after you have considered what sum you
think it is right to award on that ground, the next head which you have to consider
is the amount of expense which he actually incurred." The Court of Appeal in discussing the instruction as a whole made no comment on these specific words, but the
issue was not really raised by defendant's counsel.
487 Flint v. Lovell, supra note 486 at 359·
4 88 Infra note 490 at 854.
489 Supra note 486.
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Ford/ 90 however, the House of Lords rejected both requirements. A
healthy twenty-three year old woman was seriously injured because of
the defendant's negligence and died four days after the accident in spite
of the amputation of one of her legs in an attempt to save her. During
the four days she was either unconscious or in a coma which made it
impossible for her to understand her condition. No objection was made
to the awarding of £300 damages to the father and mother as statutory
beneficiaries under the wrongful death act. In addition, however, as
administrator the father claimed damages for pain and suffering, loss
of the leg, and loss of normal life expectancy which he claimed were
preserved by the survival statute. The trial court allowed £500 for pain
and suffering and for loss of the leg but refused to award damages for
shortened life expectancy on the ground that since she was not aware
of her condition she could not have suffered mental anguish from concern over an early demise. The Court of Appeal found that the pain and
suffering and the loss of a leg warranted only nominal damages, £20 and
£2, respectively, since she died so soon after the accident. 491 Two of
the three judges denied recovery for shortened life span, one on the
ground that at common law there could be no damages for death and
the other on the additional ground that where death ensues before action is brought the civil damage remedy is merged in the felony charge.
The three judges agreed that if damages were to be awarded for
shortened life expectancy the amount should be £r,ooo. The basis for
computing this amount was not stated. The House of Lords upheld the
Court of Appeal as to the £22 awarded but held that £r,ooo should have
been awarded for shortened life span .
. Lord Atkin saw no justification for the argument that the action
merged in the felony. 492 He further held that the right to recover for
shortened life span did not depend either upon surviving until the date
of the a:ction or upon awareness by the victim that she would die prematurely. He felt that the loss was capable of being estimated in terms
of nioney but expressly reserved opinion as to how it should be computed, indicating that some troublesome questions were involved:
Bow the dam.ages are to. be calculated is a question which this
House has not to decide. . . . Whether the rich man's life
has greater potentialities of pleasurable enjoyment than the
poor man's, and what consideration should be given to physical weaknesses other than those caused by the accident and
[1937] A.C. 8:z6.
Rose v. Ford, [1936] 1 K.B. 90 (1935) ..
492 Supra note 490 at 835. See also opinion of Lord Wright at 846.
49o
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not affecting the duration of life I prefer to consider when,
if ever, the points are raised. 493
Lord Roche agreed with the others that the cause of action arose immediately upon suffering the injury and the survival statute preserved
this cause of action to the administrator of the estate of the deceased.
He also recognized the difficulty of determining the amount of damages
to award:
I regard impaired health and vitality not merely as a cause of
pain and suffering but as a loss of a good thing in itself. Loss
of expectation of life is a form in which impaired health and
vitality may express themselves as a result. In such a loss
there is a loss of a temporal good, capable of evaluation in
money though the evaluation is difficult. . . .
Nevertheless, it is this question of the assessment of damages which gives me more anxiety than any other part of this
case. . . . 494
All of the Lords agreed that the loss of the leg and pain and suffering
warranted only nominal damages since the loss lasted only two days.
Otherwise, said Lord Wright, she would be getting double damages
since recovery was permitted for loss of life expectancy. He was not
concerned with the argument that such a reduction put the defendant
"in the paradoxical position of being entitled to plead in mitigation of
damage that he had not merely maimed but killed the plaintiff." 495 Apparently the importance of this argument was nullified by granting damages for shortened life span.
After this decision it was settled in England that there could be recovery for shortened life as a separate item of damages, at least when
th~ injured party died before trial or could prove death was rather imminent. What remained to perplex the courts was the question of how
much damages, i.e., what is the pecuniary value of lost years? One aspect of this matter was the significance of plaintiff's state of mind regarding his loss of years of life. In Roach v. Yates m the plaintiff,
thirty-three years old, became a hopeless invalid and mentally unbalanced as a result of injuries sustained in an automobile accident. The
trial judge recognized the applicability of Flint v. Lovell and Rose v.
Ford but awarded only £2,200 general damages on the ground that if
the plaintiff could sp~ak on the matter, he would prefer to have his life
493

/d. at 834-35.
at 859·
I d. at 846.
[1938] I K.B. 256 (1937).

494fd.
495

49 0
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shortened as much as possible. This was held to be error because a
judge or jury may not consider the plaintiff's desire for life after the
accident, but should consider only whether the length of life which he
would have been entitled to anticipate had been diminished by the accident. Thus, the total award was increased to £6,542, of which £2,000
was for futu.re nursing and similar expenses, and £542 was for lost
wages and expenses to date of trial. The rest was for pain and suffering, loss of expectation of a happy life, and future lost earnings.m
ln Morgan v. Scoulding, 498 plaintiff's decedent, twenty-three years
old, was killed instantly in an automobile accident and defendants
argued that no action vested which could pass to the father under the
wrongful death act or to the father as administrator under the survival
act. £r,ooo was awarded for loss of life expectancy under the survival
act, the court holding that the gist of the action was not the death but the
negligence and injury which, as soon as it occurred, gave rise to a cause
of action for shortened life span. In such a case, the court reasoned, the
only real effect of the death was to enable the court to see clearly to
what extent the life expectancy had been shortened. £300 was awarded
also under the wrongful death act for loss of expected support.
The House of Lords was finally called upon to consider the size of
awards being granted by the lower courts for shortened life span. In
Benham v. Gambling, 499 it reduced the damages from £1,200 to £zoo
for the loss of life expectancy of a two and a half year old child who
died on the same day as the automobile accident that caused the injuries.
The action was by the administrator under the survival act, no claim
being made under the wrongful death act. The analysis of the problem
made by Lord Simon who wrote the opinion for the House is worth setting out at length :
. . . The present appeal taises the problem of the assessment of damage for "loss of expectation of life" before this
House for the first time, and it is indeed the only issue with
which we are now concerned.
. . . Since the child was unconscious from the moment
of the accident till his death, there could be no claim for pain
and suffering, and the only question, apart from funeral expenses, was that of damages arising from the diminution of
the child's expectation of life. 600
In the first place, I am of the opinion that the right conclum Id. at 264. 26';, 26g.
m [1938] I K.B. 786 (1937).
499 [1941] A.C. I57 (1940),
GOOJd. at 162.
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sion is not to be reached by applying what may be called the
statistical or actuarial test. Figures calculated to represent the
expectation of human life at various ages are averages arrived at from a vast mass of vital statistics; the figure is not
necessarily one which can be properly attributed to a given
individual. And in any case the thing to be valued is not the
prospect of length of days, but the prospect of a predominantly happy life. . . •
The question thus resolves itself into that of fixing a reason. able figure to be paid by way of damages for the loss of a
measure of prospective happiness. Such a problem might seem
more s'uitable for discussion in an essay on Aristotelian ethics
· than.in the judgment of a Court of law, but in view of the
earlier authorities, we must do our best to contribute to its
solution. The learned judge observed that the earlier decisions
quoted to him assumed "that human life is, on the whole,
good." I would rather say that, before damages are awarded
in respect of the shortened life of a given individual under
this head, it is necessary. for the Court to be satisfied that the
circumstances of the individual life were calculated to lead,
on balance, to a positive measure of happiness, of which the
victim has been deprived by the defendant's negligence. If the
character or habits of the individual were calculated to lead
him to a future of unhappiness or despondency, that would
be a circumstance justifying a smaller award. . . . [T]he
test is not subjective and the right sum to award depends on
an objective estimate of what kind of future on earth the victim might have enjoyed, whether he had justly estimated that
future or not. Of course, no regard must be had to financial
losses or gains during the period of which the victim has been
deprived. The damages are in respect of loss of life, not of
loss of future pecuniary prospects.
The main reason, I think, why the appropriate figure of
damages should be reduced in the case of a very young child
is that there is necessarily so much uncertainty about the
child's future that no confident estimate of prospective happiness can be made. . . . I see no reason why the proper sum
to be awarded would be greater because the social position or
prospects of wordly possessions are greater in one case than
another. Lawyers and judges may here join hands with moralists and philosophers and declare that the degree of happiness to be attained by a human being does not depend on
wealth or status..
It remains to observe ... that, stripped of technicalities,
the compensation is not being given to the person who was injured at all, for the person who was injured is dead. The
truth, of course, is that in putting a money value on the pro-
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spective balance of happiness in years that the deceased might
otherwise have lived, the jury or judge of fact is attempting
to equate incommensurables. Damages which would be proper
for a disabling injury may well be much greater than for deprivation of life. These considerations lead me to the conclusion that in assessing damages under this head, whether in
the case of a child or an adult, very moderate figures should
be chosen . . . .
. . . I believe that . . . the proper figure in this case would
be 2ool., and that even this amount would be excessive if it
were not that the circumstances of the infant were most favourable. In reaching this conclusion, we are in substance correcting the methods of estimating this head of loss, whether
in the case of children or adults, which have grown up in a
series of earlier cases . . . and are approving a standard of
measurement which, had it been applied in those cases, would
have led, at any rate in many of them, to reduced awards. I
trust that the views of this House, expressed in dealing with
the present appeal, may help to set a lower standard of measurement than has hitherto prevailed for what is in fact incapable of being measured in coin of the realm with any approach to real accuracy. 501

After Benham v. Gambling a marked reduction in the size of awards
for loss of life expectancy was discernible. In one case involving two
deceased sailors, one thirty-nine and the other nineteen and a half years
old, awards of £350 and £500, respectively, were granted under a survival type of statute, the judge noting that the measure of damages
should not "vary with the number of years of the allotted span which
may be said to lie in front of the deceased persons." 502 By 1950 it could
be said that "£500 is generally recognised as the maximum sum recoverable ... even allowing for the depreciation ... of the pound sterling." 503
In 1953, in Harris v. Bright's Asphalt Contractors, 504 £5oo was
awarded a plaintiff who was thirty-five years 9ld at the time of the accident, thirty-seven at the date of the trial, and who had a life expectancy,
as reported by a medical witness, of between six months and two years.
I d. at 165-68.
Bishop v. Cunard White Star, Ltd., [1950] 2 All E.R. 22, 25 (P. D. & A. Div.).
The court held that if the difference in amounts were based on different life expectancies the lower court was in error but assumed the lower court based it on other
differences not described. An award was also made for each death under the wrongful
death act.
5o3 "Assessment of Damages in Fatal Accidents," 100 L. ]. 312 (n. s.) (1950).
504 Harris v. Bright's Asphalt Contractors, Ltd., [1953] 1 All E.R. 395 (Q.B. Div.).
501
50 2
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The court computed damages on the basis of an eighteen month expectation. Plaintiff was permitted to recover wages lost for the time he
would remain alive only and not for the period when it was expected
that he would be dead. Loss of earnings after death, however, may "be
considered under the item of damages for loss of expectation of life, in
the sense that they are one of the elements which indicate that a person
earning a reasonable livelihood is more likely to have an enjoyable
life . . . . " 505 £soo was granted for shortened life expectancy in consideration of plaintiff's age, prospects, and wages which showed that
he would not have been forced to live in penury. In addition to this
amount, however, £5,000 was allowed for past and prospective pain and
suffering based on the eighteen months of life left.
These cases make it clear that English courts recognize loss of normal life expectancy as separate element or, as the English say, head of
damage. Whether the injured party dies simultaneously with the injury,
shortly thereafter, or is a living plaintiff expecting to die at an earlier
than normal date, is immaterial. To avoid duplication of damages, however, he may not recover for pain and suffering or loss of wages for a
period extending beyond his death, expected or actuaJ.5° 6 For a time,
substantial awards were granted tinder this item, but at a word from
the House of Lords reductions followed.
No adequate guide has been developed for the trial courts in Great
Britain by which the loss may be translated into monetary terms. Actually little guidance can be afforded; and while the Benham case lists
certain elements that may not properly be considered in evaluating lost
years, no helpful indication is given as to what should be considered.
Of course this is not a new problem confronting those who assess
damages. The same criticism may be made of any award not based on
compensation for pecuniary loss. Pain and suffering and psychic injury
are analogous situations where "guesstimates'' are made.

a

( 2) Canadian Cases
In a 1937 case, Stebbe v. Laird/01 the court accepted without question the proposition that damages· may be awarded for loss of expectaI d. at 402.
This was made clear in Rose v. Ford, supra note 490; Roach v. Yates, supra
note 496; and Harris v. Bright's Asphalt Contractors, Ltd., supra note 504507 [Ig,38] I W.W.R. I73 (K.B. Manitoba I937). In an earlier case $6oo was
awarded for shortening life span of man destined to die of cancer anyway, but leg
fracture cut off I to I! years. McGarry v. Canada West Coal Co., 2 Alberta 299
(I!J09). Plaintiff lived through judgment but not appeal. Amount went to his estate.
505
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tion of life. The case involved an eleven year old child who was injured
by an automobile and died nine days later without regaining consciousness. The administrator of her estate sued for damages under a survival
statute. Because of the unconscious state of the child, no recovery was
permitted for pain and suffering or injury to health. No claim was
made for lost wages. The only element of damages, therefore, was· compensation for shortened life. The court stated that nothing could be
awarded for lost wages or inability to support dependents because those
are items to be recovered under a wrongful death act not as a part of
damages for shortened life span. To determine the quantum of damages, the court turned to the English decision of Rose v. Ford. 508 In its
discussion of the difficulty of making an award, the Canadian court
said:
. . . [T]o fix a money value for years taken from another
person's life cannot be done with any degree of accuracy. The
factors which enter into making life worthwhile are so numerous, so uncertain, and may vary so much from time to time,
that the task is beyond the wit of man. Some may think that
good health is important; yet many great and useful men have
suffered physically a large part of their lives. Riches in themselves do not bring happiness; indeed .they often destroy the
value of life. . . . I make these few observations merely for
the purpose of showing the great difficulties in making
an assessment in such a case as this. It is very largely conjecture and speculation. The one thing that is in some sense
certain is the number of years by which the life has been cut
short. This would seem to be the important factor. . . .
The result of Rose v. Ford . . . is that prima facie every
life is of temporal value. . . .
. . . If there is any distinction, it is that the child in this
case had perhaps larger opportunities for a full, happy life,
and was deprived of several more years of her life than Miss
Rose was deprived of .
. . . I am unable to see why the plaintiff should receive less
than the plaintiff did in Rose v. Ford. 509
The court granted $5,000 damages and placed emphasis on the number
of years by which the life had been shortened.
In the period before the English decision in Benham v. Gambling 510
was handed down, $2,000 was granted the estate of deceased, a thirty
year old deaf mute.m The recovery was for shortened life span and was
5os Supra

note 490·

Supra note 507 at 185-86.
510 Supra note 499.
509

511

Riehl v. Condy, [1939) 1 W.W.R. 152 (C.A. Manitoba).
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permitted under the survival statute. No recovery was allowed under
the wrongful death statute for he supported no one. Some time later,
and after the House of I:.ords had set the standard for computing damages in England, a smaller award of only $r,soo was granted under the
survival act for pain and suffering and loss of life expectancy in accordance with the principles laid down in Benham v. Gambling, taking into
account the depreciation in value of money since that case was decided.512 In addition, £6,000 was awarded to the wife under the wrongful death act for her loss· of support. Deceased was sixty-six years old,
slightly deaf and died sixty-six days after the accident. Apparently the
court assumed that the principles of the English case should be followed
·
in Canada.
The manner of applying the Benham case was treated by the Court of
Appeal-for Manitoba, ho:wever, in Anderson v. Chasney. 513 Deceased, a
five year old boy, died of suffocation caused by a sponge left in his
nasal ·area after an adenoids operation. The action was brought by the
administrator of the child's eState under the survival statute. Adamson,
J. A., criticised Lord Simon's rejection of the use of the statistical
method for estimating the prospective length of life. He felt that this
method is better than guesswork and is the only one used by insurance
companies and government agencies. He also asserted, contrary to Lord
Simon, that it was not necessary to establish that the person was destined
to have a happy and prosperous life, saying:
·
Happiness does not determine the value of a life. Happiness is very largely a matter of disposition. There are many
happy people whose expectancy of life is not of great value.
Many people in mental institutions are said to be happy.
Many people living busy, useful, valuable lives are not happy .
. . . Ambition and work may make a life valuable and yet
may not bring happiness. I reject the hedonistic philosophy of
life as a standard by which to value a life. 514
Adamson proposed two measures that could serve as guides : the
'·quality" of the life-whether to the deceased, his family, or societyand the anticipated length of that life. In case of a child, the estimate, he
realized, was more difficult because quality is less certain; therefore, one
might use the expectancy of quality based on an average for the country
in which he lived. He felt that :
There is, too, a difference between the value of life in England
and in Canada. In Canada we take it for granted-and I
Pash v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, [19491 1 W.W.R.
[19491 2 W.W.R. 337 (C.A. Manitoba).
514 /d. at 366-67.

512

618

225

(K.B. Manitoba).

282

TORT LIABILITY
think, properly-that an average child of five years has prospects for a long, sa tis factory and valuable life. I am unable
to value such a life at a mere £200, which is nothing more
than nominal. 515

In contrasting loss of limb with loss of life (Lord Simon having said
that the former would demand greater compensation), Adamson
pointed out :
Presumably, if the boy were to have lost both legs, he
[Lord Simon] would allow him substantial and reasonable
compensation for being deprived of a full life. Yet when he
loses his life, the compensation is to be something nominal ! I
am unable to endorse the dictum that it is "cheaper to kill
than to maim" to the extent of giving only nominal damages
for killing.
·
In Benham v. Gambling, a most pessimistic view of the
prospects and value of lives of English children has been
taken. The values in Rose v. Ford are more in accordance
with Canadian standards. We in Canada are, and can with
justification be, optimistic both as to the length and quality of
the life of a young person.ns
In the case of children, the judge concludes, a good yardstick to use
in computing damages for shortened life is the sum the parents have
spent in rearing the child, which is roughly $I ,000 a year. He therefore
would have awarded $5,000 for this element of damage, but a majority
of the court thought that $3,000 was sufficient. Coyne, A. ]., agreed
with Adamson that although the Benham judgment was entitled to respect, it was inappropriate to Manitoba, was not binding, and should
not be followed.
According to these cases, appellate courts in England and Canada
had approved two different tests for use in computing damages for loss
of life expectancy. In England, the standard was the average happy life,
with the admonition that the award must be moderate; in the province
of Manitoba, usefulness, past history, and future prospects may be
considered, with no restriction as to the maximum amount.
The later case of Rodzinski v. Modern Dairies Ltd. 511 involved injuries to a thirty-three year old married man, who had not been steadily
employed and who had spent a great deal of time in prison on various
charges. The injuries resulted in his becoming a paraplegic. The court
stated that it concurred in the view of the Anderson case with reference
515Jd. at 367.
516
I d. at 369.
517
[1949] 2 W.W.R. 456 (K.B. Manitoba).
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to the statistical or actuarial method of estimating prospective length of
life. 518 Since no evidence on this point had been presented, the court
took judicial notice of the fact that a thirty-three year old man was
likely to live twenty-five or thirty-five years longer.
The principles in both cases, the court felt, justified taking into consideration the circumstances of plaintiff's life up to the time of the accident.
It is a fair assumption, I think, that he was living the kind
life he wished to live, and that it was the kind of life that
made him happy. But it was a life of crime and laziness.

* * * * *

I am satisfied that judging by his past life, which is all I
have to go on, but taking into consideration the possibilityremote, I fear, in this case--of a reformation, the quality and
usefulness of his life based on the average for the country in
which he lives was not such as to justify me in assessing damages under this head at .any substantial sum. I feel I cannot
allow more than $1,000. 519
An additional $4,000 was awarded for lost earning power. Over
$30,000 was granted for pain and suffering, past and prospective. The
court apparently ignored the principles established in England and adhered to those expressed in the Anderson case, although it was able to
find other reasons for keeping the life expectancy award at a "moderate" figure.
The following year, in Maltais v. Canadian Pacific Ry. Co./ 20 the
court for the province of Alberta had to choose between the Benham
and Anderson cases. The plaintiff's wife was killed instantly in a collision between a car and a train. She was forty-one, the mother of three
boys, and helped with the farm chores. Damages were sought under
both the wrongful death and survival acts. The Anderson case was followed in determining damages under the survival act. The principles
applicable in Manitoba were equally applicable in Alberta. The court
repeated the argtiments and views presented in the Anderson decision
and concluded that, in the absence of special circumstances, a useful and
happy life of average duration would be assumed. Damages were fixed
at $5,000 for loss of normal life expectancy. In addition, $2,500 was
awarded under the wrongful death act to dependent husband and two
children for losses to them resulting from the woman's death.
I d. at 465.
/d. at 466-67.
52 0 [1950] 2 W.W.R. 145 (Sup. Ct. Alberta).
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In 1953 the issue of computing damages for loss of life expectancy
was presented squarely to the Canadian Supreme Court. The court followed the English House of Lords. m The deceased, twenty-three years
old, engaged to be married, and receiving a good salary, died shortly
after an automobile accident but was in a coma during the intervening
period. The trial judge awarded $10,000 for loss of life expectancy
under the survival act, basing his judgment on the Maltais and Anderson cases. This award was reduced by the Court of Appeal to $7,500.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, that tribunal recognized that differences existed between England and Canada, but felt that "they may be
taken irito account without departing from the ratio of the House of
Lords decision( ... ) in Benham v. Gambling." 522 Apparently this court
held the same. fears as to excessive damages as those which prompted
the House of Lords to order moderate awards. A $7,500 judgment
was permitted to stand but only because it had already been reduced and
because appellate courts generally should not interfere too much with
money judgments. It was stated expressly, however, that the trial
court's award was too high.
Fallowing the Supreme Court decision, there was a marked reduction
in Canada in the amount of damages assessed, just as had been the case
in England after the House of Lords pronouncement. In one case 523
$2,500 each was granted for a husband and wife killed in an automobile
accident, the decedents having been fifty-six and fifty-four years old,
respectively. The awards were made to the administrator for each of
them under the survival act. No claim was made under the wrongful
death act. In another, 524 $2,500 was awarded under the survival act for
shortened life span to the estate of an eighteen year old boy, fatally shot
in a hunting accident. In this latter case, the court discussed the development of the law in Canada relating to awards for shortened life span,
and concluded that the principles enunciated by the House of Lords
must be applied-i.e., the awards must be moderate. $4,000 was
awarded under the wrongful death act to a surviving mother and sister
as damages suffered because of loss of expected support. Her recovery
under the wrongful death act was reduced by the amount of her recovery under the survival act.
Today, no real distinction exists between the law of England and
Bechthold v. Osbaldeston, [1953] 2 Can. Sup. Ct. 177.
!d. at 18o.
m Bryce v. Northland Greyhound, Inc., [1954] I I W.W.R. (n. s.) 672 (Q.B.
Manitoba).
m Joyce v. Bartlett, [1954) 12 W.W.R. (n. s.) 665 (Q.B. Manitoba).
521

522
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that of Canada. Both recognize as a separate item of damage the loss
of life expectancy. Both award moderate amounts based on how happy
the prospective life would have been. As a matter of fact, the basis
seems not too important, as the amount of damages in all cases apparently will be approximately the same, and all must be quite moderate.
( 3) Other Commonwealth Cases
Several Scottish cases have involved situations in which damages for
shortened life span apparently were involved, but there is no actual
holding either accepting or rejecting the English rule. As early as 1885,
in M'Master v.-Caledonian Ry., 525 reference was made to this element
of damages as possibly justifying an award for damages objected to by
defendant as being excessive. A sixteen year old boy, employed as an
ironworker, was injured and sued for damages, but he died before the
trial. His father continued the action and the jury awarded £400. The
defense claimed that since he had died the only award should be for his
"losses" before death and an amount for pain and suffering while he
survived~ The Lord President stated that he was not satisfied that this
necessarily was the limit of damages. He stated that he did not mean to
give any very decided opinion but that the death suggested various considerations :
If it had been foreseen that the man was to die very shortly
after the occurrence of the injury, or very shortly after the
time when the trial was to take place, there may be a question
whether he would not have been entitled to damages for the
shortening of his life. And so it may be a question whether
his executor, as now representing him, is not entitled to damages for that very same thing, it being now ascertained beyond all dispute that his life was shortened in consequence of
this injury. But I am rather disposed to think upon the whole
that the jury were entitled in a great measure to take this matter into their own hands, and so long as they did not do anything very extravagant that their verdict should stand .... 526

All but one of the other Lords writing opinions agreed that the amount
should not be reduced because of the intervening death. The other opinions, however, seemed to be based on a- theory of survival of the action
which the deceased himself would have had if he had not died, and
525 [1885] 13 Sess. Cas. 252 (Scot. 1st Div.). Smith, supra note 486 at 791, cites
M'Enaney v. Caledonian Ry., [1913] 2 Scots L.T.R. 293, as another example but the
award seems to be based on pain and suffering, unless "patrimonial loss" is to be
interpreted as meaning shortened life span. Walker 611, apparently so interprets it.
526 I d. at 254.
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perhaps were allowing a large verdict for pain and suffering and some
lost wages, rather than for shortened life span.
An earlier case nT perhaps indirectly recognizes such a cause of action, but the clearest recognition of a separate right for shortening of
life span seems to have been made by the Lord Ordinary in the Court
of Sessions in Reid v. Lanarkshire Traction Co., decided in 1933, prior
to the first English case. 528 The Lord Ordinary said that if the decedent
"had been pursuing the action he would have been entitled to put before
a jury evidence to prove that the effect of the accident would inevitably
be to shorten his expectancy of life, and the jury would be entitled in
assessing damages to take that evidence into account," 629 indicating that
the victim's mental anguish from anticipating the earlier death is the
basis of compensation for shortened life span. The Court of Sessions
found that the damages awarded to the executrix-were sufficient but that
the theory of the Lord Ordinary was incorrect because there need not be
proof of mental anguish or conscious suffering, although "the weight
to be given to this element must be moderate." 580 In upholding the
award of £300, Lord Sand indicated very clearly how difficult is the
measurement of this item.
. . . In China, I understand, it is possible to purchase a
suicide for a comparatively modest sum. A man who is justly
suspected of a capital offense will get another man who is entirely innocent to commit suicide and leave a written confession. The suicide cannot enjoy the money himself, but it gratifies him, (. . . ) to have the money to leave to his family.
Now the thought occurs, if, instead of making a bargain of
this kind, the one party mortally injures the other, why should
he get off more cheaply? Why should the other not get as
much for his life thus violently taken as he would have been
willing voluntarily to accept ?
On the other hand, I recognize that this reasoning is inapplicable to Europeans by any strict analogy. Damages cannot
be assessed upon the basis of how much would this man have
taken for his life. Still there is something in it which I confess
puzzles me once it is conceded that a man is entitled to compensation for the shortening of his life. But the matter is so
hedged with metaphysics that, were I charging a jury, I think
I should be disposed to be content to tell them that the short521 Neilson v. Rodger, [1853] 16 Sess. Cas. 325, 327-28 (Scot :zd Div.), where Justice Hope said a claim for shortened life is personal to the victim and does not pass to
the executor of his estate after he dies.
528 [1934] Sess. Cas. 79 (Scot, rst Div.), [1933] Scots L.T.R. r87.
529 /d. at Sr.
530 [1934] Scots L.T.R. 54. 56.
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ening of life was an element which they were entitled to take
into consideration in measuring the damage suffered by the
deceased, and to leave it to them, without any strict analysis
of the content of the idea, to assess the damages, contenting
myself with warning them that the weight to be given to this
element must be moderate, and that they must not consider
what price the man would have put upon his life. 531
In a 1952 Scottish case, 582 a child of three was very seriously injured and her life expectancy was reduced to two or three years. The
jury awarded £4,000 to cover all items of damages. The report does
not indicate what weight the jury could give to the shortened life span
but clearly refers to the fact of shortened life expectancy. It is possible
to argue, as does one Scottish author, that "It is not apparent to what
extent, if at all, loss of expectation of life affected the award. It [the
court] may have diminished the sum which might otherwise have been
awarded under other heads." 588 He concludes "It is not clear from any
Scottish case whether this he~d of damages has yet been fully accepted
in respect of a living pursuer." 584 ·
The Scottish author then generally discusses damages for shortened
life.
Consideration should not be given to the fact that the pursuer
is prevented from earning wages over the period between the
date of his death and the date to which he would reasonably
have lived but for the accident, though such notional earnings
are one of the minor elements indicating that a person earning
was more likely to have an enjoyable life. Like pain and suffering loss of expectation of life is independent of financial
position and station in life and must be assessed without regard to these factors.
It should be observed that there will be over-compensation
if damages are given both for loss of wages in respect of being prevented from working for the normal period of working life, and for loss of expectation of life. The two are inconsistent. 585
A modified use of shortened life span was also permitted in a 1948
South African case. 538 The plaintiff's counsel stated that while he
claimed no specific sum for shortened life he did claim that the general
I d. at 56.
Fisher v. Mitchell, [1952] Scotts L.T.R. (Notes) 58.
533 Walker 583.
534 Ibid.
535 I d. at 584.
58 6 Goldie v. City Council of Johannesburg, [1948] 2 So. Afr. L.R. 913.
581
58 2
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recovery, which includes pain and suffering, loss of health, and loss of
amenities of life, should be increased because of the prospect of an abnormally early death. Ettlinger, A.]., held that this was proper, but in
accordance with the English cases, the amount of general damages
should not be "materially enhanced," because of shortened life span. 537
In addition to the increase in general damages permitted because of
the shortened life span, a sum was awarded for lost wages during not
only the period of life expectancy after the accident but also for wages
that would have been earned during the full life expectancy before the
accident shortened it. This is contrary to the limitation on recovery for
wages i"mposed by the English court five years later in Ha.rris v.
Bright's Asphalt Contractor's Ltd. 588 The English court held that
wages that would have been earned during the full life expectancy before the injury should not be included in determining damages. Ettlinger, for the South African court, said:
In so far as loss of future earnings is concerned, this would
prima facie be the present value of the anticipated loss of
earnings during the period of the prospective life the plaintiff would have had but for the wrongful act. This is what the
plaintiff, or his estate, has lost and this is in my view the basis
for computing what he should receive by way of compensation. In this regard I would refer to the decision in Roach v.
Yates, ( 1936 1 K. B. 256) in which this view of the position
seems to have been accepted. us
The court did reduce the allowance for future earnings by the amount
it would cost him to maintain himself, 540 but any recovery for these lost
wages is directly contrary to the English view and that expressed by
the Scottish author. They take the position this amounts to double
damages.
(4) United States Cases
Apparently the Connecticut Supreme Court in Murphy v. N. York
& N. Haven R. R. m decided the first United States case dealing with
this problem of shortened life expectancy as separate from claims of
beneficiaries for economic loss caused by a wrongful death. The plain/d. at 923·
Supra note 504539 Su.pra note 536 at 921.
540 Approved 70 S.A.L.}. 399 (1953), except the writer would only allow what
plaintiff would have saved-all of his spending, not just maintenance expenses, should
be deducted.
541 30 Conn. 184 (1861).
537

538
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tiff was the administrator of the estate of a decedent, a six year old
child, who was killed instantly when hit by a train negligently operated
by an employee of the defendant. The court upheld the lower court
judgment for the plaintiff (the amount of damages not being mentioned) against an argument that since the child was killed instantly
there could be no cause of action because there could have been no injuries suffered by the deceased; there was no cause of action to survive.
The court said :
The intestate's right of personal security has been wrongfully
invaded, and that is distinctly alleged as the cause of action.
In both cases the law attaches an injury to such a wrongful
act.
But aside from this inference of law, it is alleged in the
declaration that the blow was so violent as to produce the
de'ath of the intestate. And is this no injury? If to take one's
liberty or one's property without justification is an injury,
how much more is the taking of human life? The elementary
books, in speaking of absolute rights, classify them thus : Ist. The right of personal security; 2d. The right of personal
liberty; and 3d. The right to acquire and enjoy property. If
these rights are valued in this order of preference, then every
man of common understanding would at once pronounce it
absurd to hold it is no injury to a person to take his life, while
it is to strike him a light blow. Such a distinction is not worth
talking about, and has no foundation or existence in the law,
as it has none in common sense. 542
The court held under the Connecticut survival statute that the cause of
action accrued to the administrator even though the death was instantaneous. The rationale of this decision apparently has been followed
in subsequent Connecticut cases, including in one case the allowance of
$6,000 where the decedent was killed instantly through the defendant's
negligence, 543 and in another case, $3,500 when the injured party died,
though the defendant claimed that it was unjust to allow recovery since
the proceeds under the laws of inheritance would go to the husband and
son "whose negligence was the sole cause of the injury." 544 This line
of Connecticut cases apparently is unique in the United States and has
been ignored both by courts and most commentators. 545
suId. at 187-88.
Mezzi v. Taylor, 99 Conn. 1, 120 At!. 871 (1923). The court said the cause of
action is "after death with an enlarged right of recovery for ensuing death." (at 7).
544 Davis v. Margolis, 1o8 Conn. 645, 649, 144 At!. 665 (1929).
645 Smith, supra note 486, discusses the 1861 case but no mention is made of it in what
little has been written on the subject in American sources: Annot., 97 A.L.R. 823
54s
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All of the decisions by other supreme courts in the United States
hold that damages for shortened life span as a compensable injury in
and of itself are not allowable although the estate may be allowed torecover lost earnings during the full period of normal life expectancy.
The line between proper and improper use of such evidence was drawn
by an Illinois appellate court in Krakowski v. A., E. & C. R. R. The trial
court allowed the plaintiff, who was injured in a train accident, to prove
a shortened life span as well as loss of wages and pain and suffering.
The appellate court in reversing held:
By. the foregoing, it is clear that appellee is not entitled to
recover any damages under the law for loss of any portion of
his life, nor for any earnings he might be supposed to make,
if living, in that part of his life lost by reason of his injuries.
After reconsidering this case, however, we are convinced that
appellee was entitled to the benefit of the evidence in question
to show the extent of injury, his consequent disability to earn
a living, if any, for the time he shall live, and his bodily and
mental suffering, if any, which will result from such injuries.
Other jurisdictions hold this to be the law and our Supreme
Court seems to sanction the same doctrine, when there is evidence, as in this case, that death is reasonably sure to follow
as a result of such injuries. 548
Several cases have been decided by the Indiana court. In 1897 in
Richmond Gas Co. v. Baker 641 an eighty-five year old plaintiff was injured in a gas explosion in his home and the jury was instructed that
it could include a sum for shortening of life expectancy. The Supreme
Court of Indiana decided that the instruction was erroneous, holding
that, while evidence of shortened life span might be used to determine
the extent of the injury including the inability to earn a living and
mental suffering, there could be no damages for the loss of life itself,
since, "The value of human life cannot, as adjudged by the common
law, be measured in money. It is, besides, inconceivable that one could
thus be compensated for the loss or shortening of his own life." 548 The
court disallowed the award of $4,600 and ordered a new trial. In two
(1935); 131 A.L.R. 1351 (1941); Comment, 33 Ill. L. Rev. 967 (1939); Z2 U. of
Chi. L. Rev. 505 (1955); Conway, "Damages for Shortened Life," 10 Ford. L. Rev.
219 (1941); Hannigan, "Recent English Decisions in Damages for Injuries Ending
in Premature Death," 18 B.U.L. Rev. 275 (1938). McCormick 339 mentions the
survival statute in Connecticut as the sole remedy in death cases.
546 167 Ill. App. 469, 472-73 (1912). Cf. T. W. & W. Ry. v. Baddeley, 54 Ill. 19,
23-24 (1870).
547 146 Ind. 6oo, 45 N.E. 1049 (1897).
548 I d. at 6og.
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later cases 349 the same distinction between using such evidence to measure the extent of the injury and using it as a separate item for compensation was followed. In a later case involvi~g a living plaintiff the
Supreme Court followed the Richmond Gas Co. decision and added:
It is true that a consideration of the nature and extent of the
injuries may lead indirectly to some consideration of their
probable effect, but the jury should not be told to award damages to an injured party for the years taken off his own life
by his injury. 660
Nothing in the case indicates the other elements of damage claimed,
except for nursing care.
- In Maine the only authoritative decision was rendered by the federal
courts in a case in which the victim received a skull fracture and was unconscious for about five days until his death. Under the survival statute
his ~idow sought compensation for his estate for curtailment of his life
expectancy, computed as thirteen years before the accident, alleging
that he was deprived of the right and pleasure of growing old gracefully and enjoying the amenities of life. The wife already had recovered
under the wrongful death statute for her loss of future support. The
court held that, in the absence of any Maine decisions, the federal court
could not create a new right since there were no American cases following the English law on the subject. The court indicated its own attitude,
however, when it said, "where the injured person never regains consciousness, it seems a thin distinction to say that the executor cannot
recover for the death, but. can recover for the shortening of the life
expectancy. All one ever does in killing a person is to accelerate the
moment of his death." 651 The court indicated, however, that recovery
could be had for medical expenses and property damages.
In 1953 a similar view was expressed by the federal court in Massachusetts in O'Leary v. U.S. Lines Co. 652 The case involved injury to
a longshoreman on vessel in Boston. He died before trial and the
plaintiff brought an action under the wrongful death statute and also
under the survival statute. The claim under the latter statute was for
pain and suffering, medical expenses, lost time from work, and "general damages" for "loss of the enjoyment of the amenities of life, . . .

a

649 Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. Ry. v. Miller, 165 Ind. 381, 74 N.E. 509 (1905)
(injury to person still living at time of trial); Muncie Pulp Co. v. Hacker, 37 Ind.
App. 194, 76 N.E. 770 (1906).
550 Lake Erie & Western R.R. v. Johnson, 191 Ind. 479, 483-84. 133 N.E. 732 (1922).
651 Farrington v. Stoddard, IIS F.2d 96, 101 (1st Cir. 1940).
662 III F. Supp. 745 (D.C. Mass. 1953).
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a material diminution of his normal life expectancy, . . . [and] a
shortening of his life." 558 The court, in denying recovery for the
shortened life expectancy said that there was no Massachusetts decision
allowing a claim for loss of expectancy as an item of damages distinct
from mental anguish from fear of an early demise and there was no indication that the state would adopt the English view. The court also
gave three reasons why it believed that the Massachusetts courts would
deny recovery: ( 1) another provision of the Massachusetts statute prescribed that damages for the death of another should be assessed with
reference to the degree of culpability, and that to allow recovery for loss
of expectancy would be to base it upon the degree of damage rather
than culpability; ( 2) the English rule had not proved entirely satisfactory as indicated by the practice of allowing only small flat sums;
and (3)
. . . [T]he English rule is set in a context where duplication
of damages is much less likely than it would be in Massachusetts. In England, survival damages, awarded, e.g., for shortening of life or pain and suffering, are deducted from recoveries of relatives under the English death act. . . . In this
Commonwealth, however, survival damages, including suffering from the fear of loss of life, are in addition to damages
recovered by relatives under the Massachusetts wrongful
death statute. 55•
Nevertheless, evidence of shortened life span is permissible for some
purposes in Massachusetts. In Choicener v. Walters Amusement
Agency 555 the court used the following language:
He rules, in substance, that if they found on the medical testimony that the accident shortened the life of the deceased and
also found upon the facts and the reasonable inferences to be
drawn therefrom that he was aware or believed that the condition from which he suffered before the accident was aggravated, intensified and increased, and that because of the
collision death might be hastened, they could take into consideration his apprehensions, fears and consequent mental suffering so caused. 556
553
554

/d. at 746.
/d. at 747.

555 269 Mass. 341, 168 N.E. 918 (1929). Cf. Fournier v. Zinn, 257 Mass. 575, 576,
154 N.E. 268 (1926) (claim for personal injuries by living plaintiff-evidence of shortened life "was relevant").
556 !d. at 343·

293

NEGLIGENCE

The victim brought the cause of action for personal injuries but died
before trial and his administratrix was substituted. No action was
brought under the wrongful death statute.
In 1943 the New Hampshire Supreme Court was faced with a
case 557 in which the defendant utility company had trespassed upon the
plaintiff's land before condemnation proceedings had been started. The
plaintiff sought damages for trespass to real estate and for mental suffering and the loss of health. He died during the pendency of the action
and his executrix continued the action under the survival statute and
added an item for the loss of his life. The court held that the decedent's
loss of life entitled his estate under a survival statute to recover for his
loss of earning capacity only, but that such had not been claimed in this
case.
Beyond that loss the law gives no recovery for causing
death in an action brought before death. . . . In the nature
of things one may not himself receive compensation for the
wrongful loss of his right to live, and claim for the loss cannot be an asset of his estate in any fair view of the compensatory principle of allowable elements of damages. While allowance for bodily and mental suffering is granted as in
justice imposed on a wrongdoer, the estimate must be within
the bounds of justice. To allow for the enjoyment of continued life would mean an entrance into a boundless field of
arbitrary assessment, for which no policy of the law exists. . . . It is sometimes said that a wrongdoer is better off
in causing death than in causing severe and lasting injury
without death. If this may be considered in the balance of adjustments in social relations, it does not serve to outweight
the reasons which bar allowance for damage on this account.558
Although the case did not involve a claim for damages for shortening
the life on behalf of the deceased, an argument used by the Michigan
Supreme Court in 1867 559 suggests an interesting argument that also
could be made against allowing recovery for shortened life span. The
court, not mentioning any of the other American cases, said:
To the cultivated and enlightened mind, looking at human
life in the light of the Christian religion as sacred, the idea of
compensating its loss in money is revolting, and it can only
become reconciled to such an idea by the strong necessity
which has grown out of the new modes of travel and business
ssr Ham v. Interstate Bridge Authority, 92 N.H. 268, 30 A.zd
558 /d. at 275-76.
m Hyatt v. Adams, 16 Mich. 18o (1867).

I
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in modern times, by which great numbers are compelled to
trust their lives to the skill and vigilance of the servants of
corporations, and others in similar positions of responsibility
-a state of things which seemed to call for a remedy which
should make railroad corporations, steamboat managers, and
parties to whom others are compelled to trust for safety, more
sensible of their responsibilities, and more careful to secure a
high degree of vigilance in protecting the lives entrusted to
their care, and at the same time afford relief for cases of great
individual hardship, which might otherwise be suffered by
those dependent upon the person whose life may be lost. . . .
And it will be fortunate in the future if it shall be found that
habituating the public mind to the idea of pecuniary compensation for human life has not tended to weaken its safeguards, and to render it less sacred in the popular estimation.560

The objection most commonly stated in the American cases, however, against allowing recovery for loss of expectancy is the great
uncertainty of standards used in measuring the damages and the discretion it gives the jury in tort cases. This attitude is forcefully, if somewhat extremely, stated by Conway in his article written in response to
the English cases. He says :
But now in England there is bestowed upon judges and jurors an added foresight which approaches the supernatural.
Necromancy and crystal-gazing seem to have been sanctioned
in the law. Judges and jurors are to be veritable fortunetellers. They may forecast one's future state of happiness and,
in addition, express its value in terms of cash, with the sole
condition that they be not too liberal. 561
Regardless of the reason given, it is clear from the above cases that,
except for Connecticut, in those United States jurisdictions which have
spoken there can be no recovery for shortened life span as a separate
item of damages, although evidence of such shortening is admissible in
some jurisdictions for proof of (I) the extent and seriousness of the
injury, ( 2) inability or decreased ability to earn a living, and ( 3) bodily and mental suffering, the latter presumably caused by the prospect
of an earlier than normal demise.
On the other hand, the general rule in the United States is that lost
earning for the whole period of the injured person's normal life expectancy before the accident is recoverable apparently often without
56o
56 1

/d. at 191-92.
Conway, supra note 545. at 228-29.
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recognition that no living expenses will be incurred after death, but
damages for pain and suffering are computed on the basis of the plaintiff's expected life span at the time of trial, after the injury. 562
( 5) Some Suggestions Concerning Compensation for
Shortened Life Span
(a) Comparison of Results under British and
American Views
Actual results reached under the British and American views may
not be nearly as far apart as the principles upon which recovery is allowed would seem to indicate. A shortening of life expectancy under
the British view is a separate item of damage apart from loss of wages
and pain and suffering. The victim does not need to be conscious of his
loss. In addition, though, there has been but little discussion of damages
for loss of wages in the English opinions. Those discussions which have
dealt directly with the subjeCt have awarded damages under this head
only for the period of life that is to be expected after the injury, in
other words, only for the shortened period of life. 663 Recovery under a
survival statute may reduce any recovery under the wrongful death
56 2 The following are some of the cases supporting this view : Prairie Creek Coal
Min. Co. v. Kittrell, 1o6 Ark. 138, 153 S.W. 89 (1912); Murphy v. National Ice
Cream Co., 114 Cal. App. 482, 300 Pac. 91 (1931); T. W. & W. Ry. v. Baddeley,
supra note 546; Hughes v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 150 Iowa 232, ·129 N.W. 956
(19II); Scott v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 16o Iowa 3o6, 141 N.W. 1005 (1913);
Borough v. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry., 191 Iowa 1216, 184 N.W. 320 ( 1921) ; Thordson
v. McKeighan, 235 Iowa 409, 16 N.W.2d 6o7 (1944); Daniell v. Boston & Maine
R.R., 184 Mass. 337, 68 N.E. 337 (1903) (slightly different rule for breach of contract where damages awarded on.basis of how long plaintiff could have performed his
duties in a thorough, honest, ·and businesslike manner and for this purpose evidence
of probable length of life is admissible); Fournier v. Zinn, supra note 555; Choicener
v. Walters Amusement Agency, 26g Mass. 341, 168 N.E. 918 (1929) (jury could
consider apprehensions, fears, and consequent mental suffering caused by earlier expectation of death); Howell v. Lansing City Elec. Ry., 136 Mich. 432, 99 N.W. 400
(1904); Olivier v. Houghton St. Ry., 138 Mich. 242, 101 N.W. 530 (1904); Crecelius
v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 144 Neb. 394, 13 N.W.2d 627 (1944); West v. Boston &
Maine R.R., 81 N.H. 522, 129 Atl. 768 (1925); Alberti v. N.Y., L.E. & W.R.R.,
II8 N.Y. 77, 23 N.E. 35 (1889); Magee v. City of Troy, 48 Hun. 383, I N.Y.S. 24
(1888); Jones v. Eppler, 266 P.2d 451 (Okla. 1954); Maher v. Phila. Traction Co.,
181 Pa. 391, 37 Atl. 571 (1897); Richardson v. Spokane, 67 Wash. 621, 122 Pac. 330
(1912). See Comment, 22 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 505 at 509-10 (1955), and McCormick
341-43·
56 8 Roach v. Yates supra note 496; Harris v. Bright's Asphalt Contractors, Ltd.,
supra note 504· The South Mrican court, however, allowed lost wages to be recovered
for the full life expectancy without deduction of the amount it would be cut short by
the injury.
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statute. 564 In the United States the courts have refused to allow shortened life span as a separate item of damage but they allow"compensation
for lost earning capacity for the full life expectancy unaltered by the accident (apparently without deduction for maintenance expenses that
wi.ll not be incurred because of the early demise), although again as in
the English cases there has been little discussion of the problem. Actually, considering the flat, rather moderate sum established in England
for measuring damages for the shortened life span it is very likely that
the. injured Englishman recovers less in money award than does an
American (unless he is retired), who theoretically is given no recovery
for shortened life span. As suggested by one writer:
Neither the English nor the American solution appears to
be theoretically justifiable. The British courts may be correct
in recognizing that there is a loss of years off the plaintiff's
life which is not compensated for either by damages for economic loss or for pain and suffering. However, there has been
no good explanation put forth as to why this circumstance
demands compensation. . . .
If the American courts, on the other hand, are correct in
rejecting loss of life expectancy as a separate item of damages, they appear inadvertently to overcompensate the plaintiff
for his future economic loss. Recovery for wages lost during
years which the plaintiff will not be alive ignores the simple
fact which is recognized by our death and survival statutes :
a dead person's maintenance involves no expense. To give a
plaintiff full wage recovery is to give him (and indirectly his
beneficiaries) a windfall. The plaintiff has not only been cut
off from years of pleasure, but years of expense as well. This
difference between a living and a dead plaintiff is readily
recognized by those decisions which limit recovery for pain
and suffering to those years the plaintiff will actually live. 565
Undoubtedly there is a natural appeal in the British view which allows some kind of compensation for death, the ultimate injury to a
human being. 566 Certainly it is true that even American courts allow
money awards to be made for other than economic and physical losses;
e.g., recovery is allowed for mental suffering or anguish as well as for
physical pain, and some courts allow recovery for a reduced ability to
enjoy the niceties of life because of some physical injury. 567 In these
Supra notes 498, 521.
Comment, 22 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 505 at 510, 511 (1955).
Smith, supra note 486 at 795-&!3. He makes an impassioned argument for recognizing that death takes away the most precious thing we have.
56 7 Ibid. But see denial in ·Hogan v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 148 Kan. 720, 85
P.2d28 (1938).
564

565
5 66
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cases, however, the award is made to a living person for his own benefit and not to.. others after his death. Certainly_ the determination of the
value of life to a man who has just lost it borders on the metaphysical.
The difficulties involved in this metaphysical concept are stated so pungently, if somewhat unfairly, by an editor of the Economist (London),
that the statement bears repetition here.
As the duty of valuing lives in this way will almost certainly present itself more and more often so long as the law
remains in its present admirable state, we have in the hope of
being helpful to His Majesty's Judges and to the juries on
whom the work of valuation will fall, given serious consideration to working out a "state of happiness" index number,
which will be published as soon as certain minor difficulties
have been overcome. In the meantime, we have drawn up a
provisional schedule of life values according to occupations,
on which the authorities may base themselves till the index
number is ready. The judicial directions, fortunately, are
clear and unambiguous.· We have to value life as a whole
without taking into account wealth, social position, or earning
capacity, but concentrating on the question of how far the
life lost was a good thing, an amenity-how far the dead person was likely, if he had lived, to pass his life in rest and quietness. Money and social position do not count, and to the legal
personal representatives a dead tramp, if he was happy before he died, is a better investment than a wealthy but worried stockjobber. The issue, it will be seen, is simple, and it
remains only to express the result in sterling, to which end we
venture to submit to their Lordships for their future serious
consideration a few valuations of dead folk according to their
occupation and their respective enjoyment of rest and quietness:-

£
A High Court Judge
.. 100,000
1 o,ooo
A Commissionaire. .
A Ministry of Transport Official. . . . 10,000
An Editor of The Economist. .
10
A Motor Car Underwriter in the present
condition of the law. .
o

s.
o
o
o
o

d.
o
o
o
o

o

10

These figures can, of course, be taken only as a basis and
will need to be weighted for individual cases in different ways.
For example, in a British Court of Law regard must surely
be had to the relations of this world and the next; and evidence must be heard as to whether the deceased person was
likely to find himself better or worse off after his decease. For
if the continuance of life is only a postponement of a future
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life, the value to himself of a man's life here must depend
partly on what it is that is being postponed. If, therefore, we
had evidence that a deceased civil servant had been a very good
man, orthodox in his views and impeccable in his private life,
we should be inclined to knock 50 per cent. off the valuation
and give his legal representative £5,000 instead of £ro,ooo.
And vice versa, if the plaintiff could prove the deceased to
have been a very bad man we might raise the damages to
£zo,ooo. A judgment from the House of Lords on this aspect
of the law will be eagerly awaited. In the meantime, both the
legal profession and the personal representatives of the deceased persons may face the future in confident anticipation
of a satisfactory harvest.Ges

As the British courts themselves have recognized, it probably becomes
even more difficult when a child, an unemployed person, a hopelessly
insane, or an unconscious person is the one whose life expectancy has
been shortened.
One further consideration is important in comparing the British and
American results. The distinction drawn by most American cases between denying recovery for shortened life span, but admitting it as
evidence to show the extent and seriousness of the injury itself is of
questionable practical significance. It does not escape the notice of the
courts that evidence of shortened life span may affect the jury in unexpected ways. It is certainly possible to argue that a plaintiff who introduces such testimony may have reason to fear that a lower verdict
will be reached because his period of pain and suffering will be diminished to the extent that his life expectancy has been shortened. One
court held that the admission of such evidence, even though error,
could not be prejudicial to the defendant. The court said:
The reason why this is true is obvious. If it had any effect
at all it would have been to reduce rather than increase the
amount of plaintiff's recovery since while plaintiff was entitled to his pecuniary loss based on his life expectancy before
the injury, the recovery for future mental and physical suffering would depend upon expectancy in his injured condition.G69
If this be an accurate estimate of the effect of such evidence a defendant might even consider offering it to reduce the recovery for pain
and suffering, which is generally assumed today to be the cause of the
large amounts being awarded by juries. G70 Yet it is open to question
568

Quoted from "Is Life a Boon?" 14 N.Z.L.J. 65 (1938).
Crecelius v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., supra note 562 at 402.
s1o Plant, supra note 381.
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that a defendant would be acting wisely in introducing such evidence.
Although it may not be considered by the jury as a separate element of
damage, surely such evidence might sway the sympathy of the jury and
cause it to give a higher judgment on the other items. The technical
rules of law included in instructions to juries are interesting to lawyers
and much discussed in law school courses, but what happens when these
instructions and the evidence are taken by the jury into the privacy of
the jury room may be something quite different from the desires of the
lawyers and judges. 571 From the defendant's point of view, once evidence of shortened life span is admitted, an instruction that it may not
itself be the basis for an award as a separate item of damage would be
no assurance that it would not have this effect as a practical matter.
(b) Effect of Wrongful Death and Survival
Statutes
An additional difficulty is ereated by the existence of death statutes,
both wrongful death and survival. All American jurisdictions have
some type of statute creating a special cause of action for a wrongful
death, usually in the form of the original English Lord Campbell's Act.
The theory of these acts is to recognize that the death may have caused
pecuniary losses to survivors closely related to the deceased, i.e., those
who received financial support from him. Recovery usually is dependent
upon a showing of some beneficiary of this class who actually has suffered loss of support and, in theory, the amount of the recovery generally is unrelated to the injuries suffered by the deceased. 572
The typical survival act is based upon a different policy. The common
law rule was that the cause of action in tort died with either the plaintiff or defendant if death occurred before judgment. Survival acts have
been adopted in every American jurisdiction to preserve at least some
causes of action such as injury to personal or real property and even
other non-personal injuries. About half of them also provide for survival of personal injury actions and these are the ones of concern in considering damages for shortened life span.
The theory of recovery under this typical survival act is quite different from that of the wrongful death statute. Recovery by the personal
representative or administrator of deceased's estate is permitted to the
extent that decedent would have had a cause of action. This is deriva571 See Kalvin, "The Jury, the Law, and the Personal Injury Damage Award," 19
Ohio St. L. J. 158 (1958).
5 72 See Prosser 710, 713-16; Harper & James §§25.14 et seq.
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tive action, dependent upon the rights of the deceased and the amount
recovered becomes a part of his estate. 578 Recovery under such statutes
would include damages for pain and suffering, medical expenses, and
loss of earnings during the interval between injury and death.
In some jurisdictions recovery can not be had under both statutes
but in many jurisdictions which have both types of statutes, the theory
of recovery under each being different, there are two causes of action
and recovery under one does not preclude recovery under the other. In
many cases this means that the same beneficiaries will recover under
the wrongful death act and also under the survival statute since the
persons who take the estate of the deceased often are the same close
relatives protected by the wrongful death statute. The duplication is
even more obvious in those jurisdictions which allow the estate to recover under the survival statute for loss of earnings during the full life
expectancy of the deceased without regard to the injury inflicted by the
defendant, often as pointed out before, without deduction for the maintenance costs that the victim would have incurred and which, therefore,
would have reduced the amourit left in his estate.
The existence of both statutes in one jurisdiction has created real
difficulties for the courts and the result has been something less than
logical and just in many situations.m To apply the dictates of these
statutes and the common law tort rules and to reconcile the results of
cases in which the estate of the deceased is suing with those in which
the beneficiaries under the wrongful death acts are seeking recovery,
and both with the rights of the victim himself while he still lives, without unduly modifying the "plain meaning" of the legislative language
is too much to ask of any court. What is needed is a reconsideration of
the whole matter.
(c) A Suggested Reconsideration of the Rule of
Damages
Our first conclusion in reconsidering what rules should be applied
to recovery for shortened life span is that there is little justification for
becoming involved in a deep philosophical concern with man's psychological welfare (important as this is), at least so far as he might contemplate what he will be allowed to recover if he should be killed. The
Prosser 7o8-1o.
See objections and criticisms of Duffey, "The Maldistribution of Damages in
Wrongful Death," 19 Ohio St. L. J. 264 (1958). See also Carter, supra note 438, particularly at 76o-61.
5 73
5 74
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problem is one of deciding what kinds of interests should be recognized
by a pecuniary award in an action arising from an unintentional tort.
Lawyers and judges should not try to answer questions best left to
theologians.
A reconsideration of this area of the law of damages should take account of two basic factors: ( 1) the rights of a person while he is still
living to recover for mental anguish suffered by him, including possibly
his suffering as he contemplates a shortened life expectancy, but not
for the death or shortened life itself; and (2) the rights, if any, of
survivors who might have expected something from the deceased if he
lived his normal number of years. Whatever the type of statute and
whatever the form of action, these would seem to be the two potential
elements of damages that should be considered.
(i) Recovery When the Injured Party Dies
Before Judgment
In considering the rights of the injured party himself, it is important
to draw a distinction between the case in which he dies instantly, never
recovers consciousness, or dies relatively soon after the accident (probably within the period between the accident and trial), and the case in
which there is no other injury except an ascertainable shortening of the
life span with no real danger of death in the immediate future, as so
often will be the situation in radiation exposure cases.
When the injured party dies before judgment or settlement of the
claim, it seems quite unrealistic under a survival statute to hold that the
death itself is an item of damages, so far as the deceased is concerned,
and survives under the statute. The injured person who dies can in no
way enjoy such compensation, except possibly in the form of psychological satisfaction of being able to pass assets on after death. In the
case of instantaneous death, or death before consciousness is regained,
even this is non-existent, and the law ought to recognize that any such
recovery is in effect simply a recovery for the beneficiaries or heirs and,
in some states, cieditors. 575 Notwithstanding possible theological assertions of some religions to the contrary, it would seem best that the
legal rules be based on the philosophy that "you cannot take it with
you," at least as to assets of a pecuniary nature. This would not be inconsistent with most western religions since they do not consider
wordly goods of any particular value in any life hereafter. The law
should not go further. If this view be accepted, the English rule allow575

McCormick 340.
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ing an absolute right of recovery for loss of life expectancy even where
the injured person dies instantly or is not aware of the shortened life
span and therefore can suffer no mental pain and anguish as he contemplates an earlier than normal demise is incorrect.
(ii) Recovery When Injured Party Survives
but Has Shortened Life Expectancy
A different situation is presented, however, when the injured person
survives the trial but has a shortened life expectancy. To the extent that
the law recognizes that there should be recovery for injury to psychological interests of the injured party himself, and there is a considerable
growth of legal recognition of this right in many areas, then the recovery ought to be adjusted to the particular case and applied only to
allow compensation for the mental anguish suffered by the injured because of his concern about his shortened life span. If a money award is
to be given for injury to such psychological interest, there ought to be
both proof that the injury to this interest actually occurred, and also
a reasonable relationship between the money awarded and that needed
to purchase services or enjoyment having a reasonable relation to the
value of the period cut off the man's life. Under this heading it might
even be possible for such a person to recover enough to allow him,
during his shortened life span, to take a trip toward which he had
planned and saved. Though this example may be too extreme, this
would be the kind of interest which, though psychological, ought to be
recognized as sufficiently tangible for monetary compensation to be
made. Probably much more realistic from the standpoint of helping
the injured party would be a greater liberalization in the recovery allowed for medical expenses so that a program of rehabilitation, including mental therapy if needed, could be utilized fully to make the
remaining years of life as enjoyable as is reasonably possible. This
suggestion would reject the English practice and also would call for
modification of the rigid American rule under which recovery has been
denied in the jurisdictions which have passed upon the question. Compensation would thus be allowed for the mental disturbance to the person who knows his life span is being shortened. This would not extend
the law substantially beyond present practices in cases in which the injured person lives and makes a claim, not for shortened life span, but
for a lessening of desirable enjoyable activities during his normal life
span because of some physical injury. As pointed out before, this kind
of right has already been recognized in many jurisdictions including
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some which have denied recovery for shortened life span as such. 576 If
psychological interests are recognized in these cases, so also should they
be when shortened life span is involved. There is no reason, legal or
moral, however, for carrying this item beyond the grave, the indignant
rejection by the Connecticut court of such a barbaric distinction notwithstanding. 577 The material aspects of the recovery certainly do not
pass beyond the grave to the best of our knowledge but go to the surviving kin or other beneficiaries. Since this is true, the award should be
justified under the theory of our wrongful death acts.
It is recognized that this suggestion seems to be in conflict with the
theory of the typical survival statutes that whatever cause of action the
victim had, his estate keeps after his death. The suggestion made would
permit recovery for damages to the injured victim, including any mental disturbance, pain and suffering, and loss of enjoyment of life generally, only if he survives judgment; if he does not, recovery would be
denied to his esta:te. We do not mean to suggest that contracts and
other property rights, including the right to recover for destruction' of
property, should be wiped out upon the death of the injured party.
These rights are capable of being measured in monetary terms and
seem to be a legitimate part of the estate of the deceased, should he die
before trial. Survival statutes are aimed at preserving this kind of right.
It is submitted that there is no justification, however, for adding to the
estate of the deceased an item for damage to his psychological interest,
which so far as this world is concerned is now gone, and is rather unimportant in the next if we can believe the experts~
Any monetary awards that are given in such a case usually go to the
survivors who would recover under a wrongful death statute. If death
ensues before trial or settlement, recovery should be awarded only to
the survivors protected by the death statutes for loss of expected support. The concern in cases awarding monetary compensation should be
with the living and not with the dead. Any recovery for invasion of
psychoiogical interests ought to be resolved between the defendant and
the injured party and the amount keyed to compensating hiin, not 'the
survivors. The logical time to determine this is at the time of the trial,
which usually will be long· enough after the injury so that it will be
known whether the injured party is going to live for a reasonable period of time beyond the injury. In any event, in most cases it will make
a clear-cut distinction between the amount to be awarded to the injured
576

ii1T

See cases like Hogan v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., supra note 567.
Supra note 541. See also Prosser 709·
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party for damage to his peace of mind, and the amount to be awarded
to the persons who have lost expected financial support because of the
death or serious shortening of life expectancy of the injured person.
Their interests are of quite a different nature.
In any event, if the victim survives judgment, having proved that he
will die one, ten, fifteen, or twenty years prematurely, but a considerable period after the trial, his recovery should not include lost wages,
expenses, or pain and suffering and mental anguish for the period between his expected premature death and the life span he would have enjoyed but for the accident. In many cases of radiation exposure in which
only a few years are cut off of life expectancy, there may be no decrease
in earning capacity and no pain and suffering and probably not much,
if any, mental anguish, premature death being so long delayed. The
period cut off actually may be non-earning years, after retirement, unless retirement plans begin to take account of premature aging. Any
award of damages to the surviving victim should take account of the
mitigating factors.
(iii) Recovery by Dependents for Lost Support
Recovery by persons normally included as beneficiaries in wrongful
death statutes should be determined on the basis of support they could
have expected from the deceased had he lived his normal life. Under
this approach, a determination must be made of what these beneficiaries
would have received from the decedent had he lived, taking into account, of course, the maintenance costs of the decedent during the
period of his normal life expectancy. It should take account of the fact
that in most radiation cases only a few years should be taken off the
end of the victim's life at a time when all of his dependents, except for
his wife and perhaps other disabled relatives should have no longer
expected any financial support. In such cases no recovery should be allowed for dependents. It would be best to postpone such determination
until the victim actually dies.
(d) Advantages and Disadvantages of the Recommendations
The proposed separation of the damage rights of the injured party
and of any dependents who lose financial support because of his actual
or expected early demise should help make possible a fairer determination of how much damages to award to whom. The injured person, if
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he lived until judgment or settlement, would recover the type of damages now allowed, such as for pain and suffering, medical expenses,
lost wages (during his reduced life span only), etc., but all damages
should be limited to what is suffered during the period he now is expected to live in his injured condition. If he dies before judgment, the
length of his life is now definitely known instead of estimated and
other than expenses actually incurred during his life, all recovery
should be for lost support by dependents. The result would prevent recovery for shortened life span itself, contrary to the Connecticut and
English Commonwealth view. It also would prevent recovery of lost
wages for the full period of normal life expectancy allowed in some
American jurisdictions which purport to deny recovery for shortened
life span.
On the other hand, it would permit a separate determination of the
rights of surviving dependents whose recovery should then not be affected in any way as to amount because the injured person also may have
recovered. Realistic amounts should be awarded to such dependents.
There is no reason to carry over into a determination of their needs
the great uncertainties that are involved in deciding how much to allow
the injured party for his pain and suffering and his mental anguish
caused by contemplating an early demise. Any psychological interests of
the injured victim which have been invaded should be measured by the
time he actually lives or is expected to live. The needs of survivors have
no logical policy relationship to this amount. Their recovery should be
determined in accordance with their reasonable expectations of support
after their benefactor's death.
The result suggested probably could be achieved if courts were willing to interpret somewhat more liberally common law and death statute damage rules but this perhaps would involve a certain amount of
judicial legislation in some states. It would be better if a statute were
enacted recognizing the interrelationship cif the rights of the injured
victim, his estate, and his dependents as now protected under most
wrongful death statutes. The result would be more consistent with the
general theory of compensatory damages in unintentional tort cases
where 1i fe span has been shortened by a defendant who fails to meet
the required standard of conduct but who should not be punished so
that others can receive a windfall.
Administration of these suggestions will present some difficulties.
Juries will have difficulty keeping separate the different items of damages but probably less difficulty than they now have when they are told
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not to allow recovery for shortened life span, although they may consider it in determining how seriously plaintiff has been hurt, and also
are told to estimate his wages during his full life expectancy. The
separation should help differentiate the various elements of damage on
a more logical basis. It would permit findings of fact on specific items
of damage.
Another difficulty arises under our suggestions if the injured person
lives until after judgment but his expectation of further life is very
short. Under these circumstances should the dependent beneficiaries of
a wrongful death statute be allowed to have a further cause of action?
If so, when does it arise-at the same time as the injured party's right
or only after he dies? A related difficulty arises if there is an ascertainable shortening of life span but the victim is expected to live for as
many as forty or fifty years. This is very likely to happen in radiation
exposure cases. Who should be counted as beneficiaries and how much
should they be allowed to expect from the victim had he lived?
One writer has made the ingenious suggestion that the injured party
should recover his own losses and also those of potential beneficiaries
at his death, all in one action. 518 He would be allowed to recover the
total amount on the theory that if he dies it then will be passed on to
the persons he wanted to protect anyway. The alternative would be to
allow a separate action for loss of expected support by the beneficiaries
who could sue if he died. The writer objected to this alternative because "[t]his not only makes it impossible to ascertain the recipients,
but also leaves the court without the base for calculating the rewards."" 519 His suggestion, however, involves the same difficulty he was
trying to avoid. Determination of the beneficiaries and of the amount
of support they could expect is just as difficult no matter who brings
the cause of action.
Our suggestion would be to adopt what might be described as a "wait
and see" doctrine-allow the beneficiaries a separate cause of action
under a wrongful death theory, to arise at the time the injured pla.intiff dies, not before. Any statute of limitations problem could be
handled simply by holding that the cause of action does not arise until
the death occurs. Difficulties arise from the possibility of disappearance,
death, or bankruptcy of the defendant, but these seem not nearly so
objectionable as guessing who the beneficiaries will be, how long they
will live, and how much support they would have received from the
578 22 U.
579/bid.

of Chi. L. Rev. 505, 512 ( 1955).
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deceased during the time of his normal life expectancy. Our suggestions
involve the lesser evil.
The most important difficulty arising if the action by death beneficiaries is postponed until the actual death of the victim is that it may
delay actions for many years, twenty or more being perfectly possible.
This does create a very serious concern, not only as to whether or not
the insurance coverage of a defendant will be continued for this period
of time for the particular injury (or other funds if insurance does not
cover the injury), but also as to preservation of the evidence surrounding the original injury.
~· · Several possibilities for alleviating this problem to some extent can
be suggested. One is to adopt an arbitrary period, for example ten years
after the date of injury. If the injured person lives for ten years perhaps it is fair to assume that the beneficiaries' pecuniary losses and expectations of support have been reduced to a sufficiently low order that
the law should ignore them. This should take care of all but the most
unusual case as to child beneficiaries but may not be satisfactory for
spouses who are dependents. It may be a fair compromise even then,
however, since in most states today they recover nothing under wrongful death statutes if the decedent survives until after judgment in his
own action for tort damages.
· Another possible solution to the problem of a long delayed but accelerated death is to limit the recovery of death-act beneficiaries to those
cases in which the deceased himself has recoverd damages from the
defendant which would mean that the initial cause of action itself has
been brought within the period of the statute of limitations, and that
the basic facts of the defendant's liability for the accident would have
been established. The fact that beneficiaries probably would not have
participated in the original trial presents the matter of binding parties
by a judgment in which they did not participate. The whole cause of
action is such, however, that in a real sense it is dependent on the right
of the injured party to recover if he survives. Only because of a statute
especially concerned with such beneficiaries do they have any cause of
action at all. It do~s not seem arbitrary, therefore, to condition the
right to recover under the wrongful death act on establishment by the
deceased himself of a right of recovery for his own injuries based on
the defendant's negligence, even though the amount of damages is
determined on a different basis in the two cases. The only difficulty
with this suggestion will be when the only recoverable damage is shortened 1i fe span, and our recommendation is that the victim not be allowed recovery for this item. In such case perhaps he or the beneficiaries
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should be forced to sue soon after the exposure to establish the defendant's liability. Under the usual statute of limitations this situation would
arise under these suggestions only if the injured person lives longer
than at least a year and more typically two or three years after the injury occurred.
A difficulty still exists if the defendant is willing to admit liability,
at least in a compromise situation, and settles the claim with the injured plaintiff. If the two causes of action, for the injured plaintiff
and for the injured beneficiary, are separated as suggested here, there
is the question of how to determine the amount of damages and the
persons ·to whom recovery should go for the premature death with
consequent loss to the group of beneficiaries protected by the wrongful
death statute. Here again settlement of their rights and preservation of
any award could be entrusted to the injured plaintiff on the assumption
that he will make it available on his death anyway. Gso On the other
hand, the rights of beneficiaries could be kept separate and recovery
delayed until the injured party dies, again with an arbitrary time limitation of a decade or so, if a longer period is administratively unsound or
at least unsatisfactory to the insurance companies. One other possibility
is to guess who the beneficiaries will be at the time the victim is expected to die and allow settlement with them, with appointment of a
guardian for those not yet in existence or underage, if this seems necessary. Our recommendation is that the settlement be with beneficiaries
separately or with their guardians ad litem.
If the two interests are separated, the rule that any action of beneficiaries under wrongful death acts is lost if the injured plaintiff lives
until he has recovered judgment would be changed. 581
(e) Conclusions
Shortening of life expectancy cases are certain to result from exposure to radiation according to present scientific theory. Present damage theories as applied to this subject must be re-evaluated. Under existing rules results often will be unjust because the cases are likely to be
of the kind that gives the most trouble under existing law. The proper
solution should be determined before too many cases arise. Lawyers
and their clients should see that a comprehensive and fair statutory
scheme is enacted.
GSo This seems to be an assumption approved in a somewhat different way by the
writer of the comment in 22 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 505, 512 (1955).
581 See Annot., 39 A.L.R. 579 (1925); Annot., 99 A.L.R. 1091 (1935); 22 U. of Chi.
L. Rev. 505, 513 (1955); and arguments pro and con in Southern Bell Tel. Co. v.
Cassin, I I I Ga. 575, 36 S.E. 881 ( 1900).
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f. Other Types of Damages
In addition to the items of damages already discussed, certain others
involving some psychological or emotional disturbance features may
arise in radiation situations. They are sufficiently different from the
most closely analogous problems arising in the usual tort case to warrant
brief mention.
( 1)

Inability to Continue in Nuclear Work

One of the situations that may arise is the exposure of an individual
to the maximum permissible level of radiation beyond which there exists
a serious risk of injury, although as yet there are no observable disabling
physical manifestation!!. This most likely would happen in connection
with employment in nuclear activities, and also could occur in other tort
liability situations. For example, a nuclear physicist or engineer through
the negligence. of a doctor might be exposed to sufficient radiation to
make it unwise for him to continue to work in an environment where he
is exposed regularly even to small doses of radiation, or where there is
a chance of an accidental exposure of significant proportions. A similar
problem could arise in connection with an accident which discharges
radioactive material over a populated area and exposes to a fairly high
level of radiation, a nuclear engineer, who at that time, is not engaged
in his occupation. The amount of exposure could be such that there
would be no present physical disability and hence no injury in the ordinary sense. Yet, if this person is to take normal advantage of his
experience and training, he must work in situations where somewhat
greater than normal risks of exposure to radiation are involved. If it is
inadvisable for the worker to continue in his chosen field, can he recover damages for the inability to do so, or can he recover for the
necessity of changing occupations which may mean undertaking a long
period of training in an educational institution and perhaps an additional substantial period for practical experience?
It is generally agreed that in any suit for compensation for personal
injury, one of the elements of damage is impairment of earning capacity.m There are many cases in which this item has been allowed, 583
582 Harper & James 1316 ff.; McCormick 299 ff. See also 15 Am. Jur., Damages
§88 (1938).
58s See, e.g., Birmingham Elec .. Co. v. Cochran, 242 Ala. 673, 8 So.2d 171 (1942);
Barger v. Jimerson, 130 Colo. 459, 276 P.2d 744 (1954); Moe v. Alsop, 189 Ore. 59,
216 P.2d 686 (1950); Trombetta v. Champlain Valley Fruit Co., 117 Vt. 491, 94 A.2d
797 (1953). Cases are usually found in West Digest System under key number Damages 38.
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but the recent case involving Maureen Connolly, the famous young
woman tennis champion, illustrates as well as any the willingness of
courts to sustain a very substantial award by the jury for loss of earning
capacity, in this case for $95,000. ~ Her injury prevented her from
continuing her tennis career from which she could expect, on the basis
of actual offers for the coming year, anywhere from $30,000 to $75,000,
if she would turn professional. While the award included present pain
and suffering and possible future suffering from the loss of blood supply
to her foot, it is clear that the major item of recovery was for the loss
of expected earnings. In upholding the jury's verdict as not excessive,
the court said :
58

Loss of earning power is an element of general damages
which can be inferred from the nature of the injury, without
proof of actual earnings or income either before or after the
injury, and damages in this respect are awarded for the loss of
ability thereafter to earn money. 585
Where there is a present observable injury to the plaintiff in cases of
overexposure to radiation, it would seem clear that one of the items of
damages which the jury could award would be lost earning capacity, if
the radiation of the plaintiff actually makes it impossible for him to earn
as much after the accident as before. This kind of situation would
seem to be covered by the general rule, although the measurement of this
item is difficult.
In all of the cases decided up to the present time there has been an
actual, present physical impairment which to some extent observably
reduced the ability of the plaintiff to carry out with former ability the
job he had been doing before the accident. No case has been found
dealing with a situation in which recovery was allowed for lost earning
capacity simply because it would not be wise 'from the standpoint of
plaintiff's health to continue the work for which he had been trained.
Under the language ordinarily used by the courts in defining the
term "personal injury," it would not be difficult in radiation cases to
find that a person who has been irradiated even to a small degree has
received an "injury." An early Massachusetts opinion defines "injury"
about as well as any:
In common speech the word "injury," as applied to a personal
injury to a human being, includes whatever lesion or change in
any part of the system produces harm or pain or a lessened
5 84

Connolly v. Pre-Mixed Concrete Co., 49 Cal.2d 483, 319 P.2d 343 (1957).

585

I d. at 489.
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facility of the natural use of any bodily activity or capability. G86
This broad definition of injury literally covers a person who has been
exposed to any significant amount of radiation, because present scientific opinion holds that even small amounts of radiation either destroy
body cells or at least reduce their ability to divide and replace themselves.587 This might serve as the necessary injury upon which to base
the item of impaired earning capacity.
The difficulty with accepting this analysis is that, in awarding damages for impairment of earning capacity resulting from "personal injury," the statements of the courts have been made in cases in which
there was an observable impairment of a physical function which itself
created a physical disability to continue activities previously carried on
by the plaintiff. From this it certainly could be argued that "personal
injury". means that which is itself compensable in a tort action, aside
from the lost earning capacity. Therefore, such cases are not direct support for recovery where there is no disability in the ordinary sense and
where the only significant loss that can be measured in pecuniary terms
is the lost earning capacity resulting from the necessity of changing professions in order to avoid the health danger created by further exposure.
The presence of an actual physical . impact and some impairment of
bodily functions, however, will give a court the necessary foundation to
support an action for lost earning capacity, if it feels some physical
injury to the plaintiff is a necessary prerequisite to allowing such recovery. Actually the policy question is the same whether or not we find
a presently observable change in bodily functions, so long as it is found
that no further work in the nuclear energy area should be carried out by
the· particular plaintiff. The question really is: As a matter of social
policy, should recovery be allowed in such cases? So stated, it is difficult
to justify denial.
The only cases found which are in any way closely analogous to the
situation here posed are the allergy cases arising in connection with
workmen's compensation claims. 588 In Arkansas Nat'l Bank of Hot
Springs v. Colbert, the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the commission's award for a "disability" arising from dermatitis caused by contact with nickel and carbon, and also approved the modification of the
award by the circuit court to make the disability a "permanent, total
586 Burns's Case, 218 Mass. 8, 12, 105 N.E. 001 (1914), cited in 1 Larson, Workmen's Compensation §42.11 (1952) as the best definition of "injury" found.
587 Infra note 1090.
588 See Larson, supra note 586 at §41.00.
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disability." 589 The claimant had worked many years as a cashier for
business houses and finally for the employer bank for whom she was
working at the time the dermatitis became acute. The condition finally
forced her to resign. The court found that the allergy was caused by
"dust" coming from the nickels and from carbon paper and that this
made it a disabling injury from an occupational disease within the terms
of the workmen's compensation act. The court stated that the act should
be liberally construed, provided compensation was to be paid to an
employee actually disabled. The court upheld the finding of permanent
disability even though the dermatitis seemed to clear up completely
when the claimant stayed away from coins and carbon paper. Yet, whenever she returned to a setting where these were present the dermatitis
reappeared.
A similar result was reached in LeLenko v. Wilson H. Lee Co., where
a linotype operator developed dermatitis from an allergy to the antimony
coming from the molten metal used in the linotype operation. Here
again this allergic dermatitis was held to be an "occupational disease." 590
This apparently is a usual result in compensation cases, though it must
be remembered that frequently such awards are made on a more liberal
basis than if similar questions are raised in ordinary tort cases. 591 If the
inability to continue work in a given profession is proved, however, there
seems to be no reason why it should not be a compensable injury under
tort rules as well. The effect on the worker will be the same in either
case.
The LeLenko case did not deal specifically with the problem of alternatives open to the claimant to earn a living in some other occupation
but the statement of facts is such as to permit this assumption. In the
Colbert case the court was faced with a specific argument by the employer that since the claimant was "an unusually intelligent woman, with
a pleasing personality, she should be able to secure remunerative employment in some other business or profession." 592 The court answered
this argument by showing that there was no finding in the testimony
that she could secure such employment, and that there were very few
occupations open to women, especially of her age and training. It seems
to be true that where compensation is claimed for loss of earning capacity
in the ordinary tort case the defendant has the right to reduce the
amount of the award by the amount that the plaintiff could reasonably or
209 Ark. 1070, 193 S.W.zd 8o6 (1946).
128 Conn. 499, 24 A.zd 253 (1942).
591 Supra note 588.
592 S11pra note 589 at 1074.
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actually earn during a period of less than total disability and most jurisdictions follow the same rule in workmen's compensation cases.
The ordinary worker whose job does not .require any very special
technical training or extensive education surely will be treated like the
truck driver or seamstress whose foot injury made it difficult to continue the same occupation but does not really decrease substantially the
ability to perform a similarly remunerative task. 593 There will cirtainly be employment of this sort in atomic energy and under such circumstances this element of damages can be minimized.
The problem may not be nearly so simple for an experienced nuclear
engineer who has had as much as seven or more years of college training
preparing him for his career. It may be that such a person could find
an administrative position where his exposure to radiation would be
nil and which would be just as remunerative. It is also possible that
such a person could return to college and pursue another profession if
he were willing to spend the necessary time and effort to earn a graduate
degree. His age might seriously prejudice his chances to make aname
for himself and to get an equally rewarding position. The only fair
conclusion would seem to be, therefore, that such injuries be compensated, even though no presently observable physical injury has manifested itself. There is no reason, however, to go as far as the court did
in the Colbert case in allowing this kind of injury to be treated as a total
disability. Aside from the expense to society it would seem poor social
policy to encourage a person so injured to remain idle instead of finding
other types of employment. His age, training, and experience and the
feasibility of shifting profession of course should be taken into account
in determining if he will be able to find an equally remunerative job.
The period of time required to prepare for a new occupation and the
money lost while attaining an equal position should be included.
Our conclusion, therefore, is that recovery for the type of injury here
posed should be allowed even though there is no presently manifested
injury. This assumes that there has been proof of the fact that the
plaintiff has received exposure up to the point where it is not safe for
him to continue in work where the risk of exposure to radiation is somewhat greater than normal.
598 4 Restatement, Torts §924 (1939); McCormick 3o8, n. 40 and cases there cited.
See Trombetta v. Champlain Valley Fruit Co., supra note 583, where a $so a week truck
driver could not show loss of earning capacity from a $10 a week job he took, partly
to satisfy his obligations to his father. For workmen's compensation rule see 2 Larson,
supra note 586 at §§57.53, 57.61, 58.00.
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( 2) Psychological In juries
Because the general public's introduction to radiation injuries has
been through atomic bombs, beginning with the destruction of Nagasaki
and Hiroshima and continuing to the present concern about fall-out
from the nuclear tests, atomic energy and radiation have a fearful connotation for most people. Added to this is the fact that the science is of
relatively recent development and is mysterious to the layman because
radiation cannot be felt, seen, heard, or tasted. This is the very situation where the psychological reaction of a person who has been or thinks
he has been irradiated probably will assume rather great proportions.
The whole problem of mental or emotional disturbance is one that has
given the courts considerable concern and the movement certainly is in
the direction of giving greater recognition to this type of injury as more
is learned about the workings of the human mind.
For the purpose of discussing radiation injury cases as they involve
mental disturbance, the present state of the law can be fairly summarized
as follows : 594 ( 1) Where there has been an actual physical impact on
the plaintiff by a force set in motion by a negligent defendant (and the
impact need not be at all substantial), 595 recovery may be allowed for
mental disturbances, such as fright, pain, suffering, and similar types
of mental anguish. 506 ( 2) While in some jurisdictions it is still necessary to find a physical impact of some kind, 597 the trend in recent cases
clearly is in the direction of allowing recovery for mental disturbance
where there is no physical impact, so long as the mental disturbance
manifests itself in some physically observable way, such as a traumatic
neurosis. 5 &8 (3) If the only psychological injury is one that could not
59 4 See generally Prosser 176-82; Harper & James § 18.4, and articles listed by each.
See particularly Smith & Solomon, "Traumatic Neuroses in Court," 30 Va. L. Rev. 78,
164 ( 1943); Smith, "Relations of Emotions to Injury and Disease: Legal Liability
for Psychic Stimuli," 30 Va. L.-Rev. 193 (1944).
595
E.g., see Porter v. Del., Lack. & W.R.R., 73 N.J.L. 405, 63 Atl. 86o (1906) (dust
in plaintiff's eyes). See cases collected in Smith & Solomon, supra note 594 at 164 and
Appendix A at 159. See also Prosser 178-79, n. 7-12.
596 Prosser 178; Harper & James 1032. See particularly, Alley v. Charlotte Pipe &
Foundry Co., supra note 449, where the fear was danger of cancer; Kimbell v. Noel,
228 S.W.2d g8o (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) (same).
597
Prosser 178-79; Harper & James 1032-34. See statement of the New York rule
in Hugo v. Wade, 160 N.Y.S.2d 534 (1957).
598
lbid.: e.g., Williams v. State, 126 N.Y.S.2d 324 (1953) alf'd 134 N.Y.S.2d 857
(1954) (fright from threats of convict who escaped because of defendant's negligence);
Colla v. Mandella, 1 Wis.2d 594, 85 N.W.2d 345 (1957) (fear from possible impact with defendant's truck, citing Prosser 178-79, Harper & James 1033-34); Sutton
Motor Co. v. Crysel, 28g S.W.2d 631 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
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be reasonably foreseen if the plaintiff were a person of average constitution, including average emotional stability~ the defendant has not
breached the required standard of conduct and, therefore, is not negligent and not liable. If the defendant, however, acted unreasonably with
respect to the average person, he will then be liable for all of the results
that flow from this action, even though the plaintiff can be shown to
have been peculiarly vulnerable to this kind of psychological stimulus.Gss
This is similar to the "thin skull" cases in which damage more severe
than would have been expected results from defendant's negligence because the plaintiff was peculiarly susceptible to injury from this kind of
force. 600 Whether or not the defendant was negligent in the action
from which psychological injury results is to be tested by a person of
average constitution; 601 and in determining if the plaintiff's fears were
reasonable under the circumstances, the test is what a reasonable layman
in a similar situation would have thought and done, not what a scientist
would know to be the actual danger. 602 (4) Where the only result of
defendant's negligence is mental disturbance without any accompanying
physical symptoms, there is general agreement that recovery is not
allowed. 808
Here again radiation exposure situations will call for a reexamination
of the underlying assumptions of damag~s rules; for it is apparent that
there has been a lack of clarity in analysis, certainly on the part of courts,
and it would seem even on the part of legal writers. There has not been
sufficient recognition of the real need. for relating and reconciling the
rules controlling breach of the standard of conduct, those controlling the
kind of recompensable injuries flowing from negligent actions, and those
GDD Smith, supra note 594 at 256-61. The cases cited clearly support the conclusion
drawn.
600 2 Restatement, Torts §461 (1934); Smith, supra note 594. particularly at 26o,
n. 200. See, e.g., Owen v. Dix, 210 Ark. 562, 196 S.W.2d 913 (1946); Nelson v.
Black, 266 P.2d 817 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 1954) ; Sterrett v. East Texas Motor Freight
Lines, 150 Tex. 12, 236 S.W.2d 776 (1951); Oliver v. Yellow Cab Co., g8 F.zd 192
(7th Cir. 1938); Offensend v. Atlantic Ref. Co., J22 Pa. 399, 185 At!. 745 (1936);
dicta of Judge L. Hand in Pieczonka v. Pullman Co., 8g F.2d 353, 357 (2d Cir. 1937):
"We do not forget that if a victim is so susceptible that the tort starts up a disease,
or exacerbates his suffering, as it would not have done in the case of a normal man,
he may recover in full, no matter how unlikely the result." See also Coover v. Painless Parker, Dentist, 105 Cal. App. IIO, 286 Pac. 1048 (1930) for item of nervousness
from X-ray bums.
eo1 Smith, supra note 594 at 259.
6° 2 I d. at 265. Cf. Ferrara v. Galluchio, 176 N.Y.S.zd 996, 152 N.E.zd 249 (1958), in
which $5,000 was awarded for severe cancer-phobia because of the possibility of cancer
developing.
608 Prosser 18o; Harper & James 1031-1032; Smith, supra note 594 at 227-28.
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which determine the persons protected when somewhat unusual results
follow, particularly in psychological injury cases.
Applying the above principles to radiation situations, even in those
jurisdictions which require impact before there can be any recovery at
all, it would not be difficult to show scientifically that irradiation has a
physical impact on the exposed person. 604 In those jurisdictions which
do not require a physical impact the problem does not arise. If existing
rules are applied with strict logic, whatever mental anguish would be
suffered by an average layman when told that he had been irradiated
would be a compensable injury even though in fact there was no basis
in scientific knowledge for fearing a noticeable physical consequence
from the amount of radiation received. Yet this would actually be quite
like a case in which the only real impact on the victim is a psychological
one, the very case in which under existing case law recovery would be
denied.
Moreover, if the scientific conclusion that impact from radiation
causes some kind of physical injury is accepted, then, applying existing
rules with strict logic, mental anguish would be compensable even if the
victim exposed had an unreasonable fear of injury. The mental anguish
is a permissible item of damages when there is impact and at least some
physical injury. There would be a finding of breach of duty owed by
the defendant to the plaintiff which caused a physical injury, although
not one the plaintiff would feel other than psychologically.
If there is a purely psychological injury (in the sense that scientists
feel there is no real risk from the small amount of radiation received)
but some laymen reasonably might fear injury in spite of scientific
opinion, the present writers feel that recovery should be denied so long
as there are no real physical manifestations resulting from the fear itself.
Even under existing rules, if there are actual physical manifestations of
the fear such as some kind of traumatic neurosis, then the injury suddenly becomes more acceptable to the law and recovery may be allowed.
Also, if there is actual physical impact, recovery is allowed for even unreasonable emotional reactions. On the other hand, if there is only a
disturbance of mental tranquility, and we assume that a minor irradiation is not an impact, then laymen who reasonably fear for their future
health would not be allowed recovery.
It is submitted that these conclusions amount to an illogical mixture
of the "thin-skull" doctrine with psychological injury principles. It becomes somewhat ridiculous to use the average layman to determine
whether or not the defendant was negligent, but any neurotic layman
so• Infra note

HJ9Q.
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to test the extent of injuries. At least where radiation levels are low so
that the impact really is only a psychological one, perhaps the standard
used in determining negligence ought to be whether or not the defendant
was negligent in the sense that the radiation released might cause a person of average mental stability to have fear and concern for his future
health. Liability for mental disturbance should not be determined by
whether or not the defendant was negligent in the sense that he created
an unreasonable risk of physical harm of a kind which did not actually
result. The rule of recovery should not be changed when the damage
question is reached. There should be no allowance for harm resulting
from the fact that the exposed person is peculiarly neurotic. When
courts assert that a negligent wrongdoer can be held liable for all of the
injuries which are the proximate result of defendant's negligent action,
using the "thin-skull" philosophy, they are assuming the answer to the
question that should be faced and answered on the basis of social policy.
A recent California appellate decision well illustrates the kind of results that can follow from mixing the "average person's reaction test"
to determine breach of duty, and the "thin-skull liability for all consequences test" to govern the extent of damages. In Nelson v. Black 606
the plaintiff's neck was injured slightly when his truck was hit in the
rear by defendant. The injury seemed quite minor at the time. Shortly
after leaving the scene of the accident he noticed that his neck was hurting badly and went to his doctor. Over a period of months he had symptoms of serious pains and headaches that were hardly attributable to the
initial jolt and injury to his neck. The jury found for the defendant,
but the appellate court reversed, stating that under the evidence the plaintiff should recover since the defendant's medical expert testified that the
pain and suffering were real, even though they were not caused by the
injury itself but because of a psychoneurosis under which plaintiff was
suffering at the time of the accident. The court said:
It is admitted that the collision actually occurred and even if
plaintiff suffered no actual physical injury as a result of the
collision the effect on his nervous system testified to by defendant's only witness on the subject was none the less compensable. 606
In so holding, the court very clearly was assuming that the only reason
for the suffering and pain was the "pre-existing quality of the emotional
60 5 Supra note 6oo. See also as possibly involving such neurotic injuries, Flood v.
Smith, 126 Conn. 644, 13 A.2d 677 (1940), apparently applying the "thin skull" doctrine
whether the preexisting condition is "physical or nervous."
606 Nelson v. Black, supra note 6oo at 819.
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stability of his personality." The court then stated the usual rule that
the tortfeasor must take the person whom he injures as he finds him and
even if this includes susceptibility to greater than normal damage the
defendant still is not exonerated. The court said that in California this
ru.le applied even in cases where the susceptibility was caused by mental
instability.
A similar case is Purcell v. St. Paul City Ry. 601 in which the plaintiff
suffered a miscarriage allegedly from fright resulting when the car on
which she was riding seemed about to collide with another cable car,
although it did not actually do so. The court said that so long as there
was a physical manifestation of admittedly only mental shock (no
impact) there still could be recovery.
In such a case, though there comes, as an intermediate cause
between the negligence and injury, a condition or operation of
mind on the part of the injured passenger, negligence is nevertheless the proximate cause of the injury. 608
Although proximate cause often is referred to as the reason for decision in these cases, it really is little more than a conclusion that social
policy dictates that this particular type of injury should or should not
be compensable. The policy question should be faced squarely and a decision made as to whether or not this kind of recovery should be allowed.
It was reasonable in Nelson v. Black to expect or foresee an injury to
the plaintiff's neck if his car was bumped sharply from the rear. It is
not reasonable to foresee that a particular plaintiff will be a psychoneurotic person who from such a slight impact will suffer unusually severe
reactions. One wonders whether it is socially justifiable to conclude
under these circumstances, because an unusual risk of one kind is foreseeable, that another kind of damage should be compensable. In this
sense the Nelson case differs from the Purcell case, because many persons on the cable car undoubtedly had real fear of impact, although
actually none took place. The fear undoubtedly would be normal to any
person, not just to an especially neurotic one. Therefore it might be
said that it was reasonably foreseeable that there would be a psychological shock from the impending accident. Even in the Purcell case
the application of the "thin-skull" rule where the only impact is a mental
one seems somewhat questionable, since it can be argued that the only
reason there was any damage was because of the special condition of
one of the passengers. In one sense it is always foreseeable that anybody
607

48 Minn. 134,
at 139.

aos !d.
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N.W. 1034 (1892).
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who comes within the line of force negligently set in motion by the defendant may have some special condition which will make the injuries
particularly damaging. Whether or not to allow recovery for the particular injuries as a matter of social policy cannot be answered by this
kind of foreseeability because the result is always foreseeable by hindsight, and in most cases can be foreseen ahead of time if a person is
imaginative enough and thinks of enough possibilities.
In analyzing the policy question involved in radiation cases in which
mental disturbance occurs several different situations must be considered.
First, some cases will involve actual physical injuries of a compensable
character resulting from the physical impact of the radiation. Other
cases will arise in which a physical symptom manifests itself and is very
real to the victim but has not been caused by the physical impact of radiation and is rather the result of the psychological reaction of the victim.
Still others will occur in which the only manifestation is mental anxiety
and loss of general peace of mind. The latter can arise both when there
is other physical injury and when there is none. One must remember also
that the uninformed average person as well as the seriously neurotic may
experience a psychological reaction leading to real physical symptoms in
situations in which a scientist would feel that there was no danger of
actual physical injury from radiation exposure. It also is true that preventing fraudulent claims for psychological injuries is not easy. The
decision as to whether or not to allow recovery in any case, however,
should turn on the question of what damages society should charge to a
person who has acted negligently in some respect and who is handling a
substance of great social value but which presents some risks of injury.
If actual recoverable physical injury results from irradiation, the
Nelson case rule would permit full recovery for all physical manifestations of psychological origin no matter how neurotic and unreasonable
the disturbance was. This is an unwarranted extension of the "thinskull" cases and should not be carried over into the psychological reaction cases. Such claims in radiation cases are likely to arise and recovery
should be permitted only if a person of normal emotional stability would
have suffered the injury.
If a person using a radiation source is negligent, he should be held
accountable for any physical injury it causes, even to the person unusually sensitive to radiation. This is the "thin-skull" situation. It is submitted that this result should not be applied where the only injury is
because of purely psychological reactions. The courts could hold, though
they should not, that there has been physical impact which killed a few
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cells; they should treat them as purely psychological injury cases. If so,
the person who is unusually neurotic will not be allowed to recover under
existing case law.
The most difficult case of all is that in which the layman of normal
emotional stability would suffer anxiety if he reasonably feared he had
been exposed to radiation and its serious consequences, even though the
nuclear expert would feel confident that the person should not be concerned. Under the Purcell case, recovery for any physical symptoms
would be permitted. Applied to the case of an accident in which many
persons are seriously exposed and many others just slightly, and it is
impossible for the public to know who was exposed to what extent, a
tremendous number of claims could arise. If recovery for psychological
injuries is permitted, this would prejudice the possibility of compensating fully those with actual physical injuries who also have a claim
against available funds. Allowing recoveries for purely psychological
injury to all persons frightened in this situation seems doubtful social
policy.
If some radiation in excess of permitted levels is released but not
enough to result in physical harm so long as it is not repeated, it may
be questionable policy to allow recovery for all who as a part of the uninformed public reasonably fear some physical result. The standard of
conduct required of the non-negligent operator is purposely set very
low so that an accumulation over a period of years will not cause injury.
It may be negligent to release any more than this amount but if it happens only once no real harm can result. Perhaps recovery should be
denied for even physical symptoms resulting from the public's uninformed psychological reaction to news that excess radiation has been
released. The alternative is to be sure the public does not know of the
incident but this is worse social policy because it may prevent a person
with a legitimate claim for a physical injury from knowing that a particular source of radiation may be responsible. So long as the exposure
was not intentionally caused, even though the defendant has been negligent, it seems questionable social policy to allow recovery to a large
number of persons or to a single person simply because he fears injury
rather than actually experiencing it, real though his symptoms may be
to him.
(3) Lost Business Profits and Proximity of Atomic Installation
Most of the lost busiQess profits cases that will arise because of release
of nuclear radiation should create no unique problems for the courts.
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The problems in this area are not easily resolved and the answers are
not clear for all cases, but there is adequate analysis available. 609 For
the most part atomic energy cases will fit into the present pattern of rules
concerning damages.
In general the courts have been reluctant to allow recovery for lost
profits where a business is interfered with and is damaged solely because
of the negligence of the defendant rather than because of intentional
action on his part. On the other hand, as discussed above, if persons have
been injured physically, loss of earning capacity is a compensable
item; 610 and when personal property or realty has been damaged so as
to prevent its use in carrying on business operations, a recovery for the
lost value of the use of the property is permitted, at least to the extent
of normal profits, although a particularly profitable arrangement may
not be compensated. 611
Many cases can be found in which a general statement is made to the
effect that a destruction or interruption of a business, or an injury to a
business operation, caused by' the wrongful act of another is a proper
element of damage. 612 The cases do not depend on whether the action
was in tort or contract, but nearly all involve what might be called intentional interference, although there are a few in which the loss was
caused by negligence. The proof of the amount of profits lost, whether
past or anticipated, is not always easy and the burden of proof, of course,
is on the plaintiff. 618 Some courts hold that anticipated profits are sufficiently certain to permit recovery only if they are derived from an
established business, not a new one. 614 Most of the cases involved losses
because of physical injury, and where the operation of an atomic energy
facility actually causes damage to the property of the business by radioactive fall-out, there is no reason to apply any different rule than in
other kinds of cases. The results should be the same.
One somewhat unique situation may arise, however, from the use of
6 0 9 See discussions in McCormick §§28-30; Prosser §1o6, particularly at 732-3S;
Harper & James §§6.10, 6.11, 2S-3·
61o See discussion of lost earning capacity, supra note s82 ff.
611 See discussions cited supra note 6og.
612 See, e.g., Jacob v. Miner, 67 Ariz. 109, 191 P.2d 734 (1948); Yates v. Kuhl, 130
Cal. App.2d S36, 279 P.2d S63 (I9SS); Bashore v. Publix Shirt Corp., 370 Pa. 142,
87 A.2d 468 (I9S2); United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Construction Corp.,
194 Va. 872, 7S S.E.2d 694 (I9S3). See also IS Am. Jur., Damages §§133-34.
618 Lockwood Grader Corp. v. Bockhaus, i29 Colo. 339, 270 P.2d 193 (1954). See
also McCormick §29.
614 McCracken v. Stewart, 170 Kan. 129, 223 P.2d 963 (19SO); Evergreen Amusement Corp. v. Milstead, 2o6 Md. 610, 112 A.2d 901 (19SS); Truscott v. Peterson, 78
N.D. 498. so N.W.2d 24S (19SI).
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radioactive materials involving lost business profits. Will recovery be
permitted for damages to plaintiff's business if they result solely from
the psychological effect of the presence of the nuclear activity? Very few
cases and little discussion of this type of injury is to be found and the
answer to the question is not at all clear. Yet, at least until the general
public learns more about nuclear installations and radiation hazards,
such situations are likely to arise frequently in the vicinity of large
atomic energy facilities.
Even though there has been no accident or release of radioactive material affecting surrounding property, the mere presence of a reactor or
similar installation may depress land value, whether the land is used for
business or residential purposes, in the surrounding area. It is possible
that patrons of a business may cease to deal with the plaintiff because
of the fear generated by his proximity to the reactor. This could involve
reducing the ability of the employer to hire employees to work so close
to a reactor, or it could involve a loss of patronage of the general public
as might be the case with resort hotels, schools, and mercantile establishments so dependent upon the patronage of the public for success. It is
quite possible that public apprehension alone, even though it has no
scientific basis, may be enough to damage seriously the plaintiff's business operations. Should the school or the resort owner be allowed to
prove that the public, whether ill-advised or not, stayed away because
of the presence of the reactor?
Cases in which the interference with a business results from libel or
slander which destroys the confidence of the public are not directly applicable because such statements are made knowingly, usually with the
express purpose of injuring the plaintiff's business-i.e., they are intentional torts. In the case of the reactor or other atomic energy facility,
not only would there be little likelihood of proving an intent to injure
the plaintiff's business but the operations probably would be licensed and
therefore approved by the AEC, such approval being granted only after
a finding that public health and safety are not substantially endangered.
The only cases that seem at all analogous are those involving the
maintenance of a nuisance. Whether a nuisance is the kind of wrong
for which damages for interference with business profits would be permissible is not easy to answer. The general subject of nuisance has been
thoroughly discussed by text writers. 615 A determination usually is
based on a balancing of "the gravity of the harm against the utility of
6 1 ~ Prosser ch. 14 ; Harper & James §§ 1.23-1.30. See also discussion infra Chapter IV on strict liability.
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the defendant's activity in the light of the suitability of the area for the
respective competing uses." 616 There also are_ cases in which "conduct
producing apprehension or fear of physical danger may, if the fear is
extreme, be sufficiently annoying to amount to a nuisance, as the storing
of powder or high explosives in large quantities in a thickly populated
portion of a city, or the maintenance of a hospital for persons afflicted
with contagious diseases in a residential section." 617
The types of cases coming closest to the matter here under consideration are those supporting the statement by Prosser to the effect that
"Fears and feelings common to most of the community are to be considered; and the dread of contagion from a pesthouse, common to ordinary citizens, may make it a nuisance, although there is no foundation in scientific fact." 618 The hospital cases supporting this statement
are as close as analogy to the reactor situation as can be found. In each
situation there is apprehension, although an apparently unreasonable
one from a scientific standpoint, that hann will result from the kind of
activity being carried on nearby. Fear of harm from bacteria in the
hospital cases produces a psychological effect similar to the concern
about harm from radiation in the case of reactors; both are little understood by the general public.
In Stotler v. Rochelle, typical of these cases, the court said:
The question is not whether the establishment of the hospital
would place the occupants of the adjacent dwellings in actual
danger of infection, but whether they would have reasonable
ground to fear such a result, and whether, in view of the general dread inspired by the disease, the reasonable enjoyment of
their property would not be materially interfered with by the
bringing together of a considerable number of cancer patients
in this place. 619
The fear in this case was caused by the presence of cancer patients. As
Prosser points out in his discussion, 620 there are decisions to the contrary where an injunction against the alleged nuisance was refused
616

Harper & James 74.
ld. at 77·
Prosser 396-97. The undertaking establishment cases are not the same for it is
not fear of physical danger but generally depressed feelings from closeness to death
which is complained of in those cases. See 39 A.L.R.2d 1000 (1955). Radioactive
wastes stored in a Pennsylvania community caused enough public concern, apparently
unjustifiably, that they were removed. BNA, Atomic Industry Rep. 4: 322, 4: 382
(1958).
619 83 Kan. 86, 91, 109 Pac. 788 (1910). Similar statements are found in the cases
cited by Prosser 397, n. 78.
620 Prosser 397·
617
61 8
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when there was no showing that there was an actual existing danger. 621
It is interesting to note that the decisions denying relief are the most
recent of all those found, and none even dealing with this type of problem have been found since 1926. This may result from a change in the
general attitude of the public toward hospitals and a better realization
of the lack of actual danger involved. Or it rna)' be a recognition that
the balance of interest clearly is in favor of the maintenance of such institutions. The difficulty with these cases as analogy for our problem is
that they all involve equitable relief rather than damages.
The assessment of damages if a nuisance should be declared is somewhat complicated, but there would seem to be no reason to expect the
courts to measure the damages in any unique way in atomic energy
cases. 622 Of all the cases that have been examined dealing with the
problem of damages for nuisance, only one has been found dealing
squarely with the problem of the loss of business profits caused by a
nuisance--Johnson Oil Refining Co. of Illinois v. Elledge. 628 In that
case the court allowed the plaintiff to recover the profits from his filling
station operations lost through the defendant's maintenance of a nuisance in the form of coke dust which settled on the plaintiff's property.
In several other cases the courts have either stated or clearly implied
that the loss of business profits was permissible, but in each case the
courts have found that the evidence of the loss was insufficient to
maintain plaintiff's burden of proof. 62•
The facts of Central Georgia Power Co. v. Pope 625 come as close as
any to our suggested case of loss of business because of the mere proximity of a reactor. The defendant had built a dam and it was alleged that
mosquit.oes bred in the backed-up water, driving most of the people from
the surrounding area. The plaintiff was a store owner who alleged that
his very profitable business was almost ruined because his customers
were gone. While there is a dictum in the official headnotes that lost
business profits might be_ recovered if a nuisance kept customers from
a21 Board of Health v. North American Home, 77 N.J. Eq. 464, 78 At!. 677 (1910);
Jardine v. City of Pasadena, 199 Cal. ~. 248 Pac. 225 (1926).
6 2 2 See discussion in McCormick §127. For much less complete discussions, see Prosser 416-17; Harper & James 91-92.
628 175 Okla. 496, 53 P.2d 543 (1936).
624 Guttinger v. Calaveras Cement Co., 105 Cal. App.2d 382, 233 P.2d 914 (1951);
Bollinger v. American Asphalt Roof Corp., 224 Mo. App. 98, 19 S.W.2d 544 (1929);
Harriu v. Great Neck Motors, 143 N.Y.S.2d 472 (1955), a/f'd, 153 N.Y.S.2d 568
( 1956) ; Shreveport Laundries v. Red Iron Drilling Co., 192 So. 895 (La. App. 1939).
626 141 Ga. 186, 8o S.E. 642 ( 1913).
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ingress to plaintiff's place of business, 628 the court denied the claim in
this case because the defendant's wrongful act affected the customers, if
anyone, and not the plaintiff businessman. The court said that, in
actions based upon negligence only, injuries or death of one with whom
a plaintiff is doing business is not a recoverable damage to plaintiff.
It is not pretended that the defendant killed some of the plaintiff's customers, and made others sick, for the purpose of destroying his business. The damages sought to be recovered on
this account are too remote. If the plaintiff could recover on
this basis, it is not readily perceived why a merchant might not
bring an action against a railroad company for loss of custom
arising from the death of a good customer caused by its negligence; or why, if one person should create a nuisance in a
neighborhood, which should cause one of the residents to move
to another place, every merchant with whom such person
dealt before his removal could not recover because his patronage had been lost after his change of residence. It will be
readily seen that such claims for damages might be extended
into almost limitless ramifications. They do not fall within the
rules in cases where property has been physically injured, or
there has been some interference with an easement or right
connected with or appurtenant thereto. 621

The court then distinguished the case in which, by a nuisance, plaintiff's
place of business itself is rendered so unhealthy or unpleasant as to
drive away the customers. In many ways the reactor also involves a
neighborhood nuisance situation which keeps customers away, not because of any physical deterioration of the plaintiff's property but because
of a psychological fear of the neighborhood generally. So interpreted,
the Central Georgia Power Co. case stands for no recovery in our psychological nuisance situation-the injury, if any, is to the customers,
not to the businessman, or atleast his injuries are too remote.
On the other hand, one could argue that the psychological nuisance
really is not too unlike the coke dust and other cases in which there is a
physical interference with the plaintiff's property, in which case there can
be recovery of business profits if the losses are properly proved. He
could argue that his own property really has become psychologically unpleasant for customers, not just the neighborhood: .If recovery were
allowed for this psychological nuisance, the reactor owner would have
to compensate all established businesses and all homeowners or others
6 26 This is the only authority cited by Prosser 417, n. 91, for recovery of lost profits
of an established business, though this statement of the court is apparently dictum.
627 Supra note 625 at 18g-90. (Emphasis added.)
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with property within a radius limited only by the psychological lines
drawn by the imagination of the general public.
No doubt the effect upon the federal reactor program of a state court
holding the reactor operator liable for such psychological nuisance damages would be significantly burdensome. This raises the question of the
effect on state law of the fact that large atomic energy installations are
licensed by the federal government. Are such damages thereby precluded?
(a) Effect of Licensing-Constitutional Questions
Since all the uses of radiation sources which will create a serious possibility of radiation injury (such as reactor operators, fuel core fabricators, companies processing radioisotopes or handling the disposal of
radioactive waste material), are now federally licensed and will be so
licensed for the foreseeable future, it is important to consider the effect
of this program on the possibilities of bringing nuisance suits against
such operations. Treatise writers seem to agree 628 that so long as the
licensee acts within the terms of the license and does not act negligently
or in disregard of the rights of others, his activity cannot be abated on
the ground· that it is a public nuisance. Prosser and also Harper and
James; however, state that constitutional principles place a limit on the
extent to which legislative authority can immunize the licensee from
damage actions by surrounding property owners. They agree in distinguishing between "minor" and "major" 629 or "small" and "great" 630
private nuisances. The cases cited in the two treatises to support their
conclusions are in point, but not only are all of the cases rather old, 631 a
fact which makes them particularly unreliable authority in constitutional
law matters, but also the terms "minor-major" and "small-great" are not
very helpful, even if they can lle considered as accurately descriptive.
Actually the problem is one of a balancing of interests, in which case the
distinction is not between how great or small is the inconvenience to surrounding landowners, but rather it becomes a matter of determining how
much of an inconvenience it is balanced against the general desirability
of allowing or encouraging the particular activity. Certainly many substantial inconveniences have been held to be non-recoverable because the
activity was licensed.
The cases that have arisen so far have involved situations in which
Prosser 421; Harper & James 87-88.
Prosser 421.
630 Harper & James 87.
631 All before 1904 except for one in 1914. Supra note 628.
628

629

NEGLIGENCE

327

the licensing authority has been a part of the same government, whether
state or federal, whose courts have tried the damage actions arising out
of the licensed activity. This will differ from atomic energy operations
which are likely to present the problem of psychological nuisance merely
from the existence of the reactor, fuel core fabricating plant, or disposal operation. In the atomic energy area only the federal government
issues the licenses, but, for the most part, it will be in the state courts
that the damage actions will be brought. This, therefore, raises the
question whether the federal government, by licensing an activity that
would otherwise be considered a nuisance under state law, can immunize
the licensee from an action to abate either a public or a private nuisance
or prevent a damage action for the nuisance created. There is also the
further question whether, assuming the federal power, the Congress in
setting up the Atomic Energy Commission with its regulatory power
and in providing for government indemnity for legal liability imposed
upon licensees, intended to preclude either injunctions against operating
or damage recovery for losses occasioned by psychological nuisance. If
Congress has attempted to preclude such actions and has the power to
do so, state law on this question is unimportant. Actually no state ~t
the present time has a real licensing program for major installations, 832
but regulatory programs are being developed and the problem will become important.
( i) The Power of Congress
The general power of Congress to regulate practically all aspects of
atomic energy operations and to supersede state regulation seems clear. 633
But this does not answer the question whether such power extends to
the· point of withdrawing the cause of action that otherwise would exist
in the state courts against the operation of a nuisance. The question
whether Congress has the power to preclude an injunction or a damage
action in the state court must itself be divided into two questions : Can
the federal government encroach upon the power of the state in this connection, and can the federal government encroach upon the· rights of
individuals not to be deprived of their liberty or property without due
process? It is also important to recognize that a different answer might
be given in the case of damages from that given when an injunction is
sought.
See infra Part III, Chapter V, on state regulation and also federal pre-emption.
See Estep, "Federal Control of Health and Safety Standards in Peacetime Private
Atomic Energy Activities," 52 Mich. L. Rev. 333 (1954).
632
683
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Interference with State Power. No cases have been found dealing
with the right of Congress to interfere with the exercise of state power
so far as federally licensed nuisances are concerned, but surely Congress
may do so. Beginning with Gibbons v. Ogden, 634 where the court invalidated state laws granting a steamship monopoly in New York waters,
the court has consistently held that where Congress itself has power
delegated to it by the Federal Constitution it may supersede state power
in the area even without any expression of congressional intent. 635 This
is true even when state regulations admittedly are justified, such as in
the field of public health and safety, which traditionally is thought to
be primarily the concern of the states. 636 That such federal pre-emption
precludes the power of state courts to enjoin action which is illegal
under state law is made clear by such cases as Amalgamated Ass'n of
Street, Elect. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees of America v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Board, 637 in which the court held that, in the
light of the federal statute, a Wisconsin injunction against a peaceful
strike for higher wages was not valid. The court also has held that a
state may not revoke an interstate carrier's license even though the
licensee was using the state highways repeatedly in violation of the state
load limit regulation. 638 So long as Congress is acting within the scope
of one of its delegated powers, it does not make any difference that it
has an effect on a relationship, such as even marriage, which is peculiarly
a state matter. 639 The state power to regulate can be superseded by
congressional act.
A most recent example of this power to supersede the jurisdiction of
the state, or one of its political subdivisions, is City of Chicago v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. 640 in which the court held that the city could not
force a transportation company carrying passengers between railroad
stations in Chicago to get a state license to operate, since the activity
was within the power of the national government even though the op9 Wheat. I (1824).
See many of the cases discussed infra Part III, Chapter V, Section E on federal
pre-emption.
636 See e.g., Leisy v. Hardin, 13S U.S. 100, 10 S.Ct. 681 (189o) (liquor); Southern
Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 32S U.S. 761, 6s S.Ct. ISIS (I94S) (railroad train lengths);
Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 71 S.Ct. 29S (I9SI) (milk). See other
cases cited in discussion of federal pre-emption question, infra Part Ill, Chapter V,
notes 3I4-S3·
637 340 U.S. 383, 71 S.Ct. 3S9 (19SI). See also Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs &
Helpers Local Union #776, 346 U.S. 48s, 74 S.Ct. 161 (1953).
638 Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines, 348 U.S. 61, 7S S.Ct. 191 (I9S4).
639 Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 67 S.Ct. 13 (1946).
640 3S7 U.S. 77, 78 S.Ct. 1063 (19S8).
634
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erations of the company took place solely within the boundaries of the
city. The court said:
We are fully aware that use of local streets is involved, but
no one suggests that Congress cannot require the City to permit interstate commerce to pass over those streets. Of course
the City retains considerable authority to regulate how transfer vehicles shall be operated. It could hardly be denied, for
example, that sach vehicles must obey traffic signals, speed limits and other general safety regulations. Similarly the City
may require registration of these vehicles and exact reasonable
fees for their use of the local streets . . . [but] the City has
no power to decide whether the Transfer can operate a motor
vehicle service between terminals for the railroads because this
service is an integral part of interstate transportation authorized and subject to regulation under the Interstate Commerce Act. . . . [The] company was not obligated to apply
for a certificate of convenience and necessity and submit to the
administrative procedures incident thereto before bringing this
action. 641
·
One week following the decision in the Chicago case the Supreme
Court decided that the state of Washington could not raise constitutional
objections to participation by contract by the city of Tacoma in a federal power project, except in a manner provided by federal statute, even
though the state court had held that the city had no authority under
state law to make such a contract with the federal government against
the wishes of the state. 642 A lower federal court liad held that a federal
statute could give such authority to the city us and the Supreme Court
had denied review by w~it of certiorari. 6 " The Supreme Court said the
dec.ision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals was not subject to collateral attack since the federal statute dictated how objections were to
be raised.
On the same date that the Supreme Court decided the Tacoma case,
it handed down a decision in a case arising out of a reclamation project
being carried out in California jointly by the state and federal governments. The court held that the federal government, in the spending of
federal money and in releasing the water collected by the use of federal
money, could distribute the water in such a way as to ignore the vested
rights, under California law, of landowners to use water for irrigation
I d. at 88-89.
City of Tacoma v. Taxpayer of Tacoma, 357 U.S. 320, 78 S.Ct. 1209 (1958).
6 43 Washington v. Federal Power Comm., 207 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1953).
644 347 u.s. 9J6, 74 S.Ct. 626 (1953).
641

642
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purposes. 645 These cases show that within its delegated powers Congress
is supreme and supersedes state regulatory power.
There seems little question, then, but that Congress has the power,
under commerce, war, or disposal of property powers, to supersede state
la~s to the extent deemed appropriate by Congress and to control the
conditions under which licensees may operate in the atomic energy area.
Less clear is the power of Congress to wipe out the interest, contract or
property, of private individuals which have been affected by the existence or the operation of the facility.
Interference with Private Property Interests. The Supreme Court
has dealt with two situations which are fairly analogous to the problem
created by the atomic installation. Both of them involved the operation
of a railroad and consequent injury to private persons in the neighborhood. In the first case, Baltimore & Potomac R. R. v. Fifth Baptist
Church, 646 the railroad company had been authorized by Congress to
build the line together with the necessary buildings such as roundhouses.
A roundhouse was erected very close to the plaintiff church, which
brought an action asking damages for the discomfort occasioned by the
operations. The court held that, because of the legislative grant of authority, any incidental inconvenience which unavoidably followed the
use of the street by the trains did not give a cause of action, even though
the noise and disturbance attending their use were bothersome. Such
incidental discomforts to which all members of the public in the vicinity
are subject must be endured for the general good. At the same time,
after stating that the railroad company had been unreasonable in the
selection of its site for the roundhouse, the court held that the defendant
must respond in damages for the special injuries inflicted on the plaintiff
by the roundhouse operations.
It admits indeed of grave doubt whether Congress could authorize the company to occupy and use any premises within the
city limits, in a way which would subject others to physical discomfort and annoyance in the quiet use and enjoyment of their
property, and at the same time exempt the company from the
liability to suit for damages or compensation, to which individuals acting without such authority would be subject under
like circumstances. Without expressing any opinion on this
point, it is sufficient to observe that such authority would not
justify an invasion of others' property, to an extent which
would amount to an entire deprivation of its use and enjoyment, without compensation to the owner. Nor could such au645

Ivanhoe Irr. Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 78 S.Ct. 1174 (1958).
u.s. 317, 2 S.Ct. 719 (188J).

6 46 loB
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thority be invoked to justify acts, creating physical discomfort
and annoyance to others in the use and enjoyment of their
property, to a less extent than entire deprivation, if different
places from those occupied could be used by the corporation
for its purposes, without causing such discomfort and annoy~~

.

The acts that a legislature may authorize, which, without
such authorization, would constitute nuisances, are those
which affect public highways or public streams, or matters in
which the public has an interest and over which the public has
control. The legislative authorization exempts only from liability to suits, civil or criminal, at the instance of the State; it
does not affect any claim of a private citizen for damages for
any special inconvenience and discomfort not experienced by
the public at large. 847
In 1914 the Supreme Court decided Richards v. Washington Terminal C o. 648 involving an almost identical situation except that the
damages were claimed for diminution of property value of surrounding
property caused by the gases and smoke discharged from a long tunnel
within the city limits. The court here drew a distinction between the
gases and smoke necessarily incident to the usual running of the trains
and those collected from the whole length of the tunnel and discharged
at one spot in such a manner as to peculiarly affect the plaintiff's prop·
erty. The court said :
We deem the true rule, under the Fifth Amendment, as under
state constitutions containing a similar prohibition, to be that
while the legislature may legalize what otherwise would be a
public nuisance, it may not confer immunity from action for a
private nuisance of such a ·character as to amount in effect
to a taking of private property for public use. . . .
But the question remains, in cases of the class now before
us, What is to be deemed a private nuisance such as amounts
to a taking of property? And by a great and preponderant
weight of judicial authority, in those States whose constitutions contain a prohibition of the taking of private property
for public use without compensation, substantially in the form
employed in the Fifth Amendment, it has become established
that railroads constructed and operated for the public use, although with private capital and for private gain, are not subject to actions in behalf of neighboring property awners for
the ordinary damages attributable to the operation of the railroad, in the absence of negligence. Such roads are treated as
847

848

ld. at 331-32.
233 U.S. 546, 34 S.Ct. 654 ( 1914).
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public highways, and the proprietors as public servants, with
the exemption normally enjoyed by such servants from liability
to private suit, so far as concerns the incidental damages accruing to owners of non-adjacent land through the proper and
skillful management and operation of the railways. Any
diminution of the value of property not directly invaded nor
peculiarly affected, but sharing in the common burden of incidental damages arising from the legalized nuisance, is held not
to be a "taking" within the constitutional provision. The immunity is limited to such damages as naturally and unavoidably result from the proper conduct of the road and are shared
generally by property owners whose lands lie within range of
the inconveniences necessarily incident to proximity of a railroad. It includes the noises and vibrations incident to the running of trains, the necessary emission of smoke and sparks
from the locomotives, and similar annoyances inseparable
from the normal and non-negligent operation of a railroad. 649

The court proceeded to emphasize that normally such incidental inconveniences as are really necessary are protected by the legislative
authority. The court then said:
The present case, in the single particular already alluded to
-that is to say, with respect to so much of the damage as is
attributable to the gases and smoke emitted from the locomotive engines while in the tunnel, and forced out of it by the
fanning system therein installed,· and issuing from the portal
located near to plaintiff's property in such manner as to materially contribute to render his property less habitable than
otherwise it would be, and to depreciate it in value; and this
without, so far as appears, any real necessity existing for such
damage-is, in our opinion, within the reason and authority
of the decision just cited. . . . The case shows that Congress
has authorized, and in effect commanded, defendant to construct its tunnel with a portal located in the midst of an inhabited portion of the city. The authority, no doubt, includes
the use of steam locomotive engines in the tunnel, with the inevitable concomitants of foul gases and smoke emitted from
the engines. No question is made but that it includes the installation and operation of a fanning system for ridding the
tunnel of this source of discomfort to those operating the
trains and traveling upon them. All this being granted, the
special and peculiar damage to the plaintiff as a property owner
in close proximity to the portal is the necessary consequence,
unless at least it be feasible to install ventilating shafts or
other devices for preventing the outpouring of gases and
6 49

!d. at 553-54. (Emphasis added.)
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smoke from the entire length of the tunnel at a single point
upon the surface, as at present. Construing the acts of Congress in the light of the Fifth Amendment, they do not authorize the imposition of so direct and peculiar and substantial
a burden upon plaintiff's property without compensation to
him. If the damage is not preventable by the employment at
reasonable expense of devices such as have been suggested,
then plaintiff's property is "necessary for the purposes contemplated," and may be acquired by purchase or condemnation
(32 Stat. 909, 916, c. 856, § 9), and pending its acquisition
defendant is responsible. If the damage is readily preventible,
the statute furnishes no excuse, and defendant's responsibility
follows on general principles. 660
The court then remanded the case to the lower court to solve what it
admitted to be a difficult problem of distinguishing between that part
of the smoke which was attributable to the gases and smoke necessarily
arising from train operations from the gases and smoke issuing from
the tunnel.
Applying the rationale of these cases, one might surmise that if the
reactor operator, for example, should, through negligence or even without negligence, emit more radioactive material into the air or into a
stream than was permitted under the federal license there would be a
cause of action in favor of an injured party. On the other hand, any
damages that might result from material discharged within the limits
set in the license might be called necessarily incident to. the normal
operation of the facility as licensed by the government. The curtailment
or destruction of the business of a resort hotel, housing development,
school or similar institution because of the purely psychological nuisance created by public fear of a nearby reactor or other atomic energy
facility would seem to be the very kind of damages necessarily incident
to the existence of the reactor. The Atomic Energy Commission specifically finds as to each major installation that the site, as well as the
operation, will not constitute an unreasonable hazard to the public health
and safety.
It is not accurate to describe this as a minor or small loss so far as
the plaintiff is concerned. Nevertheless, balancing this admittedly significant loss against the needs of the country for these operations in
developing atomic energy, it would seem unwise to allow damage actions which would be a continuing burden on the operation of the nuclear installation. This is true when the AEC has found the operation to
be a safe one.
660

I d. at 556-57.
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The fact that the Baltimore & Potomac and Richards cases involve
nuisances not within a state but within the District of Columbia (federally owned territory) does not affect the application of the principles
to cases arising out of reactors situated in states. So far as its effect on
individuals is concerned, the constitutional limitation upon the legislative authority to permit a "nuisance" is the same. It is derived from
the Due Process Clause. Since the cited cases are rather old and involve
operations of a public utility which was a very necessary part of our
economic life, the question naturally arises as to whether the same
reasoning would be followed today, not only when the facility is owned
and operated by a public utility (although it be an electric utility instead
of a railroad) , but also in cases involving research or other industrial
reactors or other large plants not related to a public utility. Several
research reactors are already being operated privately in this country,
by both universities and industrial concerns.
No subsequent cases have been found dealing with the problem of
governmental authorization of what would otherwise be a nuisance. The
attitude of the present Supreme Court must be derived from other types
of cases which seem to involve similar policy questions, cases in which
the rights of private individuals are interfered with by the government
in such a manner as to deprive the person of something of value,
whether it be vested or not, by way of a regulation which results in giving some other private person a consequent advantage, such as by the
avoidance of a contract or other legal liability. Since there is no specific
constitutional provision against federal impairment of contract rights
such protection depends upon the Fifth Amendment Due Process
Clause protecting liberty and property. Cases in which federal statutes
actually have taken away a contract right of some pecuniary value are
useful analogies that should be considered along with those cases involving the taking of property rights in the traditional sense.
Under War Po·wer. Some of the cases in which there has been the
clearest invasion of a significant pecuniary interest have arisen out of
the activities of the government during World War II in the exercise
of the war power. The setting of maximum prices on commodities, 651
and on rents, 652 which in each case rolled the prices back from the levels
651 Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414. 64 S.Ct. 66o (1944). ·See Aidlin, "The
Constitutionality of the 1942 Price Control Act," 30 Cal. L. Rev. 648 (1942); Crenshaw, "Constitutional Aspects of Federal Rent Control," 5 Ala. Law. 442 ( 1944) ; Taft,
"Rationing as a Proper Wartime Governmental Function," 31 Cal. L. Rev. 270 (1943);
Merrill, "The War Power as the Basis for a National Agricultural Program," 17
Neb. L. Bull. 23 (1938); Note, 12 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 414 (1944).
65 2 Bowles v. Willinghan, 321 U.S. 503, 64 S.Ct. 641 (1944).
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at the time when the regulations were promulgated, undoubtedly had a
substantial pecuniary impact on many individuals, not only prospectively but retroactively as well, since they controlled all goods sold and
all rental of property after the effective date of the regulation even
though the goods or the rental property had been acquired prior to the
passage of the act. The over-all reciprocity of advantage involved in
such price control regulations perhaps reduces somewhat the amount of
the taking, just as does the reciprocity of advantage in the zoning
cases. Another kind of war regulation which may come somewhat
closer to an actual taking without any real reciprocity of advantage,
except the general and remote one of lower taxes, arose out of the Renegotiation Act which provided for recapture by the government of
"excessive profits." The court gave a very short answer to the argument
that renegotiating of profits was a taking of property contrary to the
Fifth Amendment. It said "Not only was it 'necessary and proper' for
Congress to provide for such production [of war material] in the successful conduct of the war, but it was well within the outer limits of the
constitutional discretion of Congress and the President to do so under
the terms of the Renegotiation Act." 668 The court held that the provisions of the act were applicable to .even subcontractors who had no
direct relations with the federal government; their contracts also were
made subject to recapture of "excessive profits."
Perhaps the clearest case of all in which the government regulations
for practical purposes destroyed, for the time being at least, something
of considerable economic value to the plaintiffs is United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co. 6 u The government regulations resulted in actual closing of the gold mines during the period of the war. It was
claimed that while the government did not actually take possession of
any of the gold, it in effect had completely destroyed the plaintiff's
economic rights to the gold by preventing all mining of it. While the
lower federal court felt that this very clearly was a taking, since it
amounted to a complete destruction of the plaintiff's right, the Supreme
Court reversed on the ground that any restrictions were temporary in
nature and there had been no actual taking of the property. 655 Mr. Justice Harlan dissented on the ground that the property had been taken
temporarily. 606
653

654
655

656

Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 76S, 68 S.Ct. 1294 (1948).
3S7 U.S. ISS, 78 S.Ct. 1097 (I9S8).

I d. at 168-6g.
I d. at 179.
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In each of these cases arising out of wartime regulations very substantial pecuniary loss had been suffered by the plaintiff, but recovery
of damages was denied. Certainly in many of the cases, particularly in
the gold mine cases, there was as much, if not more, "taking" than
would be involved in the loss of patronage by a business due to a reactor's psychological nuisance effect. Undoubtedly the most profitable use
of property surrounding a proposed reactor in many cases would be the
existing one and this use would be damaged by the psychological nuisance. Yet the land undoubtedly could be used for other purposes of a
profitable nature, and it would seem to be no more of a taking than
those involved in the cases cited above.
The difficulty with using the war cases, however, is that they are an
exercise of the war power. As stated by the court in the Lichter case:
In total war it is necessary that a civilian make sacrifices of
his property and profits with at least the same fortitude as
that with which a drafted soldier makes his traditional sacrifices of comfort, security and life itsel£. 657
As the court put it in the Eureka Mining Co. case:
In the context of war, we have been reluctant to find that degree of regulation which, without saying so, requires compensation to be paid for resulting losses of income. . . .The
reasons are plain. War, particularly in modern times, demands the strict regulation of nearly all resources. It makes
demands which otherwise would be insufferable. But wartime
economic restrictions, temporary in character, are insignificant
when compared to the widespread uncompensated loss of life
and freedom of action which war traditionally demands. 658

Under Commerce Power. Cases arising under the commerce power
of Congress are not subject to the same justification of wartime necessity. Many examples exist of exercise of the commerce power by Congress in a manner that substantially affects the contract or property
rights of individual persons. The regulation of maximum hours and
minimum wages to be paid persons producing goods for interstate commerce,6~9 and the control of the uses to which a farmer can put grain
raised on his own land, even to the point of denying him the right to
use it to feed his own livestock, 660 are examples of very substantial
encroachments upon the liberty and property of individual persons, and
6~7

Supra note 653 a,t 754.
Supra note 654 at 168. (Emphasis added.)
United States v. Darby,. 312 U.S. 100, 61 S.Ct. 451 ( 1941).
6 &0 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 63 S.Ct. 82 (1942).
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· the court has upheld such invasions of pecuniary interest as necessary to
the control of the national economy. Compensation need not be paid
for such invasions. The attitude of the Supreme Court toward regulations based upon the commerce power of Congress is exemplified by
the following statements from the opinion in North American Co. v.
S. E. C., 661 where the Court upheld a decree under the Public Utility
Holding Company Act of 1935,662 even though it forced the breaking
up of property holdings of a company acquired over a long period of
years.
This broad commerce clause does not operate so as to render
the nation powerless to defend itself against economic forces
that Congress decrees inimical or destructive of the national
economy. Rather it is an affirmative power commensurate
with the national needs. It is unrestricted by contrary state
laws or private contracts. And in using this great power,
Congress is not bound by technical legal conceptions. Commerce itself is an intensely practical matter. . . . To deal
with it effectively, Congress must be able to act in terms of economic and financial realities. The commerce clause gives it
authority to act. 668
Another situation in which there is a real, though perhaps minor,
taking of property justified under the commerce power is found in the
union shop provisions of the Railway Labor Act. They provide that to
keep employment each employee must join the union and pay dues. The
power of Congress to impose such a requirement was questioned in
Railway Employees' Dept. v. Hanson. 664 Even though such provisions
were apparently contrary to the state constitution, the Court held that
whether union shops were good or bad was a policy question with
which the courts should not interfere; its determination was for
Congress.
Congress, acting within its constitutional powers, has the
final say on policy issues. If it acts unwisely, the electorate
can make a change. The task of the judiciary ends once it
appears that the legislative measure adopted is relevant or appropriate to the constitutional power which Congress exercises. The ingredients of industrial peace and stabilized labormanagement relations are numerous and complex. They may
well vary from age to age and from industry to industry.
What would be needful one decade might be anathema the
U.S. 686, 66 S.Ct. 785 (1946).
49 Stat. 8o3, 15 U.S.C.A. §79 (1951).
66s Supra note 661 at 705.
66 • 351 U.S. 225, 76 S.Ct. 714 (1956).
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next. The decision rests with the policy makers, not with the
· judiciary. ~
66

The Court held that the requirement of financial support by all the
workers of the collective bargaining agency was within the commerce
power of Congress.
The Commerce Clause case that comes as close as any to holding that
very real and substantial pecuniary rights can be prejudiced or taken
away in the interests of the national economic policy arose out of the
Portal-to-Portal Pay Act which Congress passed to take away the extra
pay to which the workers would have been entitled for time spent walking from the gate to the work bench under the Fair Labor Standards
Act as it had been interpreted in a previous Supreme Court decision.
The workers claimed that their rights had vested and were protected by
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Supreme Court
denied certiorari, 666 after the circuit court held that there was no violation of the Due Process Clause. The Circuit Court used the following
language:
Plaintiff could not expect that their status or rights would
. remain unchanged through changing. circumstances and conditions. They could reasonably anticipate changes in the law.
The proposition that their rights granted by the Congress
under the commerce clause could not be taken away by congressional legislation under the same clause, is self-contradictory. Rights secured even by private contract may be
abrogated by subsequent legislation when authorized by constitutional provisions. 667
After holding that the law was not invalidated by being in some respects retroactive since it was only a civil case, the court stated that
the validity of the policy was for Congress to decide so long as Congress was not "arbitrary, unreasonable_ or .capricious." 668
The fact that the cause of action involved rights arising from a
statute certainly was emphasized by the court as justifying congressional
66 6

I d. at 234.

Fisch v. Gener:d Motors Corp., 335 U.S. !)02, 69 S.Ct. 405 (1949).
Fisch v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 266, 271 (6th Cir. 1948).
668 !d. at 272. See comments on statute in Barnett, "The Portal-to-Portal Act of
1947: Direct and Indirect Impairment of Vested Rights," 27 Ore. L. Rev. 274 ( 1948) ;
Brown, "Vested Rights and the· Portal-to-Portal Act," 46 Mich. L. Rev. 723 (1948);
Cotter, "Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation-the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947,''
34 Va. L. Rev. 26 (1948); Smethurst & Haslam, "'Portal-to-Portal' and Other Retroactive Liabilities,'' 15 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 131 (1947); Weinberg & Simon, "The Constitutionality of the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947 in the Light of the Decisions Affecting Retroactive Legislation in the Supreme Court," 22 Temp. L. Q. 369 (1949);
Comment, 47 Col. L. Rev. 1010 (1947).
6 66
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interference. Yet there should be no distinction between a legal right
created by statute, where there is no reservation of a right to change
an interest vesting under the statute, and rights created by common law
decisions. There is no reason for one who may have relied upon a statutory right to anticipate its modification any more readily than he
would expect common law rules governing contracts,· property or tort
rights to be changed by court decision or by statute. The basic question
would seem to be whether the legislature, in carrying out some important national or state legislative policy within its general powers, can affect existing rights to the point of reducing pecuniary values if it seems
appropriate and desirable. It is not a case of the government appropriating interests for its own use·, as in condemnation cases, but rather of
regulating the national economy and, where necessary, infringing upon
private contract or property rights which incidentally are in conflict
with the national policy. There seems little constitutio~al justification
for drawing a line between cutting off a cause of action, such as for
psychological nuisance damages in the case of an atomic reactor or disposal plant, and telling a worker that wages he was entitled to under a
prior statute are now being taken away. It is a degree question: balancing the private interests against the necessity for the national policy.
The one would seem to be no more capricious or arbitrary jhan the
··
other.
The case that illustrates more dramatically than any other the extent
of the congressional discretion pursup.nt to a delegated power to supersede the rights of private individuals, and to alter them significantly
from the standpoint of pecuniary values, is Norman v. B. & 0. Ry., 669
the famous "gold clauses" case. In establishing fiscal policy during the
"Hoover-Roosevelt" depression of the 1930's, Congress provided
that gold clauses in contracts stipulating payment in gold dollars of a
certain number of grains of gold were invalid and not to be enforced.
It was argued that this clearly was a takiJ:lg of prop~rty in. violation of
the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. In meeting this ~rgun-tent,
the court said :
This argument is in the· teeth of another established· principle.
Contracts, however expressed, cannot fetter the constitutional
669 294 U.S. 24o, 55 S.Ct. 407 (1935). Cf. Louisviile Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, :;ro5 U.S. 555, 55 S.Ct. 854 (1935) (invalidating first Frazier-Lemke Act which
delayed foreclosure); Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 54 S.Ct. 840 (1934) (invalidating impairment of the government's own insurance contract, but suggesting that
the government could withdraw consent to suit); and Perry v. United States, 294 U.S.
330, 55 S.Ct. 432 (1935) (could not impair gold clause contracts but no damage found
and Congress withdrew coruierit to be. -sued) ..
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authority of the Congress. Contracts may create rights of
property, but when contracts deal with a subject matter which
lies within the control of the Congress, they have a congenital
infirmity. Parties cannot remove their trans.actions from the
reach of dominant constitutional power by making contracts
about them. . . .
This principle has familiar illustration in the exercise of the
power to regulate commerce. If shippers and carriers stipulate
for specified rates, although the rates may be lawful when the
contracts are made, if Congress through the Interstate Commerce Commis~ion exercises its authority and prescribes different rates, the latter control and override inconsistent stipulations in contracts previously made. This is so, even if the
contract be a charter granted by a State and limiting rates, or
a contract between municipalities and carriers. 670
The Court then proceeded to say that:
The principle is not limited to the incidental effect of the
exercise by the Congress of its constitutional authority. There
is no constitutional ground for denying to the Congress the
power expressly to prohibit and invalidate contracts although
previously made, and valid when made, when they interfere
with the carrying out of the policy it is free to adopt. 671
The Court concluded that "If the gold clauses now before us interfere
with the policy of the Congress in the exercise of that authority they
cannot stand." 672
Again in this case a very substantial pecuniary interest was wiped out
by federal legislation. In making it applicable to existing contracts, interests of individuals of substantial proportions literally were being
destroyed. It is submitted that the interest wiped out in these cases is
every bit as substantial as injury to surrounding landowners and
businesses resulting from the psychological nuisance of nuclear operations.
There are many other illustrations. Pecuniary expectations may be
adversely affected when a suit barred by a statute of limitations is reinstated by repealing the statute, yet the court always has held this to be
within the legislative power, not a taking without due process. 678 An
exercise of the power of government to carry out economic policies that
have a substantial pecuniary impact upon mortgages was held valid in the
Norman v. B. & 0. Ry., supra note 669 at 307-oS.
/d. at 309-10.
672 /d. at 311.
673 Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620, 6 S.Ct. 209 (1885). Approved and applied to
state action, Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 65 S.Ct. 1137 (1945).
67o
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cases upholding state mortgage moratorium laws.m Municipal zoning
ordinances have been sustained although they substantially alter economic interests of landowners who do not conform to the use limitations imposed in their area. 675 Interests having substantial pecuniary
value may be impaired by municipal or state regulation in the interests
of public health and welfare, as is illustrated by the case involving the
prohibition of the operation of a brick kiln once the city grew out
around the kiln, even though it had been in operation long before the
area became populated, 676 and by the case in which a state regulation
prohibited the use of a distilling plant manufacturing intoxicating
liquor, although the plant had been in operation for a considerable period of time before the adoption of the prohibition law, 677 or also in
the case involving a state law which required the removal of ornamental red cedar trees without compensation so as to preserve the
neighboring apple orchards attacked by parasitic fungus. 678
In each of these cases there was a very substantial impairment of
financial values, although imposed by states instead of by the federal
government. In finding that such impairment did not violate the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment the court used reasoning
to support the use of the general police power of the states which would
also justify regulations by Congress under one of its delegated powers.
The reasoning equally supports the use of the commerce, war, or property powers of Congress to regulate and adjust economic interests
arising out of the operation of atomic energy facilities. · In all such
cases it is a question of balancing the amount of the impairment against
the necessity for regulation, with a decision by the legislature that certain interests must give way even though no compensation is provided.
Reciprocity of advantage is often used as one justification for the
exercise of government power in zoning cases. It is important to note
that there is some reciprocity to the owners of land and businesses in
the vicinity of a reactor in the provisions of the federal indemnity act
which provide a very large fund to compensate for physical injury to
person and property by reactor incidents. The availability of such a
m Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 54 S.Ct. 231 (1934). Cf.
Coombes v. Getz, 285 U.S. 434, 52 S.Ct. 435 (1932).
m Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct. 114 (1926). See
also Cusack Co. v. Chicago, 242 U.S. 526, 37 S.Ct. 190 (1917) (billboards prohibited).
See discussion of constitutional problem in city planning in Johnson, "Constitutional
Law and Community Planning," 20 L. & Contemp. Prob. 199 (1955).
67 6 Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394. 36 S.Ct. 143 (1915).
m Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 8 S.Ct. 273 (1887).
678 Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 48 S.Ct. 246 ( 1928).
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fund would seem to be a reasonable reciprocal advantage justifying the
taking away of any cause of action for a psychological nuisance damage, assuming that Congress intended to preclude such recoveries in
the case of reactor whose operation and location had been specifically
approved by the AEC.
Under Condemnation Power-What Is a "Taking"? Some light also
may be shed on the power of Congress to preclude psychological nuisance damage actions by cases concerning the federal government's
power to condemn property. Such cases at first glance might seem inapplicable to the possible reactor nuisance since they deal with the question of· for what property interests must the government pay fair
compensation when the government itself takes property. They do not
deal. with private persons infringing the property rights of others.
Nevertheless, they are valuable analogies in two respects; first, many
reactors are going to be built by public utilities which either use or have
eminent domain power, and second, they give some indication of the
interference with property deemed sufficient to require payment of fair
compensation. To the extent that property interests are considered compensably impaired by less than a complete taking, this conclusion would
seem to be based upon the same reasoning involved in deciding whether
a government in effect has permitted a private taking by regulating the
contract or tort rights of parties in such a way as to permit similar impairments.
We· are concerned. especially with the court's attitude concerning the
kind of peripheral or incidental damages deemed compensable as part
of the taking. For example, United States v. Causby 619 concerned regular, although not constant, flights of government aircraft at low altitudes over plaintiff's chicken farm so that the chickens killed themselves
by flying into fences, and his home became an uncomfortable place in
which to live. The court readily recognized this as a taking even though
there was no actual, permanent, continuous occupancy of the property
by government agents. The court held that not only was there a taking
when the plaintiff's property was made completely uninhabitable, but a
taking resulted when the government's use of the air space immediately
above the land seriously limited "the utility of the land and caused a
diminution in its value." 680 The Court said that the flying of airplanes
in this 'manner was like firing guns over a man's property, which had
been held to be .a taking .in an earlier case. 6~ 1 The facts in United States
328 U.S. 256, 66 S.Ct., 1062 _(1946).
I d. at 262.
681 Portsmouth Harbor r..ru;d & Hotel Co. v. United States, 26o U.S, 327, 43 S.Ct.
135 (1922).
679
68o
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v. Causby, however, differ from the psychological nuisance situation
posed, because there was an actual invasion directly over plaintiff's
property by a physical object put in motion by the government.
Where the government has taken less than the entire fee, such as
taking a leasehold interest for less than its full period, a taking occurs
for which "consequential damages" will be allowed for such expenses as
moving costs and losses from destruction of fixtures, 682 or for the
going-concern value of business trade routes taken over for less than
the full term of years. 683 Where the entire fee is taken, however, moving
expenses and other such incidental damages are not awarded. While
these cases indicate a liberal attitude in determining the value of what is
taken, they do not deal with damage to nearby lands and businesses
and hence do not control the question of the psychological damage
caused by a nuclear plant.
There is, however, a series of cases which comes much closer to the
psychological nuisance case. They involve the awarding of damages to
a landowner whose land has been taken in pai:t, not only for what might
be thought to be the proportionate market value of the part taken but
also for the diminution in the value of the rest of the land resulting
from the taking of only a part of it. One of the earlier cases allowing
this type of award is United States v. Welch,m where Justice Holmes,
in one of his deceptively lucid short opinions which does little more than
indicate the conclusion, found that the plaintiff was damaged not only
to the extent of the land taken but also because of the diminution in
value of farm land when his only access to a county road was cut off
by the strip condemned. The court said that the practical destruction
of the right of way amounted to a taking.
Even more illuminating is a seri~s of circuit court opinions beginning
with West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co. v. United Sta.tes. 685 The court
there stated that when only part of a unitary tract of land is taken just
compensation must include damages for diminution of the value of the
remaining land. 686 The court's allowance of still a third item of damages has even greater significance for our psychological nuisance case.
The. court said :
A part of the land acquired and held by the company as a site
for plant expansion was taken for use by the government as
a place for storing large quantities of highly inflammable and
See United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 65 S.Ct. 357 (1945).
Kimball Laundry v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 6g S.Ct. 1434 (1949).
684 217 U.S. 333, 30 S.Ct. 527 (1910).
685 200 F.2d 100 (4th Cir. 1952).
6 86 ld. at 104.
6 82
683
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explosive gasoline; and the company was damaged not merely
by the loss of the land taken but also by the depreciation that
resulted in the value of the remainder of the land by reason
of the proposed use. It was entitled to be awarded such sum
as would put it in as good position pecuniarily as it would
have been in if its property had not been taken. [Citation
omitted] A land owner, a part of whose land is taken for the
storage of large quantities of gasoline, is certainly not placed
in such position unless he receives compensation for the damage done to the remainder of the land left on his hands as well
as the value of the part taken. 887

This is ·fairly analogous to our psychological nuisance case, and the
court held that it was a proper item for compensation. The West Virginia Pulp decision was followed by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Wateree Power Co., 688 where the taking of
about one-third of a total tract resulted in an award of severance damages because the acres taken bordered a river and cut off access to
the river from the remaining property. Apparently there was no claim
that the government's intended use of the condemned property would
further depress the value of the remaining tract.
On the other hand, in Boyd v. United States 889 the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals was faced with a claim for damages for the taking of
fifteen acres of plaintiff's farm to become part of a s,ooo-acre government airbase. The plaintiff apparently complained of the depreciation
of the remainder of his eighty-two acre farm from the operation of an
airbase so close to it. The court approved the trial court's refusal of
evidence to prove this kind of consequential damage. It said that none
of the acres taken from the plaintiff were to be used for a purpose different from the use of other lands to which it was to be joined. The
evidence could not be used to prove damages by way of depreciation of
the rest of plaintiff's farm. 690 The court seems to indicate that the damages for depreciation or" the remaining property because of the particular use to which the government is to put the condemned property can
be claimed only whe':l it is the use of the property taken from the plaintiff that cau~es a depreciation and not when it is the use made of land
taken from others.
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit was faced with a reI d. at 103.
220 F.2d 226 (4th Cir. 1955).
68 9 222 F.2d 493 (8th Cir. 1955).
690 /d. at 496.
687
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lated but somewhat different problem in Nunnally v. United States. 691
Here the plaintiff complained that his vacation retreat island had ceased
to be "a relaxing place to go" because the government had acquired
land dose to the plaintiff's island in order to carry on proving ground
activities, including airplane drops of bombs for test purposes. The trial
court found that the plaintiff's property had been decreased in value
about $1,500 but held there was no compensable taking. The plaintiff
claimed that his property was invaded by the noise and shock of test
explosions and by the flight of aircraft over the island. The court said
this was not like the Portsmouth Harbor case 692 where the shells were
fired over the plaintiff's land but rather it was a case where there were
damages but not taking; here the damages were consequential only:
The damages alleged in that case were not consequential ;
they were the product of a direct in·msion of claimant's domain. But damages which are the incidental result of lawful
governmental action, without any direct invasion of private
property, are consequential; they do not constitute a taking
under the Fifth Amendment.
Plaintiff has suffered no peculiar d~mage. His annoyance is of
the same type to which everyone living in the vicinity is subjected in varying degrees. There is, at most, a "sharing in the
common burden of incidental damages". Richards v. Washington Terminal Co . . . . If it should be held that the facts
in the present case constitute a taking, any reduction in the
value of property attributable to a federal activity might be
urged as a valid claim against the United States. The distinction between a "damage" and a "taking", so carefully preserved by the courts, would be obliterated. 698
Something fairly close to the psychological nuisance situation arose
in United States v. 329.05 Acres of Land. 694 In this case the lands of
four different owners were taken by the government for the creation of
an ammunition storage depot. Some of the land of each owner was
taken in fee and some by way of a safety easement. The question before
the court was the compensation to be paid to each. The depot itself was
located on the land of only one of the four seeking compensation. The
lands of the others were taken for the purpose of building access roads
and creating safety easements restricting the use of the property so that
residences and other activities bringing together large groups of people
691

239 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1956).
Supra note 681.
Supra note 691 at 524. (Emphasis added.)
694 156 F. Supp. 67 (D.C. S.D. N.Y. 1957).
6 92
693
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could be prohibited. None of the buffer zones had been put to other
use by the government. The lands taken were not being used currently
and they were somewhat swampy in character, yet apparently a residential subdivision was a likely possibility several years in the future. The
court, following the Boyd case, held that, when only part of the land
was taken, any diminution or impairment of the remainder of the land
caused by the use of the land taken by the government was compensable, but that severance damages may not include damages to any
owner if the damage resulted from the use to which the government
put the lands which were in the same project but which were obtained
from others. Thus, only the one owner properly could claim severance
damages to his remainder land resulting from the fact that the government was constructing an ammunition depot. 695
The allowance of severance damages to the extent that the physical
severance itself actually causes the value of the remainder land to diminish, such as can happen when access to a waterway is cut off by the
parcel taken, seems quite properly awarded as part of the compensation
for the taking. This is an effect of the taking that happens only to the
owner whose access to a waterway for example has been cut off. On the
other hand the distinction made between the recovery for what we have
termed psychological nuisance affects all adjoining land, whether it is
remainder land of the owner part of whose land has been taken or adjoining land belonging to another. As to psychological nuisance damage
the distinction is utterly ridiculous. The use the government is planning
to make of the part condemned has no more effect on the remainder
land than it does on adjoining land owned by others. The use of the
condemned land as an ammunition depot or air base is just as .detrimental to adjoining land as it is to remainder land.
Nevertheless, the distinction suggested by the federal cases seems to
be followed by state courts as well, 696 whether it be the state itself or a
public utility with a power of eminent domain that is taking the land.
While some state constitutions now provide for award of damages incident to a taking of land, 691 thus avoiding the narrow construction of
a compensable taking under the old rule, generally the courts keep the
distinction between effects of physical severance and psychological nuisance effects. There may be an historical explanation for the rule, but
it does not make sense from a policy standpoint. Nevertheless, this
695 !d. at 7o-71. Citing also Campbell v. United States, 266 U.S. 368, 45 S.Ct. II5
.(1924) (nitrate plant).
696 See cases collected in Annot., 170 A.L.R. 721 (1947) and 6 A.L.R.2d II97 (1949).
6 97 See states listed in Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., mpra note 648 at 554·
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seems to be the law. What result would be reached if this doctrine were
applied to the nuclear psychological nuisance case ?
If the government (and probably the same is true of a public utility
exercising the eminent domain power) condemns less than a whole
unit of land, the owner can recover for diminution in value of the remainder arising from the psychological nuisance effect of the use made
of the condemned part. The neighboring land owned by others, which
would be just as diminished in value because of the psychological nuisance, has suffered no compensable loss.
When the eminent domain power is not involved, such as when an
.atomic installation is operated by a purely .Private concern for a nongovernmental purpose, it would seem that the same basic constitutional
considerations should govern. If the government need not compensate
for psychological nuisance damage to adjoining land, surely the government may adopt a rule that psychological nuisance damages from
private plants shall not be recoverable. The preservation of the public
pocketbook perhaps is not so important a factor in the case of a private
concern not carrying on a public utility function. On the other hand, if
the government decides that a national need exists for development of
nuclear energy for commercial and war purposes and that protection
should be given against recovery for psychological nuisance damage, it
still is carrying out a general governmental policy and ought to be governed by the same policy considerations. In fact, as indicated by the
"gold clauses" cases, 608 usually- the court will hold the government itself to a higher standard under due process than if rights between
private parties only are involved.
Conclusions as to Congress' Power to Immunize. Undoubtedly Congress can supers~de any power of the states so far as controlling tort
liability of large nuclear installations is concerned. The Fifth Amendment, however, does provide some protection against an arbitrary interference by the federal government with private property rights. If substantial quantities of radioactive material are allowed to fall-out on
private property so that it could be asserted that special damages have
resulted to th~ plaintiff's land, there is authority in older cases that the
government cannot immunize the wrongdoer from liability. In the light
of more recent cases decided in connection with somewhat different
kinds of situations but involving the same policy considerations, it
·seems rather clear that maximum recovery can be limited as provided
698 Supra note 669. Compare ~orinan v. B. & 0. Ry., supra note
v. United States, Su.pra note 669.

669.

with Lynch
·
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for in the federal indemnity statute. As to small amounts of fall-out,
even under the old cases Congress seems to have the power to provide
for no recovery at all, because this would seem to be not special damages but simply the damages necessarily incidental to the operation, like
normal smoke and noise from operation of a railroad. Congress clearly
can immunize the operator from liability for damages from the psychological nuisance created by the mere existence of the reactor in the
neighborhood. The balancing by Congress of the needs of landowners
subjected to psychological nuisance damage and of society for rapid
development of the nuclear industry surely would not be upset by the
Supreme Court. It is better policy to refuse to give psychological damages the status of a constitutional right and instead leave it to the legislature to balance the interests and decide whether this kind of damages should be allowed, and if so, to what extent and with what
limitations. It is doubtful that the United States Supreme Court would
say that such a law denying a cause of action for psychological damages
is beyond the commerce and war powers of the federal government.
(ii) The Intent of Congress
Even after it is found that the federal government has the constitutional power to give such immunity from psychological nuisance damage actions, it still must be determined whether Congress intended to
preclude such actions. Since there is nothing specific on the matter in
either the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 or the 1957 indemnity amendment, the question becomes one of implied pre-emption of the field.
Detailed discussions of the pre-emption question as it relates to state
power to license and regulate atomic energy entrepreneurs coming
under the federal act is found elsewhere. 699 Likewise, the problem of the
impact of possible federal pre-emption on damage remedies generally
is treated later. 700 These discussions need not be repeated, but application of the conclusions drawn can profitably be made here. The specific
question is whether the federal program precludes a state from enjoining the operation of an atomic energy facility or awarding damages
to private persons for the psychological nuisance created by the mere
presence of the facility.
When the Atomic Energy Commission in a quasi-judicial proceeding
authorized by statute makes a decision in a specific case that a licensee
Infra Part III, Chapter V, Section E on federal pre-emption.
!d., discussion following note 275. See also infra, Part I, Chapter III, discussion
at notes 1273-78.
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may operate in a certain way in a particular place, this is almost sure to
be held to pre-empt the. field and prevent the states from requiring
licenses or imposing other pre-operational regulations upon such activities.701 This is particularly true when the federal statute and the agency
created by it have provided for health and safety matters comprehensively and in great detail. 702 It seems fair to conclude that the Congress
wanted the kind of flexibility in setting and enforcing safety designs
and standards "which centralized administration makes possible so as
to encourage experimentation and variation on the part of licensees in
the hope of obtaining both greater economy and safety. This does not
appear to be the time, for example, for the state to specify the precise
amount, design, and type of shielding material that is necessary to
operate a nuclear reactor or other atomic energy device and it is doubtful that Congress intended the almost inevitable frustration of its policies by such state licensing specifications." 708 It is also true that, "Not
only does the Commission study the proposed atomic installation itself
and the radiation safety precautions within it, but it also gives due consideration to all the local geographic (i.e., population density, etc.),
geologic, and meteorologic features as well. In short, when the license
is issued, the Commission, pursuant to congressional directive, has determined that the particular licensee is qualified to construct and operate
a particular atomic energy installation at a specified location, for specified purposes, and in a specified manner." 104
As to pre-operation activities of the licensee, our conclusion is, "In
the light of the above considerations, it seems reasonably safe to assume
that the Supreme Court will hold that Congress has prevented any state
or local government from requiring a person, who is licensed or otherwise authorized by the Commission, to obtain prior state or local permission to operate if the granting or denying of that permission is predicated upon an independent analysis of standards of radiation health
and safety." 705 It also seems reasonable to conclude that "Local zoning
ordinances which clearly discriminate against atomic energy uses and
facilities, merely because they constitute radiation hazards deemed undesirable by the community, will probably suffer the same fate as state
licensing requirements." 708 It also seems clear that any action which
TOllnft'a Part III, Chapter V, Section Eon federal pre-emption.
T02Id., see discussion in text at notes 389-423, and seven reasons listed in text between notes 423-43.
Tos I d. at text at note 439·
1o•ld. at text at note 441.
705 I d. at text at note 450.
Toe I d. at text at note 453·
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imposes a heavier burden on Atomic Energy Commission licensees also
will be held to be pre-empted by federal action because the additional
cost of meeting higher state standards undoubtedly would tend to discourage developments which Congress has indicated it wants to suppo.rt, 707 even though it may be possible for the states to help en force
standards and regulations laid down by the AEC. 708 It must be remembered that the state can intervene in a proceeding to determine
whether a license ought to be granted or not. 709 Except where there is
an immediate, significant threat to public health and safety, there is a
route through the Atomic Energy Commission to ask for modification,
suspension, or revocation of licenses. With this channel open, it seems
very unlikely that the state will be allowed in a non-emergency case to
use any of its own enforcement procedures. 710
In the light of these conclusions, any attempt by the state to enjoin
activities specifically licensed by the Atomic Energy Commission,
merely because of the psychological nuisance they may create in the
public mind would surely be as invalid as would a state licensing system. The effect of an injunction, whether based upon private or public
nuisance, would seem to run counter to the very policy arguments that
dictate a preclusion of state licensing. The psychological nuisance arises
out of the mere existence of the reactor which is in complete compliance
with the federal regulations. Since the existence of this kind of facility,
operating in this way, in this place, has been approved specifically by
the federal agency, the state has no power to enjoin any activity, even
if it considers it a nuisance, public or private. There is not even the
possible justification for state action to meet an emergency health hazard in this case.
Where there is provision in the federal statute for all interested
parties to participate in an administrative hearing and also provision for
judicial review, the scope of federal pre-emption is made dramatically
clear in the very recent Supreme Court decision, City of Tacoma v.
Taxpayers of Tacoma. 711 The case involved the right of the city of
Tacoma to enter into a contract with the federal government under the
Federal Power Act. The construction of a dam made it necessary to
condemn a fish hatchery owned by the state of Washington. The court
denied the right of the state to object to one of its own municipalities,
I d. at text at note 464.
I d. at text at note 472.
To9Jd. at text at note 400. Sec. 189 of 1957 Act is discussed at notes 458-6o.
110 /d. at text at note 477·
711 Supra note 642.
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the city of Tacoma, entering into a contract with the federal government in such a way as to condemn state property against the state's desires. The court held that since there was provision in the federal act
for any interested party to participate in the Federal Power Commission hearing, the state should have asserted its rights before the Commission. In connection with the powers of Congress to limit the action
that a state could take as to its own municipality, the Supreme Court
said, that there was no question but that Congress had power to set the
conditions and procedures for review and the courts in which it was
to take place. 112 The court said :
Hence, upon judicial review of the Commission's order, all
objections to the order, to the license it directs to be issued,
and to the legal competence of the licensee to execute its
terms, must be made in the Court of Appeals or not at all. For
Congress, acting within its powers, has declared that the
Court of Appeals shall have "exclusive jurisdiction" to review such orders, and that its judgment "shall be final," subject to review by this Court upon certiorari or certification;
Such statutory finality need not be labeled res judicata, estoppel, collateral estoppel, waiver or the like either by Congress
or the courts. 718
Provisions for · intervention in Commission proceedings and the
power of judicial review found in the federal act referred to in the City
of Tacoma case are quite similar to Section 189 of the 1954 Atomic
Energy Act, which specifically provides for a hearing "upon the request
of any person whose interest may be affected by the proceeding." m
Subsection b provides for judicial review of the final order in such a
proceeding under the terms of applicable federal statutes regulating
federal administrative procedure. 115 When a state or private individual
believes that the location of the proposed reactor or other atomic facility
is unwise or illegal, it would seem that the proper remedy is to petition
the Atomic Energy Commission to be permitted to participate in the
hearing determining whether or not the license should be granted. Any
later action in state ~ourts seeking to enjoin the establishment or operation of the reactor in accordance with the terms of the federal license
seems to be precluded by the federal act.
The question remains as to whether or not the right of a private
person to sue for. damages because of the psychological nuisance also
112
118

71 4
1111

ld. at 336.
ld. at 336-37.

Sec. 189;1 of 1954 Act.
Sec. xf!!)b of 1954 Act.
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has been pre-empted. As pointed out later, 716 it is clear that there has
been no federal pre-emption generally of the power to award damages
arising out of nuclear incidents. From this it certainly could be argued
that private suits for damages from the psychological nuisance effect
are permissible, even though the injunction action would not be. Yet
because of the peculiar character of the psychological nuisance damages,
it is possible that this particular type of damage will be considered precluded for the same reasons as those establishing the invalidity of an
injunction abating the nuisance.
In the field of labor law the Supreme Court has held that a state court
may. award damages resulting from illegal activities which are clearly
an unfair labor practice. within the meaning of the federal statute.
There was no pre-emption of this portion of the field. The Court said in
the Russell case 711 that the primary purpose of the federal agency was
to prevent unfair labor practices and that any award remedy was purely
at the discretion of the National Labor Relations Board. The Court
was very careful to point out, however, 718 that there was no conflict in
this instance between the state's power to entertain ·a damage suit and
the power of the federal agency. This emphasis upon allowing· only
such state action as is obviously consistent with the congr'essim1al policy, indicates the basic reason for this writer's conclusion tha:t in the
atomic reactor situation, an action solely for psychological nuisance
damages should not be permitted, for in this instance it would amount
to state action, clearly in conflict with a federal action. To awar:d damages merely for the existence of the reactor or other similar. type of
atomic energy facility, when there has been no physical harm of any
kind, in effect would frustrate the decision of the Atomic Energy Commission that this type of activity, at this location does not present any
unreasonable danger to public health and safety, and is in furtherance
of the federal program to promote and develop atomic energy by private
enterprise. It is submitted that to' allow damages, even in a private
action, for psychological nuisance would be in direct conflict with the
federal determination and therefore with federal policy.
The provisions of the indemnity insurance amendment in 1957 119
actually suggest that, at least so far as the indemnity program is conInfra note 1273.
United Automobile Workers v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634, 78 S.Ct. 932 (1958), discussed fully infra, Part III, Chapter V at note 311.
11s Infra Part III, Chapter V at note 313.
11 9 Insurance amendment, 85-256, 85th Cong., H.R. 7383 (1957), discussed in detail
infra text following note 1265.
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cerned, a distinction should be drawn between what might be considered
injuries resulting from an actual "nuclear incident" by way of physical
damages and the apprehensions and fears involved in a psychological
nuisance damage case. In defining "nuclear incident" the act provides
that the term "means any occurence within the United States causing
bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death, or loss of or damage to property, or for loss of use of property arising out of or resulting from
radioactive, toxic, explosive, or other hazardous property or source,
special nuclear, or byproduct materials." 720 This language indicates
that Congress was concerned with a specific discharge of radioactive
material in such a way as to have an impact on persons or property,
perhaps including in this kind of physical damage any psychological
consequences of such actual impact. It also must be remembered that
the federal act specifically modifies state law by immunizing the licensee
who is indemnified from any liability in excess of $soo,ooo,ooo, plus
any amount of financial protection required of the licensee. 121 There is
nothing in the act or in its legislative history to indicate that anything
other than damages resulting from actual discharge of radiation or
radioactive material was meant to be covered. While the statutory provision is not specified on the question of damages for psychological
nuisance, it would seem to be much more consistent with the over-all
purpose and policy of the federal provisions to conclude that the allowance of such damages, just as in the case of an injunction to abate a
licensed activity, would be inconsistent with the federal program to
provide for the public health and safety and to promote the development of atomic energy as fast as is safely possible. Yet the conclusion
obviously is not as clear as one could wish, because the federal act
leaves the determination of general liability que~tions to the states.
To dispose of the uncertainty C ongres_s should enact a statute to make
it clear that purely psychological nuisance damages cannot be recovered
where a reactor is duly licensed by the Atomic Energy Commission and
is placed in a permissible location under local zoning laws which do
not discriminate against reactors as such. At the same time Congress
must clearly recognize the right of all possibly affected parties to participate in the AEC hearing held on the granting of the license to operate the reactor. If only small quantities which are within permissible
levels established by federal regulation are discharged, perhaps Congress should also make it clear that no recovery may be had for conse720
7 21

I d. at sec. 30.
I d. at sec. 4e.
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quent mJuries. On the other hand perhaps this should be left to the
normal rules relating to compliance with administrative regulation as
proof of non-negligence. 722
(b) Effect of Licensing-Results under State Law
Since state law might be applied in the psychological nuisance damage case (e.g., if the courts find no pre-emption by the federal government), it is important to determine the results which might be anticipated. An even more important reason, perhaps, is that the states surely
will enter into the licensing of atomic energy activities in the future as
the operations become a normal business activity and Congress perhaps
returns more regulatory power to the states. What effect will state
licensing have on a determination of whether to treat the installation
as a nuisance?
The question is not free from difficulty; broad statements frequently
are made by courts which do not take account of important distinctions
affecting the result. The first of these distinctions is one between actions to enjoin the licensed activity and actions for damages. It frequently has been held that an activity which is conducted strictly in accordance with legislative authority cannot be enjoined as a nuisance. 723
This rule seems to hold, however, only in situations where there appears
to be no other reasonable way to conduct the activity in accordance with
the license or other legislative authority. Where possible, the license
usually is interpreted to allow the conduct of the activity only in a
manner which does not unreasonably interfere with the rights of other
property owners. Courts, therefore, have issued injunctions against
such activities as blasting rocks so as to throw stones upon the lands
of others, 724 shining bright lights onto adjoining land from a city baseball park, 725 and the operation of a city pesthouse in a residential area 726
despite the existence of a license or legislative authority for this kind
of activity generally. It is likely, therefore, that if a state licensing
agency specifically approves a site for an atomic agency installation, the
activity will be deemed non-abatable since any diminution in surroundSee discussion of these rules generally, supra at Section B2b.
Fricke v. City of Guntersville, 251 Ala. 63, 36 So.2d 321 (1948) (city drainage
ditch in alley blocked access to plaintiff's lot, was claimed to be "dangerous"; injunction denied) ; Strachan v. Beacon Oil Co., 251 Mass. 479, 146 N.E. 787 ( 1925) (injunction denied against licensed oil refinery which generated offensive odors, fires, and
explosions).
7 2 4 Hakkila v. Old Colony Broken Stone & Concrete Co., 264 Mass. 447, 162 N.E.
895 (1928).
7 2 5 Downey v. Jackson, 259 Ala. 18g, 65 So.2d 825 (1953).
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ing property values surely will be deemed an unavoidable consequence
of its normal, non-negligent operation. Such a specific license is not
just a general permit to carry on a specific type of activity somewhere
at the owner's option.
On the question whether or not the existence of legislative authority
precludes a finding that an activity is a nuisance for the purpose of
awarding damages, the courts take positions which, at first glance, appear to be conflicting. On the one hand, there are courts which have
indicated that if an activity is conducted strictly in accordance with
legislative authority, and the injury which results from the activity is a
necessary result of its normal, non-negligent operation, then the activity cannot be found to be a nuisance. 127 On the other hand, there are
some courts which state broadly that "the full extent of legislative
power to legalize and shield a nuisance is to exempt it from public prosecution," 728 and therefore the rights of private individuals to seek damages for authorized nuisances remain unimpaired. 729 A closer examination of these two positions indicates, however, that there is little more
than a verbal difference between them. In the courts which adhere to
the doctrine that an authorized activity cannot be a nuisance, it still is
recognized that the legislative immunity does not extend to activities
which too seriously encroach upon the property rights of private individuals to the point where it may be said that their property is being
"taken." The United States Supreme Court has stated, as well as any
court, the general approach used by all courts :
We deem the true rule, under the Fifth Amendment, as under
state constitutions containing a similar prohibition, to be that
Baltimore City v. Fairfield Imp. Co., 87 Md. 352, 39 Atl. 1081 (1898).
Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635 (1878) (cofferdam obstructed plaintiff's warehouse docks); Messer v. City of Dickinson, 71 N.D. 568, 3 N.W.2d 241
( 1942) (city dumping sewage into river so as cause offensive odors). The latter case
involved a state statute, N.D. Comp. Laws 1913, §7231, which stated that "Nothing
which is done or maintained under the express authority of a statute can be deemed a
nuisance." Other states have also enacted similar statutes. See, e.g., People v. City
of Reedley, 66 Cal. App. 409, 226 Pac. 4o8 (1924) discussing the effect of a similar
California statute.
7 2 8 Sadlier v.·City of New York, 81 N.Y.S. 3o8, 310 (1903) (slush falling on plaintiff's property from Brooklyn Bridge).
7 29 Levene v. City of Salem, 191 Ore. 182, 229 P.2d 255 ( 1951). In holding that the
city was liable for flooding plaintiff's land, the court made it clear that authorized acts
can still be considered a nuisance. The court observed, at 197, "We need not consider whether the trespass in the case at bar was a mere nuisance or was of such a
magnitude as to amount to a taking of the property in the sense forbidden by the constitution. . .. In either event, it would appear that the municipality is liable to respond
in damages."
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while the legislature may legalize what otherwise would be a
public nuisance, it may not confer immunity from action for
a private nuisance of such a character as to amount in effect
to a taking of private property for public use. . . .780
It therefore is held that where there is a substantial interference with
property rights, the injured party may recover damages despite the
existence of legislative authority. 781
It is clear, then, that the courts must struggle with the "vexed question of what sort of nuisance may amount to a taking of property." 782
The difficulty of such a question is demonstrated by the variety of
semantic formulas which have been employed in attempts to answer it.
Some courts and text writers have suggested that legislatures may authorize "small" or "minor" nuisances without compensation, but not
"great" ones. 788 In at least one case a distinction was drawn between
"direct" injuries, which were deemed compensable, and merely "consequential" injuries, which were not.m The Court of Appeals of
Maryland has attempted to clarify the problem with this statement:
It is now the law of this State that acts done in the proper
exercise of governmental authority which impair the use of
nearby private property do not constitute a taking of property
within the meaning of the Constitution, unless there is ( 1) an
encroachment upon or physical invasion of the property, or
( 2) a substantial obstruction of access, or ( 3) a deprivation
and not merely a diminution of light and air. 785
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in Sullivan v. Commonwealth, 736 pointed out a distinction between acts which demonstrate
"premeditation and intention of continuance" .of interference with property rights, and acts which merely incidentally interfere with such
rights. The court held that physical injury to plaintiff's property was
merely an unintended side effect of blasting operations carried on in the
construction of an aqueduct, and therefore was not compensable as
Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., supra note 648 at 553·
United States v. Causby, supra note 679782 Bacon v. City of Boston, 154 Mass. 100, 102 (1891) (city held to have unnecessarily damaged plaintiff by its manner of operating sewer system).
7 88 Sawyer v. Davis, 136 Mass. 239. 243 (1883) (ringing loud mill bell, under legisla.tive authority, held a "slight" interference, and not compensable as a taking). See
Prosser 421, and discussion supra at text at notes 629-32.
734 Sadlier v. City of New York, supra note 728.
786 Friendship Cemetery v. City of Baltimore, 197 Md. 610, 619, 81 A.2d 57 (1951)
(flights in glide path of city airport held not a sufficient interference to constitute a
taking).
·
736 335 Mass. 619,142 N.E.2d 347 (1957).
78o
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a "taking" of property. The court contrasted this with cases involving
deliberate firings of gun batteries over plaintiff's land, 131 or repeated
flying of military aircraft at a low level, 738 in which a "taking" had
been found.
Perhaps one of the most significant efforts to draw the line between
what does and does not constitute a compensable "taking" was that
made by the United States Supreme Court in Richards v. Washington
Terminal Co./ 89 previously discussed. This was the case in which the
plaintiff complained of diminution in the value of his property both
from the normal operation of the railroad, which caused noise, vibration, and dust to invade his residence, and from the location near his
property of an outlet for a ventilating system which collected gases and
smoke from a tunnel and forced them out by means of a fan. The court
denied recovery for injury caused by the normal operation of the railroad, but held that the damage caused by the location of the ventilation
outlet near plaintiff's property was a "direct and peculiar and substantial" injury which constituted a "taking'' of plaintiff's property. This
statement of the rule has been quoted frequently by state courts.
The Maryland court placed the problem in better perspective when it
suggested simply that the question of what constitutes a "taking" is a
''question of degree." ao Yet under any of the tests suggested it is to
be doubted that a court would impose liability if the presence of a reactor should cause a drop in property values or a loss of business solely
because of fear or apprehension arising from the installation. In states
where courts have made it clear that only physical interference of some
kind will constitute a "taking," such as in Maryland, 741 this seems unPortsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United States, supra note 681.
United States v. Causby, supra note 679.
.
789 Supra note 648.
740 Friendship Cemetery v. City of Baltimore, supra note 735 at 618.
741 /d. at 619. The U. S. Supreme Court has also indicated that only a physical invasion of some sort will constitute a "taking." In Transportation Co. v. Chicago, supra
note 727, the city, to facilitate the building of a tunnel, had erected a temporary cofferdam which obstructed the docks in front of plaintiff's warehouse. The Court stated at
li42: "But acts done in the proper exercise of governmental powers, and not directly encroaching upon private property, though their consequences may impair its
use, are universally held not to be a taking within the meaning of the constitutional
provision. . . . The extremest qualification of the doctrine is to be found, perhaps, in
Pumpelly v. Green Bay Company, 13 Wall. 166, and in Eaton v. Boston, Concord, &
Montreal Railroad Co., 51 N.H. 504· In those cases it was held that permanent flooding of private property may be regarded as a 'taking.' In those cases there was physical invasion of the real estate of the private owner, and a practical ouster of his possession. But in the present case there was no such invasion. No entry was made upon
plaintiff's lot. All that was done was to render for a time its use more inconvenient."
787
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questionably the result. Also under the reasoning of the United States
Supreme Court in the Richards case, 742 it could be asserted that the
injuries caused by fear were of the kind that "naturally and unavoidably
result from the proper conduct" 743 of the reactor, and as such are not
compensable. In that case there was also a physical invasion of plaintiff's
property, while there is none from a purely psychological nuisance.
Moreover, the nature of the license for the atomic energy activity, or
the legislative authorization of it, may have significance, in any future
cases involving claims based on a theory of nuisance. Where a legislature or licensing agency approves a specific site for the activity, it would
appear that any diminution in the values of property surrounding that
site is a necessary incidental effect of the normal operation of the activity; but where only a general license is issued and the choice of site
left to the licensee, a court might find that the choice of location, because
of the character of the surrounding property, constituted an unreasonable exercise of the authority granted under the license. It is to be
remembered that the legislative immunity enjoyed by the licensee will
extend only to those injuries which necessarily result from the authorized activity, and the scope of the license will be strictly construed. 744
The Minnesota Supreme Court put it this way.
If the legislature expressly authorizes an act which must inevitably result in public injury, what would otherwise be a
nuisance may be said to be legalized; but if they authorize an
erection which does not necessarily produce such a result, but
such result flows from the manner of the construction or operation, the legislative license is no defense. In order to justify
a nuisance by legislative authority, it must be the natural and
probable result of the act authorized, so that it may fairly be
said to be covered by the legislation conferring the power. 745

Thus it is frequently held that while a defendant may be operating
under a general license or legislative authority, this does not authorize
him to conduct the activity in a place or in a manner which unreasonably
interferes with the property rights of others. 746 The application of
Supra note 648.
Supra note 649.
744 Messer v. City of Dickinson, supra note 727 at 577.
745 Pine City v. Munch, 42 Minn. 342, 345-46, 44 N.W. 197 (18go) (village atlowed
to abate injurious operation of a dam as a public nuisance, although construction of
the dam was authorized by legislature).
746 Baltimore & Potomac R.R. v. Fifth Baptist Church, supra note 646 (locating
and operating a railroad engine house near a church held an unreasonable exercise of
railroad's authority, and damages awarded) ; Bacon v. City of Boston, supra note 732;
Hakkila v. Old Colony Broken Stone & Concrete Co., supra note 724; Messer v. City
of Dickinson, supra note 727.
74 2
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this principle may become important in the future if the licensing of
atomic energy installations, particularly those that are relatively less
hazardous, becomes more general than at present.
It also may make a difference whether the legislative sanction is in
a form which expresses positive governmental encouragement of the
activity or merely constitutes a permit allowing an activity to be carried
on. A court may be less disposed to find that legislative immunity exists
if the activity is operating under the latter type of permit, since this
form of licensing is merely a control device and does not include any
expression of the desirability of the activity from a public point of
view. A distinction of this kind was recognized in an Alabama case, City
of Bessemer v. Abott.a7 The plaintiff sought damages against the d.ty
for maintaining a nuisance in the form of a garbage incinerator which
had been erected and operated under a state statute expressly empowering municipalities to establish such facilities. The Alabama court held
that the city would be liable only if it were negligent in operating the
incinerator. The plaintiff reli'ed on an earlier case in which it had been
held that the city was liable for the maintenance of a public privy despite
statutory authority. The court in distinguishing that case stated :
But there was no question presented in that case as to the authority of a municipal corporation, under a general statute, to
do an act in the exercise of its police power for the conservation of the public health and welfare. On the contrary, the authority granted by the Vernon charter was effective merely to
permit the town to do, as a private corporate act, what any individual could do, and of course to do it in the same way and
subject to the same restraints and penalties. Under that authority the town had no more right to maintain privies in
modes and places that would render them nuisances than any
individual had.as
Although this is a distinction not frequently articulated by the courts,
under the reasoning of cases like the Bessemer case, 749 atomic energy
installations having a quasi-public character may come under the heading of acts to be encouraged in the interest of public welfare, and therefore would enjoy legislative immunity. On the other hand, if the atomic
energy activity is operating under a mere legalizing permit, the courts
may be more willing to rule that the license does not preclude liability for
damages on a theory of nuisance. In cases involving claims against the
212 Ala. 472, 103 So. 446 (1925).
!d. at 473·
749 S~a note 745.
747

748
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owners of funeral homes, for example, it has been held that the existence
of a permit being an expression of municipal thought and opinion, may
be properly considered on the question of nuisance, but it is not conclusive. ~
The time may come when the use of atomic energy may be so common that it will no longer enjoy its favored status. Someday it will be
put to use in the ordinary processes of purely private industry having no
official relationship to the general public interest. In that event, the fact
that a permit is obtained apparently would not preclude a court from
finding the activity a nuisance and awarding damages under proper circumstances. At the present time, however, both federal and state legislation clearly is directed toward encouraging research and development
in the new atomic industry, and therefore licenses are likely to enjoy
full legislative immunity from actions based on nuisance theories.
7 0

S· Proof Problems-Causation and Damages
a. The General Interrelationship
The unusual characteristics of radiation, particularly its imperceptibility through ordinary human senses and the cumulative character of
the effects of exposure, create some unique and difficult problems in
proving both causation-in-fact and damages in tort actions. Although
these are two different elements of the negligence action and raise somewhat different questions, the proof aspects are in many respects common and the most nearly unique. Therefore, it seems best to deal with
the problems of proof together.
In discussing causation at this point we are talking about that aspect
usually called causation-in-fact. This differs from that part of causation so often treated under the title of proximate cause. Proximate cause
and its effect on limiting the liability of those whose radiation in fact
causes injury to others have been discussed previously in connection with
the duty element. Here attention is centered on the proof problems that
will arise in establishing the fact that radiation from a particular defendant's operations caused a specific damage to a particular person.
The complications arising out of radiation incidents seem to develop
principally from three factors unique to atomic energy: (I) Multiple
causation problems are created by the fact that radiation comes from
750 Dawson v. Laufersweiler, 241 Iowa 850, 43 N.W.2d 726 (1950). Sometimes injunctions have been granted also despite a general permit. Gunderson v. Anderson,
190 Minn. 245, 2SI N.W. SIS (1933). For other cases in which injunction has been
granted despite permits or zoning ordinances, see 39 A.L.R.2d ro26 (19SS).
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many sources, such as natural background radiation from many types
of materials including even the bricks of the houses in which we live
and the buildings in which we work, fallout from bomb tests, and
medical uses of radiation in addition to whatever radiation may be released by atomic energy entrepreneurs in the course of their operations.
( 2) Many, if not most, of the injurious effects that are caused by radiation result from the total amount of exposure received by the injured
person and not just the amount received by him at a particular time from
a particular source (although there are certain injuries believed by some
experts to result only in case the individual exposures exceed certain
threshold levels). ( 3) The inability to state accurately and specifically
that a given injury will be or has been caused by a specific amount of
radiation received at a specific time, means that in many cases plaintiffs
will be forced to depend upon statistics showing that exposure to radiation will increase by some more or less accurately determined percentage
the likelihood of a certain injury occurring.
Although the causation ahd damage questions, particularly as to
proof, which are created by these characteristics of radiation are not
completely unique in tort cases, similar situations are very few in number, and courts have not had occasion to work out theories and principles
for determining liability. Yet_ the problems will arise inevitably and
with much greater frequency as the uses of radiation increase from
year to year. Here again it seems that the advent of atomic energy will
cause the legal profession to re-evaluate its tort concepts,- particularly
as they relate to causation-in-fact and the extent of damage.
b. Multiple Defendants
( 1)

General Considerations

Partly a Duty Matter. The problem of remoteness or foreseeability
today generally is considered as a part of the duty question and this
also is the manner in which we have treated the subject. It also would
have been possible to have treated the question of the liability of multiple defendants as a part of duty under such headings as joint tortfeasors, proximate cause, joint enterprise, master-servant, or concert
of action. Yet the difficult and unique aspects of the multiple defendant
matter in the radiation cases would seem to arise out of the same characteristics that give rise to the proof problem generally. Therefore, the
problem can be seen in better perspective if multiple defendants are
now treated in the context of the proof questions that will arise. Never-
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theless, the subject of multiple defendants is discussed prior to dealing
with proof problems generally because duty considerations are just as
important as those of proof of causation. On the other hand, when
considering cases involving single defendants, proof of causation becomes of dominant importance. This indicates the desirability of first
discussing multiple defendants and thereafter the non-multiple situations.
It is true, of course, that some multiple defendant cases are solved by
cause-in-fact principles. The rule usually applied to determine whether
a known force is the cause-in-fact of a specific injury to a particular
person is known as the "but for" rule. In explaining this rule Prosser
says:
The defendant's conduct is not a cause cif the event, if the
event would have occurred without it. At most this must be
a rule of exclusion: if the event would not have occurred
"but for" the defendant's negligence, it still does not follow
that there is liability, since consideration other than causation,
which remained to be discussed, may prevent it. 7 15'1
This test will take care of most cases including a good many of those
involving multiple defendants. There are certain kinds of cases, however, which have caused the courts to develop a supplementary concept
usually known as the "substantial factor" rule. As Prosser says m
discussing causation-in-fact:
Such a test is clearly an improvement over the "but for"
rule. It disposes of the cases mentioned above, and likewise
of the difficulties presented by the type of case where a
similar, but not identical result would have followed without
the defendant's act. But in the great majority of cases, it
amounts to the same thing. Except as indicated, no case has
been found where the defendant's act could be called a substantial factor when the event would have occurred without it; nor
will cases very often arise where it would not be such a factor
when it was so indispensable a cause that without it the result
would not have followed. 752
Whether the test be the "but for" rule or the "substantial factor"
concept, the cases involving multiple defendants often create very difficult problems. Except for the discussion by Prosser 753 and Harper and
James m in their recent treatises, there is surprisingly little written
discussion of the subject with the exception of the application of the res
Prosser 220.
!d. at 221.
7 53 !d. at 224-41.
7H Harper & James 1121-JI, 694-714.
751
75 2
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ipsa loquitur doctrine, to be discussed later. 755 The expanded use of
atomic energy should give rise to a considerable increase in cases of
this nature.
, Some examples of situations that very likely will arise when the use
of atomic energy becomes more common will help focus attention on
legal problems that need analysis.
As to reactors the following situations very possibly will arise :
( 1) Two reactors, owned by different companies, may be so located
that the prevailing winds could have carried the materials discharged
into the air or into a stream from either one or both and caused the
injury to the person or property of the plaintiff some distance downwind
or downriver. Distinctions should be recognized between cases where:
(a) neither reactor contributed enough to cause damage, but the cumulative effect of both does cause damage; (b) the amount discharged by
each was sufficient in and of itself to have caused the damage; (c) there
is no evidence as to which one discharged the radioactive material, each
claiming it is not from its operation and the plaintiff is not able to prove
from which it came. Whether the applicable legal principles are to be
strict liability concepts or those of liability for negligence the courts
must be prepared to deal with cases involving these difficulties.
( 2) The same situation except that instead of two reactors there are
three or more such reactors.
( 3) The bulk wastes from two or more reactors are turned over
to a common disposal agent (owned either privately or by the government), who then negligently disposes of such combined waste so as to
cause the plaintiff injury. Assume that vicarious liability will be imposed upon the owner of the waste products but it will.be impossible to
identify the source of the particular material causing the damage, because the wastes are mixed and not labeled; i.e., they are fungible.
( 4) There are two or more reactors, and a person lives in the vicinity
of one for a time, then moves to the vicinity of another, and perhaps still
another. He is able to show that the cumulative irradiation has caused
personal injury although the individual contributions of any one of the
sources would not have been sufficient to have done so.
( 5) The waste or the discharge from one or several reactors is not
enough in itself to cause any damage for which compensation could be
recovered, although the discharge was negligent or absolute liability
rules will be applied. Yet the plaintiff may suffer a radiation injury because of peculiar susceptibility. The same could happen if plaintiff subsequently needs medical treatment requiring use of radiation and either
1ss Infra text discussion beginning at note 1146.
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did not know of his prior exposure from the reactor or forgot to inform
his doctor of previous exposures, or the doctor may have decided under
the circumstances that the risk of additional diagnostic or therapeutic
radiation ought to be taken, even though the cumulative dose might be
enough to cause injury to the plaintiff.
Similar situations can arise in connection with the disposal or use of
radioactive isotopes for either medical or industrial purposes. For
example:
( 1) Two or more industrial, medical, or research users of radioactive
isotopes discharge their sewage into the city system and the city sewage
plant bacterial process is harmed, or a city employee is injured by radiation, or someone downstream from the sewage disposal plant is injured
by the radiation, and (a) it takes the contributions of all to cause the
damage, although no individual user was negligent in the amount discharged in the individual case, or (b) one user must have been negligent
because the amount of radiation received exceeds what would have been
received if all had released only the proper amount, but it is impossible
to tell which one was guilty, or (c) it is possible to tell which one was
negligent but his discharge alone would not have caused injury unless
added to that of the others who were not negligent.
( 2) The total amount of all contributors is not enough to cause
injury but, because of the peculiar susceptibility or the necessity for
later medical treatment with large amounts of radiation, the particular
plaintiff is injured because of the total cumulative dose received, including that contributed by the waste disposal operations of the industrial,
medical, and research uses.
(3) A person receives enough radiation to cause injury, including
radiation from a particular defendant who is responsible for a part of
the exposure; (a) where the other exposure alone was enough to cause
the injury as was the amount received from the defendant and it is
impossible to tell which exposure actually caused the injury, or (b) the
exposure caused by the defendant is not enough in itself to cause injury
but when added to that already received by the plaintiff in medical
treatment, either carefully or negligently administered by a doctor,
causes an injury, or (c) exposure caused by the defendant is not enough
in itself to cause injury but does contribute to the total dose received by
the plaintiff from other sources, and the total dose is sufficient to cause
injury.
(4) Plaintiff's injury would occur only by accumulating several
exposures, such as from his job which involves the handling of radio-
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isotopes, fallout from government bomb tests/ 56 and fallout from the
operation of a reactor or as a result of exposure from a highway accident involving waste products, and finally later medical treatment by
radiation.
Many other variations can be imagined but these are allustrative of
the kinds of cases that very well could happen as the use of atomic
energy becomes more widespread. They present causation-in-fact and
damage problems that courts will have to answer.
In dealing with multiple causation cases a part of the difficulty arises
from questions of joinder, interpretation of verdicts, and the enforcement of judgments. These elements cannot always be separated completely from the substantive question as to who is liable and to what
extent. For example, there may be a question of whether in a particular
jurisdiction the plaintiff will be permitted under the procedural rules to
join as defendants all persons thought to have caused harm, but the
modern trend of procedural rules is such that this is becoming less of a
problem. Certainly the multiple causation cases can be handled best
when all potential defendants are present at the same time. Joining all
of the defendants does not need to affect the burden of proof placed on
the plaintiff to show causation and damages for each of the defendants
separately, although it is true that where the court has all the defendants
present it might be more willing to shift the burden, as some of the cases
to be discussed illustrate. In any event, the procedural problems of
joinder of parties, the nature of the verdict that should be rendered,
and the impact of contribution and release of joint tortfeasors should
present no different questions merely because the cases arise out of the
use of atomic energy. While many issues in these areas are difficult and
uncertain, there seem to be no problems peculiar to the atomic energy
situations. 767

( 2) Cumulative or Concurrent Causation Only-The
negligence of each is a necessary link in the causal
chain, or the negligence of each is sufficient to cause
the total injury suffered and which actually caused
injury cannot be determined.
The first problem to be considered arises when several defendants
have released radioactive material under such circumstances that each
may be held liable for the total injury since the radioactivity released
756 See study of fall-out reported in N.Y. Times, July 5, 1958, p. 5, col. 1. The
AEC reported that only one person in the region of the 1957 Nevada tests received
anything approaching the 3·9 roentgen aggregate set as the safety limit.
7 6 7 Harper & James 695-97, 709; Prosser 233-51; 41 A.LR. 1223 (1926); 47
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by each was sufficient by itself to cause the harm without the contribution of the other defendants. This is a situation that could arise when
two or more reactor operations or the use of isotopes by two or more
persons result in radioactive material being deposited on plaintiff's property where the plaintiff himself is exposed and the exposure from each
source is simultaneous either because the discharges were simultaneous
or by the time the plaintiff is exposed the two sources are merged. This
could easily happen from a discharge of radioactive materials into the
air or a stream or into disposal grounds. In this kind of case the courts
and the legal commentators agree that the full amount of damages can
be charged to one or to all of the wrongdoing defendants.
The analysis of this type of case usually starts with the Massachusetts
case, Coley v. Hooener/ 58 where the two defendants simultaneously rode
their motorcycles past a horse, frightening it and causing injury to the
rider. Many other examples can be given, such as the case of A stabbing
C and B hitting C with a rock simultaneously, either blow being sufficient to kill C and he later dies; or the case of two fires being started
independently, converging and destroying the plaintiff's house. Similar
situations have arisen in connection with automobile accidents as is
exemplified by a recent Kentucky case, Byee v. Shanks. The two defendants negligently raced their cars down the highway. The plaintiff
was injured when they crashed into each other, the plaintiff being a
. passenger in one of the cars but personal_ly free from contributory
negligence. Approving an earlier leading Minnesota case the Kentucky
court said:
. . . [W]here two or more persons are unlawfully and negligently racing automobiles on a public highway in concert, all
are liable in damages to a guest in one of the racing cars who
was injured thereby, when the guest protests to the driver, has
no control over the driver, and was not engaged in a joint enterprise with the driver. The Minnesota opinion reflects sound
legal and humanitarian principles which are applicable to the
factual situation of the case at bar.m
The "but for" rule often does not explain holding both defendants liable
under these circumstances (though it would in ~he racing car case) and
these situations have given rise to the "substantial factor" rule. 760
A.L.R.2d 8o3 (1956); 56 A.L.R.2d 239, 271 (1957); McCoid, "Negligence Actions
Against Multiple Defendants," 7 Stan. L. Rev. 480 (1955).
758 182 Mass. 250, 65 N.E. 6g (1902); Harper & James 702, 1122; Prosser 22(}-21.
Burnham v. Butler, 31 N.Y. 4Bo (1865) (two sleighs rather than two motorcycles).
7 59 Bybee v. Shanks, 253 S.W.2d 257, 26o (Ky. 1952). See also Harper & James
693, ns. 9-10.
760 Prosser 221.
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It always seems to be assumed, of course, that if the force that actually caused the injury can be identified and separated from a similar
force created by another negligent defendant, only the defendant whose
force actually caused the injury will be held liable. As an illustrative
example, suppose A and B each sell a rope to a person, bent on hanging
himself, under such circumstances that they are negligent in so doing. 761
If the person hangs himself with the rope of either A or B, the other
is not liable. On the other hand, if the two pieces of rope were tied
together, both A and B would be liable for the death. Used as an analogy
and applied to the radiation situation, we could assume, as an example,
that two radioactive cobalt 6o sources used in the same area were negligently shielded so that either could have injured the plaintiff, but it can
be proved that he was exposed only to one. On the reasoning usually
applied, there would be liability resting on only one defendant. So too,
if the person irradiated is exposed to both sources of cobalt 6o and receives damaging radiation from each, there would seem to be no question
about holding the owners of both sources equally and totally liable for
the total damage.
The much more difficult question is one that arises when it is impossible to tell whether A's piece of rope or B's was used, but it is clear that
only one was used. This raises questions to be discussed later in connection with the unknown wrongdoer.
Generally it is assumed that if the injury resulting from the contributions of both defendants is a single injury, it is an indivisible one and
there can be no apportionment In such situations it is clear that each
made a suostantial contribution to the ultimate injury even though the
injury itself may not be divisible. Is there any reason, however, why
the. recovery for the single injury could not be divided between the
wrongdoers in proportion to the amount of radiation contributed by each
if this can be .proved? One answer may be that each defendant who substantially contributes toward the final result should as a matter of good
social policy be fully liable to the deceased or injured party, assuming
the contribution of the other party was reasonably foreseeable. Then
there could be some kind of contribution between joint tortfeasors along
the lines of the apportionment suggested.
On the other hand, perhaps the radiation case is one in which we
should not treat the harm as indivisible even though it is the total and
ultimate harm of death, but should treat it like certain other cases of
761 Carpenter, "Workable Rules for Determining Proximate Cause," 20 Cal. L. Rev.
229.396 (1932); Prosser 221. See also Haley v. Calef, 28 R.I. 332, 67 At!. 323 (1907).
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subsequent, as distinguished from concurrent, negligent action, e.g.,
the case in which one driver negligently injures the pedestrian who then
is injured further by another driver, or the case in which a driver negligently injures a person and then a doctor negligently increases the
damages. 762 In these cases the second person is held liable only for the
contribution he makes in terms of additional damage, if this can be
separated. In the radiation case where there is a cumulat~ve effect, if it
can be proved that a certain number of units of exposure caused a certain injury and the radiation emitted by two different sources was in a
ratio of I :3, the damages caused by the total radiation could be divided
between the two defendants in a I :3 ratio, although the injury itself
is not separate and could not be attributed to one or the other exposure.
This would be feasible and would seem to be good policy.
A closely related question is that which arises when there is a difference in time between the forces negligently set in motion by the different defendants. vVhen each of the defendants' actions makes a significant contribution to the final result, the general rule seems to be to
impose liability on each of them as being concurrent causes of injury.
There are many examples of this kind of liability, the most numerous
of which are the automobile cases in which action of two or more negligent defendants, perhaps somewhat separated in time, occurs to
create the final injury to the plaintiff. In these cases the imposition of
liability on all defendants jointly and without apportionment generally
is approved by legal writers. 763 The question most likely to give difficulty in this situation is that of determining whether it took the contribution of all the defendants to cause the final injury. This often resolves itself into a proximate cause question of whether or not to hold
the particular defendant liable for his contribution. In such cases, of
course, the question of "the comparison and determination of alleged
plural or concurrent causes falls within the province of the jury. . . .
Where there is a factual dispute as to the events and circumstances
which caused the injuries, proximate cause is a jury question." 764
A typical example of this kind of relationship in a radiation case
Harper. & James n24 and cases cited.
See cases cited 26 A.L.R.2d 167 (1952); 55 A.L.R.2d 13, 155, 201 (1957); and
discussion and cases in Prosser 222-26 and Harper & James 705-o6. See Roush v.
Johnson, 139 W.Va. 6o7, 633, So S.E.zd 857 (1954) for treatment of contributory negligence.
764 Melone v. Jersey Central Power & Light Co., 18 N.J. 163, 175, 113 A.2d 13
(1955). See Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Coxwell, 93 Ga. App. 159, 91 S.E.2d 135
(1955), a car and railroad collision case. A very interesting case is Ristan v. Frantzen,
26 N.J. Super. 225, 97 A.zd i26 (1953).
762
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would be that of a supplier negligently assembling a fuel core and the
reactor operator also being negligent in not finding the defect, all resulting in a discharge of radioactive material following this combined
negligence of the two parties. Under these circumstances it would seem
perfectly clear that the law would hold each party, the supplier and the
operator, individually liable for the total amount of damage caused to
others.
While there are some cases to the contrary, it seems almost equally
clear that where the concurrent causes are the result of the negligence
of one party but not of the other (as when one source is derived from
nature or from an innocent person) , the negligent party is liable in full
for the jointly caused injury. 765 A good example of this is the case of
Smith v. Bonner/ 66 in which the plaintiff was killed while driving along
the highway where he was hit by a tree which .was blown over from the
defendant's property, partly because of the unprecedented violence of
the storm and partly because the defendant was negligent in not providing adequate support around the roots of the tree when he filled in
an old cesspool.
There are many situations involving radiation sources which could
be controlled by this general rule. An example might be the occurrence
of an unprecedented earthquake combining with the negligent construction of a reactor to release radioactive material and cause injury to third
parties. Even though the earthquake was unprecedented so long as the
material would not have been released except for the negligence of the
operator, the cases would seem to indicate that the operator will be held
liable for the total resultant injury. Similar situations could arise from
the discharge of radioactive material into streams, the disposal of radioactive material, or the transportation of such material where an un~
precedented natural cause combines with the negligence of the owner
to cause injury.
There is one other closely related situation which well might occur
in the radiation injury cases in connection with which a somewhat different problem in apportionment arises. Illustrations include the case
in which a boy falls from a bridge trestle under circumstances in which
death is almost certain, yet on the way down he is electrocuted by defendant's wires which are negligently uninsulated; or the case in which
the plaintiff is killed by the defendant's negligence, yet he has a reduced
life expectancy because of some previous accident or some existing
785 Harper & James 7o6, n. So.
78&63 Mont. 571, :zo8 Pac. 6o3 (1922).
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disease; or the case in which a house is destroyed which already is almost sure to be destroyed by another fire, or by the pounding sea; or
where the defendant blocks the plaintiff's barge in a canal where there
already is a landslide which also blocks the way. Under such circumstances there is a question of what is the value of the thing destroyed
by the defendant at the time he destroyed it. These problems seem to
have been seriously discussed first by Chief Justice Peaslee of New
Hampshire. 767 Prosser's analysis, by which he would reduce the value
of the thing injured by the defendant's action where the other danger
is so imminent that a reasonable man would take it into account, seems
much sounder than the suggestion of Harper and James that the
wrongdoer be held completely liable. 768 Even if we admit that the "objective of tort law is compensating accident victims" and that this is
the proper one to be stressed, there still remains the question of whether
the defendant in the case, society as a whole, or the plaintiff (or his
own insurance carrier) should bear the loss.
(3) Cumulative or Concurrent Contribution to Amount
of Injury-- The extent of plaintiff's injury results
from the accumulation of injurious impact from
several sources, usually there being no causal connection between the sources but there being a contribution by each to the total single compensable
injury
The multiple causation problems that are most nearly analogous to
the situations likely to arise in connection with radiation damage, and
matters that will give the most difficulty, particularly as to proof, are
those arising from injuries resulting to the plaintiff as a consequence not
of any one defendant's contribution, but from the contribution of several,
but no contribution is enough to allow imposition of liability even though
each was negligent in allowing the force to be set in motion. The suggested problem is one in which each of the defendants, if treated separately, would be considered as having committed no tort, even though
767 Peaslee, "Multiple Causation and Damage," 47 Harv. L. Rev. 1127 (1934). See
also Carpenter, "Concurrent Causation," 83 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 941 (1935); Prosser
231; Harper & James JI22, n. 5.
768 Prosser 231-32; Harper & James 1123. One need not accept the full implications
of Prosser's suggestion that if A kills B right after C has poisoned B so he will die
shortly, then the rule of reducing damages charged to A does not apply. What if A
acts only negligently or under rules of absolute liability? Maybe it would be better
simply to hold C liable even if someone got to B first so long as C's action was reasonably certain to cause death soon.
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each breached his duty to use due care in handling some force that affects the plaintiff at least slightly. In analyzing this problem it is most
important that one always keep in mind a general rule concerning the
proof of causation that the plaintiff must present. The considerations
involved .in proving ca':lsation and damages in radiation cases are discussed later/" but the· generally accepted statement of the degree of
proof required of the plaintiff is set forth by Prosser as follows :
He must introduce evidence which affords a reasonable basis
for the conclusion that it is more likely tha.n not that the conduct of the defendant was a substantial factor in the result.
A mere possibility of such causation is not enough; and when
the matter remains one of pure speculation or conjecture, or
where the probabilities are at best evenly balanced, it becomes
the duty of the court to direct a verdict for the defendant. no
The author points out that ordinary experience must be used to determine whether under the circumstances a given action could produce
a particular result, and that circumstantial evidence may be used to infer
the causal connection. This "more probable than not" test results in real
difficulty in cases of injuries suffered only because of contributions of
several persons. The corollary of the "more probable than not" test is
that "Where the facts prov-en show that there are several possible causes
of an injury, for one or more of which the defendant was not responsible, and it is just as reasonable and probable that the injury was the
result of one cause as the other, plaintiff cannot have a recovery since
he has failed to prove that the negligence of the defendant caused the
injury." 771 What is probable or not in many cases is a question on which
reasonable men may well differ. Problems of this type inevitably will
arise from the use of radiation sources, if for no other reason than because the effects of radiation are cumulative. Difficulty of proof also
will arise in this area because of the inability of human beings to sense
the presence of radiation and because radiation in some instances will
emanate from certain sources for great lengths of time through many
trans formations in form and over long distances~
Another very closely related problem is that which arises when it is
. known that a particular kind of action or energy hascaused injury but
it is not easy to determine which of several possible defendants or potential defendants are responsible for setting·the force in motion. Here
7 9
&

/nfra discussion beginning just after note 106o.

Prosser 222. [Emphasis added.]
Ingersoll v. Liberty Bank of Buffalo, 278 N.Y. 1, 7, 14 N.E.2d 828 (1938), cited
by Harper & James IIII, n; 7·
.
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again the nature of radiation and radioactive sources is such as to make
this kind of problem particularly acute in cases that seem inevitable as
we make increasing use of atomic energy.
(a) Liability for Another's Negligence Assessed
Because of a Legally Imposed Status Relationship
If one assumes that cause-in-fact can be proved (an assumption that
is difficult to support in radiation cases as will be indicated later), 772
and further assumes that the defendants who have set the force in
motion can be identified, there are some cases about which the answer
seems quite clear and all the writers agree. 773 In general they fall into
three categories.
(i) Concert of Action

When the parties act "in concert," all of the defendants so acting
clearly will be held liable for all the injury. The clearest example of this
type of joint liability arises out of situations where several persons are
acting together in a manner that may be in violation of both a criminal
statute and also the tort rules of due care. These are cases where there
is a known and intentional common pursuit of a common end, whether
or not it be in the form of a formal joint enterprise, such as one of
three deputy sheriffs firing the gun that injured the plaintiff. The court
held that:
It is immaterial which one of the three officers fired the shot
that produced the wound. They were all engaged upon a common enterprise or adventure which contemplated the halting
of the buggy and its occupants. They were present, encouraging, aiding, and abetting this enterprise, and they were all
equally responsible with whichever one of them actually fired
the shot that produced the wound. m
Similar concert of action, and therefore total liability on the part of
each defendant, has been imposed in cases where innocent bystanders
have been injured as the result of fights engaged in by defendants. The
Tennessee court in one of these cases said:
The rule is well settled that where two or more persons engage in an unlawful act and one of them commits a serious,
Infra discussion beginning just after note 106o.
Prosser 224 ; Harper & James 1122-24.
114 Mangino v. Todd, 19 Ala. App. 486, 491, g8 So. 323 (1923). See Moore v. Foster,
182 Miss. 15, 18o So. 73 ( 1938) for an almost identical situation.
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civil injury upon a person not engaged therein, all are equally
liable for damages to the injured party. 715
Again, in a case of several defendants taking action, which together
constitute a nuisance, such as polluting a stream, with full knowledge
on the part of at least two of the defendants of the independent acts of
others, courts have held that there was concert of action as to those
who acted with knowledge:
Where all have knowledge of the independent acts that create
the result and continue the independent acts with knowledge,
this ipso facto creates a concert of action and makes a common design or purpose. Any other position, from the facts
and circumstances of the case, would make plaintiffs practically remediless, although there is a nuisance which all jointly
concurred in and contributed to, that is alleged made the plaintiff's land valueless, and but for such joinder the injury would
not have occurred. 778
Other cases which may stretch the concert of action concept too far,
are those in which persons hunting together are held jointly and fully
liable for the injuries caused when plaintiff is hit by the bullet negligently fired by one of them. Several such cases speak in terms of concert
of action, but it would seem that this is a concert of action for a different purpose. The common goal was not that of injuring the plaintiff or
capturing him. Where officers assault a potential prisoner, or several
p·ersons participate in a fight likely to injure bystanders, there is a real
concert of action case.m A detailed consideration of the wrongly
labeled concert cases involving one of several negligent parties causing
unintended injury is found later in this chapter. 178
Except where there is an actual joint enterprise of some kind, the
application of these concert of action cases to atomic energy situations
will not be called for with any frequency. This type of case arises much
more often where there is an intentional tort, or at least an intentional
m Blalock v. Temple, 38 Tenn. App. 463, 468, 276 S.W.2d 493 (1955).
Moses v. Town of Morganton, 192 N.C. 102, 100, 133 S.E. 421 (1!)26). The
same rationale seems to have been the basis for liability in City of Skiatook v. Carroll,
163 Okla. 149. 21 P.2d 498 (1933), and Comar Oil Co. v. Sipe, 133 Okla. 222, 271 Pac.
1010 (1928), although they can be treated as concurrent nuisance cases, discussed infra
in text at note 784 ff.
777 Benson v. Ross, 143 Mich. 452, 100 N.W. 1120 (1go6); Oliver v. Miles, 144 Miss.
852, no So. 666 (1!)26); Kuhn v. Bader, 8g Ohio App. 203, 101 N.E.2d 322 (1951).
See also Reyher v. Mayne, 90 Colo. 586, 10 P.2d nog (1932). Similar ideas have been
applied in cases where dogs of several owners caused damage. See e.g., Stephens v.
Schadler, 182 Ky. 833, 207 S.W. 704 (1919); Arneil v. Paterson, [1931] A. C. 56o.
778 Infra note 881 ff.
778
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wrongful act of some kind, a situation not very likely to happen in the
atomic energy area.
( ii) Vicarious Liability
Much more important in atomic energy cases is the type of liability
that is imposed under the vicarious liability doctrines. Jn !he light of
the possibility of saying that radioactive material creates an "unusual"
hazard, this concept is particularly important to the atomic energy
entrepreneur. Under the cases discussed previously, 179 it is clear that
there are any number of situations in which the owner or user of radioactive material will be held vicariously liable for the actions of independent contractors, although a very good case can be made for not
imposing it in cases involving independent contractors engaged in
transportation and disposal operations.
An equally clear case of each defendant being held liable for the
whole damage (at least so far as the plaintiff is concerned), is that in
which the law imposes vicarious liability on one party for the acts of
another. A typical example is the liability of a master for the acts of his
servant carried out pursuant to the employment, or the liability of a
principal for the acts of his agent carried out within the scope of the
agency. 780 A similar result has been reached in a case involving the person in charge of a city dump. He did nothing to prevent other defendants from causing a nuisance to the injury of the plaintiff through their
use of the dump and the kind of material they were allowed to deposit
there. In an action against the city and the other persons involved, the
court held the city liable even though it in no way approved the action
of the other defendants. 181
(iii) Common Duty
Another category of cases in which all defendants are held equally
liable for the whole damage arises when a common duty imposed by
law upon two or more persons is not carried out, and someone is injured.182 This rule often is applied if both the landlord and a tenant are
responsible for proper maintenance of a building or two persons are
responsible for the proper maintenance of a party-wall. Both are held
liable when the wall falls whether because of the negligence of one or
Supra discussion at note 20'J ff.
Prosser 225; Harper & James 699-700.
Cases collected Annot., .52 A.L.R.2d I I34, I I42 ( I957).
782 Prosser 225-26; Harper & James 6gg.
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the other, or both. This type of case is not so likely to arise in the atomic
energy area but one possibility might be if two corporations jointly
form a third corporation to carry out research in atomic energy problems. If the third company is held liable on the basis of negligence or
absolute liability for injuries caused to others, it is possible that the
courts would pierce the corporate veil and hold both of the parent corporations liable. Again, a common duty may be found if two industrial
concerns using radioactive isotopes have a common storage vault for
such materials as cannot be discharged into the sewage system, and
through the fault of one or the other the storage vault leaks and causes
damage to a third party. In many ways this kind of activity is really a
case of joint-enterprise.
(b) Cumulative Contributions from Several N egligent Sources Legally Unrelated Except Each
Contributes to the Total Single Injury
The cases which will cause real difficulty, however, are those in which
the injury results from the contributions of several persons, each of
whom is negligent and no one of whom contributes enough to cause the
whole injury, and common duty or vicarious liability rules just discussed are not applicable. ·
In analyzing these cases several distinctions must be kept in mind.
The first is between those cases in which it is possible to make at least
some rough apportionment of the relative contribution of the individual
parties, and those cases in which it is practically impossible to do so.
Another distinction is between those cases in which all of the contributing parties are negligent, where no one of the contributing parties is
negligent, where some but not all of them are negligent, and the case
where the negligent actions of one or more defendants combine with
forces occurring naturally; the combination causing the damage. Likewise important is the distinction between the case where it is dear that
cause-in-fact has been proved as to all of the persons joined in the action and those cases where it is perfectly clear that all of the defendants
did not participate and the real question is which one caused the harm,
it being possible that any one of them might have but only one of them
did do so.
Another consideration· of importance in analyzing the cases in this
area is that joinder of all potential defendants for purposes of trial
does not lead necessarily to the imposition of joint liability on all defendants for all of the damages with total liability imposed on all. Ir.
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attempting to determine what the liability may be for the cases that are
bound to arise in connection with the use of radiation sources, it seems
wise to analyze carefully the most nearly analogous cases. In analyzing
the cases the distinctions and considerations suggested above should be
kept in mind.
( i) Cases to Be Distinguished
In addition to the distinctions between cases which involve cumulative or concurrent contribution to the amount of injury, all of which are
here discussed, it is important to distinguish certain groups of cases entirely. The kind of case of concern here should be sharply distinguished
from that involving the independent but concurring acts of two or more
defendants which create a situation causing injury to the plaintiff, but
where the injury itself comes at the end of a chain of events rather than
resulting from an accumulation of injuries inflicted by the defendants
quite independently of each other.
The case of Ristan v. Fra.nfzen 183 exemplifies the distinction that
should be kept in mind. In this case the first defendant negligently
struck the plaintiff's car and, while causing no serious injury to it or
the occupants, put the car in such a position on the highway that the
second defendant negligently ran into the car, causing very serious injury to its occupants. The first defendant was liable for the whole
damage because his negligence put the plaintiffs in such a position that
foreseeably they would be seriously hurt by somebody else, such as the
second defendant. Because there was no recoverable injury from the
first blow by the first defendant, however, the second defendant also is
liable for the total damages inflicted because his negligent act caused the
total recoverable damages, even though the injury would not have occurred if it had not been for the negligence of the first defendant. These
are concurrent contributors but each is clearly liable for the total damage independently of whether or not the other person was guilty of negligence. The case differs from the cumulative contribution cases in which
there is an accumulation of negligent actions of all defendants each
contributing to the total. It would be closer if the plaintiff were hurt ·
seriously from the first collision, then were also hurt seriously from the
second collision, and died as a consequence of the combined injuries,
although neither one alone would have been sufficient to kill him. It is
the cumulative contribution to the amount of injury type of situation
with which we are concerned here, where the injurious impacts of sev7sa Supra note 764- The cises set out in Harper & James 7o6, n. 8o do not.
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era] defendants, each negligent, combine to cause the total injury. In
considering the decisions that have been made in this area it is important to keep in mind the several distinctions suggested above.
(ii) Cumulative or Concurrent
Cases Involving Negligence

Nuisance

By far the greatest number of cases bearing on the cumulative contribution to the amount of injury question have arisen in the area of
nuisance, usually arising out of the actions of two or more defendants
resulting in pollution of streams or air, (sometimes by causing noise),
or the flooding of another's property. These cases are of especial significance to the atomic energy entrepreneur in relation to his potential
liability problems. The leading cases in those jurisdictions which have
faced the problems deserve careful study.
Roughly the cases can be divided into two categories : ( 1 ) Cases in
which the courts have held t.hat each defendant, though negligent, is
liable for only his own acts and may not be held liable without independent proof that more probably than not his actions caused a specific part
of the damages. In most cases, this means that it is improper to join
several defendants in one action, although as was pointed out previously,
joinder is not necessarily to be precluded merely because ultimately the
plaintiff will have to prove that more probably than not the defendants
individually contributed a specific proportion of the damages. ( 2) Cases
in which joinder has been permitted and joint liability for damages has
been assessed, or the court has ordered a shifting of the burden of
proof so that each defendant is· forced to show the extent of his own
contribution to the total damages to preclude being held liable for the
whole. The cases involve claims for damages, not for injunctive relief.
This point has not always been made clear in analyzing the problem.
Defendants Held Individually Liable Only. In two early cases the
California court adopted the view that unity of action is present when
an injury results from combined acts, no one of which itself would
cause any damage. Under these circumstances the California court held
the defendants to have acted jointly and to be jointly liable for the damages. In one case m tailings from several mining operations in the canyon above plaintiff's land were discharged by the defendants into the
waterway and polluted the water that passed the plaintiff's land. In the
other case 78 ~ the defendants each diverted some water from a stream so
as to deprive plaintiff of water to which he was entitled.
184 Hill v. Smith, 32 Cal. 166 (1867).
7UHillman v. Newington, 57 Cal. s6 (188o).

378

TORT LIABILITY

In a later case, Miller v. Highland Ditch Co., 786 however, the California Supreme Court changed its position and held that an action
could not be maintained jointly against defendants if each had acted
separately, and that it did not become a joint tort merely because the
consequences united with consequences caused by other defendants. In
this case water from the ditches of the several defendants, each operating independently, combined and injured the plaintiff's land. A similar
result was reached in a later case by the California Appeals Court where
cement dust from the defendant's operations united with that from
another cement company and caused injury to the trees and orange
crops of the plaintiff. 187 The court stated that each tort feasor could be
held liable only for such proportion of the total damages as resulted
from the dust from his own plant. Recognizing the difficulty of apportioning the damages, however, the court stated that the trier of facts
could estimate such damages with a "liberal han4." The problem of
joinder of parties did not arise because only one defendant was involved
in this particular action. It seems not unlikely that if the plaintiff had
tried to join both tortfeasors, a motion for a misjoinder would have
been sustained.
The Colorado court seems to have adopted the same view in Ryan
Gtdch Reservoir Co. v. Swartz. 188 While the court did not make it clear
that the damage would not have occurred without the water from both
dams which broke as the result of a very heavy rain and caused the
damage to the plaintiff's land below the" dam, the co~rt takes a position
which seems to be quite consistent with that of the later California
opinion. The court said :
We, are, therefore, asked, if we hold on this review that the
defendants cannot be held jointly liable, to affirm this judgment as to the lower reservoir owner and then let the two defendants hereafter settle this between themselves, which one,
if either, is wholly liable, or what proportion each shall pay of ·
the judgment thus entered by us against the one defendant.
We do not think this should be done, even if we had the power
to do it. The difficulty that the plaintiff will necessarily encounter, if he brings a separate action against either defendant, in showing what his contribution was to the single injury,
is no reason why this court in a joint action against them,
where the evidence does not show a joint liability, should hold
78 6
787

87 Cal. 430, 25 Pac. 550 ( 1898).
Calif. Orange Co. v. Riverside Portland Cement Co., so Cal. App. 522, 195 Pac.
694 (1920).
78 8 77 Colo. 6o, 234 Pac. 1059 (1925).

NEGLIGENCE

379

either defendant liable for the entire injury to which he is
only one separate contributor, nor is it any reason why we
should permit a joint action to be maintained against both
when there was no concurrence, either in time or place,
of their distinct and separate acts. There is always difficulty upon the part of a jury in estimating the amount of
damages in such cases, but this has never been understood to
be a reason for a court arbitrarily to say that defendants,
whose wholly distinct and separate acts have caused a single
injury, may be joined in one action for the benefit of the
plaintiff and to save him the labor of showing in a separate
action against either tort-feasor what damage was occasioned
by him. 788
In Connecticut there is one case involving stream pollution by several
upper riparian owners which contains dictum to the effect that each defendant in a joint tortfeasor situation is responsible only for his own
wrongs. 180
Again, in Florida a case involved two separate mining companies as
defendants. The waste from their separate plants united to pollute the
stream, making it unusable for the plaintiff's purposes in operating his
cattle farm. A trial court charge to the jury that defendants could be
held joint tortfeasors was reversed on appeal on the ground that to be
joint tortfeasors there must be. a concert of action which cannot be
found merely from the fact that consequences of separate acts unite to
form one injury. 181
A case arose in Georgia in which it was alleged that the airplanes of
several companies in using the runways of the city airport for landing
and taking off were causing such a nuisance to the plaintiff that he was
seriously damaged. The court said that "Since the petition does not
allege a concert of action in operating on the runway so as to injure the
plaintiff and does not allege a conspiracy to so operate it, and does not
allege any fact which would make each defendant liable for the acts of
the others, the action against the defendants jointly will not lie." 792
Three years later the Supreme Court of Georgia cited this case with
approval in denying the plaintiff a joint cause of action against several
defendants whose action together brought about the ponding of waters
on the plaintiff's lot, causing her damage. 793 The court did go ahead to
T89Jd. at 69-70.
790 Lawton v. Herrick, 83 Conn. 417, 428, 76 Atl. 986 (1910).
791 Standard Phosphate Co. v. Lunn, 66 Fla. 220, 63 So. 429 (1913).
7 92 City of Atlanta v. Cherry, 84 Ga. App. 728, 733, 67 S.E.2d 317 (1951).
1us Vaughn v. Burnette, 211 Ga. 206, 207, 84 S.E.2d 568 (1954).

380

TORT LIABILITY

say, however, than an injunction action against a continuing tort could
be brought against all of the defendants and held that,
The court, having jurisdiction for the purpose of giving injunctive relief, could under the well-established law of this
State retain it as to damages in order to do complete justice
between the parties. Code §37-105. The court, upon proper
determination of the damages caused by each of th~ .:!::fendants, could render judgment against them for the proportionate parts of the damage done. 7 u
It is held, apparently, that it is possible to join the defendants in equity,
although the court does not indicate whether or not it is possible to
shift the burden of proving what each defendant contributed.
A case arising in Idaho 795 involved a situation in which water from
the canal of the defendant combined with water from other sources to
flow on the plaintiff's land and ruin his hay. The courts held that each
independent tortfeasor is liable for that proportion of the injury which
he contributed. The court suggested that "exact and definite measurements" of the contribution of each defendant was not essential but
"some evidence in that respect is essential." 798 In this case the suit was
against only one defendant, there having been no attempt to join all of
them, but the court did state that recovery could be obtained against
each independent tortfeasor severally.
A similar result was reached by the Iowa court in Bowman v. Humphrey,791 which involved the pollution of a waterway by the defendant's
creamery to the alleged detriment of the plaintiff. Defendant attempted
to show that its own pollution was negligible and that somebody else
upstream was causing the pollution by dumping dead animals into the
water. The trial court instructed the jury that the defendant was liable
for the whole damage. The supreme court reversed on the ground that
when a defendant has acted separately and without the knowledge of
another's activity, only the pollution that could be proved to be the
direct and proximate result of his own action can be used to assess
damages. The fact that the proof problem would be difficult did not affect the rule in Iowa.
In neither Idaho nor Iowa do the cases actually hold that if all of the
!d. at 208.
795 Woodland v. Portneuf-Marsh Valley Irr. Co., 26 Idaho 789, 146 Pac. IIo6 (1915).
796 /d. at 791.
797124 Iowa 744, 100 N.W. 854 (1904). An earlier case involving smoke, soot, and
gas also held the injuries must be separated; Harley v. Merrill Brick Co., 83 Iowa 73,
79, 4B N.W. 1000 (18g1). See also Tackaberry v. Sioux City Service Co., 154 Iowa
358, 132 N.W. 945 (1912).
794
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defendants were joined in one action the burden of proof would still
be on the plaintiff to show the separate contribution of each separate
defendant but the two opinions suggest that this would be the rule.
In an early Kentucky case, 798 the plaintiff sued for damages to his land
alleged to have been rn.used by the defendant's ditches and culverts
which turned surface waters onto the plaintiff's property. The defendant argued that the county contributed to the injury, but the trial court
refused to admit this evidence on the ground that it was not sufficient
to establish a defense. This ruling was affirmed on appeal, the court
taking the position that even if the county wrongfully contributed to
the final injury, the two wrongdoers were joir,.t tortfeasors, subject to
suit jointly or separately. The court said that the action was to recover
damages for the injury, not for the failure of the separate defendants
to act with due care. In a later opinion, 799 however, the Kentuc~y Supreme Court held that tortfeasors acting independently were not jointly
liable and could not be joined in one action. The suit was for damages
against several oil companies· which had permitted crude oil and other
harmful liquids to be put in such a position on the bank of the creek
that the rains carried it into the stream and onto plaintiff's land.
Joint action was not permitted in a Minnesota case involving the
waste matter from a canning company and a city operated septic tank
combining in a stream and causing a nuisance with damage to the plaintiff's farm which was downstream. 800 The court did not even consider
the possibility of joining the parties to try common issues, but separated
them for trial of the damage question.
The Mississippi court was faced with the problem in Masonite Corp.
v. Burnham. 801 In that case the defendant company had emptied its refuse matter into the waters of a creek into which the city also emptied
its sewage. The polluted water damaged the plaintiff. The court, citing
many of the cases which we feel should be distinguished, 802 held that
the trial court should have instructed the jury that the appellant "would
only be liable for its contribution to the pollution of the stream and the
damages resulting therefrom, and not for the independent acts of others
798

Campbell Turnpike Rd. Co. v. Maxfield, 28 Ky. L. Rep.

11!)8,

91 S.W. 1135

( 1!)06).
799 Watson v. Pyramid Oil Co., 198 Ky. 135, 248 S.W. Z27 (1923). The same idea
was applied in a case involving joint fraud, Evola Realty Co. v. Westfield, 251 S.W.2d
2!}8, 301 (Ky. 1952).
8oo Johnson v. City of Fairmont, 188 Minn. 451, 247 N.W. 572 (1933), following dicta
in Sloggy v. Dilworth, 38 Minn. 179, 36 N.W. 451 (1888).
801 164 Miss. 840, 146 So. 292 (1933).
802 See discussion supra at note 782.
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contributing to such pollution and the damages resulting therefrom." 803
The only case directly in point in Missouri is a decision by a Missouri
appellate court in a case where the injuries complained of were caused
by the depositing through sewer pipes into a waterway of large quantities of manure, soot, garbage, decayed animals, etc., by individual defendants who had received permission to do so from the city. The court
denied a joint action on the ground that they were liable onty in separate
actions for the particular injuries caused by each defendant separately.
The court reasoned that "Were the rule otherwise a person, who illegally
throws some putrid matter into a highway, might be held legally responsible for the injuries caused by pestilence that depopulates a city, simply.
because others, by similar illegal acts added to his own, created the nuisance which bred the pestilence." 804 In dictum in a recent case involving
a situation where the real issue was which of two possible sources of the
injurious force was the one which actually set it in motion, the court
used some langttage which might indicate a contrary view. 805
The Supreme Court in Montana has had two occasions to rule on the
problem. In the earlier case 806 the court refused to impose liability for
the entire damages on one of several companies where refuse from several mining and smelting plants, including defendant's, had polluted a
waterway which had deposited the refuse on plaintiff's land. In a later
case 807 several defendants individually had diverted water in such a way
as to prevent the plaintiff from using the water for irrigation purposes.
The court held in each case that there could be no joint liability and that
a joint action could not be brought, whether or not damages were apportioned among all defendants. In another case a federal court sitting
in Montana refused to allow damages against any of the defendants in
a suit to enjoin multiple defendants, even though an injunction action
was proper and a restraining order would be issued against all of the
defendants. 808
8oa Supra note Sox at 854Martinowsky v. City of Hannibal, 35 Mo. App. 70,· 78 (188g).
805 Schoening v. Claus, 363 Mo. II9, 124, 249 S.W.2d 361 (1952), mentioned infra at
note 88o. Since it arose in a hunting accident situation it is very doubtful that it would
be carried over into the nuisance type of case, however. The court did say, "[l]f the
two Claus brothers acting together negligently injured plaintiff, then each would be
liable. The evidence did not justify such an instruction. If some shot fired from each
gun struck plaintiff, then each would be liable. However, if plaintiff's injuries were
the result of the shot fired by Elmer, Erwin would not be liable."
8 06 Watson v. Colusa-Parrot M. & S. Co., 31 Mont. 513, 79 Pac. 14 (1904).
807 Howell v. Bent, 48 Mont. 268, 137 Pac. 49 (1913).
8os Norton v. Colusa-Parrot M. & S. Co., 167 F. 202 (C.C.D. Mont. rgo8).
804
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A Nevada court in an early decision 809 also held that there was a
misjoinder of parties when the defendants independently through their
separate ditches wrongfully sent waste water flowing into the drain
ditch of the plaintiff, although an injunction would have been permissible.
The plaintiff in a New York case sought damages for injury to her
property caused by the defendant and other hotel owners through the
disposal of sewage into a stream. The language of the New York Court
of Appeals has been quoted often by courts ·in other jurisdictions.
The right of action arises from the discharge into the stream,
and the nuisance is only a consequence of the act. The liability
commences with the act of the defendant upon his own premises, and this act was separate and independent of and without regard to the act of others. The defendant's act, being several when it was committed, cannot be made joint because of
the consequences which followed in connection with others
who had done the same or a similar act. It is true, that it is
difficult to separate the injury; but that furnishes no reason
why one tortfeasor should be liable for the act of others who
have no association and do not act in concert with him. If the
law was otherwise, the one who did the least might be made
liable for the damages of others far exceeding the amount for
which he really was chargeable, without any means to enforce
contribution or to adjust the amount among the different
parties. So also proof of an act committed by one person
would entitle the plaintiff to recover for all the damages sustained by the acts of others, who severally and independently
may have contributed to the injury. Such a rule cannot be upheld upon any sound principle of law. The fact that it is difficult to separate the injury done by each one from the others
furnishes no reason for holding that one tortfeasor should be
liable for the acts of others with whom he is not acting in
concert. 810
The court did not even consider the possibility of shifting the burden of
proof to the defendant to show his contributed share. Neither did it
consider the advantages of a joint cause of action uniting all of the defendants in one proceeding, and either trying the common questions together and separating the damage question or shifting the burden of
proof to the defendant on damages. The case was decided at a time
when liberal rules of joinder were not generally accepted.
· A lower court in New York in another case cited the Court of Ap8os
81 0

Blaisdell v. Stephens, 14 Nev. 17 (1879).
Chipman v. Palmer, 77 N.Y. 51, 53-54, 33 Am. Rep. 566 ( 1879).

384

TORT LIABILITY

peals' opinion as justification for allowing an injunction against multiple defendants whose individual small contributions to the pollution
of the stream together caused damage to the plaintiff. 811
Since only the defendant railroad was sued in the action, the North
Dakota case of Bmtlger v. Northern Pac. Ry. 812 is not really authority
for the proposition that several defendants cannot be joined in one
action. The court held, however, that the defendant railroad could be
held liable only for the damages caused by its own embankment, and
not for the additional damages caused by other sources which together
with the defendant's contribution caused waters to flood plaintiff's
property.
The same rule was applied by the Ohio court in a case in which the
lower court had held the city liable for all of the damages caused by the
pollution of a stream which the city alleged was also partly caused by
other riparian owners. The Ohio Supreme Court, reversing the trial
court, held that the recovery must be limited to the injuries occasioned
solely by the acts of the city, regardless of how difficult it would be to
determine the part of the damages so occasioned. 818
The early Pennsylvania case of Little Schuylkill Navigation Co. v.
Richard's Adm'r. 814 is certainly one of the leading cases for this point
of view. It often is cited by courts in other jurisdictions. In this case
the plaintiff's dam gradually was filled with coal-dirt discharged from
the coal mining operations of the several defendants. The instruction of
the trial court that each was liable for the whole damage was held erroneous. As in the New York case, the Pennsylvania court held that
the deposit of the coal-dirt in the dam's basin was only the cause of the
injury but that the tort itself which gives rise to the cause of action was
the act of throwing the coal-dirt into the stream. Since each act was
wholly separate and independent of the acts of other defendants the
torts were several when committed. Nevertheless, the court said that,
because of the difficulty of proof, the jury should be permitted to measure the injury caused by each with a "liberal hand." 816 The joinder of
several defendants who acted independently is possible in Pennsylvania,
however, in an equity injunction action, but the court says nothing
about whether this means each defendant would be liable for all, or
Warren v. Parkhurst, 46 Misc. 466, 92 N.Y.S. 725 (1904).
41 N.D. 316, 171 N.W. 632 (1918).
8lS City of Mansfield v. Brister, 76 Ohio St. 270, 81 N.E. 631 (1907).
814 57 Pa. 142 ( 1868).
S15Jd. at 147; approved inGallagher v. Kemmerer, 144 Pa. 509,22 Atl. 970 (18g1).
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merely that damages can be apportioned among the defendants in such
a suit. 816
A somewhat different kind of concurrent nuisance arose in a Tennessee case decided in 1903. The defendants were separate and independent
corporations engaged in the mining and smelting of copper. The operations of each caused the emission of noxious, foul, and poisonous smoke
and gases, which drifted onto the plaintiff's premises. The defendant's
demurrer for misjoinder was sustained, and the ruling was affirmed
by the Supreme Court, the court holding that the plaintiff must proceed
in separate actions for the damages caused by each wrongdoer separately, since otherwise one who contributed only a slight amount to
the injury would be held liable for the damages of all. The court was
not unaware of the difficulty of proof but at least made some attempt to
indicate to the trial court how this might be handled and how to apportion the damages.
That a plaintiff may be. embarrassed in proving the wrong
done him by one person is no reason why he should recover
his damages from another, who did not cause them, merely
because he did the plaintiff a similar injury. [The court suggested that, to measure the damages of each, proof could be
made of the extent and capacity of the plants, tonnage of ore,
time each has been in operation, proximity from plaintiff's
land, condition of the air currents, together with other facts
and circumstances to show the amount contributed by each.] 817
While we are not now called upon to pass upon this question, we think that, where defendants are guilty of wrongs
necessitating the action, juries should not be held to too great
nicety and accuracy of judgment in ascertaining the damages
to be assessed against each of the tortfeasors; and this court
would be slow to interfere with verdicts supposed to be excessive. 818
•
The court, however, did insist on separate actions.
Only one of several who independently contributed to plaintiff's injury
was sued by the plaintiff in the Virginia case of Pulaski Coal Co. v.
Gibboney Sand Bar Co. 819 The deposit of slack, slate and mine refuse
by several companies acting independently caused injury to plaintiff's
816 Gray v. Phila. & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 286 Pa. II, 132 Atl. 820 ( 11}26), discussed infra at note 8,34.
817 Swain v. Tennessee Copper Co., III Tenn. 430, 442, 78 S.W. 93 (1903).
818/d. at 455. In accord, Madison v. Copper Co., 113 Tenn. 331, 83 S.W. 658 (1904).
Injunction suit distinguished in Ladew v. Tennessee Copper Co., 179 F. 245, 255
(C.C.S.D. Tenn. 1910).
819 noVa. 444. 66 S.E. 73 (1909).
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sand bar when the refuse was washed downstream. The court held
that each must be held separately for a proportionate injury caused by
his own negligence. The damages contributed by the one being sued
had to be proved by the plaintiff, the court said.
Another case that was decided in Virginia in 1946 presents a variation
of the problem not found in any of the cases discussed so far. The
plaintiff sued the defendant for the pollution of the plaintiff's well by
water and minerals running from the defendant's mine. The defense
was that the plaintiff by his own activities had eontributed substantially
to the pollution. The plaintiff introduced no evidence as to how much
of a contribution was made by the defendant, and the court held that
this, therefore, called for dismissal of the action, since the damage
done by the defendant must be proved by the plaintiff. 820
In the first case arising in West Virginia-, 821 the court held that the
one defendant against whom the action was brought was liable for the
entire damage even though several coal mines had contributed by depositing refuse in the stream running by plaintiff's land. The court
reasoned that otherwise the plaintiff would be denied relief because he
would not be able to prove the proportion of the share of each tortfeasor's act to the total injury. Yet later, in Farley v. Crystal Coal &
Coke Co., 822 the court expressly overruled the previous decision, and
held that there was no joint liability if there was no concert of action,
even though the contributions of the six coal mining companies had
united to pollute the river and cause damage to the plaintiff's farm.
In a case decided by the United States Court of Appeals (Ninth
Circuit) arising in Arizona, the court stated that the damages caused
by separate smelting companies to the plaintiff's adjoining farm land
sh9uld be measured separately, and that each should be liable only for
whatever damage was done by its own smelter. 823 In this case the lower
court had consolidated two cases against two separate defendants
and apparently they were tried by one jury, but separate verdicts were
given. The defendant who appealed had not introduced any evidence
but had objected to the verdict for the plaintiff. The court stated that
the evidence was convincing to the effect that the smoke and fumes from
the two smelters intermingled and caused the damages, and then proceeded to say "how could plaintiffs, farmers, be reasonably expected
to say with anything like precision what the contents of the smoke
Panther Coal Co. v. Looney, 185 Va. 758, 40 S.E.2d 298 (1946).
821 Day v. Louisville Coal & Coke Co., 6o W.Va. 27, 53 S.E. 776 (19(16).

8 20

822
8 23

85 W.Va. 595, 102 S.E. 265 (1920).
United Verde Copper Co. v. Jordan, 14 F.2d 299, 302 (9th Cir. 1926).
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were, or what proportion of damage was done by smoke from one
smelter as distinguished from the other?" 824 The court then stated
that the theory of the plaintiffs was one of separate damages and apparently assumed that the jury's verdict against this one defendant was
based upon a separation of the damages caused by the two companies,
in spite of the apparent lack of evidence to separate the damages.
Injunction Against Concurrent Nuisance. While almost all jurisdictions, as indicated above, deny any kind of joint recovery in a damage
action at law where the nuisance is the result of contributions of independent persons acting without concert, nevertheless, in a proper case it
is the rule in every jurisdiction that an action in equity to enjoin the
continuance of the nuisance is pe~missible and in this proceeding all
of the contributors can be made parties. An injunction against nuisance
is an equitable action, and to avoid multifarious suits the equity court
will allow the joinder of all parties and enjoin each of them from making further contributions to the nuisance. The cases supporting this
proposition are legion, many· of them in the very jurisdictions which
deny joint recovery by way of damage award.m
Equitable Relief by Way of Damage Award. There are a few cases
in which courts, after joinder of multiple defendants for purposes of an
injunction, have allowed an award of damages in the same equitable action, even in jurisdictions where a joinder of parties defendant in a
law acti()n for damages would not be permissible. Typical of these is
Vaughn v. Burnette, decided by the Georgia Supreme Court in 1954.828
The court held that an injunction against all of the independent concurrent defendants could be had, andThe court, having jurisdiction for the purpose of giving injunctive relief, could urider the well-established law of this
Ibid.
Miller v. Highland Ditch Co., (Calif.) .mjwa note 786; People v. City of Los
Angeles, 83 Cal. App.2d 627, I89 P.2d 489 (I!)48); City of Atlanta v. Cherry, (Ga.)
.mjwa note 792; Lockwood Co. v. Lawrence, 77 Me. 297 (I88S) (paper companies
polluting water); Woodyear v. Schaefer, 57 Met. I (I88I) (pollution of water by
slaughterhouses, soap company and brewery causing sickening odor affecting flour mill
operations); Jessup & Moore Paper Co. v. Zeitler, I8o Md. 395, 24 A.2d 788 (I~)
(paper companies polluting water); Johnson v. City of Fairmont, swjwa note Boo; State
v. Dearing, 244 Mo. 25, I48 S.W. 6I8 (I9I2) (mining refuse discharged into stream);
Blaisdell v. Stephens, .mjwa note Bog; Warren v. Parkhurst, .mjwa note 8n, approved
I86 N.Y. 45, 78 N.E. 579 (I90()); City of Mansfield v. Brister, st~jwa note 8I3; Madison v. Copper Co., supra note 818. See cases (including English) collected 45 A.L.R.2d
1285 (I9S6) and 4 Restatement, Torts §882, comment b. In Morgan v. City of Danbury, 67 Conn. 484, 35 At!. 499 (1896) an injunction was permitted against the same
defendant for two separate nuisances, filling up pond and polluting air and water.
828 Supra note 793.
824

825
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State retain it as to damages in order to do complete justice
between the parties. Code §37-105. The court, upon proper
determination of the damages caused by each of the defendants, could render judgment against them for their proportionate parts of the damage done. 827

The court in no way indicates that there would be any shifting of the
burden of proof to the multiple defendants or that there would be an
imposition of joint liability on each of them for the total damage.
The Nebraska court faced a similar problem in Brchan v. Crete Mills,
decided in 1952. 828 Here it was charged that the separate dams and
dikes of two defendants, acting independently in the construction of the
structures, together caused the river to back up in such a way as to create
a nuisance, flooding plaintiffs' lands. In addition to an injunction
against the maintenance of the dams and dikes, the plaintiffs asked for
money damages caused by three previous floods. After the court decided
that this was a proper case for joining the parties to enjoin the continuance of the nuisance, the court said, concerning the right to recover
damages:
Some cases hold to the proposition that the collection of damages was not an actionable matter, and that an adequate
remedy at law exists for the collection of damages. They
further held that the defendant was entitled to a jury trial on
the question of damages. 829
It appears from the foregoing-cited Nebraska cases that
this jurisdiction has given approval to the proposition in a suit
to enjoin a nuisance, damages suffered by the plaintiff on account of such nuisance may be included in the equitable action.
This being an action in equity, the main relief sought is the
abatement of the nuisance. The only damages that could be
recovered would be the damages occurring as the result of the
nuisance, if such be proven. This is based on the following
rule: "It is a well-settled principle of equity jurisprudence
that, where a court of equity has obtained jurisdiction of a
cause for any purpose, it will retain it for all, and will proceed
to a final determination of the case, adjudicate all matters
in issue, and thus avoid unnecessary litigation." 830
Since the question arose on a demurrer by the defendant, the court did
not answer the question of how the damages should be apportioned, if
they were to be apportioned, or if the two defendants were to be held
jointly liable for the total damage.
ld. at 2o8. [Emphasis added.]
ISS Neb. sos, 52 N.W.2d 333 (I9S2).
829 !d. at SIS.
8ao /d. at 516.

827
828

NEGLIGENCE

389

To like effect, the lower court in New York, in Warren v. Parkhurst/31 in considering the objection of the defendant that money
damages could not be awarded in a suit to enjoin a nuisance, said:
All the defendants may be enjoined, and, if the question of
damages is urged, a reference may be had to determine
what damage has been caused by each defendant. This power
of a court of equity to grant exact justice and proper relief for
or against each defendant relieves such an action of any possible hardship. 882
The Court of Appeals in New York upheld the decision of the lower
court, apparently even as to the right to award damages, although the
language is not clear on this point. The court said that the complaint
stated a cause of action and was not objectionable "on the ground of
multifariousness. Whether it would be good if the plaintiff sought
only to recover·damages at law, it is not necessary now to decide." 888
There is no indication in either New York opinion as to whether it
would be possible to assess joint liability against all of the defendants
for the total damage, but one gets the impression from reading the
cases that the damages would be separated.
The same problem arose in Penn.~yt-z,anw in the case of Gray v. Phila.
& Reading Coal & Iron Co., the court saying:
Assuming that each and all of the present defendants could
claim a jury trial on the question of damages (a matter whiCh
the chancellor will have little difficulty in deciding when called
upon to do so), [ ?] , and that they prefer to face the antagonistic sympathy of a jury, rather than the judgment of a court
not so influenced, still no difficulty would result; for, in the
interest of the public generally, the issues thus raised can be
combined for the purposes oftrial on this point, so long as it
can be done without injustice to the defendants; and, so far
as we now see, all such issues could be wisely tried together.
Moreover, the convenience of the remedy in chancery is not
the only basis of equitable relief in the present case. Equity is
the special forum for obtaining an injunction, which may be
granted to prevent actual or threatened trespasses or nuisances
of a continuing and permanent character . . . and, when once
the jurisdiction has thus attached, equity will itself proceed
to round out the whole circle of controversy, by deciding every
other contention connected with the subject-matter of the suit,
881

Supra note Bn.

882

I d. at 728.

833

Supra note 825 at 49·
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including the amount of damages to which plaintiff is entitled
because of injuries theretofore sustained . . . . ~
88

The decision of the Wisconsin court in 11t/itchell Realty Co. v. West
Allis, 835 has been cited frequently. The corporate defendants' operations discharged chemicals and vegetable ingredients from their industrial operations into the stream and contributed to its pollution, to
the injury of the plaintiff. The action was brought against the city
and seven corporate defendants for injuries caused to the plaintiff's
property by the discharge of sewage through the City sewage system
and thence to a· stream running through the plaintiff's land. The lower
court allowed damages· to the plaintiff in its suit against the city, the
other individual defendants having been separated from the action
against the city; Separate ·actions had been begun against each of them.
The lower court aiso went on· the assumption that the total amount of
damages resulting from the pollution could be charged to the city,
which then could obtain reimbursement from the other defendants. The
Supreme Court said :
It is our view, therefore, that the action as originally begun
was maintainable, and that the order of the lower court in
striking out the allegations as to damages with respect to the
private corporations charged was erroneous. Had the action
proceeded, the plaintiffs could have obtained their equitable
remedy for the abatement of the nuisance, and, upon the determination of the court of the proportionate share of the damage caused by each· of the defendants, were entitled to judgment for such amounts, thus disposing of the entire litigation
in one action. To accomplish such a result is one of the principal functions of a court of equity. 836
The court went on to hold, however, that the whole damage could not
be assessed against one defendant but would have to be apportioned
among the wrongdoers.
Cases Permitting Joinder and Joint Liability. In a few cases courts
have imposed total liability upon each of the defendants whose actions
contributed in some part to the total injury which caused the plaintiff's
damage. An action was brought in Indiana to recover damages for
injuries resulting from the pollution of waterways from paper factories
of several defendants. The defendants were held jointly liable and the
court drew a rather unusual distinction. The court held that if the
acts had amounted only to a private nuisance the defendants would be
834

Supra note 816 at 16.

83 ~

184 Wis. 352, 199 N.W: 390 (1924).
I d. at 370.

836
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liable individually only for the consequences of their own acts, but that,
since a public right had been violated, each must answer for the wrongs
of the others jointly or severally, as the plaintiff elects. 837 No other case
has been found in which the court drew a line between public and private
nuisances for purposes of finding joint liability for damage. The distinction between these two kinds of nuisance would seem to have nothing
to do with the question of whether persons, not acting in concert with
each other but whose separate actions concurred and caused a total
injury, should be held jointly liable.
In Arnold v. C. Hoffman &Son Milling Co., 888 the Kansas court held
that the defendants, one of whom had constructed a bridge and the
other a dam, which together caused an overflow of water on the plaintiff's land, could not object by demurrer to being sued jointly and
severally under the alleged facts. The defendants would be jointly liable
if it were found that their acts operated jointly and contemporaneously
to produce the overflow. A similar result was reached in a later case
involving injury to the plaintiff's land caused by pollution of a creek by
the city which discharged sewage and an oil company which discharged
refuse into the creek. 889
The opinion in a recent North Carolina case gave the same kind
of answer when one defendant was sued for damages to land from the
depositing of silt from mining operations in a stream flowing through
the plaintiff's property. The defendant filed a cross claim against additional defendants seeking to enforce its right of contribution, in the
event it was found liable. The court stated :
If the independent wrongful acts of two or more persons unite
in producing a single indivisible injury, the parties are joint
tortfeasors within the. meaning of the law, and the injured
party may sue only one or all of the tortfeasors, as he may
elect .••.
When the aggrieved party elects to sue only one, or less
than all of the tortfeasors, the original defendant or defendants may have ·the others made additional defendants (under
the applicable statute) for the purpose of enforcing contributions . . . .840
West Muncie Strawboard Co. v. Slack, 164 Ind. 21, 72 N.E. 879 (1~).
86 Kan. 12, 119 Pac. 373 (1911).
889 McDaniel v. City of Cherryvale, 91 Kan. 40, 136 Pac. 899 (1913).
See also
Mosby v. Manhattan Oil Co., 52 F.2d 364 (8th .Cir. 1931}, cert. den. 284 U.S. 677,
52 S.Ct. 131 (1931).
8•o Phillips v. Hassett Mining Co., 244 N.C. 17, 22, 92 S.E.2d 429 (1956). See also
McKinney v. Deneen, 231 N.C. 540, 58 S.E.2d 107 (1950); Stowe v. City of Gastonia,
231 N.C. 157, 56 S.E.2d 413 (1949); Lineberger v. City of Gastonia, 196 N.C. 445, 146
S.E. 79 (1929).
.
88 7
88 8
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Three cases have arisen in Oklahoma and the court has held each
time that each of several persons acting independently, whose actions
combined to produce a single injury, would be held jointly liable for
the total damages. In one case 841 livestock water was polluted by
several defendants who permitted oil and salt water to run into creeks
on plaintiff's land. In a later case 842 a city was sued for its operation
of a septic tank and disposal plant which caused obnoxious odors and
deposited refuse on the plaintiff's land. The city claimed that others,
including slaughterhouses and a cotton gin, contributed to the injuries,
but the court held the city liable for the total amount on the ground
that this defense was immaterial. In a later case a federal court held
the defendant oil companies jointly liable for the damage to the plaintiff's property arising out of the separate drilling operations of the
companies. 843 In reaching its decision in this last case, the court considered it to be an application of the rationale used in an earlier case
in which crude oil that had flowed into a creek from several defendants'
operations and ignited had then burned the plaintiff's barn. These
cases can perhaps be distinguished along lines suggested later 844 on the
ground that possibly the oil from any one of the defendants would
have been sufficient to have ignited and caused the total injury. If so this
would not be a case of each of the defendants making a small contribution to the extent of the injury, but rather they happened to be concurrent causes of one single indivisible injury, the burning of the barn.
A fairly recent Texas case, Landers v. East Texas Salt Water Disposal Co.,S 45 contains as strong an expression as any for holding each
of the contributors of injurious material liable for the whole. The court
stated that requiring the plaintiff to assume the burden of proving the
contribution of each separate wrongdoer with sufficient certainty under
existing rules of damages would deny the plaintiff an effective remedy
under prior rulings in Texas. The court then said:
In other words, our courts seem to have embraced the philosophy, inherent in this class of decisions, that it is better that
the injured party lose all of his damages than that any of
several wrongdoers should pay more of the damages than he
individually and separately caused. If such has been the law,
from the standpoint of justice it should not have been; if it is
841Tidal Oil Co. v. Pease, 153 Okla. 137,5 P.2d 389 (1931).
842 Town of Sentinel v. Riley, 171 Okla. 533, 43 P.2d 742 (1935).
843 British-American Oil Co. v. McClain, 191 Okla. 40, 126 P.:zd 530 (1942).
8H Northup v. Eakes, 72 Okla. 66, 178 Pac. 266 (1918), the distinction that should
be made is discussed in the t.ext infra at note 858.
84 5 151 Tex. 251, 248 S.W.2d 731 (1952).
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the law now, it will not be hereafter. The case of Sun Oil
Company v. Robicheaux is overruled. Where the tortious acts
of two or more wrongdoers join to produce an indivisible injury, that is, an injury which from its nature cannot be apportioned with reasonable certainty to the individual wrongdoers, all of the wrongdoers will be held jointly and severally
liable for the entire damages and the injured party may proceed to judgment against any one separately or against all in
one suit. If fewer than the whole number of wrongdoers are
joined as defendants to plaintiff's suit, those joined may by
proper cross action under the governing rules bring in those
omitted. To permit the joinder as defendants of such wrongdoers without at the same time imposing joint liability upon
them would not relieve the inequities of the situation nor cure
the ills of the plaintiff. Simple procedural joinder of the
defendants would put the plaintiff in no better position to produce the required proof of the portion of the injury attributable to each of the defendants. In most such cases, under
the decisions heretofore cited, he would still be the victim of an
instructed verdict. It would be of no comfort or advantage
to the plaintiff that the instructed verdict relieved all of the
defendants of liability in one suit and at one time_rather than
in separate suits and one at a time. 846
A rather odd result was reached in a very early Vermont case. 841
Here two separate dams caused water to overflow on the plaintiff's
land but one of the defendants removed his dam immediately upon hearing of the injury to the plaintiff's land. The jury found this defendant
not guilty and the other guilty. The one found guilty appealed on the
ground that there was a misjoinder in the trespass action. The court
said the joinder was proper on the theory that if the plaintiff had brought
an action against either one separately, the defendant would have argued
that his dam caused no injury at all. The court concluded that it is possible to join both defendants and permit the jury to decide where the
blame should be placed. The case, therefore, really is not a holding
that there can be joint liability. In a much later case,S48 however, the
Vermont court held defendants jointly and severally liable where the
dam of one and the piers of the other together raised the water level
and caused it to flow onto the highway.
A case arose in Washington involving the pollution of a river by
sewage of a city and waste from the defendant's slaughterhouse. 849 The
846

/d. at 256.

847 Wright v. Cooper, I Tyler 425 (Vt. 18o2).
848
849

Town of Sharon v. Anahama Realty Corp., r_r; Vt. 336, 123 Atl. 192 (1924).
Snavely v. City of Goldendale, 10 Wash.2d 453, II7 P.2d 221 (1941).
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court did not allow imposition of joint liability because it felt it was
unjust to hold one responsible for the entire injurious effects of acts
committed by all, but it did allow joinder of parties in one suit to determine more accurately the rights and duties of all. It held that there
was no misjoinder. This seems to reverse an earlier Washington decision in which one defendant was held liable for the whole injury in a
concurrent causation situation. 850
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in a case
arising in Louisiana adopted the joint liability for the total injury view.
Louisiana follows this· rule. If, therefore, on a new trial,
plaintiffs can introduce evidence sufficient to show that the
defendants, or any of them, were negligent and, though acting
separately, their negligence combined to produce the pollution
damage, plaintiff may recover for the whole damage against
one or all of those contributing. 851
The recent decision by the English House of Lords in Bonnington
Castings, Ltd. v. Wardlaw 852 indicates that the English rule in this
kind of case is analyzed in simple terms of "material contribution," the
only requirement being that the part contributed by each defendant
being sued make a material contribution. If it does, then total liability
is imposed upon each. At least it was so held in the case of an occupational disease, silicosis. This analysis does not seem to be dependent
upon the fact that the case involved the breach of a statutory duty or
liability to an employee, since the question is one of causation.
Results in Cumulative Contribution Radiation Cases Under Existing
Doctrines. The results which courts would reach under existing rules
in several of the multiple defendants situations have been indicated
already, including, ( 1) when the negligence of each of two or more
defendants has furnished a link in the chain of causation resulting in
a single injurious incident, ( 2) when two or more independent sources
negligently operated have exposed the plaintiff and each contribution
was sufficient to cause the total injury but which actually caused the
injury cannot be determined, and (3) when several sources each make a
cumulative contribution to the amount of injury but total liability may
be imposed upon one or more of the defendants because of legally imposed responsibility for the acts of another such as in concert of action,
vicarious liability, and common duty situations.
8 50 Johnson v. Irvine Lumber Co., 75 Wash. 539. 135 Pac. 217 (1913), where defendant's log jam and the acts of others combined to cause injury.
851 Phillips Petroleum Co..v. Hardee, 18g F.2d 205, 212 (5th Cir. 1951).
852 [1956] I All. E.R. 615. Commented on in 106 L. J. 387 (1956).
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In addition, the results which courts will reach under existing rules in
other situations will be discussed in the next two subsections. Negligent
Unknown Wrongdoer deals with those situations in which less than all
of the potential defendants are responsible for the injury (in the sense
that some simply could not have made any contribution), but it is impossible or at least extremely difficult for the plaintiff to identify the responsible party or parties. Cumulative Effect from Non-Negligent
Source is concerned with cases in which the manner of operation, including the amount of radiation, is in compliance with the standard of
conduct required of the reasonable man under the circumstances.
The cumulative or concurrent nuisance cases possibly give us answers
to the radiation situations in which several legally unrelated defendants
each has been negligent and each has made the· total injury greater than
it would have been without his contribution. Whether the sources of
radiation be reactors, industrial and research isotopes, or waste products
being disposed of, two types of cumulative contribution cases may arise:
(I) when each negligently releases radiation but the amount is below
the threshold level which causes observable injury so that without the
contribution of others no tort liability would have been imposed; and
( 2) when each negligently releases sufficient radiation to cause recoverable injury to the plaintiff without the contribution of the others
but the injury caused by each is now combined in one total injury. Many
of the nuisance cases appear to involve the latter situation, but the- facts
of others would seem to be similar to those in the first group. Unfortunately the courts have not been concerned with such a distinction so
the facts are not stated in a manner that would reveal which is involved.
Under existing rules evolved from the nuisance cases this could cause
a difference in result which would seem unjustifiable.
The clear majority of jurisdictions in the United- States holds that
there can be no joint liability in the cumulative-contribution-to-amountof-injury case; and many of these do not allow even a joinder of defendants in the same cause of action, nor do they permit a shifting to
the defendants of the burden of proving proportionate contribution.
In such states the injured plaintiff must sue each one separately and
prove the amount of damage caused by each. To the extent that the
contribution of any one of the defendants is not sufficient to cause any
recoverable harm this would seem to lead to a result denying recovery
at least for this amount of the injury. In many cases, particularly of
radiation exposure, this could mean no recovery at all. A good example
would be genetic damage since the increase in incidence of mutations
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apparently is directly proportional to the amount received. Using the
more probable than not test, if the increase in chances of a mutation is
allocated to each defendant, the contribution of no one defendant is
likely to be sufficient to make the chances of mutation more than fifty
per cent. Therefore, recovery could be had from no defendant. Theoretically, when each source contributed enough to cause recoverable
injury, plaintiff can get full compensation if he can find and recover
from all of the defendants. This would seem to be the case with such
radiation injuries as shortened life span in which there apparently is a
linear and cumulative effect from all radiation. In some jurisdictions 853
joinder inay be permitted and the jury allowed to apportion the damages
with a liberal hand so far as proof of relative contribution is concerned.
In those eight jurisdictions which not only have allowed joinder of all
defendants but also have imposed joint liability on all defendants for
the total damages, the plaintiff will not only avoid the very difficult problem of proving how much each defendant contributed but also will get a
windfall in two senses. Joint liability as imposed by the courts in these
jurisdictions means that each defendant is liable not only for his own
contribution, but also in a real sense is a surety for all other defendants
in the event they cannot be found or are unable to contribute their share
of the damages. In addition, the effect of joint liability could be to
make the defendant or defendants who were negligent and successfully
sued by the plaintiff liable not only for their own contributions but also
for any contribution made by any other source of radiation which contributed to the total injury, including natural background radiation and
that from non-negligent sources, such as those used in medical treatment. It can be argued that imposing total liability in such situations
is like the "thin-skull" cases, or those in which the first negligent person
who injures the plaintiff is liable for the negligence of a doctor who
treats plaintiff for his initial injuries, or even some of the concurrent
causation cases in which it took both a dam built by one defendant and
a railroad embankment built by another to cause plaintiff's land to be
overflowed. 854 Even if this explanation be accepted, it should not be
used to justify the imposition of suretyship liability upon one collectible
defendant when it is clear that each defendant caused some separable
part of the total injury.
Surely better solutions can be worked out and the responsibility for
doing so rests primarily with lawyers. We make the following suggestions as a start toward better solutions.
853
854

E.g., California. See case cited supra note 787.
Arnold v. C. Hoffman & Son Milling Co., supra note 838.
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Cumulative or Concurrent Causation and Cumulati'l/e or Concurrent
Contribution to Amount of Injury Distinguished. The importance of
distinguishing between the two types of cases is so great that restatement of the distinction is justified. It would seem better social policy to
apply different recovery rules in each type, or at least not to carry over
into the cumulative contribution cases the doctrine of total liability that
has been applied in cumulative causation cases, as a few courts have
done.
The cases pertinent to this subsection (S b (3) (b) (ii)) all involve
situations in which the forces set in motion by more than one source
(human or otherwise) not only combine to injure the plaintiff but also
each force itself makes some contribution toward increasing the damages; they are not just an essential causative link in creating the accident
which caused plaintiff's injury.
An example of a case in which there clearly is cumulative or concurrent causation but not cumulative contribution to the amount of the
damages is McKay & Roche v. Southern Bell Tel. Co. 8 n In this case the
injury to the plaintiff's horse and property resulted when a telephone
wire negligently maintained by one defendant, fell across a trolley wire,
negligently maintained by another defendant, thereby becoming charged
with electricity and causing injury when it fell to the ground. Here it
took the concurrent forces of two wrongdoers to cause the final injury,
but the injury itself was no different in extent or kind because there were
two wrongdoers. Other examples of this type of case are the car collision cases in which both drivers are negligent and an innocent third
party is hurt, referred to in section 5 b ( 2). 818 These are cases of true
joint tortfeasors.
Neither are the true cumulative contribution cases considered in this
subsection (5 b (3) (b) (ii)) quite like those where two causes, equally
capable of causing the total injury, happen concurrently and in fact cause
one injury, such as in the two motorcycles case or the two fires case,
hitherto mentioned in section 5b(2) and similar situations.m While
the facts are not always clear, some of the concurrent nuisance cases
may really be cumulative or concurrent causation situations rather than
cumulative contribution ones. 818 · They should be distinguished, there855 III Ala. 337, 19 So. 695 (18g6). Daggett v. Keshner, 149 N.Y.S.2d 422 (1950),
seems to be of this category, though the facts are very fuzzy. See also Roush v.
Johnson, supra note 763.
8ae Supra notes 763-64. .
817 Supra note 758.
818 Supra note 844.
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fore, even if the courts do not do so, from the case in which there is
true cumulative contribution to the amount of injury. 809
A few of the cumulative contribution situations analyzed in section
5 b (3) (b) ( ii) perhaps do fall just in between the cumulative causation
cases and those in which it is the injury itself to which each of several
defendants contributes, not to the causation of the situation or accident
from which the plaintiff is hurt. In a few of the cases where the plaintiff's land has been flooded because of obstructions placed there by two
or more defendants and where it took the effect of both obstructions
to cause the flooding, we have cumulative forces that could be said to be
either uniting in causation or in contribution to the damages resulting. 860
In many of these cases the facts do not make it clear whether it took
both or several obstructions to cause any damage, or only that each of
the obstructions made some contribution to the total damages. If the
latter is the case then they should be treated as cases in which there is a
cumulative contribution to the damage only, while if the former is the
case, they should be treated as cases of cumulative causation.
The Correct ( ?) Solutions. While the view denying imposition of
joint liability clearly is the weight of authority even today, many
authorities have condemned the res~lt. Some of them go all the way in
support of the rationale of the Texas court in the Landers Ca.se. 861 Wigmore would adopt the following rule :

Wherever two or more persons by culpable acts, whether concerted or not, cause a single general harm, not obviously assignable in parts to the respective wrongdoers, the injured
party may recover from each for the whole. In short, wherever there is any doubt at all as to how much each caused, take
the burden of proof off the innocent sufferer; make any one
of them pay for the whole, and then let them do their own
figuring among themselves as to what is the share of blame
for each. 862
Such reasoning would seem to go too far and is not necessary to protect
the innocent plaintiff.
8 50

Supra note 843-

E.g., Boulger v. Northern Pac. Ry., supra note 812; Brchan v. Crete Mills, supra
note 828; Arnold v. C. Hoffman & Son Milling Co., supra note 838; Wright v. Cooper,
860

supra note 847; Town of Sharon v. Anahama Realty Corp., supra note 848; and perhaps Johnson v. Irvine Lumber Co., supra note 850; Howell v. Bent, supra note 8o7.
See also Tackaberry v. Sioux City Service Co., supra note 797.
8 61 Supra note 845.
862 Wigmore, "Joint Tortfeasors and Severance of Damages; Making the Innocent
Party Suffer Without Redr~ss," 17 Ill. L. Rev. 458, 459 (1923). Harper & James
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A much more desirable result would seem to be a simple shifting of
the burden of proof from the plaintiff, once he has shown damages and
that each of the defendants contributed toward that damage, requiring
each defendant to assume the obligation of showing his contributive
share by producing proof to limit his liability to something less than the
whole damage. 863 As Prosser points out, 864 the difficulty of proof necessary to make a proper apportionment probably has been overstated. The
difficulties may have been caused by lack of imagination or diligence of
counsel in defending the accused. Actually a combination of solutions
might prove to be best. In any event it seems clear that a joinder of all
possible defendants is eminently desirable, and under liberal joinder
rules now in effect in many jurisdictions this will be possible. 865
It has been suggested 886 that if there is no proof of apportionment
the damages be divided equally between the persons who contributed to
the damage. When all of the defendants can be brought together in one
suit, the shifting of the burden of proof to the defendants seems entirely
satisfactory, allowing each to limit his liability, with the over-all requirement that the total damages should be fully compensated by the
contributions of all defendants when added together. On the other
hand, if it is not possible to join all of the defendants in one cause of
action even under liberal joinder rules (e.g., if the action is brought in a
state court and one or more of the defendants is out of the jurisdiction,
as well may be the case where radioactive substances are involved), then
one gets into difficulty unless the arbitrary rule of complete joint liability is accepted, or, alternatively, the arbitrary rule of equal liability is
used. Yet complete joint liability is unjustified if there really is no
concert of action either by reason of relationship or because of knowledge of the existence of the other contributing factor. While the defendant may be a wrongdoer legally, this does not necessarily mean that
he is to be punished rather than merely forced to compensate for his
seem to accept this result as sound without considering shifting the burden of proof but
not creating joint liability per se; Harper & James 708-og. But cf. language at Harper & James 113o-31.
863 This seems to be essentially the suggestion of Prosser 229. And see the suggestions in Carpenter, "Workable Rules for Determining Proximate Cause," 20 Cal. L.
Rev. 396, 4o6 (1932); Jackson, "Joint Torts and Several Liability," 17 Tex. L. Rev.
399 (1939).
864 Prosser 229, taken from Prosser, "Joint Torts and Several Liability," 25 Cal. L.
Rev. 413, 439, 443 (1937).
885 See Prosser, "Joint Torts and Several Liability," supra note 864 at 443 and Prosser 236-37.
866 Prosser 229, n. 88.
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own wrongdoing. The law is trying to distribute losses so as to reach
a fair result. The Harper and James general philosophy, i.e., when in
doubt always compensate the innocent injured party, does not necessarily
always produce real justice. There would seem to be no justification for
holding any single defendant who happens to be sued by the plaintiff,
but whose contribution is only a minor one although an ascertainable
part of the whole, liable for all of the damages,. and then in addition
place on him the burden of assuring reimbursement from the other
defendants. Assuming that there is some way of apportioning, which
will be the case in most situations, and especially in radiation cases, then
there seems to be no reason to shift the burden of finding the other
wrongdoer to the one who happens to be served with process, just to
compensate the plaintiff. If our theory is to be one of social insurance
which will assure recovery to the damaged party in every case, then we
ought to impose a general social insurance scheme. We should not pick
out a party to bear the social insurance policy losses merely because he
happens by coincidence to damage the plaintiff in the same or similar
manner as one or more other persons, where the consequence of the
wrongdoing is to add to the total injury, part of which was contributed
by others. The coincidence is no justification for imposing the total
liability of compensating the injured party on one person who happens
to be available for suit. Not only are the cases which go "whole hog"
to joint liability illogical, but also, strangely enough, unjust.
In determining to which cases real joint liability for total damages
should be applied, it seems fairer and more realistic to distinguish between the cumulative causation and cumulative contribution cases, rather
than between divisible and indivisible damages situations. 867 It is one
thing to say that it is impossible to measure the separate contribution
made by each of several causal links in the chain leading to a single injury. It is quite another to say that every person who contributes something to the total amount of injury should be held liable for the total
damages. Even in cases of cumulative causation in which joint liability
is imposed, the effect of the trend allowing contribution between joint
tortfeasors is to permit apportionment.
At least as to radiation cases (and others too, probably) involving
cumulative contribution to injury and not to causation it is best to make
each defendant liable only for the part he contributed, otherwise every
negligent user becomes a potential insurer for the wrongs of all users
of radiation who cause the plaintiff some radiation harm. In addition,
867

!d. at 226-31. Harper & James

695, 699,

7o6-o9.
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the negligent user who discharges only a small amount also would become liable for all injuries caused by non-negligent sources such as
background and medical therapy sources, if his contribution added something to the total injury. This would include all other users and sources
everywhere, often over a long period of time (at least the statute of
limitations period), so long as the plaintiff was exposed to their radiation source before or after exposure to the particular defendant's source.
Surely the defendant at least should be permitted to prove how much he
did not contribute and avoid becoming a surety for injury caused by
all other radiation sources who cannot be joined in the same action or
are not liable at all.
The cumulative nature of radiation effects makes existing niles· inadequate. This points up sharply the need for a wholly new scheme for
solving the radiation damage problem, perhaps along the lines suggested
later.
(iii) , Other Concurrent Contribution Cases Involving Negligence

Defamation. When two or more persons utter the identical slander
against the same plaintiff, absent any conspiracy, the courts practically
unanimously hold that there can be no joint liability. 868 If no distinction
is to be drawn between physical injuries and injuries to a person's
reputation, these cases are additional authority against imposing joint
liability. Moreover, if anything, the problem of separating the damages
in such cases would seem. to be even more difficult than in the case of
physical injuries, such as those resulting from the accumulation of
refuse or the cumulative effect of doses of radiation from separate
sources which concurrently contribute to a total injury. Nevertheless,
it would seem that the trend, though a minority as yet, toward joinder
of multiple defendants, and possibly to a shifting of the burden of
proof, or even to imposition of joint liability on all defendants in physical injury cases, undoubtedly will be even more persuasive in radiation
cases than in defamation cases. Thus it may be that the nuisance cases
will lead to a liberalization of the defamation rule.
Mental Disturbance. The facts in Industrial Finance Service Co. v.
Riley, decided by a Texas appellate court,889 illustrate the variety of situ868 In a recent A.L.R. annotation over fifty cases are listed which apparently hold
that there can be no joint liability; there are only three cases, one being a slander of
title case, in which there is language indicating the possibility of joint liability. 26
A.L.R.2d 1031 (1952).
86 9 Industrial Finance Service Co. v. Riley, 295 S.W.2d 498 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
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ations in which concurrent contribution can arise in mental disturbance
situations. Plaintiffs, husband and wife, in financial difficulty, borrowed from seventeen different loan companies. When they failed to
make payments, the companies and their collection agencies sought to
make collections. Their efforts were found to be unreasonable and to be
made with malice and disregard for the health and welfare of the plaintiffs. There would seem to be no question that the constant calling day
and night and the visiting at places of employment to demand payment
caused mental shock and psychosomatic symptoms. Although there was
no showing of any concert of action between the several companies
as to their collection efforts, the court said, citing the Landers case 870 as
authority:
As we have already stated, under the evidence in this case it
was impossible to ascertain the amount of damages caused by
any one loan company separately from the entire damage
caused by all the loan companies considered as joint tortfeasors. It was therefore proper for appellees to prove their
entire damages, which entire damages they were entitled to
recover from any one or more of the joint tort-feasors. 871
Because of the cumulative nature of ra<;liation effects, the apportionment problem in radiation cases may not always be as difficult as was the
proof problem in this case, but it is not hard to predict that in Texas,
at least, the courts are very likely to impose joint liability on all defendants who are cumulative or concurrent contributors in a radiation injury situation.
Defamation and mental disturbance cases present situations in which
the argument of indivisible harm is· most clearly applicable. To judge
and apportion human emotional reactions, whether as a target of a
slanderous remark, or as a victim of mental torture, would seem to be
much more difficult than to judge the cumulative effect of doses of radiation, even though it probably is true that the final injury results from a
combination of all forces brought to bear on the situation. The contribution of an individual user in the radiation case, however, would
seem to be more nearly mathematically apportionable. The relative contributions of radiation are even more measurable than the contributions
of concurrent contributors in many of the more conventional pollution
cases, whether of the air or water.
Workmen's Compensation Analogies. Probably the situations most
sro Supra note 845.
871

Industrial Finance Se~ice Co. v. Riley, supra note 86g at 504-
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nearly analogous to our radiation problem have occurred in the workmen's compensation area, particularly in cases involving occupational
diseases such as silicosis. While negligence rules are not imposed in this
type of situation, at least where the occupational disease is covered by the
workmen's compensation scheme, the question of proving causation is
still present. These cases should not be ignored iri analyzing the radiation cases.
Where the statute does not provide otherwise, some jurisdictions
adopt the rule that the employee, at his option, may recover an award
for the entire disability against any one or more of the successive employers or insurance carriers. While it is necessary to· show that each
employment under which claim is made against the employer contributed
to the disability, it is not necessary to show that it is the sole cause of
disability. Typically the employers held liable in these jurisdictions have
a right to get an apportioned recovery from other contributors in a
separate action which in no way delays the employee's compensation. 872
8 7 2 Colonial Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 29 Cal.2d 79, 172 P.2d 884
(1946) (applicant contracted silicosis while with employer who was covered during the
period of employment by various insurance· carriers ; held, an award for the entire
disability may be made against one insurer for a period when it was not acting as
such); Niedzwicki v. Pequonnock Foundry, 133 Conn. 78, 48 A.2d 369 (1946) (death
due to silicosis and both employers held liable); White v. Taylor, 5 So.2d 337 (La.
App. 1941) (deceased hurt his back when a wheelbarrow of brick fell on him and two
days later, when working for a subcontractor, attempted to lift heavy objects and suffered back pains; held, the combination of the two accidents totally disabled the employee and the two insurers can be held jointly liable); Marsolek v. Miller Waste
Mills, 244 Minn. 55, 6g N.W.2d 617 (1955) (while in three different employments,
employee sustained injuries from accidents, each of which was superimposed on the
preceding one; held, full compensation may be ·had from the last employer, who has
a right to have the court apportion the award among the previous employers) ; Dickerson v. Essex County, 2 App. Div.2d 516, 157 N.Y.S.2d 94 (1956) (while in employ
of county, deceased fell and injured his leg; because of weakened condition he fell again
and re-injured it; in subsequent employment he again fell, was injured and died; held,
the chain reaction all proxiinately resulted from the first accident, therefore the first
employer is liable, but the current employer is also liable for injuries sustained in the
course of the employment ; as between the employers, the apportionment of the award
is for the Board to decide); Esmond Mills, Inc. v. American Woolen Co., 76 R.I. 214.
68 A.2d 920 (1949) (employee contracted dermatitis under one employer and then
became totally disabled while working for another; held, for the employee's benefit,
the act permits him speedy recovery and allows him to collect the total compensation
from the one for whom he was working when he became disabled, and such employer
could then have the right to ask for apportionment from the former employers) ;
Gosselin v. Parker. Brass Foundry, II9 A.2d 18g (R.I. 1955) (deceased contracted
silicosis prior to working for respondent but died of it during such employment; held,
nothing in. the act requires the employee to prove the dis~se was contracted while
working for the last employer; it is sufficient to establish a causal connection between
the employee's disability from the disease and his employment in work of the same
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In other states, usually by virtue of a statutory provision, recovery is
granted in full against the last employer in whose employment some
contribution was made to the disease or injury. 873 It is clear that cases
in general follow the rule of imposing complete liability on either the
most available employer defendant, or upon one or all of them at the
choice of the employee.
Whether the analogy of the workmen's compensation cases can be
carried over into the public liability situation is highly questionable,
nature as that in which the disease was contracted; court cites the Esmond Mills case,
supra, approvingly). In these cases, it should be noted that the question of contribution among employers or carriers did not really concern the injured employee. In any
event, he was allowed to recover the entire amount to which he was entitled from at
least one of his employers. Other states, usually by virtue of a statutory provision,
grant recovery in full against the last employer, under whose employment contribution
to the disease or injury was made.
B7S Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cardillo, 225 F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. den., 350 U.S.
913, 76 S.Ct. 1g6 (1955) (occupational disease complained of was loss of hearing;
employee had several employers and employers had several insurance carriers during the course of the contracting and aggravation of the disease; held, under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act, for its proper and speedy administration, it was
the intent that the employer during the last employment in which the employee was
exposed should be liable for the full amount of the award; by the same token, the last
carrier who insured the liable employer during the employee's employment should bear
responsibility for the discharge of the duties and responsibilities of the liable employer) ;
Mundy v. McLean, 72 So.2d 275 (Fla. 1954) (plasterer developed dermatitis while
working for appellant; he left this job and took another one with no ill effects; then
he left and worked for a third employer when his condition became worse and he was
cautioned not to return to his trade; held, suit against the original employer will not
lie by virtue of the act's provision which says that the employer in whose employment
the employee was last exposed to the disease shall alone be liable without right of
contribution from any prior employer); Central Foundry Co. v. Industrial Comm., 374
Ill. 300, 29 N.E.zd 5II (1940) (the case itself is not applicable to the present discussion but it mentions the Illinois statute, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939 c. 48, §172.25, which provides that liability be fixed, in cases of silicosis or asbestosis, on the last employer in
whose employment the employee was last exposed during a period of sixty days or
more after the effective date of the act; and exposure of less than sixty days shall not
be deemed a last exposure); Walsh v. Kotler, 43 N.J. Super. 139, 127 A.2d go8 (1956)
(a roofer worked forty years as such and for the past ten years for respondent; in the
last two years his hands began contracting and it was diagnosed as Dupuytrens
Contracture ; respondent claimed his employment did not contribute to the disease since
once it begins it will progress of its own accord; held, the last employer is liable regardless of when the disease is contracted, as long as the last employment exposed the
employee ; as to this causal question, the burden is on the employer to show that his
employment added nothing to the severity of the disease or its acceleration); Stewart
v. Duncan, 239 N.C. 640, 8o S.E.2d 764 (1954) (employee, a coal miner all his life,
contracted silicosis at an undetermined date and became disabled while in employ of
appellant; held, G. S. 97-57 is applicable and provides that the employer in whose employment the employee was last injuriously exposed to the hazards of the disease, and
the insurance carrier at that time, shall be liable; the exposure is deemed injurious if
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since the workmen's compensation approach really is a social insurance
program which as yet has not been adopted in the area of public liability
generally. The principles are readily applicable only where there are
statutory provisions and administrative procedures by which the liability
award can be determined. Without statutory assistance, it would be
unrealistic to try to carry these theories into the usual tort liability
cases. From the standpoint of radiation injuries in workmen's compensation situations themselves, assuming that radiation injuries are
covered, there would seem to be nothing unusual or unique about such
injuries that would call for any different rule than that applied in other
cases. 874
(c) Alternative Liability-Specific 'Wrongdoer who
caused injury unknown although an identifiable
group which includes the wrongdoer can be
found
Atomic energy cases not infrequently should present courts with a
type of problem often described as one involving alternative liability,
or as we prefer, one involving an unknown-wrongdoer. The term
unknown-wrongdoer is used because, while it can be determined that
one or more of a limited and identifiable group of defendants set in
motion the force that irradiated the plaintiff, it also is clear that only
one or at least less than all of the group were responsible for the radiation which actually did harm the plaintiff. In this sense the wrongdoer
is unknown and unless the plaintiff can ·prove which one or ones "more
probably than not" 875 caused his injuries, he will not recover under the
the employee was exposed for as much as thirty working days within seven consecutive calendar months, in cases of silicosis and asbestosis ; the plain language of the
statute dispels any possibility of contribution among successive employers or carriers) ;
Karoly v. Jeddo-Highland Coal Co., 166 Pa. Super. 571, 73 A.2d 214 (1950) (employee had silicosis; held, the employee's last exposure fixes liability on the employer
and carrier at that time) ; Leva v. Caron Granite Co., 124 A.2d 534 (R.I. 1956)
(stonecutter worked for previous employer, who was not covered by workmen's compensation, for thirteen years, after which he worked on a temporary basis for respondent for about seven weeks ; he became disabled from silicosis though it was clear he
did not contract it while with respondent; held, all the act requires is that the disease
was due to the nature of the employment, regardless of when it was contracted; therefore the last employer is liable); Pocahontas Fuel Co. v. Godbey, 192 Va. 845, 66
S.E.2d 859 (1951) (coal miner disabled from silicosis; Va. Code 1950 §65-47, states
that the employer in whose employment he was last injuriously exposed and the carrier
at that time is liable, without a right of contribution from any prior employer or
carrier).
su Infra Part II on workmen's compensation.
875 Supra note 770. See discussion of res ipsa loquitur, infra text at notes 1173 ff_
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traditional rules of tort liability which require him to prove by the preponderance of evidence that a specific and identifiable defendant or defendants caused his injury. It is assumed that the plaintiff can prove
that each of the defendants owed a duty not to irradiate him and that
on:e or more of them, but less than all, is liable to the plaintiff for the
injury suffered if the specific cause can be shown. The plaintiff, however, may not be able to pinpoint which of the group actually cGJU~Sed the
harm. The only issue is that of causation, not duty, breach, or damages.
As already suggested, under traditional rules the plaintiff loses because he has not proved causation. The result, at least in some cases,
certainly is not fair to the plaintiff and there is a very small gro~p of
recent cases which may be indicative of a new approach to the problem.
As yet they do not represent the majority view and perhaps are not
even indicative of a trend. The impact of these cases, however, if applied to radiation situations is so startling, and so unjust in many cases
if traditional tort liability rules are applied, that they must be noted.
It should be emphasized that this causation question is presented regardless of whether rules of negligence, perhaps supplemented by the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, or those of absolute liability are applied.
While it has not always been done, again it is important to distinguish certain types of cases already discussed above, which are not
directly analogous, but rather involve problems of multiple causation, 876
contribution to damage, 877 vicarious liability, 878 and equal concurrent
876 Also to be distinguished from the true unknown-wrongdoer cases are those in
which the concurrent negligence of two different defendants each contributes to cause
the injury of the plaintiff, the injury resulting from a single impact. Saisa v. Lilja, 76
F.2d 38o (1st Cir. 1935) (two racing cars, and jury found both caused injury though
only one hit pedestrian); Brown v. Thayer, 212 Mass. 392, 99 N.E. 237 (1912) (clear
contribution of racing car drivers).
877 Micelli v. Hirsch, 83 N.E.2d 240 (Ohio App. 1948), is a good example of an
often miscited case. There the decedent was struck by a car driven by one defendant
and was run over by the car of another defendant. J cinder of the two defendants was
allowed since the court considered the injury indivisible. There was no question but
that each was negligent and, more important, that each did damage to the decedent.
The only question was one of dividing the damages and the joint liability imposed upon
each is similar to the results of stream pollution cases or car collision cases in which
the negligence of each of two different persons concurs so as to inflict one injury upon
the plaintiff, and the courts make the concurrent defendants separate the amount each
contributed to the total damages. This is not a case of an unknown wrongdoer, but
rather a case of unknown extent of damages. Actually, some of the hog, dog, and
cattle cases really fit into this category, since it is known whose animals participated
in the damage but it is not known just which animals did how much of the damage.
Anderson v. Halverson, 126 Iowa 125, 101 N.W. 781 (1904) (had to prove separate
damages, however); Worcester County v. Ashworth, 160 Mass. 186, 35 N.E. 773
(1893) (interpreting statute); S. S. Nohre v. Wright, 98 Minn.. 477, 108 N.W. 865
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causation. 879 Once these groups are distinguished, as they should be,
the number of cases dealing with the question of the true unknownwrongdoer, as here defined, is small indeed. Because in some of these
distinguishable cases the rule of liability has developed because of the
difficult proof problems, there is some tendency to use them as authority
in the unknown-wrongdoer situation. This is not good analysis· and
(19()6) (damages must be separated); Miller v. Prough, 203 Mo. App. 413, 221 S.W.
159 (1920) (to plaintiff's advantage to claim separate liability); Kerr v. O'Connor,
63 Pa. 341 (186g) (statute interpreted as imposing liability for all damages on all dog
owners); Nelson v. Nugent, 106 Wis. 477, 82 N.W. 287 (1900) (same); Remele v.
Donahue, 54 Vt. 555 (1882) (same); McAdams v. Sutton, 24 Ohio St. 333 (1873)
(same); Stine v. McShane, 55 N.D. 745, 214 N.W. go6 (1927) (no joint liability and
joint liability statute not effective yet); Hill v. Chappel Bros. of Montana, Inc., 93
Mont. 92, 18 P.2d uo6 (1932) (horses, and jury allowed to estimate as best they
could); Wood v. Snider, 187 N.Y. 28, 36, 79 N.E. 858 (1907) (liability on basis of
ratio of each defendant's cattle) ; Pacific Livestock Co. v. Murray, 45 Ore. 103, 76
Pac. 1079 (1904) (separate liability but defendant offered to show others contributed);
King v. Ruth, 136 Miss. 377, 101 So. 500 (1924) (separate damages between hogs).
878 Also to be distinguished from· the true unknown-wrongdoer situation are those
cases involving application of the rules of vicarious liability, whether it be in terms of
master-servant, [Raber v. Tumin, 36 Cal.2d 654, 66o, 226 P.2d 574 (1951)]; or some
concept of concert of action, artificial though this is in some of the cases, [Reyher v.
Mayne, supra note 777...:._hunting group and particular defendant known but all liable ;
Ushirohira v. Stuckey, 52 Cal. App. 526, 199 Pac. 339 (1921)-joint maintenance of
herd of cattle; Stephens v. Schadler, supra note 777-one defendant harbored both his
own and others' dogs but the court did emphasize proof problem in imposing joint liability; Kuhn v. Bader, supra note 777-gun injury from one of hunting group; Oliver v.
Miles, .supra note 777; Benson v. Ross, supra note 777; and see cases set out .supra
note 877; Queen v. Salmon, 6 Q.B.D. 79 (188o)---criminal liability for all in target
practice activity; State v. Newberg, 129 Ore. 564. 278 Pac. 568 (1929)---criminalliabi!ity for both hunters in group shooting regardless of whose shot killed]; or liability
of landowner or primary contractor for accidents occurring during construction work on
the premises, [see cases discussed supra in text at notes 220-291. Liability may not
be imposed, of course; Wolf v. American Tract Society, 164 N.Y. 30, 58 N.E. 31
( 1900)--brick fell where nineteen independent contractors were using 250 men] ; or
liability of a manufacturer for products sold without the application of the res ipsa
loquitur doctrine, [see infra Chapter V on product liability and discussion of res ipsa
loquitu-r in text following note 122; see .e.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d
453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944); Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., 42 Cal.2d 682, 268 P.2d
1041 (1954); Gordon v. Aztec Brewing Co., 33 Cal.2d 514, 203 P.2d 522 (1949); Loch
v. Confair, 372 Pa. 212, 93 A.2d 451 (1953); Nichols v. Todd, 174 Kan. 613, 258 P.2d
317 (1953)]; or some kind of special relationship in the nature of joint enterprise
such as -may be the explanation of some injury-to-surgical-patient cases [Prosser, "Res
Ipsa Loquitur in California," 37 Cal. L. Rev. 183, 223 (1949), suggests this analysis
for the famous case of Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal.2d 486, 154 P .2d 687 ( 1944) ; see
also Oldis v. La Societe Francaise, 130 Cal. App.2d 461, 279 P.2d 184 (1944); Cavero
v. Franklin General Benevolent Society, 36 Cal.2d 301, 223 P.2d 471 (1950); Meyer
v. St. Paul-Mercury Indemnity Co., 61 So.2d 901 (La. App. 1952)-finding no negligence, however; Duprey v. Shane, 39 Ca1.2d 781,249 P.2d 8 (1952)],
819 In the same general category to be distinguished are the cases in which two
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makes for poor justice so long as the existing system of tort recovery
is used. At least the distinctions should be recognized, even if it should
be concluded that they are distinctions without a difference in some
cases.
This particular causation difficulty could occur with considerable frequency in atomic energy cases. One example, already mentioned at the
beginning of the discussion of multiple causes, would be if some person
downwind from two reactors which could discharge identical radioactive material were injured by radiation which could only have come
from one or the other of the reactors, but he has no way of proving
from which reactor it came. A similar legal problem could arise if there
were a limited number of industrial users of isotopes discharging radioactive material into some central place such as the sewage system. If
a sewage plant employee is injured or if there is injury to the sewage
plant itself because of the presence of excessive amounts of radioactive
material resulting from an accidental discharge from one of the users,
how can it be determined which of the potential defendants is to be held
liable, assuming it is clear that only one discharged the excessive
amount? It also is possible that both users of radioactive material were
negligent in that they breached the standard of conduct required under
the circumstances or else discharged radioactive material under circumstances calling for absolute liability but it is impossible to determine
from whose plant the particular material which injured the plaintiff
came. This could happen if plaintiff could not pinpoint the exact time
of his exposure but he could show that it was from one or the other of
the defendants' materials or operations. Should traditional rules be applied and the plaintiff denied recovery? 880 Should the burden of proof
forces, equally capable of doing the total damage, act so nearly simultaneously that it
is i~possible to tell whether one or the other ·or both caused the injury. Corey v.
Havener, supra note 758. See also Hanrahan v. Cochran, 12 App. Div. 91, 42 N.Y.S.
1031 (1896) (same except sleighs instead of motorcycles); and probably concurrent
causation or at least concurrent contribution to total injury in Finnegan v. Royal Realty
Co., 35 Cal.2d 409, 218 P.2d 17 (1950).
880 Anderson v. Halverson, supra note 877, applied this rule in a dog-killing-sheep
case. Stine v. McShane, supra note 877 (same). Cf. language of court in Stephens v.
Schadler, supra note 777 at 837. Common law concept applied in Schoening v. Oaus,
supra note 8os (hunting accident) ; Haley v. Calef, supra note 761 (two towns responsible for bridge and injured plaintiff could join but must show which town responsible for part of bridge where hurt) ; Louisville Gas & Electric Co. v. Nail, 178 Ky. 33,
1g8 S.W. 745 (1917) (not known whether plumber or gas company employees left
hole in closet uncovered); Casey Pure Milk Co. v. Booth Fisheries Co., 124 Minn.
117, 144 N.W. 450 (1913) (not known which two companies responsible for goods
lost); Hartzell v. Bank of Murray, 211 Ky. 263, 277 S.W. 270 (1925) (not known
whether bank or bank cashier liable for loss of note-but why not master-servant lia-
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be shifted to each defendant to prove his innocence? Or, are we to impose joint liability for the total injuries upon each defendant, even
though it is clear that only one caused the plain~iff harm ?
In answering this question two general categories of cases can be
identified, each involving what we have termed unknown-wrongdoers.
First, there are cases in which it can be shown that each of the defendants was negligent in that he owed a duty to the plaintiff and did not
live up to the standard of conduct expected of the reasonably prudent
man under the circumstances, but there is only one injury and only the
force placed in motion by one defendant could have caused the injury.
Second, there are cases such that clearly only one, or at least less than
all of the possible defendants were negligent in the sense that they
breached the standard of conduct required, but the plaintiff can not
prove which defendant set the force in motion.
( i)

~ll

Potential Defendants. Negligent

Many cases establish and support the general common law rule
denying recovery where all of the multiple defendants clearly are negligent but which one caused the injury is unknown, even though the result is that tqe plaintiff's injuries will be uncompensated. 881 There are
a few cases pointing in the other direction, however. It might be argued
that some of the hogs, dogs, and cattle cases 882 really are examples of
liability imposed upon a person whose responsibility for the injury has
not been proved. This would not seem to be a correct analysis, except
for· the very unlikely case. It is possible that a particular defendant's
hog, dog, or steer, while part of a damage-feasant group actually did
bility?); Ogleship Sureties v. The State, 73 Tex. 658, 11 s.w: 873 (1889) (not known
in which term sheriff's defalcations occurred); Cohn-Baer-Myers & Aronson Co. v.
Realty Transfer Co., 102 N.Y.S. 122 (1907) (cannot plead alternative rights against
two separate defendants for failure to obtain title to land); Wolf v. American Tract
Society, mpra note 878 (brick fell where nineteen independent contractors working);
and cases discussed in McCoid, "Negligence Actions Against Multiple Defendants," 7
Stan. L. Rev. 48o, 501-03 (1955). See also discussions, often criticizing common law
rule: Carpenter, "The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur in CaJifomia," 10 So. Cal. L.
Rev. 166 (1937); James, "Proof of the Breach in Negligence Cases (Including Res
Ipsa Loquitur),'' 37 Va. L. Rev. 179 (1951); Prosser, "Res Ipsa Loquitur in California,'' 37 Cal. L. Rev. 183 (1949). Cf. Seavey, "Res Ipsa Loquitur: Tabula in
Naufragio," 63 Harv. L. Rev. 643 (1950); Prosser 222. The effect in such cases of
a recent Arkansas statute allowing tolling the statute of limitations period against unknown wrongdoers is uncertain but presents some interesting and difficult questions.
Infra note 1371.
8S1 See cases cited supra note 88o.
882 Supra note 877.
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none itself, but this is a most unlikely situation, and practically all of
the cases find or assume that each of the animals caused some damage.
The only real difficulty is in determining the amount that each did.
Therefore, this is not a case of unknown-wrongdoers in our sense. A
truly analogous situation would arise if several dogs, owned by different persons, were negligently allowed to run free, and less than all of
them attacked a flock of sheep, it being perfectly clear that one or more
of the dogs (but which is not known) did not participate. If we held
all of the dog owners liable for all of the damages under these circumstances we would have a real unknown-wrongdoing dog case.
Cases that come much closer are those involving hunting accidents in
which one or more of the group are negligent in using the weapons, but
the injury obviously comes from only one gun; 883 In all such cases, the
courts, except for a recent California decision, have found concert of
action among the hunting party as a reason for imposing joint liability.
This really is an application of vicarious liability rules. If the situation
instead of involving two members of the same hunting party, involved two hunters acting without knowledge of the existence of the
other, this would present the true case of the unknown-wrongdoer, to
which the usual rule of vicarious liability for concert of action could
not be applied.
The California court in Summers v. Tice 884 faced up to the proof
problem without relying on the concept of concert of action in a case in
which two hunters in the same party negligently discharged their guns
in such a manner that a pellet from one of them put out 'the plaintiff's
eye. The trial court, after assuming both defendants were negligent,
and finding that there was no way to determine from which of the guns
the shot came, imposed joint liability, reasoning as follows :
When we consider the relative position of the parties and
the results that would flow if plaintiff was required to pin the
injury on one of the defendants only, a requirement that the
burden of proof on that subject be shifted to defendants becomes manifest. They are both wrongdoers-both negligent
toward plaintiff. They brought about a situation where
the negligence of one of them injured the plaintiff, hence it
should rest with them each to absolve himself if he can. The
injured party has been placed by defendants in the unfair
position of pointing to which defendant caused the harm. If
one can escape the other may also and plaintiff is remediless.
Ordinarily defendants are in a far better position to offer evi888

88 4

Supra note 777 and note 878.
33 Cal. 2d 8o, 199 P.2d 1 (1948).
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dence to determine which one caused the injury. This reasoning has recently found favor in this court. In a quite analogous situation this court held a patient injured while unconscious on an operating table in a hospital could hold all or any
of the persons who had any connection with the operation
even though he could not select the particular acts by the particular person which led to his disability (Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486 [ 154 P. 2d 687, 162 ALR 1258].)
There the court was considering whether the patient could
avail himself of res ipsa loquitur, rather than where the burden of proof lay, yet the effect of the decision is that plaintiff
has made out a case when he has produced evidence which
gives rise to an, inference of negligence which was the proximate cause of the injury. It is up to the defendants to explain
the cause of the injury. 885
Prosser feels that the result is "a very desirable solution where negligence on·t:he part of both .is clear artd it is only the alternative causation
which is in doubt." 886 It certainly is not "more probable than not" that
both caused the injury; in fact it ·is one hundred per cent certain that
this is ·not the case. On the other hand it is equally probable (rather
than more probable) that either did it. Therefore; the violation of the
usual rule is only in terms of a fraction of a per cent. Harper and
James also approve the result. 887 ·.·
'A remarkable sequel to Summers v. Tice arose in Canada in 1957. 888
Here again an innocent third party was struck by a single rifle bullet
fired by one of a group of boys, ·au of whom were under fourteen years
of age. The defendants were two merchants, each of whom had sold
the boys a box of cartridges, and the court held that each of them was
negligent in making the sale to boys of this age. The damaging bullet
was the very last cartridge fired when the boys came back to town after
having used all the other cartridges from both· boxes out in the country.
The court held both defendants to have been at fault and liable for the
total damages. It rejected the argument that only the seller of the last
cartridge could be held liable because this placed on the plaintiff "the
burden of identifying the one who sold the shelt' that was last fired; a
burden which needless to say, was not discharged." 889 This case makes
ss5 I~. at 86-87.
sse Prosser 231.
·ssT Harper & James

.
II15. The result does spread the loss rather than leave the plain-

tiff uncompensated.
sss Saint-Pierre v. McCarthy, [1957] Que. B.R. 421 (Q.B.), approved in 4 McGill
L. J. 2g8 (.1958).
ss9 I d. at 422.
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it clear that concert of action is not required, a possible alternative explanation for the result in Summers v. Tice. The Canadian case is even
more remarkable because of the causation reasoning used by the court.
Instead of adopting the rationale of Summers v. Tice, shifting the burde"n of proof to the defendants each to exculpate himself if he could
prove his force did not do any harm, the Canadian court worked out a
theory whereby it concluded that each was not only negligent in selling
the shells, but also was a cause-in-fact of the injurious last shot. The
argument of the court is remarkable enough to set out in full.
The sale of the cartridges must be regarded as one act, for
though two separate sales were made it took both to put the
boys in the position to do the damage. Had one box only been
sold then, on the facts as they came to pass, the accident could
not have happened since all of the cartridges in the one box
would have been fired outside of the village. But-again on
the facts as we know them-since two boxes were sold it became possible for the boys to exhaust their interest in the
country and yet have cartridges in their possession when they
returned to the village. In consequence it required both sales
to make the accident possible and for this reason the relationship for cause and effect is established. 890
One wonders if the court would apply this reasoning if it could have
been proved whose bullet caused the injury. If so this reasoning is not
too far removed from the argument that the driver of a car who breaks
the speed limit and gets to his destination in time for lightning to strike
his guest as he steps from the car is liable for the death of the guest
because, "but for" his breaking the speed law, the guest would not have
been where the lightning struck. In fairness, however, the Canadian
case is not quite the same because the injury that did occur was the
very thing which could have been anticipated by a careful person and
the foreseeability of which made the selling of the shells negligent.
Nevertheless, this kind of "but for" reasoning cannot be recommended
for other cases.
Undoubtedly radiation cases will arise to which this reasoning could
be applied. Two manufacturers of an industrial device utilizing radiation might furnish identical items to the same user and someone is found
to have been injuriously irradiated from this type of source because the
devices were made negligently. The evidence of exposure might be such
that it is clear the person received radiation from only one source but
890 I d. at 423· This is like saying that the man who loaned them the car negligently
is liable because without it they could not have been where plaintiff was.
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it is impossible to tell now which source was responsible because records
were not kept of when the various sources were used at particular places
in the plant or operations of the user.
The validity of the Summers v. Tice solution of shifting the burden
of proof to multiple defendants should be tested by altering the facts
sli'ghtly. What if, instead of two negligent persons, there were three or
ten? Here the probabilities are not even equal ; for each wrongdoer
there is either a one-in-three or one-in-ten chance that he is responsible
for the injury. At what point does the probability become de minimus?
In a sense, this criticism can be made of the holding in another California case, Ybarra v. Spangard, 891 in which an unconscious surgical
patient apparently was negligently injured by some one of the number
of persons who handled him while he was unconscious, but it was rather
clear that less than all of them were directly responsible.
To impose joint liability on all who have been negligent and who possibly have caused the plaintiff's injury actually goes beyond even absolute liability concepts. While negligence need not be shown if an activity
is ultra-hazardous, the causal connection with the defendant's action
must. In effect the reasoning of the California and Canadian cases turns
the fault doctrine around. Instead of holding defendants liable only if
fault can be shown, it is making any person who has breached the required standard of conduct responsible for any injury which his action
might just possibly have caused unless he can prove absence of causal
connection. While Harper and James object to the use of the traditional
fault doctrine to excuse liability, there is no indication that they also
would do away with proof of causation. 892 It is true, however, that the
reasoning of these few cases compensates the plaintiff more often and
spreads the risk.
If the reasoning of the Canadian court is accepted at face value, the
result would be to impose liability on all negligent persons for all harm
that results not only from their own negligence but also from that of all
persons similarly situated who have been negligent. If liability is to be
imposed simply for increasing the risk that somebody will be injured
by negligently setting some harmful force in motion, traditional tort
liability procedures should be abandoned. Our system of total liability
or none in each individual case as to each defendant will not work fairly
if such reasoning is used.
If the Summers v. Tice reasoning is to be used in radiation injury
891
892

Supra note 878. Discussed infra in text at notes u8o ff.
Note discussion in Harper & James 1116, n. 24·
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cases, a different system of compensating plaintiffs and assessing liability on defendants should be adopted, one developed on a much more
statistically accurate basis. Use should be made of some kind of insurance fund to which all persons who might be negligent or who have
been negligent in dealing with harmful radioactive material should contribute in accordance with the increase in the risk of harm caused by a
particular defendant. Injured parties who could not identify the specific
source of their injury would then sue this fund. Perhaps something like
the. unsatisfied judgment fund schemes for covering injuries from
automobile accidents in hit-and-run cases can be used, 8911 or perhaps all
radiation injuries could be compensated under a fund similar to that
suggested below for future injuries, 894 or other fund schemes suggested
by others. 895
Such a plan would provide a more scientifically accurate basis for
spreading· the risks than would the rationale of Sttmmers v. Tice when
it is carried over into the situation in which there are more than two
defendants, even though all have been negligent in some manner in
releasing radiation that may possibly have hurt the plaintiff. Certainly
the reasoning of the Canadian court as to causation should not be used.
If we are to impose monetary responsibility for all negligence, even
though actual damages have not been proved, it would seem preferable
to make some kind of administrative evaluation of the potential loss
that might be created by each mistake and force a contribution to some
fund from which injured plaintiffs could recover. Traditional rules are
unsatisfactory in the multiple defendants case because plaintiffs remain
uncompensated when they would recover except for failure to prove
which defendant was the cause. Nevertheless, using the reasoning of
these few recent cases also leads to unrealistic results.
Courts also should avoid too broad application of 'the justification
suggested for the Ybarra type case (unconscious patient injured by one
of several defendants), that the actions constituted something of a
joint enterprise of all participating persons. If liability is imposed on
all, each one is forced to take the utmost precautions to see that no injury is inflicted upon the patient during the time he is unconscious.
Caution also should be used in applying the theory that joint liability is
sos See Elder, "The Unsatisfied Judgment Fund and the Irresponsible Motorist,"
Current Trends in State Legislation 1953-54 at 45 (U. of Mich. Law School, 1954).
894 A "contingent injury fund" is discussed inf,.a in text following note 1123.
895 Summer Institute, Workshops on Legal Problems of Atomic Energy, U. of Mich.
Law School (1956), position of minority at 36. Switzerland and West Germany have
fund plans under consideration.
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justified as a method of forcing people who probably know what happened to inform O!l each other. These justifications should not be applied under existing tort rules in situations in which there are several
wrongdoers who are acting quite independently of each other and have
no control over their co-defendants or, perhaps better, their co-potential
defendants; they have no power of selection or rejection and no way of
taking extra precautions to protect themselves against the results of the
negligence of another.

(ii) Only One Defendant Negligent
If the law is to be accommodated to the plaintiff's difficulty in proving causation in unknown-wrongdoer cases, then the ultimate development would be the result reached by an appellate court in California
recently, in Litzmann v. Humboldt County. 896 This is the case in which
the plaintiff's small boy was seriously injured when he ignited an aerial
bomb which he found lying ip the fairgrounds. The court held that the
plaintiff had a right to jury instruction to the effect that if he proved
that one or the other of two defendants was negligent in dropping the
aerial. bomb, then he was not required to prove which defendant had
been negligent. The appellate court held that this was a correct instruction.
This is exactly the kind of situation which may arise in the atomic
energy area. For example, there could be three, five, or ten reactors so
located that the radioactive material which caused the plaintiff's injuries
could have come from any one of them. If circumstantial evidence
clearly supports an inference of negligent emission, perhaps via res ipsa
loquitur, 897 then a parallel case is presented, and the plaintiff, by analogy to Litzmann, would not be obliged to prove which of the reactor
operators was the guilty party.
While this is not quite the same thing as absolute liability because it
assumes that one of the parties was negligent, nevertheless, so far as the
innocent accused are concerned it is worse. Even strict liability is dependent on proof of causal connection. Currently our theory of negligence liability is aimed at allocating the losses that occur on a basis of
culpability and not upon a doctrine of "compensate every plaintiff who
can show an injury." Accordingly, the use of the plaintiff's difficulty
as an excuse for placing the burden of proof on a potential defendant
898 273 P.2d 82 (Cal. App. 1954). The case was settled while an appeal was pending before the California Supreme Court, Note, 28 So. Cal. L. Rev. 429 (1955).
897 See discussion of res ipsa loquitur, infra at notes 1146 ff.
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to free himself from liability is to make the incidence of loss from negligent injuries depend upon the laws of chance in a peculiarly unscientific and unjust manner.
In practical effect it means that whether or not one is to be charged
with a loss depends on the purely fortuitous circumstance of whether
somebody else engaged in a similar activity happens to have caused injury. This is going even further than absolute liability because in absolute liability cases it is essential that cause-in-fact be proved. The principle is really no different than saying that one whose dog was running
loose at the time that some person was bitten by a dog, assuming that
it was at night and the dog could not be identified, is to be held liable
for some or all of the loss if it was at all possible that his dog was in
the vicinity at the time. It would be the same as holding, in the case involving the theater patron whose eye was put out by a spit ball projected
by some member of the audience, 898 that the plaintiff could hold each
spitball-shooter-carrying member of the audience liable unless he could
prove that he did not do it. This negative usually can be established only
by finding the one who did do it, a task as difficult for the innocent defendants as it is for the plaintiff. Or perhaps liability could be limited
to those who sat within spit ball range of the plaintiff.
A similar case could be one holding two contractors liable for a falling brick which injured the plaintiff even though their only relationship ·
was that they happened to be working on different but adjoining buildings at the same time. 899 If we are to spread tort risks on a broader basis
than is now the case where proof of cause-in-fact is usually insisted
upon, this objective should be accomplished by some kind of more
scientifically justifiable scheme.
This should be true even if absolute liability rules are adopted for
some aspects of atomic energy operations. Some writers at least 900
would not approve of the solution which renders all liable even though
some, or all but one, are innocent. Surely making two or four or nine
innocent parties stand the loss caused by one wrong-doing party would
carry the compensation principle too far, at least as applied to the radiation injury cases. The Litzmamz rationale, particularly if it were carried
beyond the case of two well-identified potential wrongdoers, is com89 8

Pfeifer v. Standard Gateway Theater, 262 Wis. 229, 55 N.W.2d 29 (1952).
This is also similar to Wolf v. American Tract Society, supra note 878, (a brick
fell where 19 independent contractors were working) if a brick fell from between two
adjoining buildings.
900 Prosser 231; Seavey, supra note 88o at 648. Harper & James 1116, do not take
a position on this kind of case:
8 99
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pletely unjustified and unrealistic. When one takes into account the
great time and space intervals that can intervene between a discharge of
radioactive material and its reaching a place of rest where injury is inflicted, almost any user of radioactive material in the county, at least of
the kind found to have caused the injury, might possibly have been responsible. Surely joint liability should not be imposed under our
present tort system. To do so truly would be to impose absolute liability
on atomic energy operations with a vengeance and without the requirement that has always been applied in the past,. i.e., that cause-in-fact
must be shown. For whatever comfort it is to potential defendants,
most of the courts do not approve the Litzmann rationale, although
most of the cases were decided prior to Litzmann. 901
(iii) Effect of Common Insurance Carrier
One fact which will almost inevitably be· present in many atomic
energy cases might justify application of the Tice, Ybarra, and even
the Litzmann solutions. If in this type of unknown-wrongdoer case
every one of the potential wrongdoers were insured by the same insurance carrier against the kind of loss which occurred, then a good case
could be made for recovery, at least to the extent that there was identical coverage up to the limit of the lowest policy. If the insurance company covered all of the defendants, it would be perfectly clear that if
any one of them were found liable the insurance company should pay.
To decide in such circumstances that recovery will be allowed where
there is an insurance policy, while it would not be allowed against the
same defendant if there were rione, violates our traditional rules concerning the liability of insurance companies when policies are written
on an indemnity basis only. The result, however, does seem to make
good sense, by compensating innocent plaintiffs· without imposing liability on someone who should not be required to pay.
This suggestion has peculiar applicability to the area of radiation injuries, at least to the extent that the user of radiation is licensed by
the federal government and is required to furnish financial protection 902
which ordinarily will be in the form of an insurance policy taken out
from one of two carriers of such insurance. One of them is relatively
so much smaller than the other 803 that it is very likely in many situations one insurance carrier will have insured all potential defendants,
See cases set out supra note 88o, some of which involve only one wrongdoer.
See insurance discussion infra beginning at note 1265.
ooa See discussion infra at notes 1347-48.
901
90 2
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at least in the reactor field. In the event of a major reactor disaster in
which the damages run over sixty million dollars, and clearly in the
case of an accident involving a much smaller total, where the government's responsibility to take over liability will come in at a much lower
figure, there is then absolute identity of the insurance carrier in effect,
though not technically, since the federal government's liability is only
that of an indemnitor, not as an insurer. The same result should be
reached because the government actually is indemnifying all of the potential wrongdoers above the limits of financial protection set by the
AEC. Insurance companies surely will try to find a way out of the
dilemma created by this suggestion, but until they do the solution is
attractive.
In such states as Louisiana and Wisconsin· in which the insurance
carrier can be sued directly there would seem to be no difficulty in holding that even the Litzmann reasoning applies if all of the multiple defendants are covered by the same insurance company. In other states a
court might change the common law rule and hold that recovery will
be allowed if the court finds that one carrier covers the liability of all
defendants, but deny recovery otherwise. If an insurance policy is more
than an indemnification agreement and imposes direct responsibility on
the carrier if the defendant does not pay, as is the case with much of
automobile collision insurance today, is there any reason why the court
should not determine this and impose liability as a matter of common
law rule? This does not need to violate the usual "hope" that juries
will not be allowed to know an insurance carrier is involved when they
make their fact determinations. Nevertheless, enactment of a statute
undoubtedly would be the better procedure for achieving this result.
(d) Cumulative Effecf from Innocent Sources
In one other situation, which creates more difficulty than any other,
the solution surely should not be joint liability, if liability is to be imposed at all. Except for those involving unknown wrongdoers, there
was, in the cases discussed so far, concurrent contribution toward the
amount of damage inflicted by persons at least some and usually all of
whom were wrongdoers in the sense that they breached the standard of ·
conduct requi~ed of the reasonably prudent man. Actual(y the facts in
many of the cases seem to indicate that the defendants must have acted
with knowledge of the existence of the contribution of other persons,
and so might even be considered as acting in concert with each other.
Many of the cases arising in connection with cumulative impacts of ra-
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diation may involve' situations where the contributions of the other
persons to the total injury are not known. Nevertheless, where all jxrlrties breach the standard of conduct required by law, shifting the burden
of proofdoes not seem to be too much of a burden to place upon them.
If the amount of radiation released by one or more of the concurrent
causal factors is so small that the discharge can be considered innocent
because there has been no breach of the required standard of conduct,
the court faces a real difficulty. Prosser, 904 in commenting on the ·situation where the contribution of two or more parties, standing alone,
would not even be a breach of the standard of conduct, states that:
Where, as in the usual case, such liability must be based
upon negligence or intent rather than on any ultra-hazardous
activity, it would seem that there can be no tortious conduct
uriless the individual knows, or is at least negligent in failing
to discover, that his conduct may concur with that of others to
cause damage. And liability need not necessarily be entire,
for there is no reason w,hy damages may not be apportioned
here, to the same extent as in any other case. 805
This situation could easily arise where radiation is the cause of the injury. Persons using a radioactive source may have complied with statu.;.
tory or administrative limits for discharge of radioactive material, and
may have acted as a reasonably prudent man would have in the light of
present knowledge and the circumstances, and yet, through an unusual
set of circumstances several discharges from such sources might cause
damage or unite with radioactive material negligently released and
cause· damage. Should the innocent contributor be held liable for all or
a part of the damage caused? Surely there is no excuse in this situation
for holding him jointly liable for the whole and thereby shifting to
him the burden of finding the evidence for the plaintiffs. If the Texas
liability rules 906 are· not applied, as surely they should not be in many
atomic energy activities where the quantity of radiation is at a very low
level; it seems ·difficult to· justify imposing any liability. It is even inore
difficult to justify complete liability such as that imposed in the case of
true joint tortfeasors.
Once the concurrent ·contribution injury is discovered there would
seem to be no real obstacle to an injunction suit to abate what very
likely is a nuisance, and even compliance with official regulations might
not justify the kind of taking of property that would be involved in this
eo4 Prosser 2J2.
eoD ld. at 233·
eoe See discussion supra note 845.
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situation. 907 As to damage recovery, this may be the very case in which
social policy limitations·on imposing liability should be brought to bear
to relieve the "innocent wrongdoer" from liability because, by hypothesis, in this last situation, the defendant had no reason to suspect that
there would be other contributions added to his minor one resulting in
an injury. The question in tort case really is not always how can we
compensate the innocent plaintiff but who should bear the losses that.
do arise out of normal activities in today's complicated, highly industrialized life. Perhaps this is the case where the plaintiff must take out
insuran!=e to protect himself rather .than seek compensation from a person who has acted prudently. The situation that can arise in the radiation field, at least in some cases, would be analogous to a suit against an
individual homeowner whose heating system emits into the air in a large
city some unburned particles of coal, gas, or oil contributing to the pollution of the air over the whole city, or against the drivers of thousands
of cars who do the same thing through the discharge of unburned particles· through exhaust pipes. In this situation it would seem a little unrealistic to say that if we can prove any one car driver or any one
householder contributed some small part to the total pollution he should
be liable for the whole. This is utterly ridiculous, if it is not unjust. In
the case where there are only a few contributors it still is unjust. Perhaps the atomic energy situation may present the very kind of case suggested in the English opinion in Blair v. Deakin,· 908 one person might
put something into a stream which in and of itself was not dangerous
but when combined with another equally innocuous substance put in the
stream by another person creates a dangerous condition. Injunction in
such situations would seem perfectly justified, but to impose liability
for all foreseeable damages because it is now found that such chemicals
when combined will create a dangerous substance comes close to absolute liability. Any imposition of liability for the injuries caused in situations where the individual's contribution is not enough in itself to be
considered tortious and where he has no basis in terms of knowledg~ or
reasonable grounds to believe that others are contributing a substance
which will cause harm when. combined with his is in effect to impose
strict liability without admitting it. It is doubtful if damages which
result from many of the situations that will arise in connection with
radiation sources where the contributions of many people are very small
is really any more dangerous to a city, to a country or to the world than
907 Compare psychological nuisance case and see cases there discussed, supra notes
628-722.
908 [1887] 57 L.T.R. (n. s.) 522, 525.
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a discharge into the air of carbon dioxide, an inevitable result of our
modern industrialized, technological life. Once we find the evil exists
something should be done, but it would not seem that the tort system,
devised to solve damage questions between individuals or small groups
of individuals, is the vehicle by which such problems can be solved. Compensating the plaintiff is not the only aim of the tort system. As suggested before, the aim really is to decide who should bear the loss which
seems inevitable in our kind of complicated society. There are methods
other than always imposing liability on the defendant, even admitting
that in a particular case the defendant's actions have caused some harm.
A fire insurance type of policy (or medical insurance, or life insurance)
carried by the potential victim may be the better way for some cases, particularly where the contributions are in and of themselves innocent, if
we want normal growth of atomic energy, which is so important to us
in the long run. In any event, as long as existing damage rules are used,
there is no justification for making the innocent contributor actually
jointly liable in the sense of being held responsible to the plaintiff for
his total injuries to which many others contributed. Surely at most he
should be held responsible only for his own contributive share.
c. Proof of Cause and Damage Generally
Criticism of the common law system of handling the losses that occur
as the result of what might broadly be called accidents (as <f.istinguished
from intentional torts) has been increasing both in amount and vigor
in recent years. Many respected legal scholars have advocated a sweeping examination of present tort rules, and many, of course, attack the
very basic concept of fault that underlies so much of our tort law today.909 Many of them argue for strict liability or something approaching
it in many more situations, and they urge that this be combined with
some sort of shifting the burden of losses to the industrial community,
or in appropriate areas by requiring insurance coverage, such as in the
case of automobile accidents. While such drastic changes are not imminent, it certainly is possible that there will be a continued move in
this direction and possibly even an acceleration. Whether the rule of
909 Ehrenzweig, Negligence without Fault (1951); Harper & James Introduction &
Ch. XI; Green, "The Individual's Protection Under Negligence Law-Risk Sharing,"
47 Nw. U.L. Rev. 751 (1953); James, "Social Insurance and Tort Liability: The Prob1~ of Alternative Remedies," Z, N.Y.U.L. Rev. 537 (1952); Leftar, "Negligence in
Name Only," 27 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 564 (1952); Freezer, "A Circle Tour Through Negligence," 27 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 647 (1952); Ehrenzweig, "A Psychoanalysis of Negligence,"
47 Nw. U.L. Rev. 855 (1953).
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absolute liability be applied across the board, or a scheme of insurance
or governmental funds is adopted supported by assessments of the
workmen's compensation type or by general taxes, the injured party
who seeks compensation still will face the same problem that he faces
under the present tort rules in the usual situation where the claim is
against a single alleged wrongdoer defendant. The plaintiff who sues
the industrial producer or operator, or the individual wrongdoer or his
insurance company, or the federal or state government fund set up to
award compensation in accident cases, will have to prove that his disability was caused by the accident. The plaintiff will have to show ( 1)
that he has been "injured," and (2) that his injury was "caused" by a
force for which he has a claim against an individual wrongdoer under
our present system, or against an insurance company, a fund, or some
other social group in the event our system of loss distribution should
be changed to make this possible.
Very likely our present system wili continue to be the law for many
years to come, although minor changes undoubtedly will be made. Even
if it has been proved that a duty was owed to an injured party by a defendant who did not meet the standard of conduct expected of a reasonably prudent man under the circumstances, or if the accused is to be
held to strict liability and the type of injury for which the plaintiff is
seeking compensation is recognized as compensable, the plaintiff still
must show that he received such an injury and that it was caused by the
force set in motion by .the alleged wrongdoer. Whether he represents
the plaintiff or the defendant, the lawyer handling radiation cases will
find some of his most difficult problems in this area of proof. Many
radiation cases will arise in which proof of cause and damages will be
relatively simple and certainly solvable in accordance with existing commonly recognized principles. Likewise, in the cases where the proof
problems are considerably more complex and subtle, it seems clear that
answers will be found, if only by leaving the doubtful cases to the jury.
The great majority will fall in this category. It is in the area of proof
that our present tort rules and theoretical analysis of them have been
most inadequate. The appellate opinions and the legal writers have concerned themselves for the most part with the problems of substantive
law by which we determine who is liable to whom for what kind of injury. The proof problems usually are buried in trial records, and even
the rules of evidence seldom get down to the level of concrete types of
proof that are available and might or should be used to prove specific
fact questions. Here a~in the radiation cases, which are bound to arise
in increasing numbers in the next twenty years, very likely will show,
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sometimes dramatically, the inadequacy of our present analysis of the
problems of proof. It. is still too early in the· study of the relationship
between scientific technology and legal problems, and certainly it is
beyond the scope of a general treatise, to answer in detail the many
scientific-legal proof problems that inevitably will arise. Some lines of
attack under existing rules can be indicated, however, and attention can
be focused much more sharply on some of the inadequacies of existing
concepts of proof, particularly as applied in tort cases.
A study of the problems that seem inevitable in radiation cases convinces one that here again is evidence of the fact that policies underlying the legal rules of proof and probability may be somewhat different
from those assumed by scientists when, in their scientific activities,
they are concerned with proof. The present concern of the legal profession as to the proper use and control of expert testimony is perhaps
evidence of an awakening legal recognition of the problem. In any
event it seems clear that lawyers must concern themselves much more
with the premises and techniques of the scientists if they are to handle
adequately the proof problems that are to be an inevitable part of radiation litiga~ion. Atomic energy cases seem destined to increase the need
of mutual understanding between the lawyer and certain other professions and sciences such as physicists, engineers, and biologists, to name
merely the most obvious and most inclusive categories. Radiation cases
bid well to. force lawyers to recognize :r:nuch more sharply the areas of
specialty among experts and to use those who may not have a license
but who nevertheless know scientific principles essential to the case. In
looking at the proof problems it seems convenient to separate those involved in the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and treat them as a separate
group. The res ipsa loquitur doctrine cannot be completely separated
from duty and particularly breach concepts but most commentators
treat the doctrine primarily as one of proof, and this seems wise. It will
aid clarity of analysis, nevertheless, if the res ipsa loquitur problem is
treated separately.
( 1) Proof of Radiation Injuries and the Law of Probabilities
As indicated previously, scientists generally agree that exposure to
radiation can cause many personal injuries. In analyzing the problem
of tort liability, however, the question is not what can be caused by exposure to radiation, but, rather, whether a particular injury was caused
by such an exposure; or, stated otherwise, is a given exposure to radia-
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tion the cause-in-fact of the injury. With few if any exceptions, present
scientific knowledge indicates that there is nothing qualitatively unique
about injurious radiation from the standpoint of its observable physiological and pathological effects. Numerous other forces can be causes
or causal factors with respect to seemingly identical injury manifestations. Added to this problem of multiple possible causes of the same
injury is the inconvenient fact that science has no very precise way of
determining which was the actual medical cause-much less the legal
cause. The lawyer finds himself confronted, therefore, with possibilities and probabilities. The legal result to be reached is far from certain
in many, if not most, cases.
The question then becomes one of availability of acceptable evidence·
to prove or disprove that a particular cancer or cataract or genetic injury was caused or influenced in some harmful fashion by the negligently occasioned exposure to radiation.
In answering this question it is important to recognize that the causation-in-fact question is double-barreled. First, there is the·question of
whether the negligent act or omission of the defendant actually caused
the plaintiff to be irradiated, and, second, assuming there was a radiation "impact" upon the body of the plaintiff or decedent, did this particular exposure in fact cause or aggravate the apparent injury. As~
suming that the radiation "impact" is not in itself a compensable injury,
both of these issues of causation must be resolved against the defendant
before liability attaches, regardless of whether absolute liability, negligence, or workmen's compensation rules are used. Different types of
phenomena may be needed to provide the answers to "prove" these two
causation questions. If those needed to show "impact" are somewhat
esoteric, those bearing on the second question are almost occult. The
proof must embrace a substantial portion of the fields of scientific
knowledge about matter and energy.
For the most part this study is limited to biological questions of
causation-from impact to injurious consequence; however, it is not
possible to disregard entirely non-biological considerations or matters
of social policy. One cannot avoid the feeling that in many cases,
rightly or wrongly, the plaintiff's burden of showing biological causation is made easier if the proof of causation as to impact is quite persuasive and not just barely "more probable than not." While the burden
of proof may not shift, seemingly it becomes somewhat less onerous to
prove biological injury if the impact is clearly established. It is not
surprising to find juries influenced in this fashion, but it is a little dis-
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appointing to discover the same effect upon some of the courts. Some
of the cases containing implications of this attitude are discussed below.
(a) Some General Considerations as to Proof of
Biological Cause
For our purposes biological injury can be deemed to be the terminal
result of a totality of causes. Some may be more immediate than others,
but each is essential, qualitatively, quantitatively, and chronologically,
to the result. These causes form a reticulated pattern of antecedent
events and processes made up of increments of matter and of energy
which culminate in an observable or predictable injury. In its broadest
sense, and probably in the scientific sense as well, the determination of
causation embraces this entire dynamic structure, or, to be charitable,
it would if we could make it so.
One of the aims and techniques of science is to find or at least to
iiiuminate the causal facts. The method of science is essentially one of
filling in the gaps between existing observational data with a postulate
or theory, and then testing the theory. The law has taken too little cognizance of this method. The scientific investigator is confronted with a
biological condition which he rarely can observe either on the level at
which it actually develops or as a dynamic process-limitations on aided
and unaided perception being what they are. Nevertheless, through experiment and what observational situations he can contrive the investigator is gradually able to isolate various external influences and obtain
more or less incomplete cross-sectional views at various stages in the
pattern. As soon as a consistent, or perhaps one should say readable,
pattern begins to unfold, the scientist wiii commence to put together
these observable influences with a theory that assigns cause and effect
roles to each factor. A causal theory usually consists of numerous subtheories which seek to explain what happens between observed and partially known consecutive steps in. the pltenomena.
The scientist has learned to live with the frustration that comes from
realizing that a given theory of causation is only one of the many possible theories to explain a particular disease or injury, and that no two
situations are ever precisely the same. To each injurious result there are
a number of causal routes, some occurring with greater frequency than
others, but none revealing their real origins or their true nature to the
casual eye, and few even to the trained one. The scientist is a humble
man in his field, but, unfortunately, not enough judges and attorneys
and even jurors are equally so when they enter the same field. Con-
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cerned with the assigning of legal responsibility, they too often borrow
from science with little understanding and apply the borrowed knowledge with only a modicum of caution. The plaintiff, having been injured, looks for one or more causal theories that include as a necessary
influence an event like the impact or trauma ascribable to the negligence
of the defendant. His attorney then directs his proof only to those
events which justify the application of those theories rather than some
other. He states, for example, that the plaintiff's health was excellent
before the impact, that the impact left a pronounced bruise, and that six
months later a cancer was discovered at the precise point of impact.
The plaintiff obtains the services of one or more physicians who take
the stand and testify to the existence of a causal theory that cancer can
be caused and aggravated by a. single trauma. Perhaps these experts
will state that the plaintiff's injury could have been caused by the trauma,
but, with becoming caution, they may be unwilling to state that in
their opinion the cancer probably was caused by the impact. These
physicians have been entirely honest, for, while the single trauma theory
of cancer causation has little currency, today, 910 it was looked upon with
greater favor at an earlier time and still has not been explained away
entirely.
. At this point.the defendant presents his evidence, but what evidence
does he have? All of the evidence is inside the plaintiff or in his past.
The defendant offers alternative theories of cancer causation, but these
remain hypothetical without evidence of specific events to which they
can be tied, and problematical even with such evidence. Even assuming
that there were pre-impact manifestations of cancer or that other external influences impinged, the plaintiff is under no obligation to volunteer
this information nor do the discovery procedures give the defendant
much assistance. On cross-examination the plaintiff's experts may be
made to admit that the defendant's theories of ca.usation have wider
acceptance in the medical field, but without some kind of circumstantial
evidence to show that basis exists in the instant case for applying one
of the alternative theories, little is going to help the defendant, short of
judicial notice that the plaintiff's theory of causation is too tenuous.
Thus the fact of causation has been "proved," for legal purposes at
least.
On appeal from the judgment attacking the sufficiency of the evidence
as inadequate to justify the jury's finding of causation, the defendant is
910 Small, "Gaffing at a Thing Called Cause: Medico-Legal Conflicts in the Concept of Causation," 31 Tex. L."Rev. 630 (1953).
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worse off than at the trial. On such an appeal the court will look only
at the plaintiff's evidence, and this in its best possible light. In addition
the plaintiff can cite in his brief numerous cases involving cancer caused
or aggravated by a single trauma: a metastatic cancer in the tibia caused
by a sidewalk fall; 911 breast cancer caused by an exploding hot water
heater; 912 cancer caused by an automobile accident, 913 or by an umbrella
handle, 914 or a railroad seat; 915 an eye cancer caused by a blow with a
fist; 916 a foot cancer caused by a fall in a hole; 917 death froin jaw cancer caused by false teeth worn for .three months; 918 or cancer of the
womb caused by a miscarriage two days after a railroad accident, with
death four months after the accident; 919 or a death "caused" by cancer
in the sacral area induced by a fall from a streetcar twenty months
earlier, where an autopsy revealed that the victim also was suffering
from tuberculosis, Bright's disease, acute and chronic cystitis, acute and
chronic prostatitis with abscess formation and chronic selenitis; 920 or
dormant cancer ot the larynx triggered by sinog. 921 .
Thus does the law rush iri where science fears to tread, "proving"
cause--in-fact with one theory of causation out of many (and that
theory of questionable "irtue)' allowing a minimum of circu~stantiai
evidence to indicate a circumstantial theory of causation, and saying,
that in the absence of affirmative proof to the contrary, the impact and
the injury, plus a few facts, such as prior good health, speak for themselves on the issue of causation if the jury wants to accept them. This
is virtually proof by default. Is it any wonder that "the doctor is
shocked by judicial treatment of cause in tort. . . [and] dumbfounded
when introduced to the workmen's compensation and occupational disease cases"? 922 Perhaps the doctor himself is to blame in part because
he has failed to realize the social purpose for using a scientific theory
to prove in a court before a jury what "caused'' an injury.
Juries are always suspected of assuming that a wealthy, corporate
Shaw v. Owl Drug Co., 4 Cal. App.zd 191, 40 P.2d 588 (193S).
Vitale v. Duerbeck, 338 Mo. ss6, 92 S.W.2d 691 (1936).
918 Lee v. Blessing, 131 Conn. s69, 41 A.zd 337 (194S).
914 Louisville Ry. v. Steubing's Admr., 143 Ky. 364, 136 S.W. 634 ( 1911).
915 Shaw y, Chicago, R.I. & P.Ry., 173 Ill. App. 107 (1912).
916 Harris v. Hindman, 130 Ore. IS, 278 Pac. 954 ( 1929).
917 Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Thompson, 211 F. 889 (4th Cir. 1914).
918 Coddaire v. Sibley, ~o Mass. 41, 169 N.E. 797 (1930).
919 Louisville & N. R.R. v. Kemp's Admr., 149 Ky. 344, 149 S.W. 83s (1912).
920 Thompson v. New Orleans Ry. & Light Co., 14S La. 8os, 83 So. 19 (1919).
921 Hagy v. Allied Chemical & Dye Corp., 122' Cal. App.zd 361, z6s P.zd 86 ( 19S3).
o22 Small, supra note 910 at 641.
911

912
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defendant clearly has done something "wrong," and the "pathetic"
plaintiff has to be taken care of by someone. In fairness, it must be
recognized, however, that the laws of probabilities surely support the
conclusion that many injuries go uncompensated because there· are
"more probable" explanations for the injury which actually was caused
as hypothesized by that "tenuous" or "too speculative" theory. If the
fifty-fifty chance is where the line is drawn, as many deserving plaintiffs
lose as undeserving win. The most euphemistic way to state the end result is that "rough" justice is reached. Even this is true only if we accept the concept that two wrongs average out to make a right. There
should be a better way, but first some examples of how the present system works.
(b) The Legal Standard Required to Prove Causein-Fact
As set out previously in the discussion of multiple causation cases,
causation is often arrived at by applying the "but for" test or preferably
the "substantial factor" test. 923 That these formulas are helpful always
in deciding concrete cases is at least questionable. Yet even assuming
the validity of such tests, the underlying question still remains, did the
radiation in the case under consideration amount to a "substantial
factor" or, "but for" the radiation, would the injury not have occurred ? In the ordinary case the plaintiff must prove that more probably than not the radiation was a substantial causal factor inducing the
injury. 92 ' In terms of probability, when reduced to percentages, this
would seem to mean that the chances must be at least fifty per cent plus
that the radiation caused the injury and that the chances of all other
possible causes together actually having caused the injury are slightly
less than fifty per cent.
A few cases to the contrary notwithstanding, as pointed out in the
multiple causation discussion, the majority of judicial opinions have
stated or implied that they are following the "more probable than not"
standard. 926 How the legal fact finding process really works perhaps
never will be known. Certainly the reading of appellate court opinions
cannot begin to furnish the answer, if for no other reason than that an
infinitesimally small portion of the litigated cases get to the appellate
courts. In addition, lawyers who try cases in the lower courts freSupra notes 751-53. See also Harper & James
SuPra note 770.
92& Cases cited supra note 88o.

92 3
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quently are unable to recognize their cases as they are described in appellate court opinions.
A real understanding of how the fact finding system works in the law
would require a complete study; not only of how juries react, but also
how trial judges and plaintiffs' and defendants' attorneys think in such
situations. In addition, a factual study would need to be made of the
kinds of evidence used in thousands of trials, and, once the evidence
was collected, the necessary analysis to make sense from the material
would require a statistician and an IBM machine to aid all the other
experts.
Realizing these limitations, however, the lawyer must take account
of the rules and concepts laid down by the appellate courts which have
more or less effect on the actual trial of cases and, therefore, even the
settlement of cases. Also, even though the appellate approach to the
proof problem cannot be described adequately in the generalities dictated by the format of legal treatises, such generalizations can be helpful to the lawyer who is seeking the cases from which he must distill the
approach of the appellate courts.
Certain generalizations that can be made are summarized briefly below. In addition, attached as an appendix· at the end of this section are
briefs of a group of representative cases which have dealt, in one way
or another, with the standards of probability. The cases thus briefed
support the following general propositions. When a case is mentioned
in the text or footnotes of this section by name only, it can: be found in
its alphabetical location in the Table of Cases-Problems of Proof .
.If one accepts the frequency with which a problem appears in appellate opinions as an indication of its importance, one would have to conclude that the instruction given by the court to the jury prior to· its
reaching a verdict is of key significance. Again accepting numbers as
the proper criterion in determining the weight of authority, the instruction to the jury in most cases is to the effect that the evidence must
show that it is "reasonably certain" or "reasonably probable," both that
defendant's negligence caused a harmful force to affect the plaintiff and
that the harmful force caused the injury that has been alleged. Many
cases deal specifically with the second causation question, namely, did
the defendant's force cause the biological result observed in the
plaintiff? 928
928 See the Boland, Charlton, Cohenour, Menarde, Ramberg, Vaccaro, and Walker
cases as throwing some light on this test, infra Table of Cases at end of this section:
"Reasonably" is not always tacked on "probable." Sometimes "certainty" ( ? ) is required, Menarde case; and see also DiFazio v. J. G. Brill Co., 133 Pa. Super. 576,
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There are cases, however, in which words on their face indicating a
somewhat lower standard than "reasonably certain" or "probable'' have,
been used by appellate courts or have been approved by such courts in
reviewing the standards set by trial courts. Such words as "possible,"
"likely," "could," and "liable," have been used or approved by appellate
courts. 927
Discussed in a number of appellate court decisions 928 has been the
question of the effect of other possible causes on the plaintiff's proofthe question of whether the plaintiff must produce evidence explaining
away other possible causes or whether, on the contrary, the defendant
has the ·burden of showing the probability of suggested alternative
causes. If by "reasonably certain" or "probable" one means "more
probably than not," then by hypothesis the other possible causes added
together do not weigh as heavily as did the force set in motion by the
defendant. By the same token, if an alternative cause suggested by the
defendant is more likely to have been the cause than any other, then by
hypothesis the plaintiff has not proven causation with reasonable certainty or probability. It therefore would· seem more accurate to consider
the question of other possible caus.es as simply ramification of the
reasonably probable rule.

a

3 A.zd 216 (1938); American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Landes, zsz F.zd 751, 753 {5th Cir.
1958) ; Kowalke v. Farmers Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 3 Wis.zd 38g, 88 N.W.zd 747
(1958); Durivage v. Tufts, 94 N.H. 265, 51 A.zd &47 (1947); Howley v. Kantor, 105
Vt. 1z8, 133, 163 Atl. 6z8 (1933). See also cases cited Harper & James 1117, n. JZ.
See also discussion of cases infra noteS 984 ff.
927 Alley, Bearman, Boland, Cohenour, Louisville, Vaccaro, Walker, and Wood
cases, see Table of Cases at end of this section. See also Bogany v. Consolidated
Underwriters, 252 F.2d 764, 767 (sth Cir. 1958). See also cases cited Harper & James
1118, n. 33·
· 928 Bucher, Charlton, Cohenour, Combrooks, Ingersoll, Magazine, Ramberg, Vaccaro, Walker, and Wood cases, see Table of Cases at end of this section.

TABLE OF CASES-PROBLEMS OF PROOF
The cases here briefed are representative of the thousands that could be cited dealing
with the proof concepts discussed in the preceding section and in the ones to follow.
They are arranged olphabeticaliy to facilitate reference to them if the reader wants to
check the authority for numerous· statements made in the accompanying text discussions.
The same case often supports more than one proposition and they are not arranged by
particular subject matters as such. Each contains a detailed statement of facts and
quotations from the opinion of the court bearing on the important holdings or implications of the case.
Alley v. Charlotte Pipe & Foundry Co., 159 N.C. J27, 74 S.E. 885 (1912). Plaintiff
was injured when a defective core for molding pipe caused molten metal to flow onto
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plaintiff and seriously burn him. The negligence charged against the employer ·was
that it had hired an incompetent core-maker and kept him on the job notwithstanding
that it knew him to be such. The jury found that the company was negligent and that
plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negligence. A verdict of $6,ooo damages was
returned.
Defendant contended that the court should not have permitted a physician to state
"that the character of the plaintiff's wound was such that a sarcoma, or eating cancer,
was liable to ensue." The court said the rule was that such testimony should be confined to probable consequences, "but in this instance we do not think the physician
indulged in pure speculation. . . . The word 'liable' is defined as 'exposed to a certain
contingency more or less probable.' Webster's Dictionary. The word was used by the
witness iri the sense of probable, and was doubtless so understood by the jury." (P. 330)
As to mental anguish the court said : "We think the evidence competent also as
tending to prove acute mental suffering accompanying a physical injury. The liability
to cancer must necessarily have a most depressing effect upon the injured person. Like
the sword of Damocles, he knows not when it will fall." (P. 33I)
Ayers v. Hoage (Deputy Commissioner), 63 F.2d 364 (I933). Plaintiff (appellant)
was employed by Langmead's Arm Chair Lunch in the District of Columbia from
I925 to I9JI when he was found to be suffering from tuberculosis. During employment plaintiff lived in the same house with a tubercular sister.
Plaintiff filed a claim under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act, which
was rejected by defendant on the ground that: (I) Plaintiff failed to establish either
an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of ·employment or that he was
suffering from occupational disease or infection that arose naturally out of such employment; (2) it was not shown that there was aggravation, activation, or acceleration
of a pre-existing condition due to employment.
· Plaintiff worked long hours and ate at irregular times. He was employed sometimes
as a bus boy, short order cook, and counterman. He contracted a cold of unknown
origin in January 193I. He usually work~d twelve hours a day. In the middle of
January a sewer trap in the lunchroom overflowed for about one week and plaintiff
got his feet wet. Plaintiff testified that he contracted tuberculosis or the cold because
of his employment. Expert testimony was given as follows :
(I) Dr. Walters-plaintiff's family physician. A bad cold will act as an accelerant.
Many other predisposing factors will do this also: long hours, continual exposure to
draughts, irregular meals'. It is possible to contract the disease from dishes, silverware,
etc., or from plaintiff's sister. Did not testify that plaintiff contracted tuberculosis at
the lunchroom.
·
.
(2) Dr. Tewksbury-tuberculosis specialist, twenty years, 40,000 cases. Possible to
carry tuberculosis bacilli and the infection for many years. Sputum test neg;itiv_e is
not conclusive (Dr. Walters had obtained negative n;sults in I928). Twelve hours
of work a day would not cause tuberculosis nor cause it to flare up, nor would a cold
do so, nor standing in water. Could come in contact with the bacilli anywhere any
time; many infected people were wandering about. It is not probable that cold lowered
resistance to the spread of tuberculosis . . . though possible. Tuberculosis is not" a
disease peculiar to restaurant workers ; very few cases seen involving restaurant
workers. The percentage of cases among restaurant workers is about average; the
same as clerks in the government departments ; danger of coming in contact with
bacil!i is just as great on the outside as inside. No way of prO'Ving definitely where
the i11dividual gets the disease.
(3) Dr. Avery-In I928 took a negative sputum test of plaintiff. Plaintiff's tonsils
then badly infected (should have been removed). Sputum test is not a positive sign.
Any exposure may accelerate the condition of tuberculosis; anything causing an un-
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usual strain on the resistance would have a tendency to aggravate. (Dr. Avery was a
general practitioner and surgeon.)
Decision: Decree dismissing plaintiff's bill affirmed.
An injury "arises out of" the employment within the meaning of the Compensation
Act when it occurs in the course of the employment and as the result of a risk
involved in or incidental to the employment or to the conditions under which it is
required to be performed. The mere fact that the injury is contemporaneous or coincident with the employment is not a sufficient basis for an award.
The question the court must answer is : "Was the employment a proximate cause
of the disablement, or was the injured condition merely contemporaneous or coincident
with the employment?" (P. 365)
It conclusively appeared that tuberculosis is not peculiar to restaurant workers, and
that the disease may be contracted in any place frequented by the public. To hold
that there. was a causal connection between the disease and the employment would be
to indulge in conjecture.
Bearman v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 186 F.2d 662 (1oth Cir. 1951). Action
on a life insurance policy which insured against loss of life resulting directly from
bodily injuries and independently of all other causes. Immediately before the final
illness the insured was struck on the back by an apparently unknown object. He died
six weeks later. Prior to the injury he was in apparent good health.
An autopsy revealed atherosclerosis of the left coronary artery and a thrombus completely occluding that artery. Three experts testified that this was probably a long standing disease, that in their opinion there was no relation between the disease and the accident, and that there was no causal connection between the injury and the atherosclerosis,
the rupture of the atheromatous abscess, the thrombosis, or the coronary occlusion.
They also testified that trauma or strain may produce a coronary occlusion and that
the injury might have contributed to the death. Judgment for defendant was affirmed.
Whether there was causal connection between the accident and resulting
injury and the atherosclerosis, the rupture of the atheromatous abscess, the
thrombosis, or the coronary occlusion presented a question for solution not
within the competency of laymen, and a question with respect to which, only
a medical expert with training, skill, and experience could form a considered
judgment and express an intelligent opinion. Indeed, it perhaps would require
a medical expert trained and experienced in a specialised field.
The great weight of authority supports the rule that medical expert testimony to be sufficient to take the case to the jury must be to the effect that the
accident or injury Probably caused the Insured's death; and that testimony to
the effect that a causal connection between the accident or injury and Insured's
ensuing death was possible, such as testimony that the accident or injury
"might have," or "may have," or "could have" caused the death of Insured,
is insufficient to take the case to the jury, because such testimony leaves the
issue in the field of conjecture and permits the jury to speculate or guess as
to the cause of death. (P. 665) (Emphasis added.)

Boland v. Vanderbilt, 140 Conn. 520, 102 A.2d 362 (1953). The plaintiff was injured
in an automobile accident in which the jury found the defendant negligent. Plaintiff
claimed to have sustained (1) strains, bruises, and contusions, and (2) that he suffered
a cerebral thrombosis seventeen days after the accident.
Trial of the case came some two and one half years after the accident. At this time
plaintiff's left arm was almost completely paralyzed, he walked with ·great difficulty,
he suffered constant buzzing in his head, headaches, and dizzy spells. He had to be
driven about to do his work and was earning less than formerly. Judgment for plaintiff affirmed.
The defendant claimed there was no evidence to support an award for future permanent injury, pain, and sufferiitg. The court pointed out that plaintiff was healthy before
the injury and that his injuries were readily apparent. "Speaking broadly, the jury
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had the opportunity to appraise his condition and the probable future consequences
of it." (P. 523) The court distinguished this case from another in which the injuries
were "of such a nature that the extent and probable duration of future disability by
reason of it could not have been ascertained by the jury without the aid of testimony
upon that element of damage [a knee injury]."
The defendant also maintained that plaintiff failed to establish any causal relation
between the accident and the cerebral thrombosis. The court said "The occurrence of
a post-traumatic cerebral accident or thrombosis is recognized by medical science.
There is a likely connection between the plaintiff's cerebral thrombosis and the automobile accident. . . ." (P. 525)
To be entitled to damages a plaintiff must establish a causal relation between
the injury and the physical condition which he claims resulted from it ... .
This causal connection must rest upon more than surmise or conjecture... .
A trier is not concerned with possibilities but with reasonable probabilities .
. . . The causal relation between an injury and its later physical effects may
be established by the direct opinion of a physician, by his deduction by the
process of eliminating causes other than the traumatic agency, or by his
opinion based upon a hypothetical question. . . .
The medical witness here testified, in answer to a hypothetical question, that there
was a "likely connection." The court found this to mean "[o]f such a nature or so
circumstanced as to render something probable ... (a]ppearing like truth; seeming
to justify belief. . . ." (Emphasis added.) (P. 525)
Bucher v. Wisccm.sin Central Ry., 139 Wis. 597, 120 N.W. 518 (1909). Plaintiff
was injured on September 26, 1!)06, while standing on the step of an engine cab, leaning out to catch a signal from a conductor. His head struck a standpipe along the
right-of-way as the train moved past at ten to fifteen miles per hour. Plaintiff was
examined the same day by a physician employed by defendant. There was a contusion
and small swelling on the back of his head and a contusion on his right hip and right
shoulder. He made no complaint about his ear, _but complained of pain in his left
testicle. The doctor examined and found a small chronic varicocele. Plaintiff testified
that he was in sound health before the accident, that he was in bed about a week after
it, that he went to work (for another employer) in November an4 worked until the
middle of Jaunary. In February plaintiff called on Dr. Corbitt when he was suffering
from an acute attack of grippe. He also complained of pain in his head, dizziness,
loss of sleep, numbness in the arms, impotency, and tenderness in the upper and lower
parts of his spine.
Dr. Corbitt testified that the nerve controlling erection was contained in the sacro
pleris, and that plaintiff was tender in that region, that the brain, spinal cord, and the
penval nerves all take part in the phenomenon of erection, that he believed from an
examination of the plaintiff and the injury that there was sufficient injury to either
the brain or the spinal cord from the blow on the back of the head to cause permanent
impotency.
Dr. Brazeau (specialist in eye, ear, nose, and throat) examined plaintiff and found
him to be suffering from suppuration of the middle ear. He cautiously stated that this
condition might have been caused by the accident. An osteopath testified that the
accident as described could have caused the injuries complained of. . . . The jury
found for plaintiff ($4,ooo1.
In reversing and remanding, the court pointed to the period of apparent good health
of about five months following the accident and before the attack of grippe, and that
the opinions regarding impotency were given by men who saw plaintiff after the
attack of grippe. The court said :
The verdict of a jury founded upon facts is entitled to great weight, and is
almost conclusive upon this court if supported by any evidence. But the verdict

TORT LIABILITY

434

of a jury founded only upon the opinion of experts concerning the cause of a
condition, which condition is itself established by the opinion of experts, has
no such weight. (P. 6o6)
Opinions of medical men may be rejected as an insufficient basis for a finding
of fact by a jury where the court is convinced that reasonable certainty is
outside of the possibilities of the situation. (P. 007)
The court further pointed out that one physician found plaintiff to be suffering from
grippe and having a suppurated ear, with some indications of varicocele and fever five
months after the accident, and that this physician was of the opinion that plaintiff's
sexual impotence was not due to any of these causes, but rather to the accidental
injury. It was pointed out that he did not see plaintiff until five months after the
accident, nor see the actual wounds or injuries, nor was there any evidence that they
were described to him. The court pointed out that the physician who examined the
plaintiff immediately after the accident found a chronic varicocele, and that "Dr. Allen
McLane Hamilton, in his work entitled 'Legal Medicine,' expresses the opinion that
varicocele except in its earlier stages finally results in the production of both impotence
and sterility." (P. 009) Apparently another treatise informed the court that grippe
could cause impotence.
In discussing the character of such an injury as impotence the court said:
It is very easy to exaggerate before a jury the cause, effect, or probable
permanency of such a condition as impotence. The same is true with regard
to nervous disorders. Both are easy to feign, hard to disprove, exaggerated by
auto-suggestion, and it is comparatively easy for an expert to have an opinion
tracing either to a particular physical injury instead of to a disease, a mental
condition, or a general impairment of health. If loss of sexual power is to
be thrown into the scale as an item for which the plaintiff is entitled to be
compensated in a personal injury case, common sense informs us that in practically all cases of severe injury, pain, suffering, or sickness there must be
and ordinarily is during such period of stress a suspension of the sexual functions .. -.. The consequence of considering this as an additional or independent
item of damages must be that every sick or injured man may assert his sexual
impotence as a ground for recovery additional to pain. sickness, or suffering,
and thus duplicate damages. Cases may no doubt occur of direct injury to
the generative organs in which some such ground of damages would not be a
matter of mere conjecture, and what is here said has no reference to such
cases. ( P. 6og)
The court then found that Dr. Corbitt, under the circumstances detailed, and five
months after the injury, had no certain or satisfactory data upon which to base his
opinion that the impotency of the plaintiff, if it existed, was caused by the accident.
The court discounted the testimony of the osteopaths entirely.
In concluding, the court stated:
The testimony of experts is proverbially unreliable at best, even when the
experts are learned and competent, because bias is almost unavoidable on
account of our mode of selecting experts, and bias requires small basis upon
which to ground an opinion. But where this unreliability is accentuated by
a showing that the expert has little or no data upon which to base the
opinion ... , and the subject upon which he expresses an opinion is one
recognized by the approved learning of the times to be of great doubt and
difficulty, or where the alleged expert demonstrates his lack of knowledge by
his testimony, [as the osteopaths apparently did] such. testimony will not be
sufficient to support a verdict which to this court seems unjust or excessive.
(Pp. 611-12)

Charlton Bros. v. Garrettson, r88 Md. 85, 51 A.2d 642 (1947). Following an
operation for bilateral hernia, and about two weeks after returning to work, the
plaintiff, in a collision between the streetcar of one defendant and the truck and
trailer of the other, was thrown forward and struck in the region of the groin by the
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frame of the seat ahead of him. Plaintiff claimed it caused "terrible pain." Following
the incident the plaintiff was in the care of Dr. Wilkerson, who performed the hernia
operation. The doctor testified that in his belief the accident produced a recurrent
hernia. He further testified that the only curative treatment is another operation, that
there was no "more than a fifty-fifty chance" of cure, that ten per cent of the hernias
operated on recur without accident, but that this particular type of hernia is a direct
hernia, i.e., one that must be acquired, and ordinarily is due to some abdominal trauma.
(An indirect hernia is one for which all the elements necessary for it to occur are
present at birth.)
The defendant claimed reversible error in the court's charge to the jury to the effect
that it might consider whether the injuries would be permanent, and in overruling
objections to Dr. Wilkerson's testimony as to causal connection, as to the chance of
cure, and as to a "direct hernia." Apparently the doctor did not hear the testimony in
the case. Judgment for plaintiff approved .
. . . It was not necessary for him (the doctor) to hear the testimony. [Since
he had unusually extensive, firsthand acquaintance with the plaintiff's condition.] (P. 93)
The law requires proof of probable, not merely possible, facts, including
causal relations. Reasoning post hoc, propter hoc is a recognized logical
fallacy, a non sequitur. But sequence of events, plus proof of possible causal
relation, may amount to proof of probable causal relations, in the absence of
evidence of any other equally probable cause. [Italics by court.] . . . We are
not required or permitted to assume that the collision and the new hernia
were a mere coincidence and that the hernia would have recurred if there had
been no collision.
There is also evidence of permanent injury. Plaintiff is [Italics by court.]
permanently injured, unless he is cured by a formidable operation, which offers
a so per cent chance of cure. Before the collision· his condition involved a
10 per cent risk of recurrence. His present condition, if [Italics by court.]
he undergoes another operation, involves a so per cent risk of recurrence.
This increase in hazard is itself a permanent injury. Expert testimony hardly
seems necessary to show that such an operation would ·leave plaintiff in a
permanently weaker condition. (P. 94) (Emphasis added.)

Cohenour v. Smart, 205 Okla. 668, 240 P.2d 91, (19SI). Plaintiff alleged serious
injuries as a result of an automobile accident caused by defendant. Following the
accident, the plaintiff got out of the car and walked around, and gave no indication
of injury whatsoever. He told a highway patrolman that he "was fortunate because
he had a weak back and was not even hurt." Plaintiff had been injured in a similar
accident twelve years previously. He also had been in an accident the previous year,
but claimed he had suffered no permanent injuries as a result of either event. He had
been a frequent visitor to doctors both before and after the accident, but he did not
complain to any of them of having received an injury in this accident. Examination
showed that at some time two of his vertebrae had become compressed.
This action was commenced thirteen months after the accident. The only medical
witness called by the plaintiff was one who examined him two years after the accident
for purposes of testifying. This witness testified that the accident could have caused
the condition in plaintiff's back. Judgment for plaintiff reversed.
Did the plaintiff establish by expert testimony that the plaintiff's injuries were
a result of the accident . . . ? The answer to this question necessitates the
consideration of two points, the first being: Did Dr. Rice testify with sufficient
definiteness that plaintiff's injuries were the result of the accident . . . ? and
second: Were the other accidents in which plaintiff was involved properly
eliminated as possible causes of his alleged injuries? We think the answe~; is
"No." (P. 670)
The plaintiff must show that the accident probably did cause the injuries.
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[T]he authorities clearly hold that medical testimony as to the possibility
of a causal relation between a given accident or injury and the subsequent
impaired physical condition of the person injured is not sufficient, standing
alone, to establish such a relation. (P. 670)
The court also pointed out that Dr. Rice testified on cross-examination that plaintiff's injuries could have been caused at another time than the date of the accident.
"We think that until the plaintiff has eliminated other possible causes of his injuries
as being the sufficient cause, he should not recover." (P. 671)
Cole v. Simpson, 299 Mich. 589, 1 N.W.2d 2 (1941). Plaintiff claimed to have been
injured when she was dragged by a bus from which she was alighting. No one saw
the accident and there was considerable doubt whether the accident ever occurred.
The only outward evidences of injury were a few abrasions and bruises on her left
leg and hand and on her face. Five months after the accident the plaintiff complained
of pain iri her back. Ten months after the accident X-rays disclosed that she was
suffering from duodenitis and colitis, the latter in ulcerated form. Her main complaint is that the accident caused frequent, irregular, and very prolonged and painful
menses.
There was medical testimony that duodenitis and ulcerated colitis, because of the
advanced stage disclosed by X-rays, must have developed before the alleged accident.
There was evidence that the menstrual difficulty was caused by this diseased condition;
however, one of the plaintiff's medical experts, when asked whether he had any opinion
based upon reasonable medical certainty whether or not the findings he had ~nade (a
considerable period after the injury) "could have been caused by a fall or being
dragged," answered, "Why it was possible, yes." He further stated that the possibility was "very great," "So per cent possible." Another medical witness for the
plaintiff (the doctor who had been treating her) felt that the menstrual injury,
duodenitis and ulcerated colitis were the result of a previous accident. ] udgment for
the plaintiff reversed on other grounds. (On subsequent discovery the defendant
showed that plaintiff was a professional in personal injury actions.)
We agree that this testimony has very little probative value ; that medicine
is not such an exact science that the cause of disease can always be determined
and it Inay be said that in most instances there is a possibility that any untoward condition may cause a more serious one. However, there was no error
in admitting the testimony. In Htmter
Village of Ithaca, 141 Mich. 539,
we held that it was not improper to ask a witness whether an injury "could
cause" a condition rather than whether such an injury would be likely to cause
such result. We held that the objection went to the weight of the question
rather than to its admissibility. The weight of authority sustains this ruling.
(Pp. 595-6)

v.

Comeau v. Beck, 319 Mass. 17, 64 N.E.2d 436 (1945). The plaintiff testified that
she was three months pregnant at the time of the automobile collision for which the
defendant was responsible. She further testified that the force of the collision threw
her against the steering wheel, that she experienced pain and nausea, that she was
obliged to stay in bed after the accident for a week, and that on the nil_tth day after
the accident she suffered a miscarriage. She introduced no medical evidence on her
behalf.

The defendant called as a witness a doctor, who had examined the plaintiff about
six months after the accident. He testified thit there was grave doubt that she had
suffered a miscarriage, and that, if she did, it was not as a result of the accident. On
appeal the defendant contended that the jury could not, unassisted by expert medical
testimony, find that the plaintiff suffered a miscarriage or that such a miscarriage was
causally related to the accident.
The court held that the plaintiff's own testimony as to her pregnancy and that she
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suffered a miscarriage was sufficient evidence for the issue of the injury to go to the
jury. With respect to the issue of causal connection the court stated:
The testimony of an expert that such causal connection exists, or probably
exists, has been held sufficient. . . . (E]xpert testimony that merely shows
"that such (causal) relation is possible, conceivable or reasonable, without
more, leaves the issue trembling in the balance." But there is no rule o{ law
that this relation must be proved only by expert testimony. . . . Expert testimony that an accident would be an adequate cause of subsequent disease has
been held "sufficient, taken in connection with the plaintiff's testimony that his
health was good before the accident." . . .
We think, although with some hesitation, that the plaintiff's testimony with
respect to the accident and the condition of her health afterwards, in conjunction with the testimony of the defendant's doctor to the effect that a miscarriage might be produced by "some injury, (or by) the striking of the
abdomen," was enough to support a finding that the plaintiff's miscarriage
was causally related to the accident." (Pp. 19-20)
Judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed.
Cornbrooks v. Terminal Barber Shops, Inc., 282 N.Y. 217, 26 N.E.2d 25 (1940).
The plaintiff sought damages for loss of the sight of his left eye, alleged to have
resulted from the negligent operation of an electric vibrator by a barber employed by
the defendant. The electric vibrator came in contact with the left side of the plaintiff's
face on January 9, 1934. The plaintiff testified that there was an unpleasant jarring
sensation; however, he sensed no further discomfort until the afternoon of the same
day when he became aware of a dimness of vision which gradually became more
pronounced. By January 15 the sight of the plaintiff's left eye was reduced to ten
per cent of normal. Medical examination revealed that the retina had been torn. Prior
to application of the vibrator, the left eye had been moderately nearsighted. Both
before and after the injury the eye was entirely free from disease or infection.
Plaintiff's experts testified that the most common causes of a retinal detachment
are trauma, jarring, or body strain. The plaintiff testified that he had undergone no
unusual exertion nor sustained any blow. These experts testified that the detachment
of the retina is not accompanied by pain, and that the vibration would have been a
competent producing cause of the injury. Even the defendant's experts (barbers)
testified that the vibrator should never be applied to the face.
The plaintiff was given judgment and the defendant prosecuted the appeal on the
ground of a failure to show cause-in-fact. He supported the assertion by citing the
experts' testimony to the effect that the injury might have been caused by a jolt or
jarring sustained on a subway train, a taxicab, or a bus, in which vehicles the plaintiff had admitted riding on the gth of January. The defendant offered no proof of
such incidents. With respect to these contentions of the defendant,- the court stated :
But the significant fact is that the record contains no proof that plaintiff had
been jarred or jolted at any time and, to the contrary, the plaintiff denied such
an occurrence.
It is not enough that the defendant, in an effort to break the chain of causation, should prove that plaintiff's injury might [Italics by court.] have resulted
from other possible causes, nor is it required of the plaintiff that he eliminate
by his proof all other possible causes." . . . It is enough that he shows facts
and conditions from which the negligence of the defendant and the causation
of the accident by that negligence may be reasonably inferred." (P. 223)
(Emphasis added.)
The judgment for the plaintiff was a(Jirmed.
Fidelity & Ca.rualty Co. of New York v. Industrial Accident Commission, 84 Cal.
App. so6, 258 P. 6g8 (1927). Proceeding in certiorari to review an order of the
Commission awarding compensation for the death of an employee of Balfour, Guthrie
& Co. Deceased was sent by his employer from San Francisco to Valparaiso, Chile,
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to attend a nitrate conference. On the return trip he stopped at Arequipa, Peru,
pursuant to his employers' orders to visit company customers. There he contracted
typhoid fever and died. Due to unsanitary conditions, typhoid in both Chile and Peru,
while not epidemic, was prevalent and a constant source of danger. At least one of
the deceased's superiors was familiar with the health conditions in both countries, and
had warned deceased to this effect advising him concerning the precautions to be
taken. The Commission found deceased sustained injury arising out of and in the
course of employment. Judgment was for plaintiff.
This court was without power to determine weight to be given the evidence ...
or which of two opposing inferences should be drawn therefrom. Claimant was not
required to show proximate cause by a preponderance of the evidence. The evidence
need merely be reasonably sufficient to support the award.
The distinguishing feature between this and prior cases where an award is denied
is that here at least one of the employers was aware of the greater prevalence of the
disease in the places to which the deceased was sent. "... [A]nd we are unable to
say that the conclusion of the Commission that the employee was subjected to an
exposure in excess of the commonalty was not reasonabiy supported." (P. 510)
"Commonalty" means the great body of citizens, the mass of people.
. . . [A]n employee who contracts a contagious or infectious disease has the
burden of showing affirmatively that he was subjected to an exposure in
excess of that of the commonalty and in the absence of such showing his
illness or death cannot be said to have been proximately caused by an injury
arising out of his employment . . . the question is one of fact for the Commission, and its finding thereon if reasonably supported cannot be disturbed.
(P. soB)
Furthermore, the evidence sufficiently shows that the inhabitants of these
localities, while not immune from the disease, were less subject to infection
therefrom than foreigners. . . . (P. 510)

Harris v. Hindman, 130 Ore. 15, .278 P. 954 (1929). The defendant hit the plaintiff
in the eye with his fist. The abrasion which resulted did not heal. Subsequent examination revealed the presence of a cancerous growth, for which the plaintiff sought
damages.
In appealing from the judgment for the plaintiff the defendant contended that the
opinions of the plaintiff's five medical experts rose no higher than inference in the
scale of evidence. In affirming the judgment and disposing of the defendant's contentions, the court quoted from Chamberlayne on Evidence (§r8n):
"The necessity for receiving the reasoning of skilled witnesses is selfevident. . . . [T]he skilled witness, as an observer, is permitted to state facts
perceived by him with the same admixture of reasoning which is allowed the
ordinary percipient. The presence, on his part, of a new element, that of
special knowledge, has several marked effects, in an administrative point of
view. Among these, it may be noted in the first place, that the large number
of data, professional reading, past observations, and the like, us~ally broadens
the basis of the reasoning of the skilled witness to such an extent as to make
his mental deduction from his observations resemble, not so much an inference,
as a conclusion." (P. 18) (Emphasis added.)

Howley v. Kantor, 105 Vt. 128, 163 At!. 628 (1932). The plaintiff was struck and
injured by the defendant's automobile while she was crossing the street. It was not
questioned that the evidence reasonably justified a finding by the jury that negligence
of the defendant proximately caused the accident. The real issue (for our purposes)
was with respect to expert testimony.
An expert testified that a growth on the plaintiff's left breast was caused by trauma.
Apparently it was conceded that the accident was the cause of the growth. The expert
further testified that such growths may be either simple tumors, which easily are
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removed and cured, or may be malignant or cancerous growths, that to determine
their character it is necessary to remove and examine them microscopically. With
respect to the type of growth the witness testified that they "run about eighty per cent
cancerous." No evidence ·or testimony was offered as to the character of the plaintiff's
growth; the witness was unwilling to state whether it was a simple or a cancerous
growth. The trial court left it to the jury to decide, and the jury apparently found
that the growth was a cancer or could become a cancer. The defendant took exception
to the 'failure of the trial court to charge the jury that the evidence was not sufficient
to justify a finding that there was a cancerous growth and that it was not to consider
such a condition as an element of damages.
In reversing and remanding a judgment for the plaintiff, the court stated:
Competent expert medical testimony was essential to lay a foundation for
this claim made by the plaintiff. . . . To support such a claim, the evidence
must be of such a character that the jury can find that there is a reasonable
certainty or a reasonable probability that the apprehended future consequences
will ensue from the original injury. Consequences which are contingent, speculative, or merely possible are not entitled to consideration in ascertaining the
damages. (P. 133) (Emphasis added.)
In considering the expert testimony and establishing its legal effect, the court went
on to state:
The record before us does not disclose any opinion of the medical witness
as to the probable future development a:nd result of the plaintiff's breast condition. His answer, "run about eighty per cent cancerous," does not have the
effect claimed for it. The witness did not say that in his opinion the chances
are eighty per cent that the growth is Cancerous, but, rather, as is clearly
indicated, that from his experience and the history of other cases injury to
the breast producing tumor developed about eighty per cent cancerous.
(P. 133)
This testimony and the inferences to be drawn from it were held to be too conjectural
and speculative to furnish a basis for the assessment of future damages.
·
Ingersoll v. Liberty Bank of Buffalo, 278 N.Y. 1, 14 N.E.2d 828 (1938). In this
case there was clear evidence that the basement stairs in a house owned and leased
by the defendant were defective. The defects had been pointed out to the defendant,
but they had not been remedied. The decedent, a lessee of the house, who weighed
214 pounds and was carrying a 32-pound package was discovered by the plaintiff, his
wife, at the bottom of the stairs. A piece of the tread of the second stair from the
bottom was broken off. Inspection showed it to have happened at an old crack. Shortly
after the accident the decedent said to his wife, "Something brqke, . . . Something
gave away in here," (pointing to his chest). He died several months later as a result
of injuries sustained in the fall. There was evidence indicating that decedent had been
suffering from a heart disease at the time of the accident. Neither was the body of
the decedent much bruised, nor the package he was carrying greatly damaged.
The defendant contended that the decedent fainted or lost his footing on the stair
as a result of his physical condition. He claimed that this must have happened at or
near the top of the stairs and that the package broke the stair as it fell.
The trial court submitted to the jury the question as to which inference should be
drawn. The jury found for the plaintiff. The appellate division reversed and dismissed the complaint on the ground that plaintiff had failed to show a causal connection between the defect and the injury.
In reversing the decision of the appellate division, the court of appeals pointed out
that the defendant's inference was possible but unlikely since neither the package nor
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the decedent were shown to have been bruised sufficiently to warrant the inference
that they had fallen from very far up the stairway. The court went on to state that
Where the facts proven show that there are several possible causes of an
injury, for one or more of which the defendant was not responsible, and it is
just as reasonable and probable that the injury was the result of one cause as
the other, plaintiff cannot have a recovery, since he has failed to prove that
the negligence of the defendant caused the injury. . . . This does not mean
that the plaintiff must eliminate every other possible cause. . . . The existence
of remote possibilities that factors other than the negligence of the defendant
may have caused the accident, does not require a holding that plaintiff has
failed to make out a prima facie [Italics by court.] case. It is enough that he
show facts and conditions from which the negligence of the defendant and the
.causation of the accident by that negligence may be reasonably inferred. (P. 7)
(Emphasis added.)
Applying this rule to the facts in issue the court further stated that
In the case at bar the natural and reasonable inference is that the plaintiff
was descending the stairway with the box, when the defective tread broke
under his foot and caused him to fall. There was evidence that the decedent
suffered from heart disease, and the jury might have reached the conclusion
that he fell because of heart attack or dizziness. The question was one for the
jury and .the complaint should not have been dismissed. (Pp. 8-9)

Kramer Service, Inc. v. Wilkins, 184 Miss. 483, 186 So. 625 (1938). Plaintiff was
injured while opening a door in defendant's hotel when a broken piece of transom
glass fell upon his head. The wound in the temple did not heal. About two years
after the accident it was found that at the point where the injury occurred a skin
cancer had developed. The jury awarded a $20,000 verdict.
The only two medical experts testified that there is no causal connection whatever
between trauma and cancer, and went on to observe that if there were such a connection nearly every person of mature age would be suffering from cancer.
In affirming as to liability but reversing and remanding as to the amount of damages, the court stated:
And the medical testimony is conclusive on both judge and jury in this
case. That testimony .is undisputed that after long and anxious years of research the exact cause of cancer remains unknown-there is no dependably
known origin to which it can be definitely traced or ascribed. If, then, the
cause be unknown to all those who have devoted their lives to a study of the
subject, it is wholly beyond the range of the common experience and observation of judges and jurors, and in such a case medical testimony when undisputed, as here, must be accepted and acted upon in the same manner as is
other undisputed evidence. . . •
In all other than the exceptional cases now to be mentioned, the testimony
of medical experts, or other experts, is advisory only; but we repeat that
where the issue is one which lies wholly beyond the range of the experience
or observation of laymen and of which they can have appreciable knowledge,
courts and juries must of necessity depend upon and accept the undisputed
testimony of reputable specialists, else there would be no substantial foundation
upon which to rest a oonclusion. (Pp. 498-9) (Emphasis added.)

Lee v. Blessing, 131 Conn. 569, 41 A.2d 337 (1945). The plaintiff was injured in
an automobile accident on December 24, 1942. She sustained a bad bruise over her
left breast. On February 13, 1943, a cystic mastitis was discovered at the precise point
of injury. Apparently none of the medical experts were willing to state that the
mastitis had been either caused or aggravated by the injury with reasonable certainty.
In affirming a judgment for the plaintiff the court stated:
Only the medical testimony is printed. It is highly technical. The jury could
reasonably have found that the cause of cancer is unknown; that the prepon-
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derance of medical opinion today is to the effect that cancer rarely if ever
results from a single trauma; but that the exceptional circumstances surrounding this case, particularly the period that elapsed. between the date of the
trauma and the appearance of the cancer, and the fact that the cancer was
located at the precise point of injury, justified the conclusion that there was a
causal connection between the plaintiff's injury and her cancer. (P. 570)

Louisville Ry. v. Philippina Steubing's Admr., 143 Ky. 364, 136 S.W. 634 (19ll).
The decedent fell from defendant's streetcar by reason of the negligence of the defendant's employee. In doing so the handle of her umbrella bruised her chest. Within
six months after the accident a tumor developed on her breast at the point where she
had been bruised by the umbrella. This tumor further developed into cancer which
caused her death. The judgment was for the plaintiff.
On appeal the defendant insisted that all the evidence as to the cancer should have
been excluded from the jury, as it was not shown that this was the direct and
proximate result of the injury.
In affirming the judgment for the plaintiff the court pointed to evidence showing
that the decedent was a strong healthy woman before the accident and that she suffered constant pain following it. The court also adverted to testimony of physicians
introduced by the plaintiff "to the effect that fifteen per cent of the cases of cancer
of the breast may be traced back to a traumatic injury." While these physicians
admitted that the cause of cancer was unknown, they gave it as their opinion that in
a glandular structure like the breast, where the circulation is very extensive, there
are what are called embryonic cells, and a bruise would start an embryonic cell to
growing and developing into a growth different from the original material. These
experts also testified that falling from a streetcar and having an umbrella punched
into her chest, would be sufficient or probable cause for the condition in which they
found the decedent, that the injury might not cause the· cancer, but might bring about
a condition which would cause it although a cancer otherwise would not have existed,
that any chronic inflammatory condition in the breast was liable to bring about such
a condition, and that a large percentage of the tumors of the breast in women at some
time took on malignancy. The court held that this was sufficient evidence for the
issue of causation to go to the jury.
Magazine v. Shull, n6 Ind. App. 79, 6o N.E.2d 6n (1945). This was a claim
under workmen's compensation statutes. On March 13, 1942, the claimant, while pushing a motor block up an inclined ramp to a truck bed, experienced a sharp and severe
pain in the region of his stomach. ·He became dizzy and cold and was compelled to
rest~ Later, he collapsed in his employer's office. That same day he had two rectal
hemorrhages, and during the following week he had recurrent spells of nausea and
pain. On March 21, he had several hemorrhages, both oral and rectal. On March 24,
after being taken to the hospital, claimant awakened totally and permanently blinded
by bilateral optical atrophy. Prior to this time claimant had had no trouble with his
eyes; however, he apparently had an incipiept stomach ulcer.
A medical expert stated, "It is known on good authority that one single hemorrhage or repeated hemorrhages may exsanguinate the retinas and thereby produce
death of the retinas followed by optic atrophy. That condition is rare but there are
cases reported of such a happening." (P. 84) In response to the question, "Would
you say, doctor, that the result might have occurred in this case?" (Emphasis added.)
the witness replied, "Yes, it just easily could have happened." This was all the
medical testimony favorable to claimant. Nothing was said as to what caused the
hemorrhage. Judgment for plaintiff was affirmed.
It is true that in many jurisdictions courts attach little evidentiary value to
statements of medical experts which are doubtful and equivocal and hold that
the evidence must establish a probability, not a mere possibility, of causal
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connection between an injury and disability. In this state, however, it is settled
law that the opinions of mediCal experts using words such as "might," "could,"
"likely," "possible," "may have," etc., in testifying concerning the causal connection between accident and disability, if coupled with other credible evidence
of a non-medical character, is substantial evidence and sufficient to sustain an
award. . . . In our opinion the chain of events in close sequence, such as the
accident itself followed by pain, dizziness, chill and hemorrhages, at frequent
intervals over a period of I I days, together with the fact that the appellee
previously had had good eyesight and no hemorrhages, is sufficient, under the
rule above announced, to render Dr. Alvis' testimony substantial in character
and of such probative value as the Industrial Board saw fit to give it. (P. 87)
(Emphasis added.)
·

McAllister v. United States, 207 F.2d 952 (2d Cir. I953). Libellant, a second
assistant engineer, employed by the United States on· a government owned vessel,
operated by the War Shipping Administration, brought an action contending that the
respondent had been negligent in creating conditions cqnducive to the transmission of
polio and that the libellant contracted polio as a result of this negligence.
The vessel arrived in Shanghai from New York on September 26, I945, where she
stayed until November 1. Notice was posted and announcements were made by the
master as to the existence of a polio epidemic in the area ; all members of the crew
were warned to avoid contact with the Chinese and to exercise care in eating and
drinking while ashore.
On November I the vessel went to Hong Kong, returning to Shanghai on November II. During this second stay at Shanghai Nationalist Army trucks were loaded on
board the vessel with the aid of Chinese coolies; also Chinese soldiers and mechanics
were taken on board. While a deck toilet was provided for them, no provision was
made to keep the Chinese from using the crew's·toilet facilities. The Chinese in fact
did use these facilities as well as a common drinking fountain on deck. On one occasion
libellant was required to flush the deck latrine. Judgment for libellant reversed. On
appeal to the Supreme Court, 348 U.S. I9, 75 S. Ct. 6 (I954), judgment was reversed,
the court saying :
On evidence showing these facts, including the opinion of the experts, we
think there was substantial evidence from which the District Court [no jury]
could and did find that respondent was negligent in permitting these Chinese, ·
from the infested area of Shanghai,.to have the run of the ship and use of its
facilities, and in furnishing the crude and exposed latrine provided on the deck
of the ship, by reason whereof the petitioner contracted polio.
.
.
Of course no one can say with certainty that the Chinese were the carriers
of the polio virus and that they communicated it to. the petitioner. But upon
balance of the probabilities it seems a reasonable ·inference for the District
Court to make from the facts proved, supported as they were by the best judgment medical experts have upon the subject today,. that petitiqner was contaminated by the Chinese who came aboard the ship November II, 1945, at
Shanghai. (P. 22) (Emphasis added.)
·
··

Menarde v. Philadelphia. Trans. Co., 376 Pa. 497, I03 A.2d 68I (I954). Plaintiff
was injured on May 16th whiie alighting from defendant's streetcar.· T~t evening she
noticed a discoloration on. her right breast. Over the period of the next two and a half
months the discoloration disappear~; h6wever, by the. end of July plaintiff detected a
lump at the exact spot where there had been discoloration. Plaintiff was referred to
a cancer specialist wbo recommended removal of the. entire breast. This operation
was perlormed. Plaintiff's. regular physician testified in very unequivocal terms that
in his opinion the cancer was the direct result of plaintiff's injury. This witness refused
to even concede that the cancer possibly could be caused by anything else. The cancer
specialist, who performed the operation, testified that the trauma sustained by plaintiff
caused the cancer, although in somewhat less emphatic terms. Judgment for plaintiff
·affirmed.
·
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... [T]he expert has to testify, not that the condition of claimant might
have, or even probably did, come from the accident, but that in his professional
opinion the result in question came from the cause alleged. A less direct
expression of opinion falls below the required standard of proof and does not
constitute legally competent evidence. (P. 501) (Emphasis added.)
Where, as here, a person who has enjoyed prior good health sustains an
injury to a particular member and some three months thereafter a malignant
nodule appears in precisely the same location as the bruise, and two doctors
conclude that the cancer resulted from the trauma, causal connection between
the accident and the disease is sufficiently established. . . . (P. · 503)
... Since their statements [those of plaintiff's two experts] exhibit no absolute contradiction respecting the fundamental issue, it was legally competent
evidence and was properly submitted to the jury. (P. 503)

Payne v. Charndler, 41 Ga. App. 385, 153 S.E. g6 (1930). In this case the court
pointed out that the mere fact that one event chronologically follows another is alone
insufficient to establish a causal relationship between them. In a remarkably elliptical
opinion the court merely stated : .
. . . Evidence that a woman suffered a pain in her heart and other physical
ailments after having swallowed a liquid, the nature and character of which
does not appear except that it was suitable for use as a hypodermic by a
dentist while operating in a person's mouth and possessed a bitter and disagreeable taste, is, in the absence of evidence as to any facts tending to show
a causal relation between the woman's physical condition and the swallowing
of the liquid, insufficient to authorize an inference of fact that her condition
was caused by the swallowing and the ill tasting effects of the liquid. (P. 386)

Ramberg v. Morgan, 209 Iowa 474, 218 N.W. 492 (1928). In this case plaintiff's
intestate was struck by an automobile. He was brought by the driver of the automobile to the police station. In response to a call, the doctor, an assistant police
surgeon, arrived at the station. about an hour after the acCident. He found decedent
on the floor of a cell in an unconscious condition. The doctor examined decedent.
He diagnosed the case as intoxication, stating that he found no evidence of head
injury. He left decedent, still unconscious, lying on the floor of the cell, and did not
see him again. Decedent remained unconscious· for six hours; thirty-one hours later
he was taken home in a stupor, complaining of .an "awful headache." His condition
became worse, and he died four days after the accident.
Autopsy revealed a fracture of the sutures of the parietal and occipital bones near
the base of the skull and indicated that decedent had died as a result of anemia of the
brain, or medullary edema, due to pressure of fluid inside the skull.
I~ bringing action against the doctor for negligence, the plaintiff did not plead that
the doctor's omission caused, aggravated, or accelerated. the death, but apparently
alleged that in all probability the decedent's life could have been saved had defendant
exercised reasonable care and skill, and that this omission was the efficient and
·
proximate cause of the death.
All the medical experts who testified suggested but one proper course of procedure
when confronted with a situation such as this. Apparently there was ample variance
between such a procedure and the doctor's examination. The supreme court held that
the trial court was justifiedin overruling defendant's motion for a directed verdict and
submitting the issue of breach of the standard of care to the jury.
The principal issue on appeal was that· involving cause-in-fact. The .court pointed
·
out that:
The only recognized standard in such cases is essentially within the domain of
expert testimony. . . . Nor is the value of expert opinion to be determined
by col!llting noses, as in this case two physicians were called by the plaintiff,
and three by the defendant, to testify on the proximate cause .of death ..
But, if plaintiff's own medical experts are in doubt, and could not, on the
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hypothetical question put to them, state with any reasonable certainty that the
death of decedent was aggravated or accelerated by the negligence of the
defendant, how could a court or jury determine such proposition? (Pp. 481-82)

By way of establishing the general rule the court stated :
. There must be causal connection between death of plaintiff's intestate and the
negligence of the defendant, as alleged. There must be something more than
a showing that the evidence is consistent with plaintiff's theory of the cause of
death. The evidence must be such as to make that theory reasonably probable
-not merely possible-and more probable than any other hypothesis based on
such evidence. (P. 482)
The court stated that "it was necessary for the jury to find, upon proper evidence,
that the death of the decedent would not have occurred on January 25, 1g26 (the
4th day), . but for the alleged negligence charged against the defendant." ( P. 483)
All of defendant's experts testified that the head injury was the cause of death; plaintiff's witnesses testified that "the cause of death ... was problematic"; that they did
not know whether anything the doctor did or failed to do, caused the death, or that
decedent would have lived if he had received other treatment. One of plaintiff's
witnesses, in response to a hypothetical question containing the conditions and procedures of the doctor's examination and asking if they "probably accelerated his .
(decedent's) death, answered, "I would have to answer, in any o11e case, I don't know
as I could say. I would say in a series of cases that this sort of treatment would
probably accelerate or possibly cause some of them to die sooner." (P. 485) (Emphasis added.)
In discussing the testimony of the plaintiff's expert witnesses the court stated:
It may be stated further that both of these experts, in answering the hypothetical question, stated that a person receiving a traumatic injury who lived
48 hours or more had a. better chance of life, but admitted that the law of
probability as applied to any particular individual in a class is "a mere guess."
Dr. Carney testified:
•
"There may be ninety-nine out of a hundred who receive a certain injury
that are going to die, and one may recover ; but nothing in those statistics
enables one to tell which one is going to be the fortunate one. I believe that
this man did have a severe brain injury, and a severe brain injury causes death
at times, in the face of the exercise of highest degree of skill and care."
It is sufficient to say that a physician, called as an expert, does not make
a prognosis on statistics, because no two cases are alike; and plaintiff's experts
could not say that, in any particular case, the fact that the patient lived 44
or 48 hours after the shock proved that he was not going to die. Damages
may not be predicated on statistics of the character offered in the instant case.
( P. 486) (Emphasis added.)
The court held that the defendant's motion for a directed verdict on the ground that
causation was not shown should have been sustained and reversed a judgment for the
pla4ltiff.
Thompson v. New Orleans Ry. & Light Co., 145 La. 8os, 83 So. 19 (1919). The
plaintiff was injured by a fall from a railway car of the defendant. At the time of his
death he was afBicted with both a cancer and tuberculosi~. Autopsy revealed the cause·
of the death to be cancer. In disposing of this case in the plaintiff's favor the court said:
Their [the medical experts] testimony is to the effect that tuberculosis was
not the cause of Mr. Thompson's death; and that the real cause of his death
was a malignant tumor, or cancer, which had resulted from a trauma or blow
apparently inflicted about the time of the accident to him, as before. described.
They say, in effect, that such a malignant tumor as Mr. Thompson had results
from a blow, as a. rule, and that it generally attains its full growth and does
its deadly work within 12 to 18 months' time; in just about the time between
the day of, the accident to Mr. Thompson and the day of his death. (P. 813)
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Travelers Insurance Co. v. Donovan, 125 F. Supp. 261 (D.D.C. 1954). Action by
an insurer to set aside an award under the Workmen's Compensation Act (33 U.S.C.A.
901 et seq.) made by the .defendant as deputy commissioner. The claimant (to whom
the award was made) was employed by the American Red Cross in Washington, D. C.,
and later assigned to duty in Kyoto, Japan. While at Kyoto she contracted tuberculosis.
Under the stipulated facts:
(a) Kyoto
(b) Washington, D. C.

1951-incidence
1952-incidence
1951-incidence
1952--incidence

of
of
of
of

TB 1,040/1oo,ooo
TB 1,090/1oo,OCXJ
TB 221/100,000
TB 216/IOO,OCXJ

The Act provides : "Presumptions-In any proceeding for enforcement of a claim
for compensation under this chapter it shall be presumed, in the absence of substantial
evidence to the contrary-(a) That the claim comes within the provision of this
chapter." (33 USCA 920) Claimant did not have tuberculosis when she went to
Japan. The question presented was whether it was reasonable for the defendant to
reach the conclusion that the claimant's tuberculosis was contracted not only during
the employment but out of the employment, because there was an aggravated risk as
a result of being sent to work in an area with a comparatively high incidence rate?
Judgment for claimant.
To a certain extent it must be realized that the inference drawn by the
Deputy Commissioner results from the weighing of probabilities. It may well
be that in an action for damages governed by the principles of the common
law the cau.sal relationship between the employment and the tuberculosis could
not be deemed to have been sufficiently established. Different principles govern
claims under the Workmen's Compensation Act, however. It is for the Commissioner to draw inferences from the evidence, and here the facts are stipulated and not in dispute.
The court is of the opinion that the inference drawn by the Deputy Commisioner is not so unreasonable and is not so lacking in being founded on
substantial evidence as to justify any interference on the part of the court.
(Pp. 62-63) (Emphasis added.)
On appeal (221 F.2d 886 (D.C. Cir. 1955)) the insurer claimed that the award was
void because it was based on speculation and conjecture and was not substantiated by
the facts. The court held that the sole fact of the higher incidence of tuberculosis in
Kyoto than in the District of Columbia "cannot support the inference drawn by
defendant that claimant sustained such an occupational disease or infection as arose
naturally out of her employment." Judgment for claimant was affirmed. The employment sent the claimant to Japan. The statute created a presumption for the benefit of
the claimant. Absent substantial evidence to the contrary, a disability occurring in the
course of employment must be presumed to have arisen therefrom. The court of
appeals admitted that it is conceivable that the incidence of the disease in both places
was so minimal as to require the conclusion that the 5-fold ratio was itself de minimis.
But since the insurer offered no proof to that effect, the court could derive no such
conclusion from its inspection of the record. The court concluded that it was entirely
reasonable to infer, under all the circumstances, that the plaintiff contracted the disease
by her contacts with the population of that country, infected as it was to a higher
degree than that of the District of Columbia.
Voccaro v. Marra Bros., Inc., 130 F. Supp. 12 (D.C. E.D. Pa. 1955). Plaintiff
sustained injuries as a result of defendant's negligence when he was struck under the
armpit by a heavy wire cable. The injuries were alleged to consist of a wrenching
and stretching of the muscles and ligaments of the shoulder and an aggravation of a
pre-existing chronic inflammation inside the shoulder joint. The plaintiff also alleged

446

TORT LIABILITY

that the injury aggravated a pre-existing heart condition. The jury gave a verdict
of $25,000, which the defendant claimed to be grossly excessive in that there was no
sufficient showing of causal connection between the accident and the heart condition.
An expert witness testified:
. . . "Well, I believe that this strain of the accident, and what trauma he
received during the accident, most likely contributed to a myocardial infarct.
"I think it is impossible to state positively the extent to which the accident
contributed towards Dr. Vaccaro's present condition. . . . I came to the conclusion that the myocardial infarct, . . . was probably or, possibly-/ think
possibly-was due to the emotional upset and trauma produced by the accident."
Q. " . . . [I]sn't it true that the myocardial infarction that we are discussing
·now is a frequent and common complication of the hypertensive and arterial
sclerotic heart condition, with added emphysema, that Dr. Vaccaro suffered
from,· which has no connection with the accident?" A. "That is correct."
Q. "So that is the reason . . . that you use the word 'possibly' in your opinion
concerning the causal connection?" A. ·"That is right. I wish I could use the
word 'probably' for Dr. Vaccaro's benefit." (P. 13) (Emphasis added.)
The court remanded the case for a new trial, feeling the judgment to be grossly
excessive.
"In order to link [the] impaired physical condition to the defendant's conduct, the plaintiff was forced to depend on expert medical testimony because
scientific knowledge was required for the elucidation of the question. * * *
Moreover the expert has to testify, not that the condition of claimant might
ha.ve, or even probably did, come from the accident, but tha.t in his professional
opinion the result in question came from the cause alleged. A less direct
expression of opinion falls below the required standard of proof and does not
constitute legally competent evidence." (P. 14) (Emphasis added.)

Walker v. St. Louis Pub. Seru. Co., 362 Mo. 648, 243 S.W.2d 92 (1951). When
four weeks pregnant, the plaintiff was injured in a collision, for which the defendant
was responsible. For a number of years prior to the accident she had suffered rheumatic heart disease with mitral stenosis, which was permanent and progressive. The
baby was delivered uneventfully and in a healthy condition.
The verdict for plaintiff was attacked on the ground that the court permitted the
jury to award damages for permanent injuries when there was no substantial evidence
of any permanent injury being proximately caused by the accident. Judgment for
plaintiff affirmed upon remittitur of $4,000 of a $14.000 award.
An expert who examined plaintiff one year after the accident testified that where
an aggravated heart disease of this type and extent is aggravated by any cause, the
combination would make it worse; that he could not tell how much the accident had
shortened plaintiff's life; that plaintiff would require treatment for the rest of her life;
that pregnancy and childbirth throw a burden on the heart. Another expert testified
that plaintiff's rheumatic heart disease, mitral stenosis and congestive heart failure
were permanent and apt to .shorten her life; that it was unusual for a woman of
plaintiff's age (37) to have so severe a condition; that congestive heart failure does
result from mitral stenosis, but many who have mitral stenosis do not have congestive
heart fail~re; that plaintiff's early heart failure was a result of mitnil stenosis but
that the accident might have been the precipitating event; that where mitral stenosis
exists, heart failure could and probably would result at any time; that any sudden
and unexpected occurrence may precipitate congestive heart failure; that plaintiff's
pregnancy possibly speeded up the development of congestive heart failure but that
ordinarily where congestive heart failure occurs from pregnancy alone it does not
occur until the 6th or 7th month, while the diagnosis of plaintiff's congestive condition
was made in the 4th month of her pregnancy; that plaintiff's condition has become
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progressively worse since before the accident; and that plaintiff's life expectancy was
two years. He also said, "I feel that it [the accident] has probably speeded up the
course of her development of congestive heart failure."· (Emphasis added.) Prior to
the accident plaintiff was able to do her housework. Since the accident she was not
able to do so. The court said :
... [W]e are not overlooking the facts: that plaintiff's doctors testified that
mitral stenosis would probably cause congestive heart failure independent of
any aggravation suffered at the time of the accident; that one of plaintiff's
doctors testified that the aggravation caused by the accident would last not
more than 8 months. . . . ; that the accident might have caused congestive
heart failure; that plaintiff's pregnancy possibly speeded up the development
of congestive heart failure; that any shock might cause congestive heart failure; that mitral stenosis probably would result in congestive heart failure
without the intervention of an accident or other shock. (P. 656)
We think there was an expert opinion sufficiently definite to constitute substantial evidence from which the jury could reasonably find that the accident
hastened the development of congestive heart failure. When the entire testimony of Dr. Stubbs is considered, and when his various "might", "may",
"could", "would", "possibly", and "probably" statements are analyzed with
reference to the manner in which they relate to each other and to his total
testimony, we believe that Dr. Stubbs did give his expert opinion that the
accident . . . hastened, or caused sooner than would otherwise have been
the case, congestive heart failure. (P. 656)
It will be noted that this statement came after the doctor had testified to the
possibilities and probabilities of other causes. Dr. Stubbs conceded that
whether the accident ... hastened or speede~ up congestive heart failure was
necessarily somewhat speculative; he conceded that plaintiff's pregnancy
possibly speeded up the development of congestive heart failure; he stated that
the accident might have been the thing that precipitated the congestive heart
failure; he conceded that mitral stenosis could or would have caused it independent of any accident or other shock ; but after conceding all this, the doctor
then, based upon his examination and upon the facts related to him, was of
the opinion that the aggravation caused by the accident in turn brought on
congestive heart failure sooner than such condition would have resulted but
for the accident. . . . Where, as here, it may be determined from the testimony
that the doctor was expressing his expert opinion as to the cause of a condition, the form of language used will not deprive the statement of its evidentiary value. (P. 657)
. It is well established that before recovery may be h~d for permanent injuries,
the permanency of the injuries must be shown with reasonable certainty and
likewise that the causation of such permanent injuries must be shown with
reasonable certainty; and when evidence goes only to the extent of showing
that a certain condition might or could have been caused by one of two causes
for only one of which defendant is liable, such is not a substantial showing of
which of the causes produced the condition and furnishes no basis from which
a jury may reasonably find the cause. (P. 658).

Williams v. Reading Co., 175 F.2d 32 (3d Cir. 1949). The plaintiff's decedent was
last seen, apparently asleep, in the car of the defendant's local train pulling out of
station X, where he should have alighted. The next terminal was Y, and as the train
was pulling away from it a trainman announced that Z terminal was next. It was
shown that as the train left Y terminal, and when it reached Z terminal, the doors on
the right side of the train were open. Before the train reached Z terminal, it made a
stop at an intermediate crossing, A, to allow a train bound in . the opposite direction to
cross ahead of it and proceed upon a tr;1ck immediately to the right of the track upon
which the decedent's train was traveling. It was dark at the time that the decedent
was last seen, and still dark when he was found the next morning, lying alongside
the tracks at a point near the intermediate stop of the previous evening. It was stipu-
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lated that the decedent had suffered a fractured skull. The defendant offered no
evidence.
Under Pennsylvania law the plaintiff was entitled to a presumption of having exercised due care. Also it had been decided by the supreme court of that state that if a
train, after the announcement of the next stop, stops short of or beyond that station,
and no warning of the fact is given to the passengers, such omission is a negligent
act on the part of the carrier.
The lower court rendered a verdict non obstante veredicto in favor of the defendant, saying that the evidence was too inconclusive to show causation since decedent
could have left the train at either terminal Y or Z and have been walking along the
tracks when struck by a train, or that voluntarily or involuntarily he might have fallen
from the train while in motion, as a result of pure accident or illness. No evidence
was adduced to substantiate any of these alternative theories.
In reversing and remanding with directions to enter a judgment for the plaintiff
on the jury verdict, the court pointed out that the plaintiff's proof, considered in the
best light, need not eliminate every possible cause other than the one on which he
relies, but only such causes, if any, as fairly arise from· the evidence. Moreover, the
court stated that the presumption of due care remains in the case where there is no
evidence offered by either side to offset it. For this reason the court felt that the jury
was justified in finding that decedent did not leave the train while in motion and that
he did not leave at either terminal Y or Z and walk along the tracks at night. Therefore, the court felt that the jury might find that the plaintiff's decedent left the train
as a result of the clearly negligent act of the defendant, and that as a result of his
having done so, he was struck and killed by the southbound train on the adjacent track.
Wood v. Joyce Co., 228 App. Div. 729, 239 N. Y. Supp. IIO (1930). While in the
employ of the defendant, the claimant fell from a stepladder. He continued his work
as a carpenter during the rest of the day and for three weeks thereafter. Then, while
at work, he suddenly became blind in his right eye. A medical examination disclosed
a detached retina. The eye had been bloodshot after the accident and there had been
some pain and blurring of vision. The defendant employer appealed from an award
granted to the claimant.
In reversing and setting aside the award, the court pointed out that identification of
the blindness with the earlier accident must depend upon medical testimony. While
some of the experts had eliminated practically every other cause, except the accident,
all of them hesitated to express a definite opinion that the origin of the detached
retina was the accident. They merely said it was "possible." The court held that in
the absence of other evidence leading to a reasonable conclusion, this was not sufficient.

(c) Kinds of Evidence Used

( i) Circumstantial
Because so many factors ordinarily enter into the determination of the
causes of a particular physical ailment, it is not surprising that use of
circumstantial evidence is so prominent in cases involving personal injuries. While it is impossible to catalogue the kinds of circumstantial
evidence that have been accepted as helping to prove causation, there are
some that stand out, particularly those dealing with the development
of cancer after a trauma. Apparently good health prior to impact not
only is properly admitted to show causation but it seems to be fairly
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persuasive. 929 On the other hand, lack of prior good health does not seem
to show lack of causation. 980 Another type of circumstantial evidence
of considerable effectiveness in many cases is the near coincidence of the
time of impact and the appearance of physical symptoms in the plaintiff's case, and in medical experience generally in such cases. 931 The
coincidence of the injury manifesting itself at the exact point of impact
of the force set in motion by the defendant also has been given considerable weight in several cases.932
(ii) Expert Testimony
As indicated previously _in discussing the malpractice cases involving
radiation injuries,933 the language in the opinions is not consistent as to
whether in areas involving scientific information it is necessary for the
plaintiff to produce expert witnesses if he is to recover. It seems a fair
generalization, however, that there are many cases in which the evidence
so obviously points to causation from the force put in motion by the
defendant that even a lay jury can rationally conclude without expert
testimony that causation has been proved. But, once the evidence gets
into the doubtful area, where it is of a technical or scientific nature, a
plaintiff would be foolhardy to pass up the privilege of using expert
witnesses. Certainly in radiation cases many questions of causation will
necessarily involve evidence which only specially trained people can give
and interpret. Cases dealing with biological causation in personal injury
situations seem to bear this out. 93 ' Even in those jurisdictions in which
cases are found saying that expert testimony is not necessary it is perfectly clear in general that it is admissible. 985 Whether the testimony
929 See the Comeau, Combrooks, and Menarde cases, Stt/Wa Table of Cases at end
of previous section.
930 See the Thompson, Ingersoll, Magazine, Vaccaro, and Walker cases, mpra Table
of Cases at end of previous section. Chronological coincidence rejected in suit for
damage to sheep from A-bomb test; Bulloch v. United States, 145 F. Supp. 824 (D.C.
Utah, 1956).
931 See the Charlton, Cornbrooks, Lee, Louisville, McAllister, Menarde, Payne,
Thompson, Walker, and Wood cases, mpra Table of Cases at end of previous section.
932 See the Charlton, Lee, Louisville, Menarde cases, S14Jwa Table of Cases at end of
previous section.
933 Supra discussion at notes 186 ff.
934 See the Bearman, Comeau, Harris, Kramer, Vaccaro, and Wood cases, S'Upra
Table of Cases at end of previous section. See also Bennett v. Los Angeles Tumor
Institute, 102 Cal. App.2d 293, 227 P.2d 473 (1951); Goodwin v. Misticos, 207 Miss.
361, 42 So.2d 397 (1949).
·
9SG See the Cole and Menarde cases, mpra Table of Cases at end of previous section.
See also Stanley Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 16 N.J. 295, 304, 108 A.2d 616 (1954).
Cf. Bucher case, mpra Table of Cases at end of previous section, opinion at 6n-12:
"The testimony of experts •.. which to this court seems unjust or excessive."
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given in the particular case by the expert witnesses is sufficient to support
the claims of the plaintiff or defendant is a question that ordinarily is
left to the jury, although occasionally an appellate court will rule that
the evidence was too speculative and tenuous to justify the jury's
finding. 986
(iii) The Use of Statistics, Scientific Treatises,
and Other Scientific Data
There are many cases in which the use of statistics, treatises, and scientific data, which for the most part come clearly within the definition
of hearsay evidence, has nevertheless been permitted. In such cases it
frequently has happened that the validity of such evidence either has not
been argued or the question has been ignored by the appellate court. 987
There is considerable disagreement among the courts, however, as to
whether it is proper to use such testimony. It is inevitable that the use
of such material, with or without the use of experts to explain it, will
become so important in radiation cases that its availability under the
legal rules of hearsay and the limitations on the use of such material cannot be ignored.
The principal objection to the use of medical treatises and statistics
to prove the likelihood of future injury is that it violates the hearsay
rule. Where the fact to be proved with reasonable certainty is the future
manifestation of an injurious impact, and statistical evidence is introduced to show that under similar circumstances the condition ultimately
has occurred in a certain number of cases out of the total number of
cases investigated, the defendant can argue that the evidence is hearsay,
except in the rare instance in which the witness giving the testimony
personally has investigated all of the cases. The argument is that the
witness is unable to testify from personal knowledge as to both the accuracy of the statistics generally and as to the accuracy of the diagnosis
of the individual cases specifically. Furthermore, it can be argued that
the use of such evidence deprives the opposing party of his right and
opportunity to cross-examine so as to test the validity of such statistics.
Wigmore, in addition to the above stated argument against the admission of learned treatises on medicine as evidence, has pointed out several
other arguments which have been asserted from time to time with some
988 See the Bearman, Bucher, Comeau, and Kramer cases, s11pra Table of Cases at
end of previous section.
9 8 7 See the Boland, Bucher, Harris, Louisville, and Ramberg cases, supra Table of
Cases at end of previous section.
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success: (I) That "science is shifting," that experiment and discovery
continually are altering scientific theories and. rendering them obsolete,
that there is no general agreement among scientists, and that testimony
characterized by such instability and uncertainty is untrustworthy; ( 2)
that there is danger of confusing the jury by reading technical passages
to them without explanatory comment; (3) that passages may be used
unfairly by quoting them out of context; and ( 4) that the truths of
medicine are to be sought chiefly in the personal experience of physicians.938 Wigmore's answer to these four objections is summary to
the point of being contemptuous. Both the danger of confusing the jury
and quoting out of context can be remedied easily by the use of expert
witnesses and the alertness of opposite counsel. The fourth objection is
simply ridiculous, for it does not conform to the facts of the twentieth
century. As to the first of the four objections, if the proponent is en.;
tirely consistent he would have to insist that the witness stand be denied
to all scientific experts except the most up-to-date researchers, and even
such opinions would be suspeCt since they might become obsolete tomorrow, In addition, science seldom refutes itself and the fact that it is an
evolutionary discipline, constantly improving its methods of observation
and the abstractions drawn from them, does not mean that it is "uncer-'
tain.'' If this is uncertainty, then the law itself is chaos.
In any event, such evidence generally is admissible, as it should be. 939
ssBWigmore, Evidence §169o (3d ed. 1940).
939 /d. at §66sb, where the author says: "The data of every science are enormous in
scope and variety. No one professional man can know from personal observation more
than a minute fraction of the data which he must every day treat as working truths.
Hence a reliance on the reported data of fellow-scientists, learned by perusing their
reports in books and journals. The law must and does accept this kind of knowledge
from scientific men. On the one hand, a mere layman, who comes to court and alleges
a fact which he has learned only by reading a medical or a mathematical book, cannot
be heard. But, on the other hand, to reject a professional physician or mathematician
because the fact or some facts to which he testifies are known to him only upon the
authority of others would be to ignore the accepted methods of professional work and
to insist on finical and impossible standards.
"Yet it is not easy to express in usable form that element of professional competency
which distinguishes the latter case from the former. In general, the considerations
which define the latter are (a) a professional experience, giving the witness a knowledge of the trustworthy authorities and the proper source of information, (b) an extent of personal observation in the general subject, enabling him to estimate the
general plausibility, or probability of soundness, of the views expressed, (c) the impossibility of obtaining information on the particular technical detail except through reported data in part or entirely. The true solution must be to trust the discretion of the
trial judge, exercised in the light of the nature of the subject and of the witness' equipments. The decisions show in general a liberal attitude in receiving technical testimony
based on professional reading."
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Courts frequently have accepted such evidence indirectly through an
expert's testimony; for example, when the expert witness admitted that
his knowledge that formaldehyde in milk was injurious was acquired,
not from experiments, but wholly from reading, study, and conversations with other physicians, 9 ' 0 when two physicians in a criminal case
admitted they derived their knowledge on the subject of poisons solely
from medical books,u1 when a professor of geology based his testimony
on "what I have read and the information I gathered from discussions
with numerous geologists, and from my own observations," 9 ' 2 when a
professor of science (mathematics and philosophy) used U. S. Coast
and Geodetic Survey Maps in his calculations, 948 when a professor of
In a subsequent passage Wigmore goes on to say, in §687: "To deny the competency
of a physician who does not know his facts from persotlal observation alone is to reject medical testimony almost in its entirety. To allow any physician to testify who
claims to know solely by personal experience is to appropriate the witness-stand to
impostors. Medical science is a mass of transmitted and collated data from numerous
quarters; the generalizations which are the result of one man's personal observation
exclusively are the least acceptable of all. The law must recognize the methods of
medical science. It cannot stultify itself by establishing, for judicial inquiries, a rule
never considered necessary by the medical profession itself. It is enough for a physician,
testifying as to medical fact, that he is by training and occupation a physician; whether
his source of information for that particular fact is in part or entirety the hearsay of
his fellow-practitioners and investigators, is immaterial."
9 ' 0 Isenhour v. State, 157 Ind. 517, 62 N.E. 40 ( 1901), where the court said, at 528:
"Courts have never undertaken to set up a standard of scientific knowledge by which
competency of a witness may be determined, and have not gone to the extent of holding that a scientific witness can only testify from facts learned by him from personal
demonstration. The general rule, in such cases, in this State at least, seems to be that
where a witness exhibits such a degree of knowledge, gained from experiments, observation, standard books, or other reliable source, as to make it appear that his
opinion is of some value, he is entitled to testify, leaving to the trial court, in the exercise of a sound discretion, the right to say when such knowledge is shown, and to the
jury the right to say what the opinion is worth; . . ."
·
941 Boswell v. State, 114 Ga. 40, 39 S.E. 897 (1901), where the court makes the
following distinction, at 43 : "Books of science and art are not admissible in evidence
to prove the opinions of experts therein expressed. . . . But, notwithstanding the inadmissibility of the books, the opinions contained therein may come to the jury through
the mouth of an expert witness."
9 ' 2 Schooler v. State, 175 S.W.2d 664, 670 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943).
9' 3 Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers' Mutual Casualty Ins. Co. v. Messenger,
181 Md. 295, 29 A.2d 653 (1943). The court said, at 298-99: "It is a familiar rule of
evidence that a witness, in order to qualify as an expert, should have such special
knowledge of the subject on which he is to testify that he can give the jury assistance
in solving a problem for which their equipment of average knowledge is inadequate.
. . . It is not a ground for excluding the testimony of an expert that he bases his statements in whole or in part upon what he has read, provided that his reading can be assumed to constitute part of his general knowledge adequate to enable him to form a
reasonable opinion of his own. . . . The knowledge of an expert in any science or art
would be extremely limited if it extended no further than inferences from happenings
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mechanical and aeronautical engineering admitted that his calculations
of the train's speed were based on experiments on similar train brakes
and coefficients of friction, wind, and grade resistance to be found in
handbooks on the subject,944 and when a medical expert, who had made
a blood test on the defendant and qualified as an expert in matters of
blood tests and intoxication, in testifying as to a drunkometer test, stated
this his conclusions were "accepted by physiologists." 94 ~
There is a striking similarity between cases involving the use of
statistics to relate the alcoholic content of the blood to nervous response
and cases involving future probability of injury from known dosages
of radiation. The similarity becomes even closer when, as in the Toms
case, 948 statistics are offered which correlate the intake of liquor with
the blood alcoholic content, which, in turn, is correlated with the degree
of intoxication. Assuming, for example, that similar statistics could
be obtained that correlate radiation dosage with the extent of ionization in the cell, and this latter figure to such pathological effects as
leukemia or cancer, there does not appear to be any reason why they
would not be just as acceptable. to prove the ultimate fact as are the
statistics in the drunkometer cases. The one is no more hearsay than the
other. The "necessity" for admitting such evidence is just as great in
the irradiation cases as in the intoxication cases, and there is no greater
"circumstantial probability of trustworthiness" in the latter than in the
former. It is even doubtful if individual variation is any greater in the
one than the other, and in the Toms case the court said : ·
. . . [T]he competency of such evidence is not at all impaired
because some persons yield more readily than other [ s] to the
deleterious effects of intoxicants. That fact may lessen the
weight of the expert testimony with the jury, but it cannot be
employed to exclude it. 9 "
within his own experience. His testimony is admitted because it is based on his special
knowledge derived not only from his own experience, but also from the experiments
and reasoning of others, communicated by personal association or through books or
other sources. . . . His testimony was ad,missible, even though no maps or other records
of the Geodetic Survey were produced at the trial."
&44 Los Angeles & Salt Lake R.R. v. Umbaugh, 61 Nev. 214. 123 P.2d 224 (1942),
where the court said, at 223: "His technical knowledge in respect to the subject was
reasonably calculated to enable him to give a considered appraisal to the values established by other recognized experts by actual experiments in answering the questions
propounded. 'The judgment of a skilled witness testifying as an expert may be based,
in part at least, upon the results of experiments made by himself or others.' "
94 ~ State v~ Haner, 231 Iowa 348, 349, 1 N.W.zd 91 (1941). See also State v. Werling, 234 Iowa II09, 12 N.W.2d 318 (1944); State v. Sturtevant, 96 N.H. 99, 70 A.2d
909 (1950); Toms v. State, 239 P.2d 812 (Okla. Crim. App. 1952).
946 Supra note 945·
947 ld. at 819-20.
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Actually in a number of cases discussed subsequently in the section on
future injuries, 948 the physician's prognosis of future injury was based
largely upon the histories of similar injuries. In the Alberti case, 949
the court allowed testimony of a physician as to the resulting life ex- .
pectancy of the injured plaintiff, when the physician stated that he could
only estimate the probable length of this period from histories of similar
cases. In the Cordiner case, 950 both the physician and the court referred
to similar cases as being the basis of a prognosis as to future injury.
The physician testifying in the Riggs case 951 referred to the experience
of the profession when he said, "It is very frequent that we even find
epilepsy; traumatic epilepsy, as we call it, following a severe brain injury." The expert in the Coover case 952 testified that "our medical
literature is full of cases of cancer-carcinoma, that have developed
upon a senile skin following an X-ray burn." Some of the cases dealing
with the meaning of reasonable certainty, discussed below, include
references to statistics known to a professional group.
On the other hand, the problem of direct admission of scientific source
material as evidence (e.g., statistics) presents greater difficulty than does
its indirect admission through an expert's testimony. In discussing the
subject of "learned treatises" as an exception to the hearsay rule, Wigmore has stated that they have obtained complete recognition on common
law principles in only two jurisdictions-Alabama and Iowa. 958 Initial
statutory efforts to admit such evidence in some seven or eight states
met with hostile judicial attitudes, but the recent and more carefully
drafted enactments of Massachusetts, Nevada, and Pennsylvania appear
to preclude too much judicial obstruction. 9 H Wigmore feels that, in
the discretion of the court, published scientific opinions of recognized
authorities should be admissible. 955 As he points out:
It has long been unquestioned that standard tables of mortality
(used in computing annuities, life-insurance sums, dower, and
damages for loss of 1i fe), and almanacs are admissible in evidence. The occasional controversy has arisen, not over the
present principle, but over the question how far the probability
of life-expectation in the average should be taken by the jury
to measure the probability for a particular decedent.
Infra discussion beginning at note g81.
Infra note 995·
950 Infra note 1015.
951 Infra note 1020.
052 Supra note 452·
95s Wigmore, Evidence §1693 (3d ed. 1940).
954 Ibid.
9ss !tJ. at §§r6gr-g2.
948
949
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It is doubtful whether a general rule in favor of standard
tables of scientific calculations of all sorts can be regarded as
established; but rulings tending in that direction are found.
These almanacs and mortality tables have been explained
to be admissible because they are founded on "certain and
constant data" and deal with the "exact sciences." But the
notion that every collection of figures savors of the exact sciences is sufficiently discredited at the present day. In fact,
some of these particular tables have been among the least trustworthy of scientific efforts. . . . The simple fact is that the
admission of a certain class of statistics was demanded by ·
custom and practical convenience, and the judicial mind relented. Thus, a system of mere probabilities and working
averages is not found wanting in qualities entitling it to be
placed before the jury; while the substance of other collections
of data, possessing at least equal inductive value, made with
equal or greater thoroughness, sifted, arranged, and stated by
trained observers, is by the same discriminating authority
relegated to the limbo of hearsay and other judicial abominations. The error has lain, not in looking too leniently upon
mortality tables, but in a misconception of the true qualities of
other scientific work. 956
As an early Iowa court put it :
. . . [A]n appeal to medical authorities has been disallowed
by some of the courts in this country; though physicians,
when testifying, are permitted to refer to medical authors, and
to quote their opinions from memory. Being permitted to
refer to and quote authors, we can see no good reason why
they may not read the views and opinions of distinguished
authors. The opinions of an author, as contained in his works,
we regard as better evidence than the mere statement of his
opinions by a witness, who testifies as to his recollection of
them from former reading. Is not the latter secondary to the
former? On the whole, we think it the safest rule to admit
standard medical books as evidence of the author's opinions
upon questions of medical skill or pract.ice, involved in a
triaP 51
·
Perhaps in the ordinary situation, it does not make too much difference whether or not the contents of "learned treatises" on science
are directly admissible as evidence, so long as the courts either let a
qualified expert testify as to their substance or allow him to express
opinions based on principles and probabilities that are necessarily hearsay knowledge. In general, the expert should be adquate to this task,
95 6

!d. at §1698.

957

Bowman v. Woods, 1 G. Greene 441, 445 (Iowa 1848).
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especially when he has been forewarned by counsel as to the course of
questioning. Accurate and exhaustive scientific statistics, however, do
not lend themselves to this sort of treatment. No expert can be expected
to memorize the statistics of life expectancy or a table of logarithms,
or coefficients of friction, to mention only a few, and the courts, where
the admission of such evidence is "demanded by custom and practical
convenience," have relented. Perhaps the real reason behind this judicial
inertia is not really an objection to hearsay evidence, but because of a
judicial reluctance to clutter up the trial with a lot of material that the
court feels can be more expeditiously presented as oral testimony. As
soon as· there is something positive to be gained by the direct admission of medical and scientific statistics generally rather than by having
an expert paraphrase them, the courts perhaps will disregard the hearsay prohibition. That point will be reached when it becomes apparent
that the statistics themselves are too complex to quote or paraphrase
from memory, and, what is more important, when it becomes apparent
that what a physician takes as being probable from the statistics and how
the law uses "probable" may be quite different.
(d) Use of Statistics in Personal Injury Cases
Assuming the admissibility of properly authenticated scientific data
of a statistical nature, what use has actually been made in litigated cases
of such material? It is admissible in most jurisdictions, as indicated
above, at least where such information is presented as the personal
knowledge of an expert witness. It might have been expected, therefore,
that there would be a considerable body of legal literature analyzing the
probative value of such material to prove causation and extent of injury,
or at least that there would be a considerable number of cases illustrating
the use of such material. Yet a search of the digests, annotations, and
periodical indexes proves singularly unrewarding, and a reading of
those cases in which statistical evidence surely should have been used
does not prove to be much more helpful. In personal injury cases and in
the face of a clear attack on its probative value, generally the only time
in which statistical data is used as such is in connection with the
measurement of average life span to determine the length of continued
pain and suffering or to measure the future earnings of a disabled
plaintiff. Many of the cases discussed or cited above in the study of
shortened life span 958 either expressly approved the use of such material or by clear implication accepted the validity of statistical proof.
958

Supra discussion at notes 482 ff.
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Some of the cases even recognized clearly the need to relate all such
statistical data to the particular fact situation rather than blindly accept
the statistical average. There are a few cases in which the court clearly
was aware of the statistical character of the evidence, but, in most instances, the significance of this type of evidence or an appreciation of
the value and the danger in its use has escaped recognition. Venturing
a statistical guess where no statistics are. available, it is probable that
in many, if not most, cases where legal as well as scientific conclusions
are drawn, there is an underlying statistical basis used, albeit unknowingly, because so many of our conclusions really are based upon probabilities. The difficulty is that our probability assumptions are arrived
at most unscientifically.
A postulation of general legal rules is based, in a very fundamental
way, on the use of a statistical type of data. Unfortunately, the law is in
the habit of making such assumptions as to the validity of generalities
by induction from groups of particulars assumed to be understood
correctly, instead of doing s'o only after testing them for statistical
validity. Whether or not lawyers recognize it, most of our legal observations and generalizations, as is true of observations and generalizations
for other purposes, in reality are probable only, not certain. A doctor,
for example, is seldom if ever able to observe the course of a certain
physical phenomenon in a particular individual in its_cellular, molecular,
or, in connection with radiation injuries, in the atomic or sub-atomic
level at which nuclear energy operates; his understanding of the basic
particulars of the condition is far from complete, and yet a prognosis in
terms of probability, though not in terms of certainty, can be made by
the doctor and is used by him, success fully in most cases, in taking medical· action. In making ~uch decisions, however, he must compare his
observation and analysis of the various phenomena in the particular
patient and reach his prediction on the basis of what his science teaches
him has happened or is true in other similar situations. Most of his
techniques of observation, experimentation, and isolation of factors
in any complex phenomenon are essentially macroscopic, or, at best,
microscopic. By comparing observations of enough similar situations,
the doctor and the scientist as well make their evaluations and decide
on courses of action on the basis of probabilities. The law must, or at
least should, do likewise, because human affairs cannot wait for certainty. Lawyers should recognize, however, that the probabilities implicit and fundamental in the affairs of men are, or at least should be,
based upon an empirical foundation of statistics. Unfortunately the law
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has tended to ignore the fact that its Aristotelian, two-valued concept of
either right or wrong really is based on probability and, therefore, upon
a little articulated and less understood statistical foundation.
If the above thesis is correct, as we believe it to be, probably most of
our cases involving personal injuries make use, although unknowingly,
of statistical types of evidence. Usually the character of the evidence
underlying the basic assumptions is obscured by the fact that it is the
opinion of a living, speaking witness, or by "everyone knows" assumptiol)s on the part of the jury or the judge without any reasonable testing
of the statistical validity of the assumptions made. In just a very few
cases it is perfectly clear that statistical data in the raw form, with
little or no help from an expert's statement to the effect that he is
expressing his own personal opinion, has been used to justify proof of
injury and causation. Most of the cases cited in the last section dealing
with the use of circumstantial evidence, particularly those in which
similarity of lapse of time between the impact and injury in the particular case and in similar cases was used as proof of causation, 959 actually
were using probabilities based on observation of similar situations, but
the courts seem quite unaware of the fact that such conclusions were
based on statistical probabilities. In those, cases in which the statements
from medical texts and treatises have been admitted, again use is being
made of statistically supported conclusions or statements. 960
The most flagrant examples of drawing legally significant conclusions
on the basis of assumed knowledge are the res ipsa loquitur cases. 961
The assumptions in these cases usually are made without any attempt
to test the validity of the statistical foundations supporting the probabilities on which the use of res ipsa loquitur is justified. There are, of
course, many other examples where a statistical type of evidence is used,
such as in the determination of market value of listed stocks and bonds,
or in cases where valuation is established by evidence which really is the
composite of opinions of a large number of people or of numerous
transactions. 962 Our concern is rather with the use of statistical evidence
to prove causation, the extent of injury, or the biological processes involved. Only a handful of cases have been found in this area which face
squarely the issue of the validity of such statistical data.
969

Supra note 931.
Supra note 937· See also Bowman v. Woods·, supra note 957·
Infra notes II46 ff. See also Malone, "Ruminations on Cause-In-Fact," 9 Stan.
L. Rev. 6o, 61-64 (1956).
96 2 Wigmore, Evidence §1704 (3d ed. 1940) ; an early example is Sisson v. Cleveland & Toledo R.R., 14 Mich. 489, 497 (1866) (newspaper market reports permitted).
96°
96 1
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One other type of case which often involves the use of material based
on statistical information and the conclusions to be derived therefrom,
is that in which standards formulated by national groups or by administrative or statutory rules are used to prove either negligence or
lack of negligence. 963 A clear example of this use involving what
basically is a conclusion as to probabilities grounded on a foundation of
statistics, is Rakowski v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. 964 In the construction and operation of X-ray fluoroscopic machines the setting up of safe
limits for exposure of operators unquestionably is based on much
clinical data from which statistical judgments are formed, even though
the court actually does not look at the question of how the code standards
are established. Such evidence was used in this case to show a lack of
negligence rather than to prove causation of physical injury from irradiation.
Again, Western Assur. Co. of Toronto v. J. H. Mohlman Co. 966 is a
case in which the court accepted what clearly was a conclusion based
upon empirical data from ~hich the crushing strengths of different
kinds of timber. were reached inductively. The question in the case
turned upon whether the .building fell because of weakened timbers and
before the fire or whether it fell as a result of the fire and so was covered
by the insurance policy. The court permitted the introduction of reports
from the United States Department of Agriculture, prepared by the
Chief of the Division of Forestry, showing the results of two thousand
tests of the crushing strength of timber. The report was stated to be
by a recognized authority in the engineering profession. Also a table
was introduced from an engineering treatise giving the crushing
strength of timber. Similar tables from a third volume also were presented. The court said, in overruling objections to the use of this
material:
Under the rule contended for, that valuable information would
be available for the use of a court of justice so long as the
men who made the tests and prepared the tabulations were
living and producible, but after their death or disappearance
the information they had gathered would be lost to the court,
although available for every one else in the community, and
relied upon by engineers and builders whenever a new structure is in process of erection. Upon the precise point here presented the diligence of counsel has not succeeded in discovering
Supra discussion at notes 77 ff.
Supra note 175.
965 83 F. 8n (2d Cir. 1897).
9sa
964
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a single authority. We feel, therefore, no hesitancy in so
modifying the general rule as to hold that, where the scientific work containing them is concededly recognized as a
standard authority by the profession, statistics of mechanical
experiments and tabulations of the results thereof may be read
in evidence by an expert witness in support of his professional
opinion, when such statistics and tabulations are generally relied upon by experts in the particular field of the mechanic arts
with which such statistics and tabulations are concerned. 966

The evidence apparently had been inserted to support the proposition
in the complaint that the fire rather than failure of timbers had caused
the fall, and the circuit court upheld judgment for the plaintiff.
A considerably more hostile view was expressed by the Alabama
court in Franklin v. State. 961 The case was a prosecution for bastardy
and the jury had found the defendant to be the father. The use of statistical tables was put in issue by the defendant's objections to the trial
court's refusal to allow counsel for defendant to use tables in cross-examining a physician who had been a state witness. The nature of the
tables was not described other than they came from a volume on "clinical obstetrics." The court· said :
Relevant extracts from medical treatises are not in themselves
self-proving but are admissible when recognized and approved
by the medical profession as standard. . . . The volume in
question was not shown to be a standard work or recognized
authority on the subject at issue, and in the rejection by the
court of the table there was no error. 968
While the court denied the use of such material because it was not a
recognized work, it rather clearly assumed that tables from authoritative works would be permitted. It is not possible from this opinion to
tell whether the tables were to be used as proof or disproof of causation.
The only cases found dealing directly with cause-in-fact of biological
injury supported solely by evidence of probability based clearly and
squarely on statistical data involve workmen's compensation situations.
If these cases should be followed in ordinary tort situations (and on
the cause-in-fact issue there should be no difference between workmen's
compensation and ordinary torts), a whole new area of proof will be
opened up applicable in the radiation cases as more scientific evidence
is collected from experiments as to the causal relationship, in terms of
probability, between amount of exposure and incidence of injury.
966
967
968

ld. at 821-22.
29 Ala. App. 3o6, 197 So. 55 (1940).
I d. at Jo8.
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In 1933 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Ayers
v. H oage 969 decided a case arising under the Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. The plaintiff claimed that he incurred tuberculosis
"arising out of" his employment in a restaurant. The deputy commissioner denied recovery and the court sustained him. While there
was no reference to statistical data as such, the court leaned very heavily
on the testimony of two doctors, one of whom was an expert in tuberculosis cases, to the effect that tuberculosis could spread in many
ways and "that he had not found that tuberculosis was a disease peculiarly common to restaurant workers or to people waiting on tables;
on the contrary, he had had only a few cases of people engaged in restaurant work. .. that there is no way of proving definitely where an
individual contracts tuberculosis." 970
The court made no reference to a decision by a California appellate
court six years earlier. The California case, Fidelity & Casualty Co. of
New York v. Industrial Accident Commission, 911 was for compensation
under the Workmen's Compensation Act for the death of claimant's
husband from typhoid fever while on a trip to Chile. On his return
by way of Peru, he took . sick and died. When they sent the em·
ployee into the area, the employers were aware of the unsanitary conditions and the resultant greater incidence of typhoid in both of these
countries. In reviewing the compensation awards, the appellate court
concluded that it could not say the commission's award was "not rea·
sonably supported." 972 The court held that the commission reasonably
could conclude from the evidence that the risk of contracting the disease
was enough greater in these other countries that the disease was "proximately caused by the employment." Here the court very clearly was
supporting a conclusion that exposure to an increased incidence situation as a result of employment can be used to meet the causation requirement of "arising out of the employment."
Of perhaps greater significance for our purpose is the case of MeAl·
lister v. United States,918 decided in 1953. Under the Admiralty Act
recovery could be had only on proof of negligence. In overruling the
$8o,ooo award of the lower court for the injuries resulting from poliomyelitis, the court of appeals assumed that negligence had been shown
in not keeping the Chinese laborers more adequately segregated from
969

63 F.2d 364 (D.C. Cir. 1933).
I d. at 365.
9n 84 Cal. App. 5o6, 258 Pac. 698 (1927).
972 I d. at 510.
97s 2CY7 F.2d 952 (2d Cir. 1953).
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the crew's facilities in the light of the known epidemic of polio among
the Chinese workers. Nevertheless, the court reversed, saying:
. . . [T]he proof here that the libellant contracted polio from
the Chinese is far from satisfactory. The incubation period of
poliomyelitis is not certain, as the libellant's medical witness
admitted. Estimates, as shown by the record, range from a
few days to 30 or 35 days. Thus the libellant might have become infected while on shore leave in Shanghai before November I. Moreover, he might have become infected by flies
or by members of the crew who were carriers of the disease.
Under these circumstances to hold the respondent liable for
injuries suffered by the libellant seems to be wholly speculative as the infection might well have arisen from various
causes unrelated to the respondent's action. It is impossible to
prove that letting Chinese come on board, assuming that conduct was negligent, was the proximate cause of libellant's
disease. Since either of the several inferences was permissible,
the party having the burden of proof must lose. 974
On review by the United States Supreme Court the trial court's judgment was reinstated. The court concluded on the causation question :
Of course no one can say with certainty that the Chinese
were the carriers of the polio virus and that they communicated it to the petitioner. But upon balance of the probabilities it seems a reasonable inference for the District Court to
make from the facts proved, supported as they were by the
best judgment medical experts have upon the subject today,
that petitioner was contaminated by the Chinese who came
aboard the ship November II, 1945, at Shanghai. Certainly
we cannot say on review that a judgment which was based
upon such evidence is clearly erroneous. 976
There is one difficulty with using these cases to support the proposition
that incidence figures themselves will be sufficient to support a cause-infact finding. In each of the cases, in the light of medical knowledge as
to the incubation period from the time of exposure to the onset of such
diseases as typhoid fever and poliomyelitis, it generally would be accepted that the sickness resulted from an exposure within short period
of time before the illness manifested itself. In each case where recovery
was allowed on the basis of the existence of an epidemic it would seem
that the exposure in a particular place, though not from a particular
source, was the cause-in-fact of the illness. The real question was one of
proximate cause, a legal conclusion to be reached only if one can say
974
975

/d. at 954-SS·
McAllister v. United States, 348 U.S. 19, 22-23, 75 S.Ct. 6 (1954).
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that the fact the employment carried the person into the surroundings
meant that the disease arose out of the employment. The cases suggest,
of course, that exposure in a situation where there is a significant increase in the incidence of a disease can be considered a proximate cause
if the defendant owes some duty to the plaintiff to save him from such
exposure. The cases also suggest that it will be, or at least can be, found
that a disease that might come from many sources can be considered
as coming from the more likely source, i.e., contact with groups in
which the incidence of the disease is much higher and therefore the
probabilities of catching the disease are considerably greater.
Perhaps even more significant for radiation cases is Travelers Insurance Co. v. Donova1i. 916 The only evidence submitted to prove that
plaintiff contracted tuberculosis in the course of employment under the
Workmen's Compensation Act was that the incidence of tuberculosis
was greater in Kyoto, Japan, where she contracted tuberculosis, than it
was in this country, or at least in Washington, D. C., where she had
been working before being assigned to Japan. The figures stipulated
were that the incidence in Kyoto was five times that in Washington,
D. C., being roughly a thousand cases instead of two hundred cases per
100,000 of population. Both the district court and the court of appeals
upheld the compensation awarded by the defendant commissioner. Each
court cited the statutory presumption that claims come within the provisions of the act and recognized· the same result might not be reached
under common law rules. In upholding the award the circuit court said :
The carrier has brought forward no sub~tantial evidence
opposed to the presumption, along the lines of which we spoke
m Robinson. On the contrary, the agreed statement shows that
the risk of contracting tuberculosis in Japan was some five
times greater than in the District of Columbia. It is conceivable that the incidence of the disease in both places was so
minimal as to require the conclusion that the five-fold ratio
was itself de minimis. But the carrier offered no proof to that
effect, and we certainly cannot derive any such conclusion
from our own inspection of the record. 977
While the burden of proof applied by the courts in a workmen's compensation case may be somewhat different than that used in the usual
tort case, it is extremely significant that the court found the award to
be supported solely on the basis of the evidence of increased incidence.
This case is more significant than the others because it is well known
97 6
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that tuberculosis bacilli can lie dormant in the body for a long period
of time and become active under any number of circumstances. The
court apparently accepted the increased incidence of tuberculosis in
Japan as sufficient evidence that tuberculosis in this particular case arose
out of exposure in Japan itself, rather than because of some internal
change in the plaintiff causing dormant tuberculosis to flair up, although
admittedly the court did not deal specifically with this assumption as
such.
A very recent case in which the type of statistical evidence here discussed obviously was used appropriately enough involves injury to
sheep from radioactive fallout as a result of bomb tests at the Nevada
proving ground. The plaintiff claimed that some of his sheep were injured from the radioactive fallout but the district court denied recovery
in Bulloch v. United States. 918 The court concluded that the expert
witnesses for the defendant were some of the "best informed experts
in the country," and that their judgment that no radiation damage could
possibly have been caused by the fallout was sufficient to deny recovery.
It is apparent that the evidence of the government witnesses and their
conclusions were based upon scientific tests and statistical data derived
from them. The court said :
Plaintiffs argued that there were differences in the sheep
involved in controlled experiments and the Bulloch sheep, and
that by reason of these differences a finding that radioactivity was the cause of plaintiff's damage would be possible.
But the experts maintained their opinions to the contrary for
the most part with these differences in mind. It does not lie
with the Court to question the great weight of the testimony
that these differences were not determinative, in the absence
of at least some evidence that they were. Moreover, if I
could entertain a contrary view on this phase of the evidence,
I would be confronted with the positive testimony from those
best in a position to know that the maximum amount of
radioactive fallout in any area in which the sheep could have
been, would have caused no damage. 979
The court indicated that it was odd that none of the other animals or
persons in the same camp were injured and also indicated that there
was evidence that radioactivity in the area after the test shot was not
above normal background radiation levels. Nevertheless, the most important evidence was that of experts, clearly based on empirical data
from experiments conducted on similar animals. While the court did
978
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not discuss the admissibility of such evidence or the validity of the techniques by which the conclusions of the government witnesses were
reached, this is one case in which such evidence actually was used by a
court for the purpose of proving cause-in-fact or a lack of causal relationship.
The use of this kind of statistical data in determining whether the
requirement of "more probable than not" has been satisfied is tremendously significant for the radiation injury case. Many of the types of
diseases or injuries which are caused by radiation are also caused by
other sources or forces, and the testimony of scientists and experts
ordinarily will be to the effect that exposure to a certain amount of
radiation, at least for many types of injuries, will increase only the risk
that an injury will result. If the risk is increased sufficiently, then it
would be scientifically sound to say that the damage that subsequently
appears was more probably caused by the radiation than by some other
possible explanation. Likewise, in the case of future injuries, and the
present prediction of their likelihood, the use of incidence figures based
upon the statistical calculations of past experience in similar situations
will become tremendously significant if we appreciate the possibilities
that follow from acceptance of some of the scientific theories and postulates supported by respected scientists and scholars. These are set out
later in the chapter, as are our conclusions as to the significance of such
information when combined with the rules of probability and the types
of evidence that can be used to prove probability.980

(2) Future Injury-Standard of Certainty and Statistical Proof
The prior discussion of the standard of probability and the use of
statistical evidence to prove causation perhaps will be brought into
sharpest focus by looking at a problem that seems likely to occur very
frequently in radiation cases; namely, whether or not to award damages
for future injuries not yet manifesting themselves. Here again is an
area of tort law in which radiation cases will cause the courts to analyze more carefully a problem which up to now has been simply an incidental one. A detailed study of future injuries is warranted from this
standpoint alone, but it is also significant in appraising the inadequacies
of our legal principles concerning damages generally in tort cases.
The very fact that many, if not most, of the physical symptoms resulting from overexposure to radiation manifest themselves only after a
sso Infra
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period of delay makes the consideration of future injuries perhaps the
most important of all. Not only may the effects be delayed but in many
situations whether or not an injury actually will arise is a matter of
probability, not certainty. With the increased use of statistical data to
articulate these probabilities, the legal profession will be forced to analyze more closely the validity of assumptions as to scientific facts and
the legal policy decisions based thereon, which may have been made
in previous cases where such questions were for the most part only
peripheral.
If a person has been irradiated negligently and some form of compensable injury soon follows, there may well be a reasonable probability
that other compensable consequences of the same negligent act will become manifest at a later time. In such case the injured party is confronted with the principle which allows but a single recovery for each
wrongful act. Except in the case of continuing nuisance and continuing
trespass, the common law system typically provides a single lump sum
judgment in the accident case. Few, if any, states will allow the plaintiff to "split" his cause of action so as to sue separately for injuries appearing at different times, if occasioned by the same negligent act. All
damages, future as well as past, must be taken into account at the time
of triaJ.9 81 This principle has been well established and the applicable
rules have been worked out with some precision, as will be pointed out
below.
A difficult legal dilemma arises, however, when an individual is negligently exposed to radiation and no relatively immediate injury manifests itself, although there exists a reasonable probability that injury
will develop in the future. One well might ask why the injured person
cannot wait until the injury manifests itself before seeking damages.
Certainly this would seem to be the most logical method of disposing
of the matter. Unfortunately, however, some of the possible biological
effects of irradiation may be considerably delayed, and this period of
delay may exceed the period of the statute of limitations on such a cause
of action. In addition, the injured person also faces the possibility that
the negligent actor, or his estate, may no longer exist when the injury
actually manifests itself. The question then is whether or not a negligently exposed person can obtain recovery before the injury becomes
tangible, visible, or disabling. Both of the problems suggested, i.e., splitting the cause of action and present proof of future injuries, are concerned with future damages; however, the latter is legally somewhat
more perplexing.
os1 Harper & James §25.2.
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(a) Future Injury Preceded by Compensable InJUry

The primary notion of compensation is that of repairing the plaintiff's injury or of making him as nearly whole as may be done by an
award of money; in other words, as nearly as possible placing the plaintiff in the same position he would have enjoyed had the defendant's
wrongful act or omission not injured him. 982 Even if the injury exists
at present in observable, disabling, and compensable form, its conversion into a pecuniary award is a highly speculative process. Unfortunately, in the absence of legislation, this situation is one which the
courts cannot avoid yet it does not follow that they must accept undue
speculation with respect to the existence of the injury for which compensation is sought. Under negligence and strict liability rules, whether
derived from statutory or common law sources, actual injury is a prerequisite to the plaintiff's right of action. 983 The question then arises
as to what is meant by "actu~l" injury or damage. The term suggests
two elements : that the symptoms indicate an existing compensable
injury as opposed to an injury yet to manifest itself in compensable
form, and that its existence be proved with reasonably certainty. These
two elements comprise a part of what has often been referred to misleadingly as the "rule of certainty."
The certainty rule, in its most important aspect, is a standard
.requiring a reasonable degree of persuasiveness in the proof
of the fact and of the amount of the damage. Through its
use, the trial judge is enabled to insist that the jury must have
factual data-something more than guesswork-to guide
them in fixing the award. 984
While the courts in practice have discarded any notion of absolute
certainty if they ever really entertained it, this does not mean that there
are no applicable standards. Such a standard is established in what appears to be a leading case in this area, Strohm v. The N. Y., L. E .. &
W.- R. R. 985 In this case the plaintiff's expert witness, a physician, personally had examined the plaintiff some time subsequent to the injury.
During the course of the examination, the physician received from the
plaintiff a description of his symptoms following the accident. In response to a hypothetical question embodying the plaintiff's apparent
I d. at §25.1.
Ibid.
D84 McConnick §26. (Emphasis added.)
985 g6 N.Y. 305 (1884).
9 82

98s

468

TORT LIABILITY

condition and symptoms, this witness stated at the trial that possibly
epilepsy, meningitis, or traumatic dementia was indicated for the future.
He could not determine which of the three. As to the permanence of the
existing injury, the witness stated that it was very likely to be permanent. He elaborated this by saying, "I mean that the boy will always
have some remnants of this injury, some reminder of it, great or small,
that is certain; how much he will retain I cannot tell, but I think it very
likely he will retain." 986
In reversing the decision and remanding the case the court held that
it was error for the trial court to permit the jury, in estimating the
damages, to include compensation for the mere hazard of the future
injuries to which the expert testified. By way of establishing the rule as
to future injury and the rule as to the admissibility of opinion evidence
on this matter, the court said:
Future consequences, which are reasonably to be expected to
follow an injury, may be given in evidence for the purpose of enhancing the damages to be awarded. But to entitle
such apprehended consequences to be considered by the jury,
they must be such as in the ordinary course of nature are reasonably certain to ensue. Consequences which are contingent,
speculative, or merely possible, are not proper to be considered
in ascertaining the damages. It is not enough that the injuries
received may develop into more serious conditions than those
which are visible at the time of the injury, nor even that they
are likely to develop. To entitle a plaintiff to recover present
damages for apprehended future consequences, there must be
such a degree of probability of their occurring, as amounts to a
reasonable certainty that they will result from the original
injury. 887
A few years later, the same court, in Tozer v. N.Y.C. & H.R.R., 988
again had occasion to rule on this point. In this case the infant plaintiff
was injured in a collision between the defendant's train and a wagon
in which the plaintiff was riding. Medical testimony was admitted at the
trial over the defendant's objection. This testimony concerned the
consequences which might result from the injury, and what results
might be expected in the future. The medical witness testified that there
was a possibility that some disease of the brain might set ~n, even after
the lapse of a year, and cause the death of the person who had sustained
such an injury although he had apparently recovered. Experts also testi986/d. at Jo6-7.
ld. at 3o6. (Emphasis added.)
105 N.Y. 617, II N.E. 369 (1887).

987
988

NEGLIGENCE

469

fied that a person who had sustained such an injury to the brain might,
and frequently did, become insane, that there was no limit to the period
of time within which such a result might occur, and that cases were
recorded where such consequences followed an apparently complete
recovery. In reversing a judgment for the plaintiff and granting a new
trial, the court said:
This case falls within our decision in Strohm v. N.Y., L.E. &
W.R.R. Co. . .. The testimony which was received, under
exception, as to the ulterior consequences which might ensue or
be apprehended from the injuries received by the plaintiff, was
quite as objectionable as that for the reception of which the
judgment in the case cited was reversed. 989
The doctrine was further refined, and a distinction was pointed out,
in tlie case of Griswold v. N.Y.C. & H.R.R. 990 In this case the defendant, relying upon the Strohm case, appealed from an order affirming
a judgment in favor of the plaintiff. At the trial, the counsel for the
plaintiff, after proving an ex'isting injury which the plaintiff suffered
from the negligence of the defendant, was allowed to inquire of a
medical witness having knowledge of the plaintiff's condition as to the
probability of her recovery. Defendant's objection to this kind of evidence was overruled. The judgment in the plaintiff's favor was affirmed.
Adverting to the Strohm and Tozer cases, and quoting from the case
of Turner v. City of Newburgh, 981 the court stated that these decisions
" . . . simply preclude the giving of evidence of future consequences which are contingent, spe.culative and merely possible
as the basis of ascertaining damages, . . . [T]hey in nowise
conflict with the rule allowing evidence of physicians as to a
plaintiff's present condition of bodily suffering or injuries,
of their permanence and as to their cause." 992
The court then pointed out a distinction by stating :
There is an obvious difference between an opinion as to the
pen'nanence of a disease or injury already existing, capable of
being examined and studied, and one as to the merely possible
outbreak of new diseases or sufferings having their cause in
the original injury. In the former case that disease or injury
and its symptoms are present and existing, their indications
are more or less plain and obvious, and from their severity or
slightness a recovery may reasonably be expected or the conIbid.
us N.Y. 61, 21 N.E. 726 (1889).
99t 109 N.Y. 301, 309. t6 N.E. 344 (1889).
992 Su{wa note 990 at 63.
9ss
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trary; while an opinion that some new and different complication will arise is merely a double speculation--one that it may
possibly occur, and the other that if it does it will be a product
of the original injury instead of some other new and, perhaps,
unknown cause. 993

Further clarity, both with respect to the standard of certainty and as
to what testimony is admissible, was furnished by the court when it
said:
Medicine is very far from being an exact science. At best its
diagnosis is little more than a guess enlightened by e%perience.
The chances of recovery in a given case are more or less affected by unknown causes and unexpected contingencies; and
the wisest physician can do no more than form an opinion
based upon a reasonable probability. . . . [B]ut necessarily
the opinion must rest upon a balance of probabilities, inclining the medical judgment one way or the other, and the
opinion given is none the worse because it expresses, and does
not conceal, that it rests upon a reasonable probability strong
enough to justify the formation of an opinion. 99"
In Alberti v. N.Y., L.E. & W.R.R./ 95 a case involving future consequences of an existing injury, medical witnesses were permitted to
testify as to their opinion regarding the future consequences of the
injury. The witnesses gave their opinion that the plaintiff would never
be any better and that he would never be able to straighten his legs. A
witness also was asked to state the length of time that the plaintiff might
live in the natural and ordinary course of events. He answered that he
could give only the probability of this period from the histories of
other similar cases. The court held that this testimony was admissible
under the rule of the Strohm case, so long as he answered in terms of
reasonable probability. A judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed. It
is not clear from the opinion whether or not the damages contained
an element for shortened life span.
In another case in which the facts are not pertinent here and in which
the statements are largely dictum but nevertheless useful, the appellate
division tried to cast further light upon the doctrine of the Strohm case.
In Clegg v. Metropolitan St. Ry. the court said:
The evidence that was condemned in the Strohm Case as
speculative and hypothetical related to the possible development in the plaintiff of diseases which were nonexistent at the
I d. at 64.
oo4 Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
m 118 N.Y. 77,23 N.E. 35 (1889).
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time of the trial. . . . The condemnation of such proof is a
very different thing from saying that evidence cannot properly
be received as to the probable effects of a present condition . . . . [T]he judgment of medical experts as to the
probable consequences of an injury comes within the rule of
reasonable certainty. 996
Finally, in the case of Cross v. City of Syracuse 997 the court of appeals again tried to clarify the "reasonable certainty" rule of the Strohm
case, and, in doing so, appears to have given it a somewhat different
twist. In this case a physician was asked the following question:
Assuming Miss Cross had not had any pain in her left side
previous to the time of this accident and that on March 2d she
was walking north on Butternut Street and stepped into a
hole with her left foot and fell on her left side, and that she
was black and blue on the left side, her hip, side and shoulder
were black and blue, and that since that time she experienced
severe pain in that left side, are you able to state with reasonable certainty in the ordinary course of nature, how long those
severe pains will continue in her left side? 998
The question was objected to and the objection was overruled. The
further question then was asked : "First answer . . . whether you can
answer that with reasonable certainty." The physician answered, "I can
hardly answer that question that way; I would say yes, however."
With respect to this question and answer, the defendant's brief on
appeal put forth the following proposition to show error in the trial:
"It is elementary that the proper question in a case of this
character to ask a medical expert is, whether he is able to
testify with reasonable certainty, upon the subject. If such a
question is answered in the negative, the expert should not be
permitted to testify further on that subject. If the answer
is in the affirmative, he is permitted to testify, if the question
is material, proper, based upon the evidence in the case, and is
a proper subject of expert testimony." 999
In affirming the judgment of the trial court for the plaintiff, the
court of appeals pointed- out that the defendant's proposition was based
on a misapprehension which appeared to be quite general in the profession as to what was decided by the court in the Strohm case. By way
of elaboration of this misapprehension, the court stated:
The prevalent mistake in regard to that decision [in the
Strohm case] is the supposition that it forbade the introduc996

1 App. Div. 207, 21o-II, 37 N.Y.S. 130, 132-33 (1896).

N.Y. 393, 94 N.E. 184 (1911).
I d. at 395·
999 I d. at 396·
9 97
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tion of any opinion evidence as to the probable consequences
of an existing condition due to injury unless the opinion could
be pronounced with reasonable certainty. The Strohm case
in fact laid down no such rule. . . . [T]he Strohm case applies only to the development of diseased conditions apprehended in the future but not present at the time of the inquiry.
There is no intimation in that case that opinion evidence is not
properly receivable as to the probable effects or duration of an
existing condition. There are many subsequent cases which
show that this court did not intend to hold that expert testimony was inadmissible as to the consequences likely to flow
from the present condition of an injured person. 1000
This series of New York cases has been frequently cited and followed by
the courts of other states.
In analyzing the position of the New York court it first should be
noted that the courts have distinguished, at least for purposes of expert
opinion and hypothetical questions, between the future consequences of
a present injury, existing at the time of trial, and a future injury arising
out of a present condition but where there is no observable injury of
this type at the time of trial. While the distinction is somewhat tenuous
(and perhaps scientifically questionable), it would appear that duration
and permanency, future likelihood of incapacity, possibility of recovery,
and other such effects of an existing injury which are considered to ensue
"in the ordinary course of nature," can be shown by opinion and hypothetical testimony of expert witnesses. Furthermore, the Cross case indicates that a physician may give opinion testimony or answer hypothetical questions even though the prognosis is not based on a reasonable
certainty or probability that the described results will follow. In that
case the court definitely ruled that the physician could answer a hypothetical question concerning the future duration of the plaintiff's pains
from an existing injury, even though he apparently admitted that he
could not do so with reasonable certainty.
On the other hand, future injury arising out of a present condition,
whether or not that condition is an injury in itself, apparently would
embrace those injuries which are different from the original condition
or injury and do not exist at the time of the trial. As to such injuries,
the rule is that the expert cannot testify at all unless he first can state
that the probability of their occurrence is so great as to amount to a
reasonable certainty that they will result from the original injury. 1001
10oo
10o1

!d. at 396-97·
See the discussion in Richardson, Evidence §529 (7th ed. 1948).
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Although this distinction is exceedingly important for trial purposes,
it probably does not alter the fundamental rule of certainty as to damages. That is to say, in theory, it does not lighten the plaintiff's burden
of proof with respect to that category of injury which has been characterized as being "in the ordinary course of nature," while maintaining
it with respect to future, new, and different injuries. It would appear
that the court with respect to both types must instruct the jury that they
can award damages only for those injuries which they find, from the
evidence, are "reasonably certain" to ensue as a consequence of the defendant's wrongful act or omission. The distinction seems to be concerned only with the evidentiary rules of admissibility; where the injury presently exists, the plaintiff is allowed to introduce evidence, in
the form of expert opinion and answers to hypothetical questions, based
on less than reasonable certainty that the possible consequences of the
existing injury will ensue. This does not mean, however, that the jury
can award damages, after all of the evidence is in, on less than reason~ble certainty that such a consequence will ultimately result.
Why is the distinction observed? There appear to be several reasons
why the New York courts make this distinction. The principal reason
is implied by language from the Griswold case. 1002 There the court
refers to the "obvious difference" between an objective and a subjective condition. It points out that the former is observable, while the
latter is not. The o~jective condition is observable by the physician and
the jtwy in many cases. These very appearances are additional evidence as to the dimensions of the injury; in theory anyway, the jury
has something else to consider in addition to the description and the
tentative, yet admissible, prognosis of the physician. This is not the case
if the plaintiff claims damages for a future injury not yet manifested.
In such case there is usually nothing in the plaintiff's physical condition
which permits the jury to observe either the existing or future dimensions of the injury, and there is some question, at least in the mind
of the court, as to whether the physician is in any better position to observe them. Thus it would seem that the courts are crediting the
jurors with some prognostic abilities regarding objective, external disorders, and their duration or permanence, but they are unwilling to do so
with regard to future, different, and unobservable disorders.
Another reason for the distinction is suggested by the language of the
Griswold case when the court referred to opinion testimony of experts
regarding "some new and different complication'' as being a "double
1002
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speculation." In that statement the court expresses its concern with
whether the complication will exist in fact in the future and with
whether it fairly can be attributed to the existing, present condition
caused by the defendant's negligent act or omission. With respect to
the duration or permanence of an existing injury, there is little or no
question of causation, assuming causation has been shown with respect
to the injury itself; however, proof of causation with respect to an
existing condition does not establish the second causal relationship; i.e.,
therelationship between an existing condition and a future injury.
The case of Cogswell v. Frazier 1003 illustrates the attitude of the
Maryland court toward inconclusive testimony regarding permanency
of an existing injury. In this case the plaintiff had sustained a comminuted fracture of the left tibia and fibula (the two bones of the lower
leg. The accident occurred in March of 1943, at which time a physician,
who was the only expert called at the trial, operated on the leg. In January of 1944, when the case came to trial, no union of the bones had
occurred. The physician stated that further treatment was possible,
but that if union did not occur within one or two months (from the date
of testifying), it probably would not take place at all. In answer to a
question regarding permanency of the injuries, the doctor stated:
"Since I have stated that the medical case is not finished, you
understand, I say that this injury which he -has sustained and
the marks thereof will be permanent. The scar and the injury to the bone will always be able to be seen. I can't state
whether he will go on and heal his bones and be able to walk
without his brace at this time. I simply say that his injury
is permanent but that the final effects, at this time, are not
possible to be stated." 1004
In affirming a judgment for the plaintiff that awarded damages for
permanent injury, the court stated:
In view of the full testimony which the doctor had previously
given as to nature of this particular injury, the questions asked
him as to the extent and probable effects of it were natural and
and logical ones to follow, and were relevant and admissible
under the accepted rules of evidence. The opinions sought of
him, and given, were entirely within the professional knowledge which he acquired as the attending physician and as medical expert. . . .
Moreover, his answers to these questions were as clear and
as definite as could reasonably have been expected of any
1003

183 Md. 654, 39 A.zd 815 (1944).
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witness, and the jury was entitled to have the benefit of themespecially as this was the only witness called upon to furnish
the medical testimony which was an integral part of the
case.1ooG
With reference to this case it should be noted that the physician stated
with certainty that the scar and bone deformity were permanent, but
that he could not state with reasonable certainty whether the injury was
permanently crippling.
A somewh;~.t more restrictive rule is illustrated by the case of Stevenson v. Penn. Sports & Enterprises. 1006 In this case the attending physician testified that at the time of his last examination the plaintiff ~ad a
partial disability of twenty per cent. He further testified that the condition of the plaintiff's injured heel was "possibly permanent," although
it might gradually improve. The testimony of another medical witness
was similarly uncertain as to prognosis. In affirming a reasonable award
for the plaintiff, including elements of future damages, the court said:
The problem here involved is one of prognosis on which a
doctor cannot be required to express his opinion with the same
definiteness required in a causation question. In many cases
of personal injury the honest opinion of a doctor may well
be that a plaintiff will "gradually improve" or that the injury
may "possibly be permanent or may possibly get better within
a year." This uncertainty of honest medical opinion should
not be the basis for any finding by the jury of permanent
[Emphasis by court.] injury but is sufficient, on the other
hand, for the jury to find some future disability. 1007
Thus, the equivocal prognosis of an expert with respect to the permanency of an injury is admissible in Pennsylvania, but, by itself, will not
support a jury finding of permanency.
Central Truckaway System v. Harrigan 1008 indicates that the New
York admissibility distinction as to opinion evidence is not followed
everywhere, and that such testimony is always admissible in some states
even though the opinion relates to a future injury as distinguished from
a future consequence of a present injury. In this case the plaintiff was
injured in an automobile accident occasioned by the negligence of the
defendant. An expert witness was questioned as to the permanency
of the injuries and the likelihood that the plaintiff would develop
traumatic arthritis in his spinal column. While the court reversed and
1003 Jd. at 66J.
1°06

372 Pa. 157, 93 A.2d 236 (1952).

1001 /d. at 165. (Emphasis added.)
1oo8 79 Ga. App. 117, 53 S.E.2d 186 (1949).
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remanded a judgment in the plaintiff's favor on other grounds, in response to the defendant's contention that the evidence or opinion concerning permanency and future injury should not have been admitted,
it said:
The testimony appears to be the professional opinion of the
doctor. It is therefore not subject to the objection that it
constitutes speculation on his part rather than a statement of
his professional opinion. The doctor in the instant case had
attended this plaintiff and was in position to be thoroughly
familiar with his· injuries. He was competent to give his
opinion as to their permanency. A part of this opinion appears
to have been based on the likelihood of the development of
traumatic arthritis in some of the cervical vertebrae of the
plaintiff. The evidence was admissible for this purpose. . . .
"The opinion of experts, on any question of science, skill,
trade, or like questions shall always be admissible ; and such
opinions may be given on the facts as proved by other witnesses." The weight and credit to be given the testimony of
such experts is for the jury. 1009
·
Wigmore takes a rather strong stand on the question of opinion testimony of physicians. As he points out, testimony as to the condition of
health concerns the "internal actuality," as distinguished from external,
corporeal appearances. This distinction, he has stated, is important
for it affects the qualifications of the witness who will usually be required to be a medical expert. 1010 In discussing the opinion rule with
respect to questions of probability and possibility, capacity and tendency,
cause and effect, he further states :
. . . [T]he reason why the Opinion rule is urged against
them is in general that the thing to which the witness testifies
is not anything which he has observed, but is a quantity which
lies in estimate only and is the result of a balancing of concrete
data.
This is no sufficient reason for excluding such statements
from qualified witnesses; because it must almost always be
impossible for a witness to reproduce in words absolutely all
the detailed data which enter into his estimate, and there can be
no danger in receiving such an estimate from him. . . .
It should be added that Courts sometimes misapply the
Opinion rule to enforce the doctrine of Torts that a recovery
for future personal injuries must include only the certain or
fairly probable, but not the merely possible, consequences; so
10o9
1010

/d. at IZ'J. (Emphasis added.)
Wigmore, Evidence §19?5 (3d ed. 1940).
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that the judge instead of covering the subject by an instruction
to the jury as to the measure of recovery, excludes from evidence a physician's opinion expressed in ·terms of possibility
only. This attempt to control the course of expert testimony
is of course unreasonable in itsel£. 1011
Judging by the above statement, it would seem that Wigmore certainly would approve of the court's attitude in the Central Truckaway
case, 1012 and that he would disapprove of the distinction reached in the
New York decisions. Is his criticism justified? Is this attempt to
control the course of expert testimony really unreasonable?
·.Several factors combine here to make this control by the courts entirely reasonable under our present system of compensation. Everyone
would agree that no person should be compelled to pay compensation
when his act or omission has not or will not produce injury, even though
that act or omission could have produced injury. While it is somewhat
risky to speak in terms of universals, it does not seem too much to state
that the burden of showing a compensable injury is always on the person
claiming to be injured. There is no doctrine, analogous to that of
res ipsa loquitur which raises a presumption of physical or psychological
injury or shifts the burden as to this issue. Accepting this as the
standard attitude and considering the sympathetic attitude of juries
toward plaintiffs generally, when opposed by large corporations in general and insurance companies in particular, as well as the extreme complexity of the medical features, it certainly does not seem unreasonable
to require experts to preface their prognostic opinions with the statement that they are based upon the same standard of reasonable certainty
or probability as is required of the plaintiff, unless it is made clear that
the award should be reduced as the degree of probability becomes
smaller. In most cases of future injury this expression of opinion is
the only evidence as to the occurrence of the injury which the jury has
to assist them. The danger that they will accept the ominous, though remote, prophecies of the plaintiff's experts as sufficient is too great to
justify such inconclusive testimony. Even assuming that neither the
trial nor the appellate courts will allow the jury to find future injury
upon the assertion that it is merely possible, such· testimony is a waste
of time. What is needed here is some clarification on the part of the
courts (or possibly by legislatures) as to what is meant by reasonable
certainty or probability. This would serve for the edification of both
1011

I d. at §1976.

1012 Supra
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the expert and the jury, and it should not be a liberalized rule of evidence that would allow the expert to discuss every remote contingency,
unless we change our rules of compensation.
One other justification can be given for the New York distinction
concerning the degree of certainty required to make expert opinion
testimony admissible. This admissibility rule reflects a recognized
modification of the general rule of certainty. This modifying doctrine
is illustrated by a part of the opinion in Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co.
It is true that there was uncertainty as to the extent of the
damage, but there was none as to the fact of damage, . . .
and there is a clear distinction between the measure of proof
necessary to establish the fact that petitioner had sustained
some damage, and the measure of proof necessary to enable
the jury to fix the amount. 1013
While this case involved a Sherman Anti-Trust Act cause of action, it
still is generally applicable throughout both the tort and the contract
areas of law. 1014 It does not seem unreasonable to require the plaintiff
to show either the present existence or the likelihood of future existence
of the injury with substantial certainty; however, having proved this
fact and that the injury was caused by the wrongful act or omission of
the defendant, and recognizing the inherent lack of precision in determining the dimensions of the injury and converting them into a money
value, it may not be unreasonable to allow the plaintiff to offer, and the
jury to consider, the best evidence available as to the extent of the injuries. This does not solve the problem where there is conflict between
witnesses as to the degree of certainty.
The case of Cordiner v. Los Angeles Traction Co. 1015 offers a good
illustration of an intelligent discrimination between the fact of future
injury and its extent. The plaintiff was injured in a collision between
the streetcars of the defendant street railway companies. On appeal
the defendants conceded the plaintiff's right to recover, but contended
that the amount of recovery should be limited to loss that the plaintiff
was "reasonably certain" to sustain. Pursuant to this attack, the defendants pointed specifically to the testimony of certain experts who
were allowed to testify as to the future results of the plaintiff's injury.
The evidence showed that as a result of the collision the plaintiff had
282 U.S. 555, 562, 51 S.Ct. 248 (1930), quoted by McCormick §27, p. 102.
Harper & James §25.3, n. 15.
1o16 5 Cal. App. 400, 91 Pic. 436 ( 1907).
1o1a
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suffered a fracture at the base of the brain. A Dr. Dukeman, in response to a question as to whether there woul~ be any danger of a relapse at any time in the future, stated:
"There is some danger . . . . [he further elaborated by saying] I should look for more serious and fatal results from a
fracture at the base of the brain than at any other place. I
should look for this after apparent recovery, apparent recovery so far as anybody can tell; I would always look for
something. . . . In the majority of cases I would look for
future trouble. I can't tell what will happen in this case. My
experience and knowledge as a physician has taught me that in
a majority of cases of this kind, where there has been, to even
the eye of a doctor, a complete recovery, . . . various symptoms, would happen. I should look for convulsions in the
majority of cases of that kind where there had been a complete
recovery, to the eye even of a doctor." 1016
Another expert, Dr. Brainard, also in response to a question concerning the condition of the plaintiff after an apparent recovery, answered, "'[A]nd we might expect from the injury the symptoms that
rise frequently from a case of suffering from a fracture at the base
of the brain. There is danger of convulsions or epilepsy, danger of
mental deterioration, danger of paralysis.' " 1011
With respect to this evidence, and in affirming the judgment of the
lower court for the plaintiff, which contained elements of future damages, the court said :
The evidence here tended, in an appreciable degree, to prove
the ultimate fact; that is, the reasonable certainty that future
evil consequences would result from the injury, and was
properly admitted for the consideration of the jury-it being
its function, upon a consideration of the evidence as a whole,
to determine its sufficiency as proof of the ultimate fact.
. . . Testimony of duly qualified experts which shows that in
a majority of cases where the injury . . . results in future
epilepsy, paralysis, or mental deterioration, tends to prove
the reasonable certainty that such consequences will follow
in any given case of like injury. 1018
Observe that Dr. Dukeman's testimony concerned three facts: ( 1)
'the present existence of a potentially injurious condition in the plaintiff's brain, ( 2) the future probability that injurious consequences
/d. at 403. (Emphasis added.)
Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
101s /d. at 404-5. (Emphasis added.)
1o16
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would follow (based on the "statistics" of similar injuries), and (3)
the type of injury which could be occasioned by such a condition. As
to the first two facts, the doctor's certainty was expressed with as much
precision as is generally possible. He was certain of the present existence of a potentially injurious condition, even though there had been an
apparent recovery, and he stated that "in a majority of cases of this
kind" injurious consequences would follow. Notice that neither doctor
could predict with any kind of certainty, however, the precise character
or type of future injury which would follow. A!s to the future existence
of injurious consequences the experts were reasonably certain; but, as
to the type and extent of the injury, they were not certain. The opinions
as to all three facts were admissible, and were sufficient to support an
award for future damages. It is submitted that, in many situations, a
physician will be able to predict future injury generally, but will not be
able to identify and name the precise result. As will be shown, this is
particularly true in radiation exposure cases. Assuming that the plaintiff should be able to collect now for future injury (a different system
really should be worked out), 1019 there does not appear to be any logical
reason why he should be prevented from recovering by the lack of a
name for the ultimate injury. Injury, and the science which is concerned
with it, is not tied to nomenclature, and insofar as is possible, the law
should be equally unrestricted.
While the above attitude illustrates a commendable one on the part of
the California courts, their more recent decisions indicate that they are
carrying this lenient attitude as to the admissibility of expert opinion
to rather extreme lengths with regard to future, new, and different
injuries. Often it seems that the courts now believe that a jury has substantial prognostic faculties of its own and needs no expert opinion as to
"certainty" of future, new, and different injuries. Any expert opinions
on such injuries are admissible, so it would appear. In Riggs v. Gasser
Motors the plaintiff had suffered a severe concussion of the brain. With
respect to future injury, an expert witness was allowed to state:
My opinion of the outcome of the injury is this-it is very
likely that in the end the result will be some permanent damage. It is very frequent [Emphasis added.] that we even find
epilepsy, traumatic epilepsy, as we call it, following a severe
brain injury. If the fracture of the skull is severe enough-if
the injury is severe enough-we might get that as a result, but
nobody knows, except for time, and time will only tell what
1o19
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will come here. No doctor could say ·with reasonable certainty
[Emphasis added.] that the results I have described would not
follow. 1020
·
On appeal from a $20,000 judgment in plaintiff's favor, the defendant
claimed that the award was excessive, and that the testimony as to the
brain injury was too speculative. Notice that the physician did not
say that epilepsy was reasonably certain, but rather, that no doctor
would say with reasonable certainty that it would not occur. The court
affirmed the judgment, saying, "That question we think is as much
within the judgment of the jury as within the province of any court,
and unless we can say, with reasonable certainty, that such injuries
will not affect the future of the plaintiff, we are at a loss to say that
the damages awarded are the result of either passion or prejudice." 1021
This begins to look as if the burden of proof as to the possibility of
future injury can be shifted to the defendant in California.
In Bauman v. San Francisco 1022 the defendant city appealed from a
judgment in favor of the plaintiff and from an order granting plaintiff's
motion for a new trial upon the issue of damages alone. At the trial
a physician, who had operated on the plaintiff following the injury,
was asked to give his prognosis. He stated that, "The prognosis in
this case is good, providing the particular patient does not develop epileptic seizures." When asked if such result was "probable," the trial
judge ruled that the doctor could not answer unless he would state that
epileptic seizures were "reasonably certain" to occur. The doctor stated
that he could not state whether or not this patient was "reasonably certain" to have such seizures and added that, "I would not say it was reasonably certain." The court then ruled that his testimony be stricken
from the record.
In affirming the order granting the plaintiff's motion for a new trial
on the issue of damages, the court said, with respect to the stricken
testimony:
The law does not require a doctor to state that future results are "reasonably certain" to occur before his testimony is
admissible. Before the jury may allow a recovery for future
consequences the evidence must show with reasonable certainty that such consequences will follow, and the jury should
be so instructed. The testimony referred to above would not,
standing alone, support an award for damages for future
102022

1022

Cal. App.2d 636,643,72 P.2d 172 (1937).

at 645 (Emphasis added.)
42 Cal. App..2d 144. 108 P.2d g8g (1940).
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consequences. But that does not mean that such evidence was
not admissible. The ultimate fact to be determined by the jury
is whether it is reasonably certain that future evil consequences
will flow from the injury. Any evidence reasonably tending
in an appreciable degree to prove that fact is admissible.
Its sufficiency to prove that fact is largely for the jury. 1023

What other evidence is there as to the incidence of future injury besides the prognosis of experts, at least where there is no conflict between
the experts? The California courts do not indicate how the jury can
find a result to be reasonably certain to follow when the physicians
themselves are only willing to say that it is possible, unless this is implied in the following statement, quoted from the C ordiner case :
Testimony of duly qualified experts which shows that in a
majority of cases where the injury consists of a fracture at the
base of the brain, such injury results in future epilepsy,
paralysis, or mental deterioration, tends to prove the reasonable certainty that such consequences will follow in any given
case of like injury. 1024
By this the court may be recognizing a distinction between what a
physician is willing to state will occur with reasonable certainty and
what the professional statistics disclose has actually happened in a majority of cases of similar injuries. If in a majority of cases epilepsy,
paralysis, or mental deterioration has followed fractures at the base
of the brain, then perhaps the jury is justified in finding such results
reasonably certain to occur in the particular case, even though the
attending physician is unwilling to so state with respect to the particular patient. This may be a semantic difficulty in equating legal and
scientific degrees of certainty. The doctor might have answered affirmatively if asked if it were more probable than not that injury would
result.
An interesting device is used in the C ordiner case, and in three others
considered below, which may become highly significant with respect to
radiation injuries, especially since it seems to enable the plaintiff to
partially avoid the restrictive attitude of many of the courts toward
contingent and speculative evidence. This is the technique of emphasizing and seeking recovery for a present condition which, although it
is not presently incapacitating or otherwise injurious, was caused by
the defendant's wrongful act or omission and has the predictable, potential effect of making the plaintiff substantially more susceptible to
102a
1024

I d. at 163.
Supra note 1015 at 404-5. (Emphasis added.)
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particular or general injuries in the future. While in the Cordiner
case the emphasis was on the future consequences themselves, in the
testimony of Dr. Dukeman there was an u~mistakable allusion to a
present condition, a dangerous, yet unknown pathological condition,
which remained "in the majority of cases" even after an apparent recdvery. The question is, will the courts regard this condition in itself a
compensable, presently existing injury when it has been wrongfully
inflicted?
-Crank v. Forty-Second St., M.H. & St. N.A. Ry. 1025 appears to
indicate that the technique may be successful. In this case the plaintiff
was injured while riding upon the defendant's streetcar. The nature of
the injuries was not specified. On appeal the defendant conceded .the
proof of causation and negligence, but claimed that the award was
excessive, charging error in the trial judge's instruction to the jury to
the effect that, upon the subject of the permanency of the injuries, they
might take into consideration the plaintiff's increased general susceptibility to disease. There was evidence that the plaintiff required medical
attention for a considerable period of time and that the injury was
permanent and would affect her during the remainder of her life. A
physician testified that if she was sick from other causes, the result of
this injury always would complicate other illnesses. The court stated
that this evidence furnished grounds for the consideration by the jury
of the results of the injury and affirmed for the plaintiff. The standard
imposed was that of "reasonable certainty that they [the results] will be
permanent." In concluding, the court pointed out that :
It is true, it may be, that the plaintiff will never suffer from
any other illness; but where the injury is of such a character
as renders her less able to contend against the ordinary ills
which flesh is heir to it does not seem to be at all speculative
to allow the jury to take such a state of affairs into consideration in making compensation to the plaintiff for the injuries
suffered. 1028
The court seemed to be entirely unconcerned with whether the plaintiff would ever actually suffer from this existing condition. The condition in itself did not incapacitate her, at least in the sense for which
recovery was allowed, and the plaintiff was not required to show with
reasonable certainty or probability that she would be in such position
in the future as to make the condition actually harmfuP 027
6 N.Y.S. 229 (188g), aff'd without opinion, 127 N.Y. 648, 27 N.E. 856 (1891).
I d. at 230.
1027 See discussion supra at notes 452 ff.
1o25
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The case of Coover v. Painless Parker, Dentist, discussed previously,1028 warrants further consideration here. This was an action for
damages for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff as a result of
ov.erexposure in the taking of dental X-ray photographs by the defendant. The defendant appealed from a verdict in the plaintiff's favor
for $ro,250 on the ground that the amount, in view of the injuries
sustained, was excessive. Specifically, the defendant argued that the
evidence as to the possibility of cancer was wholly conjectural and uncertain and that that element rightfully could not be considered by the
jury. After quoting from the record the testimony concerning the
plaintiff;s present condition and describing her skin, the court set forth
the foiiowing portion of the record :
"A. ... The light (x-ray) has destroyed these hair follicles
-you have a skin that is not functioning and our medical
literature is fuii of cases of cancer--carcinoma that have developed upon a senile skin following an X-ray burn.
"Q. You give your professional opinion to the effect that
Mrs. Coover at this time might be in danger of a cancerous
growth? A. I do not say that she has a cancerous growth,
she has not, but a cancer may develop on this area-it is
common."

* * * * *

"A. ... That [the scars on plaintiff's face] will be permanent, and there may possibly be some further changes in the
skin. On this senile skin not infr~uently develops new
growths, little neoplasm, warty growths, and from these warty
growths, the carcinoma develops ; sometimes that is a year,
sometimes it is two years-sometimes it is three or four years
before they develop."
[The physician also testified that over the area affected the
plaintiff had a skin that is predisposed to cancer, that she had
some disturbance of the sensory nerves of her face.]
"Q. In the event the sensory nerves have been destroyed, in
this portion of the face that is burned or impaired, what
would be the natural consequence of such a condition, in other
words, what effect would that have on Mrs. Coover? A. The
most important sequela from a dermatological standpoint is
the possibility of carcinoma--of a cancer."
"Q. It may happen that she can go on through life without
that occurring, I suppose? A. It is possible, but we do find
many times, carcinoma developing upon the scars of X-ray
burns, in all of our literature they speak of that as very,
very likely sequela, it is the thing to be guarded against and
to be watched." 1029
102s
10 29

Supra note 452.
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The trial court instructed the jury that they were to consider as elements
of damage only such physical injury as they found the plaintiff was
reasonably certain to suffer in the near future. In affirming the judgment for the plaintiff the court said:

If we assume that respondent's skin condition was considered by the jury it by no means follows that this was improper. While the actual condition of cancer may have been
conjectural and uncertain, the record contains positive evidence that a condition actually exists which makes this dread
disease much more likely. We think this j»"edisposition in itself is some damage, and when caused by the wrongful act of
another it is an interference with the normal and natural conditions and rights of the other, which must be held to be a real
and not a fanciful element of damage. The necessity of constantly watching and guarding against cancer, as testified to
by the physician, is an obligation and a burden that the defendant had no right to inflict upon the plaintiff.1030
In Leenders v. California Hawaiian Sugar Refining Corp. 1031 the
plaintiff's eye had been injured as a result of the defendant's negligence.
A physician testified that the tear duct did not carry off the water from
the plaintiff's eye, and that such a condition would result in an abnormal
accumulation of bacteria and that, in the event of the eye being scratched
in the future, the presence of these germs might cause an infection or
an ulcer which could impair the patient to a great extent or even result
in the loss of the eyeball. On appeal the defendant attacked this testimony as speculative. In affirming the lower court's judgment for the
plaintiff, the court said:
The fact that plaintiff had been physically impaired so as to
increase the possibility of future infection in the eye was a
proper matter to be considered by the jury in determining the
extent of his present and permanent injury. The jury could
not properly award him damages on such evidence on the
theory that such infection with its attendant results was reasonably certain to occur, It could take into consideration
the actual impairment of his eye which permanently decreased
his resistance to infection with all the results that might
be attendant thereon. The size of the verdict does not indicate
that the jury awarded damages on the theory that it regarded
the future impairment of plaintiff's eyesight or the loss of his
eyeball as reasonably certain. 1082
The opinion did not disclose the size of the judgment.

us. (Emphasis added.)
59 Cal. App.2d 752, 139 P.2d 987 (1943).
10a2Jd. at 759. (Emphasis added.)
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The' ramifications of these cases have great significance for radiation
exposure claims. It is accepted that when a person is irradiated, there
is definite "impact," whether by matter or energy is immaterial. The
probability of collision between the cell matter of his body and the
alpha or beta particles, neutrons, or the gamma ray photons is so great
as to be almost wo% certain. If there are collisions, it must necessarily
follow that some change in the body cells has taken place, some increment of ionization. Scientists, and certainly geneticists, inform
us that the effects of these changes on healthy cells are nearly always
deleterious and permanent. In the words of the geneticists: "Any radiation is· genetically undesirable, since any . radiation induces harmful
mutations." 1033 Furthermore, there is substantial opinion among scientists that any amount of radiation is pathologically undesirable. 1034
It is not surprising that the court in the Coover case was impressed and
persuaded by such an argument, that they found this a condition and a
"burden that the defendant had no right to inflict upon the plaintiff." 1086
The most startling feature Of the doctrl.ne in radiation cases is that
if the plaintiff can prove the existing, irradiated condition with reasonable certainty-and he should riot have too much difficulty in this
connection-the probabilities of some existing effect are overwhelming,
and if this condition in itself is "some damage," then both the possibility
of future injurious results and the character of those results go to the
amount or extent of the injury. Under the New York admissibility rule,
opinions of experts on these latter facts can be stated with less than
reasonable certainty. In fact, this is what happened in each of these
cases. In none of them did the experts predict, with reasonable certainty, that the actual, incapacitating results would follow from the
existing condition.
Consider, also, the impact of this doctrine on claims for psychological
injury. The existing condition theory can be highly advantageous to a
plaintiff alleging such injuries, for it gives him real, objective justification upon which to predicate his neurosis~his apprehensive suffering
with regard to an untimely and painful demise. There is at least an
implication in the Coover case that the injury for which the court al.lowed recovery had such a subjective element. The court said, "The
necessity of constantly ·watching and guarding against cancer . . . is
an obligation and a burden that the defendant had no right to inflict
upon the plaintiff." 1036
Infra notes H>72-79·
1ou Pollard, "Fall-Out Fever," 200 Atlantic Monthly 27-32 ( I957).
1035 Supra note 452 at I IS.
.
1036 Ibid.
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One further observation should be noted. In. both the Coover and
Leenders cases, the courts do not treat_ the "predisposition" or existing
condition and the ultimate, future injury as the same thing. The court,
in the Coover case, refers to the predisposition, for which recovery is
allowed,- as "some damage." Apparently, in theory at least, the measure
of recovery for the predisposition would not be the same as it would be
were the cancer fully developed. If the courts are willing to regard the
predisposition as a compensable injury in itself, however, and if they
allow opinion testimony of the possible consequences of the condition,
it is not unreasonable to expect that the jury will award damages on the
ba'sis of the gloomiest and most pessimistic prognosis. It is one thing
to distinguish between the two with respect to the question of existence
and quite another for the jury to distinguish between them when con~idering the monetary dimensions of the injury.
(b) Future Injury Not Preceded by Compensable
Injury·
Thus far the cases have been concerned with the future consequences
of existing injuries which may follow a past or existing compensable
injury-past or existing as of the date the cause of action is brought.
But what of future injuries which are not preceded by any compensable
injury or incapacitating condition that has been reasonably contemporaneous with the negligent act or omission? Briefly stated, the plaintiff
in such a case, due to the negligent act or omission of the defendant,
will suffer injury at a future date. The first question is, When does
the cause of action accrue? The second question is, Assuming that the
cause of action accrues at the date of the negligent act or omission (if
it does arise at this tinie the statute of limitations, except possibly for a
recent Arkansas enactment, will preclude recovery for many injuries) / 087 how does the plaintiff prove the future injury for purposes of
obtaining damages?
Cases· concerning this question are very difficult to find. In most
instances injuries to persons have been more or less immediately observable. There is usually little time interval between impact and initial
toarLa Porte v. U. S. Radium Corp., 13 F. Supp. 263 (D.C. N.J. 1935). Injuries
may be delayed as much as 35 years; see report in N.Y. Times, May 27, 1958, p. 21,
col. 4· The Arkansas enactment, described infra note 1371, might be interpreted to permit tolling the statutory period on the theory that it is not known whether the potential defendant is a wrongdoer until the victim's symptoms appear in the future. This
would be an unfortunate application when no provisions are made for the problems
raised by long-delayed injuries.
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effect. While there have been numerous instances in which plaintiffs
have anticipated future injuries and claimed damages for them, this
practically always has been in connection with allegations of and claims
for existing injuries. 1038 A situation in which a person will not suffer
reeognizable and compensable injury for a considerable period after
the negligent act or omission which is its cause, and in which there is no
interim indication of the condition, has been comparatively rare in the
pre-atomic era. Even where such a situation is possible, the fact that
the person who will ultimately suffer injury is not sufficiently aware
of his condition means that he will not bring suit against the person
responsible. No cases involving this exact situation have been found .
. Inasmuch as the cases offer so very little direct light on this question,
attention should be focused on the cases where, ·by reason of a statute of
limitations, the principal question has been whether the plaintiff has
been too late in bringing his action. Even these cases shed little light
upon when the plaintiff could have brought the action.
Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Transp. Co. 1039 is one case in which
the court gave particular consideration to when the plaintiff could have
brought his action. In this case the complaint alleged that, while in the
employ of the defendant, the plaintiff inhaled foreign substances in the
form of dust, and, as a result, contracted a disease of the lungs known
as pneumoconiosis, or silicosis. In separate and distinct causes of action the complaint alleged first that the plaintiff's exposure constituted
a breach of a common law duty which the employer owed to the employee, and, second, that there was a breach of a similar duty imposed
by statute; The periods of limitation with respect to the breach of
these duties were three and six years respectively. The plaintiff brought
suit shortly after he became incapacitated and his affliction was identified as silicosis. This time was more than three years after the last
exposure to the dust but less than six years. The New York Civil Practice Act, §49, required that "An action to recover damages for a personal injury resulting from negligence" must be commenced within
three years after the cause of action has accrued. The defendant maintained that the duty owed to the plaintiff was negligently breached, that
the plaintiff had only a single cause of action for damages for such
personal injury, and that, therefore, the action was barred by the threeyear statute of limitations. The plaintiff claimed that his cause of action
103 8
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accrued, not at the time he inhaled the dust, but at the time when the
dust, so inhaled, resulted in a disease of the lungs.
With respect to these contentions, the court conceded that a cause
of action accrues only when the forces wrongfully put in motion produce injury, but, by way of explanation, it pointed out that this does
not mean that the cause of action accrues only when the injured person
knows or should know that the injury has occurred. In answer to the
question as to when the injury has occurred, the court said:
The injury occurs when there is a wrongful invasion of personal or property rights and then the cause of action accrues.
Except in cases of fraud where the statute expressly provides
otherwise, the statutory period of limitations begins to run
from the time when liability for wrong has arisen even though
the injured party may be ignorant of the existence of the
wrong or injury. 10• 0
In the following statement the court indicated that the magnitude of
the in jury at its inception has no bearing on when it occurred :
Consequential damages may flow later from an injury too
slight to be noticed at the time it is inflicted. No new cause
of action accrues when such consequential damages arise. 10u
Applying these rules to the case before the court, Justice Lehman
said:
The injury to the plaintiff was complete when the· alleged
negligence of the defendant caused the plaintiff to inhale the
deleterious dust. For that injury, including all resulting
damages the defendant was then liable. The disease of the
lungs was a consequence of that injury. Its result might
be delayed or, perhaps, even by good fortune averted; nevertheless, the disease resulted naturally, if not inevitably, from
a condition created in the plaintiff's body through· the defendant's alleged wrong. 10u
With respect to the question as to when the plaintiff could have brought
his action and what damages he could have collected, the court went on
to state:
It cannot be doubted that the plaintiff might have begun an
action against the defendant immediately after he inhaled the
dust which caused the disease. No successful challenge could
have been interposed on the ground that the action was preJd. at JOO.
Ibid.
to•z I d. at JOI.
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. matur~ly brought because at the time it was commenced no
serious damage to the plaintiff had yet developed. In that action the plaintiff could recover all damages which he could
show had resulted or would result therefrom. 1048
The court concluded that any cause of action of the plaintiff which
rpust be commenced within three years after it accrued was barred
for the above reasons. Nevertheless, it went on to impose liability on
the defendant by finding that he had failed to provide the safeguards
required by statute, that the statutory duty was imposed upon employers
for the benefit of that group of persons of which the plaintiff was a
member, and that the statute of limitations upon recovery for injuries
arising out of the breach of such a statutory duty was six years.
Whether the court actually would allow recovery before the disease
or injury has manifested itself in some form is not made clear, but it
does appear that the ruling of the court in the Schmidt case, with respect
to when the period of limitation begins to run, represents the majority
rule in negligence actions. 1044 If the period of limitation has begun to
run it is because a cause of action has accrued. Therefore, the Schmidt
holding implies that damages for future consequences should be recoverable if proper proof is made. One writer takes rather strong
exception to this majority rule. He states that "by no system of law
giving weight to practical considerations could a cause of action accrue
in respect of any mere act or neglect exposing one to disease, prior to
the time when, if at all, a disease actually results-save for special circumstances, as of fright or apprehension." 1045
Several courts have evolved a theory, however, whereby the continuing negligence is regarded as a single wrong against which the
limitation period commences to run, only from the time of cessation
of the wrong, or cessation of the inhalation of the dust, gas, or fumes
or exposure to deleterious substances. In instances of disease contracted
by employees outside of the workmen's compensation laws, some courts
have established that the limitation period runs from the termination
of the employment. 1046
The United States Supreme Court in Urie v. Thompson 1041 did not
follow the majority view . .In this case the plaintiff, a former fireman
on defendant's steam locomotive, filed suit in a Missouri court under
the Federal Employers' Liability Act to recover for injuries. He alIbid.
See cases collected in Annot., II A.L.R.2d 2'17, 283-89 (1950).
1046 I d. at 279 .
. 1 0 46 I d. at 289-95.
1041 337 U.S. 163, 6g S.Ct. 1018 (1949).
1o4s
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leged that after thirty years of service he had been forced to cease work
because of silicosis occasioned by continuous. inhalation of silica dust
which arose from sand ~mitted in excessive amounts by the locomotives'
poorly adjusted sanding apparatus. Urie filed suit on November 25,
1941. Under the terms of the then prevailing three-year statute of
limitations, the court could not entertain the claim if Urie's cause of
action accrued before. November 25, 1938. Urie became too ill to work
in May of 1940, and his condition was diagnosed as silicosis a week or
so later. The defendant contended that Urie, having been exposed to
silica dust since approximately· 1910, unwittingly must have contracted
silicosis before 1938, and hence that his cause of action accrued more
than three years before the action was brought. Alternatively, the defendant also argued that each inhalation of silica dust was a separate
tort giving rise to a fresh cause of action, and that Urie, therefore, was
limited to a claim for inhalations after Noyember 25, 1938.
The court, in ruling in the plaintiff's favor, rejected "such mechanical
analysis of the 'accrual' of the petitioner's injury-whether breath by
breath, or at one unrecorded moment in the progress of the disease," 1048
stating that it would only serve to thwart the congressional purpose
'under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. While the court simply
could have ruled that the limitation period commenced to run on the
date of termination of employment, as has been done in a number of
of cases between employer and employee, it said that since the record
contained no suggestion that Urie should have known he had silicosis
earlier than May of 1940:
. . . "It follows that no specific date of contact with the
substance can be charged with being the date of injury, inasmuch as the injurious consequences of the exposure are the
product of a period of time rather than a point of time; consequently the afflicted employeee can be held to be 'injured'
only when the accumulated effects of the deleterious substance
manifest themselves." 1049
The statement is itself a quotation from the case of Associated Indem.
Corp. v. Industrial Accident Commission. 1050
One other case dealing with silicosis should be noted. In Henson v.
Dept. of Labor & Industries the court, quoting from Reed & Emerson,
The Relation Between Injury and Disease, at 183, stated:
"Silica dust inflicts injury to the lungs, not because of the
physical properties of the individual particles, as the hard,
1048
1049

/d. at 169.
I d. at 170.

1oso 124 Cal. App. 378, 381, 12 P.2d 1075 (1932).
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sharp particles of quartz and carborundum; but its danger lies
purely in its poisonous chemical action. Because of this, it
causes tiny areas of necrosis in the walls of the lymph spaces
of the alveoli in which it is deposited, at which necrotic points,
by ways of healing, there develops fibrosis and a proliferation
of the surrounding epithelial cells, the latter explaining the
nodule formation.
"Silicosis is a progressive disease, the lung changes continuing to develop for one or two years after complete removal of the individual from the silica hazard, this advance
probably due to the continued chemical action of the silica
stored in the lung tissues." 1061

This court also pointed out that :
It is evident, as shown by the authority just quoted, that,
in most if not all cases, the symptoms of the disease do not
manifest themselves until after a long period of exposure to
silica dust and that an individual may not become aware of
any disability until long after he has ceased work. 1052
From this it would appear that silicosis is one of the types of injury
most closely analogous to those frequently caused by irradiation.
Aside from the fact that in the Urie case the plaintiff was bringing an
action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, which the Supreme
Court has often construed at least "liberally," 1058 the principal distinction between this and the Schmidt case appears to be the manner in
which the two courts look at the injury. Notice that in both cases the
courts were concerned with "injury" and not with "disability," and
that both courts were concerned with when the injury occurred, for this
is when the cause of action is said to accrue and when the limitation
period commences to run. In the Schmidt case the New York court
takes a very mechanical position; the injury occurs when there is an
"invasion" of the plaintiff's body by the substances whose chemical activities cause the fibrosis and epithelial cell proliferation which constitute the disease itself. As in the Crank 105• and Coover 1055 cases, discussed in the foregoing section, the incipient or initial condition caused
by the defendant's wrongful act is the "injury," and the silicosis itself is
regarded as "consequential damages" for which "no new cause of action
accrues." Medically speaking, this view of the New York and the Cali15 Wash.:zd 384. 386-87, 130 P.2d 885 (1942).
!d. at 387.
105 8 See Neese v. Southern Ry., 350 U.S. 77, 76 S.Ct. 131 (1955).
1054. Supra note 1025.
1055 Supra note 1028.
1051

1052
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fornia courts probably is the correct one. The initial "invasion" or "impact''-the inhalation of the deleterious dust or exposure to radiation
-constitutes the injury, and all conditions and consequences which
follow naturally therefrom, irrespective of what additional causes
may concur, are simply new increments of the initial injury. In essence,
the situation is really no different from that in the cases discussed in the
previous section. For example, in the Cordiner case 1066 the plaintiff
had made an apparent recovery at the time of trial; in so far as the
present was concerned he probably had merely a potentially dangerous
condition, which, at the time was not incapacitating. The only difference between this situation and that of Schmidt before he developed
silicosis, is that Cordiner had suffered past injuries which were themselves compensable. Since there is no qualitative difference between
their conditions with respect to future damages, there is no logical
reason why the one should be able to collect for future damages because
he has suffered past damages while the other should not be able to recover for future damages be·cause he has not suffered past damages.
Any such distinction is scientifically untenable and should be so regarded legally as well. So long as the legislative policy is to bar claims
of a certain age, the courts must allow recovery for future damages
that are reasonably certain to ensue regardless of whether there is past
or present damage.
In the Urie case the court expressly rejected any "mechanical analysis
of the 'accrual' of petitioner's injury." The court, however~ did not say
that petitioner could not bring an action until he was incapacitated, it
used the word "manifest." It would seem that Urle was injured and a
cause of action accrued "when the accumulated effects of the deleterious
substance" manifested themselves to him. Depending upon his knowledge, the period of limitation could have begun running at any time between the date when his lungs contained a sufficient quantity of the silica dust to give rise to the disease and the time when he was hospitalized
with silicosis. This imparts a subjective quality to injury and does not
impose the objective criterion of present disability; future disabilty is
still sufficient to warrant recovery if properly proved. The decision in
this case is predicated on notions of "fairness" and congressional policy,
and not upon any substantially different attitude toward when an injury
occurs or what constitutes a compensable injury.
Admittedly the Schmidt and similar cases are not directly concerned
with the problem under consideration and so are not too persuasive
1ose Supra note 1015.
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authority for the proposition that an action can be brought for future
damages before any disability or other compensable circumstance or
condition has arisen. Nevertheless, if cases containing such an implication are rare, cases stating the converse are even rarer, at least none
have been found. This fact, plus the fact that the courts have repeatedly
allowed damages for future consequences in connection with past and
existing damage, should give some weight to the conclusion. Where
such a cause of action is asserted, it will not fail, or at least should not,
because of any absolute prohibition against the claim but rather because the prognosis in the particular case does not meet the standard of
reasonable certainty.
Although distinctions could be suggested, an analogy can be drawn
to certain allergy cases. 1057 These cases indicate that for purposes of an
award under workmen's compensation laws, an occupationally derived
allergy may be regarded as a "disability" regardless of the fact that
upon separation from the irritant, ·the condition disappears. In Arkansas Nat'l Bank of Hot Springs v. Colberf/ 058 for example, the court
sustained an award of the workmen's compensation commission for
total and permanent disability. Claimant-appellee, a sixty year old
woman, was compelled to give up her employment as a bank cashier
when it was discovered that her dermatitis was caused by an allergy to
nickel and carbon, substances she came in contact with in the form of
coins and carbon paper. Under the Arkansas statute-"The following
diseases only shall be deemed to be occupational diseases. . . . Dermatitis, that is, inflammation of the skin due to oils, cutting compounds,
or lubricants, dust, liquids, fumes, gases or vapors." 1059 The court, applying the general rule of liberal interpretation of such a statute, found
that the claimant. was allergic to the "dust" from coins and carbon
paper. Although at the time the award was given the claimant's dermatitis had cleared up entirely, an allergist testified that it would return if
contact with the substances was resumed~
Surely a better system can be found to take care of such cases so as
to avoid the "either-you-recover-or-you-don't" aspect of our two-value
system. A suggested solution that takes greater cognizance of the statistical probahilities is suggested later. 1060
"'"" ( ulleckd 111 4 N C.t. A 3d 559 f tQSS l under the heading "Compensability of
allergy w1thout present disabling manifestation.''
1058 20Q Ark 1070. 193 S.W.zd 8o6 f 1946)
1059 Ark Acts of 1939, No. 319, §14(7).
toao Infra recommendations discussion following note 1123.
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(3) Application of Proof Rules and Present Scientific
Opinion
If the rules of proof described above are to be followed in radiation
injury cases, what results might be reached based upon present opinions
of responsible scientific persons? The postulation of some of the results should bring into focus much more sharply the inadequacies of
the proof concepts and standards now applied by our courts. Some of
the results may be startling to say the least. A warning is necessary
therefore, lest the discussion that follows be misunderstood. The same
warning will be repeated at the end to emphasize the purpose of the
discussion and to place it in proper perspective, taking account of the
limitations that are inherent in the information available.
First, it should be remembered that our knowledge of the biological
effects of radiation is still quite inadequate. The expert opinions used
in the examples below are in many cases tentative and admittedly less
than certain. Likewise, in rnany cases there is responsible scientific
opinion to the contrary. In each case, however, the opinion expressed
is that of a responsible, respected scientist who is speaking without regard to legal concepts, particularly without reference to those involved
in tort litigation. In each case the eminence of the expert is such that,
to the extent expert witnesses are permitted to testify, his testimony
would be submitted to the jury and whatever our differences of opinion
as to what is the best policy, the jury under our present system would
be permitted to decide which of the opposing views was to be accepted
as "true." As pointed out previously, therefore, while the results are
startling in some cases, it is submitted that each of the postulates could
actually lead to the result suggested on the basis of existing rules of
proof.
·
. Before plaintiffs' lawyers make too much of the examples to be discussed, it should be· indicated that to use present scientific information
in the manner allowed by the jurisdiction most liberal in its admission,
and under our present rules, would be quite premature and lead to
a:bsurd results. Our thesis in· fact is that as yet scientists do not know
enoug}:l about the biological effects of radiation to place too much dependence upon their conclusions, arrived at for scientific and not legal
purposes, except in the most obvious cases, until more is known about
these effects. It is our view that such scientific information should be
admitted in evidence in actual litigation only if we change our present
system of trying and proving the damage and causation elements in
tort cases. Since in most cases the understanding of the lawyer, and

496

TORT LIABILITY

even more certainly that of the jury, as to the validity and weaknesses
of scientific evidence is so inadequate, and since the likelihood of serious
injustice is so great, it seems most unwise to allow the laymen on juries
to evaluate scientific opinion of the kind now finding its way into print.
Our thesis is that radiation cases will show how completely inadequate is our present system of proving causation and damages, and this
is particularly so in the kind of cases likely to arise in the event of overexposure to radiation. They clearly should not be used to award damages or to assign causality for future injuries. We suggest there is a
better way to do it.
Our tentative conclusions probably will not be acceptable initially to
either plaintiffs' or defendants' lawyers. On reflection, however, both
groups may ~orne to feel there is merit in the suggestions. In any event
the possibilities in radiation cases, if present rules are used, should be
set forth, even though the results themselves may be too startling
to be accepted as a method of measuring and allocating the losses that ·
seem inevitable as we expand the use of atomic energy sources. We believe that the case is clear for initiating a combined scientific-legal study
of the proper legal use of the most valid, presently accepted scientific
information. In this way the proof problems as to causation and damages can be identified and dealt with intelligently on same other basis
than the happenstance of an isolated case and the information available
to the lawyers who happen to be trying it. This well may be an area in
which there must be legislation if we are to arrive at anything like a
just scheme for taking care of radiation injuries through the litigation
process.
(a) Specific Types of Radiation Injuries
( i) Leukemia
Leukemia is the injury about which we have the most scientific data
bearing upon the certainty of causal relationship. There is responsible
scientific opinion as follows : (I) Radiation "will produce an increased
incidence of leukemia. At present the rate of leukemia for the few most
heavily exposed survivors at Hiroshima is about 1.3 per cent. Radiologists, some of whom have received chronic irradiation on the order of
I,ooo r. have 7 to IO times as much leukemia as has the general population."1061 (2) The ratio of observed cases of leukemia among the sur10a1 Hearings Before the Special Subcommittee on Radiation, Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 1957, p. g81 [hereinafter cited as Radiation
Hearings]. See also figures at g86 on English study, indicating increase of from 4.1
per 10,000 persons irradiated· to 17.6 per 10,ooo. Also at 988, 916, 1791.
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vivors at Hiroshima in the zone where supposedly fifty rems exposure
was received was 2.6 times greater than should have occurred normally
during the period observed. 1062 ( 3) " [ T] he data obtained from surveys
of exposed human populations indicate that there is a clear association
between leukemia and previous radiation exposure." 1063 ( 4) Of the
survivors at Hiroshima, in the region estimated to have received only
twenty-five rems (with a maximum possible dose of 100 rems), ten
persons died of leukemia, four of whom would have been expected
to die on the basis of spontaneous incidents. 1064 (5) Out of a group of
1,400 children treated with from 100 to 300 units of radiation, seven
developed leukemia where only one would have been expected from the
natural incidence of leukemia. 1065 (6) "[R]adiation induction of leukemia is proportional to the radiation exposure and . . . for wholebody radiation exposure the number would be entirely consistent with
an estimation that 50 r. doubles the chance of development of leukemia." 1066 (7) Two hundred roentgens exposure to children has been
found to induce cancer in later life. It also has been found that exposure
to as little as three to five roentgens during the last two months before
birth has caused cancer a few years later .1067 ( 8) "The laboratory evidence for the leukemogenic action of ionizing radiations is overwhelming, the Hiroshima-Nagasaki experience dramatic, and the evidence
for an increase in carcinoma of the thyroid after therapeutic irradiation
of supposed enlargement of the thymus highly suggestive. More disturbing than all this, however, is an English publication . . . indicating that the fetuses of women subjected to x-ray pelvimetry during
pregnancy develop leukemia and malignancy during childhood twice as
frequently as do non-irradiated.... Of course, it is total body radiation
that the fetuses receive, but the dose probably does not exceed 2,500 mr.
[2.5 rems]." 1068 (9) No one has yet been able to demonstrate an increased incidence of leukemia or other cancer of the person living in a
brick house in Denver who is exposed to 4·5 rems in a thirty year period
as against 3 rems for a person living in a frame house at sea level, nor
among the inhabitants of Travancore, India, where the thirty year
/d. at 989. table 1. But note limitations on accuracy. See also pp. 1554, 1624/d. at 992. Compare scepticism as to such conclusions at 906-<>7, 909·
1064 /d. at 957·
1085 I d. at 9s8.
1068 I d. at I132. (Emphasis added.) See also 1791.
1067 /d. at 1264- Effect from fall-out alone enough to double rate of leukemia in
some places; 1292.
1o6s Hodges, "Health Hazards in the Diagnostic Use of X-Ray," 166 ].A.M.A. 577,
578-79 ( 1958). He warns our proof is not very accurate. (Emphasis added.)
1o62
1068
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accumulation may be as high as fifty rems. 1069 ( 10) Natural background radiation may be responsible for ten to twenty per cent of the
observed leukemia/ 070 (which might be taken to mean that a dose of
less than t'l.oenty rems would cause a doubling of the leukemia rate.)
(I. I) "The evidence is increasingly in" the direction that there is no
threshold for either the somatic or genetic effects of radiation. 1011
Assuming for purposes of analysis the accuracy and relevancy of
these statements (which actually should not be done in our opinion at
the present time, if present rules are followed), observe the case that
could be made for a plaintiff. If as little as 2.5 rems exposure of a foetus
and from 25 to so rems exposure of an adult doubles the incidence of
leukemia, then a person so exposed could claim (ignoring the statute of
limitations problem) that if he should develop leukemia at a later date
the chances are better than fifty-fifty that his leukemia resulted from
the radiation exposure, rather than from all other causes together.
Therefore "more probably than not" his leukemia was caused by the
radiation to which he was exposed. It is submitted that prognostications of this kind are every bit as good as, if not better than, the opinion
of just any doctor or even an expert in the field, offered in the form of
testimony, that "more probably than not" or that "there is a reasonable probability" that the injury resulted from a particular exposure.
Yet this is the conclusion to which the present tort rules concerning
proof of causation and damages would lead us if applied logically to
radiation cases on the basis of present scientific information.
(ii) Pre-Birth Injuries-Genetic Damage
The following statements have been made by responsible persons :
( 1) "Radiation, whether acute or chronic, has a definitely damaging
hereditary effect, because, in contrast to most cells of our bodies, there
is no threshold for damage to the hereditary material and there is no
recovery from injury in them." 1072 (2) "While the majority of these
genes [mutated genes] may have no recognizable effects for a number
1oa9 I d. at 581-82. See also Burnet, "Where Is Science Taking Us?" 41 Sat. Rev.
38-39 (Aug. 2, 1958).
1010 Nee!, "The Delayed Effects of Ionizing Radiation," 166 ].A.M.A. goB, 912
(1958).
1o11 I d. at 914.
1o12 Radiation Hearings g81. See also gg8, 917. See also excerpts from U.N. Commission's Report on Effects of Nuclear Radiation, reported N.Y. Times, Aug. II, 1958,
p. 8, cols. r-8. Cf. statement reported in N.Y Times, Aug. 16, 1958, p. 3, col. 4, that

chronic doses have less genetic effect than acute doses. See also more extended report in N V Times Feh X, IQStJ. p 32, cols. 3-8.
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of generations, practically all are potentially bound to result eventually
in undesirable conditions." 1078 (3) Thirty to eighty roentgens are estimated to be the doubling dose for mutation. 1014 (4) "[M]utations produced by radiation are probably as a class much worse in nature than
those which arise spontaneously~" 1075 ( 5) Minor mutations are as important in the long run if not more so than gross mutations and the
mutations are directly proportional to the radiation dose except for
very high levels of radiation. 1076 (6) There is no threshold level of ra..,
diation below which radiation damage does not occur. 1011 (7) There
is no recovery with a time lapse so far as genetic damage is concerned.1018 (8) "Man may prove to be unusually vulnerable to all ion..,
izing radiations including continuous exposure to low levels, on account
of his known sensitivity to radiation, his long life, and the long interval
between conception and the end of the period of reproduction." 1079
Here again if we accept the validity of such scientific opinion, at
least to the point of admitting it for consideration, a jury would be
justified in finding that exposure to radiation of an amount which already has happened in a number of cases has the effect of doubling the
mutation rate. If the jury should then find that the deformity in the
child is a result of a gene mutation and that the defendant exposed
either one of the parents before conception, or the mother while carrying the child, to something less than 100 rems the chances are more
likely than not that the mutation is the result of radiation rather than
some other natural cause. It is perfectly clear that a certain number
of such malformations would occur even without the particular radiation exposure that resulted from defendant's negligence or the operation of an ultra-hazardous source, but if one relies upon probabilities,
such evidence would justify a jury's reaching the conclusion that "more
probably than not" it came from defendant's source.
One cannot help but ask. whether this. is the kind of evidence that can
Radiation Hearings 79CJ.
/d. at 917, 1017-18, 1003. See also Neel, supra note 1070 at 912; Hodges, supra
note Jo68 at 579-Bo. May be as low as ten roentgens; Radiation Hearings 1033, 1036.
1on R~diation Hearings 1032.
·
.
·
1o1e /d. at IOIJ. See also 1757; Neel, supra note 1070 at 909, 914. But see doubts
indicated in Radiation Hearings 1755, and statement of Dr. Warren of UCLA, reported
N.Y. Times, April 21, 1958, p. 25,-col. I.
1011 Radiation Hearings· 1090. At least the burden of proof is ·on one who argues
that there is threshold; Nee!, supra, note 1079 at 909·.
101s Radiation Hearings 1095.
.
1079 Excerpts from U.N. Commission's Report on Effects of Nuclear Radiation,
~pra .note i072 a~ col. 4·
·
101s

1o74
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be intelligently considered by a jury or even by lawyers in the present
state of scientific knowledge. To make the case turn on whether the
percentage is forty-nine or fifty-one, illustrates the unfairness, in an
individual case, of our system of awarding damages on the basis of
probability. It is true that the defendant can introduce expert testimony
casting doubt on the validity of the statements made by the plaintiff's
scientists, but this may not have the desired effect on the jury which
probably will be permitted to decide the question if there is a conflict
between the scientists or experts.
In such cases, defendant can find such statements as (I) "The radiation dose necessary to double the mutation rate appears to be about so
roentgens. It should be clearly understood that this is an estimate, and
competent geneticists have submitted proposals from S to I so roentgens." 1080 ( 2) "With respect to the genetic effects which have been extensively studied by biologists, there are sufficient uncertainties even in
these data so that it is not possible to accept them as entirely unassailable. These include the fact that data at low levels do not exist, that
data are confined at present to Drosophila and to a few small mammals
such as mice, that the mutation rate due to ultraviolet radiation appears
to be nonlinear, and there is reason to believe that some of the energy
transfer with ionizing radiation is in part of the same character as that
with ultraviolet radiation. Man has existed since time immemorial in a
sea of radiation where fairly large differences because of altitude and
special geographic places also are present. It is difficult to reconcile
some of the conjectures to be made at very low levels with the
natural radiation doses to which man has already been subjected." 1081 (3) "It is our contention . . . that available data . . .
are so inadequate that semi-quantitative treatments are ill advised since,
except to the relatively few who have made a detailed study of the problem, they impart an error of mathematical exactitude and scientific accuracy to an area where the errors ·are sometimes large and often indeterminate. There is doubt concerning the advisability of calculations
which have the appearance of mathematical exactitude to persons not
thoroughly indoctrinated in genetics and unfamiliar with the shaky
basis of the primary examinations (but) exposures to radiation of all
types should undoubtedly be minimized until we have a clear idea of
just ho~ harmful these efie~ts are." 1082 (4) It is extremely difficult to
Radiation Hearings 910. (Emphasis added.)
Ibid. See .also 178o, 1785-91. See also Hodges, su.pra note 1o68 at 581-82.
1 08 2 Nee!; "Effect of Exposure to Atomic Bomb on Pregnancy Termination in
Hiroshima ·and Nag:isaki," Wash. D.C., Nat. Res. Council, National Academy of
1o8o
1 08 1
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measure the dosage to the gonads or reproductive organs to the point
of being almost speculative. 10 Bs ( 5) "In ordinary circumstances only a
small fraction, perhaps one or two per cent, of the hereditary abnormalities which appear in a generation can be attributed to fresh gene
mutations. For the offspring of any given parents the risk from increasing the mutation rate is very slight." lOBi
The question is again presented, should juries be allowed to "play"
with this kind of material, which even the scientists are accused of mishandling?
(iii) Shortened Life Span
That radiation exposure will shorten the life span of the exposed person seems to be generally agreed upon by scientists. Certainly a plaintiff can find not only ample expert testimony to support this general
conclusion but also he will find a considerable body of expert opinion
which will reduce into disarmingly certain estimates the correlation between exposure dosage and the length of shortening. One finds such
statements as : ( 1) "Human beings are too variable in their responses
to radiation and in their state of health to permit any direct correlation,
but it is probable that an acute dose of about 300 r. or repeated small
doses totaling 2 to 3 times that would produce up to 5 years shortening
of life span." 10B5 ( 2) " [I] t may be shown that an appreciable shortening of the lifespan occurs in mice and rats exposed daily to doses of
X-rays in the neighborhood of 0.1 r. Whether this extrapolation is justified or not cannot be decided at the present time. Experimental data
on lifespan obtained with other laboratory animals are quite fragmentary and extrapolation to low daily doses is even more uncertain.
No· quantitative information is available in the case of man. Because
the possibility of a shortening of the lifespan in man by small daily
doses cannot be excluded, the available experimental data may be assumed to indicate the desirability of lowering the permissible daily dose
for lifetime exposure of the whole body to penetrating radiation." 10B6
Sciences, publication 461 (1956) at 205. (Emphasis added.) In the same vein is
Wright, "Discussion on Population Genetics and Radiation," 35 ]. Cell. & Comp.
Physiol. 187-204 (June, supp. 1) (1950) [quoted by Hodges, supra note 1068 at 58o].
See also Neel, supra note 1070 at 913.
lOBs Hodges, supra note 1o68 at sSo-82. See also Neel, .Nf!ra note 1070 at 913; Radiation Hearings 1785-91.
lOBi Radiation Hearings 16o3. See also 178g.
10B5 /d. at g8r. (Emphasis added.) 1,000 r. to radiologists has lowered life span five
years; 814
1osa /d. at 8oo.
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( 3) " [ M] ost mutations in man would produce various body impairments leading to increased susceptibility to disease, lower life expectancy, increased embryonic death rate and similar things." 1087 (4)
"[T] here is growing reason in infer that this shortening of life and the
other long delayed damage done to an exposed individual have their
basis in damage done to the genetic material-the chromosomes and
their contained ·genes-{)f the body's ordinary cells, those of the blood,
skin, glands, and so forth, similar to the damage done in his reproductive cells that is passed on to later generations." 1088 ( 5) Any damage to
the chromosomes or the genes results in a decreased resistance to disease and the consequent shortening of the life span no matter how
small the dose. 1089 ( 6) "It is almost certainly through the individual
cell deaths and impairments that minute doses of radiation, long continued or repeated, exert their action in shortening the life-span of the
exposed individual. This effect, first analyzed by Boche and then by
Sacher, had been calculated to cause a reduction in length of life in the
order of several days for every roentgen unit received by the body as a
whole during a person's lifetime." 1090 (7) Assuming a loss of ten days
for each roentgen of exposure, 400 r. would shorten a human life by
eleven years. 1091 (8) There is no threshold effect so far as shortening of
life span from radiation is concerned, it being proportional to the
dose.1092
If these facts, or rather opinions are accepted, they lead inevitably to
the conclusion that exposure to radiation, even at a very low level, reduces the life of an exposed man to some measurable degree. The
opinions even have considerable significance in connection with proving
certainty of damages to the genes which unite and become the embryo,
later born as a child. Accepting the usual rules of evidence expressed
in terms of probability, a tenable argument can be made that exposure
of the parents would create a very good chance that the life expectancy
of the child, later conceived and born, has been reduced. Considering
the accidents that already have happened, as in the recent incident in the
Oak Ridge Laboratory where a workman was found to have received
1o81

Id. at 1012.

1088 !d.

at 1052.
1o8o I d. at 10541090 !d. at 1o67. (Emphasis added.) See also 1093 (five to thirty-five days for each

unit of radiation received by the father).
1091/d. at 1094. See also 1103 (I! years per 100 r.); 1122-24.
t092Jd. at 1110, 1118. See also N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1957, p. 35, col.
fifteen days per r.)

1.
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rems full body exposure, 1093 how many cases for damages for a
shortened life span are actually possible at the present time, not to mention the future, assuming the law permits recovery? Argument can be
made to the contrary, of course, as in the case of incidence of leukemia
and genetic damage. Yet the statements of experts to the effect that
shortened life span probably results from irradiation are certainly sufficient to go to the jury, and in fact there seems to be general agreement that there is some shortening of the life span, the question being
only as to amount.
There are statements to the contrary, such as: (I) The difference
in life span found between the normal white male population and radiologists in America can be explained on differences in age composition of
the two groups, rather than on the basis of exposure to ionizing radiation.1094 (2) "From the point of view of the span of life, I feel for
projections to low levels this falls in exactly the same kind of category.
We cannot determine what~ happening at very low levels." 1095 (3)
"All data presented at the present time are either presumptive or speculative for very low doses. They rest in hypotheses derived from the
theoretical aspect of dose effects at high levels. I believe there is sufficient uncertainty so that it would be unwise, and in fact nonscientific,
to make conclusive decisions on the basis of these extrapolations." 1098
(4) There has been no reliable evidence yet of a shortening of life span
in people living in Denver or more importantly in Trayancore, India,1097 and studies in the United Kingdom have failed to demonstrate
a shortened life span effect. 1098
The defendants also can point out that there are many other factors
which cause an equal or in some cases greater shortening of life span
than exposure to high amounts of radiation. For example, it is estimated that life expectancy is reduced five years for living in the city
instead of the country, three and one half years for being twenty-five
per cent overweight, and seven years for smoking one pack of cigarettes
320

1ous See articles in N.Y. Times, June 17, 1958, p. 23. col. 2; June 20, 1958, p. 11,
col. 1; June 28, 1958, p. 2, col. 5; July 4. 1958, p. 28, col. 7; Aug. I, 1958, p. 42, col. 7;
and Sept. 9, 1958, p. 24, col. 4. See also discussion of shortened life, supra notes 482 ff.
1094 Seltser & Sartwell, "Ionizing Radiation and Longevity of Physicians," 166
].A.M.A. 585, 587 (1958).
1095 Radiation Hearings go6. (Emphasis added.)
1098 I d. at 910. (Emphasis added.)
1097 Hodges, supra note 1o68 at 581-82.
to9s Excerpt from U.N. Commission's Report on Effects of Nuclear. Radiation,
supra note 1072 at col. ~·
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a day. 1099 Even assuming that recovery should be allowed for shortening of life span, how can it be determined whether the shortening of
the life span is caused by one factor or another? On the other hand,
every factor has its own effect independently of the others. When
scientists differ as to the quantitative effect of exposure on length of
life, the case typically is taken to a jury in our tort system, on the assumption that it can resolve the conflict which experts cannot.
(iv) Increased Susceptibility to Disease
Most ·scientists agree that exposure to radiation increases the susceptibility to disease or other bodily injury from a later force other than
radiation. We find responsible scientific opinion to support the following: ( 1) Studies of patients who have received radioactive material in
the course of medical treatment have been found to have much more
fragile skeletal systems in which the bones break much more easily than
would otherwise be the case. 1100 ( 2) Exposure from ingested radium
may be much worse for older people because the body is not able to
repair damage as well. 1101 (3) "[S]ubclinical changes may cause a reduction in the reserve function of organs. This may go undetected in
most instances. The combined effects, however, of an intercurrent disease
and the reduced function from the effects of radiation may cause more
severe effects than either the disease or the radiation separately." 1102
(4) Most of the testimony of the geneticists indicates that one very
likely effect of the exposure of genes before conception is that the resultant child will have a lower resistance to disease. 1103
The general agreement among most scientists that exposure to radiation does lower resistance to disease again leaves to the jury the duty
of determining not only which scientific conclusions as to the degree of
increased susceptibility to accept but also the monetary value of such
increase. It may be one thing for a jury to determine the value of such
a loss, but it is quite another for it to determine the meaning of the data
which scientists use to draw their conclusions that there is a certain increase in susceptibility.
1 0 99 See table set out in Radiation Hearings 1107. Some authorities doubt that mutations are mechanisms for causing radiation aging. N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 1958, p. 4,
col. 6.
11oo Radiation Hearings 1153-54. See also 1167-68.
1101 l d. at 1 173.
1102 Ibid.
1103 Supra notes 1072-79.
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( v) General Somatic Effects
Related more or less directly to the specific diseases just listed is the
effect of radiation on the general physical well being of the irradiated
person. Again there seems to be general agreement that there is some
such effect, although it is not easily measured. Among the types of injury mentioned in this category are lowered growth rate among exposed
children, 1104 damage to the blood producing bone marrow 1105 by doses
as low as one roentgen per week, 1106 a change in the normal ratio in the
sexes of newborn children, 1107 damage to the ability of body cells to
divide and replace old cells/ 108 premature aging, 1109 and lowering of the
intelligence quotient of children whose parents' genes have been exposed.1110 One estimate has been offered to the effect that exposure to
two roentgens a year of the population generally would cancel all the
gains made in general health level and life span by modern medical
science.1111
It should be remembered, of course, that such effects can be shown
only by the use of statistics. Conclusions apply tg averages, and there is
a statistical risk only for a specific person. At the present time there
seems to be no way of knowing whether the injury will be suffered by a
specific individual, or even whether an injury manifesting itself in a specific person came from a particular source, such as radiation. If one
uses probabilities as the test, however, such lack of preciseness for individual cases does not refute the validity of the assertion that the injury was caused more probably by radiation than by all other sources.
Here again we see the effect of our accepted system involving either
full recovery or no recovery at all.
(b) Other Legally Significant Scientific "Facts"
There are certain other responsible scientific opinions (not facts)
which will have significance in the handling of the legal problems aris11o4

Radiation Hearings II36.

11o5Jd. at ust.
1106/d. at IS6o.

1101 Id. at 178o.
110SJd. at 10,52-53.
110DJd. at nos-o6,

II04II22.

Cf. opinion reported in N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 1958, p. 4.

col. 6.
1110 Excerpts from U.N. Commission's Report on Effects of Nuclear Radiation, supra
note 1072 at col. I. Damage to the brain may result from small doses of radiation,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1958, p. 4. col. s.
1111 Radiation Hearings Il2I.
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ing in radiation cases. Any lawyer, in dealing with the kind of evidence
which inevitably seems part of a radiation case that is well-handled,
should be aware of these as well. In the first place, there is a considerable difference of opinion of experts as to whether experiments conducted with relatively high doses of radiation can be extrapolated on a
linear basis to low doses. 1112 This in turn is closely related to the question whether there is a threshold level below which radiation does not
cause injury, or at least does not cause irreparable injury. 1118 It also
should be recognized that much of the contemporary scientific opinion
is supported by experiments on other organisms, such as fruit flies and,
in a few cases, mice. Doubt exists as to what extent the experience
with these other organisms can be extrapolated and used in predicting
the effect on man. 1114 There has been very little experience in exposure
of human beings in sufficient numbers to give a statistically sound basis
for conclusions. 1115
It must be remembered always that opinion as to the correlation between exposure and present or potential future diseases or injuries is
statistical in nature and that as yet there is no way of tying down a
particular injury to a particular exposure, or to radiation exposure as
against other forces, natural or human. 1116 Equally important, because
it may be a contributing or even a sole cause of certain injuries, is the
background radiation to which all people are subjected at all times, not
only from cosmic rays but also from surrounding material including
the earth upon which we live. 1117 The fact that the manifestations of
exposure may be delayed for considerable periods of time, up to at
least thirty-five years/ 118 is also significant, particularly for purposes of
the statute of limitations question. In considering the legal significance
of radiation dosage standards that have been established by one or
another group (private or official), it also must be remembered that
the standards set have been merely estimates on the basis of the best
1 112
1 113

/d. at 902-03, 906-<>7, 909, 910.
/d. at III3, II I6, II38, II4I; excerpts from U.N. Commission's Report on Effects
of Nuclear Radiation, supra note 1072 at col. 6.
1114 Radiation Hearings Io¢, II44, I8o8.
1115
/d. at 8<>7, 945, 957, 958, 963, 965-66, 968, g8I, 986, IllS, II22, I264, 1554, 1624,
178o. See also Hodges, supra note 1068 at 578-79.
1110 Hodges, supra note 1068; Radiation Hearings I 106; N eel, supra note 1070 at 913.
1 117 Hodges, supra note 1068 at 581-82; Radiation Hearings I292, 1429. Brazil nuts
and cereal are reported to have higher concentrations of radiation than other foods.
N.Y. Times, Aug. 18, 1958, p. 45, col. I.
1118 N.Y. Times, May 27, I958, p. 2I, col. 4; Radiation Hearings 1168, II71, I557-S8,
1560.
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existing knowled~e.
They represent, at best, a balancing of interests,
recognizing that some damages may result, but that the advantages outweigh the disadvantages, although always with the basic premise that
it is better to err on the side of safety. On the other hand, experience
over the last ten years has indicated that our earlier estimates of safe
levels probably were too high.
(c) Conclusions
As indicated at the beginning, the foregoing is not an exhaustive collection of all the scientific information that is available to a lawyer trying a radiation case. The information here referred to, however, particularly that collected in the congressional hearings, literally is a gold
mine of such information, and undoubtedly is the most extensive collection of the most authoritative opinions to be found anywhere dealing with the problems of radiation injury. If the law continues to
insist upon the tort liability concepts that "you either recover total damages or you recover nothing at all," and uses the weight of probabilities
to determine whether there is to be recovery or no recovery, the lines
drawn are arbitrary in the extreme, particularly as to future injuries
not yet manifested.
·
The results that may be reached under our present system can be almost ridiculous in atomic energy situations. If a person has been exposed to radiation to the extent that the best scientific opinion would
indicate that his chances are sixty to forty of developing cancer or some
other radiation injury, then it is perfectly clear, in the long run, that
many of those who recover damages will never actually suffer the injury. The closer the percentage is to fifty per cent the more will be
compensated unjustifiably, and the closer it is to a hundred per cent the
more will recover justifiably. It is equally a hardship to the plaintiff
who actually suffers injury in cases where the law of probabilities comes
out at something below fifty per cent. He may be able to show only
that the probabilities are one out of three that an injury will occur. It
is possible that he will be the one who was damaged. It actually can be
said under these circumstances that only at the extremes, perhaps between ninety and one hundred per cent and between ten and zero per
cent, is an)rthing like "substantial" justice done.
While the system in the long run may work out favorably in terms
of the law of averages for society as a whole, this is purely coincidental
1110 Radiation Hearings 8o8, Su, 831-32; N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1957, p. 6, col. 4; Dec.
·n, 1957, p. 14, col. 6. ·
·
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and has nothing to do with justice between the individual parties. A
defendant who has to pay damages to a person who proves a fifty-five
per cent probability but who does not develop the injury later has been
forced to pay without good cause. Likewise, a plaintiff who could show
only a forty-five per cent chance that he will be injured in the future
as a result of present exposure, but develops the injury later, surely
feels no better merely because others who proved a fifty-five per cent
chance may have recovered unjustifiably. The results have little to do
with compensation in any true sense of the word. Even as to present,
as distinguished from future, injuries, the chances that factors other
than radiation are the real cause of the condition are very great and the
results are almost as capricious. The difficulty is that there is no way of
knowing whether the particular plaintiff or the particular defendant has
been treated fairly in the specific case. It will be purely happenstance.
By taking just one extreme although not impossible example, it can
be shown how completely unrealistic and arbitrary the results will be
if present tort rules are applied. While the chances of a major reactor
burn-up are extremely slight and the possibility that significant amounts
of radioactive material will be discharged over heavily populated areas
is even less, there is no responsible scientist who will give assurance that
it can never happen. The insistence of business interests that the federal government adopt the indemnity program evidences the fact that
industry believes such a disaster could take place and it is willing to pay
very high premiums for insurance coverage up to the point where the
federal government will take over liability. What are the legal consequences under existing rules, assuming the "impossible" becomes a
reality? They are ridiculous! Even if this kind of major accident never
occurs its possibility serves to dramatize the results we will get in minor
accidents. It is a matter of statistical incidence whether the number
exposed be large or small; the large number just makes the application
of the law of averages in a particular case more dramatic, not any less
accurate.
The number of persons and the extent of exposure in the event of a
major reactor burn-up with a resultant discharge of radioactive material under circumstances which carry it over a city in concentrated form
has been the subject of two scientific studies. 1120 Laying aside the most
unlikely case of 100 per cent discharge, where literally scores of thou1120 Gomberg, Bassett & Velez, Report on the Possible Effects on the Surrounding
Population of an Assumed Release of Fission Products into the Atmosphere from
3oo-Megawatt Nuclear Reactor Located at Lagoona Beach, Michigan, Eng. Res. Inst.,
University of Michigan (1957).
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sands conceivably might be killed and many more exposed to 300, 100,
so, or 25 rems, what would happen if it were assumed that only twentyfive per cent of the accumulated fission products were discharged over
a large city? Even with this amount large numbers would be exposed
to whole body irradiation of 100, so, and 25 rems, and untold numbers
to S rems. Using the estimates of biological effect set out above, 1121 the
legal results in damage cases will have only a lottery-like chance of
being just, even under present statutes of limitations. If these were
changed (as they ought to be) to take care of the long-delayed injuries
known to result from radiation, the results could be fantastic!
Fifty-five rads is a general average of the estimates scientists have
made as to what constitutes a doubling dose for mutations in human
beings. By hypothesis this means that twice as many mutated genes
have been created and therefore the chances are just as good, or better
if more than this amount of radiation was received by the parents of
a mutation-deformed child, that the mutated gene was caused by the
particular radiation exposure rather than by all other causes added together. This is inevitable unless the defendant can show something in
the individual case that increased the chance of a mutation from these
parents above the normal expectancy. But this means that every single
genetic deformity in like fashion can be "legally proved" to have come
from this one exposure, unless the defendant can show a greater than
normal chance of mutation for a particular couple. Yet, scientifically
only half or a little more than half of them are attributable to the radiation exposure from the reactor accident. Legally all are so attributable.
Every baby, born within the period of the statute of limitations after the
exposure of his parents to fifty-five rads or more, and whose deformity
is the result of a mutation can show "more probably than not" that his
deformity was "caused" by the particular exposure.
Every case of leukemia that occurs within the succeeding decade or
so in children who were conceived but not yet born at the time of the
exposure of the mother to more than 2.s rems can also be "proved"
legally to have been "caused" by this exposure. The same case can be
made, of course, against any person who negligently exposes an expectant mother to a dose which results in the embryo's or foetus' receiving
as little as 2.s rems, and this could happen under any number of quite
possible, in fact likely, circumstances.
Not so absurd but equally stunning will be the liability for shortened
life span resulting from the incident. Present scientific opinion sup1121

Scientific information cited supra notes

1061-I 119.
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ports the proposition that every irradiated person loses something from
his life span, one estimate placing it at ten days for each roentgen.
Every person who receives 200 units of radiation can claim a loss of
2,000 days, or five and one half years, those who receive 100 can
"prove" loss of almost three years, those who receive fifty can claim
one and one-half years, and those who receive twenty-five can assert a
claim for two-thirds of a year. In the case of shortened life span this is
actually an effect on each person, and individual differences in susceptibility to radiation exposure certainly are no greater, if as great, as the
variation present in most cases where life expectancy is determined by
life insurance tables.
The amounts claimed for shortened life span and even increased susceptibility to disease will be striking if all are asserted, and there is at
least some fairness in allowing such claims to each person so exposed.
The claims for mutation-caused deformities, leukemia, and many other
similar injuries whose incidence is substantially increased by radiation
exposure, are truly fantastic. Nevertheless, they are recoverable under
our present theories of proving causation and damages. Moreover, this
is true in all jurisdictions, not just the most liberal, if recovery is allowable whenever it is "more probable than not" that a particular source
is the cause of an injury:
Other equally objectionable results will be reached from the plaintiff'_s standpoint. These can be demonstrated dramatically by reference
to possible future injuries, rather than existing injuries as in the immediately preceding examples. Taking figures from the English study
of irradiated children who developed leukemia, let us assume that
28,ooo children are exposed to enough radiation to cause seven instead
of one out of 1,400 to develop leukemia sometime in the future, mostly
after the statute of limitations has run. Even though the incidence in
leukemia has been increased seven-fold, for each child exposed the
chances are nevertheless only seven out of 1,400, considerably less than
a fifty-one per cent likelihood, not "more probably than not," far less
than "reasonable certainty." Yet, if the scientific studies are accurate,
the defendant's negligence has "caused" 140 cases of leukemia that will
show up sometime.
.
The doubling dose for mutations, possibly not so high as for leukemia in adults, certainly could be received by m~ny thousands of persons should there be discharge of radioactive fission products over a
city as a result of a major reactor burn-up. Assuming that fifty-five
rems is the doubling dose, perhaps 50,000 would receive this amount.
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The incidence of genetic mutation from all causes is low so that doubling the number still does not come close to a fifty-one per cent chance
that a radiation-induced mutation will result· in a particular case. In
fact, it would mean only an increased incidence of about one or two
per cent in the first generation, hence, no recovery for this kind of
future possibility. Again, however, it is assumed by geneticists that, if
a large group of people is exposed, a fair number of mutations actually
will show up in children born not only in the next generation but for
many succeeding generations as well.
These examples should suffice to show that the unfairness of our
present damage concepts cuts both ways-for and against plaintiffs
and defendants as a group. From this it can be argued that in the overall picture the system works satisfactorily. But this is so only in the
same sense that a lottery is fair-it has nothing whatsoever to do with
whether a particular plaintiff will suffer injury and so should or should
not recover. The defendant's obligation to compensate will be determined "correctly" only by c(jincidence.
While certainly this same problem is found in many tort cases, particularly in connection with proof of causation, it is peculiarly pressing
in the radiation cases. A better system can be worked out, one having a
more realistic relationship to the real probabilities, to the benefit of both
plaintiffs and defendants, even though it may involve difficulties in administration. Since one of the peculiar characteristics of overexposure
to radiation is that only the statistical chances that damage will result
are increased, we have a perfect opportunity for experimenting with a
different system of proving causation and awarding damages to a possibly injured party. The use of statistics and probabilities involves inaccuracies, of course, but for all of its inaccuracy it comes much closer
to both reality and justice than the present system. A system can be
worked out that will not make too many changes in the present manner
of handling tort cases so far as concerns proof of duty, breach, and even
. the evaluation (in money terms) of the injury received, and which still
will preserve most of the traditional roles of judge, jury, and lawyers.
( 4) Some Recommendations
While absolute "truth" and "certainty," are unattainable legal goals,
this is no justification for judicial nihilism. Despite their elusive character, the law should not be content with anything less than a reasonable
approximation of practical justice. The results reached by applying
present theories of proof are remarkably close to those obtained in a
lottery.
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(a) Inadequacies in the Present System

The best that can be said for the present situation is that it tends to
allow, in the aggregate, the successful assertion of more claims for
future injury that ultimately may develop. In individual cases, however, justice often depends on luck. Many tragically injured persons
will be denied recovery because the probabilities are a little less than
fifty per cent. On the other side of fifty per cent, many will receive
"windfalls" for injuries that never develop. In such cases the award is
bound to be too much when no injury results and too little when it
does. None will receive compensation at the time when it is actually
needed, and, from the standpoint of the state, there is little assurance
that even the fully compensated individual will not become a burden to
society when the injury actually does develop.
Likewise, the technique of seeking recovery for an existing predisposition or predilection toward future injury which is not a present
disability, is an unsatisfactory solution to the problem. An award whose
amount is reduced in proportion to the degree of probability, as suggested by one or two cases discussed in connection with increased susceptibility to disease, will never be adequate in cases where the condition
does become an actual disability. Nevertheless, the proportionate award
idea suggests a solution to the problem of future injury. As presently
used, however, this method is little better than the more generally accepted solution because no recovery is needed if no injury results, and
total recovery is needed if the injury does develop.
As pointed out previously, the rule against splitting a cause of action
and the statute of limitations concept are the principal legal obstacles to
a more adequate approach to the problem of future injury. As to splitting a cause of action the plaintiff's natural desire is to recover as much
as he can immediately, perhaps while he can still find a solvent defendant. If he has to wait, he may recover nothing because the injury does
not develop. The defendant also has a natural desire to have his liability determined as soon as possible and therefore he favors a short
statute of limitations.
The principal argument favoring a "wait-and-see" doctrine for recovery of damages for future injury is a resultant greater degree of
certainty, and, thereby, a fairer treatment of both the plaintiff and the
defendant. In addition, society's interests are better served by a system
that makes compensation available when the injury actually becomes
disabling. At least in the field of radiation injuries an attempt should
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be made to modify the present system enough to see that these advantages are achieved.
The changes recommended could be limited to avoid affecting recovery for past or existing injury. Clearly they should not affect the
size of the recovery for an existing fully manifested injury or the
"guesstimate" as to the value of a fully manifested impairment. The
changes should affect the recovery only for those injuries which may
possibly arise in the future, both those which may follow an existing
manifestation of injury and those which are not preceded by any disabling or otherwise observable condition.
The future injuries dealt with here presuppose knowledge on the
part of the victim that he has been irradiated. There scarcely can be
any problem of anticipatory recovery for future injury when the injured person is not even aware of his exposure. It seems reasonable to
expect that the vast majority of irradiation injuries are going to be suffered by persons connected with the nuclear industry. Most of these
persons, through the use of film badges, monitoring, and other detection devices, 1122 will know, within limits, when they have been exposed
and the magnitude of the exposure. 1123 The only other sizable group
will include those involved in a disaster of some proportions so that
publicity will follow and exposed persons will be duly advised of their
exposures. It is reasonable to say that science can now predict, to some
extent, and will later be able to do so with even more precision, both
the probability of future injury and the eXtent of the injury should it
develop. Since we are dealing with a reasonably measurable quantity,
the injury usually being statistically fairly well correlated with the
amount of exposure, future radiation injury cases lend themselves to
even greater accuracy of prediction than is to be found in the ordinary
case of future injury, where there are no quantitatively determinable,
causative factors.
(b) Suggestions for Modification of Our Present
Rules
The:: changes here recommended represent an attempt to obtain
greater certainty while preserving the desirable features of the present
system. They are made with full recognition of the policy considera1122 Hutton, "Evidentiary Problems in Proving Radiation Injury," 46 Geo. L. J, 52
(1957).
u2a The authors have been told that there may have been an error in monitoring
devices in the plant Y-12 .accident at Oak Ridge, the error perhaps off by a factor of
10. Discussed supra at note 1093·
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tions which militate against a "wait-and-see" approach. A mmtmum
of change is desirable for several reasons. We are as yet somewhat uncertain, both quantitatively and qualitatively, as to the nature of radiation injury. Also it is recognized that we are dealing with legislative,
judicial, professional, and business attitudes that are conservative and
inclined to regard the existing order as somewhat sacrosanct.
The basic concept is a simple one. We would deny any right to recover at the time of exposure for any injury that will occur, if at all,
only in the future. We would allow, or even require, however, that the
plaintiff bring an action at once to establish the duty owed to him by
the defendant, the breach of the required standard of conduct, and the
fact of the plaintiff's exposure to radiation. The present statutes of
limitations could remain applicable to this part of the proceeding, at
least where the possibilities of exposure are presently known. In addition, the plaintiff should have the burden of proving ( 1) the percentage
probability of occurrence of a future, disabling injury and ( 2) the
probable monetary dimensions of that injury, should it develop. Should
a duty be found to exist and should the defendant be found negligent
and to have irradiated the plaintiff, there would then be a determination
of the percentage of probability of future injury and the amount of
probable damages. For purposes of these preliminary determinations
all reliable medical statistics in both oral and published form should be
freely admissible.
Departure from the present system would come at the point of judgment. No award for future injury should be paid to the plaintiff at this
time, except, possibly, the amount necessary for minimum attorney's
fees. Instead, the defendant should be ordered to pay into a fund or to
obtain insurance coverage to protect the plaintiff for as long as there
is real danger that the injury will develop, payment to be made only if
the injury actually develops. The amount which would be made available by the particular defendant for the future contingency would be
measured by the total damages predicted by the trier of fact multiplied
by the percentage probability of the injury's occurrence. For example,
if it is determined that the plaintiff, as a result of the exposure has a
twenty-five per cent chance of developing cancer, and that, should such
injury develop, his damages will be $20,000, the defendant, at the time
of the first proceeding, need only contribute $5,000.
The suggested result is far from certain justice in view of the uncertainty of the base for our statistical calculations, but it is far more
nearly accurate and therefore fairer than our existing system because
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it is based on the injury actually manifested. Admittedly, the defendant
has had to pay something upon some claims that may never be justified
and upon some claims that he would not have been required to pay at
all under the present system, but, if the number of cases is large
enough, he is no worse off than before, since he will never pay the full
amount of the future damages. Those contributions to what might be
called the "contingent injury fund" by other defendants, for injuries
that never develop, will be used to meet the cost of those that do and for
which full contribution has not been made. From the standpoint of the
plaintiff, the suggested system is far more certain. He will be able to recover damages for any negligent exposure to radiation which gives
rise to a probability of future injury when that injury does develop.
This feature would provide compensation for many who previously
could not have recovered because the probabilities were less than fifty
per cent, and would deny recovery where subsequent events disclosed
that there should not have been any recovery even though the probabilities of occurrence were mort! than fifty per cent. There is also the advantage that this system provides for compensation at the time when it
is needed-at the time when the injured person becomes disabled, a
burden on his family or society.
Upon compliance with the order of the court, and payment for any
existing damages the plaintiff has shown, the defendant should be
absolved from further liability for injury arising out of the negligent
exposure in question. Thereafter, the plaintiff will have to seek recovery
from the fund at such time as the predicted injury actually develops.
Should the injury never develop, the plaintiff should not recover anything. In the event the injury occurs, the plaintiff can then proceed
directly against the fund for an amount no greater than that determined
by the trier of fact in the first proceeding-$zo,ooo in the above example. In recovering from this third party or fund, the plaintiff would
have to prove the fact ofhis injury, the dimensions of the injury, and
the fact that the injury was caused by the negligent exposure which was
proved in the earlier action. All issues of law and fact, decided in the
first proceedings, as to duty, breach, and exposure, would be res judicata
at this later determination. The earlier determination of damages
should be res judicata as to the maximum limit of the award, to give
some certainty to the .base upon which all statistical calculations must
be made.
Let us consider these suggestions in light of the arguments pointed
out earlier for and against a delayed recovery for future injury. Stat-
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utes of limitations are enacted to prevent the assertion of stale claims
with the consequent opportunity for plaintiffs to wait until the tactically
opportune moment when witnesses for the defense may no longer be
available, although plaintiffs may well have preserved their own evidence. The suggested system will not disturb this desirable goal. Only
those issues of fact determined at the initial trial require witnesses with
first-hand knowledge of the circumstances of the injury, and the ordinary period of limitation can be applied to this proceeding. The issues
of fact determined at the second proceeding require, for the most part,
expert witnesses whose ability to testify will be little affected by lapse
of time; in fact their testimony will be improved because the symptoms
will have manifested themselves.
In addition, the suggested system will enable the plaintiff to establish
a source from which he may be certain to recover later. The plaintiff
need not run the risk of subsequent bankruptcy or disappearance or hiding of assets by the wrongdoer; such actions will not affect the plaintiff's ability to recover. This seems only fair if the plaintiff is to be
denied present recovery. At the same time the defendant's liability will
be established and fixed within a reasonable time, and he will be absolved of further liability. The burden of waiting for future uncertainties will be shifted to insurance companies or to a fund, and there
will be no present and highly contingent liability for uncertain future
injuries.
The suggested modifications are intended to preserve the incentive to
maintain the highest standards of care and safety. Atomic energy
users, whether strictly liable or liable only for negligence, who are
responsible for the greatest number of possible injuries will be required
to contribute the largest amount. Admittedly, even this system does
not maintain exact correspondence between those who actually cause
injury and those who have to pay, but the approximation is as close as
other considerations permit and probably closer than under workmen's
compensation programs. The resemblance of the present tort recovery
to a lottery draw would be obviated.
(c) Administration of the "Contingent Injury
Fund"
Obviously the most difficult question that arises in connection with
the suggested scheme is that concerning the nature of the fund or other
source out of which damages ultimately will be paid-How and by
whom is it to be handled? Whether the fund is to be administered by
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a government agency or by private insurance carriers, a larger amount
of money must be provided than ultimately will be available to claimants. The costs of administration alone, not to mention the profit margins that insurers would require, are going to make inroads on each
dollar contributed by the defendants. For this reason there will be a
degree of probability above which it will be less expensive for the defendant simply to pay the plaintiff immediately and directly. If, for example, the defendant has to pay one dollar to provide ninety cents of
compensation (the remaining ten cents going into overhead), he is just
as well off if he pays immediately when the probability is greater than
ninety per cent. This of course assumes that the ten cents administration cost should be paid by the defendant. For this reason, direct payment to the plaintiff should be made optional in cases involving more
than a certain percentage of probability. It also may be fair to provide
that if the probabilities are less than ten per cent or perhaps five per
cent, plaintiff should be obliged to take his chances; i.e., no recovery
should be allowed.
The principal requirement to assure success of the "contingent injury
fund" is that it accumulate a sufficiently large number of proportional
contributions to permit application of the theory of pn:~bability. The
fund itself will represent the accumulation of all sizes of contributions
for all degrees of probability of future injury. Its effectiveness will depend in large measure upon the number and variety of claims it represents. Thus, the least effective method would be found ·in a system
wherein each defendant obtained insurance from carriers acting individually and with no pooling of risk between them. Conversely, the
most effective method so far as statistical probability is concerned
would be a single, nationwide pool or fund, either governmentally or
privately administered. Self insurance would seem unworkable.
If a government administered fund were used, it probably should
cover the risks arising in more than one state. It could be administered
by the federal government and the amount contributed in each case still
could be determined by state law and trials in state or federal courts in
the same way as is now the case with tort actions. The judgments,
however, would be paid into the federal fund rather than to the plaintiff and later the fund would pay full damages to a plaintiff who later
contracts the disease. The fact determination that the disease exists at
that time could be made by an appropriate state or federal court, or perhaps by an administrative board.
Perhaps a nationwide fund could be created by interstate compact if
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a large enough number of states would agree, rather than have the fund
administered by the federal government.
A third alternative, of course, would be for Congress to create the
fund and lay down the rules to govern liability and recoverable damages
for all radiation injuries, superseding all state laws perhaps. The "contingent injury fund" could function, however, without accepting this
degree of interference with traditional state control of tort law.
The theory suggested could be adopted so as to make use of private
insurance carriers and avoid a government administered fund, whether
federal or interstate. This plan might even make it possible to avoid
jury determination of the percentage of risk created by defendant's
radiation source, a determination not wisely left to a lay jury. Once
liability and the amount of recovery were found, the defendant might
then provide an insurance policy for the full amount, payable if and
when the possible future injury occurs. The insurance company would
charge a premium based upon an expert judgment of the probabilities,
and if enough radiation risks were pooled by private insurance companies and the statistics were valid, the premiums should cover the total
that would be claimed by all plaintiffs who actually suffer the injury in
the future. The effect on such premiums of interest earned before payment to the victim is required and of death of some victims by other
non-radiation causes could be worked out by the insurance companies,
and the premiums charged defendants adjusted accordingly.
In any event, once defendant makes his contribution to the "contingent injury fund," or takes out an appropriate insurance policy if
this plan is used, his liability ceases completely. Thereafter the victim,
if and when the disease occurs, looks to the fund created by the contributions of many defendants on behalf of many plaintiffs. If the injury does not materialize or if plaintiff dies of other causes first, the
·amount contributed for him helps defray the awards to other plaintiffs
who do suffer the injury.
If the federal indemnity fund described in the last section of this
chapter has to be used because claims from a large reactor accident exhaust private insurance coverage, the federal government contributions
for future injuries should be made to the contingent injury fund or be
used to take out a paid up insurance policy for each plaintiff who proves
his case.
Some Experience in Administering Injury Funds. It is not meant
to suggest that a workmen's compensation plan of recovery for each
injury regardless of tort rules of liability should be adopted and based
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on a fixed schedule of awards for each type of injury. Nevertheless,
workmen's compensation plans involve some administrative problems
not too dissimilar to some posed by our "contingent injury fund." It
is worthwhile, therefore, to look at the financing and experience rating
aspects of workmen's compensation plans.
In all state and territorial jurisdictions, except Louisiana, employers
to whom the workmen's compensation laws are applicable are required
to give assurance of their abi\ity to meet their compensation obligations.
This may be done by insurance with a private carrier (in all but eight
jurisdictions), or with a state fund (in nineteen jurisdictions), or by
furnishing proof of ability to carry one's own risk, called "self-insurance" (seven states excepted) .112•
Private insurance is written by casualty companies of three types :
stock companies, which are generally non-participating corporate enterprises in which profits are paid to stockholders and policy holders do not
directly participate; mutual companies in which the policy holders are
shareholders automatically, and generally they divide the profits as dividends; and reciprocals, which generally are unincorporated groups of
employers organized to sell insurance to each other. The reciprocals do
less than two per cent of the total private compensation business. In 1951,
as indicated by net premiums written, private carriers did about 8o.6
per cent of the compensation ·business, state funds covering the remainder. These figures have been relatively constant since 1917, with
the state funds gaining a little during the depression period and losing
again during times of greater prosperity. The only really significant
proportional change is that which has taken place between the stock
and the mutuals, the latter having gained appreciably at the expense of
the former-from 12.4 per cent of the total in 1917 to 30 per cent in
1951. Stock company carriers have generally recruited from the relatively smaller and middle-sized risks, doing business through brokers
operating on a commission, selling a more expensive type of insurance,
but giving greater service. The mutuals have tended to attract the larger
firms and higher grade risks, escaping some of the overhead inherent
in the large sales organizations of the stocks. There is a noticeable
tendency for each type to adopt the competitively advantageous features of the other, so the differences between them are disappearing.
On the basis of premiums, state funds account for 19.4 per cent of
the compensation business. These funds are of two types: exclusives
1124 The statements here made are based on Chapter 4. Somers & Somers, Workmen's
Compensation ( 1954).
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(in eight states), and competitives (in eleven). The latter are in competition with the various forms of private carriers but the statutes setting up such funds compel acceptance of every grade of risk, so they
tend to cover the highest risks where they are in competition with private carriers.
On the basis of benefits paid in 1952, private carriers accounted for
62.3 per cent, state funds 24.5 per cent, and self-insurers 13.2 per cent.
Mutual, stock, exclusive state fund, and competitive state fund carriers are to be found among the ten largest carriers in the country.
The subject of rate making is far too complicated to allow elaboration here; however, some consideration must be given to it, for its very
complexity reveals a significant problem or weakness in the suggested
"contingent injury fund" scheme to cover radiation injuries. Essentially, rate making, whether by state insurance supervisors, individual
carriers, or the National Council on Compensation Insurance, is a
statistical study in which optimum probability determinations are the
goal. Periodically the various classes of risk, by industry and occupation, are assigned a compensation rate per payroll unit (e.g., $roo),
which is determined from recent past experience with the class. This
"manual classification gross rate" contains two elements : "pure premium" and "expense loading." Pure premium is that portion of the rate
to be used to pay claims, and includes reserves for future benefit payments. It may be adjusted up or down periodically, depending on class
experience- and educated guesses. Expense loading is the portion of
the rate set aside to defray anticipated underwriting expenses or overheac.l. These expense loadings have been state approved and are uniform
for all private carriers. Traditionally they have stood at or above forty
per cent of the total rate, with acquisition costs, brokers' commissions
( 17.5% ) , general administration expenses ( 7. 7% ) , and claims adjustment (8.2%) comprising the major portion. Generally they have reflected the higher costs of the stock carriers. While in recent years both
stock and mutual carriers have managed to reduce their actual expense
ratios, established expense loadings have remained constant or even increased slightly. The periodic revisions of these "gross rates" mainly
have been changes in the "pure premium" figure and not the "expense
loading." Needless to say, this feature of the rates has occasioned considerable criticism from both employers and labor, and is one of the
principal arguments favoring the state fund.
"Merit rating" has been proposed as a solution to many of the inequities of the "gross manual rating," and is being adopted widely. This
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type of rating is intended to distinguish between individual employers
within the same industrial classification so that the rates imposed upon
each will reflect that employer's accident record with respect to the average. There are three main types of merit rating with an indication of
an emerging fourth type: schedule rating, prospective experience rating, retrospective rating, and interstate experience rating. Schedule rating was an early attempt to predicate the individual employer's burden
upon the safety installations in his plant. It is of no practical significance today. Prospective experience rating is based on the actual accident experience of the individual employer over the past one to three
year period. It attempts to reward the employer with a relatively good
safety record, and is both simple and expedient to administer. Unfortunately, it has not affected the "expense loading" and has proved impractical with respect to low-risk, small employers. Retrospective rating,
which was originally intended to help the stocks recapture from the
mutuals who paid dividends to policy holders, uses only the employer's
current policy year experience. He is rated tentatively, at the beginning
of the year, by the prospective method. At the end of the policy year
a final audit is made of his accident costs, and his final premium is
established. This type of rating has also been used to reduce the carrier's expense loading, primarily by striking at brokers' commissions,
which have been reduced to as low as six per cent in some cases. This
type of rating has been available only to employers paying fairly substantial premiums (e.g., about $5,000 in New York), but has represented a large saving to them. It is criticized as being discriminatory
with respect to small employers and as not being in harmony with the
concept of a workmen's compensation program. The fourth and most
recent development with regard to individual risk rating is interstate
experience rating for employers in interstate operations.
Most of the state funds, whether exclusive or competitive, set their
rates in a fashion substantially similar to the method described for private carriers. They often utilize the manual gross rates set by the private rating organizations. The competitives may be found giving advance discounts or dividends or both to employers on an individual
basis, and also they may charge above the manual rates for the undc;!sirable risks which they must accept. The really significant difference
between the private carriers and the state funds is to be found in their
expense ratios. "Over the years competitive funds have devoted, on the
average, about 14 per cent of premiums to expenses, exclusives about
6 per cent," as opposed to 29 per cent for the stocks and 16 per cent for
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the mutuals. 1125 In connection with these comparisons it must be remembered that the competitives tend to get the worst risks and the exclusives
get all grades of risk. The Ontario fund, which is an exclusive and
must pay all the costs of administration, adjudication, etc., has paid
eighty-nine cents in benefits for every dollar of receipts. No part of the
Ontario workmen's compensation program is supported by taxes. Of
the eleven cents per dollar that goes for expenses, 2.5 cents goes for
safety and mine-rescue work. 1126
Two features of these workmen's compensation rates are significant
in a consideration of our "contingent injury fund." The first of these
is the fact that the carriers themselves, whether private or public, who
are liable for the benefits the law requires, are the determiners of the
probability of injury. Their techniques for doing so are exceedingly
complex and intricate. It is extremely doubtful if any jury or administrative tribunal could do the job with equal accuracy. It is obvious that
no carrier is going to accept a judicially determined probability of
future injury as a basis for insuring against the risk of liability; it
would be financial suicide for it to do so. Before accepting a proportionate contribution from a defendant, and agreeing to accept the possible
future liability, the fund administrator will have to make an independent determination of probability, and charge accordingly. From the
standpoint of the private insurer, at least, a determination of probability
by the trier of fact in a judicial proceeding is somewhat superfluous,
although it might be mentioned that both jury and insurer will be inclined to err in the same direction-i.e., toward greater probability.
The second feature of the workmen's compensation rates that reveals
a substantial problem in connection with the suggested "contingent injury fund" is the high cost of the insurance. The high level of expense ratio, especially that of the stock companies, may be prohibitive.
Perhaps private insurance is out of the question, but our system of justice should not be absolutely bound to existing insurance programs.
(d) Some Not Dissimilar Experience in New York
An experiment tried in New York presents a very interesting analogy
to our suggestion. In 1933 the New-York legislature amended its workmen's compensation law to include a "fund for reopened cases." 1127 The
purpose of this fund is to establish a method by which risk of claims
1125

I d. at 125-26.
1126/d at 314112164 N.Y Consol. Laws Ann. (McKinney 1946) §25-a.
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recurring beyond the statutory period shall be borne by all employers
and carriers, 1128 and to insure in proper cases the benefits of the workmen's compensation law to injured workmen regardless of prior denials
and time limitations. It also serves to cushion the burden on the employer and carrier by relieving them from a continuing liability. 1129
Under New York law a person whose case is closed may come back later
and state that he is still disabled or that his condition has worsened
and that he can no longer work, in which case his right to additional
compensation can be reopened if he presents medical proof of his condition and of the fact that it was caused by an industrial accident or occupational disease. The fund was created as a result of a recognition
that there were numerous cases of industrial injury and disease which
were arising, returning, or worsening after an award of compensation.
Under existing law the courts had held that, when a case was closed,
as to the type of injury, it could not be reopened upon this issue after
three years from the date of injury. If the injury had been classified,
for example, as "temporary· partial disability," such a finding could
not be disturbed after three years, no matter what tragic developments
might ensue. In a remarkable illustration of industry responsibility,
employers and insurance carriers withdrew their objections to allowing
the Commission to reopen cases even after an unlimited number of
years-provided they got some relief in return.
As a result of these conditions, the law was amended to provide that
in a reopened case, if the award was made more than severi years from
the date of accident and more than three years from the date of the last
payment of compensation, the award ~ould not run against the employer or his insurance carrier directly, but would run against the "fund
for reopened cases." This fund, in effect, became a reinsurer of all employers and private carriers for "stale" cases.
Initially, it was thought that there would be comparatively few cases
requiring compensation seven years after the date of accident and more
than three years after the date of the last compensation payment.
Therefore, only $250,000 was set aside to initiate the fund, and it was
further provided that in the case of an industrial death, where the deceased had no dependents to whom compensation was due, the employer
or carrier would pay $r,ooo into this fund. These funds soon were
found to be insufficient, so the act was amended to require a $r,soo
contribution for eacl) "no dependency" case. The amendment also
112s
1120

Casey v. Hinkle Iron Works, 299 N.Y. 382, 87 N.E.2d 419 (1949).
Watkins v. Cornwall Press, Inc., z;o App. Div. 615, 63 N.Y. Supp.2d 23 (1946).
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authorized the chairman of the Workmen's Compensation Board to
examine the fund periodically and calculate its liabilities. If the fund
does not exceed those liabilities by $250,000 he is authorized to make
assessments against all private insurance carriers, including self-insured
employers, to make up the deficit.
Because of the understandable popularity of this fund, two subsequent modifications were found necessary. The first of these was a
rather generous statute of limitations. Under the present law, no case
may be reopened and charged against the fund more than eighteen
years after the date of accident or more than eight years after the last
payment of compensation, whichever may be the longer. It also was
found necessary to provide for a defense for the fund. A Special Fund
Conservation Committee was created with five members, one from the
stock companies, one from the mutual companies, one from the State
Insurance Fund, one from the Compensation Insurance Rating Board,
and one self-insurer. In any reopened case the chairman of this committee is authorized to designate the employer or insurance company
that was primarily responsible for the compensation to act as defender
of the fund and represent it with respect to the particular claim.
.
Apparently, the New York "reopened case fund" is unique among
the workmen's compensation laws of the United States. The similarities between it and our "contingent injury fund" recommendations for
radiation injuries are clear. Each is intended to meet the same problem-the problem of delayed injury. The fund provides one source
from which recovery for delayed injury is made available. It should be
noted that in New York employers and private carriers were willing
to accept the right of the employee to have his case reopened and the
injury reclassified, for purposes of additional compensation, if their
direct liability was cut off at a reasonable time, even though as a group
they paid in any event. The private insurance companies apparently had
no desire to insure indefinitely and they did not object to a state administered fund. The method of financing this fund is especially significant. The requirement of contributions up to $1,500 from carriers and
insurers who are liable for ~·no dependency death" cases, is essentially
arbitrary from the "fault" standpoint, but it is expedient and it can
hardly be termed "unjust." Notice that the "reopened case fund" was
faced with the same problem that confronts the "contingent injury
fund," i.e., the problem of lack of correspondence between predicted
liabilities and reserves and actual liabilities and payments. If anything,
the New York fund encounters a larger problem, for no attempt is made
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to predicate individual contributions upon the probability of injury for
which the individual may be responsible. This problem has been resolved by authorizing the Board to levy assessments upon all carriers
to make up the deficit. If employers and private carriers will accept this
arrangement, there is no reason why they should not be equally willing to
accept liability to the proposed "contingent injury fund" for radiation
injuries. In connection with this latter fund, problems of solvency of
the fund can be resolved in the same way. Thus, the individual found
to have been negligent could be required to make a present contribution
to a national, public fund. The amount would be determined by the
monetary dimensions of the possible future injury, multiplied by the
percentage probability of its occurrence. This contribution could be
augmented by a pro-rata payment for the expense of administration
of the fund. Furthermore, any deficits that arise in the fund as a result
of inaccurate predictions by the triers of fact at the initial trial could
be made up by the use of assessments against all users of nuclear energy
sources. These assessments could be made proportionate to the amount
of radiation (both as to intensity and quantity of source) used by the
different operators.
There are some very vital distinctions between the New York "reopened case fund" and our "contingent injury fund." The New York
scheme takes care of future injuries only where there is present injury
for which recovery can be had within the time and coverage limitations
of the regular workmen's compensation provisions. Our ·fund would
be available to those whose only injury is possible future damage and
defendants would contribute to the fund every time they are legally
responsible for exposure which may ca~se future harm. This should
be fairer, not only to the injured but also to the members of the defendant's group as well, because each will contribute an amount based on
his own fault or liability and in proportion to the amount his activities
increase the possibility for future recovery against the fund. This preserves much more realistically the concept of individual responsibility
for harm caused by a particular activity and also takes care of what in
radiation cases may prove to. be a very large group of plaintiffs who can
show no present compensable symptoms but of whom a statistically
predictable number will suffer serious injury.
The fairness of the "contingent injury fund" is only as great as the
degree of validity of the statistical evidence used. They are not completely reliable by any means, but the results from their use will be infinitely more "just" than those reached in ordinary tort cases today.
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Many of those within the "more probably than not " group will die long
before a feared injury manifests itself and from completely unrelated
causes. This will be a "saving" to the "contingent injury fund" which
can be passed on to those other plaintiffs who actually suffer the future
injury feared and deserve fully adequate financial help.
The "contingent injury fund" concept has another important advantage in multiple wrongdoer or causation cases. Advantage can be taken
of the merits of contribution between joint tortfeasor ideas in normal
tort cases and of last-employer concepts found in some workmen's
compensation plans. In radiation injury cases the "amount of damage"
caused by each source can be approximated much more closely than in
the usual accident case for the reason that the damage done, particularly
as to future injury, correlates rather closely with the amount of radiation received, although it may be difficult sometimes to determine this
amount. By making each source, if there is legal liability for radiation
from that source, contribute its share to a common fund there will be
no need to hold each fully liable and subsequently make the one against
whom a judgment is entered find and recover from the others legally
liable.
The multiple causation situation suggests one of the most important
possible inequities and perhaps the greatest difficulties inherent in the
"contingent injury fund" plan. Since most of the injuries which radiation can cause also may arise from other forces for which the particular defendant may not be responsible, what assurance can be given that
a future injury that manifests itself will not have been caused by some
source which has made. no contribution to the fund; e.g., cosmic rays,
other background radiation, or radiation properly used in medical treatment? The short answer is that such assurance cannot be given. This
does not justify rejection of the plan, however, because the same objection is even greater as applied to present tort liability rules. The same
multiple causation possibilities exist whichever damage system is used,
and the "contingent injury fund" idea lends itself much more readily
and justly to a solution than does our present rigid two-value scheme
of "recovery in full or no recovery at all." Possible shortages in the
fund when the injury is attributable to causes making no contribution
could be avoided in one of three ways: (I) the number of exposed
persons who die for other reasons before the future injury manifests
itself may be sufficient to offset those injuries actually caused by other
forces, somewhat as in the New York "reopened case fund"; or (2) the
government can make a lump-sum contribution annually representing
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the statistically estimated contribution of such non-liable sources ; or
( 3) the plaintiff will be allowed to recover only such proportion of the
total damages as is represented by the contribution to his injury by contributing sources, the remainder to be taken care of by his own resources, which in many cases today might include his own medical,
hospitalization, and loss-of-income insurance. Each of these solutions
within the "contingent injury fund" scheme is much more acceptable
than our present system of making the result depend upon "more probably than not" which gives a black-or-white result depending on
whether the particular case falls on one side of fifty per cent or the
other. Under our present system, by hypothesis, in cases in which the
probability falls between twenty-five and seventy-five per cent, the
result reached in the particular case is "more probably than not" wrong!
(e) Concepts of the Civil Law Concerning Principles of Damages 1130
The problems involved in awarding damages are universal. Accordingly, advantage should be taken of experience under other systems of
law. The civil law has taken a somewhat more realistic approach than
that followed in the common law countries.
Specific Performance. In France the principle of specific performance allows for reparation of losses caused by tortious interference with
property. The remedy is strictly within the discretion of the judiciary,
but where the interests of justice are best served, and a lessening of
burdens of evaluation may result, a court may order the "restitution"
to the victims of a lost, destroyed, or damaged item, the substitute to be
equivalent in quality, quantity, or general serviceability and value. The
court may permit the defendant to choose between giving the plaintiff a
like item or paying a certain sum. An impartial officer of the court
will decide whether the object delivered by defendant to plaintiff substantially corresponds to the lost, damaged, or destroyed article. A
court may also insist on specific "restitution'' as the only just remedy,
and effective enforcement is generally assured by a judicial device called
"astreinte," which corresponds roughly to a pecuniary penalty which increases as the defendant delays performance. For example, in a case
in which the defendant tortiously had cut and harvested the plaintiff's
1180 This section is based on research in the original language done by Rinaldo L.
Bianchi, ].D., Mich. 1955. Mr. Bianchi served on the staff of The University of Michigan Law School from February 1955 to June 1957. He is currently with the firm of
Covington & Burling, Washington, D.C.
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hay, the court ordered that an equivalent amount be delivered by the
defendant. 1131 The same kind of automobile wheels has been ordered
delivered to the plaintiff, 1132 as have tires, 1188 and where the defendant
accidentally destroyed the plaintiff's truck, the court ordered him to
obtain and deliver to the plaintiff a truck of the same quality and
make.m 4 The judge is free to choose between a money judgment and
specific performance. As for the availability of the concept of specific
performance in tort cases, an eminent French author has remarked
that, since the remedy is used in contract cases, there is even more reason
(a plus forte raison) that the court should have similar powers in tort
cases. 1135 This might be a very appropriate remedy where personal
property has been contaminated by radioactive material and can be replaced with something quite similar thus eliminating any concern about
the salvage value in determining damages.
Money Judgments. Other types of damage that do not lend themselves to specific restitution, such as personal injuries, are subject to
the unlimited power of the courts in matters of remedy. A judge, in
his discretion and depending on the circumstances of the case, can set
the date and the place of payment of a judgment of indemnity. He
can decide whether the judgment should be in the form of one lump
sum, or in installments, or as an annuity. The requests of the parties
are not binding on the court. 1186 The only limitation on the powers of
the courts in the choice of remedies is the prohibition against judgments that encroach on the freedom of the defendant or upon his civil
rights.
Provisional Decrees; The discretionary powers of the courts in
France are broad enough to include all possible claims within the cause
of action together with the power to render a provisional decree designed to allow reopening for later discovered damages. Periodic revisions of a judgment may also be ordered to diminish or terminate as
well as to increase the installments of an annuity granted to a plaintiff,
according to whether his condition has improved, disappeared, or
deteriorated.
It is remarkable that no article of the French Code directs the courts
11 31
1132
1133

Verdot v. Fusis, Besam,;on App., Dec. 4, 1946, Gaz. Pal. 1947, 1, 20.
Soc. aut., du Centre Gatty v. Dymerias, Lyon App., July 30, 1946, D. 1947, 377.
Etabl. Compte et Dupriet v. Malaval, Tr. Com. Seine, June 23, I947, Gaz. Pal.

1947, 2, I95·
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S.N.C.F v. Guillou, Caen App., March 2, I943, Sem. Jurid. I944, II 2657.
Savatier. 2 Traite de Ia Responsabilite Civile 17I, n. 5 (I94I).
usa S.N .( F v Ulma, Paris App., March 1, 1945, Gaz. Pal. I945. I, ISS
11 ' 5

NEGLIGENCE

529

to follow such procedures. The system has developed by case law from
the implications of a single word in Article 1382 which states the
general theory of tort liability based on fault. The article merely states
that the defendant who is found liable must make reparation. From
that point it has become a matter of judicial development, subject to
limitations of personal freedom, to decide the techniques best suited
to the particular case. The French Court of Cassation repeatedly
has affirmed that the courts are free to choose the mode of compensa·
tion in tort cases according to their own judgment, taking into consideration all of the circumstances of the cases. 1137
An annuity, in personal injury cases, may often correspond more
accurately to the extent of the defendant's damages than will a final
lump sum which must be adjusted to take into account the permanency
of the particular loss. In addition, as previously noted, judging the
possibility of future new injuries or the aggravation of a present injury
is guesswork at best. Atomic energy injuries probably will present this
dilemma in many cases. Should there be a major radiation disaster, a
defendant may be better able to stand the imposition of smaller periodic
payments over a period of years than a huge lump sum if, as expected,
the federal indemnity program is dropped in the future. The French
experience at least shows that delay in determining the exact nature
and extent of future damages can be administered.
Another French technique throws light on the feasibility of our
suggested "contingent injury fund." It is a process of distribution of
the damages according to the respective liability of the parties. In
Correia v. Lucet 1188 the plaintiff was found one-fourth responsible for
an accident and the defendant three-fourths. An impartial expert established that plaintiff had suffered a two months' total disability and a
continuing twenty per cent disability, which condition, however, could
improve in time. The trial court granted an award of three-quarters
of the medical expenses, plus the cost of plaintiff's bicycle which was
damaged, and two months' salary. The "moral damages" (pretium
11 8 7 Cie des Forges de Chatillon-Commentry v. Auclert, Req. May 2I, I928, D.H.
Ig28, 366, Gaz. Pal. I928, 2, 3S4 (Damages to land from exploration and mining operations subject to probable increase in time. The judge was allowed to assess the extent
of existing damage and wait to determine later damage); Schmitt et at. v. Adret, Cass.
Ch. Criminelle, Feb. 2S, I928, D.H. tg28, 239. S. Ig28, I, IS3, Gaz. Pal. Ig28, 1, SIS
(Court allowed to order defendant to purchase a temporary annuity for plaintiff in
bodily injury case) ; Veuve Deglaire v. Hubert, Req. July 11, I938, Gaz. Pal. I938, 2, 67I
(Court could award a lump sum or installments at its discretion). See also C. c.
dame M, Req. Feb. s, I940, Gaz. Pal. I940, I, 47I.
11 8 8 Angers, April 2, I93S. Gaz. Pal. I93S. 2, 36.
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doloris), based upon aesthetic prejudice from disfiguration, plus the
twenty per cent continuing disability were assessed at a yearly pension
of I,OOO francs, account being taken of the victim's station in life. The
appellate court affirmed the judgment saying, however, that the defendant was entitled to request that the judgment include a reservation
of his right to petition at a later date for a reduction or discontinuance
of the installments if the plaintiff's condition should improve or be
cured. The civil law does not use the concept of contributory negligence
but instead uses a system of apportionment based upon relative "contributory causation."
Again, in Cugno v. Parzy 1139 the victim of a car accident suffered
brain injuries accompanied by diminution of mental powers, muscular
atrophy of the left arm, and other injuries of the left hand. The court
decided that since these conditions might improve in the future, a final
judgment would not be in character with the nature of the injury. An
annuity was granted, made subject to periodic revision every two years
depending upon whether the plaintiff's condition improved, deteriorated,
or remained the same.
Similarly, in Abram v. Petit 1140 the victim of a motor car accident
was left with a nervous disorder persisting after his other wounds had
healed. An expert witness declared that the condition was curable and
that it might disappear leaving no traces. The court ruled that it would
be unjust to award a final sum. An annuity was granted, made subject to revision every two years, and subject to discontinuance if the
plaintiff's condition should be cured.
The procedural difficulties that these techniques would encounter
under the common law are overcome rather nimbly by the French
courts. It is the theory of the French doctrine that a judgment passes
only upon the damages actually submitted to the court at the time of
trial and not on "new damages" stemming from the same cause. To
be sure, a court can make an express, final 'decision that all possible
claims from a cause are merged in the judgment, but, short of that,
"new damages" give rise to a new cause of action. It is not always
easy to decide when "new damages" exist which were not present and
claimable in the first instance; but, for example, the loss of a second
eye after the judge has passed on the loss of the first one is "new
damage." 1141
11s9
1140

11 41

Riom, Feb. 8, 1939, D.H. 1939, 269.
Dijon, May 5, 1933, D.H. 1933, Gaz. Pal. 1933, 2, 314.
Teissere v. de Gasquet, Aix App. April 2, 1870, D. 1871,

2,

241.
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The courts have also shown a tendency to regard an injury which
was not definable nor perceivable at the time of the first judgment as
"new damage," sufficient to support an action for supplemental indemnity. In Corne v. Pozzi 1142 the initial judgment rendered in 1946
granted the plaintiff a lump sum of 125,000 francs. A few years later
he petitioned for a re-examination. As to an objection of res judicata
the court said that the aggravation of an injury suffered in an accident
in itself is a new cause of action for damages, distinguishable from
the cause of action first litigated, and supplemental damages may be
requested. Experts must be called, of course, to testify as to whether
the aggravation is a direct consequence of the accident, and to determine its extent .
. Again, in Canac v. Abline 1148 the argument of res judicata was
rejected in a case involving subsequent aggravation of damages, even
though there was no reservation of the right to reopen the original
judgment. The French courts have gone so far as to say that res
judicata is always subject to 'an exception, even in cases where the injuries constitute only an aggravation of a condition existing prior to the
the first judgment at which time they were either unpredictable as to
their future extent or not perceivable by normal means of investiga"7
tion. 11u
The right to revision of judgments and awards is by no means automatic in French law. The courts are merely empowered to use sound
judgment to achieve equitable disposition of particular· cases; they
actually make rather sparing use of this prerogative. Generally a
party cannot reopen a case if the first court purported to adjudicate the
entire damages in a lump sum and made no reservation as to the reopening of judgment. This is so in most cases even if a party has expressly reserved the right to open the case and the court recorded this
reservation in the judgment. The appellate courts generally oppose the
tendency of trial courts to award indemnities subject to future modifications based solely on a rise in the cost of living. In general it is
said that variations in the cost of living are not attributable to the tort
and thus should not be taken into account in a· judgment awarding
future compensation.
11 42

Paris, Dec. 8, 1949, D.1950, J.C.P. 1950, 2, 5459·
Grenoble, Jan. 20, 1936, 154.
11u (Ex Parte) Blandin, Conseil d'Etat, July I, 1949, Gaz. Pal. 1949, 2, 305, in
which the plaintiff was given a supplemental income to compensate for the devaluation of the currency at the time of the second trial in a case arising out of government
liability for injuries caused by an army vehicle.
1H8
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(f) Conclusions

If the French can administer their provisional judgment system
there would seem to be no real, insurmountable obstacle to administering the "contingent injury fund" plan which actually should be much
more satisfactory from the defendant's point of view since, if he is
successful, he will be discharged at the first trial. Plaintiffs should
gain because they do not have to pursue a defendant who perhaps at a
later date may be bankrupt or who may have disappeared. Also, provision would be made for the case where there is as yet no observable
injury to be compensated. The necessity of enormous awards, increasingly frequent in recent common law decisions, may in part be
due to the "now or never" approach to tort liability. In the case of
radiation injuries, results in keeping with this liberal trend under the
present system may even lead to an impossible situation. 1146 It is time
we changed our damage rules as well as. re-evaluated our concepts concerning proof of both causation and damages.
The suggested "contingent injury fund" might seem to do harm
to interests of lawyers handling tort cases, yet even here it should call
only for an adjustment of their way of handling fees and planning income. There should be no reduction in total income over a period of
years. Perhaps the greater degree of certainty of outcome would make
it possible even to increase total professional incomes because the cases
could be handled more expeditiously.
In any event it seems that a fairer system between the important
parties in tort actions, the plaintiff and defendant, can be worked out,
and this is the most significant consideration, a concept which the
profession will surely applaud.
If the suggested plan proves to be adequate for future injuries, there
is every reason to believe it also might be made applicable to present
injuries where there is less than real certainty that a particular force
or cause is responsible for a specific injury. If it works, this should
do much to increase the lay public's respect for law as a means of
achieving justice in tort cases, something the public and non-legal experts often doubt, and rightfully so in many cases.
1145 See text supra at notes II20-2I for a discussion of possibilities should there be
a major reactor incident and the "more probable than not" rule applied.
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6. Application of Res Ipsa Loquitur Concepts
a. In General
Assuming that negligence rather than strict liability rules are applied in radiation cases, (and surely this should be true in a large percentage of the cases) the plaintiff may seek to invoke the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur. If so, his burden of proving the defendant's negligence and that it caused his injury will be made easier.
Without help from this doctrine it may prove to be extremely difficult
to establish by direct evid~nce that a particular radiation accident was
the result of negligence. The plaintiff may find himself totally unable
to pinpoint precise negligent acts or omissions, probably because of (I)
ignorance on both his part a~d the defendant's as to exactly what happened, or ( 2) death of potential witnesses and destruction of material
physical evidence, or possibly (3) assertion of government secrecy
restrictions. Therefore, whil~ he stands an excellent chance of recovery
once his case is placed in the hands of a sympathetic jury, the plaintiff
in these three situations may lose on defendant's motion to dismiss .
. Res ipsa loquitur, literally translated, means "the thing speaks for
itself." In terms of legal practice, the phrase connotes a method of
proof by circumstantial evidence. In most jurisdictions, the plaintiff is
given the advantage of an inference that the defendant was negligent
and thereby he escapes a nonsuit. Res ipsa loquitur, however, can be
used only in restricted circumstances. To speak for itself, an accident
must be one that normally does not occur without negligence, and it
must arise from a force or instrumentality "controlled" (in a loose
sense) by the defendant.m 6 Establishing these conditions precedent to
the application of res ipsa loquitur may frequently be almost as difficult as establishing negligence directly; but, in the usual case, the
plaintiff's burden on the negligence issue is substantially lessened by
resort to the doctrine, and at least a psychological obligation is placed
on defendant to offer rebutting evidence. 11 n Hence the doctrine is
extremely popular with plaintiffs' attorneys.
There is no logical reason why res ipsa loquitur should not be applied in radiation injury situations, and a number of writers have
1H6 See Prosser. 199-211. Additional conditions, that plaintiff eliminate the possibility of his own contributing conduct as the responsible cause and that the evidence be
more accessible to defendant than to plaintiff, are also frequently listed. Ibid.
1H7 See the discussion of the procedural effect of res ipsa loquitur in the text accompanying notes 1197-1204 infra.
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noted its possible application to such cases. 1148 Seldom, however, has
more than a superficial treatment been given to the doctrine's possibilities in this context, 1149 and for this reason, a relatively extensive discussion of res ipsa loquitur is warranted here.
( 1)

Development

In the past quarter-century, practically all of our leading tort authorities have attempted definitive examinations of res ipsa loquitur. 1150 In
spite of or perhaps because of this, confusion reigns to a considerable
extent, at least as to the refinements of the doctrine. General unanimity
among commentators and courts exists, however, on many of the major
principles.
There is wide concurrence, in the first place, that res ipsa loquitur
is an evidentiary rule which, at least in its original state, was based on
common sense. 11 n Early English jurists recognized that in some instances, circumstantial evidence on the issue of negligence might be
such that a jury reasonably could exclude every hypothesis other than
that defendant's negligence was a proximate cause of the accident.
Plaintiff was allowed in these cases to use res ipsa loquitur as a form
of circumstantial evidence. This proved, of course, to be of great
assistance to him.
One of the early statements, defining the cases in which res ipsa
loquitur would be permitted, is found in Scott v. London & St. Katherine Docks Co. The court said:
But where the thing is shewn to be under the management
of the defendant or his servants, and the accident is such
1148 See e.g., Dunlap, "Medicolegal Aspects of Injuries from Exposure to X-Rays
and Radioactive Substances," (footnotes by Smith) II Mo. L. Rev. 137, 150, n. 25
(1946); Hiestand, "Compensation for Injury to Life or Property," Lectures on
Atomic Energy Industrial and Legal Problems (Univ. of Mich.) 216, 223 (1952);
Seavey, "Torts and Atoms," 46 Calif. L. Rev. 3, 13 (1958).
1149 Becker & Huard, "Tort Liability and The Atomic Energy Industry," 44 Geo.
L. ]. 58 (1955); Cable & Early, "Torts and the Atom: the Problem of Insurance," 45
Ky. L. ]. 3, 17-20 (1956); Hutton, "Evidentiary Problems in Proving Radiation Injury," 46 Geo. L. ]. 52, 64-69 (1957); Hutton, "Res Ipsa Loquitur and Actionable Radiation Injury," 25·Tenn. L. Rev. 327 (1958). All of these articles, in greater but mostly
lesser degree, consider the applicability of res ipsa loquitur to the industry.
1150 Malone, "Res Ipsa Loquitur and Proof by Inference--A Discussion of the
Louisiana Casest 4 La. L. Rev. 70 (1941); Prosser, "Res Ipsa Loquitur in California," ·37 Calif. L. Rev. 183 (1949) ; Seavey, "Res Ipsa Loquitur: Tabula in
Naufragio," 63 Harv. L. Rev. 643 (1950); Prosser 199-217; Harper & James §§19.519.12.
uu See e.g., Prosser, "Res Ipsa Loquitur in California," supra note 1150 at 184-85.
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that as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if
those who have the management use proper care, it affords
reasonable evidence, in the absence of ·explanation by the
defendants, that the accident arose from want of care. 1152
Use of the doctrine was limited, therefore, to instances where the reasonable inference to be drawn from the facts adduced by the plaintiff
was that the defendant, or someone for whose acts he was legally responsible, had been negligent in causing plaintiff's injury.
In the years that followed the Scott decision, this original "pure"
statement of res ipsa loquitur became clouded by judicial efforts to
identify the doctrine with responsibilities of carriers, since most of
the cases in which it was applied involved railroads or other common
carriers. 1153 It remained for Dean Wigmore to clear the air in this
country with a careful definition of the situations in which the rule
should be applied :

( 1) The apparatus must be such that in the ordinary instance
no injurious operation is to be expected unless from a careless construction, inspection, or user ; ( 2) Both inspection
and user must have been at the time of the injury in the control of the party charged; (3) The injurious occurrence or
condition must have happened irrespective of any voluntary
action at the time by the party injured. 1154
The fifty-odd years that have passed since Wigmore's statement
first appeared have witnessed relatively unanimous judicial acceptance
of his formula in determining when to apply res ipsa loquitur. Nevertheless, it is no more than a guidepost. The three conditions precedent
to application have been gradually both eroded and expanded, and today,
whlle commentators' catchphrases bear remarkable similarity to Wigmore's, the doctrine must be. examined in _greater detail if its contemporary nature and extent are to be pictured accurately.
In examining the conditions, however, it is important to keep in
mind one traditional limitation on its use. Res ipsa loquitur traditionally
is said to deal only with the question of proof of breach of duty in a
negligence action. It has no application to actions based on intentional
wrongdoings or to actions based on some form of strict liability. The
doctrine is thought not to apply to any issue in a negligence action other
115 2

3 H. & C. 596, 6o1, 159 Eng. Rep. 665 (1865).

u5s See Prosser, "Res Ipsa Loquitur in California," supra note nso at 185-89 and

cases cited therein.
1154 4 Wigmore, Evidence §2509 (1st ed. 1905).
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than breach of duty, although some of the cases are beginning to corrupt the doctrine's purity in this latter regard. 1155
There are two principal aspects of the res ipsa loquitur conditions.
The first deals with the probability that the accident would not have
happened without negligence; this is strictly a matter of the nature,
scope, and breach of a particular duty to use care. We ask whether this
kind of accident normally would happen without negligence; if not, the
accident speaks for itself. This is the first condition precedent to the
use of res ipsa loquitur.
The second aspect involves the second and third condi~ions precedent
to application-i.e., connecting defendant with responsibility for this
particular accident and discounting plaintiff's responsibility. These
inquiries must range beyond a strict duty analysis; indeed, the question
becomes specifically one of causation-in-fact. Generally, on these issues
the question is whether defendant most probably is the person to be
held accountable for the accident, and this involves examination of the
various other possible causes.
Thus, in a sense, this second aspect of the res ipsa loquitur prerequisites is really an inquiry as to cause-in-fact: Did defendant's action cause the injury? Typically, res ipsa loquitur, however, applies
only to that part of the cause-in-fact question dealing with whether it
was a particular defendant who set the injurious force in motion, but
not whether a given type of force did in fact cause the particular injury
which plaintiff suffered.
The difference between these two quite separate aspects of res ipsa
loquitur has not always been kept in mind. The doctrine that the accident speaks for itself can be applied only when both are satisfied, and
they· call for fundamentally different evaluations of the facts. The
reader should keep this in mind in analyzing each of the three conditions
precedent.

(2) Prerequisites for Applying
(a) Nature of the Accident
Prosser rephrases Wigmore's first condition m these terms:
The requirement that the occurrence be one which ordinarily does not happen without negligence is of course only
another way of stating a principle of circumstantial evidence,
that the accident must be such that in the light of ordinary
''"" See text following not!'

1

189 infra
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experience it gives rise to an inference that some one has
been negligent. 1156
At the extremes the appropriateness or inappropriateness of res ipsa
!oquitur under this definition is frequently obvious. If a boiler explodes,1157 or impurities are found in a food product,1158 there is a rather
strong tendency to infer that someone has acted negligently. If, on the
other hand, a car skids/ 159 or a person falls alighting from a public
conveyance, 1160 it is eminently possible-absent contrary evidence-to
conclude that no one has been negligent. Nevertheless, in many instances, the decision whether res ipsa loquitur is appropriate is of the
"hairline" variety, ultimately turning on the subjective process of
weighing the various possible causes of the accident. While there is
considerable disagreement on the matter,1161 it is perhaps fair for our
purposes to generalize that courts will deem this first condition satisfied
if it appears "more probable than not" that someone's negligence was a
proximate cause of the accid~nt.
In most instances involving ordinary accidents, the layman is fully
qualified to decide this question of probability. Cases often arise, however, in which expert testimony would appear valuable in determining
whether the incident is one in which negligence ordinarily would be
involved. Because of an early conception that an accident could not
speak for itself before a jury unless a layman were fully qualified to
weigh the probabilities, some courts have excluded expert testimony on
this issue. 1168 The commentators generally agree today, however, that
experts should be permitted to give opinion testimony on the negligence
probability issue in appropriate cases, 1184 and there is a growing trend
in this direction. 1186 Expert testimony has been permitted in a variety
1162

1 15 8

Prosser

202.

un Kleinman v. Banner Laundry Co., 150 Minn. 515, 186 N.W. 123 (1921).
1 158 Dryden v. Continental Baking Co., 11 Cal.2d 33, 77 P.2d 833 (1938). Cf. Ash
v. Childs Dining Hall, 231 Mass. 86, 120 N.E. 396 (1918).
115 9 Lithgow v.-Lithgow, 334 Pa. 262, 5 A.2d 573 (1939).
1160Greeley v. Baltimore Transit Co., 18o Md. 10,22 A.2d 46o (I94I).
1161 See e.g., Jaffe, "Res Ipsa Loquitur Vindicated," I Buff. L. Rev. I (1951).
1162 Prosser, "Res Ipsa.Loquitur in California," supra note II50 at I94- See discussion generally of test of probability, supra notes 923 ff.
11 68 For a modem reflection of this view, see Costa v. Regents of University of California, 247 P.2d 2I (Cal. App. 1952), modified u6 Cal. App.2d 445, 254 P .2d 85 (I953).
1164 See Morris, "Res Ipsa LoqUitur ·in Texas," 26 Tex. L. Rev. 257, 76I (I948);
Harper & James §I9.6.
1165 See the supplementary opinion of the California appellate court modifying Costa
v. Regents of University of California, cited at note II63 supra. For a careful study of
res ipsa loquitur cases in which expert testimony has been admitted, see Note, Io6 U.
Pa-. L. Rev. 73I (I958).
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of cases, particularly those involving complex or dangerous instrumentalities, both for the purpose of invoking res ipsa loquitur and for showing it inapplicable. 1166
In addition to expert testimony, the question of probability undoubtedly is further affected by a considerable number of peripheral
factors not involving the immediate circumstances of the accident. The
safety record of an industry, for example, for certain types of operations
can be of considerable importance. This is evident when one considers
that, while in the early cases the courts held res ipsa loquitur inapplicable
to aircraft accidents, there is today a growing acceptance of the conclusion that this type of incident is appropriate for imposition of the
doctrine. 1167
Another contributing factor affecting the balancing process may be the
relationship of defendant and plaintiff. Once defendants in litigated
cases begin to be held liable in certain fact situations, "the inference of
negligence becomes all the easier to draw. As the precautions that defendant must take to avoid injury increase there is a proportionate increase in the number of available hypotheses involving carelessness." 1168
Thus in situations involving the carrier and his passenger,1169 or the
conduct of hazardous activities 1170 by the defendant, res ipsa loquitur
is more likely to be applied than in typical negligence situations.
In the final analysis, these latter tendencies represent no more than
specialized manifestations of basic policy decisions. It is inevitable
in any subjective process that fundamental conceptions of policy will
affect a court's decision, and the application of res ipsa loquitur is no
exception. Thus if the nature of a person's activity is such that society
demands that he assume an insurer's responsibility, res ipsa loquitu·r
11 6 6 See cases cited in Note, 106 U. Pa. L. Rev. 731, 736-37 (1958). See also discussion .of X-ray cases in which res ipsa loquitur has been at issue, text accompanying
notes 1213-1245 infra.
6
11 7 See McLarty, "Res Ipsa Loquitur in Airline Passenger Litigation," 37 Va. L.
Rev. 55 (1951); Goldin, "The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur in Aviation Law," 18 So.
Cal. L. Rev. 15 (1944); Note, 1o6 U. Pa. L. Rev. 731, 739-740 (1958).
1168 Malone, supra note 1150 at 78. "It should be noted that this reasoning applies
not only where there is a relationship which calls for great care, but whenever the
dangerous nature of the defendant's conduct calls for commensurately great precautions.
This does not mean (logically) that an inference of negligence may be drawn in all
cases calling for great care, but that it may be more easily drawn from facts that otherwise might be regarded as equivocal." Harper & James 1084.
1169
E.g;, Osgood v. Los Angeles Traction Co., 137 Cal. 28o, 70 Pac. 169 ( 1902).
1170
E.g., Atlas Powder Co. v. Benson, 287 Fed. 797 (3d Cir. 1923) ; Cratty v.
Samuel Aceto & Co., 151 Me. 126, 116 A.2d 623 (1955). See, however, the discussion
of the explosives cases in text. accompanying note 1258 infra.
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becomes the "poor cousin" of liability without fault. A court unwilling
to accept and apply the latter doctrine can often accomplish the same
end result by easing the plaintiff's evidentiary burden with res ipsa
loquitur. 1111 Conversely, when the defendant is engaged in an activity
which, although it is potentially dangerous, society desires to foster,
considerably less judicial enthusiasm for application of res ipsa loquitur
should be encountered. 1172
(b) "Control" by the Defendant
It would be erroneous to read literally Wigmore's second condition,
that the instrument be in defendant's control at the time of injury.
Myriad cases have presented fact situations in the past fifty years which
do not involve exclusive physical control by defendant, but the application of res ipsa loquitur nevertheless is considered appropriate. The most
famous of these are the "exploding bottle" cases in which the defendant normally relinquishes physical control long before the accident
takes place. Indeed, the plaintiff himself usually has exclusive physical
control at the time of injury. In these and similar cases, the concept of
physical control at the time of accident ceases to effectuate its original
purpose, and it generally is held sufficient that the defendant, or one
for whose acts the defendant is legally responsible, had dominion over
the instrumentality at the time when, more probably than not, the negligent act took place. 1118 Other difficult cases are solved mer~ly by requiring that the defendant have the "right to control" as opposed to actual
1111 "In a system where the adoption of an agnostic position will deny recovery to
the accident victim (who has the burden of proof) the practical impact and importance
of res ipsa loquitur has probably consisted in its tendency · to invite or encourage the
asstimption of broad and doubtful postulates favorable to liability in many situations
where the courts would otherwise be understandably reluctant to adopt them, at least
without the aid of expert opinion. If the foregoing· is true, the persistence and expansion of the 'doctrine'-in spite of trenchant and penetrating logical criticism-may well
be attributable to the strong general trend towards strict liability and social insurancea trend which is corroding a system of liability nominally based on fault. This would
also ·account for the greater readiness to invoke the doctrine in certain kinds of situations, and within certain relationships, where the pull towards absolute liability. has been
particularly strong, or where the accident victim's burden of proof has been particularly forbidding." Harper & James 1079-81.
1172 For this reason, a number of courts have declined to apply the doctrine to malpractice actions. See Note, "The California Malpractice Controversy," 9 Stan. L. Rev.
731, 737 et seq. (1957).
11 78 E.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 24 Cal.2d 453, 150 P.2d 436
(1944); Zentz v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 39 Cal.2d 436, 247 P.2d 344
(1952); Weidert v. Monahan Post Legionnaire Club, 243 Iowa 643, 51 N.W.2d 400
(1952).
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physical control, 1174 or by stating that defendant's duty to control is
non-delegable in law. 1175 Prosser has termed the control concept as
"pernicious and misleading" and suggests that the second condition precedent to application of res ipsa loquitur be phrased that "the apparent
cause of the accident must be such that the defendant would be responsible for any negligence connected with it." 1176 This latter suggestion
is broadly accepted by the commentators and the tendencies may be in
this direction. The courts, however, generally display greater conservatism, and it is seldom, in a res ipsa. loquitur opinion, that the control
theory in some form is not at least mentioned by name.
A further aspect of the second condition, tacit in what already has
been said, is the requirement of exclusivity. The control or right to
control the harmful instrumentality by the defendant must be such that
other causes may reasonably be discounted. These other causes need
not be eliminated, but "their likelihood must be so reduced that the
greater probability lies at defendant's door." 1177
As was the case with the first condition, this process involves a balancing of probabilities. Here, however, the court deals in terms of
probable causation-in-fact, whereas for the first condition, an entirely
different evaluation-probability of negligence-was required. The
general judicial approach to the causation question, nevertheless, should
not diverge substantially from that indicated previously, and we may
equally expect courts to bring similar policy considerations into play
when the strict logic of res ipsa loquitur fails in a particularly appealing
case.
The principal area in which such considerations have arisen is that
involving multiple defendants. The plaintiff often may find it impossible to narrow the reasonable hypothetical causes of an accident to an
instrumentality in the exclusive care of one person. At first glance,
logically res ipsa loquitur cannot be applied, since the probabilities do
not point toward the defendant. If, however, the plaintiff has discounted all causes but two or three, each independent of the others but
all in some way within the defendant's legal responsibility, there is no
1174 E.g., Crump v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 313 Ill. App. 151, 39 N.E.2d 411
(1942); Robinson v. Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 184 Misc. 571, 54 N.Y. Supp.2d 42
(1945); Hogland v. Klein, 49 Wash.2d 216, 298 P.2d 1099 (1956).
1175 E.g., Motor Sales & Service, Inc. v. Grasselli Chemical Co., 15 La. App. 353,
131 So. 623 (1930). See cases cited in Prosser, "Res Ipsa Loquitur in California,"
supra note 1150 at 199-200.
1176 Prosser 206.
177
•
Harper & James 1086.
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reason for refusing res ipsa loquitur. 1118 True, causation is not proved
precisely, even by probabilities, but the question is of no importance
when the defendant is responsible for all the probable causes. Similarly,
where there are several defendants operating in a joint enterprise, so
that each is legally responsible for the others' negligent acts, the courts
are willing to apply the doctrine to defendants as a group. 1179
The difficult case, and the one evoking the most discussion, involves
multiple defendants who operate independently. Even if the plaintiff is
injured under circumstances making it probable that negligence was the
cause of the accident, there may be more than one possible source of the
negligence and more than one defendant possibly responsible for several
sources. It may be that the plaintiff will be unable to give circumstantial
proof indicating that the injury resulted "more probably" from any
single defendant's negligence. For this failure to pin exclusive responsibility on one defendant in a case where the enterprise is not joint, is
the plaintiff to be denied the use of res ipsa loquitur? Again, logically
the answer must be in the affirmative, since application of res ipsa loquitur is predicated on the assumption that at least it is more probable
than not that the defendant was responsible. When the plaintiff fails
to sustain this logical burden, he should not be allowed the use of res
ipsa loquitur.:_in the traditional view. In several decisions, however,
this logic has been overlooked in judicial response to certain fundamental conceptions of social policy, and res ipsa loquitur has been extended beyond the original and logical limits, implied by "the situation
speaks for itself."
The most significant of these cases is the. California decision of
Ybarra v. S pangard. 1180 During an operation for removal of an appen1178 "There are, indeed, cases in which a showing that every instrumentality to
which a given injury could with reasonable probability be attributed was under a
defendant's management has been accepted by the courts as, for practical purposes,
the equivalent of a showing that the defendant controlled the particular instrumentality
that did cause it." Hubbert v. Aztec Brewing Co., 26 Cal. App.2d 664, 687, 8o P.2d
185 (1938). See also Judson v. Giant Powder Co., 107 Cal. 549, 40 Pac. 1020 (1895).
1179 The famous case of Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal.2d So, 199 P.2d 1 (1948), is illustrative of this point. In that case, plaintiff was on a hunting expedition with the two
defendants. Plaintiff was shot in the eye with a single shotgun pellet after defendants
had fired at a quail almost simultaneOusly. ··The court approved a trial court finding
that "defendants were jointly liable and that thus the negligence of both was the cause
of the injury or to that legal effect." Id. at 84. Without mentioning res ipsa loquitur,
the court held that the circumstances of the injury required "that the burden of proof
... be shifted to defendants. . . . They are both wrongdoers-both negligent toward
plaintiff." Id. at 86. The court cited Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal.2d 486, 154 P.2d
687 (1944) as authority. Cf. Cook v. Lewis, (Canada) [I952] I D.L.R. I.
u8o Supra note I 179.
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dix, the plaintiff received an injury to his shoulder. The precise cause
of the injury was unknown, but apparently it resulted from an external
trauma occurring while the plaintiff was under anesthesia. The plaintiff brought suit against the hospital and all of the persons who had
been present at his operation. He sought to apply res ipsa loquitur
against each of them. The court held that the doctrine applied, stating:
The control, at one time or another, of one or more of the
various agencies or instrumentalities which might have
harmed the plaintiff was in the hands of every defendant or
of his employees or temporary servants. This, we think,
places upon them the burden of initial explanation. Plaintiff
was rendered unconscious for the purpose of undergoing
surgical treatment by the defendants; it is manifestly unreasonable for them to insist that he identify any one of them as
the person who did the alleged negligent act.
The other aspect of the case which defendants so strongly
emphasize is that plaintiff has not identified the instrumentality any more than he has the particular guilty defendant.
Here, again, there is a misconception which, if carried to the
extreme for which defendants contend, would unreasonably
limit the application of the res ipsa loquitur rule. It should
be enough that the plaintiff can show any injury resulting
from an external force applied while he lay unconscious in
the hospital; this is as clear a case of identification of the instrumentality as the plaintiff may ever be able to make. 1181
While there is some indication in this language that the court's hold~
ing may have rested on a theory of mutual legal responsibility among
defendants, the court purportedly goes on to apply res ipsa loquitur
without reliance on this theory. In essence, the justification is merely
that under the circumstances it would be "manifestly unreasonable" to
call upon the plaintiff to identify the instrumentality or the person controlling it. The circumstances appearing significant to the court were
( 1) that the defendants had rendered the plaintiff unconscious for the
purpose of performing an operation, (2) each had a duty of care toward plaintiff, and (3) each of them at one time or another had control of instrumentalities that could have caused the injury. Thus, the
court reasoned, the defendants-rather than the unconscious plaintiff-were in a much better position to pinpoint the negligence and
should be required to do so.
The Ybarra decision naturally has evoked considerable comment and
1181

ld. at 492-93.
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some criticism. 1182 Seavey, the principal critic, argues that it is error
to "impose liability upon all the members of the group where it is evident that the harm was not the result of group action and that most of
the members of the group were innocent of wrongdoing." 1183 This argument has considerable force if we assume that none of the defendants
except the negligent party knows how plaintiff was injured, since the
chances are that all defendants will be found liable by the jury. If, on
the other hand, we assume that the defendants have knowledge as to
the particular act of negligence, but are withholding it out of a sense
of mutual protectiveness, Seavey's suggestion loses some of its vitality.
The court could use Ybarra reasoning only to force out of defendants
an explanation for the accident, ~n a situation in which very likely they
all do know what happened. It need not hold innocent defendants liable,
unless they refuse to testify as to ·what they know and did. If every
defendant testified he was not responsible, all might still be held liable
under the Ybarra rationale.
Prosser, while not specifically approving the result in Ybarra, justifies it on the ground of a '·'special responsibility for the plaintiff's
safety undertaken by everyone concerned." 1184 He visualizes other situations in which courts might reach similar results because of the special relationship between the defendants and the plaintiff.
. A second rationalization is possible. The court may have felt that
while the relationship inter se of defendants was not sufficiently strong
that the application of res ipsa loquitur could be based on· a theory of
joint venture, neither were the acts so completely separate that the court
should not attach some group responsibility to their conduct. All of the
participants in the operation, together with the hospital, could be said
to have entered consciously on a course of conduct which included cooperation and mutual reliance in handling plaintiff. This conscious
unity of purpose thus might have been, at least for the California court,
a sufficiently strong substitute for exclusivity that the second condition
could be said to be reasonably satisfied. It may be one way of forcing
each of the group in effect to assume responsibility for the actions of
all, and therefore force them to check on each other.
.

11 8 2 Commenting on the decision, see e.g., Prosser, "Res Ipsa Loquitur in California,"
supra note II50 at 223 et seq.; Harper & James 1091; McCoid, "Negligence Actions
against Multiple Defendants," 7 Stan. L. Rev. 48o (1955). For a criticism, see Seavey,
supra note II50.
118s Seavey, supra note 1150 at 648.
1184 Prosser 2o8. See also Prosser, "Res Ipsa Loquitur in California," supra note
1150 at 224-
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If either this explanation or Prosser's analysis is accepted, we transcend traditional res ipsa loquitur concepts. The doctrine's prerequisite
of causal probability in fact is left unsatisfied, since the plaintiff has
shown only that (most probably) one of several persons, not acting in
legal concert, acted negligently. He does not show which one. Theories
of "special responsibility" or "moral interrelationship" on the defendants' part do not fill this logical vacuum, they merely circumvent it.
Rather than attempting to fulfill the traditional conditions precedent to
res. ipsa loquitur, these theories proceed fundamentally on a different
social policy. At most, this is "quasi" res ipsa loquitur, by which a convenient evidentiary tool is wielded liberally to effectuate an overriding
conception of just result.
As Seavey points out, all of the defendants in Ybarra were probably
insured. 1185 If we take this one step further and assume that all were
insured by the same company, 1186 the Ybarra result becomes irresistible.
In practical effect, when this is the case, the situation is no different as
to ultimate liability (of the insurer) than if one defendant were responsible for several negligent forces. Although the plaintiff cannot precisely denominate the offending force, the courts need not be troubled,
since the defendant (or the insurer) is going to be liable in any event.
Reasoning such as this becomes another rationalization for Ybarra, if
we can assume coverage for all by a single insurer, something that
should be proved, not assumed.
Harper and James pass off the result as a manifestation of the general trend toward strict liability and social insurance. 1187 It is clear,
however, that there may be many occasions on which a court would
be willing to shift the burden of explanation to the defendant, yet refuse to impose strict liability. A traditional argument underlying imposition of res ipsa loquitur has been that the defendant has superior
knowledge of the precise facts of the accident and that use of the doctrine will force these facts out. 1188 Ybarra, certainly is a case of this
Seavey, suPra note ~ 150 at 648, n. 15.
Hospitals normally obtain insurance for their "employees," which could often·
mean that all the persons present at an operation were covered by the same policy. See
generally, McGibony, Principles of Hospital Administration 207 (1952); Hines, "Hospital Malpractice Liability Insurance," 34 Chi. B. Rec. 135 (1952).
1187 "This is no retreat from individualizing the finding and treatment of fault, but
rather a retreat from insistence upon fault (in accident law) and from the fiction that
damage claims are paid Out of the pockets of individual wrongdoers. It is simply a
recognition both of the fact and the desirability of spreading accident losses according
to the principles of insurance." Harper & James ro89.
1188 The superior knowledge of defendant has frequently been listed as a prerequisite
for application of us ipsa loquitur. While courts and commentators roundly discount
1185
1186
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nature--one feels (and the court felt) a spontaneous urge to call upon
the defendants to explain. This is different from holding the defendants strictly liable as a group. It is to be admitted that often, when
only one defendant is involved, imposition of res ipsa loquitur has the
same effect as applying strict liability. When there are multiple defendants, however, acceptance of the doctrine frequently may mean only
that the defendants will be forced to introduce evidence against one
another, particularly when they are insured by different companies.
This evidence may be sufficiently strong that the logical exclusivity requirement eventually will be satisfied in reverse, viz., causation is established after, not before, res ipsa loquitur is applied.
Ideally, faced with a situation like Ybarra where it is obvious that
someone has been negligent, the court would like to see liability imposed on that one person and no others. Since plaintiff's evidence does
not reveal that person's identity, the court must choose between two
alternatives : ( 1) deny application of res ipsa loquitur and in effect nonsuit plaintiff; or ( 2) apply the doctrine and wait for defendants to
fight out the causation issue. Choice of the latter alternative, of course,
creates the risk that innocent defendants may be as ignorant of the precise facts as the plaintiff and thus ultimately may be held liable despite
their innocence. In Ybarra, however, the strong possibility that the defendants actually had superior knowledge-plus the presence of insurance, the unconscious state of the plaintiff, and the special relationships
involved-probably served to make the choice an easy, if logically questionable, one.
In any event, the Ybarra doctrine today is firmly entrenched in California malpractice law, having been applied on several recent occasions.1189 The doctrine was considerably extended, however, in Litzmann v. Humboldt County, 1190 a lower court decision deserving special
mention. There the plaintiff, a nine-year-old boy, found an unexploded
aerial bomb on certain fairgrounds. The bomb exploded, and the plaintiff sustained severe injuries. There were two companies located on the
fairgrounds who owned and had used such bombs, but there was no
evidence indicating that one company more probably than the other was
such a rule today, there is no doubt that the suspicion of such superior knowledge is a
strong factor influencing courts to apply the doctrine. Prosser 209-210.
1189 See; e.g., Bowers v. Olch, 120 Cal. App.2d 108, 26o .P.2d 997 (1953); Seneris v.
Haas, 45 Cal.2d 8n, 291 P.2d 915 (1955); Leonard v. Watsonville Community Hospital, 47 Cal.2d 509. 305 P.2d 36 (1956).
1190 273 P .2d 82 (Cal. App. 1954), hearing granted Cal. Sup. Ct., Sept. 30, 1954,
dismissed Nov. 16, 1954. noted in 3 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 122 (1955) and discussed in McCoid, supra note n82 at 497·
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the source of the particular offending bomb. The companies were entirely independent of one another; there was in no sense the cooperative
undertaking or conscious unity of purpose present in Ybarra. Res ipsa
loquitur was held to apply even though it was clear that one of the defendants was entirely innocent. 1191 If Ybarra is read in its broadest
terms without regard to the particular fact situation involved, Litzmann
follows the pattern. In the latter case, however, there was not even a
semblance of concurrence of action among .defendants, and it would
seem that Ybarra has been stretched further than the actual opinion
would justify. Statements of law and of fact are so interspersed in
Ybarra that it is somewhat difficult to say that the case stands for any
particular abstract propositions, 1192 without reference to the facts on
which the propositions are based.
Prosser's justification for the Ybarra decision, that of "special responsibility" on the part of the defendants toward the plaintiff, could
perhaps be stretched to cover the Litzmann situation. This could mean
that the possessor of any unusually hazardous instrumentality would
run the risk of the imposition of res ipsa loquitur against him any time
the plaintiff sustains injuries for which his instrumentality might have
been a cause. Discounting the possibility of superior knowledge on the
part of the particular potential defendant, such a broad doctrine would
appear unwarranted.
Litzmann also might be said to stand upon another ground that
under particular circumstances would not make imposition of res ipsa
loquitur against independent defendants seem quite so unjust. The
facts show that there were only two defendants, one of whom clearly
was negligent, the other of whom clearly was innocent. In other words,
the probability of one or the other being the responsible negligent person
was "so-so." Although res ipsa loquitur is phrased logically in "more
probably than not" terms, who is to measure the difference between "soso" and "s I -49" ? 1198 Some might argue that since the probabilities are
only a guess in a close case anyway, we should be willing at least to extend our thinking to the case where we know the probabilities are equal.
The theoretical difficulties with this type of argument are fairly obvious. In the traditional sense, the justification for having the res ipsa
loquitur doctrine at all is the fact that we can reasonably denominate the
defendant as the responsible cause. In essence, then, the question beLitzmann v. Humboldt County, supra note 1190 at 85.
See the quoted portion of the opinion accompanying note 1 181 supra.
11 93 For a critical discussion of this type of approach to the probabilities question,
see Jaffe, supra note 1161.
1191
11 92
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comes whether to take what was once a legitimate evidentiary tool and
make it an instrument of social policy. Many_ courts would argue that
even the "SI-49" probability is not good enough to justify imposing res
ipsa loquitur upon the defendant, for the reason that they do not feel
qualified in such a close case to say flatly that the defendant's negligence
is the more probable cause. These courts are acutely aware, it would
appear, that our system of justice (for better or worse) requires the
plaintiff to prove his case, or lose, 1194 Dilution of the res ipsa loquitur
requirement to the "so~ so line" theoretically, if not practically, works
contrary to this basic principle.
If Litzmann-type thinking is accepted for cases involving two named
defendants, the next question is what to do when there are six or seven
defendants or more, only one of whom is negligent and none of whom
is connected in any way with his fellow defendants. This would be the
case if, instead of two companies at the fairgrounds, there had been
several. The plaintiff clearly cannot invoke res ipsa loquitur in its true
sense, for our assumption is that he has no evidence which points more
strongly to one defendant than any of the others. The "so-so probability" thesis of Litzmann is unavailable, of course, and there is no
room for argument, as in Ybarra, that the defendants engaged in a joint
enterprise or conscious mutual undertaking to treat the plaintiff with
care. Nor is there nearly as good a basis for assumption of superior
knowledge on the defendants' part, since they are independent operators
with no knowledge of how others acted or perhaps even of their exist. ence. Indeed, application of res ipsa loquitur to these facts-"calling
upon defendants to explain"--can only be predicated on an argument
that the defendants are possessors of dangerous instrumentalities and
probably are insured against public liability. This, of course, begins to
sound like strict liability talk. But, in one se~se, it goes much further
than that: it eliminates the causation requirement from. the plaintiff's
cause of action as well. Assuming. no superior knowledge on the defendants' part which eventually would force liability on the one negligent party, Litzmann-type thinking would make innocent partieswithout proof of negligence or causation-liable for. the acts of an unrelated wrongdoer. This is surely a curious result and not likely to be
approved by too many courts or commentators. Any attempt to so
"liberalize" the second res ipsa loquitur requirement is dangerous and
improper.
uut The validity of our present scheme of tort liability, as applied to radiation injuries, is discussed elsewhere in this chapter. See text following note Io6o supra.
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Ybarra may be justified on the ground of joint undertaking, or
group responsibility, or revealing concealed common knowledge. The
line between a joint venture and the concept of conscious unity of purpose that we may distill from the opinion necessarily is a hazy one. Can
we not say that when the relationship between each defendant and plaintiff is such that th~ defendant's duty of due care also includes guarding
the plaintiff from the negligence of the other defendants, this will be
sufficient to satisfy a group unity requirement for multiple defendant
cases? This stays within the legitimate extremes of the res ipsa loquitur
doctrine since, although detailed causation is admittedly not proved,
neither is such proof important, inasmuch as each member of the group
is responsible for the others' misconduct.
If Prosser's "special responsibility" thesis is adopted, res ipsa loquitur can easily get out of hand. A court might find that all the fireworks
companies on the fairgrounds owe nine-year-old boys special responsibility. Then res ipsa loquitur could be applied despite a lack of any other
relationship among the defendants and, in effect, the causation requirement is eliminated.
As long as insurance is not compulsory for all business and professional enterprises and as long as all insurance is not derived from a
single source, causation remains a legitimate element of a tort action.
In taking what was once a logically justifiable evidentiary device and
converting it into a lever for forcing evidence out of multiple defendants, the courts run the danger of eliminating causation as a prerequisite to recovery in this type of case. Probably not many courts would
be willing to say, "We will shift the burden of going forward to defendants in the hope that their evidence, reluctantly divulged under the
threat of liability, will narrow the cause-in-fact to the one responsible defendant; but if it appears from their evidence that their knowledge of
the circumstances is no greater than plaintiff's, he must be nonsuited
for failure on the general issue of causation." Courts are much more
likely to apply res ipsa loquitur against independent multiple defendants on the breach of duty issue, in the sense that somebody was negligent, and upon the defendants' failure to pinpoint the source of negligence, permit the jury to find all the defendants liable, for "failing to
rebut the inference of negligence," without further regard for the issue
of causation-in-fact. Depending upon how one chooses his words, this
process either eliminates causation or permits res ipsa loquitur-if we
may still call it that-to solve the general causation issue as well as the
breach of duty issue.
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This is valid, of course, if plaintiff predicates his cause of action on
a theory of group responsibility-he need trace negligence only to the
group. However, if the plaintiff's case is such that not all the members
of the group are responsible for the negligence, a mere tracing of causation to the group is insufficient. It should be insufficient whether done
by direct evidence, or indirectly, by way of inference.
In any event, whatever one's conclusion as to the legitimacy of the
Ybarra-Litzmann trend, the lawyer must be prepared to recognize
clearly the existence of such deviations from a logical application of res
ipsa loquitur. The device is logically used only when it is more probable
than not that a particular legal entity is responsible for the negligence
connected with an accident. When it is used without this foundationeither to force out evidence under a threat of liability or to impose liability because of overriding social conceptions--res ipsa loquitur is a
different concept than that traditionally accepted by American and
English courts.
(c) Eliminating- the Party Injured
The final basic requirement for application of res ipsa loquitur, as
stated by Wigmore and as generally accepted by modem writers, is that
the accident must have happened "irrespective of any voluntary action
. . . by the party injured." 119$ This is an obvious corollary of the
second condition, that the defendant be responsible for any negligence
connected with the accident. The plaintiff therefore must eliminate
himself, as well as third persons, as reasonably probable causes before
an inference of negligence through res ipsa loquitur is available against
the· defendant.
This does not mean, however, that the plaintiff must not have been
an active participant when the accident occurred. Indeed, as in the exploding bottle and collapsing seat cases, he may be in exclusive control
of the instrumentality. But it is sufficient for the plaintiff to show that
he was using the instrumentality in an ordinary manner such that the
inference of the defendant's negligence is still reasonably probable.1198
1195 4 Wigmore, Evidence §2509 ( ut ed. 1905). Prosser states this condition: "The
possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated." Prosser 199. This is logically a different issue than that of contributory negligence and must be demonstrated by plaintiff even in states where generally he is not
given the burden of proof as to absence of contributory negligence. See Harper &
James §1g.8.
noa Prosser, "Res Ipsa Loquitur in California," supra note 1150 at 201-o2.
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(3) Procedural Effect

Should the plaintiff satisfy a court's conditions precedent to the application of res ipsa loquitur, the pertinent question becomes : What procedural advantage, aside from the fact that he is temporarily relieved
from proving negligence directly, does the plaintiff gain from the doctrine? Initially, of course, he escapes the possibility of a nonsuit, but
what then?
There is considerable disagreement among the courts on this question. The vast majority of American courts-supported by the commentators-hold that successful invocation of res ipsa loquitur creates
an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant. 1197 This is an
inference which the jury may or niay not accept, as it chooses, just as
the jury decides the weight to be given to other forms of circumstantial
evidence. No legal burden is placed upon the defendant to introduce
rebutting proof. His failure to do so will not result in a directed verdict against him, and the jury may even find in his favor upon completion of the case. 1198
If this were the only effect of res ipsa loquitur, one might wonder
why claimants' attorneys seek so tenaciously to bring it into every possible case. The answer lies in a general feeling about how juries react
in negligence cases. Lawyers seem to feel that in the great majority of
these cases all the plaintiff needs is to get beyond nonsuit, to place his
case in the jury's hands; the vision of a rich, heavily insured defendant
will do the rest. The end result, if this is an accurate description, is no
different than if strict liability had been applied formally in the first
place.
A minority view holds that res ipsa loquitur has an even greater effect on the procedural burden. Some courts say that it creates a legal
presumption which, if the defendant does not offer some probative
evidence to the contrary, will permit a directed verdict for the plaintiff
once all other elements of a negligence cause of action are shown. 1109
Prosser 2II-I2.
Sweeney v. Erving, 228 U.S. 233, 33 S.Ct. 416 (1913). In California, however,
while the courts hold that application of res ipsa loqmtur created only an inference of
negligence, "in all res ipsa loquitur situations the defendant must present evidence
sufficient to meet or balance the inference of negligence, and that the jurors should
be instructed that, if the defendant fails to do so, they should find for the plaintiff."
Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., 42 Cal.2d 682, 691, :z68 P.2d 1041 (1954). A procedural
effect such as this, as we shall indicate, traditionally is reserved for the presumption.
See text preceding note 1199 infra.
1199 Prosser 212. Dean Prosser notes that this ·doctrine derives from early cases involving injuries to passengers caused by common carriers. where the latter had the
1197

1198
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In addition, a few decisions have given res ipsa loquitur the effect of
shifting the burden of proof from the plaintiff to the defendant, requiring that the latter show a preponderance of evidence in favor of
non-negligence. 1200 Under the inference and presumption views, the
burden of proof of course does not shift from the plaintiff, although
the presumption view. temporarily does shift the burden of going forward with the evidence to the defendant.
There is disagreement, as well, on the question of the effect to be
given to evidence introduced by the defendant to show non-negligence.
This depends, of course, on the effect originally given res ipsa loquitur.
In states where application of the doctrine permits only an inference of
negligence, the defendant can introduce no evidence and hope that the
jury will find in his favor anyway, or he may introduce whatever evidence he has to show non-negligence. 1201 This normally will consist of
proof of safety precautions taken in the particular manufacturing or
operational process, and the jury will be free to weight the inferences
suggested by this evidence against the original res ipsa loqu·itur inference. In presumption states, on the other hand, the defendant must
provide probative evidenc~ showing non-negligence or suffer a directed
verdict. 1202 It is to be doubted, however, that the mere introduction of
probative evidence will cause the presumption of negligence to disappear
entirely from the case, as is often said to happen with presumptions
other than that created by res ipsa loquitur. 1203 Finally, in those states in
which the burden of proof is said to shift, the defendant himself must
introduce enough evidence of non-negligence to sustain the ultimate
burden of persuasion, i.e., the evidence must preponderate in his
favor. 1204
burden of proof on the negligence issue. ld. at 213. A controversy concerning the
proper procedural effect of res ipsa loquitur has raged for years. ld. at 213, n. 2.
See also lfarper & James §19.IJ.
120 0 Prosser 212. For a decision going even farther than this position, see Thomas
v. Lobrano, 76 So.2d 599 (La. App. 1954) discussed in some detail in text following
note 1229 infra.
1201 Harper & James §19.n.
1 2°2 "A presumption, in other words, gives to evidence an artificial effect over and
above its logically probative effect. The difference is far more theoretical than real.
Few defendants fail to offer some defense by way of explanation or rebuttal in litigated res ipsa cases. And if no defense is offered, defendant is usually gambling on a
court ruling that the doctrine does not apply. He does not expect to win from a jury
and almost never will. Plaintiff does not need a directed verdict and is ill-advised to
move for one except under a procedure for reserving decision on such a motion until
after verdict. For these reasons few of the cases which use the language of presumption actually deal with a situation where it would affect the result." ld. at IIOI-o2.
12oa See McCormick, Evidence §311 (1954).
1204 Harper & James §19.11.
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b. In Radiation Cases

(I) Radiation Injury Characteristics
.As indicated previously, there is no generic reason why courts should
refuse to apply res ipsa loquitur to cases involving radiation injuries.
On the other hand, certain characteristics of radiation injury will perhaps make application of the doctrine more difficult than in the normal
tort actions. The obstacles posed by these characteristics will be most
formidable when the plaintiff attempts to satisfy the second condition
precedent, that of the defendant's responsibility. In view of the fact
that there exists only limited (and in this respect, not very helpful)
judicial precedent for application of res ipsa loquitur to radiation· injuries, a brief reminder of the characteristics of radiation which will
cause the most trouble is warranted.
First, ionizing radiation, unlike other forms of injurious force, cannot be detected by the usual senses. 1206 Unless an individual wears a film
badge or similar device, or unless the event through which he receives
radiation is so dramatically apparent that he cannot escape the realization, a person may be injuriously exposed without ever being aware that
he is in danger. Any demonstration of defendant's "control," even in
a loose sense, over the harmful instrumentality is obviously made more
difficult when the plaintiff cannot, upon discovering his injury at a later
time, pinpoint the incident of exposure. If the plaintiff has been subjected to more than one potential source of substantial radiation, less
than all of which are within the defendant's control or responsibility,
he may have an extremely difficult task in :t:easonably discounting other
sources as probable causes.
This picture is further confused by a second consideration- the fact
that even though the plaintiff may suspect that he has received radiation from a defendant's source, resultant injuries may not appear for
years. Particularly is this true when the emissions are of low intensity,
but periodically repeated. 1208 The greater the lapse of time between the
defendant's act and discovery of injury by the plaintiff, the more difficult it becomes to conclude that the injury was caused by the defendant.
Proof of causation-in-fact becomes even more diffi.eult when account
is taken of the fact that a number of injuries caused by radiation-inSee Chapter I, Section C. 4·
Ibid; Dunlap, supra note n48 at 140; National Res~ch Council (Report of
Committee on PathologiCal Effects). The Biological EffeCts of Atomic Radiation, reported at CCH, Atomic Energy Law Rep. 1!4028.
120G
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eluding cancerous conditions--can be caused by other forces. 1207 To a
considerable extent, scientists and medical men have established rational
predictions of injury resulting from radiation, 1208 but this typically is
a matter of greater likelihood of injury, not of known direct causal
connection with a particular person's injury. This often means that the
plaintiff must discount, besides emissions of radiation controlled by
other persons, the remaining possible causes of the condition of which
he complains.
Despite this rather bleak picture, one further characteristic of radiation may assist plaintiffs seeking to invoke res ipsa loquitur. In some
respects, the effect of multiple and continuing radiation is cumulative
in nature, so that each new radiation incident serves to aggravate latent
injury potential. 1209 Let us assume that a plaintiff has received exposure from several sources in a given period of time. None of these
sources emanates from the defendant. Their effect, however, has been
cumulative, and when the defendant appears on the scene, the plaintiff's
body tolerance for radiation is nil. The plaintiff receives just enough
radiation from the defendant's instrumentality to result in perceptible
radiation injury. He sues the defendant, and seeks to invoke res ipsa
loquitur. Assuming the incident is one which ordinarily would not occur without negligence, can the plaintiff satisfy the second condition
precedent-reasonably discounting those causes of injury for which the
defendant is not responsible?
The answer apparently is "yes." It is not to the fact of the plaintiff's
injury that res ipsa loquitur is applied-that is an entirely separate issue of proof. Res ipsa loquitur deals only 1210 with the questions of
breach of duty: whether it can be said, more probably than not, that the
circumstances indicate that the defendant has violated his duty to use
due care in his relationship to the plaintiff. This being the ·case, it
would appear that the plaintiff, to employ res ipsa loquitur, only must
show that the defendant more probably than not was responsible for
the single instrumentality charged to him. While perhaps not the exclusive cause of injury, the defendant's act is at least a cause-in-factit is a substantial faCtor. The exclusivity aspect of the second res ipsa
loquitur prerequisite does not require that the defendant's negligence
See Chapter I, Section C. 4- e. (4) et seq.
uos Chapter I, Section C. 41209 See discussion of cumulative effect, supra Chapter I and discussion supra text
following note 750.
1 21 0 N. b. discussion concerning use of res ipsa loquitur to obviate the causation-infact issue as well, text following note 1191 supra.
1201
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be the sole cause of the plaintiff's injury. Conceivably, res ipsa loquitur
might be applied to the separate but contributing acts of several defendants:._each of whom could be shown to have been negligent in his
relationship with the plaintiff. Such a finding is not to be confused, however, with the Litzmann and Ybarra situations, 1211 where the probabilities indicated that only one of the named defendants in fact caused the
injury. Here, to the contrary, the assumption is that the cumulative nature of radiation injury means that possibly more than one "negligent"
radiation source, over a period of time, could concur in the ultimate injury. This concurrence should be sufficient basis for liability under
normal tort rules. 1212 The plaintiff, therefore, while faced with the
problems of non-detectability, latency, and unidentifiability in solving
the question of probable ·cause-in-fact, need ·only establish that the
defendant's radiation source was probably one cause-in-fact. Res ipsa
loquitur is then presumably available.
(2) Precedent: The X-Ray Cases
Judicial consideration of the applicability of res ipsa loquitur to
radiation injury accidents has been confined to malpractice actions for
negligent use of X-ray machines. 1213 These decisions to some extent
turn on the special physician-patient relationship, and their value as
precedent for other nuclear energy enterprises must be discounted accordingly. Nevertheless, it appears likely that the medical use of radioisotopes may be one of the most fertile sources of future negligence litigation in the atomic energy area. The X-ray cases thus assume
considerable importance, since there should be no appreciable legal
difference between radiation injury induced by over-exposure to X-rays
and that caused by other radioactive substances.
Regrettably no general rule of thumb can be distilled from the decisions either permitting or denying application of res ipsa loquitur to
X-ray accidents. Unequivocal affirmative precedent favoring use of the
Ibid.
"If defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's injury,
it foiiQws that he will not be absolved from responsibility merely because other causes
have contributed to the result. Nothing occurs in a vacuum, and the event without
multiple causes, numbered in the thousands, is inconceivable. In particular, the defendant is not necessarily relieved of liability because the negligence of another person
is also a contributing cause." Prosser 222. See discussion supra text at notes 923 ff.
121s Most of the cases in this area are collected in the Annot., 41 A.L.R.2d 329, 355
(1955). A discussion of selected cases appears in Hutton, "Res Ipsa Loquitur and
Actionable Radiation Injury/' 25 Tenn. L. Rev. 327, 334 et seq. (1958).
1211
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doctrine exists today in at least six jurisdictions, 12u and several other
states have announced rules so similar in end result that they must be
numbered in the "friendly" group. 1215 Application has been specifically
denied, however, by the courts in nine jurisdictions. 1216 In three statesthe best example being California-there appear to be irreconcilable
conflicts among recent pronouncements, and no clear rule can be said
to have evolved. 1211
The over-all judicial disharmony cannot be justified solely on the
basis of differing factual situations, although as will be indicated below,
the facts of a particular case, particularly the amount of radiation received, may have considerable influence. Principally, differences rest on
divergent judicial attitudes toward ( 1) the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
in general, ( 2) the nature of the physician-patient relationship, and
(3) the peculiarities of X-ray accidents and the likelihood that negligence is responsible for radiation injury. In Michigan, for instance, the
court has specifically repudiated the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur or its
12u Illinois: Holcomb v. Magee, 217 Ill. App. 272 (1920) and Johnson v. Marshall,
241 Ill. App. 8o (1926); Kansas: Emrie v. Tice, 174 Kan. 739, 2s8 P.2d 332 (1953);
Minnesota: Jones v. Tri-State Telephone & Telegraph Co., n8 Minn. 217, 136. N.W.
741 (1912) and Holt v. Ten Broeck, 134 Minn. 458, 159 N.W. 1073 (1916); Mississippi: Waddle v. Sutherland, 156 Miss. 540, 126 So. 201 (1930) ;. Tennessee: Lewis v.
Casenburg, 157 Tenn. 187, 7 S.W.2d 8o8 (1928), later appealed 163 Tenn. 163. 40
S.W.2d 1038 (1931); Texas: Hess v. Millsap, 72 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934)
and Martin v. Eschelman, 33 S.W .2d 827 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930).
1215 E.g., Louisiana: Thomas v. Lobrano, supra note 1200; Virginia: Hunter v.
Burroughs, 123 V a. JJJ, g6 S;E. 36o ( 1918).
1 21 &District of Columbia: Sweeney v. Erving, 35 App. D.C. 57 (1910), aff'd 228
U.S. 233, 33 S.Ct. 416 (1913); Indiana: McCoy v. Buck, 87 Ind. App. 433, 157 N.E.
456 (1927); Maryland: Streett v. Hodgson, 139 Md. 137, ns Atl. 27 (1921); Michigan: Barnes v. Mitchell, 341 Mich. 7, 67 N.W.2d 208 (1954) and Facer v. Lewis, J26
Mich. 702, 40 N.W.2d 457 (1950); New York: Antowill v: Friedmann, 197 App. Div.
.230, 188 N.Y. Supp. 777 (1921); North Carolina: Nance v. Hitch, 238 N.C. I, 76
S.E.2d 461 (1953); North Dakota: Dolan v. O'Rourke, 56 N.D. 416, 217 N.W. 666
(1928); Oklcih07na: Cooper v. McMurry, 194 Okla. 241, 149 P.2d 330 (1944); Pennsylvania: Stemons v. Turner, 274 Pa. 228, II7 At!. 922 (1922).
121 7 Arkansas: Gray v. McLaughlin, 207 Ark. 191, 179 S.W.2d 686 (19M) (applying
rule closely similar to res ipsa loquitur} and Routen v. McGehee, 2o8 Ark. 501, 186
S.W.2d 779 (1945) (denying applicability of res ipsa lOquitur to this class of cases);
California: Bennett v. Los Angeles Tumor Institute, 102 Cal. App.2d 293, 227 P.2d
473 (1951) (denying applicability for several reasons) and Costa v. Regents of University of California, supra note n63 (assuming applicability of the doctrine); Iowa:
Shockley v. Tucker, 127 Iowa 456, 103 N.W. 300 (1905) (applying doctrine akin to
res ipsa loquitur) and Berg v. Willett, 212 Iowa nog, 232 N.W. 821 (1930) (denying application); Wisconsin: Rost v. Roberts, 18o Wis. 207, 192 N.W. 38 (1923)
(approving instruction on res ipsa loquitur or closely analogous doctrine) and Kuehnemann v. Boyd, 193 Wis. 588, 214 N.W. 326 (1927) (denying application in physicianpatient context).
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equivalent in malpractice cases and has seen no need for varying the
precedent when it was faced with an action involving X-ray injuries. 1218
Several courts have similarly rejected res ipsa loquitur on the broad
theory that the doctrine, which frequently in effect makes the physician
an insurer against bad results, should have no application in malpractice
actions. 1219 One of the more articulate courts of this group has stated
its reasoning thus:
To put upon the medical profession . . . such a burden as
financial responsibility for damages, if injury or death results,
without proof of specific negligence, would drive from the
profession many of the very men who should remain in
it. . . .1220
However one evaluates the validity of this argument (and many have
disputed it), 1221 it is embraced by several courts and has not been limited
to actions involving X-ray machines. 1222 It has potential, therefore, in
any malpractice action.
The third and perhaps most significant justification for refusal to
apply res ipsa loquit1tr in X-ray cases,-i.e., that this is not the type of
accident which would occur only if there were negligence--appears in
several decisions. 1228 The basis of this objection is that a number of
expert medical witnesses have stated that, because of the peculiar sensitivity of some persons to X-rays, radiation injury can take place during diagnostic or therapeutic treatment without neglect on the part of
the administering doctor or technician. 1224 This is because sensitivity is
not a characteristic which can be determined before administration of
X-ray, but only becomes apparent from the patient's reaction to early
Barnes v. Mitchell, supra note 1216.
Streett v. Hodgson, supra note 1216, Cooper v. McMurry, supra note 1216.
122o Stemons v. Turner, supra note 1216 at 233.
1221 It may be questioned whether professional medical men, who universally carry
insurance against public liability, are deterred in great measure by legal doctrines
(such as res ipsa loquitur) from attempting the more risky cures. For a protestation
of contrary opinion, however, see e.g., Morris, "'Res Ipsa Loquitur'-Liability Without Fault," 25 Ins. C.]. c;n, II2-13 (1958).
1 222 See generally Morris, supra note 1221 ; Regan, Doctor and Patient and the Law
§30 (2d ed. 1949).
12 28 Normally such a conclusion is limited to the facts of the particular case. Refusing application of the doctrine on these grounds, therefore, does not necessarily mean
that the court would reject it if faced with more appropriate facts. E.g., Nance v.
Hitch, supra note 1216; Antowill v. Friedmann, supra note 1216.
122 ~ See e.g., testimony of experts in Nance v. Hitch, supra note 1216.
See also
Gray, 1 Attorneys' Textbook of Medicine,1!71.37 (3d ed. 1958). But see Dunlap, supra
note 1148.
121s E.g.,
1219 E.g.,
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exposures. Thus, while continuing applications of X-ray, after knowledge of super-sensitivity has been or should have been obtained, may
constitute a specific act of negligence, it is possible to argue that a physician in many instances might be said to act with due care in administering treatment initially in small doses. In cases involving this latter type
of fact situation, courts have been reluctant to apply the res ipsa loquitur assumption, i.e., that the accident is one which ordinarily would not
occur without negligence. 1226
On the other hand, there are experts who discount the hypersensitivity argument and argue for application of res ipsa loquitur in the majority of cases involving diagnostic use of X-rays and even in some
therapeutic use cases.
It seems that diagnostic films properly made, considering the
low voltage of the rays and the transient exposure required,
should never result in burns; injury of the patient therefore
raises an inference of negligence and the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur should be uniformly applied . . . . In case of therapeutic burns, on the other hand, one cannot say so confidently
that production of a bum always proves negligence. . . .
The factor of hypersensitivity of the patient is . . . much
overstressed ; furthermore, the exposure required in making
diagnostic films ordinarily should not bum a sensitive individual and lastly, in cases requiring prolonged treatment, there
is no reason why the physician should not determine for himself, by initial small dosage of irradiation, whether the patient
is hypersensitive or not. 1228
Even if a physician determines that a person is hypersensitive, the patient's disease may be so grave that the possibility of its cure or arrestment could warrant taking the chance of radiation bums. It would be
difficult to argue that the physician, embarking upon this course of
treatment, should be subjected to an inference that he was negligent,
without more specific proof, should radiation injury result.
Courts approving application of res ipsa loquitur in X-ray injury
cases have done so rather automatically. Decisions normally are limited
to their facts, the court stating that wider the circumstances, an inference or presumption of negligence is warranted. 1227 Almost invariably
these "circumstances" have included expert testimony to the effect that
1220 Nance v. Hitch, supra note 1216, is perhaps the best example of this approach,
although there is admittedly conflict in the expert testimony on many of the points in
controversy.
122s Dunlap, supra note 1148 at 15o-st, n. 25.
1221 Holt v. Ten Broeck, supra note 1214; Holcomb v. Magee, supra note 1214.
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this particular burn could not have been made without negligence on
the part of someone. While no absolute factual pattern emerges, the
majority of these decisions involve the treatment of milder maladies
during which the patient has suffered third-degree burns. 1228 These courts
demonstrate a readiness to discount hypersensitivity as a source of
plaintiff's injury, particularly if there has been a continuing course of
treatment permitting defendant to have ascertained the condition. 1229
The most recent decision of this variety is one which, while not applying res ipsa loquitur by name, applies a procedural theory of the same
general cast. In the Louisiana decision of Thomas v. Lobrano/ 230 the
plaintiff over a three-year period received therapeutic X-ray treatment
for boils. She eventually developed serious radiation burns in the general area of application. Commenting on the fact that one of plaintiff's
counts was predicated on res ipsa loquitur, the court indicated that it
was incumbent on the defendant physician to show in a malpractice
action that he possessed an ordinary degree of professional skill "and
that in applying that skill.to the given case he used reasonable care and
diligence along ·with his best judgment." This, the court stated, "related" to the . res ipsa loquitur rule. The court then
went on to say :
.
... [T]he burden in the instant case is upon the defendant
physician to affirmatively establish his use of reasonable care
and diligence, together with his best judgment, in his treatment of the plaintiff. . . . It follows as a corollary that the
defendant is also under the burden of negativing the many
specific charges of negligence or want of proper care. 1281
This doctrine, it may be suggested, if "related" to res ipsa loquitur
also considerably exceeds it in effect if it should be applied to radiation
treatment cases generally and is not limited solely to the rather peculiar
facts of the Lobrano case. Res ipsa loquitur in theory is predicated on
the assumption that, although the plaintiff cannot show specific acts of
122s E.g., Emrie v. Tice, supra note 1214 (severe burns over large area resulting
from removal of wart on ear); Thomas v. Lobrano, supra note 1200 (applying strong
presumption of negligence where severe burns resulted from treatment of boils); Jones
v. Tri-State Telephone & Telegraph Co., supra note 1214 (severe burns after diagnostic ·treatment); Waddle v. Sutherland, supra note 1214 (treatment for eczema caused
burns so severe as to necessitate amputation of limb). But see Berg v. Willett, supra
note 1217 (radiation burns from treatment for ringworm, doctrine not applied) and
McCoy v. Buck, supra note 1216 (severe burns from treatment for eczema, doctrine
not applied).
1229 Waddle v. Sutherland, supra note 1214; Lewis v. Casenburg, supra note 1214
1 23 0 Supra note 1200.
1281 !d. at 6os. (·;Emphasis added.)
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negligence, the probabilities of the situation, because of known circumstances of the accident, point to the fact that defendant has been negligent. The burden of proving negligence except in a very few states/ 232
remains with the plaintiff. Under the broad language of the Lobrano
case, however, the burden of showing due care in a malpractice action
in Louisiana is automatically on the defendant. The apparent assumption, without contrary proof, is that the defendant has been negligent.
This is not an instrument of logic, but solely one of policy, made all.the
more dramatic by the Louisiana rule permitting direct action against
the insurer as a named defendant. 1283 If followed, the Lobrano reasoning will mean that in Louisiana the physician in many cases will be held
strictly liable for damaging results of his treatment.
Thomas v. Lobrano is seemingly the furthest extension of proplaintiff sentiment in the X-ray field. It has been remarked that the
case promises to be a leading one, 1284 but such a conclusion is very questionable. Practically all courts show some deference to the awkward position of the physician, who works constantly with dangerous instrumentalities and must continually make hair-line decisions as to the best
course of treatment. The courts are not likely to disregard this difficulty in future cases.
In addition, those courts which are willing to apply res ipsa loquitur
to the X-ray cases do so at best on an empiric basis, and one may doubt
that this rather hesitant approach can form the foundation for the long
jump to the . Louisiana doctrine. As a precedent outside Louisiana,
Thomas v. Lobrano would appear to have little weight except perhaps
as one more decision applying a doctrine similar to res ipsa loquritur in
the X-ray· cases. One also should not ignore the fact that the way in
which the doctor kept, or failed to keep, his treatment records rather
dearly indicated to the court (and reasonably so if the facts stated in
the opinion are taken at face value) that the defendant frequently was
very careless and hence he probably was negligent in this instance as
well.
More significant, perhaps, are some of the distinctions which have
been drawn in the decisions to indicate those instances in which res ipsa
loquitur would or would not be applicable. Some courts are willing to
apply the doctrine when X-rays are used purely for diagnostic purposes,
1232

See note 1201 supra and accompanying text.

123sLa. Stat. Ann. (1952) §22:655 (Supp. 1956).

Hutton, "Res Ipsa Loquitur and Actionable Radiation Injury," 25 Tenn. L. Rev.
327. 338 (1958).
1234
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but not in the case of therapy. 1235 This is explained principally by the
fact that there is a much greater likelihood that injuries resulting from
diagnostic treatment are the product of negligence than is the case in
therapeutic cases. Relatively low radiation exposure is required for Xray diagnostic photography, and it is felt that even persons allegedly
hypersensitive to radiation should not be affected by the rays if they are
applied with ordinary care.
A further distinction is sometimes drawn between instances in which
radiation burns are localized at the point of treatment and those in
which injuries cover an area larger than necessary for treatment. Courts
are more willing to apply res ipsa loquitur in the latter case, 1236 because
the probabilities of negligence appear stronger than when radiation is
localized. With known techniques, physicians are assumed generally to
be able to localize the place of application.
Two restrictions on the use of res ipsa loquitur-generally repudiated
elsewhere-<>ccasionally are voiced in the X-ray decisions. One recent
California decision stated that res ipsa loquitur could be applied only
when, as a matter of common knowledge, the accident was one which
would not happen ordinarily without negligence. 1237 The court construed this test to mean that expert testimony was not admissible on
this issue of probability. Such a construction has seldom been followed,
however, and indeed, the decisions as to the applicability or inapplicability of res ipsa loquitur to X-ray treatment accidents almost invariably
are based in part on expert testimony.
There also have been a few cases in which the courts have declined
to consider the plaintiff's res ipsa loquitur count on another ground, i.e.,
that he pleaded and introduced evidence to prove specific acts of negligence.1288 Thus some decisions, which at first glance appear to repudiate
res ipsa loquitur in the X-ray context, are based only on this technical
procedural point. The more liberal modern attitude toward permitting
alternative pleading generally has spelled the decline of this argument,
but it is still alive in some jurisdictions. 1289 Practitioners seeking to invoke res ipsa loquitur in radiation cases would do well, therefore, to
12ss Holt v. Ten Broeck, supra note 1214; Bennett v. Los Angeles Tumor Institute,
supra note 1217.
1236 Emrie v .. Tii:e, supra note ·1214; Martin v. Eschelman, supra note 1214. Cf.
Hamilton v. Harris, 223 S.W. S33 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920).
1237 Bennett v. Los Angeles Tumor Institute, supra note 1217. But see Costa v.
Regents of University of California, s~tPra note 1163.
1238 E.g., King v. Dotto, 142 Ore. :Zo7, 1!.) P.2d 1100 ( 1933); Hess v. Millsap, st~pra
note IZI4.
12se See generally Harper. & James. §19.10.
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make a preliminary check of local precedent to avoid the possible embarrassment of seeing their strongest argu~ent rejected on a pleading
technicality.
Despite the divergent courses followed and theories advanced by the
courts in X-ray cases, it is possible to draw certain conclusions which
may form a basis for prediction as to future judicial action in radiation
cases. Of course some jurisdictions will continue to refuse recognition
to res ipsa loquitur, either in all cases or in malpractice actions. The
discussion which follows is predicated on the assumption that the court
is willing to apply res ipsa loquitur "under appropriate circumstances."
Even with this assumption, the first conclusion perhaps must be a
negative one: there is or should be a general presumption against the
applicability of res ipsa loquitur to radiation accidents resulting from
radiation treatment, particularly when radioactive isotopes are used.
There are three justifications for this statement. First, experts generally agree that untoward resu,lts may be produced, particularly in radiation therapy when used for serious diseases such as cancer, without any
lack of care on the doctor's part. In part, this is because, as one expert
has stated:
This field of treatment is still in its infancy. A doctor must
proceed as best he can, and with the meager knowledge of
this field available. Unfortunate results are bound to occur in
spite of his best efforts. He cannot properly be held at fault
if he proceeded in accordance with the practice used by other
men of like ability in his community.mo
Even those experts, who feel that the science of treatment by X-ray is
sufficiently developed so that the doctor knows what the possible results
will be, nevertheless agree that taking the chance of severe radiation injury in the hope of arresting serious disease may be action commensurate with due care and good practice. 1241 There is much that is unknown
about medical use of isotopes, but their use holds great promise and
must not be stultified.
Further, it has been pointed out that not even expert radiologists can
control with absolute certainty the amount of emitted radiation, so that
excessive radiation may not always be the product of human error. 1242
Finally, a number of experts point to hypersensitivity as a possible
Gray, supra note 122i.
See Dunlap, supra note II48 at 153 et seq. See generally, Comment, 30 So. Cal.
L. Rev. 8o (1956).
1 242 Gray, supra note 1224 at 1T71.JI. See Berg. v. Willett, supra note 1217.
1240
1 241
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source of radiation injury, even though due eare has been exercised.m 3
There is a difference of opinion, of course, as to the validity of this last
justification, 1244 but the lack of unanimity among experts is all the more
reason for rejecting the flat assumption that res ipsa loquitur should
apply to radiation injuries caused by the use of radioactive isotopes for
medical purposes.
Given the case of diagnostic treatment, however, where proved good
practice dictates the use of radiation which should not harm even the
hypersensitive person, or given the therapeutic case in which the condition is mild but burns are severe, res ipsa loquitur becomes easier to
apply. Likewise, if the doctor subjects his patient to a long course of
treatment, but fails to test for reaction following early treatment, or if
he administers further radiation when first-degree burns are apparent,
the doctrine is more inviting in all but the most advanced malignancy or
similar cases.
In brief, the more serious the results of the exposure and the less
grave the patient's condition, the less attractive theories of reasonable
hope of cure, uncontrollable radiation error, or hypersensitivity become.
Experts in radiology have shown marked willingness to evaluate these
various sources of injury in a given case, and ·the courts have displayed
equal receptiveness to such opinions. 1245 This expert testimony, together
with the lay reaction to defendant's conduct and plaintiff's condition,
spell the ultimate fate of res ipsa loquitur in those jurisdictions where
the doctrine is considered acceptable under proper circumstances.
(3) Application of Principles in Other Radiation Cases
It would be impossible to chronicle here all tlie potential accidents in
nuclear energy operations and processes and then predict the extent to
which courts may be expected to apply res ipsa loquitur in each situation. Such a study would require technical acumen beyond the scope of
this discussion, since the all-important probability of negligence can be
determined only through knowledge of the specific technical feature~ of
a particular operation. More valuable, perhaps, would be a brief summarization of the general considerations which are likely to influence a
court faced with a radiation injury case. The court normally will be
interested in the questions of probability of negligence and defendant's
1ua Ibid. See also testimony of expert witnesses in Nance v. Hitch, supra note

1216.

Dunlap, supra note II48.
1245 In practically all of the X-ray cases herein cited, expert testimony was received
on the issue of probability of negligence.
1244
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responsibility. As indicated before, these will be affected not only by a
strict evaluation of the probabilities involved, but also by broader considerations of policy which some courts allow to replace a strictly logical
approach in a given case.
(a) Negligence Probability
With the modem dilution of the "exclusive control" condition precedent, the judicial evaluation of Wigmore's first res ipsa loquitur condition (i.e., probability of negligence) becomes the most significant
obstacle to the attorney seeking to invoke the doctrine.
(i) Expert Testimony
Probability of negligence is likely to be most strongly influenced by
the testimony of experts. As previously noted, 1246 at first courts were
disinclined to accept expert opinion on whether or not a particular accident could have happened without negligence and was therefore appropriate for res ipsa loquitur. This hesitancy may be laid to the fact
that in the beginning judges were willing to accept res ipsa loquitur
only in the simple accident situation, e.g., the falling brick or scaffold.
Situations began to arise, however, involving more complicated ins.trumentalities not understood by laymen, but occurring under circumstances, after explanation by the expert, strongly indicating negligence
to the lay mind. It soon became evident that for accurate appraisal of
the probable causation of an accident induced by such instrumentalities,
testimony of someone familiar with their operation was indispensable.
Thus a significant increase in judicial willingness to accept expert opinion became discernible.
·
The use of experts to determine whether or not res ipsa loquitur
should be applied to radiation incidents often is imperative. In the nuclear field, ho~ever, there is no justification for a court's assuming that
it knows enough to determine if the probabilities of negligence are
great enough to justify using the doctrine without first hearing expert
testimony. There may be situations which experts will agree probably
could happen only if there has been negligence, but this should not be
guessed at by the judge or the jury unaided by experts. As greater experience is gained in nuclear operations it may become generally recognized that in certain situations the probability of negligence is as great
as in the "exploding bottle" .cases, but this is surely not yet true for
most cases.
1246

See text following note u62 supra.
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Assuming that strict liability will not be applied at least to certain
types of small research reactors, particularly to low power and subcritical assemblies, is this the type of case in which res ipsa loquitur
should be applied? If a reactor "burns up" 1241 after operating safely
for several months in compliance with all safety requirements established by the AEC and other expert consultants, should the law assume
or allow the jury to conclude that someone has been negligent unless
the defendant comes forth with proof of lack of negligence? 1248
It is true that under AEC regulations extraordinary safety precautions must be used in operating a reactor with its potentiality for
harm. In the light of the fact that there is much to be learned about the
nature and properties of the atomic nucleus it clearly would be negligence to fail to use such precautions. The AEC makes a finding as to
each reactor licensed to the effect that it can be operated without undue
risk to public health and safety, and this determination is made only
after careful study by competent scientists and engineers. Do these
facts justify an assumption that if an incident occurs it probably resulted from negligence? Should res ipsa loquitur be available since
present knowledge indicates that the safety precautions make it unlikely
that an incident will occur? Or should we say that the requirement of
so many safety precautions indicates that unless there is evidence that
the safety devices were by-passed, mere human error in operation
could not be a logical explanation, but instead the incident must have
happened because of some scientific fact not heretofore known or at
least not fully understood ?
Unless res ipsa loquitur is to be used simply as camouflage for what
actually is strict liability, there are some situations in which there is no
possible justification for imposing liability on the basis of an assumptio11
of negligence. If an airplane should crash into a reactor and cause a
burn-up and subsequent release of radioactive material into the atmosphere under adverse weather conditions, it is not realistic to say that
the release was the result of negligence. The same is true if it happened
to be an unusually large meteorite or an enemy missile or bomb which
pierced the reactor shell, or an earthquake of completely unpredictable
magnitude which caused a burn-up. These possibilities have been recognized, but scientists for government and industry have decided that the
chances of these events taking place are so small that they should be
See generally Chapter II, Section A. 1., supra.
See incidents described. infra. Chapter IV See also report of a recent reactor
incident at Idaho Falls. Idaho NY Times, Nov. 29, 1958, p. 2. col. 7.
1247
1248
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ignored rather than to require the extreme precautions necessary to preclude them. This is not negligence but deliberate choice, approved by
responsible persons including government officials. If liability is imposed for consequent injuries, this is application of strict liability, not
negligence rules.
These, however, are not the difficult cases. If the burn-up occurs
when no such obvious and non-negligent cause is known, should it then
be assumed that negligence is responsible? This question cannot be
answered generally; rather the answer should depend on the many
variables for each installation, including the development of the art,
particularly as to safety precautions, which will change from time to
time as experience is gained. What is non-negligent procedure today
may become negligent in the light pf new knowledge. Likewise, the
converse is possible. Surely, res ipsa loquit1tr should not be applied
automatically but rather only when the facts of a particular installation
as to a specific incident at a given time are considered. Types of reactors and incidents should not' be catalogued either as _calling for or not
calling for an application of the doctrine. If any generalization has
validity at all, it might be that, while a more complicated reactor increases the chance that some negligence in procedure is the cause, the
chances are much greater that something unforeseeable or at least unpreventable caused an incident. Perhaps the same can be said for reactors using new and relatively untried designs. If liability is to be
imposed, it should be an honest application of strict liability, not an assumption of negligence.
While in general similar conclusions may be drawn with respect to
industrial and medical uses of radiation other than from reactors, there
are differences. In the first place, the amount of damage including the
number of persons that might possibly be hurt is very much less, even
for high level radioactive material. Secondly, the variety of materials
and their radiation characteristics is great and the possible uses cover
a very wide range. Lastly, the possibilities for unforeseeable incidents
are much less with radioisotopes-we know so much more about the injury potential and what might happen to cause trouble than we do about
reactors and what happens when neutrons interact with material. Several conclusions concerning the use of res ipsa loquitur possibly can be
drawn from these facts.
Laying aside medical therapy cases, the safety procedures are much
more standardized and consequently there is a smaller number of possible explanations should something go wrong. Likewise, the proper
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procedures may be learned readily, although it may be difficult to get
personnel to follow them. Undoubtedly this will lead to greater willingness of courts to apply an assumption of negligence rule. On the
other hand, it would be unrealistic to require the presence of a trained
safety officer whenever a radioisotope is being used because this will
impede greatly the more extensive use of such materials, a program the
AEC is now promoting vigorously. In many cases at least the level
of radiation and the difficulty of carrying out safety procedures would
not call for such precautions, and the expense would be prohibitive.
This conclusion probably is sound for many industrial uses, but it may
not be a realistic one for the radiation laboratory where high level
sources are present and where disposal problems may be so great that
extreme care must be taken and only a properly trained specialist can
provide it.
With sealed sources of radiation now being used in many industrial
processes, there may be little to distinguish cases involving the handling
of such sources, e.g., a leaking thickness gage, 1249 from normal product
liability situations in whiCh it is thought proper to assume that there was
negligence if an accident happens.
It may be completely reasonable to apply res ipsa loquitur if someone
is injured by a high-level cobalt 6o source in a research laboratory
which is properly safeguarded. If there are electrical interlocks, special
light signals, limited access by special keys available only to trained
personnel, and requirements of maze-type construction and precautionary use of detection devices, it would seem almost impossible for accidental exposure to occur unless some human negligence intervened.
Undoubtedly, there are other similar examples of cases in which it
would be fair to adopt the res ipsa loquitur principle.
The necessity of offering expert testimony before applying the doctrine in isotope cases may not be nearly as great as in reactor cases ;
nevertheless in many cases conclusions should not be drawn without
such testimony. The same probably is true of accidents arising during
the transportation of radioactive materials. If the question of negligence turns on whether sufficient precautions were taken, including adequate warning signs, to advise an unsuspecting layman or even a professional rescuer of the danger, the jury would seem in an even better
position than an expert to determine adequacy of precautions. If the
t249 This does not necessarily mean, of course, that res ipsa loquitur can be applied.
The requirements that defendant is probably responsible for any negligence connected with the accident and that plamtiff eliminate himself as a <:ontributing cause
still post> formtdahlt> ••hstacles
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question involves a determination of whether there was sufficient shielding or a strong enough container to withstand the impact of a crash or
other accident, then it would be unrealistic to assume negligence without
expert advice.
In connection with radioactive isotopes, as in the reactor cases, it is
impossible to list those cases in which res ipsa loquitur should or should
not be applied. Many judgments of social policy should be left to the
layman; but when a technical question of probabilities is involved, expert evaluation should be sought. The court which errs on the side of
caution and refuses to permit the unaided jury to decide such cases will
do neither the parties nor justice a disservice.
( ii) Accident Experience in Operations
Taking account of developments in aircraft accident cases, there is
yet another pertinent consideration in applying res ipsa loquitur in
radiation cases. An improving safety record for an industry or operation may result in an increased willingness in the courts to apply the
principle. 1250 The logic behind this tendency is that, with increased
technical knowledge and prevention procedures, the probability of an
accident occurring without someone's having been negligent decreases
considerably. It has been argued already that the fine safety record in
reactor operations may serve as a "boomerang," opening the way for
res ipsa loquitur with its concomitant decreased burden of proof for
plaintiffs. 1251 This argument is tenuous at best. Its basic thesis-that
a: rare accident means negligence--is valid only if it is assumed that
design and operating procedures have been perfected, i.e., that from a
safety standpoint at least, there are no substantial vacuums of knowledge and that compliance with established procedures by operating
personnel almost certainly will prevent any accident. This assumption
simply is not applicable to many phases of nuclear energy operations,
particularly reactors. Scientists, engineers, and medical researchers
admittedly are only on the threshold of understanding nuclear energy
and its many ramifications. In addition, the safety record thus far
spans considerably less than two decades and is based on the operation
of relatively few reactors. This would not seem sufficient, either as to
comprehensiveness of knowledge or extensiveness of experience, to justify judging the probabilitjes as to cause with sufficient accuracy to
12 50

See text accompanying, and authorities cited in, note 1167 s11pra.
Becker & Huard, supra note II49 at 67. But see Hutton, "Res Ipsa Loquitur
and Actionable Radiation Injury," 25 Tenn. L. Rev. 327, 340 (1958).
1251
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permit general application of res ipsa loquitur. It is not even accurate
to draw the conclusion that, because there have been so few injuries in
past operations, this means that accidents are not likely to happen. As
Dr. C. Rogers McCullough, chairman of the AEC Advisory Committee
on. Reactor Safety, stated at the Geneva conference, there is "serious
doubt that our skill and care is sufficient to prevent all [reactor] accidents. . . . [ W] e are convinced that the record is better than we have
a right to expect. . . . [C]olleagues in other countries have been somewhat less fortunate than we and this emphasizes our own conviction
that we cannot expect perfection in this regard." 1252 In evaluating the
likelihood of accidents, we must consider that the large reactors with
which we hope to produce economical electrical energy will be much
more complex and of less tested design than existing reactors.
(iii) Relationship of Parties
A third, and possibly more important, general consideration in dealing with res ipsa loquitur is the relationship of the parties. It has already been pointed out that a number of courts are reluctant to impose
res ipsa loquitur in the physician-patient context. 1258 This reluctance
stems from judicial recognition that sound medical practice often may
suggest more than one course of conduct. m• Some treatments may
carry with them great risk of untoward result yet perhaps also offer
the only hope for complete cure or arrestment of the disease. Judicial
doctrines which potentially second-guess a physician's reasoned choice
among the courses open to him, without requiring specific showing of
negligence, are certain to have a deterrent effect upon the progress of
medical treatment techniques and knowledge. Thus, whenever courts
are presented with cases involving the use of radioactive materials for
the cure of human ills, this type of reasoning is likely to be utilized.
In a sense, the logic which emerges from the X-ray cases is likely to
cut across the enti-re atomic energy industry when the question of res
ipsa loquitur arises. There is reluctance to second-guess the physician
who is faced with alternative courses of action, but more willingness
to do so when it appears that the malady that he sought to cure was of
a less dangerous nature. In other words, choosing the more dangerous,
but also potentially more effective, course may more easily be termed
negligence when a serious untoward result occurs from treatment for a
1252

Reported in 4 BNA, Atomic Industry Rep. 324 (1958).

See text following note 1218 .rupra.
t2u Dunlap, .rupra note u48 at I53·
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mild condition rather than a serious one. In essence, the process is one
of weighing the possible end result against the personal health risk involved. Similarly when isotopes are being used commercially for an
industrial purpose, e.g., to determine the thickness or purity of some
material, an accident in which a non-employee is injured by radiation is
likely to be classified as appropriate for res ipsa loquitur. 1255 Commercial perfection of materials, the desired result, generally would be considered a less important end, certainly minor in significance when compared with the cure of disease in a human body, and thus would be less
justifiable as a ground for risking radiation injury. Conversely, it
might be less appropriate to apply res ipsa loquitur to an accident occurring during experimental nuclear energy studies undertaken to advance
the art which is so important to national welfare-particularly if some
exposure was unavoidable. 1256
This particular policy decision is probably an unconscious one, however, and can be exaggerated in importance. Often it may be much
more difficult to weigh the end against the risk than in the cases suggested here. But it is a consideration which should not be ignored, for
it often is basic to a court's conclusion that an accident speaks for itself, although such considerations have no logical relationship to the
statistical chance that certain accidents were caused by negligence
rather than an unforeseen circumstance.
( iv) Dangerous Instrumentality
One final factor deserves mention. The statement has been made
that courts tend to apply res ipsa loquitur more freely if the instrumentality is dangerous in nature. 1257 While this conclusion has received
some support in judicial dictum and has obvious significance for reactor
operators, it should be viewed with skepticism. A review of cases involving explosions of dangerous materials, in which the plaintiff has
attempted to apply res ipsa loquitur, indicates a strong tendency among
1 255 If, of course, the local workmen's compensation schedule applies to radiation
injury, the question of res ipsa loquitur is obviated. At the present time, however, there
is serious question whether many of these schedules are set up to cover radiation
injury adequately. See Part II, infra.
.
1256 This would seem ·to be basis for refusing recovery under the Federal Tort Claims
Act for damages arising out of the Texas City disaster; Dalehite v. United States, 346
U.S. 15, 73 S.Ct. 956 (1953). See discussion of disposal operation and vicarious liability, supra notes 297 ff.
1257 E.g., Hutton, "Res Ipsa Loquitur and Actionable Radiation Injury," 25 Tenn.
L. Rev. 327, 340-41 ( 1958).
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courts to reject the doctrine.ms Indeed, one finds no greater willingness
to ignore other hypotheses of cause in these "dangerous instrumentality" cases than appears in cases involving less dramatic occurrences.
Harper and James argue, 1259 however, that the more complicated and dangerous a machine or process becomes, the more likely it is that the defendant's negligence caused the accident. Apparently the logic of this argument is not nearly as irresistible as they believe. 1260 The mere fact that
more parts, people, complications, or dangers are involved is significant
in determining what precautions should be required; but it does not
mean that the probability of negligence in a specific case is greater. If
anything it could be argued that if the defendant is at all conscientious
and sensible, probably he will be more careful than when the situation is
more familiar, simpler, and less dangerous. Familiarity and low danger
potential breed carelessness. While negligence may occur in more places
or ways, there is an equally great if not greater increase in the chances
that something not reasonably to be foreseen or prevented is the cause
of an accident. The probabilities that an accident will occur have increased because of the number of people or parts. It does not follow
that there is a greater chance that someone was negligent, except in the
sense that the more people there are, the greater the possibility of negligence. This would be like concluding that, because there is a greater
likelihood that a negligent collision will occur when there are 1,000
··people driving cars than when there are only IOO doing so, this means
that when a collision occurs while I ,ooo are driving it follows that it
was the ~esult of negligence. The number of negligent collisions will
increase, given enough chances for the rules of probability to work, but
· the probability that any one of the drivers will be negligent does not
increase. If the precautions required by the standard of care in a particular setting are so high that normal persons cannot be expected to
live up to them, then the standard, by hypothesis, is too high or the law
is imposing absolute liability or a variation of it by making defendant
show his lack of negligence. The situation does not speak for itself and
res ipsa loquitur should not be applied. If the rule of liability is to be
1258 See e.g., East End Oil Co. v. Pennsylvania Torpedo Co., 190 Pa. 350~ 42 At!.
707 (1899); Carter OiL Co. v. Independent Torpedo Co., 107 Okla. 209, 232 Pac, 419
(1924); Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Lambert, 222 S.W.2d 125 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949); ·
Brooks v. United States, g8 F. Supp. 679 (E.D. N.C. 1951). See comparable conclusions as to vicarious liability in transporting explosives discussed in text 'following
note 291 supra.
t25o Harper & James §19~6, especially at 1084.
12eo See !d. at n. 21 for their cute but completely uninformative and therefore unpersuasive answer to Prosser's difficulty in seeing the logic .of the argument.
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changed it should be done honestly and not camouflaged with a Latin
phrase.
(b) Defendant's Control
The second condition precedent to application of res ipsa loquiturthat the defendant probably was responsible for the negligence connected with the accident-posed no difficulty in the X-ray cases. Treatment invariably was administered by the single named defendant or by
a person for whom the named defendant was legally responsible. Seldom was there any difficulty in tracing the probable cause of the accident to the operation of the X-ray machine. As previously noted, usually the real question in these cases concerned the probabilities involved
in Wigmore's first condition: Would the accident probably not have
happened except for negligence? No case has been found in which the
court's decision to accept res ispa loquitur turned on a concept similar
to the reasoning in Ybarra o~ Litzmann. Nor has any case been found
in which res ipsa loquitur was applied against the manufacturer of the
X-ray machine or a component part thereof.
The existing plethora of these latter complicating factors in the Xray cases does not mean, however, that the atomic energy industry can
ignore their obvious implications. As has been pointed out elsewhere, 1261
res ipsa loquitur has been invoked successfully against suppliers of chattels and their component parts, where there is some reasonable thesis
upon which the court can discount possible causes-in-fact controlled by
third persons. The willingness of the Ybarra and Litzmann courts to
apply the doctrine against multiple defendants where there was no legal
responsibility relationship inter se/ 262 is of significance to the industry.
Indeed, in Nichols v. N old, 1263 . the Kansas Supreme Court permitted
res ipsa (oquitur to be applied. against the manufacturer, distributor,
and dealer of a bottled beverage. For the designer or manufacturer of
a reactor or its component parts, for the medical researcher who develops new therapeutic uses of radioisotopes, for the packager or shipper of radioactive materials, these judicial tendencies are extremely
important. If the second condition precedent to the application of res
ipsa loquitur, i.e., control by the defendant, can be satisfied by fact situInfra Chapter V, discussion of product liability.
This is at least one possible thesis for the result in Ybarra. See quotation accompanying note n81 supra.
1263 174 J{.an. 613, 258 P.2d 317 (1953). For ~ sirn.ilar holding, see Loch v. Confair,
372 Pa. 212, 93 A.2d 451 (1953) noted in ZJ Temp. L. Q. 238 (1953). ·
1261
1262
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ations such as these, then the potential vistas of liability are broadened
greatly.
One concrete example should serve adequately to illustrate the problem. Suppose that a reactor burn-up takes place, and the cause is traced
to the fuel core of the reactor. The plaintiff may not be able to obtain
evidence as to the preparation of the fuel by the processor, design of the
core by the reactor designer, or operation by the reactor licensee. He is
reasonably certain that one of these three persons, whom he names as
defendants, is negligent, but he has no evidence to indicate which of the
three. He can argue for application of res ipsa loquitur on two principal theories. First, he can claim joint enterprise or joint responsibility,
thereby obviating the issue of specific causation-in-fact. Since, at least
in some cases, each defendant will be held responsible for the errors of
the others, the determination of which defendant is at fault becomes
unnecessary.
Second, if this is not possible, he can fall back on the theory tacit in
Ybarra and Litzmann. All the inducements for application of this
doctrine are present: a totally innocent plaintiff, the probability of insurance, the knowledge that . this insurance may stem from a single
source/ 264 and the strong possibility that the defendants have superior
knowledge. Faced with these facts, the California court almost certainly
would be willing to throw the logic of traditional res ipsa loquitur to
the winds and shift the burden of "explanation" to the defendants. The
pull in this direction for other courts may be equally strong.

C. Insurance and Indemnity
I.

Introduction

In the 1957 Anderson amendment 1265 to the Atomic Energy Act,
Congress- offered at least a partial solution to the gigantic third-party
liability problem facing AEC licensees. In the worst imaginable case,
·property losses might run as high as $7 billion, with personal injury
. 1 2 6• The government insurance an<f indemnity program is constructed on a framework that provides for the i"~ctor operator to obtain insurance -for other persons connected with operati~ of the reactor. See text accompanying notes IJOO ff. infra. The
fact that one pOlicy insures all the persons .Potentially liable can be a strong argument,
of oourse, for eliminating the specific cause~hi-fact question (rom the case. Whether
it is a legitimate argument, in view of our traditional reluctance judicially to recognize
the· fact o{ insurance. at all, is another question. .
. U 65 Pub. La~. 85-256, 85th. Co~g., 1st Se5s. (1957), i1 Stat. 576, 42 U.S.C.A.
§22io (Supp, -1958), amending the Atomic Energy Act of l954. 68 Stat. 919. 42
U.S._C.A, §§20n-2:z81 (Supp 1958). Section references that follow are to the 1954
Act. as amended ..
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and wrongful death claims aggregating additional untold amounts. 1266
Neither licensees nor domestic insurers were inclined or equipped to
meet such a risk, and it soon became apparent that some form of government action was necessary.
a. What the Amendment Does
Several possible solutions were offered to Congress. One was to limit
liability of a licensee or contractor to an amount equal to twice the
original cost of the reactor or to an amount equaling the total private
insurance available. Each of these limitations would have left the potential public claims largely unsatisfied, and the plans were rejected for
that reason. 1267 A second solution involved unlimited government indemnification for all liability, but this also was rejected for the reason
that Congress was reluctant to undertake such an obligation with so
little knowledge concerning the extent of its commitment. 1268 The AEC
suggested a third program, by which the government would sell (for a
premium) indemnity coverage in excess of the amount of private insurance available on the open market. The purchase of indemnity under
this plan was purely voluntary, however, and the fear that licensees
might not purchase sufficient additional financial coverage to protect
the public, led ultimately to the abandonment of this scheme as welJ.1 269
The insurance and indemnity plan finally enacted contains features
drawn from all the suggested programs and closely parallels the idea
embodied in the AEC program-government financial backing to supplement funds available from private sources. Private insurance, or
"financial protection," is made mandatory in amounts prescribed by the
AEC for all Section 103 and 104 licensees and may be required of all
other licensees and· AEC contractors up to the maximum amount of
insurance offered by insurance companies. 127° For those licensees or
contractors of whom financial protection is required, the amendment
grants : (I) limitation of liability to the amount of financial protection
required plus $500 million, and (2) governmental indemnity, for a
nominal charge, of $500 million beyond the level of required financial
1266 Statement of Lewis L. Strauss at Hearings before the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy, Governmental Indemnity and Reactor Safety, 85th Cong., 1st Sess.,
p. 11 (1957) [Hereinafter cited as "Indemnity Hearings"].·
128T H.R. g8o2, B4th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956). See Note, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 750, 751
(1958).
1288 H.R. 9701, B4th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956).
128& H.R. II242, B4th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956). See Note, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 750, 751
(1958).
1210 Subsection 17oa.
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protection. 1271 If damages aggregate more than the total of these two,
third-party losses theoretically will lie 1272 where they fall and neither
the indemnitee nor the federal government will be held to further
liability.
b. What the Amendment Does Not Do
The general congressional intent is thus clear: to satisfy the interests
of the nuclear entrepreneur and the general public, at a non-prohibitive
price, through a combination of private insurance and indemnification
by the federal government. Equally clear is the fact that, beside the
limitation on liability and certain other less significant provisions to be
discussed below, Congress in no way has attempted to affect substantive
doctrines of liability as they have been and are to be developed by state
courts for the atomic industry. The report of the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy accompanying the Anderson amendment states unequivocally:
1. Since the rights of third parties who are injured are
established by State law, there is no interference with the
State law until there is a likelihood that the damages exceed
the amount of financial responsibility required together with
the amount of indemnity. At that point the Federal interference is limited to the prohibition of making pa-yments throuqh
the State courts and to prorating the proceeds available. 1213

Sta~e courts, therefore, are left free, at least as to the usual tort damages, to impose upon licensees their own legal liability doctrines when
adjudicating claims under the amendment, and federal district courts
1 2 71 Subsections 17oc, 17oe. "A system of indemnification is established rather than
an insurance system, since there is no way to establish any actuarial basis for the full
protection required. The chance that a reactor will run away is too small and the
foreseeable possible damages of the reactor are too great to allow the accumulation
of a fund which would be adequate. If this unlikely event were to occur, the contributions of the companies protected are likely to be too small by far to protect the public, so Federal action is going to be required anyway. If the payments are made large
enough to insure that there is an adequate fund available, the operation of reactors will
be made even inore uneconomic. On the other hand, if, as the Joint Committee anticipates, there never will be any call on the fund for payments, the funds will have been
accumulated to no purpose. Hence, ~n this instance it seemed wisest to the Joint
Committee not to treat this as an insurance problem but to treat it as an indemnification problem." S. Rep. 296, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 9 (1957); This is the report
of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy written to accompany the Anderson legislation, and it will hereinafter be cited as "Joint Committee Report."
1272 Congress can probably be expected to augment the funds authorized by the
amendment if a more serious .nuclear incident develops. See Joint Committee Report
21, 22.
121s Joint Committee Report g. (Emphasis added.)
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sitting in diversity cases will apply the law of the state in which they
sit. The controversies, therefore, concerning the application and extension of doctrines of strict liability, res ipsa loquitur, and the duty of
manufacturers and suppliers, continue to be extremely important and
have received detailed treatment elsewhere in this volume. 1214 It is only
after the state laws establish legal responsibility under these and other
relevant principles that the Anderson legislation comes into play as a
framework for satisfying the defendant's liability.
It would be naive in the extreme, however, to fail to recognize that
the existence of the Anderson amendment, as a practical matter, may
have a profound effect on state liability doctrines. The simple knowledge that defendant-licensee is protected by a fund of perhaps $560
million is certain to affect the thinking of legislators, judges, and juries,
whether or not we like this kind of reasoning. 1275 But this tendency is
not to be confused with a notion that the amendment imposes strict
liability, authorizes the use of res ipsa loquitur, or establishes a manufacturer's duty to the ultimate person injured. Congress dearly did
not intend this; and the states are at liberty to apply their own substantive, procedural, and conflicts rules without regard to the amendment,
at least for most cases. 1276
There is no provision in the 1954 act or any of its amendments
authorizing the AEC or any other federal agency to award damages for
radiation injuries except for those arising from testing atomic weapons.1277 Therefore, under the reasoning of such cases as United Automobile Workers v. Russell (allowing state awards of damages arising
from union unfair labor practices) it is clear that the states are not
precluded in' general from determining their own damage rules. 1278
1214 See B6 of this chapter and Chapters 4 and 5· See also, Becker & Huard, "Tort
Liability and the Atomic Energy Industry," 44 Geo. L. ]. 58 (1955).
12u The problems of. claim adjudication created by the Anderson amendment are
discussed in Section C3 of this chapter.
1210 Congress' specification as to types of injuries which do not come within the
protection of the amendment, together with the limitation of liability given thereby,
is certain in some instances to have an effect on state liability doctrines. Thus, as we
shall see, one who demonstrates mere depreciation in land values from the presence
of the reactor, or one who is injured outside this country, may not be able to assert
a claim under the amendment even though perhaps state law would accord him a
valid cause of action. See the suggestion that psychological nuisance damages are
precluded, mpra text following note 716.
1211 See Section 167. See also discussion infra at notes 1290-92.
121s See discussion of this problem infra Part III, Chapter V at note 311. (United
Automobile Workers v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634, 78 S.Ct. 932 (1958). The related
question of the impact on state tort rules of compliance with federal health and safety
standards is discussed supra Section B2b(2).
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On the other hand, Congress in a sense was restrictive as to the stateestablished liabilities for which financial protection and indemnity
would be available. In general, 1279 the Anderson amendment extends
only to domestic public liability arising from the hazardous properties
of radioactive materials. This eliminates numerous potential causes of
action. Injuries abroad, damage to property caused in a normal nonnuclear accident during construction of a reactor, or damage to the licensee's reactor itself, for example; are not covered by the amendment.
These are broad areas which clearly have been excluded, and there are
many other refined and complicated questions of exclusion. One who
seeks to act or advise under this amendment must familiarize himself
with these questions, or run a dangerous risk not necessarily apparent
at first glance.
This discussion is devoted, therefore, to a scrutiny of the amendment.
Several analyses of the general type of risks covered have already appeared in print, 1280 and references will be made to them and to the legislative history in the course of the discussion. Some of the most
troublesome questions have not been commented on. at all, or have only
been mentioned casually. To understand these matters it is necessary
first to define and explain the risks for which protection is provided.
Then will follow discussions of the nature of the indemnity, the extent
and nature of financial protection required and offered, and, briefly, the
limitation of liability. Finally, discussion will be directed toward a consideration of the administrative problems inherent in the process of
claim satisfaction under the amendment, a vital problem concerni1tg
which there must be some legislative changes.
2.

The Program in Detail
a. Nuclear Incident and Public Liability

The risks against which insurance and indemnity are provided are
circumscribed by several definitions which become terms of art, the
most important of which for our immediate purposes are "nuclear incident" and "publi~ liability," Unless ~<public liability" .arises from a
Generalizations expressed here will be discussed in detail below.
See especially Conunent, 5Q Mich. L. Rev. 752 (1g58); Note, 71 Harv. L. Rev.
750 (1958). The best source of background material for dealing with the legislation
is undoubtedly Atomic Industrial Forum, Financial Protection Against Atomic
Hazards (1957). See also recent' discussions of indemnity provisions in Atomic Industrial Forum, Nuclear Liability Insurance and Indemnity (1959); AEC Report on
Indeninity Act and Advi5ocy Committee on Reactor Safeguards, Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
·
127.9

12so
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"nuclear incident" there is no governmental indemnity and no federal
limitation of liability.
( 1)

Nuclear Incident

As defined in the amendment, a "nuclear incident" is
. . . [A]ny occurrence within the United States causing bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death, or loss of or damage
to property, or for loss of use of property, arising out of or
resulting from the radioactive, toxic, explosive, or other hazardous properties of source, special nuclear, or byproduct
materiaP 281
The report of the Joint Committee indicates that this definition "is
designed to protect the public against any form of damage arising from
the special dangerous properties of the materials used in the atomic
energy program." 1282 The rather broad terms of this statement and the
definition itself make it clear. that Congress intended that the scope of
the statute should be delineated liberally ; nevertheless there are a
number of apparent limitations.
The first major exclusion is express in the definition. A nuclear incident can occur "within the United States" only. Where both a radioactive discharge and the resulting injury take place outside this country,
as where materials have been exported to Europe, the answer is definite: no protection. 1283 The problem is more difficult, however, when
one or the other of these conditions is changed. If, for example, a reactor "bums-up" near Detroit and a person living in Canada is injured,
that person logically should be protected since the nuclear incident took
place "within" the United States, albeit causing damage in Canada. 1284
The joint Committee hedged on this question, however, saying that the
problem would require further investigation when and if it should
arise. 1285
1281
1282

Subsection no.
Joint Committee Report 16.

1283Jbid.

Contrary to the normal oonflict of laws rule which posits a tort at the place of
injury, the amendment fixes the site of a nuclear incident as the place where the
incident occurs, and not where damage may be caused. Subsection 17oe. See Joint
Committee Report 22.
12ss Joint Committee Report 16. The Atomic Industrial Forum report, on the other
hand, concludes that the Anderson legislation covers both this and the situation in
which an incident occurs abroad and causes injury in this country. See Atomic Industrial Forum, Financial Protection Against Atomic Hazards 61, n. 355 (1957). This
theory is based on the statement, found elsewhere in the amendment, that the statute
1 284

578

TORT LIABILITY

In the same category, according to the Joint Committee, is the situation in which "there is any activity abroad which causes further injury
in the United States." 1286 Presumably, if American special nuclear
material exported to Canada caused a reactor "burn-up" there, and
persons in this country were injured, Congress would want to consider
the possibility of extending coverage to such persons at that time. The
report does not state whether "activity abroad" refers only to American
activity, or also includes a reactor operated by foreigners with foreign
materials. It can be argued that Congress did not intend. to extend protection to any persons other than American licensees. On the other
hand, part of the reason for the act was to protect the American public
as a whole, which suffers no lesser injury because the radiation emanates from a foreign source than from a domestic one. Congress' reluctance to deal with this problem in the amendment again seems to
indicate a desire to consider any such incident at the time it happens,
rather than making advance provision for protection.
Obviously, the restrictive geographic definition placed upon "nuclear
incident" constitutes a deterrent to our nuclear materials export program, and would pose an even more substantial threat to eventual widespread overseas activity by American licensees. 1287 Without protection
similar to that offered in the Anderson legislation, entrepreneurs are not
eager to expose themselves to the unprotected risks that foreign nuclear development would involve. Congressional leaders are aware of
this problem, but display understandable hesitancy to enact an indemnification program that would cover non-nationals all over the world,
when the benefits of such a program to the American people to a great
extent would be quite indirect. Alternative means of establishing international protection are now under careful study. 1288 Perhaps the most
covers "any legal liability" and therefore should encompass both cases. The Joint Committee Report indicates, however, that this phrase was included to remove time
restrictions on claims, rather than for some other purpose. Joint Committee Report 16.
1286 Joint Committee Report 16.
1287 An excellent statement of the foreign problem was made by Stoddard M. Stevens
of Sullivan & Cromwell at the Indemnity Hearings 191-202.
128 8 See Atomic Industrial Forum, Financial Protection Against Atomic Hazards,
The International Aspects, Preliminary Report (1958). This study, conducted under
the auspices of the Harvard Law School, examines the various means available for
affording financial protection · to American nuclear entrepreneurs abroad. Among
those methods which have been suggested are : ( 1) extension of the indemnity
scheme of the Anderson amendment to foreign operations; (2) permitting only
limited access to American courts by foreign claimants; (3) insulation of assets
through formation of independent subsidiaries abroad; (4) contractual arrangements
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promising, and yet an arrangement most difficult to achieve would appear to be an international convention limiting the liability of nuclear
entrepreneurs. 1289 There is precedent in the maritime and aviation areas
for this type of international agreement, but obviously the problems of
geographic scope and latent injuries offered by the dangers of a substantial reactor "burn-up" complicate the picture for a convention in
the atomic energy field.
Accepting the fact that the Anderson amendment generally is limited
to application in the United States, one must further consider some less
well-defined limits on the statute's scope. These relate particularly to
the types of injuries which are compensable. In its broadest terms, a
"nuclear incident" involves a sickness or loss arising from the hazardous properties of nuclear materials. It may be asked whether this definition would cover damages for mental suffering caused by the apprehension of having a major power reactor operate nearby. 1290 In a
similar vein, what of the case of the well-established private school
whose entrance applications fall off sharply the year after a minor nuclear incident occurs at a facility in the general neighborhood? Are
claimants entitled to compensation for such "losses" arising from "hazardous properties"? Does the phrase "loss of use of property" include
the profits lost by a manufacturer who is deprived of the commercial
power supplied by a reactor when the reactor suddenly "burns-up"? 1291
These questions are not answered in the amendment, and one can
only try to deduce congressional intention from the language of the
"nuclear incident" definition and the general history of the legislation.
The Joint Committee apparently contemplated one limitation: a mere
for indemnification' by foreign purchasers; and (5) an international convention for
limitation of liability. See also Hearings before the Joint Committee 01~ Atomic
Energy, Operation of AEC Indemnity Act, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 32 et seq. (1958).
1 28 9 Atomic Industrial Forum, Financial Protection Against Atomic Hazards, The
International Aspects, Preliminary Report, pp. 47 et seq. ( 1958). The study points
out that an international convention limiting liability will be of little value to the
general public unless there is also some government assumption of responsibility for
damages exceeding the liability to which operators and suppliers are limited. Any
such international commitment of government funds will certainly mean that the convention will require considerable time for ratification. It would probably be necessary, therefore, to negotiate bilateral agreements as interim devices.
1290 This question would become pertinent, of course, only if applicable state law
also permitted recovery for such damage. This may often be a greater hurdle for
claimants alleging mental suffering than is the "nuclear incident" definition itself. See
discussion supra in text following note 716.
1291 It is probable that this would not be compensable under insurance policies presently available to the industry. See text accompanying note 1356 infra.
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drop in land values caused by the presence of a reactor is not intended
to be compensable. 1292 From this clue and from a reading of the amendment as a whole, it perhaps is safe to say that coverage was intended for
personal injury and property damage caused by actual radioactive contamination, rather than loss resulting indirectly from the presence or
operation of a facility. 1293 Indeed, compensation in a hypothetical case
of a manufacturer probably would not turn upon a reading of the definition at all but would be provided for in the contract between his
company and the pqwer utility. Undoubtedly many interpretive questions can be obviated by contrast, and it is only in the cases where contractual protection is not feasible that courts must turn to close scrutiny
of the amendment.
( 2) Public Liability
The second crucial term of art is closely related to the first. The
amendment's requirement of financial protection and provisions for
indemnification are against "public liability," which is defined as:
. . . [A]ny legal liability arising out of or resulting from a
nuclear incident, 'except claims under State and Federal
Workmen's Compensation Acts of employees of persons indemnified who are employed at the site of and in connection.
with the activity where the nuclear incident occurs, and except
for claims arising out of an act of war. "Public liability" also
includes damage to property of persons indemnified : Provided, That such property is covered under the terms of the
financial protection required, except property which is located
at the site of and used in connection with the activity where
the nuclear incident occurs. 1294
Within this definition are limitations and exceptions which must be
added to those suggested with respect to the "nuclear incident" defini- ·
tion. It is clear that the on-site property of an indemnitee used in connection with the activity is not protected by the amendment, but as
pointed out later, independent insurance against such a hazard is avail1 2 92 Joint Committee Report 16, 17. The Report also indicates that the Committee
did not intend to include in the definition of "nuclear incident" any "similar causes of
action which may occur, namely, from the location of an atomic energy facility at a
particular site." I d.. at 17.
1293 Such a limitation would appear to be a proper interpretation of the Joint Committee Report. ld. at 17. It also generally coincides with the limitation written into
the avail~ble nuclear energy insurance policies. See note 1356 infra and accompanying
text.
1294 Subsection nu.

NEGLIGENCE

581

able from private sources. It also should be suggested parenthetically
that the word "indemnitee" includes more than just the licensee who
signs an indemnification agreement. While this feature will be discussed
later, 1295 it is mentioned here to emphasize the fact that everyone for
whom indemnification exists under an agreement is denied a claim for
damages for loss of his on-site property.
Off-site property belonging to indemnitees, however, is fully covered
within the "public liability" definition, so long as the underlying insurance policy or other form of financial protection is equally extensive.
The insurance policy currently approved for the nuclear industry provides such coverage. 1298 Thus it is possible that one who is at fault in
causing a nuclear incident nevertheless may proceed,· with respect to his
off-site property loss, against the insurance and indemnity fund on as
favorable a basis as injured third parties. The Joint Committee has
indicated that this provision was inserted to protect universities operating reactors on their campuses, 1297 but the language of the definition
does not limit protection to ·this type of situation. Whether a court
would be willing to construe the statute more narrowly when faced with
the case of a tortious indemnitee-licensee asserting a large (but credible) claim against the fund for lost profits from loss of use of off-site
property on a par with innocent claimants is an open question. The
question becomes a hard one when there -are insufficient funds by ·way
of insurance and indemnity to pay all valid claims. It is probable that
the expression of congressional motive for insertion of the provision,
together with the obvious equities, could open the door for a construction favoring claims of innocent third parties. In any event this would
seem to control as against any contrary result under state law, if state
law should call for no distinction betwe~n types of claims.
Two exclusions are explicitly stated in the definition. First, daims
usually falling under workmen's compensation acts of employees of
persons indemnified, who are employed at the site and in connection
· with the activity where a nuclear incident occurs, are not part of the
public liability against which indemnity is offered. Congress felt that
these claims could be satisfied adequately through existing legislation. 1298
That this may not always be the case is indicated in the discussion elseSee text following note 13o6 infra.
Approved Form of Nuclear Energy Liability Insurance, 23 Fed. Reg. 6684
et seq. (1958). Such persons are covered by the policy, and off-site property is not
listed as an exclusion.
129T Joint Committee Report 18.
1298 I d. at 18, 19.
1295
1296
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where in this volume of problems' under the present workmen's compensation statutes.
The second express exclusion involves war damage. The Joint Committee explained that in the event of war, "damages would be so great
and the task of proving causation so difficult that further congressional
study would be needed. . . . [However any] single act of sabotage
would be covered by the indemnification provisions of the bill if it could
not be proven to be an act of war." 1299
In both the "nuclear incident" and "public liability" definitions, there
are such general phrases as "arising out of," "in connection with," and
"at the site of," to delimit certain claims or losses which are intended to
be either included or excluded from the protection of the act. These
phrases, necessarily ambiguous in the final analysis, invite speculation
as to their actual meaning, and one may be sure that they will pose difficulties on the outer fringes of intended coverage. 1300 It is doubtful,
however, that the statute could have been drawn with greater specificity
and still permit some liberality in construction to take care of the "hard
case." Nevertheless, these broad phrases make the interpretive process
extremely important to numerous Claimants, and the potential problems
inherent in a system which entrusts this process' to myriad state and
federal courts, permitting centralized control only at the enforcement of
judgment level, are dramatically apparent. 1801
b. Indemnification
With this brief picture of the risks to which the Anderson amendment protection is applicable, what is the protection offered to licensees
and contractors? As indicated in the introduction, coverage normally
will consist of private financial protection (syndicate insurance in the
usual case) and government indemnification. The coverage of the latter
1299

I d. at 18.

uoo "This language obviously includes any incident which occurs on the site of

the licensed activity, and the Committee Report specifically includes any mishap that
may arise while radioactive materials are being transported to or from that site. Does
the phrase 'in connection with the· licensed activity' embrace an incident which occurs
at the plant of the fuel elements fabricator or re-processor? While such an inclusion appears reasonable, can the language be further extended to cover an accident
occurring in one of these independent plants arising out of work done for another
customer (which has no indemnity agreement) but whi"ch is aggravated by fissionable
materials on hand for use in the indemnified reactor? To state such questions is to
emphasize that they are a matter of degree and must be determined on their facts
as they arise." Comment, 56 Mich. L. Rev 752, 759-6o (1958).
1 801 The problems created by this system are discussed in detail in Section 33 infra.
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will coincide to a considerable extent with the terms of the proposed
insurance policy approved by the AEC. In some instances, however,
indemnity protection may be somewhat broader, and this state of affairs
will pose problems as to the nature of actual coverage. To simplify
consideration of these problems, it will be best to analyze first the more
comprehensive protective device-government indemnification.
( 1)

Generally

The principal feature of the Anderson amendment without question
is the government's offer of $500 million third-party liability protection
as a stimulus to further activities in the nuclear energy industry. 1302
This protection, which takes the form of individual indemnification
agreements, is available to all licensees and contractors who are required
under the operation of the amendment to obtain private financial protection against a nuclear risk. It may even be available to those who are
not so required. 1303 By the terms of these agreements, the government
agrees to indemnify and hold harmless "the licensee and other persons
indemnified, as their interest may appear, from public liability arising
from nuclear incidents which is in excess of the level of financial protection required of the licensee." 1804 If, therefore, a particular licensee
is required to obtain $6o million of private financial protection, the government will sign an agreement to protect him for another $500 million
-or a backstop fund totalling $56o million public liability protection
for third parties who may assert claims in the event of a nuclear
incident.
As pointed out in the previous section, indemnification is provided
against public liability only as that term is defined in the statute. 1805
Thus there is no coverage for on-site property losses to indemnitees,
off-site property losses of indemnitees where private insurance does not
also cover such losses, claims of employees properly covered under
workmen's compensation plans, and war losses. Indemnity is provided
only for "nuclear incident" injuries and damage, not for claims arising
from some other type of activity at the atomic facility. Protection generally is limited to domestic incidents.
1s02 Subsection I70C. The AEC has promulgated a proposed regulation containing
a general form of indemnity agreement. This form rather closely parallels the specifications of the Anderson amendment. 23 Fed. Reg. 6681 et seq. (1958).
1803 The language of the amendment is not clear on the question of indemnity for
contractors and materials licensees who are not required to obtain financial protection.
See discussion in text following note 1311 infra.
1304 Subsection 17oc requires this language.
1305 See Subsection I 1u.
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( 2) Protective Scheme

Indemnification covers "the licensee and other persons indemnified." 1306 As previously indicated, only the prime licensee signs an indemnity agreement for a facility, 1807 but its protection extends to any
other person who might be subject to public liability, including subcontractors, designers, independent contractors dealing with the prime
licensee, and tortfeasors such as trespassers. This relatively unusual
scheme of coverage was motivated primarily by the requests of insurers,
who feared that any other system would lead to pyramiding of insurance at each facility. 1308 Rather than requiring insurance of each person
potentially responsible for a nuclear incident, Congress permitted all but
the prime facility licensee to gain protection from the agreement executed by the latter. Cost to the facility licensee of the additional coverage probably will be passed along to the consumer of the facility's
product, if any, just as it would if each sub-contractor were required to
obtain protection for his own operations.
Foreign to this analysis, however, is the trespasser who causes a
nuclear incident. Although he has no contractual dealings with the
prime licensee, he is as fully protected by the licensee's indemnity agreement as is the licensee himself. Thus the operator of an aircraft who
negligently crashes into a reactor/ 809 causing a nuclear inci~ent, is afforded $500 million indemnity. The reason for this particular feature
of the statute is obvious. Congress had as one of its two primary objectives in enacting indemnity legislation the protection of the general
public, and an innocent third person is no less irradiated because the incident is caused by a tortious stranger than by the licensee himself.
( 3) Indemnity for Contractors and Materials Licensees
Analysis thus far has been predicated on the assumption that some
financial protection would be required of the licensee and that the government indemnity would be given in addition thereto. For some licenSubsection 17oc.
The AEC plans the same scheme for contractors. Hearings before the I oint
Comtmittee on Atomic Energy, Operation of AEC Indemnity Act, 85th Cong., zd Sess.,
pp. I!)-20 ( 1958).
1 aos "Having the agreement run to the benefit of any other person who may be liable
will parallel the policies which the insurance companies are planning to issue. They,
too, will be entered into with the licensee or prime contractor and will run for the
benefit of any other person who may be liable." Joint Committee Report 17.
1809 This hypothetical case is specifically mentioned in the Joint Committee Report.
ibid.
18.06

18 07
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sees and for government contractors, however, private financial protection is not mandatory but rests on the discretion of the AEC. Only
facility operators under Sections 103 and 104 of the Atomic Energy
Act are required to obtain financial protection. Materials licensees
under Sections 53, 63, and 81 and Commission contractors are not so
required unless the AEC requires financial protection. 1310 Thus far,
these latter individuals have not been asked to show private financial
responsibility. 1311
If this is so, then the question immediately arises as to whether a
licensee or contractor having no private financial protection can demand
and obtain government indemnity coverage of $500 million? As to AEC
contractors, by Subsection 1 7od. the Commission is "authorized" to enter
into indemnity agreements in which the Commission "may" require
financial protection and "shall indemnify the persons indemnified . . .
above the amount of the financial protection required," in the amount
of $500 million. It would appear perfectly defensible to read this .language either as authorizing the Commission to sign indemnity agreements only with contractors who have obtained financial protection or
as authorizing indemnification of contractors, whether or not private
financial protection is required. The Joint Committee Report is of no
assistance in choosing the proper interpretation, and our only clue, for
what it is worth, is the fact that the AEC signed indemnity agreements
(without insurance) before the Anderson legislation was passed and
has indicated its intention to do so under the new statute. 1312
The statute is no more helpful with respect to materials licensees.
Subsection 1700 provides that financial protection "may" be required
of such licensees in the discretion of the Commission, and that "whenever such financial protection is required, it shall be a further condition
of the license that the licensee execute and maintain an indemnification
agreement." Subsection 170c then states that the Commission, with
respect to licenses for which· it requires financial protection, shall agree
to indemnify. Nothing in the amendment specifically authorizes the
Commission to sign indemnity agreements when financial protection is
not required, but neither is there provision to the contrary.
Subsection 17oa.
Report by the Atomic Energy Commission to the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy on Operations under Section 170 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. March
28, 1958, reported at CCH, Atomic Energy Law Rep. 1!9571 (1958).
1s12 Hearings before the Joint Committee on Atomic E11ergy, Governmental Indemnity, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 76-85 (1956); BNA, Atomic Industry Rep. 4:29
(1958). See also Hearings before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Operation
of the AEC Indemnity Act, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 19 et seq. (1958).
1s1o
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Since the cost of indemnification under the amendment is nominal, 1313
an indemnity agreement without the cost of private insurance would be
a real boon to contractors and materials licensees. During the hearings
on the legislation, strong arguments were made in favor of mandatory
financial protection for all contractors and licensees, and not just Sections 103 and 104licensees. 1814 Thus far it appears that the Commission
has not exercised ifs discretion to require financial protection of its contractors· and materials licensees and, if it continues on this course, the
question of whether it is nevertheless empowered to give indemnity
becomes quite important. If the risks involved in the operations of
AEC contractors and materials licensees are great enough to warrant
the advocacy of their inclusion within the mandatory provisions of the
amendment, they also would appear great enough to require that some
form of protection be given the public immediately. In the case of contractors particularly, the Commission may be reluctant to impose the
financial protection requirement since the cost of insurance undoubtedly
would be passed along to the government/815 but this is no reason why
the indemnity agreement should not be signed anyway, for the sake of
the public and for the protection of the contractor or materials licensee.
Since the statute can be fairly interpreted to permit such a practice, it
is submitted that the more liberal construction should be applied and the
AEC should follow the course it has already set with respect to contractors, 1316 thus providing indemnification for both materials licensees
and contractors, even when no insurance is required.
c. Financial Protection
The $500 million government indemnity generally is designed to
supplement third-party liability protection obtained from private resources in the form of "financial protection." We thus far have used
this term as if it were self-explanatory in the nuclear industry context.
This is far from the case, as an examination of the requirements of the
act will demonstrate.
1818 "The Commission is authorized to collect a fee from all persons with whom an
indemnification agreement is executed under this section. This fee shall be $30 per
year per thousand kilowatts of thermal energy capacity for facilities licensed under
seetion 103. For facilities licensed under section 104, and for construction permits
under section 185, the Commission is authorized to reduce the fee set forth above. . . .
No fee under this subsection shall be less than $100 yer year." Subsection 170f.
1aa E.g., Indemnity Hearings 162-63, 185.
1815 See BN A, Atomic Industry Rep. 4: rsS C1958).
ts1e I d. at .4 29.

NEGLIGENCE
( 1)

587

General Requirements

By Subsection I 70a, each license for a production or utilization facility under Sections 103 or 104, and permits for the construction thereof
under Section 185, must contain a condition that the licensee will obtain
"financial protection" against public liability of such type and in such
amount as the AEC may require. As indicated in the previous section,
licenses for the handling and use of special nuclear, source, and byproduct materials also may contain such a condition, if the Commission
deems it necessary. ~ Financial protection may take the form of private insurance, contractual indemnity, self-insurance, or other proof of
financial responsibility, or a combination of such measures. 1318 The
Commission may not, however, require protection in excess of the
amount available from private sources, currently some $6o million, and
its discretion is further limited by a statutory provision that any facility
capable of producing Ioo,ooo electrical kilowatts or more must carry
insurance in the maximum amount privately available. 1819
181

( 2) Educational Institutions
Soon after passage of the Anderson amendment, the AEC promulgated temporary regulations implementing the legislative provisions. 1320
Pursuant to its statutory authority, the Commission, inter alia/ 321 initially set the minimum level of financial protection at $250,000. 1822 Because it soon became apparent that this relatively low minimum figure
would potentially force the AEC into the "small claims" business, the
Commission thereupon proposed a draft amendment to the proposed
1317

Subsection 17oa.
Subsection 17ob. The Commission recently reported that of 22 licensees required
to file proof of financial protection, 12 have submitted insurance binders and one has
elected to make a showing that he possesses adequate resources to provide the required amount of protection. Nine licensees claim immunity from tort liability and
one is considering such a claim. Report by the Atomic Energy Commission to the
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on Operations under Section 170 of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954. March 28, 1958, ·reported at CCH, Atomic Energy Law Rep.
1f9571 (1958).
181 9 Subsection 170b.
182o Financial Protection Requirements and Indemnity Agreements, 10 C.F.R. Pt. 140
(Supp. 1958).
1 321 Other sections of the regulations deal with such questions as the permissible
types of financial protection, proof of financial protection, Commission review of
such proof, reports by licensees asserting immunity from liability, indemnity agreements, and exemptions. ld. at §§140.12-140.18.
1 3 22 I d. at §140.II. Financial protection was to be required at a rate of $150,000 per
thousand kilowatts of thermal energy capacity authorized.
1s1s
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regulation by which the minimum level of protection required would be
increased to $3 million. 1823 Criticism of this new figure immediately
arose from reactor-operating educational institutions, who pointed out
that a policy providing coverage for the required $3 million might .
cost as much as $24,000 annually, a sum too great for the operating
budgets of most university reactors. 1824
Many universities were at the same time faced with another related
problem. Serious doubt was being expressed as to the authority of state
universities to waive their immunity from suit as might be required
under the terms of Subsection 170a of the Anderson amendment. 1825
Five out of six state universities claiming immunity for their reactor
operations advised the AEC that they had neither the power to waive
or modify such immunity nor authority to purchase public liability insurance.1826 In some of these states, the prohibition against waiver was
constitutional, 1827 so that mere legislation could not eliminate it were
the Commission to so require.
To meet this awkward situation, and at the same time to relieve
educational and research institutions from the prohibitive burdens of a
$3 million financial protection requirement, the House in mid-1958 proposed the addition of a new Subsection I 70k to the Atomic Energy
Act. This provision stated that :
k. With respect to any license issued pursuant to section
53, 63, 81, 104a., or 104c. for the conduct of educational ac1323 See proposed amendment to 10 C.F.R. §140.11 (Supp. 1958), reported at BNA,
Atomic Industry Rep. 54:31, 54:33 (1958). A further amendment has been more
recently proposed, not affecting this particular provision but containing a draft indemnification agreement. See 23 Fed. Reg. 6681 ( 1958). Other provisions of the
draft amendment revising §140.11 change the formula by which the ·required amount
of financial protection ·would be determined. The level of protection between $3 million and $6o million would be determined by an empirical formula based primarily on
the authorized power level of the reactor, the length of the fuel cycle, and the population density in the general area. For reactors having a rated capacity of 100,000
electrical kilowatts or more, of course, the maximum $6o million would be required,
as specified in the Anderson amendment. Subsection 170b.
1824 Communication from Director, Michigan Memorial Phoenix Project, Ann
Arbor, Michigan. This figure does not include the cost of property insurance on the
facility itself, which would probably amount to another $8,ooo annually. Ibid.
1825 It is probable that this type of activity would be held to fall under the aegis
of sovereign immunity, absent legislative waiver, in the vast majority of our states.
For a recent review of this question, see Comment, 42 Corn. L. Q. 540 (1957). See
also Livingston v. Regents of New Mexico College of A. & M.A., 328 P.2d 78 (N.
Mex. 1958).
1 326 Report by the Atomic Energy Commission to the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy on Operations under Section 170 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, March 28,
1958, reported at CCH, Atomic Energy Law Rep. ff957I (1958).
1a21 Ibid.
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tivities to a person found by the Commission to be a nonprofit
educational institution, the Commission shall exempt such
licensee from the financial protection requirement of Subsection I 70a. With respect to licenses issued between August 30,
I954, and August I, I¢7,.1328 for which the Commission
grants such exemption :
(I) The Commission shall agree to indemnify and hold
harmless the licensee and other persons indemnified as their
interests may appear, from public liability arising from nuclear incidents. The aggregate indemnity for all persons indemnified in connection with each nuclear incident shall not
exceed $soo,ooo,ooo, including the reasonable costs of investigating and settling claims and defending suits for
damage . . . .

***
(3) such contracts of indemnification, when entered into
·with a licensee having immunity from public liability because it is a State agency, shall provide also that the Commission shall make payments under the contract on account
of activities of the licensee in the same manner and to the
same extent as the Commission would be required to do if
the licensee were not such a State agency. 1829
This enactment, ostensibly providing indemnification by the federal
government from the ground up for approved educational institutions,
eliminated both the problem of large financial protection premiums and
that of the inability of some institutions to waive their immunity and
purchase insurance. No financial protection would be required for such
facilities, and liability would fall only on the federal government under
its $500 million indemnity provisions.
Objection was raised in the Senate, however, to federal assumption
of indemnitor's liability from the first dollar up, the thesis being that
this was too much like the federal government entering the business of
private insurance. 1830 A compromise measure therefore was reached,
whereby the House version remained untouched except for the insertion, in paragraph ( 1) of the subsection following the phrase "public
1 8 28 This language, taken together with the preceding sentence, appears to indicate
that such institutions will be exempted from the financial requirement indefinitely,
whereas indemnity will be provided only under licenses issued until August I, I¢';.
It is probable, however, that Congress intends to re-evaluate the exemption as well as
the indemnification provisions by the I967 date.
122e H.R. I3455, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (I958). Paragraph (2), omitted here, is
merely repetitive of concepts discussed elsewhere in this discussion. The bill is accompanied by H. Rep. 2250, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
188o 104 Cong. Rec. I4834 ( 1958).
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liability," of the words "in excess of $250,000." Exception from financial protection requirements is given while government indemnity
still would be provided, but rather than beginning with the first dollar,
indemnity would begin only at the $250,000 level. Up to that point the
institution itself would be responsible. For private universities and
state educational agencies not claiming immunity, the initial liability
span would be covered by "private insurance, suppliers' liability insurance, or special State procedures." 1331 The compromise bill was passed
in August 1958. 1832
Congress' decision refusing to indemnify non-profit educational institutions from the ground up, while it preserves the indemnity program
as a purely supplemental protective device, still leaves unsolved the
waiver of immunity problem so neatly obviated by the House measure.
As enacted, the legislation makes no provision for public liability claims
up to the amount of $250,000 damages when the facility at which a
nuclear incident occurs successfully invokes sovereign immunity. To
satisfy damage claims beyond that level, the $sao million indemnity will
operate "in the same manner and to the same extent as . . . if the
licensee were not such a State agency." For the "first" $250,000 of
claims, however, some or all third-party claimants are certain to find
their judgments not fully satisfied. Congress does not indicate whether
the loss will be borne only by the first claimants to obtain their judgments, or will be divided pro rata among all the claimants who ultimately win judgment. While the latter course obviously is more equitable, it also means that no final settlement of the amount to which each
claimant is entitled can be determined until all judgments are rendered.1888
As indicated, liability beyond $250,000 of state agencies successfully
invoking sovereign immunity will be covered by government indemnity
just as if the agency were a private institution. One technical criticism
of such a statutory scheme is in order. The new provision contemplates
that payments under this indemnity provision will be made pursuant to
a contract of indemnity signed by the Commission and the indemnitee.
One may legitimately ask under what authority does an immune agency
sign an agreement of indemnity? Indemnity protection for one who is
immune is an anomaly, to say the least; there is no need to be indemni1831 H. Rep. 2585, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. ( 1958) (Statement of managers on part of
the House of Representatives).
133 2 104 Cong. Rec. r6o76 (House of Representatives), 16207 (Senate) (1958).
1838 See the discussion of similar problems arising under Subsection 17oe, Section
3b ( 3) of text infra.
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fied from non-existent liability. And if the agency is immune, whom
does the claimant sue in order to obtain judgment? Certainly he cannot name an immune person as defendant. While the over-all congressional intent as to these questions is clear, courts undoubtedly will be
forced to read the statutory language liberally to overlook the technical
defects of the congressional scheme. Probably courts will merely find
an unwritten authorization that the government itself be named as defendant and be liable under its indemnity agreement for $5oo,ooo,ooo
worth of claims, although this will require some verbal, if not mental,
gymnastics.
A final aspect of the new provision, dealing with the type of institution to which its coverage extends, should also be mentioned. While the
terms of the amendment restrict its operation to "nonprofit educational
institutions," Congress has indicated that this term includes "privately
owned and sponsored nonprofit educational institutions" as well as
those operated under state funds. 138• The language of the provision
thus encompasses reactors at private universities, and this is said to be
true even though the facility is used for "incidental nonprofit research
... for outside organization. and industries." 1885 Apparently excluded
by implication are licensees using radioactive materials purely for medical or other philanthropic purposes (but not educational), although the
equities in favor of exemption for this type of operation would seem
to be just as compelling as for those installations already covered by the
amendment.
.
( 3) Federal Facilities
With respect to the immunity of federal agencies operating reactors,
the AEC has acknowledged that these bodies are without authority to
make a more extensive waiver of. sovereign immunity than that provided for in the Federal Tort Claims Act, 1338 and that they are without
133•

H. Rep. 2250, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 3 (1958).

1aa5

Ibid.

188 8 Report by the Atomic Energy Commission to the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy on Operations under Section 170 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, March
28, 1958, reported at CCH, Atomic Energy Law Rep. 1!9571 (1958). The Federal
Tort Claims Act permits suit in tort cases where a private person under the same
circumstances would be liable, except that "an act or omission of an employee of the
Government ... in the execution of a statute or regulation .•. based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or
duty ... whether or not the discretion involved be abused" will not subject the federal government to liability. 62 Stat. 984 (1948), 28 U.S.C.A. §:z68o (1950). This
exception has been broadly construed, but the Supreme Court has distinguished the
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authority to purchase policies for nuclear energy liability insurance. 1337
No mention of federal facilities is made in H.R. 13455 or its accompanying report, but it is possible that certain government facilities could
be_ classified as a "non-profit educational institution" by the Commission. Instead of legislation exempting federal agencies from the insurance requirements altogether, however, the Commission at one time was
considering a bill which would waive government immunity from tort
with respect to claims rising from a nuclear incident caused by federallyoperated facilities. 1338 The AEC recently has indicated, on the other
hand, that it will enter into indemnity agreements with federal agencies
without requiring them to obtain financial protection. These agreements, subject to the $500 million limitation on liability, will indemnify
federal licensees and other persons who may be liable. The Commission
concluded that requiring federal agencies to obtain financial protection
"would not accomplish any useful purpose under section 170." 1339
( 4) AEC Contractors
As previously indicated, financial protection for AEC contractors is
authorized but not required by Section 170. No limitations are placed
upon the discretion of the Commission as to the criteria for, or amount
of, such financial protection to be obtained by its contractors, perhaps
because Congress was aware that the cost of any insurance ultimately
would be borne by the federal government and therefore there was no
need of establishing an equitably-rated standard. For this same reason,
use of governmental discretion to undertake a given activity and the mechanical
aspects of carrying out that activity. See Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350
U.S. 6r, 76 S.Ct. 122 ( 1955). "Two recent district court decisions have evidenced
a conflicting approach as to how far the exercise of discretion extends in the process
of testing atomic weapons. These cases indicate generally that if, e.g., the alleged
negligence of a federal employee is in the determination of safety standards, rather
than their proper administration, the government will escape liability." Comment,
56 Mich. L. Rev. 752, 759 (1958), citing Bulloch v. United States, (D.C. Utah 1956
145 F. Supp. 824), and Bartholomae Corp. v. United States, 135 F. Supp. 651 (D.C.
S.D. Cal. 1955).
1337 Report by the Atomic Energy Commission to the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy on Operations under Section 170 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, March
28, 1958, reported at CCH, Atomic Energy Law Rep. 1T9571 (1958); Hearings before
the Joint Committee 011 Atomic Energy, Operation of AEC Indemnity Act, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess., p. 4 (1958).
1388 Report by the Atomic Energy Commission to the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy on Operations under Section 170 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, March 28,
1958, reported at CCH, Atomic Energy Law Rep. 119571 (1958).
1339 H carings before the I oint Committee on Atomic Energy, Operation of AEC
Indemnity Act, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 4 ( 1958).
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the Commission decided late in 1957 to omit the requirement of financial protection for contractors. 1840 This decision presently is being
reconsidered in light of the fact that services of insurance groups for
the handling and investigation of claims arising from nuclear incidents
probably would not be available in case of injuries caused by contractors due to the disinclination or lack of authority of insurers to engage
in settlements when they had no pecuniary interest therein. 1841 Subsection 170g imposes upon the AEC the duty to use private insurers'
services to the maximum extent possible, ostensibly to avoid building
a claims-investigation branch within the Commission itself and also, of
course, to take advantage of insurance company know-how in this area.
Costs of such services normally would be charged to the indemnitee,
but in the case of an AEC contractor, the federal·govemment would
bear the ultimate burden. The Commission has expressed hope, however, that nuclear insurance may be made available on a retrospective
rating plan " 'that will permit AEC to require its contractors to obtain
nuclear insurance for damages caused by AEC contractors' " without
bearing the burden of a high annual premium. 18u
d. Financial Protection Available
Under the terms of Subsection 170b, the required financial protection tnay be furnished through private insurance, private contractual
indemnities, self-insurance, or other proof of financial responsibility,
or a combination of these means. While there are thus several alterna:.
tive programs available to licensees, the vast majority of corporate and
state licensees in fact have turned to private ins~rance for protection.
In 1958 the AEC reported that only one licensee had elected to show
that he himself possessed adequate resour~es to provide the required
amount of protection. 1848 For the remainder, the only practically available sources of insurance were the syndicates formed in 1956 to provide
third-party liability coverage for the industry.
These s)'ndicates or insurance pools came into existence in responst:
to the need for a policy adequate to meet the unusual risks involved in
BNA, Atomic Industry Rep. 4: 158 (1958).
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Operation <if
AEC Indemnity Act, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., pp.. 21 et seq. ( 1958).
1a4o

1su Ibid.; Hearings before the
1842/bid.

1843 Report by the Atomic Energy Commission to the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy on Operations under Section 170 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, March
28, 1958, reported at CCH, Atomic Energy Law Rep. 1[9571 (1958). See note 1318
supra.
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reactor operation. While licensees could boast a nearly unmarred safety
record, 18 H the mere possibility was a gigantic risk for which to provide
protection. Insurers have little or no experience upon which to base rate
tables, but it was rather clear that any rate which was reasonable from
the standpoint of the insurer would be grossly too large if no incident
took place and grossly too small if a real disaster should occur. 1845 No
single private company was equipped financially or was inclined to provide coverage in the face of such problems at any level approximating
the desired amount. The obvious solution, if the government was to
adhere to its normal policy of offering indemnity only when no insurance was available from private sources, was to turn to the pooling of
insurers' resources. 1846 The insurance companies responded with three
associations, two providing protection against the public liability hazard
and the third against property damage to the licensee's facility.
(I) NELIA-MAERP Policy
One of the liability syndicates is the Nuclear Energy Liability Insurance Association (NELIA), composed of more than 130 insurance
stock companies, which eventually will offer third-party protection to
the extent of $50 million per nuclear incident. 1347 Supplementing the
policy offered by NELIA is the further protection available from the
Mutual Atomic Energy Reinsurance Pool (MAERP), which is expected to develop a capacity for an additional $I 5 million insurance,
including reinsurance. 1848
A tentative draft of a combined NELIA-MAERP policy was first
promulgated in I957. 1349 Certain provisions of this draft came under
criticism, and the insurance syndicates undertook to draw a more satisfactory policy. 1830 In August I958, the AEC published an amendment
See Chapter IV at summary following note 126 for a discussion of this record.
Snow, "Atomic Energy and Financial Protection," 24 Ins. Counsel ]. 353, 358
(1957).
1846 Discussion of these pooling arrangements is found ibid., and· in Thomas, "Can
We Insure Against Liability from Nuclear Incidents ?" 46 Calif. L. Rev. 14 I 5 (I 958) .
See also CCH, Atomic Energy Law Rep. 1'11'14043, 4044 ( I958).
1847 Press Release, Nuclear Energy Liability Insurance Association (Feb. I, I957),
reported at CCH, Atomic Energy Law Rep. 1'[4044 (1958).
1848 Snow, supra note I345·
1349 Indemnity Hearings IOO-I07. The best discussion of this contract is found in
Butler, "Liability Insurance for the Nuclear Energy Hazard," 6o Public Utilities Fort.
9I3, 9I7 et seq. ( 1957). See also Thomas, supra note 1346 at I6.
1350 See, e.g., letter from Nuclear Energy Liability Insurance Association officer,
included in Joint Committee Report 10.
1844
1845
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to its regulations issued under the Anderson amendment, approving the
second NELIA-MAERP policy as one by which the financial protection requirement could be satisfied. 1351 Since undoubtedly this policy
will be the most popular means by which licensees will insure against
public liability, it warrants closer scrutiny.
It first should be noted that the approved policy extends only to the
"nuclear energy hazard," i.e., "the radioactive, toxic, explosive or other
hazardous properties" of source, special nuclear, or byproduct materials.1352 Injuries to which public liability coverage extends generally
are the same as those specified in the "nuclear incident" definition of
the amendment. 1363 The terms of the policy state, however, that continuing discharges in the course of transportation or periodically over
a long period of time from a single facility amount to only one nuclear
incident. 1354 This provision spells out the answer to a question which is
left undecided by the Anderson amendment. 1m
Protection for loss of use of property is restricted to instances in
which the property is "injured, destroyed or contaminated" or withdrawn from use because of real or potential contamination. 1558 This
limitation by its terms is narrower than the broad indemnity coverage
for "loss of use nf property," but as was indicated previously, 1857 judicial construction of the indemnity provision probably would circumscribe the latter in just about the same terms as those included in the
policy.
Persons insured under a policy include the named insured (the prime
licensee) and other persons with whom the prime licensee has entered
into contractual relations concerning the facility. 1358 This clause is substantially the same as the ''persons indemnified" concept written into
1 851 See 23 Fed. Reg. 6684 et seq. (1958). At the time of this writing, the AEC
has issued a notice of proposed rule-making only. The proposed amendment includes
the following statement: "The Commission will accept any other form of nuclear
energy liability insurance as proof of financial protection, if it determines that the provisions of such insurance provide adequate financial protection. ..." Ibid.
1 8 52 Approved Form of Nuclear Energy Liability Policy, §II C, 23 Fed. Reg. 6684
(1958).
135s Subsections II o, 11 u.
18 54 Approved Form of Nuclear Energy Liability Policy, Condition 4. 23 Fed. Reg.
6684. 6685 (1958).
1355 Subsection 11 o.
1856 Approved Form of Nuclear Energy Liability Policy, §lA (2), 23 Fed. Reg. 6684
(1958).
1857 See text accompanying note 1293 supra.
135 8 Approved Form of Nuclear Energy Liability Policy, §III, 23 Fed. Reg. 6684,
6685 (19s8).
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the Anderson legislation, and it is to be doubted that coverage under the
latter would be any broader than the insurance scope, as far as constructors, suppliers, and other contractors are concerned.
In the original tentative policy, there was no provision to include a
trespasser or other non-contracting tortfeasor as a person indemnified.
Thus presumably the owner of an aircraft crashing into a reactor would
not have been able to claim insurance coverage under the NELIAMAERP policy, although statutory indemnity protection would have
extended to him. 1359 Such a situation would have seriously endangered
the public, since government indemnification is merely supplemental to
insurance, beginning where the insurance coverage ends. This problem
was raised with the insurance syndicates, and in the approved policy,
the definition of persons insured includes, besides the named insured,
"any 'other person or organization with respect to his legal responsibility for a nuclear incident." 1360
Exclusions under the approved policy, except for the limitation on
the· amount of insurance available, are not extensive. 1361 It must be
noted, however, that on-site property generally is not protected, and
coverage does not extend to nuclear materials being transported,
handled, or stored. 1862 Off-site property of persons insured apparently
is covered, and therefore off-site property will have insurance coverage
and statutory indemnity coverage as well under the terms of the amendmeni.1B63
Further exclusion is made in the proposed policy for all operations
and facilities outside the United States and its territories and possessions, so that, in general, exporters and prospective operators of foreign
reactors at present cannot expect to obtain insurance for their activities.1364 On the other hand, it appears that persons in Canada or Mexico who might be injured by United States domestic incidents would be
18!19 Note 1309 supra.
136o Approved Form of .Nuclear Energy Liability Policy, §III, 23 Fed. Reg. 6684,
6685 (1958). By this_ provision, an agency of the United States cannot be an insured
party.
1361 The principal exclusions to the standard policy are (I) for workmen's compensation; (2) for liability assume:d under contract;· (3) for the handling or use of
any nuclear weapon; (4) war damage; . (5) the reactor property itself; (6) damage
to nuclear materials in the course of transport; and (7) damage arising from use
of such materials outside the United States and its possessions. Approved Form of
Nuclear Energy Liability Policy, Exclusions (a)-(h), 23 Fed. Reg. 6684,6685 (1958).
1362 /d., Exclusions (f), (g).
1363 See· text accompanying note . 1296 supra.
IS64 Approved Form of Nuclear Energy Liability Policy, Exclusions (h)(l ), 23
Fed. Reg. 6684, 6685 (1958).
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able to claim under the policy. 1365 This is broader coverage, of course,
than Congress has been willing to acknowledge with respect to indemnity.1366 The insurers have further suggested that insurance may be
available for foreign operations sometime in the future, 1867 perhaps as
soon as the domestic program begins to function smoothly.
Because of the risks involved, the absence of loss-experience tables,
and the lack of a broad base of exposure to spread the risk, 1368 the syndicates are demanding premiums which at first glance appear excessively high. For the maximum insurance of $60 million, the licensee
may be forced to pay as much as $26o,ooo annually. 1869 This rather
staggering figure may be somewhat deceptive, however, because the
syndicates have announced a plan of retrospective premium adjustment.
By this program, if it develops after ten years that accumulations in the
premium funds, as diminished by actual payments under the policy
and other normal expenses and charges, indicate that the premium level
is too high, pro rata adjustments may be made whereby considerable
portions of the paid premium would be returned. 1870
Application of the proposed policy is limited to bodily injury and
property damage resulting from nuclear incidents which occur within
the policy period ahd for which a written claim is filed not more than
two years following expiration of the policy period. 1871 Either party
1aes See Joint Committee Report 10; Testimony of Charles J. Haugh, Nuclear
Energy Liability Insurance Association, Indemnity Hearings 97·
1366 The Joint Committee has indicated that "further investigation" will be required
on this question. See note 1284 supra and accompanying text.
1887 See Butler, supra note 1349 at 920; Atomic Industrial Forum, Financial Protection Against Atomic Hazards : The International Aspects, Preliminary Report 37
(1958).
1868 Thomas, supra note 1346 at 17.
1389 Butler, supra note 1349 at !)22.
187o "The premiums earned by the pools for the first ten years of operation will be
accumulated. From these premiums will be deducted actual incurred losses and loss
adjustment expense thereon. A specified provision for expenses and long-term reserves
will also be deducted. The balance of the Io-year premiums will be accumulated in a
special reserve. During the eleventh year of operation, a procedure of gradual refund
of this reserve will begin. The portion of the reserve to be returned in the eleventh
year will be that percentage of it which corresponds to the relationship of the first-year
premium to the accumulated ·Io-year premiums. . . . This return will be made to the
insureds who paid premium in the first year of operation and will be divided [pro
rata] ..•. In the twelfth year, the process will be repeated. . . ." ld. at 924·
1an Approved Form of Nuclear Energy Liability Policy, §IV, 23 Fed. Reg. 6684,
6685 ( 1958). The inadequacy of the policy's coverage will be even more dramatic in
some nuclear situations if a recent Arkansas modification of its statute of limitations
should be adopted in other states. Act 140, Laws of 1959, reported at CCH, Advance
Sess. Laws Rep. 139 (1959), provides that the statute is tolled "whenever the identity of
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can terminate the policy by giving advance notice, 1372 and if such a step
is taken, then any claimant who does not or cannot discover his injuries and report them within two years after termination cannot claim
under the policy. Potentially, therefore, the requirements of NELIAMAERP are even stricter than the already-inadequate periods of limitations which presumably would be applied by our state courts to radiation injury claims growing out of a nuclear incident.
There is no mention in the contract ·as to when coverage first can be
obtained by a facility operator. The Anderson amendment itself undoubtedly anticipates that financial protection may be required of construction permittees be fore the facility is in operation, 1373 and any policy
which would not be available as early in the process of construction as
a (adiation hazard is present, therefore, would appear inadequate.
The approved policy differs from the normal third-party liability insurance contracts available in that it is continuous, rather than for a
fixed period such as a year. As indicated, however, it may be cancelled
on notice. 1374 The policy further provides that the limit of liability
stated in the policy itself is the total aggregate liability of the insurers,
and that each payment by the companies shall reduce by the amount of
such payment the limit of the companies' liability under the policy. 1375
When payments of claims have exhausted this total of liability, the
policy terminates automatically and the insurer is discharged. 1376 Thus
presumably if a nuclear incident occurs at an insured facility, and the
third-party claims exhaust the insurance fund, the policy terminates
the tortfeasor or tortfeasors be unknown," if an action against "John Doe" is filed.
This might apply in the multiple defendant cases when it is not known which one of
several possible defendants caused the injury, discussed supra in text beginning at note
875. It also might apply to situations in which a person suffering from radiation injury cannot determine the source until more than two years after his symptoms appear. If he can use the Arkansas statute to extend the period for bringing his cause of
action this will be another claim not covered by the insurance policy. Under such a
statute the plaintiff's attorney should file a "John Doe'' as soon as he knows the injuries are caused by radiation, and then he can investigate possible defendants at his
leisure. The Arkansas statute is too concise and leaves many important uncertainties.
137 2 Approved Form of Nuclear Energy Liability Policy, Condition 12, 23 Fed. Reg.
6684, 6686 (1958).
1378 Subsection 17oa specifically requires that construction permits under Section 185
shall contain a financial protection provision. The Joint Committee indicates that use
of the term "license" throughout the Anderson bill is intended to include the construction permittee. Joint Committee Report 20.
1314 Note 1372 supra.
5
137 Approved Form of Nuclear Energy Liability Policy, Condition 3, 23 Fed.
Reg. 6684. 6685 (1958).
1a1a Ibid.
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and the facility operator is without financial protection until he can
obtain another insurance contract. Even if the insurance fund is not
exhausted, it is reduced by the amounts paid out. One may speculate
whether the requirement of financial protection under the Anderson
amendment would prevent a reactor operator in such a position from
conducting -further activities. It could be argued that if NELIAMAERP refused him another policy, then the maximum amount of
financial protection would be zero, and he therefore should be granted
indemnification from the ground up. 1377 On the other hand, the insurance group probably would offer further coverage for another premium.
It is anticipated that the larger facility operators will obtain policies
from both NELIA and MAERP, each containing very similar provisions.1318 In the event of a nuclear incident, the two syndicates will be
proportionately liable on all claims. The ratio normally should be between four and five to one, with NELIA of course assuming the greater
burden.

( 2) Potential Gaps in Protection
Of the NELIA-MAERP policy, one legitimately may observe that
in general its coverage is co-extensive with that of the government indemnity. There are, however, exceptions to the rule. Oaims arising
from a nuclear incident might be asserted more than two years after
termination of the policy and thus fall beyond the policy's discovery
period, yet still be within the period of limitations for government contractual liability. Some types of injury, such as lost profits, may be
construed to be covered by the indemnity, but not by the private insurance. A clause of the insurance contract gives the insurer the right to
suspend the contract for unsafe operations; if an incident should occur
after such suspension but before the AEC closed down operations at
the reactor, presumably the indemnity would apply but the insurance
would not. 1819 Remote as these possibilities may be, they pose funda1377 Article II, 1[2 of the AEC indemnity agreement says the licensee "will make
all reasonable efforts to obtain such reinstatements" in case the insurance policies fall
below the figure set for financial protection. 23 Fed. Reg. 6682 (1958).
13 78 The policies issued by NELIA and MAERP will be identical in terms and
conditions. Thomas, supra note 1346 at 20. For this reason, available insurance is
frequently referred to as "NELIA-MAERP" in this chapter.
1379 Approved Form of Nuclear Energy Liability Policy, Condition 2, 23 Fed. Reg.
6684, 6685 (1958). This contingency was suggested in Note, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 750,
753 (1958). The new approved policy lessens the likelihood of this happening by requiring twelve hours advance notice to the AEC prior to suspension. Approved Form
of Nuclear Energy Liability Policy, Condition 2. Presumably the same question
could arise if the insured failed to pay the annual premium, although no express
power of suspension is included in the policy for this breach.
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mental questions concerning the government indemnity : Is it intended
to operate as an extension of financial coverage beyond the level of required insurance, or is it also intended to reinsure the risk covered by
the policy, e.g., the first $6o million? If it is the latter, then an exclusion operating under the policy will merely mean that only a total of
$500 million will be available for payment of claims within the excluded
area, and that the government will pay from the ground up for such
claims. This of course would be ideal for facility operators who could'
be assured always of full protection of their own assets from the attachment of creditors. It does not appear, however, that Congress has.
chosen this interpretation. The Joint Committee Report indicates that
if, for some reason, the policy does not apply to the incident or to the
claim, the burden must be borne by the insured himself, to the level of
the required financial protection. 138° From the latter point only will
government indemnity operate. The remote but distinct possibility exists, therefore, that in spite of the insurance and indemnity program, a
licensee may himself be ruined financially or seriously injured by a nuclear incident, and third parties may go substantially uncompensated.
(3) NEPIA Policy
Loss to the licensee, however, may be prevented at least in part under
the third insurance policy offered to the atomic energy industry-protecting against property damage to the nuclear facility itself. 1881 This
is not the "financial protection" against public liability required by the
statute, and therefore it is not a condition precedent to obtaining government indemnity. Coverage is expressly limited to on-site property,
thereby avoiding duplication with the NELIA-MAERP policy, and
such property may be owned either by the insured or by other persons
with whom the insured prior to loss has agreed to provide protection. 1382
This policy is offered by the Nuclear Energy Property Insurance As1380 "The protection of indemnification afforded by the Government under the agreement of indemnification is intended only to start when the damages exceed the face
sum or the level of the financial protection required by the Commission. This means
that if there are any exceptions in the scope of coverage of the underlying financial
protection which may be applicable. to a particular incident the indemnification does
not pick up from the ground up but still picks up only after the amount of damage
reaches the level of the financial protection required of the licensee." Joint Committee Report 21.
1381 On-site property of indemnitees is, of course, not. covered by the Anderson
amendment. Section IIu.
1382 NEPIA. Specimen of Policy, reported at CCH, Atomic Energy Law Rep.
114047 ( 1958)
.
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soc1atwn ( NEPIA), another syndicate of stock companies, and is expected to provide facility operators protection up to $56 million. 1383 At
the time the amendment was passed, such an amount was believed sufficient to cover the value of even the most expensive reactor, but this
estimate may prove to be incorrect. 1384 In any event, it is to be doubted
that Congress will be interested in providing supplementary protection
by way of indemnity.
NEPIA insurance is not limited to damages arising from the nuclear
energy hazard, but extends to all risks to the property of the insured
by any periP385 Of the numerous specified exceptions, however, the
most important would appear to be gradual accumulation of radioactive
contamination, neglect of the insured to use reasonable means to save
and preserve the property when it is in danger of physical damage, theft
losses, injuries to land, war damage, business interruption costs, and
property removed from the premises for purposes other than preservation from danger. 1386 Considering the "all risk" nature of the policy,
one can deduce that there is certain to be some overlapping with other
already-existing types of property insurance offered by individual syndicate members, and no doubt endorsements similar to those anticipated
in the liability area will be common provisions of normal property insurance contracts, excluding therefrom the nuclear risk. 1887
e. Limitation of Liability
The last of the three essential protective features of the Anderson
legislation is the limitation of liability of persons indemnified to an
aggregate of $Soo million plus the amount of financial protection requi.red.1388 As we shall see below/ 389 if claims arising from a nuclear
1888 Thomas, supra note 1346 at 20.
1384 The AEC has estimated that the cost of the entire reactor plant at Shippingport, Pennsylvania, including the fuel element fabricator, will be about $72.5 million.
See AEC Twenty-Third Semi-annual Report, Progress in Peaceful Uses of Atomic
Energy 436-37 (1957).
1385 Thomas, supra note 1346 at 20.
u8e NEPIA, Specimen of Policy, reported at CCH, Atomic Energy Law Rep.
1[4047 (I9s8).
1887 Thomas, supra note 1346 at 21. Four states have passed legislation permitting
damage from "nuclear reaction" to be excluded from coverage under standard policies.
North Dakota Laws 1959, H. 652, CCH. Advance Sess. Laws Rep. 135 (1959);
Nebraska Laws· 1959, Leg. 111, CCH, Advance Sess. Laws Rep. 37 (1959); West
Virginia Laws 1959, S. 192, CCH, Advance Sess. Laws Rep. 99 (1959); Idaho Laws
H. 194, CCH, Advance Sess. Laws Rep. 207 (1959).
1s8s Subsection 17oe.
1889 Section 3c infra deals with problems of claim administration.
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incident exceed these combined amounts, the indemnitee or the Commission may petition the appropriate district court for limitation. This action would prevent claimants from satisfying claims by execution on
other property of the indemnitee, and would force them to accept only
partial payment if total claims did in fact exceed the funds. If, of course,
the insurance policy for some reason is found not to apply to the nuclear
incident, the limitation is for the most part illusory, since claimants
presumably would satisfy their judgments out of other assets belonging to the indemnitee, up to the level of financial protection required.
From that point on, government indemnity and limitation would take
over.
In adopting the closed-end indemnification concept, Congress did not
altogether shut the door on claimants when aggregate judgments exceeded the level of limitation. On the contrary, it was quite clear that
Congress would be willing to consider the appropriation of further
funds when and if a major disaster occurred, 1390 if all claims were not
substantially compensated. The closed-end indemnity simply reflects the
legislators' reluctance to promise unknown amounts of federal funds
for an event, the probability of occurrence and extent of which are
speculative.
Potentially, however, the limitation prevents full satisfaction of a
valid state judgment, and the constitutionality of such federal action
may eventually be questioned. 1891 In the present state of Supreme Court
authority, it is extremely doubtful that this provision could be said to
violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Over forty
years ago, the court upheld a limitation imposed on recovery under
workm.en's compensation acts, on the theory that in return for the limitation, a valuable right (absolute employer liability) was given by the
legislation. 1892 The same reasoning has been applied with respect to the
limitation given under the Warsaw Convention. 1893 It woulq appear to
be equally applicable here, since the government's $500 million indemnity will in all but the n:iost unu~Ufll case be a completely adequate substitute for the right to levy against all of the indemnitee's property.
There have been several cases in which limitation was imposed by
Congress with no apparent substitute offered. to claimants in return.
Limitations in these cases also are upheld if the wngressional action is
found to be a reasonable and appropriate exercise of a substantive
Joint Committee Report 21, 22.
See Comment, 56 Mich. L. Rev. 752, 765-66 (1958):
New York Central R.R. v. White, ~43 U.S.· r88, 37 S.Ct. 247 ( 1917).
1 3 9 3 Pierre v. Eastern Air Lines, 152 F. Supp. 486 (D.C. N.J. 1959).

1890

1891
1392
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power. 1394 The substantive bases for the atomic energy program are
several, and it is to be doubted that the Supreme Court would find the
Anderson legislation an unreasonable restriction on claimants' rights
(even ignoring the indemnity) in view of the need for protecting the
nuclear industry.
·
Subsection 17oe provides that for a single nuclear incident, the aggn!gate liability of persons indemnified, including the reasonable costs
of investigating and settling claims and defending suits for damage,
shall not exceed $500 million plus the financial protection required.
Several special matters should be noted with respect to this provision.
First, the limitation is available not only to the prime licensee, but also
to any person indemnified, including a malicious trespasser. Although,
from the public's point of view, there would appear to be justification
for granting an indemnity to this latter class of persons, there seems
to be no reason why they should also enjoy the limitations on liability.1395 Protection against levies on the property of malicious or intentional trespassers really in no way fosters the atomic energy program.
The statute well might be amended to provide that the government indemnity would operate only when insurance and leviable assets of such
trespassers were exhausted. This should not include merely negligent
trespassers, such as an airline whose plane crashes into a reactor.
A further question arises as to whether persons of whom no financial
protection is required can obtain the benefit of the limitation. Obviously, this question turns upon the answer to our previous inquiry,
whether such a person can sign an indemnity agreement under the terms
of the Anderson amendment. 1396 The same policy considerations which
would seem to dictate that these persons should be permitted to enjoy
indemnity would operate equally to justify a limitation. Contractors
and materials licensees deserve the same type of protection as operators
of production and utilization facilities.
A very closely related but nevertheless distinct problem is whether
the limitation on liability applies to all liability of the licensee or only
to that liability for which the government provides indemnity, i.e., "public liability" arising out of a "nuclear incident." The whole act is keyed
carefully to these two terms of art. If they are applied to the limitation
of liability of the individual as well as that of the government, it means
there will be no limitation in some circumstances, such as ( 1) damages
1 394

Comment, 56 Mich. L. Rev. 752, 765 (1958). See also discussion supra at note

1276.
1395
1396

I d. at 757.
See text following note 131 1 supra..
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caused in foreign countries possibly either from a domestic facility or
certainly from one sold or operated in a foreign country, and ( 2) property of some indemnitee not at the site of the accident and not covered
under the terms of the financial protection required.
An argument can be made that the limitation applies to all liability
and not as limited by the terms of art. The language of Section 170e
is that the "aggregate liability" shall not exceed financial protection
plus $500 million. Because the word "public" is not found here it can
be argued that the limitation is not so restricted, since in most of the
rest of the indemnity amendment provisions the term used is "public
liability." This certainly is true of Section 170a, c, d, and even of e.
The difficulty with this argument is that "public" also is omitted when
reference is made to liability in Section 53e(8), Section 17ob, and in
the last part of 17oe itself. These would seem to indicate that the two
phrases, "public liability" and "liability" were used synonymously. If
this is the interpretation accepted by the courts, it will mean that some
very substantial liability will not be limited by the Anderson amendment
provision. It is true that this is not likely to exceed the amount of insurance available and Mexican and Canadian damages apparently are
covered by the approved insurance policies, but in the event of a major
reactor incident such liability might well exceed the amount of insurance coverage.
One final matter remains. If a nuclear incident takes place and it appears that two persons who have signed agreements of indemnity are
found at fault and responsible, is government indemnity for the incident doubled? The language of Subsection I 70c appears to give a
negative answer. It says that the "aggregate indemnity for all persons
indemnified in connection with each nuclear incident shall not exceed
$soo,ooo,ooo. . . ." This does not necessarily indicate, however, that
where two licensees independently obtaining insurance under NELIAMAERP are both responsible for an incident, the insurance fund available would not be the sum of the two policies. The terms of the
NELIA-MAERP agreement do not state that the syndicates will only
be liable to a certain extent for a single nt.).clear incident, but merely that
they will be liable to that extent "under tpis policy." 1897 In the rare
case, then, indemnity would be available in the amount of $500 million,
plus the sums of two insurance policies.
·
E:ven as to government re~ponsibility to indemnify it is arguable that
each release of harmful radiation which causes qamage is a separate in- ·
1397 Approved Form of Nuclear Energy Liability Policy, Condition 3. 23 Fed. Reg.
6684, 6685 (1958).
.
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cident, whether it comes at widely separated times from the same facility or at the same time from two widely separated installations. The
language of Section I I o, "any occurrence . . . causing" harm, might
be read to mean each separate release of material which causes harm,
no matter how many indemnified sources also contribute, rather than
each occurrence of harm to a person or particular property. It would
seem more consistent with the over-all policy of the indemnity scheme
if the former interpretation were accepted. The general philosophy
seems to be to limit the liability of the government for a single incident
at a single installation to $500 million. There is no reason to limit the
protection of the injured public to $500 million when the injury results
from two separate installations merely because they happened to coincide in time of occurrence or effect. So long as each facility incident
causes some of the injury and the government would have been liable
up to $500 million for each incident if the other had not happened at
the same time, the government should be liable as fully as if they had
happened separately. Liability should not be limited because of a coincidence in time of occurrence or effect. To so interpret the act would be
to subvert the theory of covering each installation up to $500 million
for each harmful incident at that installation.
Where two installations contribute to a total injurious radiation dose,
but the contribution of neither would have been enough alone to cause
compensable harm, will the government be liable for an "incident"?
Certainly it can be argued that unless discharge from a specific installation causes harm there is no "incident" within the terms of the act.
If legal liability should be imposed on the owner, however, the whole
theory of the indemnity legislation to protect both the operator and the
public would be defeated. It could be argued that each installation
caused some harm, though recovery is not allowed until the harm manifests itself in an observable manner when added to the radiation from
another source. This type of situation is not likely to cause injury extensive enough to call for government indemnity, but it is not impossible.
3· Claim Satisfaction Under Subsection I70e.
One provision of the Anderson amendment which has drawn little
comment or criticism is Subsection I7oe, dealing with the procedural
aspects of satisfying claims arising from a nuclear incident. In part,
the subsection states :
The Commission or any person indemnified may apply to the
appropriate district court of the United States having venue
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in bankruptcy matters over the location of the nuclear incident, and upon a showing that the public liability from a single nuclear incident will probably exceed the limit of liability
imposed by this section, shall be entitled to such orders as may
be appropriate for enforcement of the provisions of this section, including an order limiting the liability of the persons
indemnified, orders staying the payment of claims and the
execution of court judgments, orders apportioning the payments to be made by claimants, orders permitting partial payments to be made before final determination of the total
claims, and an order setting aside a part of the funds available for possible latent injuries not discovered until a later
time.1a9s

The relative dearth of commentary on this provision is somewhat remarkable when one considers the number of difficult problems either
created or totally ignored under its terms. One explanation for this
situation perhaps lies in the general attitude that a substantial nuclear
incident is so unlikely that there is little point in worrying about the
procedural problems until they arise. The Anderson amendment, however, was enacted on the assumption that a nuclear incident could happen 1399 and that there should be federal legislation to cover such a possibility. Accepting this basic assumption, the procedural aspects of
claim satisfaction become extremely important, and for that reason
warrant careful analysis. Unless procedures are adequate, substantive
benefits well may prove illusory.
In the report made by the Joint Committee to accompany the amendment, it was emphasized that Subsection 170e sets venue at the site of
the nuclear incident giving rise to liability, not at the place where resulting damage might occur. 1400 This specification of venue, however,
is applicable only to petitions by the Commission or indemnitee for
the various orders enumerated in the subsection. No restriction is
placed upon venue for suits by claimants. Indeed, the report states that
"the right of the State courts to establish the liability of the persons involved in the normal way is maintained, but the payment of those lia1398 Subsection 1703. The venue provision is somewhat similar to the admiralty rule
setting venue for petitions to limit liability when no libel has as yet been filed. See
28 U.S.C.A., Admiralty Rule 54 (1950).
1399 For an interesting study of the possible effects of a reactor burn-up under
"ideal" meteorological conditions, see University of Michigan Engineering Research
Institute, Report on the Possible Effects on the Surrounding Population of an
Assumed Release of Fission Products Into the Atmosphere from a 300-Megawatt
Nuclear Reactor Located at Lagoona Beach, Michigan (1957).
Hoo Joint Committee Repo.rt 22.
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bilities can be stayed." 1401 Thus it is apparent that Congress intended
a two-step process for satisfaction of claims: ( 1) determination by
state courts, and federal courts sitting in diversity of citizenship cases,
of the fact and extent of liability of the indemnitee, and ( 2) apportionment of the financial protection amount and indemnification fund to
these judgments, presumably on a pro rata basis, by the federal district
court having venue over the nuclear incident. The second step undoubtedly is included to prevent the discrimination which might otherwise result from the satisfaction of some judgments earlier than others,
and from the "race of diligence" that could be expected if no such provisions were made.
_ It is important at this point to note one very substantial limitation
upon the power of the local federal court to enter limitation and apportionment orders under Subsection 17oe. Under its express terms, the
provision restricts the court's authority to those instances in which
claims "will probably exceed'' the available fund. In other words, the
amendment makes absolutely no provision for centralized control of
judgments or payment of claims as long as there appears to be sufficient
monies available for satisfaction of all judgments. Thus when a
"small" incident takes place (perhaps involving only $300 million worth
of valid claims), the federal district court having venue is not vested
with the power to set aside a fund for latent injuries, or to permit payments before judgment to claimants demonstrating immediate financial
crisis, or to stay execution of court judgments against the indemnitee's
property. Any of these steps, if a district court takes them, could only
be based upon a general equitable power to implement apparent congressional intent implied in the amendment.
In the situations most likely to happen, therefore, Subsection 17oe is
of no assistance whatsoever. On the other hand, it does purport to deal
with incidents in which claims probably will exceed the fund-where
the special problems of limi~ation and apportionment are presented.
Our discussion deals primarily with this particular problem, but many
of the considerations and suggestions which follow will relate equally
to the case in which the fund is adequate to meet valid claims.
There is no express indication in the subsection that the district court,
even in the instance where the fund is inadequate, is given the power
to stay proceedings in state courts uo 2 before their culmination in judguo1 Ibid. See also the general statement of purpose for the amendment made by
the Joint Committee, text accompanying note 1273 supra.
uo2 Reference to "state courts" will henceforward include federal courts sitting in
diversity and therefore applying state substantive law.
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ments or to consolidate all claims for trial before it. Any such power
would have to be derived from an application of the doctrine of ejusdem generis to the phrase "such orders as may be appropriate for enforcement of the provisions of this section" and the enumerated authorized orders which follow. 1403 The other orders seem more limited and
this probably makes the use of ejusdem generis of little value. One of
the permissible orders under the subsection is for the stay of execution
of court judgments. Enumeration of such an order is clearly inconsistent, without explanation, with an intention that the district court
should have the power to consolidate before a judgment is rendered by
the state court. In addition, a finding of a power to consolidate is made
extremely difficult by the statement quoted above from the congressional report accompanying the amendment which appears to contemplate "normal" state proceedings on the question of liability.
a. Effect of Inability to Consolidate Claims
· While certainly the limited statutory grant of power to issue stay
and apportionment orders will alleviate considerably the confusion and
vexation engendered by prosecution of multiple claims against the indemnitee, the apparent failure of Congress expressly to empower the
district court to take jurisdiction over all claimants' suits is unfortunate.
Potentially a nuclear incident may cause damage over a large area encompassing several states. It is more than probable that the indemnitee
will be sued in each jurisdiction where'injuries result, since a corporation in general today is amenable to process in any state where it does
business or its property can be attached. Within each of these jurisdictions, actions sometimes may be brought in several different trial courts.
Thus thousands of actions arising from a single incident may be
brought and pursued in a vast number of courts: Each court of course
will apply its own procedural rules; and, smce the prevailing conflicts
rule for substantive tort questions- is "place of injury" rather than
"place of defendant's act," 1404 it will apply different substantive prin1~os This would actually be an inverse application of ejusdem gmeris, which normally comes into play when a list specifics is followed by a general descriptive phrase
into which further specifics of like nature can logically be placed. Here the authoriza-.
tion for granting "such" orders as are "appropriate" invites a reading which would
permit the court to make other orders to those subsequently listed in the subsection.
uo• Stumberg, Conflict of "Laws, 182 e.t seq. (2d .ed. 1951). N{)te also that in
wrongful death actions, the law of the place of injury, rather than the place of death,
controls the substantive questions of liabltity. ·[d. at 191. See also Goodrich, Conflict
of Laws, ·263 et seq. (3d ed. 1949). The best illustration of conflict of laws problems
involved in a tort having multi-state impact is the case of the so-called "national libel,"
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ciples depending upon the jurisdiction in which the plaintiff's person
or property was located at the time of injury. Thus one court may
apply a one-year statute of limitations to a claim arising from the incident, whereas another will be bound by a two-year limitation period.1m Substantively, the defendant may be held only to a standard of
due care or, on the other hand, to strict liability, depending upon the
plaintiff's location. Because of these differences, it is entirely possible
that one claimant, whose injuries are no less serious than another's,
may be barred because of the vagaries of place of injury or place of
suit. The equality of treatment for claimants apparently intended by
Congress thus often may not be fully realized under the explicit terms
of the subsection. Even if consolidation were possible, state substantive
rules are applicable and this would cause the same unequal treatment.
Even if we ignore these vexing considerations, we are further struck
by the profoundly difficult task facing any district court seeking to
administer the fund under the terms of the subsection. Let us assume
that the incident causes dama·ges of over $500 million plus the amount
of required insurance (although such a determination in itself may
Often be an enormous problem) and that an order has been granted
limiting liability to that amount. Assuming the court has no power to
consolidate claims, it apparently must wait until all judgments are
entered before it can finally apportion the indemnity and insurance
fund. In the interim, however, it is empowered to permit "partial payments to be made before final determination of the total claims." 1406
Does this mean that the court may authorize payments to persons who
have not reduced their claims to judgments if defendant agrees to a
in which a defamatory statement is made to persons in numerous jurisdictions through
the medium of a large-circulation magazine or newspaper. Even if the states are able
to establish a "single-publication" rule by legislation or judicial decision, the courts
are still confronted with the problem of what substantive law to apply to defendant's
act. Prosser lists ten possible rules for the choice of law-including the law of each
place of impact, the law of the place of predominant impact, the law of the place of
defendant's act, the law of the place of plaintiff's domicile, and the law of the forumarid concludes that possibly the last has been employed more frequently than any of the
others. Prosser, "Interstate Publication," 51 Mich. L. Rev. 959, 971-78 (1953). See
also, ~'Developments in the Law-Defamation," 6g Harv. L. Rev. 875, 950 et seq.
(1956). The defamation rules are complicated in the context of the nuclear incident,
however, by the traditional "place of injury" rule for the physical torts involving
negligence or intentional conduct. It is probable that the latter test would prevail
in the event of a nuclear incident.
uo5 Periods of limitation, with some exceptions, are considered procedural matters,
and the law of the forum therefore controlling. Stumberg, supra note 1404 at 147

et seq.
140 6

Subsection 17oe.
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settlement, or does it merely mean that some judgments may be satisfied before all judgments are rendered? Either interpretation of the
statutory language leads to confusion. If the former construction is
correct, what happens if the state court ultimately determines that the
claimant is not entitled to judgment, because the defendant's conduct
is non-tortious or because the statute of limitations had run on the
claim? Or if the latter interpretation is adopted, the question becomes:
How much should be paid-what if the amount paid turns out to be
more than the claimant's ultimate proportionate share? Too liberal payments early in the administration of the fund possibly will leave nothing
for those obtaining judgments later. It has been suggested that in the
event of serious mishap Congress can be expected to appropriate more
monies for compensation of claimants. While this may be a reasonable
assumption, it is no basis for accepting the ambiguity of the subsection.
A clarifying amendment should be enacted.
Crucial to many of these problems is the fact that the touchstone of
the district court's power is the preliminary state court judgment. It is
entirely possible that the last valid judgment will not be finally rendered
until years after the nuclear incident. Claims may not have been filed
until shortly before the statute of limitations was to run; courts frequently find themselves two or more years behind their docket calendars,
and appeal and retrial processes are likely to consume even more time.
The district court, therefore, can look forward to a five to ten year
period before the fund can be apportioned to the initially adjudicated
claims.
Even when all state judgments have been rendered, the subsection
poses yet another obstacle to complete claim satisfaction. The district
court is permitted, upon petition, to set aside a portion of the fund
"for possible latent injuries not discovered until a later time." 1407 While
such a provision is admirable in its recognition of the fact that the damage picture is immensely more complex when radiation injury is involved, its terms also provide further problems for the district judge in
requiring his continuing supervision for an even longer period. It is
almost impossible for him to determine what a fair reserve should be.
The subsection gives him rio guide on this point, and indeed, there is no
indication whether the judge should determine the amount based on his
conception of what would be equitable in view of probabilities of latent
injuries, or based on his estimate of what legal liabilities for latent injuries will be adjudicated by state courts. If the latter, then the size of
1407

Ibid.
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the reserve fund will be exceedingly small, since there is little precedent
in our state courts for delayed assessment of damages to compensate
for later-appearing injuries. 1408 Even if the district judge should decide
on a figure, he is faced with the dilemma of how long he should keep
the reserve open. Theoretically, at least, genetic damage may appear
more than 100 years after the incident, and there is excellent indication
that latent in juries such as bone damage and leukemia may appear as
much as thirty years after harmful radiation. 1409 Surely Congress did
not intend that claimants demonstrating present injuries for which the
insurance and indemnity fund (as reduced by the reserve fund) does
not provide adequate compensation, should be forced to wait for such
a period in order to obtain more adequate satisfaction of their judgments.
While these reserve fund matters are not problems peculiarly present when the district court finds itself unable to consolidate the numerous actions, they nevertheless are made more complicated if multitudinous state courts are permitted to take the initial action. In one
state, a jury may include in its damage award an amount equated to the
degree of possibility of future manifestation of radiation injury, whereas in another state a judge may direct the jury to disregard such a
factor in assessing damages. How can the district court weigh such
differences when petitioned for an order to permit payment from the
reserve fund? And for that matter, who is to determine what later
uos "There is also the matter of statutes of limitations. There is no uniformity
among the states as to the length of the period during which they run. Further, and
more importantly, these statutes are not well adapted to take care of radiation injuries. As presently worded, most of them, except those with reference to fraud
and to occupational diseases, begin to run from the time of the harmful impact. The
diseases which result from radioactive substances may not be discovered for years
after the impact. In fact, until the disease becomes manifest its victim may have no
realization of the radiation. I suggest that the federal statute should include a provision which would enable suit within a reasonable time after the disease or disability
is discovered or should have been discovered in the exercise of reasonable care. Further, since the immediate consequence of radiation is frequently only apparently
minor harm for which an action might or might not be brought, the statute should
provide for a subsequently appearing but unpredictable harm. The present rules of
res judicata prevent a subsequent action if judgment has been obtained in an action
based on the impact, although at that time, the harm appeared to be minor. Perhaps
it would be better to provide for installment payments, to be increased or diminished
as subsequent events determine the extent of "the total harm." Seavey, "Torts and
Atoms," 46 Calif. L. Rev. 3, 12 (1958).
uoD Atomic Industrial Forum, Financial Protection Against Atomic Hazards 16-17
( 1957); National Academy of Sciences, Biological Effects of Atomic Radiation (Report of Committee on Pathological Effects), reported at CCH, Atomic Energy Law
Rep. 1!4028 (1958).
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payments are to be made out of the reserve fund-the state court with
the approval of the district court or the district court alone?
These are a few of the immensely difficult questions that will confront any district judge called upon to administer the insurance and
indemnity fund and apportion it equitably to numerous state judgments. One can conjure up further problems almost at will. Should
any distinction be made between claims based on personal injuries and
those involving property damage? Should the traditional notion that
the claim is merged in the state court judgment be followed? How can
the district court prevent juries in a given jurisdiction from inflating
damages for local claimants in order to assure them a greater share of
the funds?
The secondary and supervisory role apparently accorded the federal
district court by the subsection thus appears an exacting one indeed. It
can readily be seen that many of the suggested legal and administrative
problems would be alleviated if an effective means of consolidation
could be found. A single set of procedural rules would thereby be
applied to all actions. One tribunal only would decide the fact of liability and the monetary extent of injury. 1410 Administration of the indemnity fund, including the provision of reserves for latent injuries,
would be in the hands of the district judge alone, subject of course to
appellate supervision. Enormous administrative difficulties would no
doubt remain, but the fact that a district court could deal with them ab
initio, rather than after t~e picture has become confused by the actions
of numerous state courts, would surely lead to saner, more equitable
distribution of the indemnity fund.
b. Available Consolidation Devices
If the desirability of consolidation and the apparent omtsswn of
Congress to include such a device in Subsection I 7oe is accepted, there
remains the question of whether the federal district court is not otherwise vested with the power to consolidate without regard to the subsection. Several equitable devices have been employed with great success in previous mass tort cases. 1411 Any attempt, however, to use one
of these devices always meets several serious obstacles which cannot be
1410 Without further federal legislation, however, the district court would still
apply that substantive law dictated by traditional conflicts rules. Thus the possibilities
of inequities among claimants would still exist, although perhaps to a lesser extent.
See the discussion of this problem in Seavey, supra note 1408 at 11.
1411 Instances of the use of such devices will be discussed in some detail below. See
generally, Comment, 63 Yale L. ]. 493 (1954).
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dismissed lightly. Most formidable of these is the legislative limitation
on range of process. With minor exceptions, a federal district court
cannot render a valid and binding in personam judgment based on personal service of process beyond the territorial limits of the state in
which the court sits. 1412 Facts litigated in one action before the district
court could therefore have no binding application to a foreign claimant
who chooses not to appear.
A further problem which becomes immediately apparent is the very
limited power of federal courts to enjoin concurrent state proceedings.
The general rule is that a court of the United States "may not grant
an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly
authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments." tm Of course, no
express authorization is found in Subsection 17oe for such an order,
and the tendency has been to construe the latter two exceptions strictly
against the injunctive power. 1 m "Aid of its judisdiction" refers to
cases in which the jurisdiction of federal courts is exclusive, not where,
as here, it is concurrent with that of the states. 1 m Protection of judgments is valid as a basis for injunction only when the federal court has
rendered a judgment; it is not construed as a ground for staying other
proceedings while an action is pending or in progress in a federal
court. 1416 Thus when it is possible for claimants also to bring action in
state courts, consolidation is of limited value since the court is without
power to consolidate all claims before it by use of the injunction.
Still another obstacle to an equitable proceeding into which all claimants might. be forced is the right to trial by jury. While in strict constitutional terms, an equitable action probably would not violate federal
or state guarantees, tm yet it is widely accepted in this country that tort
1 41 2 "All process other than subpoena may be served anywhere within the territorial
limits of the state in which the district court is held and, when a statute of the United
States so provides, beyond the territorial limits of that state." 28 U.S.C.A., Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 4(f) (1950). This is a legislative and not a constitutional restriction on the range of process. Howard v. United States, 126 F.2d 667, 668 (1oth
Cir. 1942), cert. den. 316 U.S. 699, 62 S.Ct. 1297 (1942). See 2 Moore, Federal Practice 1!442 (2d ed. 1948).
1413 62 Stat. 968 (1948), 28 U.S.C.A. §2283 (1950).
14 14 See Moore, Commentary on the U.S. Judicial Code 407-15 (1949).
141~ I d. at 412.
u1a I d. at 41o-n.
1417 The federal and state constitutions generally preserve the right to jury trial as
it existed at common law. There is evidence that equity courts took jurisdiction in
this type of case at the time the constitutions were adopted. See Comment, 63 Yale
L. J. 493, 5oS (1954).
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actions, and particularly negligence actions, should be tried by jury. 1418
One writer has suggested that such a tradition will not be easily broken
for the mere sake of convenience for the defendant and the court, 1419
especially in view of the fact that the claimant has an equally strong
interest in having his grievance independently litigated before a jury.
Formidable though these objections may be, yet, as indicated, there
is a growing body of precedent for the consolidation of mass tort claims
before a single court, although none of the procedural devices thus far
evolved can completely surmount the enumerated obstacles. Several of
these devices have received extremely careful consideration in two recent law review comments, 1420 and the discussion which immediately
follows draws liberally on the factual background provided by their
authors. It must be noted, however, that these comments were not written in contemplation of the nuclear incident. While many of the questions arising with respect to previous non-nuClear disasters may be
related by analogy to the nuclear incident, yet obviously the problems
peculiar to the latter merit special attention in the context of Subsection
I7oe. Particularly important are the probabilities that, should a nuclear
incident occur, (I) there will be latent injuries whereas in all previous
mass tort cases the injuries have been immediately or soon apparent
and (2) injury or damage may be spread over a much larger area than
previously considered by courts. Finally, it bears repeating that Congress may well have intended, by its failure to provide for consolidation
in Subsection I70e, to preclude such proceedings altogether, in which
case consolidation under an independent device is impossible. Our assumption must be either that Congress intended to permit consolidation, or in view of the ease in administration which it affords, will
amend the subsection to include its use.
( r) Bill of Peace
This traditional remedy has been employed occasionally at the instance of the defendant in a mass tort situation to enjoin multiple suits
in other courts and to bind all claimants to the decision of a single
equity court. 1421 There is little uniformity in the decisions to define the
permissible limits for use of this device, but a safe general rule is that
a bill of peace may be entertained in a federal district court only (I)
See Chafee, Some Problems of Equity 186 et seq. (1950).
Comment, 63 Yale L. J. 493, 496 (1954).
142 0 Note, 6o Yale L. ]. 1417 (1951); Comment, 63 Yale L. J. 493 (1954). See also,
Molnar, "Equity Jurisdiction in Tort Actions" 10 Ga. B. J. 309 (1948).
1421 Comment, 63 Yale L. J. 493, 501 et seq. ( 1954).
1418
1419
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where the defendant shows that he will be subjected to multiple suits
and ( 2) where a common or "general" interest binds the multiple claimants together. 1422 A recent court of appeals decision interprets the latter
requirement to mean, not that there must be "privity" among claimants
in the narrow sense of common title, but that there need only be a common and substantial question of law or fact involved in the general controversy.u23 Thus construed, the equitable bill of peace would appear
generally appropriate to the consolidation of claims arising from a single nuclear incident.
Use of the bill of peace, however, is severely limited by the problems
of process, power to enjoin, and right to jury trial discussed above. As
indicated, process of the federal court generally extends only to the
borders of the state in which it sits. The power to enjoin state court
proceedings already begun in the mass tort situation has been specifically denied in a recent district court case based on Section 2283 of the
Federal Judicial Code quoted above. 1m And an equity suit pursuant to
a bill of peace in which the co'urt decides questions of fact may well run
contrary to traditional notions of the right to jury trial in negligence
cases. 14211

( 2) Spurious Class Actions
Under the federal rules of civil procedure, a class action is authorized
when, inter alia, the character of the right sought to be enforced for
or against the class is "several, and there is a common question of law
or fact affecting the several rights and a common relief is sought." 1426
This class action is known as the spurious type, in which the only relation of the claimants inter se need be one of related law or fact rather
than common title.
In an action by one of the alleged tortfeasors in the recent South Amboy ammunition explosion causing injury to several thousand claimants,
u22 I d. The most recent federal case upon this point in relation to mass tort claims
is Yuba Consolidated Gold Fields v. Kilkeary, :zo6 F.2d 884 (9th Cir. I953) involving property damage caused by flooding.
u2s I d. at 888, rejecting the narrower construction offered in Tribette v. Illinois
Central R.R., 70 Miss. 182, I2 So. 32 (I8g2), and relying on I Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence §269 (5th ed. I94I).
142f Pennsylvania R.R. v. United States, III F. Supp. So, 88-Sg, (D.C. N.J. I953)
refusing to enjoin state court proceedings arising out of the I950 South Amboy ammunition explosion.
u211 See note I4I7 supra. The mere showing of a multiplicity of actions was not
sufficient grounds for equitable intervention at the time of adoption of the Federal Constitution, so the objection may be constitutional as well as traditional. Ibid.
1426 28 U.S.C.A., Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23 (a) (3) (I958).
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the plaintiff sought to employ this device to bind all claimants to the
findings made by the court in which the spurious class action was
brought. 1427 In addition to refusing to enjoin prosecution of the numerous state actions already initiated, the court refused to permit its decision to be binding on any claimant who had not expressly signified
an intention to enter the suit. 1428 Such a refusal appears to accord with
previous interpretations of the meaning of a spurious class action judgment.1429 It is thus evident that such a device is of extremely limited
efficacy in the context of a nuclear incident, where the claimants' normal
disposition will be to refrain from entering the class suit and where it
is probable that numerous claimants can be neither served nor notified
of the action.

(3) Receivership
The use of receivership proceedings by a lower Connecticut court
to handle the problem of multiple claims arising from the Ringling
Brothers, Barnum and Bailey circus fire in Hartford several years ago
has received detailed consideration in a recent law review article. 1430
This procedural device was settled upon by agreement between defendant circus and the prospective plaintiffs as an effective means of assuring payment of the numerous claims asserted. The defendant waived all
affirmative defenses, claims were submitted to arbitration, and the arbitrators' findings were made binding upon the parties. The receivership order placed all of the defendant's prop~rty under the court's control, abating previous attachments and barring subsequent attachments.
Court permission was required for suits against the receiver. Within
six years following the disaster, this procedure resulted in the arbitration or settlement of every claim.
Employment of a receiver in the mass tort context has little precedent
in American law. 1431 Two reasons are indicated for judicial reluctance
to turn to this device. In the first place, the traditional but now gen1427 Pennsylvania R.R. v. United States, supra note 1424, discussed at length in
Comment, 63 Yale L. J. 493, 511 et seq. (1954).
1428 Supra note 1424 at 90·
14 29 See 3 Moore, Federal Practice 1T23.II [3] (2d ed. 1!)48). For the most recent
case on this point, see Hurd v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 234 F.2d 942 (7th Cir.
1956).
143 0 Note, 6o Yale L. J. 1417 (1951). The facts surrounding settlement of the claims
are drawn from this note, at 1418-20.
us1 Receivership was permitted to handle tort claims arising from a hotel fire
in Geele v. Willis, 203 Ga. 267, 46 S.E.2d 126 (1948). See Molner, supra note 1420.
So far as the authors have determined, receivership has never been used in this context in a federal court.
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erally discredited view that a non-judgment creditor has no standing
to ask for a receiver normally would appear to prevent a mere tort
claimant from doing so. 1432 Secondly, receiverships designed solely for
moratorium purposes, abating the rights of creditors, are looked upon
with disfavor. 1488 Receivership is normally considered a remedy ancillary to some other equitable proceeding, not an end in itself. The argument is made, however, that receivership may be peculiarly adapted to
the solution of the mass tort problem, and that creditors would be aided
rather than injured by the creation of a moratorium during which
claims are adjusted by arbitration. 14u
By application of ejusdem generis to the phrase in Subsection I 7oe
granting power to issue orders "appropriate for enforcement of the
provisions of this section," 1485 one could further argue that the subsection permits the use of this procedural device. Such an interpretation
no doubt would circumvent the traditional objection that a non-judgment creditor cannot demand receivership since by Subsection 17oe the
Commission or the indemnitee could so petition. Whether it would also
circumvent the objection to the use of receivership except as an ancillary
device is an open question. But even it be found that receivership was
contemplated by Congress and that these problems are obviated, substantial judicial legislation would be necessary to impute sufficient
powers to the district judge appointing the receiver to make the device
effective. Receivership, by itself, does not accomplish consolidation.
Without a power in the court to enjoin claimants from participating in
actions against the receiver other than those brought in the federal
district court having venue over the incident, the effectiveness of the
device would be seriously curtailed. The Ringling Brothers receivership
was created by common consent, and it was the accompanying arbitration provisions which gave real force to the centralized proceeding.m6
Moreover, it must be noted that the principal feature favoring receivership in the mass tort context is that it permits continued operation
us2 I Clark, Receivers 2IO el seq. (:zd ed. 1929). For a more recent discussion of
the question with respect specifically to the power of a federal court, see Note, IO
Stan. L. Rev. 361 (1958).
usa Michigan v. Michigan Trust Co., 286 U.S. 334. 345, 52 S.Ct. 512 (1932). See
also I Clark, Receivers 6o (2d ed. 1929).
us• Note, 6o Yale L. J. 1417, 1422 (1951).
us5 This appears to be the tacit assumption of a comment writer, who states that
the subsection "suggests as a solution to these [claim administration problems arising
under section 170] the use of a device akin to the equity receivership." Comment,
56 Mich. L. Rev. 752, 768 (1958).
usa See text following note 1466 infra.
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of the defendant's business, which in turn permits greater likelihood
that claims will be more promptly and fully paid. This feature probably
would be of little significance in the event of a nuclear incident. In the
latter case, a fund for the payment of claims theoretically is already
available in the form of compulsory insurance and the indemnity fund.
The existence of these funds and the limitation of liability above such
amounts mean there is little justification for receivership as a guarantee
for continued operation of the business. The only possible exception
would be when, because of some exclusionary clause in the policy covering the incident, the insurer is not liable, and the company must then
meet claims from its own assets up to the point where indemnification
begins. 1437
( 4) Consolidation
The federal rules of civil procedure permit a federal court to order
consolidation (in the technical sense) 1438 or joint hearing or trial of
actions pending before it involving a common question of law or fact.
This device, coupled with the pre-trial conference, has been used with
considerable effectiveness in the district court on at least two occasions,
the most recent of which involved claims arising from the sinking of
the Italian liner, Andrea Doria. 1489 But in both cases, the district court
had exclusive jurisdiction over all of the multiple claims; in the Andrea
Doria case, because of federal admiralty jurisdiction; 1440 in the other,
because defendant was the federal government and could be sued only
in the federal district court under the terms of the Federal Tort Claims
See text following note 1379 supra.
The term "consolidation" up to this point has been used in the broad sense,
encompassing all of the various devices by which a court can .bring numerous claimants before it in one action or group of actions. In its nariow construction, "consolidation" means the procedural device authorized by Rule 42(a) of the Federal
Rules. See 28 U.S.C.A., Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 42(a) (1958), which
states : "When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before
the court, it may order joint hearing or trial of any or all matters in issue in the
actions ; it may order all the actions consolidated ; and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay."
1439 Clark v. United States, (D.C. Ore. 1952 13 F.R.D. 342) discussed at length in
Comment, 63 Yale L. ]. 493, 517 et seq. (1954), involved some 3,000 damage claims
for property loss from flooding for which the federal government was liable. Litigation ensuing from the sinking of the Andrea Doria is progressively described in The
New York Times, beginning on August I, 1956. See particularly, N. Y. Times, Aug.
9, 1956, p. 49, col. 2.
144 0 See Gilmore & Black, Admiralty §§10-16 to 10-18 (1957), describing the court's
power over other proceedings once the owner has petitioned for limitation.
1437
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Act. 1441 In neither, therefore, was the injunction against concurrent state
court proceedings a problem. Thus it is relatively clear that the unwill- ·
ingness or inability of federal district courts to enjoin state proceedings
would render consolidation under the federal rules of little value in
deciding claims arising from a nuclear incident, since potentially there
is concurrent state court jurisdiction. Only those claims actually
brought in federal courts would be subject to consolidation.
( 5) Interpleader
Another device which appears to have pertinence in the mass tort context, but which clearly was not designed for such use, is the statutory bill
in the nature of interpleader. Such a bill may be brought in any district
court by a stakeholder having custody or possession of money or property of the value of $500 or more when there is diversity of citizenship
between two or more adverse claimants and when these claimants
threaten to subject the stakeholder to multiple liability. This is federal
statutory interpleader. 1442 Each of the traditional obstacles to consolidation is in great measure overcome by this relatively new device. Process is expressly designed to run throughout the United States.1448 The
federal code provisions authorize the district court to enter an order
restraining all claimants from initiating or prosecuting any proceedings in state or federal courts affecting the property. 1m Interpleader is
an equitable action, and while there may continue to exist the accepted
notion that actions involving negligence or similar conduct should be
tried before a jury, there is no constitutional prohibition to trial of the
factual issues by a judge when interpleader is brought. 1 u 5
1441 6o Stat. 842 (1946); 28 U.S.C.A. §§1291, 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401, 2404.
2411, 2671-So (1950).
1442 62 Stat. 931,936,970 (1948); 28 U.S.C.A. §§1335, 1397, 2361 (1950). This
is the most recent of a series of federal interpleader statutes. Interpleader may also
be accomplished in a suit based on the normal diversity of citizenship and amount in
controversy rules. See 2 Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure §551
(1950). Statutory interpleader liberalizes the diversity rule by requiring diversity
between "two or more claimants" only, whereas complete diversity is required in the
non-statutory interpleader suit. See Note, 55 Mich. L. Rev. 1183 (1957). See generally 2 Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure §552 (1950). The
statute further liberalizes the interpleader device with respect to range of process,
jurisdictional amount, and power to enjoin other proceedings. See 3 Moore, Federal
Practice fii[22.0I-22.og (2d ed. 1948). The statute is supplemented by 28 U.S.C.A.,
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 22 (1958).
1443 62 Stat. 970 (1948); 28 U.S.C.A. §2361 (1950).
1444 Ibid.
1445 2 Barron and Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure §555 (1950).
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Interpleader in this statutory form would appear in general to provide an excellent foundation for settlement of claims arising from a nuclear incident. The minimum diversity requirement of the statute.
almost certainly would be met, and even less question should be anticipated with respect to the jurisdictional amount of $so::>. Interpleader
claims need not be in privity nor of an identical nature. 1446 And a bill
in the nature of interpleader under the statute does not carry with it a
requirement, as in the traditional practice, that the stakeholder admit
his liability and thus seek only a determination of the person or persons
entitled to the fund. 1447 Thus the insurance group, who would be the
most likely party to bring this type of bill, would be free to assert
defenses to the indemnitee's liability, or to its own liability under the
policy.
Two requisites for the maintenance of the statutory action appear
troublesome if interpleader in its strict sense is to be used in this context. First, the adverse claims must expose the stakeholder to potential
double or multiple liability, that is, the aggregate claims must appear
to exceed that which will be available for their payment. 1448 If it appears that damage or injury is caused only in a sum less than that for
which the indemnitee has financial protection, interpleader apparently
is not available-a serious limitation on the effectiveness of the device.
If on the other hand, claims exceed both the insurance and indemnity
funds, the incident would clearly appear appropriate for a bill in the
nature of interpleader, 1449 unless it should be argued that the limitation
against any liability above financial protection requirements plus $500
million makes it impossible to be subjected to multiple claims.
In the case, however, where the claims total a sum more than the
amount of financial protection carried, but less than the amount of total
insurance plus indemnity, a second difficulty arises. It has been held
(and probably quite properly) by a lower federal court that the United
we 62 Stat. 931 (1948); 28 U.S.C.A. §1335(b) (1950).
3 Moore, Federal Practice 1[22.07 (2d ed. 1948).
/d. at 1!22.o8. The original use of statutory interpleader was to protect insurers
who hold a fund being wholly claimed by two or more persons, as in Sanders v.
Armour Fertilizer Works, 292 U.S. 190, 54 S.Ct. 677 (1934). It is recognized, however, that the requirement of multiple liability is also met if claims to only a part of
the fund all total more than the fund itself. See 3 Moore, Federal Practice 1[22.o8
(1948).
1449 Note also, however, that as Subsection 17oe now reads, the district court having venue apparently has no power at all in the event of a nuclear incident unless
claims exceed both the insurance and the indemnity fund. See paragraph of text following note 1268 supra.
1447
14 48
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States under the statutory language may not act as interpleader plaintiff.1450 If this is so, then it would be possible that in the normal case,
the sole interpleader plaintiff would be the insurer, and that at best the
United States would be an intervenor defendant. One might argue,
therefore, that the sole amount of money for which interpleader is
brought is the insurance fund alone, and that the claims need only aggregate an amount larger than this. On the other hand, the court might
recognize that in substance, since the United States is a party to the
action as intervenor, its judgment would have binding effect on the
United States as well and therefore the presence of the indemnity fund
also must be accepted. The court could thus conclude that the claims
must aggregate more than both the insurance and the indemnity before
interpleader could lie.
These complications surely arise in part because interpleader was
never designed for this type of situation. Either interpretation of the
requirements of the statute will still mean that the device is of limited
value in dealing with nuclear· incident claims. Indeed, the equitable bill
of peace or even the declaratory judgment 1451 more closely resembles
the desirable type of procedural device for the mass tort situation. But
the liberalized aspects of interpleader-its broad range of process, the
court's injtinctive power, and the absence of a jury trial requirement
-are all essential for a really effective consolidation proceeding and are
common to none of the other devices discussed above.
(6) Federal Removal Power
One final device by which consolidation conceivably might be effected
in the mass tort situation is the use of federal removal power and the
federal statutory successor to the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
The Federal Judicial Code provides that:
· {a) Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, any
civil action brought in a State court of which the district
courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be
removed by the defendant or defendants, to the district court
of the United States for the district and division embracing
the place where such action is pending.
H 50 The interpleader statute is available by its terms only to "any person, firm, or
corporation, association, or society." In United States v. Coumantaros, 146 F. Supp.
51 (D.C. N.Y. 1956), the court held that the United States did not fall within this
definition.
uu See Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 68 Stat. 89o (1954), 28 U.S.C.A.
§§2201-2 (Supp. 1958).
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(b) Any civil action of which the district courts have original
jurisdiction founded on a claim or right arising under the
Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States shall be
removable without regard to the citizenship or residence of
the parties. Any other such action shall be removable only
if none of the parties in interest properly joined and served
as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is
brought. 1452
On the face of the statute, defendants in actions brought in state
courts, if they can demonstrate a federal question or diversity of citizenship as a basis .for original federal judisdiction, are in a position
to have the actio.ns removed to the federal district court. Thereupon,
the more liberal provisions of statutory forum non conveniens 1453 in
federal courts are potentially available, opening the way for drawing
all actions into a single court.
Let us examine this possibility more closely, beginning with the provision for removal where original jurisdiction is not based on a federal
question. The statute states that such actions shall be removable only if
none of the defendants is a citizen of the state in which the action is
brought. A recent change in the Judiciary Act expressly provides that
for the purposes of this section, a corporation shall be deemed a citizen
of any state by which it has been incorporated and of the state where it
has its principal place of business. 1454 This being the case, even though
there is original jurisdiction based upon complete diversity of citizenship among the parties to the action, if the defendant or any one of several defendants is a corporation which is either incorporated in or has
its principal place of business in the state where the action is brought,
removal to the federal district court is impossible. Often this will be the
precise situation if there is a "burn-up." Many reactors will be operated
under license issued to private domestic corporations. The chances
would appear great that the plaintiff would be forced to sue in a state
where the defendant was incorporated or had his principal place of
business. If a nuclear incident took place in Michigan, for example, and
the defendant was incorporated or had his principal place of business
14s228 U.S.C.A. §1441 (1950).
1453 §1404 (a) of the Federal Judicial Code provides: "For the convenience of
parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any
civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought." For
thorough discussions of the pre-statutory federal forum non conveniens doctrine and
its limitations, see Barrett, "The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens," 35 Calif. L.
Rev. 38o (1947); Braucher, "The Inconvenient Federal Forum," 6o Harv. L. Rev.
go8 (1947); Comment, 56 Yale L. ]. 1234 (1947).
H 54 Pub. Law. 85-554, 72 Stat. 415 ( 1958).
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in Michigan, undoubtedly many Michigan plaintiffs would sue in the
courts of that state. Under such circumstances the defendant would be
powerless to remove to the federal courts. As indicated previously, a
device by which less than all of the actions can be brought into one
court is defective in the mass tort context.· It is to be doubted, therefore,
that the non-federal question removal power is a practical basis for
consolidation.
Still a possibility, of course, is the removal power where the basis of
original jurisdiction is that the action is "founded on a claim or right
arising under the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States .
. . ." .Here, citizenship is ·irrelevant, so the basic question becomes
whether an action brought in a state court against a defendant who is
licensed, insured, and indemnified under the aegis of the indemnity
amendment to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 is one "founded on a
claim or right arising under the . . . laws of the United States." The
interpretation of this phrase, as to whether a given suit is "founded"
on .a federa] law,. forms a vast body of law in itsel£, 1455 and a study
thereof is beyond the scope of this presentation. Certain basic principles
~re clear, however. First, the Supreme Court has decided that to be removable a suit must involve a real and substantial dispute or controversy, the resolution of which turns on the construction of a law of the
United States.1456 A cause cannot be removed merely because it may
become necessary to construe the laws of the United States. Rather the
cause must be one the decision of which depends on such construction,
i.e., the plaintiff's right to recovery stands upon federallaw.w 7 Finally,
it is the federal nature of the right to be established that is important
for removal purposes, not the source of the authority to establish it. 1458
The mere fact that a state establishes a right in an area which could be
pre-empted by the federal government is no justification for saying the
state-established right is "foun~ed" on federal law.
The foregoing summarization of the federal-question removal jurisdiction is neither detailed nor specific; nevertheless it can serve as a
general guide for our purposes here. It is safe to say that the basic right
asserted by a plaintiff in the nuclear incident situation is a tort right
created by state statutory or common law. 1459 A federal license in the
See 2 Cycl. of Fed. Procedure §§3.22 et seq. (3d ed. 1951).
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Ann Arbor R.R., 178 U.S. 239, 20 S.Ct. 867
(1900); Williams v. 1st Nat!. Bank of Pauls Valley, 216 U.S. 582, 30 S.Ct. 441 (1910).
145 7 Gold-Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U.S. 199 (1877).
1458 Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 288 U.S. 476, 53 S.Ct. 447 (1933).
14 59 See discussion in text, supra at notes 1401 ff.
145 5
1456
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hands of the reactor operator and insurance purchased under the federal financial protection requirements, while required by federal statute,
have no direct bearing on establishing_ the state-created right. At most,
the insurance enhances the insured's ability to respond in damages. It
has no effect in most cases on the fact of liability, because the plaintiff's
right is substantively affected only by the existence of the federal limi~
tation of liability provision. If total claims aggregate more than $560
million (assuming maximum financial protection required), each plaintiff potentially can be prevented from full collection of his state judgment. One could argue, of course, that this federal provision begins to
operate only after the state right has been vindicated and judgment
awarded, and therefore no federal question is raised before this time.
Probably, however, a court would be willing to look through the form
to the substance, saying that potentially each plaintiff's right is· diminished substantively by the federal provision. Then, of course, the question of construction previously raised with respect to the exact operation of Section 17oe comes into play-and one can argue that the exte1:1t
of the plaintiff's right turns on a federal statute. To succeed with this
argument, however, the defendant would have to induce the Supreme
Court to overrule those cases that clearly hold that a federal question
defense does not make the case one involving federal question jurisdiction.1660 The federal question must be the basis for the plaintiff's claim.
Even if successful, which seems. unlikely, the argument is valid only
when the total claims. aggregate more than the limitation level. Frequently, indeed normally, this will not be the case. It is likely that a
given court will refuse to look beyond the fundamental limitation of the .
indemnity provision-that it only affects state remedies at the judgment level. Likewise, removal jurisdiction is available only if the claim
exceeds $Io,ooo,1481 and if a major reactor incident occurs it is likely
that there will be thousands of claims for less than this amount.
Even assuming that all suits brought by injured plaintiffs in state
courts could be removed to a federal court on the ground of diversity
of citizenship or federal question, twc;> difficulties of almost insurmountable proportions block effective consolidation of all claims. If the plaintiff brings his action where he was at the time of impact (the place of
146D Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149. 29 S.Ct. 42 (1!)08) (Federal statute wiping out pass privileges previously contracted for used as a defense held
not to be a federal question). And see similar concept applied in declaratory judgment case, Skelley Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 70 S.Ct. 876

(1950).
ast §§1331, 1332 of Federal Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C.A. §§1331-2 (Supp. 1958).

NEGLIGENCE

625

injury), there would seem to be considerable doubt that a federal court
would transfer the trial on the ground of a more convenient forum. 1462
This might be true also if the plaintiff shows nothing more than that he
lives where he brought the action. 1463 Perhaps more important is the
fact that an action cannot be removed to a federal court and then the
place of trial transferred on the basis of more convenient forum until
the plaintiff chooses to start <!- suit. There is no way to force all potential plaintiffs to bring their actions within a given time so they all can
be removed to the court of the federal district where the incident
occurred. For all of these reasons we can only conclude that the removal power will not be of service in connection with the mass tort litigation resulting from a nuclear incident.
One author has suggested the propriety and need for congressional
legislation to deal with the mass tort problem, and we support the suggestion with particular reference to nuclear incidents and Subsection
· 17oe. 1464 A statute is required which combines the best features of the
bill of peace and the bill in the nature of interpleader, by which one
who is threatened with suit by potentially numerous claimants can bring
1462 The general theory of the federal transfer provision is that it codifies the old
forum non conveniens doctrine and was not intended to give plaintiffs a better hunting license in shopping for a desirable district for trial. Foster-Milburn Co. v. Knight,
181 F.2d 949 (2 Cir. 1950); noted 45 Ill. L. Rev. 676 (1950), 6o Yale L.J. 183 (1951).
In accord, Shapiro v. Bonanza Hotel Co., 185 F.2d 777 (9th Cir. 1950). See also
Kaufman, "Observations on Transfers under Sec. 1404(a) of the New Judicial Code,"
10 F.R.D. 595 (1951); Comment, "Limitations on the Transfer of Actions under the
Judicial Code," 64 Harv. L. Rev. 1347 (1951); Comment, "Change of Venue in Federal Courts under Section 1404-A of the New Judicial Code-Effect on Rights of the
Parties," 2 Hastings L. J. 29 (1950).
In Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 75 S.Ct. 544 (1955), the Supreme Court
held that the district courts in transfer cases could order transfer upon a lesser showing of inconvenience by a defendant than would be required for dismissal under the
doctrine of forum non conveniens. Noted 55 Col. L. Rev. 1o67 (1955); 36 Bost. U. L.
Rev. 127 (19s6); 41 Va. L. Rev. 813 (1955); 2 N.Y.L. For. 127 (1956). In this
case the cas~ was transferred to the place where the three employees suing under the
F.E.L.A. had been injured. This is a more appealing case for transfer than when the
plaintiff brings suit where the injurious impact took effect as would likely be the
case if there were a reactor "bum-up."
1468 This was the rule under the forum non conveniens doctrine prior to enactment
of §1404 (a) ; Braucher, supra note 1453 at 919-20; Barrett, supra note 1453 at 413.
But see Nicol v. Koscinski, 188 F.2d 537 (6th Cir. 1951). One of the plaintiffs in
Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, supra note 1462, resided in the district in. which the suit
was brought. This fact brought forth a sharp dissent. In any event, the appeal courts
refuse to upset the trial judges' exercise of discretion unless a serious injustice results.
Ford Motor Co. v. Ryan, 182 F.2d 329, 331-32 (2d Cir. 1950); Moore, Commentary
on the U. S. Judicial Code 210 (1949).
14 64 Comment, 63 Yale L.J. 493, 521-22 (1954).
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a single action into which all claimants can be forced and by which they
are all bound. It would appear that the desirability of individualized
determinations of the liability relation between each claimant and the
defendant is far outweighed by the factors of timeliness, equality, and
efficiency that a centralized proceeding would bring. In short, Congress
should modify Subsection I7oe to provide for an original bill in the
federal district court having venue ov~r the incident, under which
process would run throughout the United States, the court having the
power to enjoin proceedings elsewhere, and the right to jury trial being
discretionary with the judge, although this raises the problem of the
constitutional right to jury trial in civil proceedings in federal courts. 1465
It should not be necessary that claims exceed the fund available, but
only that the defendant will be subjected to a multiplicity of suits and,
in the opinion of the court, the ends of justice will be served by consolidation. Only when this or a similar provision is enacted into law
will Subsection I 7oe provide an adequate basis for the satis faction of
nuclear incident claims.
c. Administrative Detail
Assume that the federal district court has discovered or been given
a procedural device by which it can force substantially all of the injured
parties to consolidate their claims: Although many administrative problems thus would be solved, others emerge. The court is confronted
with the task of sorting out, evaluating, and satisfying the thousands
of valid claims likely to arise from a nuclear disaster. The district
judge, if possible, must seek further procedural tools at this stage to
assist him in the administration of this enormous proceeding. Again
there is some precedent in previous mass tort cases which may have application to an action resulting from a nuclear incident, and the judge
may also find additional assistance in the federal rules of civil procedure.
(I) Arbitration

Arbitration was used with considerable success in the R-ingling
Brothers case, discussed above with respect to receivership. 1466 The
appointment of a receiver in that action was accompanied by an arbitration agreement, signed by the circus and most of the claimants, by the
terms of which (I) the circus waived defenses of contributory negligence, absence of negligence, or the statute of limitations; ( 2) the
1465 Jacobs v. Ringling Bms., Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc., 141 Conn.
86, 103 A.2d 8os (1954). See Note, 6o Yale L. J. 1417 (1951).
14 6 6 Supra note 1430 and accompanying text.
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assets of the circus were released to the receiver; and (3) with certain
minor exceptions, the award of the arbitration panel was made final.
Additional provision was made for direct settlement of claims, with
the arbitration panel having the right to supervise settlement of any
claim in excess of $200. It further was agreed that successful claimants were to be paid in periodic dividends from operational profits, income tax refunds, and proceeds of insurance policies.
While such a device would appear highly efficient as a means of processing claims, there are several serious limitations on its use in federal
courts in the context of a nuclear incident. The first drawback is somewhat obvious; such arbitration agreements are by definition the product
of consent. Local pressures, such as the obvious favor with which the
Connecticut court and the local bar association looked upon arbitration
in the Ringling Brothers case, strongly induced claimants to submit to
arbitration. 1467 These pressures might be absent in the event of a nuclear incident, particularly since damages are certain to be of a less localized nature in many instances.
The probability, therefore, that a substantial majority of claimants
would agree to arbitration is not great and is at best speculative. On
the one hand, arbitration could be expected to insure more rapid settlement of claims; but on the other, the claimants would lose the advantage of jury trials. Wide geographical distribution of claimants and the
fact that many potential claimants would not know at the time of recommended arbitration that they had sustained injuries or the extent of
those injuries further lessen the effectiveness of the arbitration device.
In the Hartford disaster and in all other mass tort cases herein discussed, injuries were of such a nature that all claims were asserted within a relatively short time. An arbitration agreement signed by less than
all of the claimants has only limited value, and the fact that many claimants will not know of their injuries probably will mean that considerably fewer than all the claimants would be parties to the contract.
A final difficulty with arbitration of claims in federal courts is the
fact that the United States Arbitration Act apparently is restricted in
scope to "transactions involving commerce" and "maritime transactions." 1468 It is clear that a rather broad construction of the term
Note, 6o Yale L.]. 1417, 1419, n. 12 (1951).
61 Stat. 66g et seq. (1947); 9 U.S.C.A. §§1-14 (1953). The statute specifically
empowers federal courts with respect to these transactions only, and it has been concluded that although Congress could constitutionally extend the statute further, it did
not do so. See Sturges & Murphy, "Some Confusing Matters Relating to Arbitration
under the United States Arbitration Act," 17 Law & Contemp. Prob. 58o, 585 et seq.
(1952).
1467

1468
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"commerce" would be required before one could conclude that the district courts had the power under the statute to implement the arbitration process judicially. The authors have found no tort cases in which
issues have been submitted to arbitration pursuant to the federal act.
Further, it is to be doubted that a federal court would enforce an agreement to arbitrate tort claims solely on the basis of its inherent equity
powers, in view of the traditional doctrine that arbitration agreements
are both revocable and non-enforceable unless a statute dictates otherwise.ue9

(2) Pre-Trial Conference
Advantageous use of this simplification device in mass tort litigation
was illustrated in Clark v. United States, 1410 a case in which consolidation of all claims was possible because all the actions were against the
government under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The court insured
complete claimant participation in the proceeding by waiting until the
statute of limitations had run before beginning hearings. Under the
close supervision of the district court, numerous pre-trial conferences
were then held for the purpose of drafting a definitive pre-trial order
as a basis for the simplification of the issues of liability. Twenty cases
eventually were selected for trial at a final conference between the government and claimant's attorneys, arid at the same time a final pre-trial
order was submitted to the court. Counsel for claimants whose causes
were not selected for trial were directed to submit proposed definitive
pre-trial orders of their own, or to agree of record to abide by the order
for the selected cases. After careful review of its terms through the
submission of briefs by the parties, the district court ultimately. gave
final approval to a binding pre-trial order framing all the issues of fact
and law in the case.
So employed, the pre-trial conference with its resulting order is a
powerful weapOn for simplification of mass tort litigation. The real
questions of fact and law at issue are brought out forcefully in the
candid atmosphere that can characterize such a proceeding. Stipulations among parties as to agreed facts are encouraged, and without a
doubt, the frank airing of issues provides an excellent opportunity for
initiation of settlement discussions. 1411 Particularly where the only real
U 69

I d. at 587.

Supra note 1439. For a discussion of the procedures followed, see Comment,
63 Yale L. J. 493, 517-18 ( 1954).
1471 See Murrah, "Pre-Trial Procedure, A Statement of Its Essentials," 14 F.R.D.
417, 418 ( 1953). This paper was prepared for use by federal district judges seeking
to work under Federal Rule 16. The rule states: "In any action, the court may in
HTO
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controversy is over the extent of claimants' injuries, the pre-trial conference can easily become the most satisfactory forum for the satisfaction of claims. It was in this fashion that hundreds of claims arising
from the sinking of the Andrea Doria were settled and paid in less than
a year. 1472 A district court finding itself able to consolidate claims
arising from a nuclear incident almost certainly would wish to make
extensive use of this device for rapid, reasonable satisfaction of claims.
In this regard, however, Subsection 17oh of the Andet:son amendment introduces a complication. There it is provided that, as a term of
each indemnity agreement, when the AEC determines that the government probably will have' to make payments under the indemnity agree_ment, the Commission "shall collaborate with any person indemnified
and may approve the payment of any claim under the agreement of
indemnification, appear thr~ugh the Attorney Genera,) on behalf of the
person indemnified, take charge of such action, and settle or defend
any such action." 1478 The Commission is further given the authority
"on behalf of the United States to settle or approve the settlement of
any such claim on a fair and reasonable basis with due regard for the
purposes of this Act." uH The Joint Committee report indicates that
its discretion direct the attorneys for the parties to appear before it for a conference
to consider (I) The simplification of the issues; (2) The necessity or desirability of
amendments to the pleadings; (3) The poss.ibility of obtaining admissions of fact and of
documents which will avoid unnecessary proof; (4) The limitation of the number of
expert witnesses; (5) The advisability of a preliminary reference of issues to a master
for findings to be used as evidence when the trial is to be by jury; (6) Such other
matters as may aid in the disposition of the action. The court shall make an order
which recites the action taken at the conference, the amendments allowed to the pleadings; and the agreements made by the parties as to any of the matters considered, and
which liinits the issues 'for trial to those not disposed of by admissions or agreements
of counsel ; and such order when entered controls the subsequent course of the action,
unless modified at the trial to prevent manifest injustice . . . ." 28 U.S.C.A., Federal
Rules of ·civil Procedure, 16 (1950).
u12 See reference to Andrea Doria settlements, note 1439 supra.
u1s The full text of Subsection 17oh is as follows : "The agreement of indemnification may contain such terms as the Commission deems appropriate to carry out the
purposes of this section. Such agreement shall provide that, when the Commission
makes a ·determination that the United States will probably be required to make indentnity payments under this section, the Commission shall collaborate with any person indemnified and may approve the payment of any claim under the agreement of
indemnification, appear through the Attorney General on behalf of the person indemnified, take charge of such action, and settle or defend any such action. The ComInission shall have final authority on behalf of the United States to settle or approve
the settlement of any such claim on a fair and reasomible basis with due regard for
the purposes of this Act. Such settlement may include reasonable expenses in connection with the claim incurred by the person indemnified."
HH Ibid. The indemnity agreement proposed by the AEC provides in this respect
that the "Commission shall have the right ... to require the prior approval of the
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this latter authority is given the Commission so that it will not be bound
by legal technicalities "such as rules of legal proof in a situation in
which the courts have not yet had a chance to establish new rules for
new problems arising from radiation." 1475
The problems that lurk in this rather remarkable provision are
myriad. While the Commission's powers under the subsection are apparently restricted to settlement of claims against the indemnity fund,_
it would appear as a practical matter that separation of claims against
the insurer and the indemnitor is impossible, particularly when Subsection 17oe appears to contemplate apportionment of claims among the
entire fund of insurance plus indemnity. Cali it be that Congress intended two apportionments: first, payment by the insurer of those legal
liabilities which are established against the insurance fund; and then
second, payment through settlement or otherwise by the government of
"fair and reasonable" claims out of the indemnity fund, whether or not
the insurer's legal liability therefor has been established? This is
certainly a curious, cumbersome process. But if this is not what Congress intended, then the insurers undoubtedly are laboring under the
misapprehension that they will be liable for payment only when such
liability is established in a court of record under legal rules, albeit
"new," or in the alternative, when they themselves decide that settlement
is the more intelligent course. If the Commission can tell the insurers
when and for how much to settle, then really an insurance policy containing conditions and exclus~ons is little· more than a pious gesture.
Also illusory would be the hope that the insurer's liability would be
based on legal doctrine, except to the extent that legal doctrine may accord with the Commission's notion of what is "fair and reasonable.''
Commission for the settlement or payment of any claim . . . and . . . take charge
of such action and settle or defend such action." Proposed 10 C.F.R. §140.76, 23 Fed.
Reg. 6682, 6683 ( 1958).
1475 Joint Committee Report 23. The report also states that this authority is given
to the Commission so that its settlements need not "wait for an action to go to final
judgment but can be settled when it seems fair and reasonable." Ibid. One can easily
see the dilemma that this provision brings to the district court judge having venue.
He is empowered to limit liability and make the other orders specified in Subsection
17oe only when it appears that claims will exceed the combined funds. With the government settling state actions even before they come to trial, it is almost impossible for
him to know whether claims are actually "sufficient" to empower him. Assuming that
the government does settle many claims before state judgments are rendered (even so,
sufficient claims go to judgment that they aggregate more than the insurance and indemnity fund), does an apportionment by the district court require those with whom
the government settled to refund part of their payment? Or is the amount of indemnity reduced by the settlements made, and therefore apportionment is only necessary
among those claims which go to judgment?
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Perhaps this interpretation would also result m significant changes
being made in state substantive tort rules.
One possible interpretation of this subsection is that it is merely
designed to place final authority in the Commission, among government agencies, to establish the government's position on each claim.
This would not necessarily mean that the Commission's authority was
final with respect to the insurer or indemnitee. So restricted, the subsection would pose less of a problem, although certainly in any case in
which the decision as to settlement is to be made by more than one
agency, there will always be differences of opinion. But so to restrict
the subsection is to ignore much of its language and much of the language of the Joint Committee report. Oarification of Congress' position in this respect is certainly in order, for undoubtedly the settlement
process will be extremely important in the event of a nuclear disaster.
(3) Reference to a Master
One of the appropriate issues for discussion at a pre-trial conference
under the federal rules is the advisability of preliminary reference to a
master for findings to be used in evidence when trial is to be by jury. 1476
The purpose of such reference is the simplification of complex evidence
for the jurors, and the master's report, while. not conclusive, appears as
strong and impartial evidence for them to weigh with whatever testimony is introduced by the parties at tl,le trial. Good practice would
seem to support the use of a master in a jury case where it is necessary
to introduce technical, scientific, and medical data in order to show the
fact and extent of indemnitee's liability to various claimants allegedly
suffering radiation injury. 1477
If, however, the proceeding in which claims are to be satisfied is of
a non-jury variety, the possibility of reference to a master is considerably less. Rule 53 of the federal rules provides that in these cases a
reference is to be made "only upon a showing that some exceptional
condition requires it." u 78 It is clear that the mere fact of a crowded
docket is not sufficient ground for reference. 1479 The court may be able
28 U.S.C.A., Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 16(5) (1950).
"A reference to a master shall be the exception and not the rule. In actions
to be tried by a jury, reference shall be made only when the issues are complicated;
in actions to be tried without a jury, save in matters of account, a reference shall be
made only upon a showing that some exceptional condition requires it." 28 U.S.C.A.,
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 53(b) (1950). "Complicated" jury cases in which
reference has been allowed are listed in 5 Moore, Federal Practice 1Ts3.05[2] (2d ed.
1948).
H7B See Federal Rule 53(b), supra note 1477.
1479 McCullough v. Cosgrave, 309 U.S. 634, 6o S.Ct. 703 (1940).
1476

1477
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to show, on the other hand, that speCialized training on the part of the
master in the field of radiation injury makes him peculiarly suited for a
preliminary hearing of claims arising from a nuclear incident. 1480 If
such a justification is possible, then, of course, the court will be spared
the task of holding full individual hearings on each claim. Perhaps
the most desirable procedure that a court could follow would be to appoint a master to hear matters of damage or injury after pre-trial conferences have been held on the issue of liability. The chance of rapid
settlement for just amounts would appear excellent should such a course
be followed.
As with the question of possible consolidation, there is little guidance
in Subsection I 70e for a federal district court called upon to deal with
these basic problems of administration. While undoubtedly considerably more latitude should be left to the judge in these matters than in
the issue of deciding upon a consolidation device, yet the Atomic
Energy Act or regulations promulgated thereunder at least should provide a framework for a claims proceeding. As Subsection 170e now
reads, there is no indication of· the nature of the action in which the
enumerated orders are to be granted, or the manner in which adjudicated claims actually are to be paid. Such procedural details are easily
specified and should not be left to judicial invention.
4. Conclusion
The government indemnity provisions found in the 1957 enactment
badly need some clarifying amendments. This should be d_one immediately, before more reactors are put into operation, since a reactor
incident, should it occur, could cause enough datnage to bring the indemnity provisions into play.
The form of insurance policy as approved by the AEC should be
changed in at least one respect ; liability from all operations during
the time the policy is in effect should be covered so as to give protection
commensurate with the applicable statute of. limitations, and not be
arbitrarily limited to two years after the policy is cancelled. This means
that most radiation injuries will not be covered because they often are
delayed more than two years after irradiation. The only alternative is
to allow the possibility of immediate recovery for future injuries. As
pointed out in the previous discussion of such damages, this is far from
Hso See 5 Moore, Federal Practice 1T53.05[2] (2d ed. 1948) for cases in which reference has been made when trial was to be before the court without a jury. See also
Kaufman, "Masters in the Federal Courts," 58 Col. L. Rev. 452, 455 ( 1958).
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satisfactory so long as present compensation methods are used. 1481 If
the approved policy is not changed, the question then is posed as to
whether legal liability will be indemnified by the government for the
whole amount beginning with the first dollar not covered by the approved policy or whether the indemnitee will have to stand the losses.
It can be argued that the indemnitee will have satisfied the financial
protection requirement by taking out insurance under an approved
policy and that the government must step in where the insurance policy
ceases to protect. This will mean that much of the private insurance
coverage is illusory even though very high premiums have been paid
for it. Congress should answer this question specifically.
us1 Supra discussion at Section B 5 c (4) (a).

Chapter IV
STRICT LIABILITY FOR RADIATION INJURIES*
A. Introduction and Historical Background
Strict liability for all damages inflicted by one person upon another
was anciently the rule of the common law. Every man was held responsible for the consequences of his acts, however reasonable he may
have been and however carefully he may have performed his tasks.
In the beginning this doctrine was apparently applied by the courts
principally if not exclusively to trespasses commited by the defendant's
domesticated animals upon the adjoining land of a neighbor. Strict
liability was imposed in such instances on the ground that owners of adjoining land owed the mutual obligation to save each other's property
from harm caused by such incursions upon it. Even today, apart from
statutory provisions to the contrary, such strict liability is the rule in
most of the courts of the United States as regards animals that are likely
to stray and do damage to others. Some of the western states have rejected the idea because of their range grazing needs, and statutes now
very generally cover the field.
Likewise something approaching strict liability was imposed by the
early common law for injuries caused by fire escaping from the premises
of a landholder to those of his neighbors. This harsh result was, however, mitigated in England by a statutory provision enacted in 1707/ to
the effect that no action should be maintained against one whose building or estate caught fire accidentally, although liability was imposed
for negligence and for intentional acts. This early English statute was
carried to this country as part of the common law and was taken over
by the courts on this side of the Atlantic. Our courts have consistently
held in the absence of legislation that there is no liability for the escape
of fire if the defendant was not negligent or guilty of an intentional
wrong. 2
These early doctrines of strict liability and those related to them ap-

* The authors wish to acknowledge the research assistance of Rinaldo L. Bianchi,
John W. Birchall, and Mrs. Mimica Janez, Graduate Research Assistants, University
of Michigan Law School, and E. B. Stason, Jr., in connection with his LLM degree
program at the University of Harvard Law School.
1
6 Anne c. 31, 1[6, as amended by 10 Anne c. 14, 1[1, and 14 Geo. 3, c. 78, 1[86.
2 See Prosser, Torts 327 (2d ed. 1955).
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plied in other areas of the law did not derive from deep moral principle;
instead the law was occupied principally with the very practical problem of keeping peace between individuals. To that end it provided a
judicial remedy that would be accepted by the people in place of self help
or private vengeance. Moral bases of the law were a later development.
With the lapse of time and by the process of evolution, as growing
moral consciousness in the community made itself felt, the courts moved
away from the cruder methods of early complete liability toward the
more discriminating rule of equating legal liability in tort with conduct
which would not be expected of a worthy member of the community.
Accordingly, two types of conduct were in general found to involve such
a degree of moral or social fault as to make the actions unworthy in
the eyes of the law ; first, conduct intended to invade the legally protected
interests of others and; second, conduct which created an unreasonable
risk to such interest, i.e., negligence.
As Lord McMillan stated it in the recent and important English case,
Read v. The Lyons Company, Ltd.:
The process of evolution has been from the principle that every
man acts at his peril and is liable for all the consequences of
his acts to the principle that a man's freedom of action is subject only to the obligation not to infringe any duty of care
which he owes to others. The emphasis formerly was on the
injury sustained and the question was whether the case fell
within one of the accepted classes of common law actions; the
emphasis now is on the conduct of the person whose act has
occasioned the injury and the question is whether it can be
characterised as negligent. I do not overlook the fact that
there is at least one instance in the present law in which the
primitive rule survives, namely, in the case of animals ferae
naturae or animals mansuetae naturae which have shown
dangerous proclivities. The owner or keeper of such an animal
has an absolute duty to confine or control it so that it shall
not do injury to others and no proof of care on his part will
absolve him from responsibility. 8
Accordingly the law became so shaped that unless a man were guilty
of "a fault" in the sense indicated he would not be compelled to respond
in damages for injuries resulting from his acts.
There has, however, developed in the latter part of the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries stiJJ a new direction in the law of civil liability; that
is, a limited though more sophisticated return to "liability without
8

[1946]

:z All. E. R. 471 at 476.
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fault," at least without fault in the ordinary sense, unless the term be
broadly defined to include ultrahazardous activities.
Following the lead of an 1868 English decision in the case of Rylancfts
v. Fletcher • a modern doctrine of strict liability has been enunciated
and applied to certain types of activities which may, in general, be
loosely characterized by the phrase "ultrahazardous in nature." The
application of this doctrine to particular fact situations is quite unclear
for it depends not only upon potentialities for harm, but also upon such
vague and intangible considerations as social utility, the nature of the
location, common usage within the area, and other related factors.
The twentieth century development of the Rylands v. Fletcher doctrine is of substantial concern to the atomic energy industry, for it
would seem that certain segments of that industry will in all probability
become subject to its financial burdens although certain other segments
may be dealt with under conventional negligence doctrines. Or, on the
other hand, some parts of the new industry may follow the course developed in connection with damages occasioned by fire, for in many respects fire is a predecessor of atomic energy. If this parallelism should
prove to be appealing, atomic energy may in the initial stages of its use
be held subject to absolute liability, in some of its applications at least,
although social utility and community needs may, in the more distant
future, bring about through statutory means a change in the theory of
liability to one less drastic in nature.
At all events we shall find ourselves, in discussing the question of tort
liability of atomic enterprise, facing the full circle of historical development starting from ancient strict liability, continuing through the Victorian doctrines of negligence, and now back again to strict liability. 6
B. Current Common Law Principles in General
As the peaceful uses of atomic energy become more and more commonplace, we shall find it necessary to deal increasingly with the problems of civil liability for the very simple reason that, notwithstanding
all of the care that will be exercised, injuries due to overexposure to
radiation will occur in ever increasing numbers. For practical purposes
there are three principal theories of liability demanding consideration
in this connection: negligence, nuisance, and strict liability, the latter
sometimes called liability without fault.
• 3 Hurl. and C. 774 (1865); L. R. I Exch. 265 (1866); L. R. 3 H. L. 330 (1868).
s For further development of the historical background of strict liability, see Prosser,
Torts 315 (2d ed. 1955), and 2 Harper & James, Torts 785 (1956).
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Negligence has been defined as conduct which involves an unreasonably great risk of causing harm to others, or, in different words, conduct
which falls below the standard established by law for the protection of
others against unreasonably great risk of harm. Conduct falls short
o{ this standard when the individual against whom the charge is advanced has failed to act as the reasonable man of ordinary prudence
would act under similar circumstances. The standard is an objective one
rather than one based upon the individual judgment of any particular
person. Negligence, as a legal basis for imposing liability, emerged as a
judicial doctrine after the Industrial Revolution. It constituted a departure from the more primitive concepts of the earlier common law.
Over the last century or more it has developed into a widespread and
omnipresent theory of liability applicable to most forms of human activity and enterprise.
Nuisance, or at least "private nuisance," according to Dean Prosser
is "a term applied to unreasonable interference with the interest of an
individual in the use or enjoyment of land." He further states that the
interference "may be intentional, or negligent, or may result from an abnormally dangerous activity for which strict liability is imposed. It must
result from conduct of the defendant which is found to be unreasonable
in the light of its utility and the harm or risk which results." 8
Not all authorities in the law of torts agree with Dean Prosser in his
definition of nuisance. For example, Professor Warren Seavey argues
that the term "nuisance" should not be deemed to refer to the fact of
interference with the land of another but to the nature of the defendant's conduct which causes the interference. He places emphasis not
only upon the conduct of the defendant but also he would require unlawfulness ; that is, to be a nuisance there must be a tortious or criminal act
interfering with the use of the land of another. 7
However, regardless of definitions given by commentators, the term
"nuisance" is in fact widely used by the courts in rendering judgments
for damages in situations not too far removed from those which may
and probably will in due course arise out of peaceful utilization of atomic
energy. Nuisance, therefore, must be taken into account as a possible
theory of liability applicable to this new field.
The third theory demanding consideration is so-called strict liability,
e Prosser, Torts 389 (2d ed., West Pub. Co., 1955).
See Seavey, "Nuisance, Contributory Negligence, and Other Mysteries," 65 Harv.
L. Rev. 984 (1952). The Restatement of Torts follows Prosser rather than Seavey;
see 4 Restatement, Torts, S~ope Note to Ch. 40 (1939). We shall deal more fully
with this matter later in this chapter.
7
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sometimes referred to as liability without fault. As previously noted
there is a new direction in the evolution of the law, a change from the
course of development which limited liability in tort to acts involving
fault of the defendant, and a movement, in certain areas in any event,
toward developing a policy of imposing liability without regard to such
fault. This is particularly the case when injuries arise out of activities
involving unusual danger to persons and property in the community.
It is possible to argue, in support of strict liability as a mere extension
of negligence, that the actor who carries on a dangerous activity in a
community under such circumstances that harm is likely to be inflicted
upon other persons is by virtue of that fact alone guilty of committing
a fault. Or, on the other hand, one can say, as courts have frequently
said, that the person who carries on such activities should be obliged to
pay (as a matter of proper social distribution of the loss) the damages
resulting therefrom, that is, to "pay his way." The social expediency of
this development in the law has been favorably commented upon by certain authorities writing recently on the law of torts. Professors Fowler
Harper and Fleming James, Jr., have written:
There is a growing belief, however, that in this mechanical age
the victims of accidents can, as a class, ill afford to bear the
loss; that the social consequences of uncompensated loss are of
far greater importance than the amount of the loss itself; and
that better results will come from distributing such losses
among all the beneficiaries of the mechanical process than by
letting compensation tum upon an inquiry into fault. 8
In specific reference to atomic energy injuries, Dean Prosser, writing
in 1955, offered this observation:
The first case involving damage from the escape of radiation from the use of atomic energy has yet to reach the courts.
When it does, it is not difficult to predict that there is no court
which will refuse to apply to it the principle of strict liability
found in the cases which follow Rylands v. Fletcher. 9
In this chapter we shall explore with considerable detail the doctrines
to which Professors Harper, James, and Prosser refer, namely, the
doctrines stemming from Rylands v. Fletcher and involving this modem
trend toward liability without fault. It is this trend and these doctrines
with which atomic energy users and their insurance carriers will be
chiefly concerned. We shall also concern ourselves with the possible ap82 Harper & James, Torts 794-795 (1956).
o Prosser, Torts 336 (2d ed. 1955).
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plications of nuisance doctrines to activities involving peaceful utilization of atomic science. In other words, in this chapter all phases of
liability imposed upon operators of equipment containing radiation
sources except liability founded upon negligence, will be discussed.
C. Strict Liability Under the Doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher-The
English Decisions
We will now proceed to examine the current theory of strict liability
employed in common law jurisdictions as derived from the English case
of Rylands v. Fletcher. The case was decided by the House of Lords in
1868, and, although it is now ninety years of age, its value as a precedent seems to grow with time. It is a part of a modern trend toward
strict liability. In the United States especially, it has become a very
broadly ranging and even severe doctrine in some of its applications.
In Rylands v. Fletcher a mill owner built a water reservoir on his own
land over an abandoned mine shaft that, unknown to him, connected
with a mine located on the plaintiff's adjoining premises. The water
accumulated in the reservoir and thereafter escaped into and through
the abandoned shaft and thence into the plaintiff's workings. Damage
resulted and the plaintiff brought suit. Neither negligence, nuisance,
nor trespass was claimed or found to exist.
In the lower court (Exchequer Chamber) Justice Blackburn found
the defendant liable though without fault. He stated the rule of the case
in these often quoted words :
We think that the true rule of law is, that the person who
for his own purposes brings on his lands and collects and keeps
there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it
in at his peril, and, if he does not do so, he is prima facie
answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence
of its escape. He can excuse himself by showing that the
escape was owing to the plaintiff's fault; or perhaps that the
escape was the consequence of a vis major, or the act of God. 10
This decision was affirmed on appeal to the House of Lords, but
some important limiting qualifications were added to the doctrine of the
case as stated by Justice Blackburn. Specifically a requirement of "nonnatural user" of the defendant's land was added. The court, Lord Cairns
speaking, said :
[I] f, in what I may term the natural user of that land,
there had been any accumulation of water, . . . and if, by the
to Rylands v. Fletcher, L. R., I Exch. 265, 279-28o (1866).
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operation of the laws of nature, that accumulation of water
had passed off into the close occupied by. the Plaintiff, the
Plaintiff could not have complained. . . .

* * * * *

On the other hand if the Defendants, not stopping at the
natural use of their close, had desired to use it for any purpose
which I may term a non-natural use . . . and if in consequence . . . the water came to escape and to pass off into the
close of the Plaintiff, then it appears to me that that which the
Defendants were .doing they were doing at their own peril.u
The court did not specifically limit the rule of the case to damage inflicted on adjoining land but, on the contrary, as it was stated, it could
readily be made applicable to personal injuries as well. That aspect of
the decision has subsequently been given judicial consideration in
England with results that we shall presently note.
In accordance with these pronouncements, therefore, three important
limitations appear in respect to the application of the Rylands doctrine;
namely, ( 1) liability is imposed only in case of bringing and maintaining on to the land a dangerous substance likely to cause mischief if it
escapes, ( 2) this activity must constitute a "non-natural use" of the land,
and (3) there must be an "escape" that causes damage. These limitations create great uncertainty in the application of the doctrine to other
situations.
In regard to the first point, i.e., the dangerous quality of the s-ubstance
or instrumentality, Dr. Stallybrass reached the conclusion, after an extensive examination of all of the English decisions down to the time of
writing in 1929, that the application of the doctrine rests upon a principle
of relativity. He wrote that "just as there is nothing which is at all
times and in all circumstances dangerous so it seems that there is scarcely
anything which is in all circumstances safe." 12 He elaborates the principle in the following language:
The principle of law behind all these cases is, it is submitted,
that if a man takes a risk, which he ought not to take without
also taking upon his shoulders the consequences of that risk,
he shall pay for any damage that ensues.
In every case the question really is : Was the risk one which
the defendant was entitled to take only on condition of paying
compensation to those injured thereby irrespective of any
negligence on his part? And the answer to that question will
Rylands v. Fletcher, L. R., 3 H. L. 330, 338-339 (1868).
Stallybrass, "Dangerous Things and the Non-Natural User of Land," 3 Carob.
L.J. 376, 387 (1929).
11

12
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not depend upon whether the thing in question was dangerous
per se, but upon whether it was dangerous in the circumstances
of the particular case. 13

In short, if the defendant brings a substance on his land which involves an unreasonable risk of harm to persons or property in the
vicinity, he falls within the doctrine of the Rylands case. It is obvious
that application to specific situations will present difficulties.
Moreover, there is serious uncertainty in connection with the application of the term "non-natural user." The court's opinion in the_
Rylands case offered no assistance, and the problem of determining
when a given user is non-natural persists to this day. The words have
now become "terms of art," and the courts have indicated that they are
susceptible to change as the world becomes more crowded, and as industry becomes more complex. The doctrine has been said to be confined to activities which are "extraordinary" or "abnormal." It does
not apply to "usual," "ordinary," and "normal" types of activity. It has
also been said that "the reasonable use of property in the way most
beneficial to the community" is not deemed to be a "non-natural use"
so as to render the actor subject to strict liability. 14
Forty-five years after Rylands v. Fletcher was decided the case of
Rickards v. Lothian came before the English courts. That case, somewhat like Rylands, involved an overflow of water on an upper floor
damaging plaintiff's stock in trade stored below. Recovery, sought on
the basis of the Rylands case, was denied, however. The court said:
The provision of a proper supply of water to the various
parts of a house is not only reasonable, but has become, in accordance with modern sanitary views, an almost necessary
feature of town life . . . . in some form or another it is
usually made obligatory in civilized countries. Such a supply
cannot be installed without causing some concurrent danger of
leakage or overflow. It would be unreasonable for the law
to regard those who instal or maintain such a system of supply
as doing so at their own peril.

* * * * *

It is not every use to which land is put that brings into play
that principle [namely the principle of Rylands v. Fletcher]. It
must be some special use bringing with it increased danger to
others, and must not merely be the ordinary use of the land or
such a use as is proper for the general benefit of the community.15
18

!d. at 387, 388.
Bramwell, ]., in Nichols v. Marsland, L. R ro Exch. 255, 259 (1875).
15 [1913] A. c. 263, 2&>-282.
14
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It is clear, then, that not only the character of the activity but also the
place and manner in which it is carried on are pertinent to the classification of the function as a non-natural user or otherwise.
In accordance with the foregoing principles, the English courts have
applied the strict liability doctrine in a considerable variety of cases involved in some seventy English decisions. They have applied it against
defendants who collected water in large quantity in hydraulic power
mains; who operated a plant for washing film in close proximity to the
plaintiff's land; who stored illuminating gas in quantity; who conducted
high voltage electricity in the public streets; who operated a traction
engine with the fire under its boiler shooting out sparks along the highway; who operated a ten-ton traction engine too heavy for the highway;
who stored large quantities of explosives, or inflammable liquids; who
engaged in blasting or accumulating sewage; who maintained a facility
involving the emission of creosote fumes; or who operated a pile driver
which caused excessive vibration. All of these have been deemed "nonnatural users" for which strict liability ensued. On the other hand,
maintaining water in a cistern, or in household pipes, or household gas
or electricity supply, or fire in a fireplace, or driving automobiles on the
highways are customary uses for which strict liability does not apply. 18
In respect to the requirement of "escape" of a dangerous substance
from the defendant's premises, the recent English case of Read v. The
Lyons Company, Ltd. 11 may well exert considerable influence upon
American courts in further evolution of the American doctrines of strict
liability. The cause of action arose during World War II as a result of
an accident in defendant's ordnance factory. The plaintiff, an employee
of the Ministry of Supply, was on the premises as a shell inspector, and
she was injured by the explosion of a shell. The issue was briefly summarized by Lord Porter who asked :
Are the occupiers of a munitions factory liable to one of those
working in that factory who is injured in the factory itself by
an explosion occurring there without any negligence on the
part of the occupiers or their servants? 18
A claim of strict liability was advanced by the plaintiff but without success. Said Viscount Simon, one of the judges :
The fact that the work that was being carried on was of a kind
which requires special care is a reason why the standard of
1 6 For a citation of the many English cases, see Prosser, Torts 329, 330 (2d ed.
1955).
17 Supra note J.
18 I d. at 478.
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care should be high, but it is no reason for saying that the
occupier is liable for resulting damage to an invitee without
any proof of negligence at alP'
On the question of "escape" Viscount Simon commented :
The first essential condition of "escape" does not seem to me
to be present at all. "Escape," for the purpose of applying the
proposition in Rylands v. Fletcher means escape from a place
which the defendant has occupation of, or control over, to a
place which is outside his occupation or control. 20
Lord McMillan also participated in the court's opinion. He commented
both on "escape" and also on "non-natural user" as follows :
The doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher, as I understand it,
derives from a conception of the mutual duties of adjoining or
neighboring landowners. . . . The two prerequisites of the
doctrine are that there must be the escape of something from
one man's close to another man's close and that that which
escapes must have been brought on the land from which it
escapes in consequence of some non-natural use of that land
whatever precisely that may mean. Neither of these features
exists in the present case. I have already pointed out that
nothing escaped from the defendant's premises, and, were it
necessary to decide the point, I should hesitate to hold that in
these days and in ari industrial community it was a non-natural
use of land to build a factory on it and conduct there the manufacture of explosives. I could conceive it being said that to
carry on the manufacture of explosives in a crowded urban
area was evidence of negligence; but there is no such case
here. 21
Lord Simonds who also wrote an opinion mentioned the rule set forth
in the American Law Institute Restatement of Torts, reference to which
will be made later in this chapter, to the effect that "ultra-hazardous
activities" should carry with them the doctrine of strict liability. He
rejected both the Restatement rule and other American strict liability
doctrines in the following language:
Somewhere the line must be drawn unless full rein be given
to the doctrine that a man acts always at his peril. . . . I
speak with all deference of modern American textbooks and
judicial decisions, but I think little guidance can be obtained
from the way in which this part of the common law has developed on the other side of the ocean. 22
19

/d.
zo /d.
21 /d.
22 /d.

at 473·
at 474at 477.
at 48I.
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In regard to liability of persons on the defendant's premises, Lord
Simonds concluded :
I would reject the idea [of the Restatement] that, if a man
carries on a so-called ultra-hazardous activity on his premises,
the line must be drawn so as to bring him within the limit of
strict liability for its consequences to all men everywhere. On
the contrary, I would say that his obligation to those lawfully
on his premises is to be ultra-cautious in carrying on his ultrahazardous activity, but that it will still be the task of the injured person to show that the defendant owed him a duty of
care and did not fulfil it. It may well be that in the discharge
of that task he will sometimes be able to call in aid the maxim
res ipsa loquitur. 28
It should not be assumed, however, from the above quotations that
the English courts apply the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher only to
injuries to land. It is true that most of the seventy decisions involve
such injuries, and, in English law, landed interests are for historical
reasons highly regarded-perhaps considerably more so than are personal interests. However, there are cases imposing strict liability. for
purely personal injuries such as the I enning$ Brothers case concerning
an amusement park with its centrifugal whirling chair device which
went awry and injured the plaintiff. 2 '
Moreover, there are certain exceptions to the doctrine of strict liability that may be gleaned from the British decisions. Strict liability is
not applicable :
I. When the defendant is able to ". . . excuse himself by showing
that the escape was owing to the plaintiff's default"; 25
2. When the damage is caused by ·the intervention of an Act of
God; 26
3; When the harm results from the deliberate act of a third party
stranger ; 27 or
4· When the defendant is acting under .and in accordance with statutory authority, a subject to be more fully developed later in this chapter. 28
In short, the views of the British courts as reflected in the cases, including the· significant Read v. Lyons Company, Ltd., may be summarized as follows: ( 1) strict liability un:der the Rylands rule is founded
2s

I d. at 481-482.

Hale v. Jennings Bros. [1938] I All. E. R. 579·
L. R. I Exch. 265, 279 (Ex. 1866).
26 Nichols v. Marsland, L. R. 10 Exch. 255 (1875).
27 Box v. Jubb 4 Ex. Div. 76 (1879).
2 8 Green v. Chelsea Water Works Company, 70 L. T. R. 547 (1894); Longhurst v.
Metropolitan Water Board [1948] 2 All. E. R. 834.
24
25
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historically upon a mutual obligation of adjoining or neighboring landowners, a fact which to no small degree affects its interpretation; and
( 2) in order to apply the Rylands doctrine the court must find : first,
a dangerous substance or instrumentality; second, non-natural user of
th~ land under defendant's c<;mtrol; third, an escape of the dangerous
substance or instrumentality from the defendant's premises; fourth,
harm caused to the owner of adjacent or neighboring premises, or to
persons in the vicinity; and, fifth, that none of the named exceptions is
applicable.
In considering the future application of the British cases to injuries
occasioned by escaping radioactive substances it would seem that the
principal difficulty will arise from the necessity of applying the concept
of "non-natural user." Because radioactive particles migrate with
distressing ease, there will be little question but that in the years to come
untoward incidents will result in the escape of radioactivity into the surrounding countryside, and the question will be raised whether or not the
source from which the escape takes place does or does not amount to a
"non-natural user" of the land. The determination of this issue will
depend upon ~ considerable number of factors, including location of the
source with resped to outside persons and property, the character of the
utilization device with respect to its dangerous propensities, and the
social utility expected to be derived from the location of the particular
activity in the community where the inciderit occurred.
D. The Doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher Under American Decisions
We will now consider the American cases which are obviously of
greater significance than are the English cases in connection with an
appraisal of the possibility of strict liability for radiation injuries being
imposed uport nuclear industry in the United States. In this country
Rylands v. Fletcher has been accepted by some courts and rejected by
·
others. ·
At a very early date the Supreme Courts of Massachusetts and Minnesota approved the doctrine. 29 Soon afterward, however, the doctrine
was repudiated in New York, 80 New Hampshire, 81 and New Jersey. 82
29 Ball v. Nye, 99 Mass. 582 (1868), involving the escape of filthy water from the
defendant's premises; Cahill v. Eastman, 18 Minn. 324 ( 1871), involving damage to
property caused by escape of water onto plaintiff's premises through a tunnel constructed by the defendant.
8o Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N.Y. 476 .(1873), a steam boiler case.
81 Brown v. Collins, 53 N.H.' 442 (1873), a traffic situation.
82 Marshall v. Welwood, 38 N.J.L. 339 (1876), a steam boiler case.
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In subsequent litigation- the doctrine has been repudiated by name, at
least, in seven additional states-Kentucky, Maine, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, and Washington. On the other hand, an
even greater number of American courts have accepted the doctrine and
applied it in one way or another. In addition to Massachusetts and Minnesota, decisions to this effect have been rendered in Arkansas, California, Colorado, District of Columbia, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Missouri, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, and West Virginia. 88
Accordingly it would appear that the doctrine has met with substantial
favor in the United States and the extent of the approbation is increasing. The doctrine has been applied to many and varied cases involving
such situations as the impounding of water, the storage of explosives
and inflammable liquids, blasting, fumigation,- crop dusting, oil well
operations, and the emission of smoke, dust, or noxious gases. Like the
courts in Great Britain, the United States courts have declined to apply
the doctrine to so-called "natural uses" of land, and for this reason they
have declined to apply it to such activities as carrying water in pipes
for household use, conducting gas in ordinary household supply devices,
installing electric wiring, storing gasoline in filling stations, coal mining
operations, and other affairs that are deemed normal and natural in relation to the community where they are carried on.
In view of the importance of the American cases in connection with
possible strict liability of the atomic industry, it will be desirable to
survey a number of the leading cases. For this purpose, we shall divide
the cases into three categories : first, cases in which the doctrine has
been repudiated altogether and the plaintiffs have been referred for
redress to the doctrines of negligence; second, cases in which the
doctrine has been recognized and applied; and third, cases in which the
doctrine has been recognized but the courts have declined to hold the
defendant in the particular situation to a rule of strict liability.
I.

Rylands v. Fletcher Repudiated

As has already been stated, in the United States the doctrine of
Rylands v. Fletcher was early repudiated by several of the leading state
courts, and there is today a substantial body of judicial authority to the
effect- that it will not be applied, at least under the conditions and circumstances involved in the cases in which the question has been raised. Although the trend of modern decisions may be in the direction of acceptss Dean Prosser in his volume Selected Topics on the Law of Torts (1953) has
assembled a most complete listing of citations. See pp. 152-157.
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ance rather than rejection of the doctrine, these cases nevertheless
possess considerable current authority.
In Losee v. Buchanan, 34 decided by the New York Court of Appeals
shortly after the English courts handed down their decision in Rylands
v. Fletcher, action was brought to recover damages occasioned by the
explosion of a steam boiler as a result of which parts were projected onto
the plaintiff's premises and through several of his buildings, damaging
the same and destroying personal property therein. The plaintiff urged
the court to apply the principle of liability without fault apart from
considerations of negligence. The court declined to do so, not because
the operation of a steam boiler was a "natural use" of the premises, but
because the doctrine of strict liability was generally distasteful. A quotation from the opinion reveals the theory.
By becoming a member of civilized society, I am compelled
to give up many of my natural rights, but I receive more than a
compensation from the surrender by every other man of the
same rights, and the security, advantage and protection which
the laws give me. So, too, the general rules that I may have
the exclusive and undisturbed use and possession of my real
estate, and that I must so use iny real estate as not to injure my
neighbor, are much modified by the exigencies of the social
state. We must have factories, machinery, dams, canals and
railroads. They are demanded by the manifold wants of mankind and lay at the basis of all our civilization. If I have any
of these upon my lands, and they are not a nuisance and are not
so managed as to become such, I am not responsible for any
damage they accidentally and unavoidably do my neighbor.
He receives his compensation for such damage by the general
good, in which he shares, and the right which he has to place
the same things upon his lands. I may not place or keep a
nuisance upon my land to the damage of my neighbor, and I
have my compensation for the surrender of this right to use
my own as I will by the similar restriction imposed upon my
neighbor for my benefit. I hold my property subject to the risk
that it may be unavoidably or accidentally injured by those
who live near me; and as I move about upon the public highways and in all places where other persons may lawfully be, I
take the risk of being accidentally injured in my person by
them without fault on their part. Most of the rights of property, as well as of person, in the social state, are not absolute
but relative, and they must be so arranged and modified, not
unnecessarily infringing upon natural rights, as upon the
whole to promote the general welfare. 86
B4

Supra note

SG

/d. at 484, 485.

JO.

STRICT LIABILITY

649

In a more recent Oklahoma case, Gulf Pipe Line Company et al v.
Sims,S 6 the plaintiff claimed that absolute liability should rest upon the
defendant for injuries occasioned to the plaintiff while he was riding
as a passenger in an automobile driven along a public highway. As he
approached a bridge over a small ravine, gas which had collected near
and around the bridge was ignited causing an explosion and fire as a
result of which the plaintiff was severely burned. The gas came from
crude oil leaking from the defendant's pipelines. The plaintiff contended
that the defendant should be held liable regardless of negligence, relying
upon the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher. Yet the court refused to apply
the doctrine to the circumstances as they existed in Oklahoma. Said the
court:
We think that case, (i.e., Rylands v. Fletcher) is not in point
here upon the facts. And we conclude that the rule there
announced, and here contended for the plaintiff, Sims, cannot
be sustained in this jurisdiction in this character of action,
and that our conclusion that it should not be followed is justified both by the trend of modern decisions, and by modern
economic and industrial developments.
The business engaged in by the defendants, that of transportation and storage of crude oil, is one of the basic industries
of the state; that business is not only legal, necessary, and
proper, but has an outstanding part in the development of the
natural resources of the state. When that business is conducted in the recognized manner, with all diligence, and with
the use of standard equipment, materials and appliances, and
without negligence, then the persons engaged in such business
should not, under the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher, be held to
be insurers that in no event would it be possible that damage or
injury could result from such operation. 87
In later cases the Oklahoma Supreme Court has pointed out that the
Sims case has no application in cases of injuries to real property which
is protected by Section 23, Article 2 of the state constitution providing
that no private property shall be "taken or damaged" for private use
without compensation. 88
sa 168 Okla. 209. 32 P.2d 902 (1934).
37 ld. at 213.
ss See Phillips Petroleum Company v. Vandergriff, 190 Okla. 28o, 122 P. 2d 1020
(1942), and British-American Oil Producing Co. v. McClain, 191 Okla. 40, 126 P.2d
530 (1942). See Comment on the Oklahoma cases in Foster and Keeton, "Liability
Without Fault in Oklahoma," 3 Okla. L. Rev. 38-41 (1950), where the authors criticize
the Sims case, referring to the fact that, in the later British-American case, the coui:t
had stated that the views expressed in the Sims case were largely dictum. They add
"It would appear that there is substantial doubt as to the present vitality and future
application of the Sims case." However, it still stands as the law of Oklahoma.
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A similar question has arisen in the neighboring state of Texas in
Turner v. Big Lake Oil Company. 89 This case also involved oil producing operations. In a state in which such operations form a very large
part of the economy, Turner brought suit against the oil company for
damages for alleged pollution of the plaintiff's land and his water holes
resulting from the defendants' permitting the escape of salt water from
oil producing operations on its property. The jury found that the defendants were not guilty of negligence. The plaintiffs on appeal contended for a doctrine of strict liability, referring for authority to the
rule of Rylands v. Fletcher and American cases in accord with it. The
Texas court declined to apply the rule stating that "in Texas we have
conditions very different from those which obtain in England" and that
it had "long since repudiated the general rule announced in Rylands v.
Fletcher." The court referred with approval to another Texas Supreme
Court opinion, in Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Oakes, in which case the
court criticized the rule of the Rylands case stating:
The rule laid down was largely deduced from prior rulings
establishing absolute liability for damages caused by fires
kindled on one's premises and spreading to those of another;
by injuries inflicted by one, in his lawful self-defense against
another, upon an innocent bystander; and by animals straying
from the lands of their owners upon those of others. The law
has become settled, in this country at least, that there is no
liability in the first two instances without negligence on the
part of the person permitting the fire to spread or inflicting the
injury; and in the case of animals, the law is entirely different
in this and other states.'0
Accordingly, the court in the Turner case concluded :
Since we have repudiated the bases of the rule announced
in Rylands v. Fletcher, it follows as a necessary corollary
that we should not apply the rule in cases such as the one before us. 61
Although the Texas court declined to apply the rule of Rylands v.
Fletcher in the Turner case, it did at several points in its opinion refer
to the possibility of imposing an equivalent of liability without fault
by reference to nuisance doctrines, if a nuisance were in fact created
by the defendant. 42
I28 Tex. ISS. g6 S.W.2d 221 (I936).
Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Oakes, 94 Tex. ISS at IS8, IS9, s8 S.W. 999 (Igoo).
4 1 Supra note 39 at 162.
42 See Prosser, "Nuisance Without Fault," 20 Tex. L. Rev. 399 (I942), criticizing
the Turner case and indicating that the effect of strict liability might perhaps be
achieved in Texas by pleading and urging a nuisance doctrine.
89

40
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These cases make it dear that there is at least some authority in the
United States to the effect that the doctrines of strict liability should not
be applied indiscriminately. The vitality and extent of this opposition
are open to question in view of current trends in thinking about tort
liability, and, in any event, there is still left open the question as to
whether or not the doctrine should be applied to damages occasioned by
radioactive substances.
2.

Rylands v. Fletcher Accepted and Applied.

We have already mentioned the fact that more state supreme courts
have accepted and approved the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher than
have ·refused to give it recognition. It is now desirable to review a number of the better reasoned opinions rendered in cases approving and
applying the doctrine, or its American eguivalent, and thus to attempt
to derive a theory which will permit us to predict the likelihood of strict
liability being invoked against those who inflict radiation injuries on
others. We shall not be able to derive the sam,e clearcut pattern of theory
as that which can be derived from the opinions of the English courts.
However, by examining a selection of six leading cases, we can obtain
a fairly adequate understanding of the extent of the doctrine as it is applied in those states that have accepted it, and thus place ourselves in a
position to make a projection into the atomic age.
The Kansas case of Berry v. Shell Petroleum Company .a involved a
claim for damages caused to real property by the seepage of salt water,
thereby. ruining the water supply on the plaintiff's premises. The de. fendant owned and operated an oil producing field. The oil, as it came
from the ground, was mixed with salt water. Separation was achieved
by .storage in tanks, drawing the oil off the top and the water off the
bottom. The salt water was discharged through pipes which connected
with a drainage ditch in the city of Wichita, Kansas. This was done
pursuant to and in accordance with a city ordinance. It was understood
that the salt water would be carried through the sanitary sewer system
except in case of. emergency or when it was found necessary to divert
it into a drainage canal fo.r the purpose of flushing the drainage canal
.system. During the course of a flushing operation salt water apparently
seeped through the sand bottom of the canal and into the wells used by
the plaintiff. The water was rendered unfit for use. The plaintiff made
no allegation of negligence; reliance was placed squarely upon the doctrine of absolute liability. The defendant not only denied the applicabil48

140 Kan. 94. 33 P.2d 953 (1934).
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ity of strict liability rules but also contended that when it delivered its
water, impregnated with salt, to the city, all duties resting upon it came
to an end. The court nevertheless held the defendant strictly liable.
The court first spoke in terms of nuisance, saying :
The rule· is well settled that an individual who sustains an
injury peculiar to himself may have relief against a public
nuisance and is entitled to maintain an action at law for damages on account of the special injury which he has sustained. 44
The court did not, however, rest its decision exclusively on the ground
of nuisance. It also turned to the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher, referring to it with approval and stating :
It is well settled in this state that when a water supply is
damaged by salt water percolating through the soil and impregnating it with salt so that the water is rendered unfit for
use, the owner of the land may maintain an action for damages
against the owner of the land from whose land the salt water
escaped. 45
It must be remembered that negligence is not a necessary
element of the right of recovery in a case like this. The right
to recover results from the company having the harmful substance on its land and permitting it to escape to the damage
·
of plaintifV 6
It should be notedthat the facts in the Berry case are in interesting
contrast to those in the Turner case, referred to in the preceding section,
decided by the Texas Supreme Court only two years later. The fact
that the economy of the state of Texas is so largely dependent upon the
production of oil, whereas that of Kansas depends more on agricultural
and industrial pursuits, can no doubt be regarded as at least a partial
explanation of the difference in the attitude of the two courts concerning
the applicability of the doctrines of strict liability to the business of oil
production. It should be noted that in the Be"y case the Kansas Supreme Court made no mention whatsoever of the Ryland.r requirement
of "non-natural use of the land." The court simply stated that "the
liability . . . springs from the fact that the companies had salt water
on their property and permitted it to escape." 47 Furthermore, the court
said : "We are aware of the fact that such a ruling places a great burden
on the oil industry. It is, however, no new principle which we are an44

!d. at 99.
at 100.
/d. at 101.
ld at 102.

45/d.
46

47
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nouncing. It is as old as the industry of man. We consider that the
water supply of the people is of greater importance than the operation
of a business at a reduced cost." 48 Thus the court enunciated a doctrine
of relative social utility which is more nearly akin to nuisance doctrines
originating in equity.
In Berger v. Minneapolis Gaslight Company 49 the defendant, a gas
manufacturer and distributor, maintained a reservoir containing crude
petroleum. The petroleum escaped and percolated through the ground
to the plaintiff's premises where it caused damage. The defendant contended that the case should be dismissed since there was a failure to
show negligence. Nevertheless the trial court instructed the jury that the
defendant was liable without proof of negligence. The Supreme Court,
citing Rylands v. Fletcher with approval, agreed with the instruction
and sustained the verdict and judgment for the plaintiff, saying that the
proofs showed that the defendant fell within the limits of strict liability,
and that
The essential condition of liability, without proof of negligence on the part of the owner, for injury to others by the
escape of things kept by him on his own premises, is that the
natural tendency of the things kept is to become a nuisance or
to do mischief, if they escape.~
0

Thus the Minnesota court, like the Kansas court in the Berry case, apparently ignores the question of "non-natural use" of the land, but concentrates simply and solely upon the question as to whether or not something of dangerous potentialities has been permitted to escape. Thus
the decision is rested upon only one of the principal requirements imposed by the English courts in connection with Rylands v. Fletcher.
The fact is that the doctrine of strict liability is developing in this
country on an. even broader base than in the country of its origin. If,
for example, the defendant's crude petroleum tank had been located far
away from centers of population and in a location in which such storage
in tanks was a common practice, the defendant would still have been
held liable according to the language used by the court.
Another ·case worthy of attention in this connection is Frost v.
Berkeley Phosphate Co. 51 This was an action for damages inflicted upon
the plaintiff and his' property by the defendant who operated a mill i11
which he manufactured sulphuric acid and commercial fertilizers. In
Ibid.
6o Mitm. 296, 62 N.W. 336 (1895).
GO /d. at J01.
u42 S.C. 402, 20 S.E. 28o (1894).

48
•9
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the process of producing sulphuric acid certain gases and fumes were
produced which had injurious effects upon vegetable and animal life.
The plaintiff charged that gases escaping from the defendant's mill
injured and destroyed his crops and other vegetation growing upon
his land, and proved so detrimental to health as to render his premises
unfit for habitation. Under the instructions of the trial court a verdict
was returned by the jury for the defendant, and the plaintiff appealed.
The Supreme Court of South Carolina found the instructions of the
trial court objectionable for the reason that they propounded a doctrine
of non-negligent liability based solely upon nuisance (i.e., unlawful
action) and leaving no room for strict liability in cases of lawful conduct
of business. The Supreme Court disagreed with so limited a doctrine
and in so doing laid down its views concerning strict liability as follows:
The second objection to this charge is, as it seems to us, that
it unwarrantably limits the operation of the maxim, Sic utere
tuo ut alienum non ltEdas, so as to allow the owner of a tract
of land to so use his own land in the prosecution of any lawful
business as would necessarily or probably injure his neighbor,
provided he takes all reasonable care to prevent such injury.
This we do not understand to be the law. On the contrary, we
think if one uses his own land for the.prosecution of some
business from which injury to his neighbor would either necessarily or probably ensue, he is liable if such injury does result,
even though he may have used reasonable care in the prosecution of such business. This doctrine is supported not only
by reason, but by the weight of authority . . . .62

Rylands v. Fletcher was referred to with approval. Here again we
find no limitation to "non-natural user" but instead a very broad enunciation 'of a: doctrine of strict liability, far broader than the principles
initially derived by the English courts from Rylands v. Fletcher.
·A Maryland ~se, $usquehanna Fertilizer Co. v. Malone/ 3 also involving a fertilizer plant producing sulphuric acid fumes, affords a
somewhat similar broad theoretical base for the doctrine. In this case
the plaintiff. was the owner of .several dwelling houses in one of the
suburbs of B~timore. On the adjoining lot was the defend;mt's large
fertilizer factory frorp which, so the plaintiff charged, noxious gases
escaped, not only to the great physical discomfort of his tenants and
himself, but also to cause material injury to the property itself. The
court, in its opinion, specifically negated the possibility of submitting
n I d. at 409.
n 73 Md. 268, 20 At!. 900 ( 18c)o).
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to the jury the question as to whether ot not the factory was located in a
convenient and proper place for carrying on such business, i.e., whether,
under all of the circumstances it was a "natural use" of the land. Citing
Rylands v. Fletcher among other authorities the court expressed itself
as follows:
No principle is better settled than that where a trade or business is carried on in such a manner as to interfere with the
reasonable and comfortable enjoyment by another of his
property, or whi~h occasions material injury to the property
itself, a wrong is done to the neighboring owner, for which an
action will lie. And this, too, without regard to the locality
where such business is carried on; and this, too, although the
business may be a lawful business, and one useful to the public,
and although the best and most approved appliances and methods may be used in the conduct and management of the business}1"
And further quoting from the opinion :
We cannot agree with the appellant that the Court ought to
have directed the jury to find whether the place where this factory was located was a convenient and proper place for the carrying on of the appellant's business, and whether such a use
of his property was a reasonable use, and if they should so find
the verdict must be for the defendant. It may be convenient
to the defendant, and it may be convenient to the public, but,
in the eye of the law, no place can be convenient for the carrying on of a business which is a nuisance, and which causes substantial injury to the property of another. Nor can any use of
one's own land be said to be a reasonable use, which deprives
an adjoining owner of the lawful use and enjoyment of his
property}111
We must not fail to note the breadth of the doctrine thus enunciated
and further, we should note the continual reference to "nuisance." In
the opinions of many of the state supreme courts in the United States
the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher becomes inextricably involved with
doctrines of nuisance. The two are often used interchangeably to impose strict liability in those cases.i"n which they are invoked. "Nuisance"
is at best a vague concept of uncertain dimensions used in different ways
by different courts. The breadth of the views enunciated by the Maryland court in the Susquehanna case are in part at least attributable to
this fusion of doctrines, and results in a principle that runs far beyond
54

/d. at 276.

Ufd. at 276, 277.
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that of Rylands v. Fletcher which is rather precisely limited to "nonnatural" user resulting in an "escape" of substances "likely to do
mischief."
A very recent case of significance is Gotreaux v. Gary. 56 This was an
action against a farmer who employed a certain flying service to spray
his rice crop with the chemical 2, 4-D. Unfortunately the chemical was
carried by the wind to the plaintiff's premises three and one-half miles
away, and there it served to destroy some thirteen acres of cotton and
three acres of peas under cultivation. The Louisiana Code contained
a provision reading as follows :
Although a proprietor may do with his estate whatever he
pleases, still he cannot make any work on it, which inay deprive
his neighbor of the liberty of enjoying his own, or which may
be the cause of any damage to him. 57
However, the legislature of Louisiana had adopted regulations concerning the use of 2, 4-D and permitting its use during periods of wind
velocity of less than six miles per hour. With this limitation the defendant had complied. The defendant pleaded that fact and· lack of
negligence. The court, however, declared that it was unwilling to follow
any rule which rejected the doctrine of absolute liability in cases of this
nature. The court stated that nuisance was not involved but based· its
holding for the plaintiff upon the principle that in such circumstances
negligence or fault is not a requisite to liability, but that liability should
follow irrespective of the fact that the activities resulting in the damages
were conducted with reasonable care and in accordance with modern
and accepted methods. Said the court without mentioning Rylands v.
Fletcher but reaching a like result :
. . . . [I]t is true that theLegislature consented to the use
of herbicides, btit this did not entitle the defendants to injure
plaintiff's crops. Although the use of the spraying operation
was lawful, it was carried out in such a manner as to unreasonably inconvenience plaintiff and deprive him of the liberty
of enjoying his farm. 58
One other case should be given consideration in this discussion of the
Rylands doctrine in United States courts. In Green v. The General
Petroleum Corporation 59 the plaintiff instituted an action to recover
damages for injuries to his property occasioned by the defendant's oil
56

232 La. 373, 94 S.2d 293 (1957).

La. Rev. Civ. Code art. 667.
n Supra note 56 at 378.
59 205 Cal. 328, 270 Pac. 952 (1928).

57
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drilling operations. It appeared that in the process of drilling 'for oil,
although the defendant had exercised ordinary care and was not guilty
of negligence in any particular, a stream of oil, gas, mud, and rocks was
shot into the air and onto the plaintiff's property located about two
hundred feet from the well. The defendant denied liability, asserting that
under the California decisions there was no such thing as liability without negligence. The court, outlining the California law on the subject, indicated that, quite apart from negligence or the commission of a nuisance
per se, neither of which existed in this case, and notwithstanding the
fact that the production of oil is a legitimate and lawful business, nevertheless, a doctrine of strict liability should be applied. Without referring
to Rylands v. Fletcher the court stated the rule in California to be as
follows:
Where one in the conduct and maintenance of an enterprise
lawful and proper in itself, deliberately does an act under
known conditions, and, with knowledge that the injury may
result to another, proceeds, and injury is done to the other as
the direct and proximate consequence of the act, however carefully done, the one who does the act and causes the injury
should, in all fairness, be required to compensate the other for
the damage done. The instant case offets a most excellent example of an actual invasion of the property· of one person
through the act of another. 80
Thereupon the court after emphasizing the fact that there was here
an actual invasion of the plaintiff's property, i.e., a trespass upon his
premises, said in holding the defendant to strict liability:
Any other construction would permit one owner, under like
circumstances, to use the land of another for his own purpose
and benefit without making compensation for such use. We
do not conceive that to be the law. 81
We can note in this case another type of extension of the principle of
Rylands v. Fletcher, which was limited on its facts substances brought
on to the defendant's land. In the Green case the substances were already on or under the land in extraordinary quantity, but the ~efendant
by his activity put them in such a position as to make. their escape possible. In other words the defendant did not bring onto his land a dangerous substance, but he used his land in such a way as to release a substance already there.
Many more cases could be discussed but those which have been here

to

80
81

I d. at 333, 334·
I d. at 334.
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set forth are illustrative of the breadth bf the doctrine of strict liability
as it has been applied by some of the state supreme courts to certain
highly useful activities in this country. As we have already several times
noted, those courts that are applying the doctrine do so in a manner
which gives it greater coverage than that indicated for Rylands v.
Fletcher. The purport of this for the operator of a nuclear reactor is
apparent.

3· Rylands v. Fletcher Accepted but Not Applied, in View of the
Circumstances of the Particular Case
From the standpoint of atomic enterprise the cases outlined in the
preceding subsection would seem to leave but little room for the application of any less rigorous doctrine of liability in the case of radiation injuries than that of Rylands v. Fletcher. Indeed an even more severe
doctrine may, and in all probability will, in many jurisdictions emerge
and be ·applied in appropriate circumstances. Nevertheless, we should
not immediately conclude that all cases of radiation overexposure will
result in the imposition of the doctrine. We should now view briefly
certain of the rather numerous cases arising in jurisdictions which accept the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher, but which have declined to apply
it in the particular circumstances of the cases at hand. We shall see that
in some of the states at least there is dev~loping, as in England, a requirement of "naturalness of use,'' or "reasonableness under the circum~tances," or "appropriateness in view of the public benefit derived,"
which may serve tb mitigate the harshness of strict liability in connection with certain uses of atomic energy,
An illustration of this type of case is McCord Rubber Company v.
St. Joseph Water Com-pany, 62 an action for damages for the flooding of
plaintiff's cellar with water, ther.eby destroying the value of a large
quanticy pf merchandise stored therein. The defendant water company
supplied water to the -plaintiff's premises and also to the premises of a
co-defendant who occupied quarters adjacent to the plaintiff's. The
water pipes entering the co-defendant's premises were frozen and
ruptured filling the co-defendant's cellar with water which then over-·
flowed into. the -plaintiff's cellar ruining his stock of goods. The trial
~ourt instructed the jury on a negligence theory. A verdict was rendered
for defendant. The plaintiff on appeal contended that the defendant
should be held liable regardless of negligence and that the jury should
have been so instructed. The plaintiff rested its contention upon Rylands
62

181 Mo. 678, 81 S.W.

18g

(1904).
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v. Fletcher. However, the court declined to agree. It distinguished the
case from Rylands v. Fletcher saying:
•
There is a wide difference between a great volume of water
collected in a reservoir (Rylands v. Fletcher) in dangerous
proximity to the premises of another and water brought into
a house through pipes in the manner usual in all cities, for the
ordinary use of the occupants of the house. Whilst water so
brought into a house cannot literally be said to have come in in
the course of what might be called in the language . . . of the
Lord Chancellor "natural user" of the premises, yet it is
brought in by the method universally in use in cities and is not
to be treated as an unnatural gathering of a dangerous agent.
The law applicable to the caging of ferocious animals is not
applicable to water brought into a house by pipes in the usual
manner.
The learned counsel for the plaintiff tried their case on the
theory that the defendants were negligent, and that is the only
theory on which they could have tried it. 83
In short, the Missouri court accepted the distinction stated in Rylands
v. Fletcher between natural and non-natural uses, regarding only the
latter as subject to the application of the doctrine of strict liability.
Two cases involving the coal industry of Pennsylvania, both with exceptionally well-reasoned opinions, illustrate "tlie·Jines of division which
properly can be drawn in the ~pplicat1on':of the doctrines of strict liability. In the first of these two cases, Pennsylvania Coal Company v.
Sanderson, 64 it appeared that the plaintiff, Mrs. Sanderson, had bought
a tract of land in the city of Scranton bordering on Meadow Brook.
The existence of the stream, the purity of its water, and its utility for
domestic and other purposes were inducements leading to the purchase.
She erected a home and built dams across "the brook to form a fish and
ice pond and to supply a cistern. Thereafter the defendant, Pe~sylvania
Coal Company, opened coal .veins upstream, and.as a result of these
operations a large volume of mine water was accumulated and was
pumped into Meadow Brook, corrupting the stream to such an extent
as to render it totally unfit for domestic use, destroying the fish, corroding pipes and apparatus, and rendering Mrs. Sanderson's equipmet:tt useless. A suit was ~rought to recover damages. The. trial court ent~red a
nonsuit on the ground of failure to sh.ow negligence. · On ·writ of error
88

64

I d. at 694, 6gs.
113 Pa. 126, 6 Atl. 453 (1886).
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the plaintiff contended that a doctrine of strict liability should be applied.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania disagreed, stating:
It will be observed that the defendants have done nothing
to change the character of the water, or to diminish its purity,
save what results from the natural use and enjoyment of their
own property. They have brought nothing on to the land
artificially. The water as it is poured into Meadow Brook, is
the water which the mine naturally discharges; its impurity
arises from natural, not artificial causes. The mine cannot,
of course,· be operated elsewhere than where the coal is naturally found, and the discharge is a necessary incident to the
mining of it.
It must be conceded, we think, that every man is entitled
to the ordinary and natural use and enjoyment of his property;
he may cut down the forest trees, clear and cultivate his land,
although in so doing he may dry up the sources of his neighbor's springs, or remove the natural barriers against wind and
storm. . . . 65

* * * * *

The defendants were engaged in a perfectly lawful business,
in which they had made large expenditures, and in which the
interests of the entire community were concerned; they were at
liberty to carry on that business in the ordinary way, and were
not, while so doing, accountable for consequences which they
could not control. . . .
I~

* * * * *

may be said that . .
when the flow of water is increased artificially or is greater than would result from gravitation alone, the mine owner who causes it is liable for the increased injury; that this may be termed a non-natural use of
the land, and the mine owner would be held for any injury,
which would be sustained in consequence of this artificial
increase in the amount. . . :oe

* * * * *

But the defendants, in the case at bar, brought nothing
upon the land ; they accumulated nothing there; the water was
there without any act of theirs, and it was the accumulation of
it which they sought to prevent. They were in the natural user
of their lands for a lawful purpose, and the discharge of the
mine water was an absolute necessity in order to that use of the
land. The distinction is obvious, and we cannot see how
Fletcher v. Rylands can be supposed to have any application in
the consideration of this case. 87
osfd. at 145.
ld. at 147.

66
67

I d. at 151.

STRICT LIABILITY

661

Then follows a significant sentence from one of the opinions filed
in a previous review of the case, as follows :
The trifling inconvenience to particular persons must sometimes give way to the necessities of a great community. Especially is this true where the leading industrial interest of the
state is involved, the prosperity of which affects every household in the Commonwealth: 68
We should not fail to take note of the fact that in this last sentence
above quoted the court adds to the fact of "natural use" the idea that
the balance of convenience for the community is a significant factor in
determining whether or not the doctrine of strict liability shall be applied. This doctrine of balance of convenience appears also in other connections, and it may well be that, on balance, certain activities, even
though somewhat hazardous, will be permitted in our modern technological age in view of the fact that the best interests of. the entire community will be served thereby, notwithstanding the potentialities of the
hazardous conditions. The chemical business is illustrative of this
aspect .of the law in an industrial age. Perhaps some aspects of the
atomic business will furnish another illustration.
The second Pennsylvania case presents the other side of the coin. In
Robb v. Carnegie Brothers & Company 69 Robb brought an action
against Carnegie Brothers to recover damages for injuries to his land
arising from the operation of certain coke ovens owned and operated
by the ddendants. In the course of such operations large volumes of
smoke and gas were emitted from the defendants' ovens and carried
over to the plaintiff's land. In consequence of this, the plaintiff contended, his timber and fruit trees were killed, and the productiveness of
the greater part of his land was diminished to a point of almost total
destruction. The earlier Sanderson case was argued by the defendant in
support of its claim that, apart from negligence, there would be no
liability. With this argument the court disagreed, holding the defendant
strictly liable, distinguishing from the Sanderson case on its facts and
using the following language :
The coal company (in the Sanderson case) was using its own
land in the only manner practicable to it. The harm done
thereby to others was the least in amount consistent with the
natural and lawful use of it own. . . . But the defendants are
not developing the minerals in their land, or cultivating its
surface. They have erected coke ovens upon it, and are en68

I d. at 162.

69

145 Pa. 324.

22

Atl.

649
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gaged in the manufacture of coke. Their selection of this site,
rather than some other; is due to its location and to their convenience, and has no relation to the character of the soil, or to
the presence or absence of underlying minerals. The selection
was no doubt ·a wise one, quite secluded, and quite convenient
to the several mines from which the material was to be obtained for the making of coke; but it was the selection of a
manufacturing site, and is subject to the same considerations
as though glass, or lumber, or iron had been the commodity
produced, instead of coke. The rule in Sanderson's case has
therefore no application to the facts of this case. The injury,
if any, resulting fr9m the manufacture of coke at this site, is
in no sense the natural and necessary consequence of the exercise of the legal right of the owner to develop the resources of
his property, but is the consequence of his election to devote his
land to the establishment of a particular sort of manufacturing, having no natural conne{:~ion with the soil or the subjacent
strata. 70
·
·

Accordingly, the court held that. the plaintiff was entitled to damages
without proving negligence, but_at the'same time he was held not entitled to an injunction _to preclude the operation of a great industry
important to the economy of the region. Rylands v. Fletcher was not
mentioned by the court although it was. cited and relied upon by the
plaintiff.
The atomic industry also will be bringing something dangerous upon
its premises-and the analogy to the Rylands case is apparent: Yet at the
same time the balance of interests and considerations related to general
prosperity and welfare are significant in seeking an answer to the
question of the extent of liability to be imposed upon peaceful uses of
atomic energy. We are entitled to- regard this new form of energy as
something that, in due course, will have a· pronounced effect upon the
welfare of the nation. It must be encouraged so far ·as it can be done
consistently with justice and equity.
·. Reference may riow be made briefly to cas~s invoiv_ing da~age occasioned by fire. As we have already noted, the basic principles of liabil- ·
ity for such damage, brought to this country from England, required
proof of negligence, but, nevertheless, from time to time attempts have
been made to impose strict liability in. connection with such injuries.
Two cases decided by the Minnes9ta Supreme Court are worthy of note.
In the .earlier case, D'ay v. H. C. Akeley Lumber Company, 71 _it appeared
70
I d. at 338, 339·
71 54 Minn. 522, 56 N.W.. 243 (I8gJ).
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that fire had escaped in the form of sparks and cinders from large stacks
used in connection with burning sawdust and refuse in the defendant's
sawmill. The plaintiff requested an instruction for the jury based upon
strict liability. Refusing it the court said:
This request eliminated from the case any consideration by
the jury of defendant's alleged negligence, and planted the
plaintiffs' right to recover upon grounds independent of such
negligence. The fire used by defendant was for manufacturing
purposes, arid, if used with proper safeguards and without
negligence, no liability attached for damages caused by its
escape. Any other rule would make the person who uses fire
for manufacturing or mechanical or propelling purposes, or
even for heating, an insurer against accidents. . . . Doubtless, one who employs the element of fire for manufacturing
or mechanical or propelling purposes, or who employs it for
any purpose under circumstances which render it especially
dangerous to others, is held to the exercise of more care and
caution than is one who -employs the same element for a less
dangerous purpose. Yet the degree of care is the same, for
in either case reasonable care, or, what is the same thing,
ordinary care, only is required. 72
•
In short, the court declined to apply the doctrine of strict liability to this
useful instrumentality.
In the second Minnesota case, August Berger v. Minneapolis Gaslight
C ompany/8 to which reference has hitherto been made, the Supreme
Court of Minnesota_ did apply a doctrine of strict liability to the defendant from whose premises quantities of crude petroleum were discharged through the soil to the plaintiff's premises where the damage
was caused. The earlier Day case was relied upon by the defendant, but
the court disposed of it using the following language:
The case .of Day v. Akeley Lumber Company . . . relied
upon by defendant's counsel, is . . . not in point, for it was a
case :where fire escaped from the defendant's premises, and
destroyed the plaintiffs' property, and it was correctly held that
there could be no recovery without proof of negligence on
the part of the defendant. Fire is, and has been ever since the
statute of 6 Anne, c~ 31, an exception to the-rule that, where a
person receives and keeps ·upon his premises anything not
naturally there, the natural tendency of which is, if it escapes,
to injure others, he is liable, without reference to any considerations of care and skill on his part. It is difficult to see
72

18

I d. at 527, 528.
Supra note 49·
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why fire should have ever been included in the rule, for fire is
one of the most beneficent servants of man,-an absolute
necessity,-and, from its own nature, does not necessarily
injure surrounding persons and things. 74

·This is strictly in line with American case law dealing with liability
for fires occasioned by industrial operations, 75 although in most states
there are special statutes imposing more or less strict liability upon railroads and sometimes other activities in cases of fire damage.
The foregoing cases are illustrative of the special limitations that
are imposed upon strict liability in some of the courts in this country.
They reveal a thoroughly reasonable appr<;>ach-one that may prove to
be of interest in connection with problems of radiation liability that are
likely to arise in the future. We shall discuss their possible application
later in this chapter.
4· Special Cases-Blasting and X-Rays
Blasting cases. The courts may, when required to determine the liability of a reactor operator, look for precedent to cases of handling explosives and blasting operations. In a recent article, 78 Harley J. McNeal
of the Cleveland Bar notes that the majority of the current decisions
result in absolute liability, but he calls attention to the confused state of
the law in connection with such cases. He finds that questions of negligence, nuisance, and absolute liability are thoroughly intermingled, that
Rylands v. Fletcher is applied in some states in blasting cases, but not in
others, that fine spun distinctions are being based upon differences between direct and indirect trespasses to adjoining property, that some
courts refuse absolute liability for considerations related to the. social
utility of blasting as an agency used for the benefit of mankind, and that
liability is often dependent upon the location of the blasting and the
foreseeability of damage with respect to other ·persons and property.
He points out that the balance of equities as revealed in current case law
tips towards the blaster in direct proportion to the distance of his activity from the major population centers, and hence in inverse ratio to
the likelihood of causing serious harm should a mishap occur.
Mr. McNeal divides the cases into three categories:. (I) those in
which strict liability is enforced for all foreseeable harm, ( 2) those in
Hfd. at JOO, JOI.
75 See 2 Harper & James, Torts h4.15 (1956); see also Prosser, Torts 326-328
(2d ed. 1955).
76 McNeal, "Use of Explosives and Liability Questions Involved," 23 Ins. Counsel].
125 ( 1956).
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which no liability is imposed except for negligence, and (3) a rather
indefensible intermediate position that blasters are to be held strictly
liable for their activities if the explosions cause direct trespass to adjacent land by casting rocks or other debris upon it, but not if the same
explosions cause harm by vibration or percussion. The latter are deemed
indirect in their effect and not trespasses in the historical sense. The
principal purport of the blasting cases so far as the atomic energy problem is concerned is to place emphasis upon the location of the activity
and its relationship to foreseeable harm on the one :hand, and direct
trespasses to valuable property on the other.
Certain courts in blasting cases have reached a result of absolute
liability through application of the doctrine of nuisance. This is true,
for example, in New York state where in fact the doctrine of Rylands v.
Fletcher has been disapproved. In Vincent v. Hercules Powder Com. pany 77 the defendant, a munitions plant, suffered a devastating explosion
which damaged the plaintiff's home situated at a considerable distance.
The defendant contended that it should be protected from strict liability
because of the provisions of a state statute which fixed the relative locations of powder magazines, the quantity which each might contain,
and their distances from the buildings, railroads, and highways. The
defendant had complied with this statute and argued that an act which
the law sanctions and authorizes cannot be deemed a nuisance, although
it may cause damage to individual rights on private property. The
analogy to the licensed atomic reactor is apparent. Notwithstanding the
argument of the defendant, however, the court held the defendant
strictly liable on a theory of nuisance and, in addition, citing Richards v.
Washington Terminal Company, 78 declared that under the Due Process
Clause of the Constitution, the legislature, although it might legalize
what otherwise would be a public nuisance could not confer immunity
from suit on the theory of private nuisance such as to amount, in effect,
to a taking of private property for public use.
So far as atomic operations are concerned we can draw some general
conclusions. from the blasting and explosive cases which in fact indicate
a clear leaning and trend tOWiJ.rd strict liability in most of the state COUrtS
in this country. Conclusions that may be stated with assurance are as
follows:
1. The trend of the more recent decisions reveals an increasing number of courts moving in the direction of absolute liability for damages
resulting from blasting.
rr 228 App. Div. n8, 239 N.Y.S. 47 (1930).
78 233 u.s. 546, 34 s. Ct. 654 (1913).
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2. Eyen in those jurisdictions where negligence must be proved, it
would appear that the degree of negligence required to be proved in such
cases is slight; or, in reverse, that the standard of due care is correspondin~ly high,-more so than in situations involving less hazardous activities.
3· There are a few courts, possibly seven or eight in number, that
continue to adhere to the distinction between direct and indirect trespasses, imposing absolute liability in blasting cases only for the former. 79
4· It is generally held that no recovery of damages can be expected
for injuries so remote that they cannot reasonably be foreseen or anticipated.80
S· As distinguished from the blasting cases, the storage of explosives
in quantity in places adjacent to crowded areas, if followed by an explosion, is quite likely to result in the individuals involved being held
absolutely liable for all injuries inflicted upon others, regardless of negligence Or failure tO exercise due Care. 81
One cannot avoid a feeling that, in view of the current trend in the
blasting and explosive cases, they are certain to be used in support of
strict liability in the event of a reactor burn-up, which although not an
explosion in a technical sense would have many similar characteristics.
X-ray cases. Before leaving the subject of liability under the doctrine
of Rylands v. Fletcher we should also take account of the numerous
cases involving injuries by overexposure to X-rays. X-ray macines subject persons engaged in operating them, as well as persons undergoing
treatment or examination by means of them, to two primary dangers,
namely, the possibility of harm from the X-rays themselves and also
from the powerful electric currents necessary to the production of the
X-rays. It is generally held that the principles of law normally applicable
to physicians and surgeons, i.e., that a medical practitioner is subject
to no more severe requirement than the duty of exercising reasonable
skill and care in his patient's behalf, is also applicable to an action against
a physician for X-ray injuries to patients. 82
The same result has been reached in connection with injuries resulting
from industrial uses of X-ray machines. For example, in Rakowski v ..

See cases cited in Prosser, Selected Topics on the Law of Torts 161, n. 175 (1953).
See cases cited in McNeal, supra note 75 at 132, n. 4·
8l See Exner v. Sherman Power Construction Company, 54 Fed.2d 510 (1931), and
many cases cited in Anno., So A.L.R. 6g2. Judge Augustus Hand in the Exner case
said of those who store explosives or engage in blasting "When a person engages
in such a dangerous activity, useful though it be, he becomes an insurer."
8 2 See many cases cited in 41 A.L.R.2d pp. 329 et seq.
T9
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Ray-Bestos-Manhattan, Inc. 83 the court, speaking of .the duty of an
industrial employer toward an employee engaged in making X-ray examinations to disclose defects in manufactured products, pointed out
that liability must be based upon negligence as distinguished from strict
liability, but that a high degree of care, higher than in the ·ordinary
affairs of life, must be exercised. A more extensive and inclusive
measure of liability is achieved by enlarging the duty to exercise reasonable care, rather than by applying a doctrine of absolute liability.
The negligence doctrine as distinguished from strict liability has been
applied to the use of X-rays by beauty specialists. Greenberg v. Post 84
was an action for X-ray burns sustained by the plaintiff while undergoing treatment by a beauty specialist for the.removal of superfluous
hair from her face. The court ruled that the specialist owed the plaintiff
only a duty to exercise due care. She was liable only if the plaintiff
proved negligence.
It is true that in most of these X-ray cases there was a contractual
relationship between the operator of the machine and the victim, and
t}:tis may constitute a partial distinguishing fact based upon claim of
assumption of risk by ·the injured party. This fact, however, by no
means precludes the courts from imposing 'a doctrine of strict liability
if they should deem the social pressures or other considerations to be
sufficiently compelling. Indeed, patie11ts do not intend to assume the
burden of injuries whether accidental or otherwise, and hence the contractual relationship should not be of significance.
In actions involving X-ray machines it is conventionally held that the
burden of proof rests upon the plaintiff, and that he must not only show
t}:te defendant's negligence, but aJso that the negligence proximately
caused the harm. On the side of the plaintiff, applicability of the doctripe .of: res ipsa loquitur is frequentiy urged. The ~ourts are in disagreement on .the point, but there have been many decisions in which the
d~trinehas been held available to the plaintiff, thus making it necessary
only for him to prove that he received an injury from overexposure ~o
the X-ray apparatus, placing upon the defendant the burden of going
forward with proof that he exercised due care under the circumstances.
On the other hand, the defendant can be aided by proof of contributory
negligence or by establishing an unusual susceptibility of the plaintiff.to
injury from X-ray.
From the standpoint of users of rac;lioactive substances the important

a

8s
84

S N.J. Super. 203, 68 A.2d 641 (I949),.certif. den., 3 N.J. S02, 70 A.2d .908 (19SO).
ISS Fla. IJS, 19 S.2d 714 (1944).
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conclusion to be gleaned from the X-ray cases is the fact that the doctrine
of absolute liability is not applied, coupled with the further fact of
similarity of X-rays to other radioactive emanations so far as injury to
man is concerned. Whatever may be the applicability of the doctrine of
Rylands v. Fletcher to reactor operators and others who make use of the
more highly dangerous fissionable materials, one can properly urge, on
the basis of analogy, that the theory of liability imposed in the X-ray
cases, namely, the requirement of the proof of negligence, should also
be applied to the numerous medical, biological, agricultural, and industrial uses of radioisotopes. These are, after all, merely utilization of
sources of ionizing radiation, varying in intensity and often even less
hazardous than the X-rays given out by high voltage X-ray machines.
5· Concluding Observations with Respect to the Doctrine of
Rylands v. Fletcher
Before we proceed to the next phase of the subject matter, we may ask
ourselves what conclusions should be drawn from our examination of
the cases discussing the· doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher, particularly
insofar as they may apply to injuries caused by radioactive substances.
The first impression that one receives is that the English decisions
present a reasonably precise and satisfactory pattern, but that there is
utter confusion in the principles developed by the American courts.
Under 'the English decisions there must ordinarily be a "dangerous
substance" brought by the defendant to his premises or at least brought
under his control, the activity must involve a "non-natural use," and
there must be "an escape," not caused by an "act of God," or a "third
party," or the plaintiff himself, which results "proximately" in damage
to the plaintiff· or to his property.
We in the United States inherit these specifications of the doctrine
and apply them variously in different parts of the country. Moreover,
we interject in varying degrees in different courts at least three significant corollaries to the English rule as above stated. Each of these corollaries involves a vague standard not easily applied.
First, the utility of the enterprise, in relation to the economy or general welfare of the 'community, has an important bearing upon whether
or not the .doctrine of strict liability shall be applied. This may be
nothing more than a different approach to "non-natural user," but, in
effect, it brings forth a "balance of convenience" doctrine under which
many courts resort to equity principles originating in private nuisance
cases to resolve strict liability problems.
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Second,. in a not inconsiderable number of cases the escaping substances, though somewhat "dangerous," create a relatively minor degree
of hazard and, accordingly, the courts require proof of negligence rather
than apply strict liability. Thus, in connection with fire which escapes,
explosions which result in damage by concussion or vibration, X-rays
which over-irradiate the victims in medical, industrial, or commercial
applications, and other "lesser danger" instances, courts in general adhere rather consistently to conventional negligence doctrines.
Third, the rule of strict liability can be and sometimes is approached
by the courts by using and extending the techniques of the law of negligence rather than by resort to Rylands v. Fletcher. The standard of
care is raised to require "a very high degree of care" or even "the highest
degree of care." Thus, the defendant, though he is not made an absolute
insurer, is obliged to exercise such a high degree of care that the applicable principles do not fall far short of ultimate liability without fault.
This third point merits further elaboration for it has implications
of especial concern to those who engage in atomic activities. By way
of i-llustration consider the rather unique and striking circumstances
in Chase v. Washington Water Power Company. 85 In this .case an
accident that was almost fantastic resulted in the burning of plaintiff's bam and wheat fields. Two chicken hawks, fighting while in
flight, struck and short circuited the defendant's high tension wire,
completing contact through a guy wire attached to one of the supporting
towers. In addition, the weight of the hawks on the guy wire caused it
to sag enough to contact <!- barbed wire fence c<;mnected with the plaintiff's bam and the accident resulted. The court, holding the electric company liable, said that was bound to" exercise "a very high degree of care,
indeed the highest that human prudence is equal to." This comes very
close indeed to strict liability under the Rylands doctrine, reached by a
different route--one that well merits attention in connection with our
discussion of radiation injuries.
From all of the foregoing it becomes abundantly clear there is no
single or simple formula of liability that will dispose of all of the cases
from all of the states or even the majority of the cases from a majority
of the states. Moreover, it would be a ~ompletely unacceptable oversimplification to attempt to set forth in summary form on the basis of
existing case law what the effect of the Rylands doctrine is likely to be
when atomic energy cases come before the courts and plaintiffs seek to
impose strict liability. Finally, if certainty in the law is to be obtained,
so 62 Idaho

298,

III

P.2d 872 (1941).
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it must be reached in some other way than through common law methods
of evolution of the Rylands doctrine by judicial decision.
E. Strict Liability Under the American Law Institute Doctrine
The Restatement of the Law of Torts, published in 1938 under the
auspices of the American Law Institute, purports to present a comprehensive and orderly statement of the common law of the United States,
including not only the law developed by judicial decision, but also that
which has grown from the application by the courts of generally accepted
statutes that have been enforced for long enough periods to have become thoroughly imbedded in the law of the land. Since the Restatement
may be resorted to by some courts in this country in deciding cases arising from radiation injuries, we must examine its scope and effect.
With respect to ultrahazardous activities in the law of torts, the Restatement expresses its principles in six short sections, which for the sake
of complete understanding will be quoted in full as follows:
§519. Miscarriage of Ultrahazardous Activities Carefully
Carried On. Except as stated in §§521-4, orie who carries on
an ultrahazardous activity is liable to another whose person,
land or chattels the actor should recognize as likely to be
harmed by .the unpreventable miscarriage of the activity for
harm resulting thereto from that which makes the activity
ultrahazardous, although the utmost care is exercised to prevent the harm.

* * * * *

§520. Definition of Ultrahazardous Activity. An activity is
ultrahazardous if it
(a) necessarily involves a risk of serious harm to the person, land or chattels of others which cannot be eliminated by
the exercise of the utmost care, and
{b) is not a matter of common usage.

• • • * •

§521. Ultrahazardous Activity Carried On in Pursuance of a
Public Duty. The rule stated in §519 does not apply if the activity is carried on in pursuance of a public duty imposed upon
the actor as a public officer or employee or as common carrier.

* * * * *

§522. Contributing Actions of Third Persons, Animals and
Forces of Nature. One carrying on an ultrahazardous activity
is liable for harm under the rule stated in §519, although the
harm is caused by the unexpectable
(a) innocent, negligent or reckless conduct of a third
person, or
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(b) action of an animal, or
(c) operation of a force of nature.

* * * * *

§523. Participants in Ultrahazardous Activities. The rule
stated in §519 does not apply where the person harmed by the
unpreventable miscarriage of an ultrahazardous activity has
reason to know of the risk which makes the activity ultrahazardous and
(a) takes part in it, or
(b) brings himself within the area which will be endangered by its miscarriage
( i) without a privilege, or
(ii) in the exercise of a privilege derived from the consent of the person carrying on the activity, or
-(iii) as a member of the public entitled to the services
of a public utility carrying on the activity.

* * * * *

§524. Effect of Contributory Fault.
(I) A plaintiff is not barred from recovery for harm done
by the miscarriage of an ultrahazardous activity caused by
his failure to exercise reasonable care to observe the fact that
the activity is being carried on or by intentionally coming into
the area which would be endangered by its miscarriage.
( 2) A plaintiff is barred from recovery for harm caused by
the miscarriage of an ultrahazardous activity if, but only if,
(a) he intentionally o.r negligently causes ~e activity to
miscarry, or (b) after knowledge that it has miscarried or is about to
miscarry, he fails to exercise reasonable care to avoid harm
threatened thereby. 88
In an accompanying commentary the authors of the Restatement
point out by way of illustration that the term "ultrahazardous" includes
such items as the operation of airplanes, the storage and transportation
of explosive substances, and the drilling of oil wells. They also include
blasting for clearing woodlands and otherwise. On the other hand, they
do not include the ordinary automobile because of the fact that it is a
matter of "common usage" and thus is excluded by reason of Section
520(b).
The question which confronts us is whether or not under the Restatement doctrine any or all phases of atomic enterprise will be included
within the range of strict liability. Should we conclude that all uses of
atomic energy "necessarily involve a risk of serious harm which cannot
sa See 3 Restatement, Torts, ch. 21, pp. 41-53.
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be eliminated by the exercise of the utmost care" ? Or may we argue
with good reason that certain uses of less dangerous radioisotopes fall
on the other side of the line? Or may we so interpret the phrase as to
exclude certain types of reactors or certain processes involving the
handling of critical quantities of fissionable materials when the reactors
or processes become well established, with well understood technology
and good safety records? Do they then become "matters of common
usage"? What is to be deemed "common usage" under the circumstances?
.
As Dean Prosser has pointed out so clearly, 87 the Restatement doctrine
is more inclusive than the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher in at least one
respect, for by ignoring the effect of the place where the activity is carried on and its surroundings, even a location far removed from population centers would be included. Also it falls short in another respect,
namely, in the insistence placed upon the necessity of extreme danger
and the impossibility of eliminating it with all possible care. This
sharply limits the list of "dangerous substances." Accordingly it would
follow that, under the Restatement, the fact that an atomic reactor is
located in the middle of a desert would not constitute a defense, but, on
the other hand, a cobalt 6o source used for the irradiation of food or
drugs might not be deemed so extremely dangerous as to warrant the
imposition of strict liability. The Restatement doctrine was not formulated until. 1938, and thus far only a very few cases have been decided in
which it has been interpreted and applied. In California, for example,
the courts seem to have adopted the Restatement rule, possibly for the
reason that they have in at least three cases expressed disapproval of
the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher and they are seeking some basis for
granting relief in proper cases. Luthringer v. Moore 88 is illustrative.
There the California court took advantage of the Restatement and applied it to impose strict liability in a case involving the use of hydrocyanic acid gas for fumigating operations on certain premises. The gas
escaped into an adjoining building where it injured the plaintiff. The
court regarded the use of the gas under the circumstances as "a hazardous activity," holding that it was "perilous and likely to cause injury
even though the utmost care is used" and that "the use of it. under these
circumstances [i.e., the circumstances of the case] is not a matter of
common usage within the meaning of the term." Thus the Restatement
paved the way to the plaintiff's recovery.
87
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On the other hand, in another California case, Guy F. Atkinson Co. v.
Merritt, Clw,pman & Scott Corporation, 89 the federal court, following
what it believed to be the law of California, declined to apply either the
Rylands case or the Restatement doctrine to a case of water damage
caused to plaintiff's property by the failure of a cofferdam built by the
defendant. There was no charge of negligence involved, and the cofferdam failed because of flood conditions. Refusing to find ground for
imposing strict liability the court said with respect to the Restatement
doctrine:
This court does not believe that this doctrine has been or
should be extended to damage by water under the circumstances set forth in the complaint. 90
The Oregon Supreme Court relied upon the Restatement doctrine in
Bedell v. Goulter,91 which involved injuries to real property caused by
concussion and vibration from blasting operations. The court quoted
Sections 519 and 520 of the Restatement and concluded that "blasting
is ultrahazardous because high explosives are used." Continuing, the
court said, "The one who causes the injury must be held to engage in
the dangerous activity at his peril 'because it is impossible to predict with
certainty the extent or severity of its consequences.' "
In another blasting case the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reached
a like result, also relying upon the Restatement. In Federoff v. Harrison
Construction Co. 92 it appeared that the p.laintiff's house, distant some
1,600 feet from the defendant's blasting operations, was damaged by
vibration and concussion. The defendant was held liable. The court,
relying primarily upon the Restatement, said :
We think the record supports a finding that the damage was
caused by the blasting, thus bringing the case within the rule
stated in Section 519 of the Restatement of Torts: that, subject to exceptions not now material, "one who carries on an
ultrahazardous activity is liable to another whose person, land
or chattels the actor should recognize as likely to be harmed by
the unpreventable miscarriage of the activity for harm resulting thereto from that which makes the activity ultrahazardous,
although the utmost care is exercised to prevent the harm." 98
The Restatement principle has also been applied in the state of Connecticut. In Whitman Hotel Corp. v. The _Elliott & Watrous Engineer59

123 Fed. Supp. 720 (1954).

90

I d. at 722.

199 Ore. 344. 261 P ..2d 842 (1953).
362 Pa. t8t, 66 A.2d 817 (1949).
93 I d. at 183.
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ing Company 94 the court relied upon the doctrine in a case involving
damage caused by dynamite blasting within the city of Norwich, the
damage again having been caused by vibrations of the earth set in motion by the activities of the defendant. In the absence of proof of
negligence the court nevertheless held the defendant liable, referring to
Sections 519 and 520 of the Restatement and stating:
The rule [i.e., the Restatement rule] is adhered to in Connecticut. It has been stated as follows: A person who uses an
intrinsically dangerous means to accomplish a lawful end, in
such a way as will necessarily or obviously expose the person
of another to the danger of probable injury, is liable if such
injury results, even though he uses all proper care. 95
The foregoing brief examination of the· cases is a summary of the
rather limited number of judicial decisions in which the Restatement
doctrine has been directly applied in support of the imposition of absolute liability. Only twenty years have elapsed since the publication of the
Restatement, and it is therefore not surprising that the number of
decisions based upon it is not great.
There have been several opinions in which the courts have cited the
Restatement doctrine with general approval, but have declined to apply
it to the facts of the particular cases a:t hand. For example, in Smith v.
Okerson 98 an action was brought to recover the cost of fodder which
the plaintiff purchased to feed his cattle after the defendants, while
spraying their potato crop with arsenic solution, had rendered the plaintiff's alfalfa crop useless. It appeared that some of the arsenic spray
had drifted to the plaintiff's adjoining fields. The court, stating that
the New Jersey courts have declined to follow Rylands v. Fletcher, also
observed that it was doubtful if they would go as far as indicated by the
Restatement rule. Section 519 of the Restatement was cited, the court
saying:
The prevailing American rule admits liability in the absence
of negligence, only in connection with an activity that is not a
matter of common usage and that necessarily involves a risk of
serious harm to others, and not even in such case if the activity
is carried on in pursuance of a public duty. . . . I doubt
whether in New Jersey we go even that far.

* * * * •.
94

137 Conn. 562, 79 A.2d 591 (1951).
/d. at s6s.
ee 8 N .]. Super. s6o, 73 A.2d 857 ( 1950) .
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I conclude that the defendants are not answerable to plaintiff
unless they were negligent in the spraying of the arsenic solution.'"
The fact of "common usage" of arsenic solution spray for potato
fields would have saved the day for the defendant in the absence of proof
of negligence, but unfortunately for the defendant in this particular case
the court found evidence of negligence on the basis of which the plaintiff
recovered a judgment for damages.
Again, in a Delaware case, Fritz v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. 98
an action was brought against the company for personal injuries occasioned when the plaintiff was overcome by a concentration of chlorine
fumes which escaped from a plant operated by the defendant. The court,
although urged to do so, declined to apply the doctrine of absolute liability either under Rylands v. Fletcher or under the Restatement, stating
its position as follows:
In the present case it was not unlawful for DuPont to have
on its premises chlorine gas, nor was its presence there unusual, and it cannot be said that the mere possession of chlorine
gas by DuPont without more was dangerous per se in the light
of recognized industrial use. To say that any corporation or
individual possessing or using dangerous substances upon its
or his premises should be held liable as an insurer in the event
of injury to others by reason of the mere possession, use, or
escape thereof would be but to strangle corporate and individual enterprise in many well recognized fields of endeavor.
If the rule of absolute liability is to be adopted in this State,
it seems to me that its application should be confined to those
operations which have connected with them a history of doing
injury to others or the destruction. of their property, and
only in those cases where a nuisance by reason of their presence or use can be established. 99
Chlorine gas would seem to be a reasonably dangerous commodity,
perhaps fully as dangerous as some forms of radioisotopes. Yet the
court, persuaded in part by considerations of relative utility_;_a balance
of convenience-reduced the scope of the Restatement doctrine as well
as Rylands v. Fletcher to uses having a "history of doing injury."
Again, in South Dakota, in Midwest Oil Company v. City of Aberdeen 100 the court, in the absence of proof of negligence, declined to apply
91
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the Restatement doctrine to impose absolute liability in a suit for damages inflicted upon plaintiff's gasoline filling station by a break in the
defendant city's water main. In regard to the applicability of the Restatement doctrine the court said :
The present facts disclose water being sent through a ten-inch
main in the manner now generally accepted for the purpose of.
furnishing a water supply to city dwellers. We think it clear
that such a distribution of water does not constitute an ultrahazardous activity. The definition of an ultrahazardous activity as set forth in Section 520 in the Re&tatement of the
Law of Torts is as follows: [Thereupon Section 520 is
repeated.]
Water mains are universally in use in cities, and to hold that
a proper and reasonable use of such mains "necessarily involves a risk of serious harm to the person, land or chattels of
others" would be contrary to the experience of at least several
generations. 101
This is, of course, quite like the result that would be reached by most
courts in applying the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher.
By way of conclusion, we may suggest that the doctrine of the American Law Institute Restatement of the Law of Torts, though not yet
widely applied, is, at least, a worthy attempt to achieve precision and
definiteness in the field of absolute liability. At the same time, although
there is not enough case Jaw as yet available to warrant reaching a
definite conclusion on the matter, it would seem likely that the Restatement would not accomplish the desired result of bringing order out of
chaos in strict liability. Iri the twenty years in which it ·has been available the courts have been inclined to ignore it and to rely upon previously developed common law principles derived from Rylands v.
Fletcher. So, at the very most, we can only say that the Restatement
gives us one more doctrine of occasional utility to be added to the welter
of confusion under American law, and that, up to the present time at
least, it has not made a significant contribution to the solution of strict
liability problems.
l\4oroover, there are several good reasons why the Restatement doctrine is not likely to contribute much in the future to the solution of
problems of liability for radiation injuries. Not only has it not as yet
enjoyed wide acceptance by the courts in this country, but, more importantly. its rigid coverage runs counter to the flexible application of
Rvlands v Pletcher, which is current practice in this country. Further"H
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more, it may be said with accuracy that certain courts both in England
and the United States have receded somewhat from their earlier enthusiasm for the Rylands doctrine. Finally it should be noted that the
language of Sections 519 to 524 of the Restatement departs rather
markedly from the patterns of liability for radiation injuries that are
currently being developed by statute in other important countries-in
England, Germany, Switzerland, and elsewhere in the world. Both
the scope of the coverage and the specified exceptions differ radically
from current thinking elsewhere. It is far more likely that European
influence will be effective than that the American Law Institute doctrine
will be accepted even in the United States, for the former is better and
more realistically fitted to the facts of radiation injuries. The foreign
proposals will be examined later in this chapter.
F. Private Nuisance Doctrines-Absolute Nuisance
1.

Nuisance Doctrines and Remedies

In order to complete the review· of American doctrine involving or
related to absolute or strict liability we must give brief consideration
to a considerable group of cases disposed of either wholly or in part
under the law of private nuisance. 102 Of especial interest is a doctrine
that has been developed which for want of a better name has often been
called "absolute nuisance," or "nuisance per se," although the addition
of the words "absolute" or "per se" cannot be regarded as either significant or definitive.
By way of definition we may say that, in general, a private nuisance
may result whenever there is an interference with the use or enjoyment
of the land of the plaintiff occasioned either by the intentional misconduct of the defendant, or conduct which is negligent, or conduct with
respect to which the courts are inclined to apply strict liability without
proof of either intent or negligence. It is this third category with which
we are primarily concerned. A nuisance case normally is disposed of by
a petition in equity in which the plaintiff seeks an injunction to restrain
continuance of the nuisance and perhaps asks damages as well. However, the decisions reveal that the courts of law also, in actions in which
damages alone are sought, frequently refer to nuisance principles and
apply them in reaching the conclusion that the circumstances call for the
imposition of the equivalent of an absolute liability.
1o2 We are not concerned with public nuisance which is, in effect,
punishable as such.

a
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In considering the possible relation of nuisance doctrines to liability
for radiation injuries we should take account of two classes of cases.
The first includes cases in which the defendant intentionally maintains
an_ activity in a neighborhood where in normal operation it causes annoyance or injury to occupants of property in the vicinity, e.g., the operation
of a plant which gives off sulphuric acid fumes, or, in the atomic field,
possibly radioactive gases. The second covers cases of unduly hazardous operations which, in normal and successful operation cause no harm
whatsoever, but if an accident takes place trouble ensues, e.g., storage
of nitroglycerin, or, in the atomic field, operating a reactor or a fuel
processing plant. In both instances the courts work out and apply a
"balance of convenience" doctrine with the result that no nuisance is
found and no liability is imposed apart from negligence, if the activity
is reasonable in relation to its location, its proximity to population, its
economic worth, and other related factors. If otherwise, however, the
court will enjoin or will give judgment for damages, or will afford both
such remedies as the equities may require. It is apparent that such a
doctrine will embrace many cases that would fall within the scope of
Rylands v. Fletcher as currently interpreted, and therefore the two
doctrines are concurrent in effect to a considerable degree. We need not
be surprised, therefore, when we find some courts using the two doctrines interchangeably, or perhaps using both in the same opinion.
Doubtless, defendants in radiation accident cases will encounter the
double-barrelled approach with considerable frequency in the years to
come.
For example, we have previously referred to the case of Be"y v.
Shell Petroleum Company/ 08 an action for damages in which the court
based its conclusion of absolute liability both upon a theory of nuisance
and also upon the precedent of Rylands v. Fletcher. Many such cases
could be cited and, indeed, several of the other cases previously referred
to in this chapter reveal more or less of the same dual reasoning.
It is also apparent that many courts which purport to reject the principle of Rylands v. Fletcher do in fact reach like conclusions under the
name of absolute nuisance. As stated by Dean Prosser :
There is in fact no case applying Rylands v. Fletcher which is
not reasonably duplicated in all essential respects by some
American decision whirh proceeds on the thf'ory of nuisance. 104
to8

104

Supra note 4J.
Prosser, Selectt:d Topics on the Law of Torts r70 ( l9S3).
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A wealth of authority could also be cited in support of the foregoing
statement, but the following will serve as illustrative and typical cases.
In none of them was there a showing of either negligence or wrongful
intent. In Longtin v. Persell 105 the plaintiff recovered damages in an
action involving use of explosives producing vibrations which were held
to constitute an actionable nuisance ; in Holman v. Mineral Point Zinc
Co. 106 the plaintiff was refused an injunction but was awarded damages
in an action to abate as a nuisance and to recover damages for losses
caused by defendant's plant emitting sulphuric acid fumes; in Bartell v.
Ridgefield Lumber Co. 101 the plaintiff also recovered damages but was
denied an injunction asked by him to prevent the operation of defendant's saw mill which emitted sparks, smoke, and soot; in Whittemore v.
Baxter Laundry C o. 108 the plaintiff brought an action to restrain the storage of inflammable liquids on the defendant's premises adjacent to those
of the plaintiff, and under the circumstances the court held that an injunction should issue. In the Holman and Bartell cases, in which the injunction was denied, the court based its action on balance of convenience under the particular circumstances in each instance. In the Whittemore case,
the injunction was issued, but actual construction had not yet commenced, thereby illustrating a phase of the nuisance remedy not available under the Rylands doctrine. Other cases that might be cited involve
percolating water, storage of explosives, fireworks, oil wells, mining
operations, the accumulation of sewage, and bad odors, noxious gases,
smoke, dust, etc. In other words, the cases in which American courts
have resorted to an absolute nuisance doctrine as the basis of strict liability cover much the same territory as that covered by cases directly
based upon Rylands v. Fletcher and the doctrines developed thereunder.109
Professor Warren Seavey, an eminent authority in the field of tort
law, is inclined to criticize the theory underlying these cases and to
feel that this broad application of the doctrine of nuisance is unjustifiable. He asserts that it should not be applied to accidents arising from
lawful conduct but only in cases involving tortious conduct.110 He main105 30 Mont. 3o6, 76 Pac. 699 (1904).
108 135 Wis. 132, ns N.W. 327 (1go8).
131 Wash. 183, 229 Pac. 3o6 (1924).
181 Mich. s64. 148 N.w. 437 (1914).
109 Dozens of other cases are cited in Prosser, Selected Topics on the Law of Torts
166-171 (1953).
no See Seavey, supra note 7.
101
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tains that some wrongful act, either intentional or negligent, should be
established as a proper basis of the charge of nuisance. He says :
The primary function of nuisance as a separate topic in the
law of torts is to mark out the area within which it is unreasonable for one to subject his neighbors or the public to noise,
vibrations, fumes, immorality or the risk of physical harm.
Where there is a nuisance because of the risk of harm, nuisance
overlaps negligence. But its rules are neither esoteric nor eccentric; they follow the normal pattern of tort principles. A
few courts have been misled by incautious statements, especially statements dealing with harm resulting from a public
nuisance. But the results reached by those courts are not representative. In general it may be said that legal fault is a requisite for nuisance and that contributory negligence is a defense
to an action for harm caused by a nuisance resulting from
merely negligent conduct, whether or not the physical condition which was the cause of the harm was intended. 111
Mr. Seavey is undoubtedly right so far as the historical origin of the
doctrine of nuisance is concerned. But the plain fact is that the American courts have, in large numbers of cases, ignored the historical distinctions and have spoken in terms of nuisance when they have wished
to impose strict liability in situations where the activity itself was not
illegal either by reason of wrongful intent or negligence. This being
the case, we can only take account of these decisions as existing factors
of importance in the current juristic scene. Therefore, we must perforce
recognize the existence of an absolute nuisance doctrine when we seek
to appraise the likelihood of strict liability being imposed upon the
atomic industry of the future.
2.

Some Special Features of Absolute Nuisance as Compared with
Rylands v. Fletcher

We have already called attention to the fact that, under the doctrine
of Rylands v. Fletcher, the location of the dangerous instrumentality
becomes important, for if it is located at a sufficient distance from
others who might conceivably be injured by it, or if, because of the
customs of the community or the nature of the activity, it is appropriate
to the place where it is maintained in the light of the character of that
place and its surroundings, no strict liability will ensue. The doctrine of
nuisance embraces an equivalent line of reasoning, and that which might
111
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be deemed a nuisance in a congested community would not be so regarded if located in a desert miles removed from human habitation.
With respect to another feature, however, there would seem to be an
important difference between Rylands v. Fletcher and the doctrines of
nuisance. The Rylands theory focuses primarily upon the "dangerous
nature" of the instrumentality, and if it escapes and it "does mischief,"
strict liability is imposed without further question. On the other hand,
the nuisance doctrine, in accord with the general approach of courts of
equity where most of the cases arise, is more likely to produce decisions
based upon a balance of public convenience or a balance of interest between the plaintiff and the defendant. The court of equity has discretionary authority, particularly (although not exclusively) used in connection with issuing the injunction. Intangible factors, including among
others a high measure of social utility or economic value, may serve to
exculpate an activity that otherwise would be deemed a private nuisance.
The fact that the strict liability cases which we are now considering
normally (although not always) have arisen in courts of equity has
given rise to the idea of balancing of equities. It should be observed that
this element not only serves to mitigate undue hardship, a worthy consideration, but also it serves to create a decidedly vague and indeterminate standard to be applied. Under such a theory the lines of demarcation between strict liability and otherwise become shadowy indeed.
One other point of interest is the distinction that is sometimes asserted to the effect that in order to constitute a nuisance the defendant's
conduct must result in a continuing or recurring damage to the plaintiff,
whereas the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher contains no such limitation
and a single event may give rise to liability. This distinction finds some
justification in American decisions for most of them involve situations
in which the damage has been a continuing one. It is a fact, however,
that courts have, in a number of instances, found an absolute nuisance
to exist when but a single damaging event has taken place, such as a
single accidental explosion setting off a powder magazine or the setting
off of a single charge of blasting powder. 112 Accordingly, we may conclude that the singleness of the act is no absolute bar to resort to the
application of the nuisance doctrine, although the duration or recurrence
of the interference with plaintiff's property is always a factor to be
weighed in determining whether or not the damage is sufficiently substantial to constitute a nuisance. 118
n2 See Heeg v. Licht, 8o N.Y. 579 (188o), and Patrick v. Smith, 75 Wash. 407,
134 Pac. 1076 (1913). Also see the discussion of the subject in Prosser, Torts 397
(2d ed. 1955).
us See 4 Restatement, Torts 245, Comment on §827.
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Wholly apart from the fine points of refinement relative to the precise scope of the doctrine of absolute nuisance and the remedies which
it affords, we must conclude that in a general way the doctrine parallels
that of Rylands v. Fletcher, and that courts in the United States are
inclined to use the two doctrines more or less interchangeably and even
simultaneously, although not coextensively. As Dean Prosser has pointed
out, although the two remedies have a large area in common, the nuisance remedy is primarily directed toward providing redress for injuries
to land, and does not cover personal injuries not connected with land.
Moreover, it can lead to the issuance of an injunction as well as an
award of damages. On the other hand, Rylands v. Fletcher, strictly a
damage remedy, reaches personal injuries but does not, so far as the
decisions reveal, reach certain relatively non-hazardous types of injury,
such as those arising from noise, for example, which might conceivably
be subject to attack under the nuisance doctrine. It is clear that both
doctrines must be taken into account in dealing with radiation hazards.
G. Defenses to Strict Liability-Defendant's Contributory Negligence
or Assumption of Risk-Third Party Actions
We have hitherto noted that the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher has been
held not to apply in case the escape of the dangerous substance arises
from plaintiff's contributory negligence, or from an act of God, or of
a third party stranger, or if its activity is specifically sanctioned by
statutory authority.i14 We have also noted that the American Law
Institute Restatement specifically provides for exemption in case of activities carried on in pursuance of a public duty (Restatement, Sec. 521),
in case of an assumption of risk by the person harmed (Sec. 523), in
case of action by the person harmed which causes the dangerous activity
to miscarry (Sec. 524), or, after knowledge that the activity has miscarried or is about to do so, in case he fails to exercise reasonable care
to avoid harm (Sec. 524) .m
It is desirable, before concluding this discussion of strict liability under common law doctrines, to give further brief consideration to certain
of these defenses. They are often resorted to i~ connection with ordinary actions based upon negligence. This is true of contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and contributing third party action. These
defenses may be pleaded and relied upon in actions for damages based
upon strict liability for radiation injuries. Are they to be deemed valid
• •• See text at notes 25-28 supra.
' " Set> text at note 86 supra.
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defenses when the action is based upon the Rylands theory, or the Restatement, or the doctrine of nuisance? Are they valid under all circumstances, or, if not, to what extent may they be relied upon?
Defendant's Contributory Negligence and Assumption of Risk. It is
frequently said that contributory negligence is not a defense in cases of
strict liability whether such liability is based upon Rylands v. Fletcher
or upon a doctrine of nuisance. Yet this statement is only partially true.
The Institute Restatement seeks to clarify the point by dividing contributory activities of the plaintiff into two categories. The plaintiff is
not barred from recovery on the ground of contributory action if it consists of negligently failing to observe the dangerous situation, or of
intentionally coming into proximity to the hazard (Restatement, Sec.
524(u) ). However, he is barred if he precipitates the miscarriage of
the dangerous substance, or if, after learning of the hazard, he fails to
take reasonable care to avoid personal harm (Sec. 524 ( 2) ) . In other
words, he is barred in those instances in which his own default or his
own assumption of the risk has contributed to his injury in such manner
as to suggest the injustice of holding the defendant to the absolute liability. If contributory negligence and assumption of risk are to be accepted as valid defenses in an action based upon negligence when the
defendant is proved guilty of a social wrong, i.e., negligence, it would
seem only just that a somewhat equivalent defense be available when
the defendant is by hypothesis innocent of social wrongdoing. This
the Restatement seeks to achieve. Moreover, the cases and text writers
bear out a like conclusion with respect to actions based upon Rylands v.
Fletcher and also those based upon nuisance. 116 Therefore the generalization to the effect that these defenses are not valid in strict liability
proceedings is inaccurate.
Third ParJy Activities. It can and sometimes does happen that a
third party contributes in a significant way to the incident causing the
damage, and the question arises as to whether or not such third party
action will exculpate the defendant from strict liability. So far as radiation injuries are concerned, one of the principal problems raised by third
party activities is the possibility of two or more users of atomic energy
each contributing to stream or air pollution under such circumstances
that neither acting singly would have caused damage or created a nuisance, but the combination of the several users does so. What should
be the effect of these third party contributions? In cases of a similar
116 See Prosser, Torts 341-343, 423-426 (2d ed. 1955); also Harper & James, Torts,
Vol. I, p. 8z-8s, Vol. II, p. 8o2-8o5.
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nature based upon the nuisance theory it has been consistently held that
each contributor to the plaintiff's injury is liable jointly with his fellow
contributors for the full amount of the damage, although, if apportionment of damage can readily be made, the court may undertake to do
so. 117 A like result would be reached under Section 522 of the Restatement. On the other hand there have been a number of cases tried under
the Rylands doctrine in which third party action has intervened in such
manner as to relieve the defendant of his strict liability. 118 In short, the
confusion and inconsistency of doctrine to which reference has hitherto
been made in another connection also prevails with respect to these
special defenses.
H. Conclusions Concerning Common Law Doctrines
We should now attempt to shape some conclusions from the foregoing review of case law, particularly having in mind the problem of obtaining redress for persons injured by radioactive substances.
(1) We must keep general principles in mind. It is a principle not
only of the common law but also of the Roman law and the Codes based
upon it that no one is to be held liable unless he is guilty of negligence
or wrongful intent. However, today, under all responsible legal systems,
there is a tendency to gravitate from liability only in case of fault
toward the principle of absolute liability-"liability without fault."
Over-all absolute liability without any restrictions or limitations whatsoever is rare. It is to.o severe and too unsophisticated. Instead the law
seeks (and should seek) what has been aptly called "the golden mean"
between too much and too little-between the ancient Roman principle
that persons are responsible only for negligence, (a principle under
some circumstances too generous to the defendants) and the primeval
common law principle that persons who cause injury are to be held unconditionally liable in all circumstances (a principle too generous to the
plaintiff).
The basic problem in connection with users of radioactive substances
is to find this "golden mean," the middle way suited to the atomic user's
circumstances, appropriate in view of the desirability of encouraging the
development of atomic enterprise, yet taking due account of justice to
the injured persons.
(2) As we have noted, there are two directions from which the
111 See Northup v. Eakes, 72 Okla. 66, 178 Pac. 266 ( 1918), a stream pollution case;
see also Prosser, Torts 422 (:zd ed. 1955).
us See Prosser, Torts 340, 341 (2d ed. 1955) and cases cited.
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''golden mean" may be approached. On the one hand we may extend the
concept of negligence by expanding the standard of due care in such
manner as to facilitate recovery by the injured person, thus promoting
justice without taking the ultimate step of invoking a doctrine of absolute liability. Or, on the other hand, we may create absolute liability,
yet, by attaching appropriate conditions and limitations to the concept,
bring it into line with justice and good sense. Each approach is exemplified by judicial decisions in more or less analogous fields. It is apparent,
however, that the approach of absolute liability with exceptions is the
more in harmony with current thinking.
(3) We must take account of the Rylands v. Fletcher doctrine, including the many variations found in different states of the Union. Yet
this doctrine has not helped us to the "golden mean," but has left us
with a welter of indefinite boundary lines and differences of judicial
v1ews.
(4) We must also take account of the American Law Institute doctrine of ultrahazardous activities. Although this doctrine has been
formulated by eminent authority, it has not yet been fully ripened by
judicial decisions. However, it is sufficiently important to have been
accepted in several jurisdictions. At the same tin:te, for the purposes of
atomic energy, it seems quite unlikely to bring about an orderly and
acceptable solution.
(5) We must also take account of the vague contours of the doctrine
of absolute nuisance, with its possibilities for injunction as well as judgments for damages. This doctrine, although frequently invoked, does
not provide the precise answers necessary to dispose adequately of civil
liability for radiation injuries.
( 6) None of the foregoing theories leads us to any helpful drawing
of lines of demarcation in the atomic field. For example, a reactor containing critical quantities of uranium is relatively more dangerous than
a cobalt 6o radiography capsule, and the latter is worse than a radioisotope thickness gage. In one sense all are "dangerous substances," likely
to "cause mischief" if they escape. Yet a line must be drawn unless we
wish to place all atomic uses in a single category so far as liability is
concerned. This would not be realistic, yet common law methods offer
very little help in resolving the difficulty.
(7) In view of this complicated and uncertain state of affairs of one
thing we may be certain, namely, that before we move very many years
into the atomic age, state legislatures will be taking action to provide
statutory rules covering the matter of liability in radiation injury cases,
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thus making an effort to bring order out of choas, giving certainty to the
law, and attempting to satisfy contemporary ideas concerning justice for
in jured persons. We should not anticipate the discussion later in this
chapter but we may merely suggest that in the near future statutes will
be. enacted, as they have been, for example, in. connection with fires
caused by railroads, to impose calculated, though varying, degrees of
liability upon users of radioactive substances. Indeed, as we shall later
see, a statutory solution of the problem of liability for radiation injuries
may well become the standard of practice throughout the civilized world,
both in common law countries and in those basing their law upon civil
codes. 119

I. Factual Analysis of Applications of Atomic Energy to Show Basis of
Liability
Up to this point we have examined the existing law, with only occasional references to atomic energy uses and radiation accidents. We
must now, before attempting to reach final judgments concerning the
law that will be applied to such accidents, undertake to get a fairly detailed view of the highly variant kinds of accidents and injuries that
may take place. We will then be in a position to draw some informed
conclusions. These fact situations vary widely in extent, severity, character, and quality, and we can predict with certainty that courts will
react differently depending upon individual circumstances. They will
no doubt be sympathetic with the applications of doctrines of strict liability in certain of the aspects of this new development, but they are far
less likely to do so in others.
I.

Early History of Radiation Accidents

Hitherto in this volume we have called attention to the fact that at
an earlier day the pitchblende miners in Czechoslovakia were found to
be dying of pulmonary ailments at a rate approximately thirty times
greater than that of the general population. They were in fact dying of
lung cancer although the nature of the ailment was not known at that
time. It is believed that the inhalation of the radioactive radon, a gas
created from the disintegration of pitchblende, caused the cancerous
growths and resulted in the high degree of mortality.
We have also called attention to the fact that, when radium was first
discovered, the earlier workers with the element suffered radiation inuu This idea of a statutor-y liability receives interesting support in a recent brief
article by Professor Warren A. Seavey, "Torts and Atoms," 46 Cal. L. Rev. 3-13
(1958).
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juries as a result of undue exposure. The same has been true of X-rays,
for, in the early stages of development of that useful instrumentality,
the scientists and technicians working with it were frequently overexposed, with the resultant development of malignancy.
One of the most highly publicized of the earlier cases involves the
radium dial painters of New Jersey. The well-known case is LaPorte v.
United States Radium Corporation. 120 In this case it appeared that the
decedent had been employed for approximately a year and a half painting watch dials with radioactive luminous paint. She had been following the common practice of pointing the bristles of the paintbrush with
her lips, thereby ingesting small quantities of radioactive material.
Twelve years after she left the company she began to exhibit the symptoms of radium necrosis. She commenced an action for damages, and
shortly thereafter she died. The action was revived by her legal representative.
There was a two-year statute of limitations. The action, which took
the form of a suit in equity to enjoin the defendant from pleading the
statute of limitations as a bar, was dismissed. Because of the statute,
the plaintiff was unable to recover damages.
2.

Radiation Accidents Since World War II

We now turn to injuries which have been suffered in more recent
years as a result of undue exposure of persons and property to radioactive substances. These are the World War II and later developments
connected with the important contemporaneous expansion of nuclear
enterprise.
In general, there are three broad classes of injuries arising and likely
to arise from atomic enterprise. There are those that arise from accidents of a conventional character although occurring in atomic installations, e.g., ordinary cuts, bruises, broken bones, etc. Then there are
accidents that are peculiar to atomic industry because they arise from
materials or processes peculiar to that industry but do not involve radiation as such, e.g., uranium scrap fires. Finally, there are those in which
radiation is the principal or the exclusive cause of injury. Since we are
concerning ourselves with the unique legal problems of atomic energy,
we will direct our attention primarily to this third category. No doubt
the shape of the law of civil liability is going to be very largely determined, as we have seen, by the characteristic hazards of the business, and
we must try to appraise these hazards as they are revealed by experience.
We can learn something from "the incidents" that have already arisen,
120

13 Fed. Supp. 263 (D.N.J. 1935).
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although fortunately they are few in number. Thereafter, we will hypothesize the possibilities for the future, thereby obtaining a complete,
though necessarily speculative, view of the field. 121
(I) Criticality Incidents. During the earlier years of experimentation with fissionable materials several tests at Los Alamos, New Mexico,
involving the assembly of critical quantities of such material, resulted
in accidents. Two deaths ensued, one in 1945 and the other in 1946.
Thereafter, remote control devices were utilized, strict regulations were
imposed governing the conduct of criticality experiments, and the most
meticulous precautions were taken to prevent further accidents. Although several other unexpected criticality incidents have taken place
since then, and several staff members have been overexposed to radiation, there have been no observable, untoward symptoms. However,
these incidents reveal the need of the highest degree of care and skill
and the utmost in precautions to be taken in carrying out all experiments
or operations in which supra-critical masses may be assembled. If a private reactor operator should have an accident with off-site injuries to
persons or property, it would seem certain that a court which follows
Rylands v. Fletcher would impose strict liability upon him. Moreover,
the same result would probably be. reached under the Restatement principle and also under nuisance doctrines unless the court should insist
upon a continuing or recurring activity before relying upon the latter.
(2) The NRX Reactor at Chalk River, Ontario. The Chalk River
reactor which commenced operation in 1947 was a high power reactor
being used for experimental purposes. Natural uranium was the fuel;
heavy water, the moderator; and ordinary water, the coolant. Thereactor was used for general reseach purposes and for the production of
radioisotopes as well as plutonium. In December 1952, when a special
experiment was .being carried on, a power surge took place which resulted in the reactor "running away." The incident is thought to have
been due to a combination of human and mechanical errors. Melting
caused the failure of the aluminum sheathing of some ten per cent of the
uranium rods in the reactor. Both melting and oxidation of the uranium
accompanied the failure. As a result a considerable quantity of radioactive fission products was carried into the coolant water. Simultaneously gaseous fission products spread throughout the reactor structure
and into the ancillary equipment. The reactor vessel was damaged beyond repair. It contained highly radioactive uranium which could not
121 See Hayes, "A Summary of Accidents and Incidents Involving Radiation in
Atomic Energy Activities, June, 1945 Through December, 1955," published by the
AEC, Safety and Fire Protection Branch, Wash., D.C. (1956). TID-336o.
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be withdrawn in the ordinary way. All the ancillary equipment was radioactively contaminated, and the basement was flooded with radioactive
water. The ceiling, walls, and floors of the upper part of the building
were also contaminated. About a million gallons of radioactive water
had to be pumped to a remote deposit area. It was, however, found
possible by using entirely new techniques to decontaminate the surrounding property, and by early 1954 the reconstructed reactor was working
again. There were no personnel injuries, although about ten thousand
curies of fission products were released. So far as legal implications are
concerned the incident can be regarded as illustrative of the fact that
even a major reactor disaster can take place without unduly serious results excepting to the plant itself, and yet there is an "escape" of a
dangerous substance and the potentialities are such that strict liability'
for damages may well be deemed a certainty. Moreover, the radioactive
effiu.ent would produce a continuing condition of private nuisance that
would without question support a finding of absolute liability on that
theory.
·
,(3) The Argonne Control Rod Test Incident. On June 2, 1952, at
Argonne National Laboratory a damaging incident took place in connection with an operation involving the testing of a series of newly
manufactured control rods. The standard procedure for inserting a new
control rod required that the water moderator of the critical assembly be
first drained away, thus reducing reactivity and permitting the safe withdrawal of the control rod for which substitution was to be made. However, in the particular operation that resulted in an accident, the water
was not first removed. One of four test crew members proceeded to
withdraw one of the control rods by hand. As he did so a bluish glow
was emitted by the center of the reactor core. A large bubble formed
and an explosion took place. The operator immediately dropped the rod
<~,nd automatic devices drained the water from the core. All four operators left the assembly room. Later tests showed exposures of 190,
I6o, 70, and 12 rems respectively. Two of the operators suffered nausea,
but there were no other observable symptoms. Clinical tests revealed increase in excretion of urinary amino acids and decreased sperm counts,
althoug\1 these effects disappeared in due course. No damage to the eye
lenses was observed. What the future may hold for the victims no one
can say. 122 Apparently the human being can absorb a very substantial
122 For a report of these four cases see Hasterlik & Marinelli, "Physical Dosimetry
and Clinical Observations on Four Human Beings Involved in Accidental Critical
Assembly Excursion," II Proceedings of the International Conference on the Peaceful
Uses of Atomic Energy 25 (Geneva 1955).
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overexposure for a short period without suffering immediate and observable damage, although it is usually estimated that a total dosage of
450 rems will be fatal to about one half of the population, i.e., this is the
"mean lethal dose." Although the injuries were limited to persons employed on the premises, it is quite conceivable that under a proper combination of circumstances, off-site damage could take place, and again
one can hardly doubt that the dangerous nature of the test device would
lead to strict liability.
(4) Borax No. I Run Away. A small experimental reactor at Arco,
Idaho, known as Borax No. r, was constructed in 1953 with water as
both coolant and moderator. The core assembly consisted of plates made
from an alloy of enriched uranium and aluminum, clad in aluminum and
immersed in water inside a steel tank. In July 1954, after more than 200
tests on the reactor, it was decided that it should be sacrificed in an experimental runaway. Control rods were withdrawn, the last one rapidly.
The results were much as expected. Most of the fuel melted, and the
reaction from the molten metal in contact with the water burst open
the tank. The control rod mechanism was carried away, and the remains
of the reactor core were ejected high into the air. Most of the fuel element fragments fell within a radius of two hundred feet. There was
no appreciable radioactive fallout except within a radius of a few hundred feet. The explosion by ordinary standards was a mild one, being
comparable with that which would be produced by a few pounds of TNT.
Indeed those who may feel concern lest peaceful atomic industry may
result in explosions approximating those of atomic weapons may take
comfort from the fact that this is virtually an impossibility. Highly
specialized techniques are required to produce sharp explosions. Industrial atomic reactor accidents even if serious will inevitably be of a
milder character, although this is not to say that extreme precautions are
not desirable and even necessary. If, instead of taking place miles from
the nearest habitation, Borax No. 1 had "run away" on the outskirts of
a city, the question of legal liability would be presented. In view of the
precedents involving explosions, nuisances, and escaping dangerous substances there can hardly be a doubt of strict liability under such circumstances.
(5) The EBR..;r Reactor Accident. In November 1955 at the Arco
testing station a partial meltdown and release of radioactive substances
took place in an experimental breeder reactor being operated under the
supervision of the Argonne National Laboratory. Dr. Walter H. Zinn,
Director of the Laboratory, described the accident as follows:
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EBR-1 had been used for a number of years in an experimental program, mostly in the physics of fast reactors. The
core loading was reaching the end of its useful life and it was
scheduled to be removed from the reactor early in 1956. As a
last series of experiments with this core, it was decided to make
measurements on transient temperature coefficients. The experiments consisted of measuring changes in reactivity of the
reactor as the temperature of the fuel elements was increased.
. . . Because it was desired to obtain the temperature coefficient of the fuel only, it was necessary to shut off the flow of
the liquid metal coolant.

* * * * *
Increasing the temperature of the uranium rapidly involved
very considerable chance of distorting the fuel element jackets,
especially since uranium metal and stainless steel form a eutectic at about 725° C. This is very little above the temperature to
which it was desired to pulse the fuel elements.
That there was some ri~k of melting the fuel elements was
well appreciated.

* * * * *
In previous experiments of this type, it had been possible to
interrupt the excursion and return the reactor to low power by
making use of the motor-driven control rods. These subtract
reactivity slowly. In this excursion, the technician at the control panel was expected to use the fast-acting shut-off rods
upon receipt of a spoken instruction from the scientist in
charge. . . . Upon receiving instruction to shut down the reactor, th~ technician repeated the use of the slower control
rods. The staff scientist, as soon as he realized the situation,
reached over and pressed the rapid shut-off button and, simultaneously, the automatic power-level trips responded to activate the shut-off rods. The delay in time, which was almost
two seconds, was sufficient to permit the reactor power to overshoot to a point where the alloying of uranium and steel and
melting of the uranium took place.
The reactor shut down and there was no way by sound or sight
to know that anything untoward had occurred. . . . After a
period of fifteen minutes, detectors for radioactivity installed
both in the cooling system, . . . and in the ventilation exhaust
ducts . . . began to show readings higher than normal. 128
A dangerous quantity of radioactivity escaped into the atmosphere of
the test building, but material damage was restricted to the reactor core
and the inside of its vessel. There was severe distortion of the elements
12s Forum Memo, June 1956, pp. 26-28.
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but there were no personnel injuries. The incident illustrates the possibility of human fallibility and the need for protection against accidents
by use of all possible mechanical devices, shields, protective envelopes,
and other safeguards, j4st in case something does go wrong.
If similar human fallibility connected with a private reactor should result in off-site damage, the ensuing law suits will raise many interesting
questions involving not only strict liability under its various· doctrines,
but also questions related to the standard of care to be exercised in connection with such an operation. Yet the time may arrive in the distant
future when fast breeder reactors will be used to produce a significant
percentage of the electric power supply. When that time arrives the
technical problems will have been resolved, the safety of the facilities will
be assumed, the installations will become numerous and commonplace.
Under such circumstances there will be much force in the argument that
they have become "matters of common usage" subject only to liability
for negligence.
(6) The Saclay Reactor. A reactor at Saclay. France, was fueled
with natural uranium using heavy water as the moderator and carbon
dioxide as the coolant. The reactor was used for the preparation of
radioisotopes for research purposes and for the production of small
quantities of plutonium. Continuous operation at a high power level
was permitted. In June 1956, a rupture occurred, breaking the sheathing
enclosing one of the fuel rods. This caused a slight contamination of the
cooling circuit. The incident lead to release through the ventilation
system of a quantity of slightly radioactive carbon dioxide gas. Measurements of radioactivity on the instruments located near the reactor
showed only a modest increase, and there was little, if any, contamination of personnel. The incident was such that repair could be effected
quickly with only a temporary holdup in operation. The incident was
a minor one, but it reveals the dangerous possibilities inherent in a defect in a minor component part, in this case the sheathing on one of
the control rods. We can anticipate that the highest of mechanical skills
will be required in the fabrication of essential component parts of atomic
equipment, that private reactor operators will be held to the very highest inspection standards, and that mechanical faults must be completely
eliminated if liability for legal fault is to be avoided. Even if all this is
done, strict liability seems a virtual certainty under present day theories
and circumstances.
(7) The Benjamin Zawacki Case. Every half hour throughout the
evening of January ro, 1956, and all during the night, radio and tele-
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vision stations in Connecticut and New York flashed emergency bulletins ending with this sharp warning :
The life of the person carrying the radioactive cylinder missing from a construction job at Devon is in danger. Dispose
of it in a remote area at least a hundred feet from any house.
Call the police, giving them its location. Then go immediately
to the nearest hospital.
Benjamin Zawacki was the man who had the radioactive cylinder.
As an electrician he had been working on a new building being erected
on the outskirts of Bridgeport, Connecticut. Late in the afternoon he
was seeking a piece of cord to tie down a cable that was being installed.
Nearby, passing through a hole in the concrete floor, there was a twelveinch steam pipe. Loosely tied to this pipe and hanging down to the
floors below was a long strand of cord, apparently not serving any useful purpose. Zawacki pulled the cord up through the hole and detached
it from the steam pipe. After tying up the cable, he observed that there
was a little weight hanging on the end of the remaining cord. He automatically dropped the capsule into his shirt pocket. Upon leaving the job
he tossed the contents of his pocket, including the capsule, into the glove
compartment of his car. Another electrician rode with him into Bridgeport, and later in the evening a friend also rode some distance in Zawacki's automobile.
The next morning another construction worker rode with Zawacki
to the job site. As they approached the watchman's gate they saw a long
line of cars waiting, each being tested for radioactivity. When Zawacki's car reached the test point, the Geiger counters began to click
violently, and the capsule was discovered in the glove compartment. The
capsule was a cobalt 6o source, 1,280 millicuries in strength, which had
been used for radiography on the construction· job. The radiographer
had left it unguarded and no warning signs were posted.
Two weeks of hospitalization and much testing failed to reveal any.
outward signs of physical disorder. However, the incident had a substantial demoralizing effect not only on Zawacki but on his companions
as well. Various psychosomatic disturbances resulted.
A suit for $200,000 in damages for negligence has been filed against
the contractor on the construction job and against the subcontractor
who was engaged in radiological inspection. If this incident cannot be
regarded as actually prophetic, at the very least it indicates that in the
atomic future unusual care must be taken in instructing workmen, in
posting danger signals, and in alerting the public generally to the
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hazards involved. We can and must learn to live with these hazards as
we have learned to live with other dangerous instrumentalities, e.g.,
the automobile, but we must also learn how to protect ourselves against
overexposure to radiation. Whether or not the use of cobalt 6o in radiography will call for an application of the doctrine of Rylands v.
Fletcher remains to be seen, but it may well be that such uses are already
so commonplace as to be deemed "common usage" as that term is used
both in the Rylands case and in the Restatement.
(8) TheM. W. Kellogg Company Incident. The M. W. Kellogg
Company was an Atomic Energy Commission licensee doing business
in South Houston, Texas, engaged in the task of encapsulating and
selling iridium 192, a radioactive isotope which is used for industrial
radiography. On March 13, 1957, irradiated pellets of a mixture of
compressed iridium 192 and aluminum metal powder were broken while
being handled. The incident resulted in severe contamination of the
laboratory. The laboratory was not used for several days thereafter
and was partially decontaminated by the company. Two employees were
present at the time of the incident and at least one of them may have
have inhaled some of the radioactive powder. The exposure to external
radiation was not believed to have been large. Investigation indicated
that the clothing of at least the two employees was contaminated and was
not removed until after the employees arrived home. Radioactivity was
detected in the home of one of the employees and also in a trailer where
the other lived at the time of the incident. Some of the clothing of
other members of the family was found to be slightly radioactive, presumably as a result of being washed along with the employee's clothes.
The Atomic Energy Commission immediately directed a temporary
suspension of the license of the company and issued an order to show
cause at a hearing in Washington as to why the order should be modified or vacated. Subsequently the Commission modified the order sufficiently to permit salvaging and sale of the inventory of radioactive
material, but the company was not permitted to resume its normal
activity. 126
-Only careful and competent operation can be tolerated, and the regulatory power of government must be utilized to protect against the careless and the incompetent. However, even rigorous compliance with
governmental regulations will be no more than evidence of due care and
will not relieve the defendant if strict liability principles are applied.
(9) Oak Ridge National Laboratory "Wrong Room" Incident. On
12•

See AEC Release No. 1213, Nov. 6, 1957.
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October 4, 1957, an employee of the Atomic Energy Commission's Oak
Ridge National Laboratory accidentally received an exposure to radiation when he mistakenly entered a room containing highly radioactive
material. He was looking for a wrench which he had actually left in
another nearby roomit:t which he had been working. He entered the
wrong room although the door was clearly marked with radiation hazard
signs. The incident was discovered when laboratory technicians noted
that his pencil-type radiation detection instrument revealed the overexposure. The facts were confirmed when the film badge was subsequently
processed. Investigation revealed that he received an exposure of about
63 roentgens in the period of about one minute in the room. The incident involved only exposure to external radiation with no internal contamination involved. According to all appearances the employee was inexcusably careless, but in the atomic age especial care will have to be
exercised to protect others against employee inattention and even stupidity. The defense of assumption of risk will be applied only under
unusual circumstances when the claim is based upon strict liability.
{ IO) The Windscale Accident. On October 17, 1957, one of Britain's
plutonium producing reactors located at Windscale, Cumberland, produced the free world's worst nuclear accident to date from the standpoint of off-site injuries to persons and property. Although at this
writing a security blackout masks the cause of the accident and the extent of the damage, it is clear that it was a major occurrence possibly
involving as much as several hundred tons of uranium. Seemingly a
really major catastrophe was averted only by a successful, on-the-spot
emergency action led by nuclear experts.
The reactor was an open-cycle, air"'-cooled machine (thus to be differentiated from Calder Hall's closed-cycle, pressurized gas-cooled type
with carbon dioxide used as the coolant). · According to reports, the
Windscale reactor was shut down for routine maintenance. It was then
discovered that a considerable number of the fuel elements were glowing
red hot. This meant that they were several hundred degrees hotter than
they should have been, and that uranium was fissioning in the supposedly idle reactor. Also it meant that radioactive products were being
discharged from the stack being carried by the rising column of coolant
air. The immediate threat was the escape of volatile fission products,
principally radioactive ·isotopes of iodine which could pass through the
chimney filters. Solid particles such as radioactive strontium and cesium
were for the most part trapped in the filters. After careful consideration
water was applied to quell the overheating.

696

TORT LIABILITY

Milk samples from freshly milked cows in the vicinity were rushed
to Harwell and showed traces of radioactive iodine. In twenty-four
hours the content had rocketed to six times the permissible tolerance
level. Soon a special press conference announced a shutdown of all milk
distribution within a three-mile radius, an area that was later extended
to cover 200 square miles. All contaminated milk was discharged into
the sea.
Speculation has indicated that the cause of the unexpected heating
effects lay in fission products trapped in the fuel elements the heat producing reactions of which continued after the reactor was closed down.
Further study will be necessary to determine the exact cause of the difficulty, and doubtless an official report will be issued in due course.
This incident is the first that has resulted in extensive damage to
persons or property off the plant site, although the Chalk River affair
gave rise to a certain amount of neighborhood inconvenience. The fact
that such incidents can occur is certainly of significance in appraising the
theory of civil liability to be applied to atomic operators, but at the same
time the rarity of such occurrences is also both significant and encouraging. It is understood that the people in the vicinity who have suffered
damage will be fully compensated for their losses by the Atomic Energy
Authority; for under Section 5 (3) of the Act of I954 the Authority
is made absolutely liable for injuries occasioned by the escape of radioactive substances. However, even so, there will be troublesome questions
of damages to resolve. For example, will compensation be paid for
diminution of property values caused by popular fears of another such
accident ? This question has arisen at Windscale and up to the moment
has been answered negatively by the Authority.
(I I) The Hot Fish Study. The disposal of radioactive wastes is one
of the primary obstacles to widespread use of atomic energy. A threeyear study was recently initiated by the U. S. Atomic Energy Commission and the Tennessee Valley Authority for the purpose of determining if the partially purified liquid wastes discharged by the plant into
White Oak Lake had any ill effects on fish life in the lake. The study
brought forth the significant information that discharge water released
by the plants produces "hot" fish many times more radioactive than the
water in which they live.
The study particularly revealed that two species of fish, the bluegill
and the blackcroppe, absorbed and concentrated in their bone structures
large quantities of radioactive strontium. This substance is readily deposited in bone tissue much the way calcium is deposited. Skeletons of
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these fish were found to contain radioactive strontium in concentrations
20 to 30 thousand times as great as that of the lake water itself. For
example, it was noted that the body of a seven-inch blackcroppe produced on the average well over one microcurie of radioactivity. Moreover, it was noted that the fish in White Oak Lake not only grew more
slowly than those of the same species in nearby reservoirs but that
they died younger.
Studies such as this may well give pause to those who would dispose
of radioactive wastes in the ocean depths or in fresh waters inhabited
by fish on which man relies for food supply. Damage suits will be a
certainty, and strict liability will probably be the applicable rule of law.
Moreover, if there are several contributors, each may be held fully liable
although his own contribution is well below tolerance levels.
(12) The Oak Ridge Y-12 Radiation Accident. In June 1958, at
Oak Ridge, a quantity of highly enriched uranium bearing solution,
normally stored in "always safe" tanks of such geometric configuration
that a critical quantity could not be assembled, was permitted by a
most unusual series of events to flow into an ordinary ss-gallon drum:
A critical quantity was thus assembled and a chain reaction followed.
Eight persons were within fifty feet, one being not over six feet away.
Injuries to personnel seemed to be temporary only, but the incident illustrates the possibilities that exist when handling critical quantities of
fissionable material. As stated in the official report, the accident "could
not have happened unless a chain of about twelve unusual and unrelated
events happened in just the right order. None of these twelve events
was by itself sufficient to be called an error. The chance of just these
twelve events occurring in just the right sequence is so small as to be
rightly called impossible." 126 An accident of this sort would seem to
involve an ultrahazardous activity that would satisfy even the restricted
category of Section 520(a) of the Restatement doctrine.
( 13) Miscellaneous Minor Incidents.· In addition to the foregoing
that may be regarded as the major and more striking radiation incidents,
we should refer briefly to a number of other minor occurrences which,
although they caused no serious damage, nevertheless indicate the kinds
of hazards to which the atomic business may be subject. For example,
there have been instances of contamination of premises due to the breaking of radium sulphate capsules used in laboratories; similar results have
followed the rupture of neutron source capsules (such as those containing polonium and beryllium); there is one recorded instance of
1 26

See Forum Memo, August 1958, p. 39.
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considerable quantities of radioactive mesothorium being discharged
into a city sewer system where it was handled in a "complete treatment"
sewage plant, from which the dry sludge (with fairly high radiation
levels) was spread as a fertilizer; a tank trailer containing I 500 gallons
o{ radioactive uranyl nitrate hexahydrate has overturned and spilled its
contents on a highway; fires have taken place in contaminated waste accumulations, in uranium scrap, in plutonium turnings, etc. (These metals
are pyrophoric in nature, and although natural uranium is of negligible
radioactivity, U-235 and plutonium can cause serious contamination).
These are illustrative of the possibilities and indicate the wide range of
events of possible legal consequence against which those who engage
·
in nuclear enterprises must guard. 126
Summary. The foregoing is a virtually complete list of the principal
nuclear "incidents" that have taken place during the thirteen years following World War II. The period really shows a remarkable record of
freedom from serious accidents. The Atomic Energy Commission has
taken extraordinary precautions to minimize the hazards both for personnel working on plant sites and even more so for outsiders. Very few
workers have been exposed beyond the allowable limits of radi~tion. A
few accidents have resulted in injury and even death. A few workers
have undergone technical overexposure but without untoward symptoms.
Indeed the entire history of the thirteen year period affords considerable assurance that operations utilizing radioactive substances can,
by proper precautions, be made extraordinarily safe. Such installations
may eventually become rather highly regarded as good places in which
to work and good neighbors in the community. When that time arrives
the facts should have a material bearing upon the rules of law to be
applied. Developing still further the remarkably safe record up to the
present time, in a complete tabulation set forth in the July-December,
1956, report of the Atomic Energy Commission can be found a complete
listing of all incidents involving radiation overexposure during the
period 1945 through 1956 in Atomic Energy Commission activities.
In that period of time some sixty-nine persons were overexposed in
eight separate incidents. There were two fatalities, the two previously
noted as occurring at Los Alamos. Twenty-eight of the total number of
overexposures resulted from an unexpected fallout in the course of a
weapons test in the Marshall Islands. Of the total sixty-nine exposed,
nineteen suffered only skin injury and several other exposures were
comparatively minor. In a word, to date, the atomic energy business has
128

For a more complete coverage, see Hayes supra note
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proved to be an exceedingly safe operation so far as employees are concerned.
With respect to persons and property off the plant sites, the fact is that
the public has not suffered in any material degree, notwithstanding the
potentialities of the h11siness and the rather widespread extent of its utilization. Adequate safety precautions seem to make the activity fully as
safe as many other types of industrial enterprise-as safe, for example,
as the chemical business. A reference to the Texas City disaster involving nitrate fertilizer 127 and the East Cleveland disaster involving a
large gas container, 128 each resulting in many deaths and much property
destruction, is all that is necessary to indicate that an industrial economy
necessarily involves certain limited hazards. They must be minimized
and guarded against as well as possible but an occasional accident is almost inevitable. To date, then, the atomic industry has no cause for
concern about its safety record. It has been remarkably good. In regard
only to the safety of reactors, as distinguished from other atomic activities, in over twelve years of operation, the Atomic Energy Commission reported two years ago that it has operated twenty-five nuclear reactors for a total of 6o6,868 hours using 17,799,000 man hours with
no accidents involving either contamination of off-site property or personnel exposure sufficiently serious to cause lost time. This is good evidence that reactors can be safely operated, as safely, perhaps, as the
more conventional sources of heat energy. When they become commonplace and a necessary part of the economy, there would be good reason
for urging that they be subjected to the legal principles applicable to
other industrial units with equivalent safety records.
3· Some Hypothetical Possibilities of Radiation Accidents

Although the record of atomic industry ·up to the present time has
been an extraordinarily good one, remarkably free from incidents resulting in damage to persons or property, we should not for this reason
alone become too optimistic with respect to the future. When peaceful
applications of atomic energy become widespread throughout industry,
agriculture, medicine, and the numerous other possible areas of utility,
we can expect that accidents will take place, that people will be injured,
and that property will be damaged and destroyed. Safety regulations
will, of course, be in effect, at both state and national levels. But, with
127

See Dalehite v. United States, ·346 U.S. 15, 73 S. Ct. 956 (1953).
See Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Company, 166 F. 2d go8 (3d Cir.
1948).
t28
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the large number of persons utilizing radioactive substances, persons
of varying degrees of knowledge and competence, and with the many
possibilities of dispersion of radioactivity here and there throughout
the numerous areas of human activity, we can be reasonably sure that
-injuries will ensue.
We are seeking to determine the nature and extent of the remedial
rights of the individual whose person or property is subjected to overexposure to radiation. Is liability to be predicated on doctrines of negligence or, taking account of the possibilities, is the operator to become
strictly liable for the damage resulting from his atomic activities? In
order to further place this problem in proper perspective, let us now add
to the previous account of actual accidents by trying briefly but systematically to envisage hypothetically the principal types of accidents
which may be anticipated in the atomic future if something goes wrong,
as it may well do. Examination of these types will give us background
for more adequate consideration of the legal theories that should be
made applicable. Let us consider a dozen or so hypothetical possibilities
starting with those displaying the more serious potentialities.
( 1) A large power reactor meltdown. We shall start with the type
of accident that, although extremely unlikely to happen, could be the
most devastating of all-a reactor "burn-up." As of June 30, 1958,
one full-scale civilian power reactor was in operation, four more were
being built in the United States, and some ten more were being planned.
These operations contain certain inherently dangerous potentialities
against which proper precautions must be taken. In the first place, each
reactor contains an amount of fissionable material considerably in excess
of the critical figure, i.e., in excess of the quantity which if properly concentrated would result in a chain reaction. Secondly, in addition to the
fuels themselves, after operation for a period of time a reactor will contain a considerable inventory of radioactive byproducts. Some of these
byproducts are said to be from three million to two billion times more
toxic than chlorine, the most potent common industrial poison. Moreover, these substances cannot be detected by the senses, even in lethal
concentrations, and they are capable of producing injuries which may
not become evident until many years after exposure.
Although the reactor will not explode in the sense of an atomic bomb
explosion, it may, if the unexpected takes place, become overheated, the
fissile elements may melt, perhaps become vaporized, and the rapid
formation of gaseous products create pressures which will rupture all
containment structures,. and release radioactive fission products to the
environment. Operating personnel on the plant site may be injured or
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killed, and a cloud of lethal gas with radioactive particles in suspension
may escape from the reactor building and drift downwind toward inhabited areas. Fallout of radioactive material may take place which
will contaminate farms, animals, and buildings, as well as people in the
vicinity. Radioactive materials may be deposited on or in the ground
and be carried by the percolating ground waters to adjacent rivers or
other water supply sources. Under certain atmospheric conditions a
radioactive cloud of gases and particles in suspension may proceed downwind for many miles at approximately ground level, carrying its destructive potentialities along with it.
All of this is decidedly on the pessimistic side and is quite unlikely to
happen especially in view of the extensive precautions taken· by the
Atomic Energy Commission in evaluating plans and facilities prior to
issuing operating licenses. Moreover, all power reactor accidents are
not necessarily going to be as violent as that indicated. There may be
no rupture of the containment vessel. Or if there is a rupture, the radioactive cloud may rise vertically and disperse itself without damage to
persons or property on the ground. Nevertheless, if an accident of
major character takes place within a short distance of a major center
of population, it is theoretically possible, assuming a high percentage of
dispersion of the core inventory of fission products and unfavorable
inversion type of atmospheric conditions to produce a serious situation
that might require the evacuation of the population and possibly result
in widespread damage to persons and property .. Unlikely as all of this
may be, it is within the range of remote possibility and must he taken
into account in appraising the applicability of various doctrines of legal
liability. 129 Should an accident such as that described take place, at least
during the earlier years of atomic industry, ther.e can be little doubt that
strict liability will be imposed upon the reactor operator.- He must protect himself by appropriate insurance coverage.
( 2) A contained power reactor accident. The above-stated case is an
extreme. Let us assume that, instead of the foregoing extensive disper1 29 For a full scale study of this problem, see Gomberg, Bassett, & Velez, "Report
on the Possible Effects on the Surrounding Population of an Assumed Release of
Fission Products into the Atmosphere from a 3oo-Megawatt Nuclear Reactor Located
at Lagoon Beach, Michigan," published by Engineering Research Institute, University
of Michigan, July 1957, 2500-1-F. Also see the so-called "Brookhaven Study," officially and lengthily entitled "Theoretical Possibilities and Consequences of Major
Accidents in Larger Nuclear Power Plants-A Study of Possible Consequences if
Certain Assumed Accidents Theoretically Possible but Highly Improbable were to
Occur in Large Nuclear Power Plants," written by a team of Brookhaven staff members with Kenneth W. Downes as Project Director, March 1957.
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sion of radioactive products, we have the massive large scale reactor
meltdown but the gaseous fission products are retained within the reactor
containment vessel-a structure that has become an essential feature of
reactor design. The only leakage is relatively minor, consisting perhaps
of gamma radiation penetrating the walls of the containment vessel
which may affect persons within a narrow radius, or possibly leakage
through the foundations or otherwise which result in some contamination of underground waters, which in turn affects wells in the vicinity
and possibly water supply sources of larger communities. This may be
referred to as a partially contained accident, and the question arises as
to whether or not the fact of more or less successful containment should
affect the principles of liability. One can only speculate on the answer,
but in view of the decided cases and the general trend of thought of the
present day, the fact that a critical mass of fissionable material has been
brought by the operator to the premises would doubtless result in the
imposition of strict liability.
(3) An accident involving a small privately owned research reactor.
Consider the possibility of the small research reactor with a thermal capacity of perhaps one or two megawatts "running away" and distributing
a limited amount of radioactive substance over a limited area, compelling evacuation of farmers and others in the vicinity, and contaminating
agricultural products and farm animals within a relatively limited
radius. Such a reactor might be owned by an industrial organization
which utilizes it for research purposes, or it might possibly be owned
by a university or a research institute. Again, legal liability principles
come up for consideration. Is the same principle of strict liability to be
applied as to the large power reactor with its more lethal potentialities?
The law has not, in evolving its strict liability doctrines differentiated
on the ground of size.
(4) An atomic fuel-reprocessing plant radioactivity accident. Consider the possibility of an accident taking place in a fuel-reprocessing
plant, with the result that radioactive fission products escape by some
means other than an uncontrolled chain reaction, either into the air or
into adjacent water supply, thus causing damage to nearby persons or
property or. both. The damage might be no more extensive than that
which would result from the escape of chemicals as a part of an accident
in a chemical plant. However, it would involve radioactive substances in
a plant containing critical quantities of fissionable materials, and for this
reason alone it may subject the operator to a strict rule of civil liability.
Yet the fact that no chain reaction is involved means that the potentiali-
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ties are less severe, and this fact affords a significant distinction that
could well affect the legal result. _Should it do so? The available case
law is inconclusive.
( 5) An atomic fuel-processing plant non-radioactivity accident.
Consider the possibility of an atomic fuel-processing plant having an
accident involving the explosion of zirconium oxide or some other material connected with the atomic industry but not of itself fissionable or
radioactive. Such accidents have taken place; for example, at the
Sylvania Products Company plant on Long Island and at Oak Ridge,
Tennessee. Employees may be injured, and we may assume also that
minor elements of damage may be inflicted upon surrounding property
as. a result of the force of the explosion. Such an event would be comparable to and not significantly different from an accident in any industrial installation where explosive materials are kept on hand as a
part of the process. Should the principles of legal liability be different
simply because the accident is connected with atomic energy? It would
seem otherwise.
(6) An accident in a radiation laboratory connected with an industrial plant. Let us suppose that a chemical plant maintains for developmental purposes an experimental radiation laboratory in which it
carries on various types of testing and experimentation with radioisotopes or possibly with high level radiation sources, all in an endeavor to
find new ways of making articles useful to mankind. Let us assume that
by accident some of the radioactive isotopes are discharged into the sewage system and thence to the river or lake water supply or possibly into a
sewage treatment plant. Damage to individuals or possibly to farm animals can ensue if these radioactive elements become incorporated in a
drinking water supply or fish life or vegetation. What will be the
theories of liability to be imposed in such instance? Should they be
different from those applicable to a chlorine plant? Should the fact that
radioactive substances are permitted to escape result in the same strict
liability as that applied to the reactor in which a chain reaction takes
place? Tlw available case law does not afford the answer.
( 7) An escape of radioactivity from a waste disposal plant. Consider
the legal status of an operator who is licensed by the Atomic Energy
Commission to carry on activities which involve the disposition of radioactive waste products. Presumably either the terms of the license or
general Commission rules will include appropriate specifications for
operation which will cover matters of health and safety, including the
maximum concentrations of radioactivity that may be dispersed into
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air, water, sewers, etc. Suppose the licensed operator proceeds in accordance with the specifications without exceeding prescribed limits,
but nevertheless damage ensues (a) if radioactivity is deposited on land,
by. pollution of air or underground waters, or, (b) if deposited at sea,
by pollution of fisheries, or (c) if discharged in diluted form into a
sewage system, by eventual damage to fish, animal, or vegetable life.
Will the fact that the operator under such ,circumstances has proceeded
in accordance with specifications of the Atomic Energy Commission
license preclude his being liable, or, at least, to strict liability? Or consider another possibility, namely, that the operator has accidentally or
negligently permitted the release of radioactive substances and in so
doing he has failed to act in accordance with the specifications in his
license. Will he then become per se liable and if so, shall it be on the
basis of strict liability or merely for negligence? Discussion in the next
section will throw some light on these questions, but the answers are far
from crystal clear.
(8) An accident in food or drug irradiation pla.nt. Consider the possible liability of an operator of a food or drug irradiation plant, who by
reason of accident over-irradiates the articles involved, thus causing unexpected changes in the irradiated products and damage to persons or
animals who consume the products. What is to be the nature and
measure of the operator's liability under such circumstances? Under
American decisions he probably will be deemed an insurer since the
end products are intended for human consumption.
( 9) An accident involving an industrial user of radioactive isotopes.
Suppose an industry makes use of radioisotopes for thickness gages,
or for tracers in connection with wear testing, or in the form of a cobalt
6o gamma ray source to be used in radiography. Assume that certain
of these radioactive substances, through accident, are removed from their
protective shielding and get into contact with persons or property either
on the plant site or possibly off-site as a result of transmission through
the air, water, or otherwise. Again we must ask ourselves whether or
not the operator is to be held liable on the theory of negligence or on the
basis of a doctrine of strict liability. Since no chain reaction is involved,
it is not unreasonable to argue that the same rules of negligence should
be applied as would be used if the incident had involved chemicals of a
less hazardous nature.
( 10) An accident involving medical 14ses of radioactive substances.
Suppose a doctor of medicine is engaged in operating a teletherapy unit
on a cancer patient, or is using a radioactive tracer to locate the seat of a
malignancy, or administers a radioactive substance to be taken internally
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for therapeutic purposes. Assume an overdose or overexposure, due to
accident. Is the medical operator to be held strictly liable if it can be
proved that the injury to the patient bears a causal relation to the exposure to radiation? Or is he to be held liable merely for negligence as
seems to be the case in connection with the X-ray operators? Both reason and precedent would indicate that only the principles of negligence
should be applied, but can this conclusion be reconciled with the strict liability cases?
(I I) An accident involving transportation of radioactive substances.
Radioactive substances will be transported throughout the country
by bus, truck, rail, and airplane. They may also be transported across the
ocean by surface vessel. Suppose the truck overturns, or the train is in
an accident, or the airplane crashes, or the vessel sinks in the harbor.
The radioactive substances may be either relatively inoffensive tracers,
or they may be high energy cobalt, or they may be even more dangerous
objects, such as irradiated fuel elements that have been taken from a
power reactor and are being returned to a processing plant for separation
of the unexpended fuel from the fission products. Are all of these operations to be treated alike so far as legal liability is concerned ? Or is strict
liability to be applied in certain instances and not in others? Unless
normal principles of liability of those who operate transportation facilities are applied, law suits for such accidents will become decidedly
complex. Again, current case law fails to afford the answers.
4. Conclusions Concerning Types of Accidents and Injuries
The foregoing hypothetical possibilities might be multiplied many
times over, and doubtless some of them will materialize in the form of
actual incidents as the atomic age becomes a reality. ·However, the types
of situations exemplified by the recapitulation of the accidents that have
already taken place, together with the dozen or so hypothetical suggestions, present sufficiently well the kinds of fact situations with which
the law must now concern itself.
·
Let us now proceed to take a broadly perspective view of the entire
range of possibilities of injury from overexposure to radiation.
First of all, we note the wide range of possible incidence of overexposure, i.e., from injuries to many persons and much property, both
on-site and off-site, to very minor affairs, involving possibly the pollution of a single well or a slight overexposure to gamma radiation of one
or two persons. Second, we note that the damages may extend in intensity throughout a wide range-from death and widespread devasta-
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tion of property, to trivial injuries of no real consequence. Third, we
note that the undertakings causing the injuries may vary from activities of fairly serious potentialities to rather commonplace, routine,
and relatively non-hazardous affairs; the meltdown of a reactor illustrating the former, the use of a radioactive isotope for industrial wear test
representing the latter. Fourth, we note that in the nature of things the
locations in which the activity will be carried on will range all the way
from unpopulated deserts to great population centers in industrial areas,
-from Frenchman's Flat, Nevada, to New York City. Finally, we note
that the utilization of atomic energy in its peaceful applications will
range all the way from well-established, long-tried, and generally accepted operations that eventually become quite conventional, to new
and unusual applications of an experimental but promising nature,
well worthy of trial, but not yet fully accepted as a safe and normal procedure.
In short, in thinkingabout the problem of the nature of civil liability
for radiation overexposure we cannot think of a single, simple operation
or activity. This would be unwarranted oversimplification. There is
instead a vast spectrum of possibilities, of coverage, of damage, of
hazards, of locus, and of uniqueness. Nevertheless, sooner or later we
must come to grips with the problem as to whether or not and to what
extent we must accept and apply the doctrine of strict liability or its
equivalents, or, in the alternative, be satisfied with an application to any
or all atomic injuries of the more widely accepted doctrines of negligence. Can we properly say that the same rule of legal liability should
be applied throughout all of the spectra? This would be both unrealistic,
unwise, and unnecessary.
In turning to our attempt to reach solutions of these problems we
shall take into account both the foregoing spectra of possibilities and
also the fact that to date, at least, the atomic energy business has been
extraordinarily successful in minimizing the overexposure of persons
or property. In the final section of this chapter we shall assemble our
conclusions based upon the decided cases, the general trend of the times,
and the nature of the fact situations likely to arise. Before reaching this
point, however, we must give consideration to various statutory enactments that bear on the problem and that suggest some helpful ideas.
]. Statutory Provisions Affecting Strict Liability
With the chaos of case law, and the great variety of possibilities as
to radiation accidents laid before us, we can now give consideration to
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possible statutory means of bringing some measure of order out of the
juristic confusion facing operators in the atomic field. We shall first
examine certain statutory provisions which may, to a greater or lesser
extent, immunize defendants from strict liability. Thereafter, we shall
consider certain other statutory possibilities which serve to extend strict
liability, incorporating appropriate exceptions and limitations, and introducing helpful statutory clarification of the applicable rules.
I.

Statutory Immunization from Strict Liability

A1. this point we are confronted with a question of policy. In view of
social trends is there any justification whatsoever for considering the
possible immunization of atomic activity in whole or in part from the
non-intentional and non-negligent accidents which are certain to take
place?
Recognizing that it is desirable to encourage and promote the development of atomic enterprise, should this be done by holding it within the
limits of liability for negligence only, and thereby minimizing the costs
--doing this, however, at the expense of persons who may, without fault
of their own, be damaged by overexposure to radiation. All members
of society must pay a price in the form of inconvenience or even assumption of loss for the privilege of living in an improved society. If accretion to general welfare will be sufficiently accelerated by relief from
strict liability, then it is possible that society should pay the price in the
form of individual assumption of the risks and burdens. On the other
hand, there are those who argue for the proposition that industry should
pay its own way by being subject to strict liability excepting, perhaps,
for catastrophic disasters, in which event the government should step in
with indemnity from the public treasury. The trend of present day
thinking is, as we shall see, toward the latter alternative. It is socially
more acceptable, and accordingly we shall not find much current emphasis on statutory immunization.

a. Statutory Franchises, Licenses, or Privileges and Their
Effect
There is some authority, mostly in the form of early court decisions,
for the proposition that activity which would otherwise entail strict
liability may be privileged beca.use conducted under statutory authority,
or because it involves the performance of a public duty, to the extent of
relieving that activity from the burden of responding to strict liability,
holding it, however, within the conventional standards of the doctrines
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of negligence. This proposition has been most frequently applied to
transportation facilities and public utilities which, although they may
in fact constitute dangerous activities, are, nevertheless, highly valued
for their social utility and, by virtue of their franchises, licenses, or
privileges, are given a special place by the governing authority of the
state as an essential part of the economy. The rationale seems to be that
statutory authorization and regulation amount to a government declaration that the activities concerned are sufficiently necessary to the public
welfare to justify immunity from strict liability. There is also to be
found in the cases the suggestion that such functions are compulsory
and are quasi-governmental in nature and should therefore share the
ancient sovereign immunity to the extent of relief from liability without fault. In view of the necessity of obtaining licenses for the conduct
of atomic activities, this theory has an obvious possible application to
atomic industry.
A brief examination of some of the pertinent decisions will show
more precisely the limits of this doctrine. In reviewing the cases it
should be remembered that, although immunity from strict liability
may perhaps be conferred, a result almost the equivalent of strict liability may be reached through the application of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur, or by an elevation of the standards of care to which the jndustry is subjected. Therefore, the change may be of but little significance.
In an early English case, Price v. South Metropolitan Gas Co./ 80 the
plaintiff was injured by an explosion of the defendant public utility's
gas line. The court of the Queen's Bench refused to apply strict liability,
saying:
It is clear, too, that where a gas company such as this, having statutory authority to lay pipes, does so in exercise of its
statutory powers, the . . . [rule of] Fletcher v. Rylands is
inapplicable. 181
In an early American case, Actiesselskahet Ingrid v. Central Railroad
of New Jersey 182 the court voiced a somewhat different reason for a
similar immunity. The action was based upon a theory of strict liability, the complainant demanding compensation for injuries inflicted upon
him by the explosion of a quantity of dynamite then in transit on the
defendant's railroad. The court held that, since the defendant was a
1so6s L.J.Q.B. 126 (18gs).
181 /d. at 127.
132 216 F. 72 ( 1914).
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common carrier, it was obliged by law to transport explosives as well
as other commodities, and, this being so, it would be unduly harsh to
impose the additional burden of an insurer's liability.
The type of statutory authorization deemed to immunize a quasipublic enterprise from strict liability was defined in Cogswell v. New
York, New Haven, & Hartford Railroad Co. 188 In that case the court
made the following statement:
But the statutory sanction which will justify an injury to .
private property, must be express, or must be given by clear
and unquestionable implication from the powers expressly conferred, so that it can be fairly said that the legislature contemplated the doing of the very act which occasioned the injury. This is but an application of the reasonable rule that
statutes in derogation of private rights, or which may result
in imposing burdens upon private property, must be strictly
construed. For it cannot be presumed, from a general grant of
authority, that the legislature intended to authorize acts to the
injury of third persons, where no compensation is provided,
except upon condition of obtaining their consent. 184
Occasionally the question has arisen as to whether or not such statutory privilege will serve to immunize the operator so that he may conduct a nuisance adversely affecting the lawful utilization of neighboring
property. On this point a distinction must seemingly be drawn between
the right of the aggrieved person to obtain an injunction to prevent the
continuance of the alleged nuisance, and his right to obtain a judgment
for damages to the extent he has suffered loss. There are several cases
in which it has been held that the aggrieved party cannot enjoin a
licensed activity.
For example, in Strachan v. Beacon Oil Co. 185 an attempt was made
to enjoin the defendant from maintaining and operating his business of
refining and distributing petroleum. The defendant had invested many
millions of dollars in his plant and many more millions were invested
in tank steamers and other materials used in his business. The site of the
plant was well fitted for the conduct of such a business. A permit for
the building of the refinery and its operations had beeti duly issued by
the proper authorities to the defendant, and it was found that there was
no failure on the part of the defendant to comply with the statutes and
regulations, as well as the conditions of his license. The court found
N.Y. 10 (1886).
1s• I d. at 21.
185 251 Mass. 479, 146 N.E. 787 (1925).
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that, although the normal conduct of the business resulted in more or less
pollution of the air, nevertheless, on balance, these acts did not constitute a nuisance in view of all of the circumstances. But the court also
addressed itself to the question of the effect of the licenses held by the
defendant. Said the court :
The question remains whether the defendant has conducted
its business in conformity with the licenses granted to it. It is
settled that under statutes similar to those under which the defendant was granted the licenses, if the licensee has complied
in all respects with the terms, what he does thereunder cannot
be considered a nuisance or be restrained, even if without such
licenses the acts done would be a nuisance. 136
The court cited many cases in support of its conclusion as thus stated and
dismissed the bill.
However, so far as damages are concerned two leading cases decided
by the United States Supreme Court throw light on certain constitutional aspects of this question of statutory immunity. The cases are
Baltimore & Potomac Railroad Co. v. Fifth Baptist Church 181 and
Richards v. Washington Terminal Co. 188 In the latter case it was
claimed by the plaintiff that his property had been damaged by large
quantities of dense black smoke and dust, together with dirt, cinders,
and gases, emitted from trains while passing in and out of a tunnel in
the District of Columbia. A fan system caused all such gases to be
forced out of the south portal of the tunnel and the plaintiff's nearby
property was especially damaged thereby.
The Court held that in view of the act of Congress which authorized
the establishing of the railroad and specifying its location within the
District, the activity could not be deemed a public nuisance. N evertheless, said the Court, the acts referred to, if done without legislative sanction, would form the subject of an action by the plaintiff to recover
damages as for private nuisance, and, with respect to this element, the
provisions of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution are applicable
to the effect that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. The Court said :
We deem the true rule, under the Fifth Amendment, as under
state constitutions containing a similar prohibition, to be that
while the legislature may legalize what otherwise would be a
public nuisance, it may not confer immunity from action for a
t86

/d. at 487.

u.s.

317. 2 S.Ct. 719 (I88J).
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Supra note 78
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private nuisance of such a character as to amount in effect to a
taking of private property for public use. 139
Accordingly, it was held that, although the railroad duly licensed by
public authority would not be subject to the issuance of a restraining injunction, an action for damages would be available. As to the extent of
recoverable damages, the Court held that there would be a limited immunity with respect to those damages that naturally and unavoidably result from the proper conduct of a railroad, such as are shared generally
by property owners whose lands lie within the range of the inconveniences necessarily incident to proximity thereto. This would include
ordinary noises, vibrations, and the necessary emission of smoke and
sparks from locomotives. The Court pointed out that this limited immunity from liability for incidental injuries, although it is attended by a
considerable degree of hardship to the private landowner, nevertheless is
a necessity unless the company is to be made liable for damages for these
minor items in which case the practical result would be to bring the
operation of the railroad to a standstill. But this principle, held the
Court, does not carry to the point of construing the act of Congress in
the light of the Fifth Amendment to authorize the imposition of a
special, direct, peculiar, and substantial burden upon the· plaintiff's property without compensation to him. Accordingly, the defendant was held
subject to liability for damages suffered by the plaintiff over and above
those incidental inconveniences suffered by all who live nearby a railroad
right of way. In short the statutory privilege precludes the injunction
and the payment of damages for incidental inconveniences, but the Constitution prevents closing the door to damages for special and severe
losses. This principle would clearly be applicable to licensees of the
Atomic Energy Commission. ·
We may conclude from the foregoing that, although there is some
possibility in view of the case history of a limited immunity deriving
from statutory privileges, such immunity has not been particularly significant in the more recent evolution ofthe law, and it is unlikely to play
an important part in atomic activity except perhaps to preclude the use
of the injunction against Atomic Energy Commission licensees.
b. Statutory Limits on Maximum Liability
Statutory limits upon the recoverable damages seem destined to be a
significant feature of atomic liability legislation, not only in the United
States but in other countries as well. We have long been used to the
130

I d. at 553.
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imposition of such limits in workmen's compensation legislation where
fixed dollar limits serve to offset the broader liability coverage. As to
atomic energy in the Anderson-Price Act, adopted in 1957, amending
the. United States Atomic Energy Act, it is provided that .the liability
of a licensee shall not exceed the amount of insurance coverage prescribed in· his license (not to exceed the approximately $6o,ooo,ooo
available in the insurance market) plus the government indemnity that
covers amounts in excess of the insurance up to $soo,ooo,ooo.
. In other countries, similar liability limits are under consideration. In
England, a limit of £s,ooo,ooo for any one accident may be adopted; in
West Germany the figure is DM 1 s,ooo,ooo; in Switzerland, Sw fr 30,ooo,o~. Some form of government indemnity in excess of those sums
is also under consideration in Germany and Switzerland. Accordingly,
it may be concluded that atomic industry, although it may be subjected to
strict liability in connection with its more hazardous activities, will have
the benefit of definite monetary limits on such liability, probably also
supported by governmental indemnity. Such limits will permit insurance
companies to enter the field with assurance of manageable losses, and
operators will be enabled to protect themselves by covering predictable
maximum risks by insurance. Such provisions serve to promote the
development of a new and usef_ul field of activity, and we may conclude
that they stand a good chance of becoming universally a part of the pat·
tern of atomic legislation for the future.
c. The Federal Tort Claims Act
The Federal Tort Claims Act 160 provides a major exception to the
rule of sovereign immunity from private legal action. The government
is made liable for certain of its torts. It is interesting to note, however,
that courts are in effect establishing an "exception to the exception" to
the effect that in no case shall the government be held subject to strict
liability while in the execution of certain of its public duties. It is this
feature that interests us especially in connection with atomic energy
liability.
The Tort Liability Act permits an injured party to sue the United
States government for a tort claim brought because of harm caused by
activities that would otherwise enjoy sovereign immunity on account of
their governmental character. However, an important limitation is
embodied in Section 268o which prevents action being brought upon
140 z8 U.S.C.A. §§1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401, 2402, 2411, 2512, 2671-Bo (1952
Supp.).
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claims for harm caused by "discretionary acts" of government officials.
Then there is another limitation which does not expressly appear in the
act but is implied by the federal courts. It is that the government cannot
be found liable without fault in connection with harm caused by legitimate pursuit of activities of a purely governmental character. This is
in interesting contrast to the British policy under Section 5 ( 3) of the
United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority Act which provides for
strict liability without limit.
The most dramatic case that has arisen up to the present time under
the act is Dalehite v. United States. 141 This case involved an action for
both personal injuries and property damage caused by an explosion of a
shipload of ammonium nitrate while in transit to Europe to be used as
fertilizer. 142 The fertilizer was produced from surplus military explosives and was being sent to the Continent as a part of the government's plan to aid European agricultural development. Action was
brought under Section 1346 (b). and Section 268o of the Federal Tort
Claims Act and was based upon negligence. The Court denied recovery
on the ground that, even if the accident had been caused by negligence
of government personnel, the government could, nevertheless, claim immunity under the "discretionary exemption" provision of Section 2680.
It is in a dictum, however, that the item of especial interest in connection with this examination of the doctrine of strict liability is to be
found. The court, interpreting Section 1346(b), stated that the government could not be held to liability without fault in an action prosecuted
under the Tort Claims Act. This aspect of the opinion is particularly
applicable to the government owned nuclear industry, since, in the event
of a reactor burn-up, evidence of negligence would be most difficult to
come by and much of it would doubtless be obliterated in the accident.
Hence strict liability would be the only recourse.
The court's dictum that the government was not to be held liable without fault uder the Federal Tort Claims Act was actually followed in a
later case, Bartholomae Corp. v. United States. 148 In that case action was
brought against the government for damages to the plaintiff's building
caused by shock waves produced by atomic weapons that were being
Supra note 127.
tu The ship was in the harbor at Texas City when the explosion occurred, so the
mishap is now known as the "Texas City disaster." The incident is somewhat like a
possible though unlikely major reactor disaster because of the enormous amount of
damage involved. A large area of Texas City was laid waste by the explosion and
some 300 claims were filed totaling approximately $2oo,ooo,ooo dollars.
148 135 F. Supp. 651 (1955).
14 1
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tested on the government's proving grounds at Los Alamos, New
Mexico. The plaintiff's buildings were about 150 miles away from the
scene of the testing. In an action under the Federal Tort Claims Act,
one of the four counts was based on a claim of absolute liability. The
court denied recovery on that count, saying:
There is an additional reason why there can be, no recovery
on count three which is founded on a theory of absolute liability without fault where the government is engaged in an ultrahazardous activity. In Dalehite v. United States, supra, the
court stated that liability under the Tort Claims Act does not
arise by virtue of the United States engaging in an extrahazardous activity and that it is to be invoked only on a negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee. 144
The Tort Claims Act thus limits recovery to actions based upon negligence. By implication strict liability has no place in actions against the
government. In effect the government claims the immunity that its
licensees or franchise holders might conceivably derive under the theory
of the utility cases heretofore referred to in this chapter.
2.

Statutory Extension of Strict Liability

As we have indicated hitherto, the trend in judicial decisions is in
the direction of extending strict liability rather than limiting it. We
shall find that, in line with general social policies of the day, the same is
true in the field of statute law, which we now proceed to examine.
a. Illustrations of Legislation in the United States Imposing
Strict Liability
Strict liability is no novelty in contemporary legislation. The example
which comes first to mind is the workmen's compensation legislation,
almost universally enacted in this country. Under such legislation the
burden of industrial accidents is placed upon the employer if injuries
"arise out of and occur in the course of the employment." Negligence
is not a factor. Strict liability for occupational diseases of many different kinds is also imposed. Such legislation is based upon a desire to provide summary relief for injured employees, and also to place the burden
of industrial accidents upon the employer who is in the better economic
position to bear the burden or shift it to the public.
Another kind of strict liability legislation is exemplified by the Federal
Safety Appliance Act which requires interstate railroads to install pre144

I d. at 654.
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scribed safety devices, making the railroads subject to absolute liability
for injuries caused by any deficiency in complying with the terms of the
statutes or regulations. Again, we find many of the Pure Food and
Drug Acts making the manufacturer or the seller of defective food or
drugs absolutely liable to the injured consumer, without regard toquestions of negligence or reasonable care.
In the field of aeronautics a dozen states have adopted a rule of absolute liability for "ground damage" through statutory enactment of the
Uniform Aeronautics Act, promulgated in I922 by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Several other
states have adopted limited versions of the Uniform Act. Still other
states, influenced no doubt by the safety records and the wide extent of
use of civil aviation, have leaned more recently toward a negligence rule,
and at least two states, namely. Pennsylvania and Idaho, have adopted
laws affirmatively applying ordinary rules of negligence to aviation accidents. Three other states, Georgia, Nevada, and Maryland, have
adopted a presumption of negligence rule, but stop short of absolute
liability. 145
b. Illustrations from Other Countries of Statutory Extensions of Strict Liability
Turning to other countries for further illustrations, Sweden, as long
ago as I902, adopted an act imposing strict liability upon operators of
electric installations. In principle this act prescribes absolute liability
for the operator for all damage occasioned by electricity flowing from
the plant. The act, however, establishes certain exemptions from liability. Exempted are damages resulting from acts of God, or major external force, those resulting from the negligence of the injured party by
infringing regulations or otherwise, those caused by installations operating with an electric potential of less than I so volts, and those that result
from facilities that are completely fenced in or placed underground. In
short, Sweden has long since concluded that its social structure demands widespread, strict liability for the electric power industry utilizing
its special kind of dangerous facility.
Germany likewise has entered the field with its Federal Law on Liability. Article I of this law imposes absolute liability upon operators of
railroads. They can exempt themselves only by proving that the accident
arose because of an act of God, or major external force, or because
us For statutory citations, see Eubank, "Land Damage Liability in Aircraft Cases,"
57 Dickinson L. Rev. 188 (1953).
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of the fault of the injured person. Article 1 (a) of the German law deals
with electric companies, providing that such companies also are to be
held strictly liable if personal injury or property damage is caused by
their activities. Again, strict liability is made subject to exceptions for
acts of God, major external force, or fault on the part of the damaged
person. 146
These brief references to Swedish and German laws illustrate the
fact that in other highly developed legal systems, social regard for the
injured party has resulted in legislative measures to assure the payment
of damages regardless of proof of negligence.
c. Atomic Energy Acts and Proposed Acts Establishing Strict
Liability for Atomic Activities
We may most assuredly anticipate that in the atomic field we shall find
legislatures moving in the direction of establishing strict liability by
statute. Such legislation in effect will be forced by the completely unsatisfactory state of the common law on the subject; the confusion of
Rylands v. Fletcher, the Restatement, and nuisance doctrines leaves too
much to be desired.
In England, the country of origin of Rylands v. Fletcher, the most
positive and sweeping legislation along this line has been placed in effect.
The Parliament of the United Kingdom in adopting its Atomic Energy
Authority Act of 1954 made the Atomic Energy Authority absolutely
liable for all radiation injuries both from reactor operations, and also
from all other nuclear activities, by providing in Section 5 ( 3) of the Act
as follows:
It shall be the duty of the Authority to secure that no ionising
radiations from anything on any premises occupied by them,
or from any waste discharged (in whatever form) on or from
any premises occupied by them, cause any hurt to any person
or any damage to any property, whether he or it is on any such
premises or elsewhere.
This section places the English Atomic Energy Authority under an
absolute duty which permits of no exceptions whatsoever, even for acts
of God, except that possibly the Authority can plead a counter-claim to
14 6 See Gesetz betr. die V erbundlichkeit zum Schad en ersatz fiir die bei dem Betriebe
von Eisenbahnen, Bergwerken usiv. herbeigefiihrten Totungen und Korperverletzungen
(Reichshaftpflichtgesetz) vom 7. ]uni 1871 (R.G. Bl. 207) h and ha. Also see
Gesetz iiber die Haftpflicht der Eisenbahnen und Strassenbahnen fiir Sachschaden
vom 29. April 1940 (R.G. :at. I 691) in der Fassung des Gesetzes vom 16. Juli 1957
(B.G. Bl. I 710), §I.
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any action brought by a person who by his own negligence or willful
act causes or contributes to the escape of radioactivity. Moreover, the
act covers all kinds of radioactivity, both that resulting from chain reactions and that from less dangerous sources. Thus, the Authority in
Britain is under an exceptionally broad duty to see that their reactors
and all other atomic activities are proof against acts of God, falling
airplanes, and mishandling by strangers, as well as the vicissitudes of
normal operational activity. Finally, the Authority's liability is without
financial limit. u 7
It should be noted, however, that Section 5 ( 3) applies only to the
Atomic Energy Authority, namely the British government agency. It
does not apply to private industry. At the present time such industry
is not actively engaged in England in reactor operation but it doubtless
will be so engaged in the near future ; and if an accident takes place, the
doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher would then be controlling, unless in
the meantime legislation is enacted.
But Parliament is about to act. On February 10, 1958, the British
government announced its intention to intro4uce legislation providing
for the licensing and inspection of all privately owned atomic energy
operations, announcing, further, that all such private owners would be
subject to the same duty as that of the Atomic Energy Authority with
respect to the prevention of damage and the obligation to make recompense for personal injury or property damage occasioned by their
operations. In other words, the British do not seem to feel that Rylands
v. Fletcher is adequate for atomic energy purposes, and they intend to
provide a very comprehensive strict liability measure covering atomic
operations, government, private, and otherwise. There is some uncertainty as to whether or not the act to be applied to private industry would
require strict liability for escaping radioisotopes as distinguished from
chain reactions. A high government official has indicated that he does not
believe the act in its final form will be quite so drastic. In any case this
proposed measure represents the current thinking in the land of origin
of the common law--one of the principal competitors for the world's
atomic business in the future.
In Germany also the matter of liability for atomic injuries has recently received extensive and intensive consideration. As early as 1955
H7 See discussion by C. ]. Highton, General Counsel for the U.K. Authority, in a
paper entitled "International Problems of Tort Liability and Financial Protection
Arising Out of the Use of Atomic Energy-Law Relating to Atomic Operations in
Great Britain" presented to the International Bar Association Convention, Cologne,
Germany, July 21, 1958.
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German lawyers and insurance experts were studying the liability problems likely to arise from peaceful uses of atomic energy. As a result of
these deliberations a draft of a Federal Atomic Energy Act was prepared. In 1957 this draft was ready for adoption, but because of politicai obstacles final action was deferred. In the meantime several of the
West German Lander having research reactors operating or under
construction have felt the need for enacting provisional laws on the
subject. In January, 1958, Land Nordrhein-Westfalen adopted a
measure that included a brief interim treatment of civil liability and insurance coverage therefor and other somewhat similar measures have
been adopted in Bavaria, the City of Berlin, the City of Bremen, the City
of Hamburg, Hesse, Schleswig-Holstein, and Wiirttemberg-Baden.
The 1957 German draft bill as proposed by the government of the
Federal Republic of West Germany contains an exceptionally thoughtful
treatment of the question of liability, and it will be worth while to
summarize these provisions. 148 They may become useful in connection
with the formulation of American legislation. The principal articles of
Part IV on Liability for Injuries are in substance as follows:

Article 2 I. ( 1) Should any person suffer death, bodily injury or any deterioration in health or should property sustain
damage owing to the effect of a nuclear fission process or of
radiation from a radioactive substance emitted from an installation within the meaning of article 7 (.installations for the
production or fission of fissile materials or for the processing
of irradiated fissile materials) or from equipment forming
part of such installation or from any operation, including the
disposal of waste, the owner of the installation shall be required to pay compensation for such damage in accordance
with the provisions of articles 23 to 31. Liability for compensation shall not arise where the damage is caused by act of
God.
( 2) Where the use of property has been impaired by the
effects of radiation from a radioactive substance, this shall be
deemed to be damage to property for the purpose of the regulations under this Part.

Note that this provision does not spell out strict liability for all
radioactivity from reactor plants, but merely from the reactor itself and
the disposition of waste products. If there should be other radioactive
substances involved, the question of liability would fall under Article 22.
us The original draft of this measure was submitted to the Bundestag in a report
dated May 9, 1957, (Paper 3502) as a result of the deliberations of the 38th Parliamentary Commission on Atomic Questions. A revised version, translated into English
by Centre D'Etudes de Ia Commission Permanente du Risque Atomique (CERA)
can be found in Information Bulletin No. 12, July 1958.
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This differentiation in liability between cases falling within Article 2I
and those under Article 22 is most important.

Article 22. (I) Should any person suffer death or bodily
injury or any deterioration in health or should property sustain damage through the effects of a nuclear fission process or
of the radiations from radioactive substances in cases other
than those set out in article 2 I, the possessor of the substance
affected by the nuclear fission or the radioactive substance
from which the radiation is emitted shall be required to pay
compensation for the damage arising therefrom in accordance
with articles 23 to 3 I. Liability shall not arise where the damage is caused by an event which the possessor, his servants or
agents cannot avoid, even by taking every precaution possible
in the circumstances, and which is due neither to faulty safety
arrangements nor to faulty workmanship.
The effect of this rather obscure inversion of language is to provide
that there will be no liability if proper care is utilized, but the burden
is placed on the defendant to exculpate himself,-a so-called "inversed
burden of proof."
It is further provided in Article 22 that the burden will not be reversed if the radioactive material is used by a physician or dentist in
medical treatment of the plaintiff, nor will it be reversed if there is a
legal relationship between the operator and the plaintiff whereby the
latter accepts the risk occasioned by the dangerous material.
Article 23. This article deals with the so-ailed "contributory responsibility" of the injured. It is provided here that, if damage is
caused by his "cooperative fault," _another provision of the German Civil
Code shall be applied, prorating the damages according to the respective
faults-an adaptation of a "comparative negligence" theory.
. Article 24. This article provides the specific items of damages to be
compensated. They include medical treatment, loss of earnings, funeral
expenses in case of death, and maintenance costs of legal dependents,
but no provision is made for pain and suffering. This subject needs
careful treatment in any such statute.
Article 27. This article deals with limits upon the liability. In case
of death a maximum of DM Ioo,ooo, or in case of injury a yearly payment of not to exceed DM6,ooo is provided. The total amount to be
paid by the operator or his insurance carrier for any one accident shall
not exceed DM I s,ooo,ooo, except in case of negligence for which there
is no limit.
Article 28. The statutes of limitations are revised. All claims under
the act continue alive for two years after the time the injured person
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obtains knowledge of the damage done and the person liable, but not
more than thirty years frorri the time when the overexposure took place.
Article 29. This article deals with forfeiture and provides that the
person entitled to the compensation will lose his right under the law if
he does not furnish the liable person with notice of the damage within
three months after becoming conscious of his injury. This "notice of
damage" must be followed by bringing the suit within two years as
provided by Article 28.
It is contemplated that the foregoing provisions will be supplemented
by another federal enactment, somewhat like the United States Anderson-Price Act, requiring insurance and providing indemnity by the
government to the extent of DMsoo,ooo,ooo over the amounts of
private liability stipulated in Article 27. 149
The foregoing provisions illustrate the very thorough current thinking in the West German Republic with respect to statutory extension of
liability for overexposure to radioactivity.
A somewhat similar measure is being currently drafted in Switzerland. In fact, a second draft of this measure was completed by the
commission charged with the task on May 6, 1958, and is now ready for
submission to the Swiss Parliament. This draft also provides for absolute liability for injuries caused by those who engage in "nuclear
processes," a term which is defined to be the substantial equivalent of
"nuclear criticality," i.e., processes involving chain reactions. It should
be observed that on this point the Swiss draft is the reasonable equivalent of that of West Germany. In short, absolute liability is to be
limited in both countries to the chain reaction process and its necessary
radioactive auxiliaries. It will not include other radioactive substances
which are therefore left to the ordinary principles of negligence.
Moreover, the Swiss draft excludes damages resulting from acts of
God, earthquakes, events of war, or grave faults of the injured person.
Neither the German nor the Swiss draft exempts from strict liability any
accidents resulting from the activities of third persons. The Swiss draft,
like the German draft, limits the amount of liability per accident, the
Swiss figure being Sw fr JO,ooo,ooo, which is the maximum amount of
insurance coverage available in the Swiss Insurance Pool. Under Swiss
policies a deduction will be made from the face value of the policy for
any amounts paid out or incurred for prior accidents during the policy
period. Accordingly, the Swiss draft provides that when the remaining
149 For a complete discussion of the proposed West German law, se«> a-paper entitled
"[nternational Problems of Tort Liability and Financial Protection Arising Out of the
u~ of Atomic Energy" presented on July 21, 1958, by Dr. H Fischerhof to the
International Bar Association at Cologne, Germany.
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maximum liability is reduced by one-tenth or more, the insured must
seek additional coverage to meet the deficiency.
The Swiss draft includes a statute of limitations of only ten years
from the date of the accident, but provision is made for a "delayed
damages" fund to cover cases that turn up after the expiration of the
statutory period. This fund, which would be administered by the State,
would be accumulated by contributions required. of all operators in the
form of a supplementary payment of an amount not to exceed one-third
of the insurance premium.
We may anticipate that these German and Swiss bills will become law
in substantially the form stated within the next year or two. Moreover,
they are likely to set a pattern for legislation in other countries of
Western Europe and perhaps for other parts of the world. They have
value to the United States as precedents. First, they confirm, so to
speak,· the wisdom of the Anderson-Price Amendment by imposing
similar requirements, i.e., by requiring insurance, providing government indemnity, and limiting maximum liability; and second, they point
the way toward a solution of the civil liability problem by statutory prescription of absolute liability in its proper field with clearcut definitions
and appropriate exceptions. Of especial importance is the segregation of
the chain reaction elements, making them subject to strict liability, but
leaving other radioactivity subject to normal principles of negligence.
This last named feature serves to establish an orderly system in place
of the present unsatisfactory state of affairsand should provide a system
of redress for injured persons based upon a: careful legislative appraisal
of the economic and social needs as well as the problems of a new industry. The search for such a wisely conceived statutory solution is
the next important step in the law of the atomic age.

K. Conclusions Concerning Strict Liability
We have now sufficiently reviewed both the case law, the statute
law, and the facts pertaining to the question of strict liability so that
we may formulate some conclusions concerning its proper applicability
to atomic activities, drawing together the tentative suggestions heretofore set forth and attempting to express a comprehensive prospectus of
this area of the law. With a reasonable degree of assurance we offer
the following:
( 1) As has already been noted, the judge-made law, particularly
that made by American courts, is in a state of confusion, with manifold
uncertainties created by the indefiniteness of the standards to be applied.
Under Rylands v. Fletcher, what are "dangerous substances?" \Vhat is
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a "non-natural use?" Under the American Law Institute Restatement,
what is the meaning of "ultra-hazardous?" When does an activity
"necessarily involve a risk of serious harm?" What is "common
usage?" Under the nuisance doctrine, how shall we evaluate the "balance of convenience" in connection with possible nuisances from atomic
activities? All of these vague terms create uncertainties in the case law.
The terms cannot be readily applied to users of atomic energy to determine who are included within strict liability and who are not, or
what accidents fall within the exceptions and which do not, or what
defenses are available in special circumstances. In addition, we find that
variances between the views of different courts compound the difficulty.
In short, common law processes seem ill-adapted to meet the atomic
liability problem.
(2) The facts related to atomic injuries present widely variant patterns. Some radioactive substances are highly dangerous, others not so
much so. Some atomic activities are unique or nearly so, others are or
soon will be commonplace. Some will be carried on in centers of population, others in remote areas. No single rule can wisely be applied to all of
the variants. These diverse facts further complicate the legal scene and
bespeak a comprehensive rather than a piecemeal solution.
(3) Notwithstanding an excellent safety record to date, injuries to
persons and property are certain to occur in the future in connection
with peaceful uses of atomic energy. It is a fast moving technology, too
swift, indeed, to be readily accommodated under the relatively deliberate
evolutionary processes of the common law. Yet the law must provide a
suitable framework for the new industry, both clarifying the duties and
obligations of those who take part in it, and providing adequate, speedy,
and certain redress for injured persons.
(4) Insurance and indemnity programs sponsored and administered
by government are being made available to protect the industry against
undue liability, but we have not yet really come to grips with the proper
extent and nature of this liability so far as individual cases are concerned. This is an essential next step.
( 5) In other leading countries constructive minds are coming to grips
with the problem of civil liability by resort to statutory measures, with
clearly expressed principles to guide the solution of problems in the field.
Some statutes have already been adopted, others are in the drafting
stage. It is a field in which the legislative process best serves the public
needs.
( 6) Certain European proposals are of especial interest by reason of
the differentiation established between two classes of radiation accidents
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(a) those connected with chain reaction, in which case strict liability
is imposed, and (b) those due to other radioactive substances, in which
case the usual rules of negligence prevail.
(7) In the United States we must give serious consideration to a
similar statutory approach to determining liability for radiation injuries.
The trend is towards strict liability, but exceptions must be worked out
to achieve justice and avoid discouraging the development of a new and
valuable technology. Many phases of nuclear enterprise can properly
be fitted into the normal standards of negligence. Others must accept
strict liability. The lines of cleavage must be carefully drawn.
(8) In the light of the materials presented in this chapter, we suggest
the following principal points as essential to the formulation of a just
and sensible law of civil liability for radiation injuries.
(a) Those who engage in atomic activity (including both private
and government operations) involving critical quantities of fissionable
material, or the disposition of waste fission byproducts therefrom, and
those who have in their possession critical quantities of fissionable materials, should be held strictly liable for injuries occasioned by ariy accidental escape of radioactivity resulting from such operations, if the
escape is in excess of the permissible tolerance limits specified by the
Atomic Energy Commission or state regulatory bodies. This would include the power reactor "runaway," the EBRI situation, the Chalk
River, and Windscale types of accidents, the fuel processing and reprocessing plants, and waste disposal facilities and even the small research reactor accident which some may feel should not be subject to
such strict liability.
(b) If in connection with activities included in (a) radioactive
effluents escape, not by accident, but necessarily in the ordinary course
of operations but in quantities less than the officially prescribed tolerance levels, liability should be based upon principles of negligence only.
This will afford reasonable latitude for normal operations without the
harassment and expense of constant litigation. For example, the hypothetical escape of radioactivity from a waste disposal plant would be
covered by this provision.
(c) Those who engage in atomic activity of kinds other than those
included in (a) which involve the irradiation of food, drugs, or other
articles for human consumption should likewise be ·held strictly liable
for injuries caused by their products.
(d) Exceptions, if any, from strict liability should be clearly spelled
out and defined. Such exceptions should be kept at a minimum, limited
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at the most to acts of God, acts of war, and results that flow from the
intentional acts of the injured person. The availability or otherwise of
defenses in the nature of contributory negligence, assumption of risk,
or actions of third parties should also be spelled out and defined. In
general, if there is good reason for strict liability, there is an equally
good reason for keeping the exceptions and defenses within the narrowest possible bounds.
(e) Those who engage in any atomic activity not included in (a) or
(c) above should be held liable for negligence only. This would include radiography, thickness measurement, the use of tracers, medical
diagnosis and therapy; and the dozens of other highly valuable applications of radioisotopes. Again, there is a good argument for including
in this category small research reactors of conventional types and proved
stability. Dividing lines between negligence and strict liability situations
would thus be sharply drawn in common-sense way, and all concerned
would profit thereby.
(f) Statutes of limitations should be revised to extend substantially
the period within which suit may be brought, thus to take account of the
fact that the damaging effects of overexposure to radioactivity frequently do not become apparent for many years. A reasonable period,
perhaps two years, should be allowed after acquisition of knowledge of
the injury and identification of the person liable, with possibly an overall limit of twenty years from the date of the accident. Such a provision
would give redress to the victim who after many years develops cancer,
cataract, or leukemia.
(g) Statutory provision must be made to deal with the extraordinary
problems of evidence and burden of proof that will arise in radiation
cases. In negligence cases the proof of negligence will be extremely
difficult and it is possible that the only feasible solution will be the "inserved burden of proof" of the German draft. Moreover, it may be
necessary to resolve problems of causation by resort to statutory presumptions based upon roentgens of exposure or other available objective data.

* * * * *

A statutory approach to the problem of strict liability utilizing as a
framework the foregoing points, and taking advantage of the West
German and Swiss thinking on the subject, would minimize litigation,
bring prompt justice to injured persons, and, at the same time clarify
the law to facilitate the growth of a new type of industry.

Chapter V
ENTERPRISE LIABILITY IN ATOMIC ENERGY
A. Product Liability
1.

Introduction

Ascertaining the potential liability of designers, manufacturers,
wholesalers, retailers, and suppliers of goods and services in an atomic
energy industry is extremely difficult. This is due in part to the fact that
the theories of liability are in a state of ferment and in part because there
is a confusion between tort and contract law concepts and the application of each in particular fact situations. Out of the confusion, we can
draw one conclusion. There is a marked tendency to provide compensation to persons injured by defective chattels or services by the imposition of a type of "enterprise liability," apparently on the assumption
that suppliers can shift the economic loss through price increases and by
obtaining liability insurance coverage.
The importance of determining the extent of liability under existing
legal doctrines is perhaps obvious from the standpoint of obtaining
recoveries for persons injured by atomic radiation and also of advising
entrepreneurs of desired insurance coverage and of possible measures
to limit liability. Nonetheless, a few hypothetical questions inay indicate
some problems that will have to be dealt with by lawyers in the atomic
age. Will or should the designer of a nuclear reactor be liable for injuries caused to persons subjected to radiation outside the facility? Will
or should the manufacturer of radioisotopes be liable for injuries caused
as a result of leaks in packaging even though a wholesaler or retailer had
control over the goods after the manufacturer? Will or should the supplier of a mechanical device used in conjunction with radioactive materials be liable for radiation injuries caused by ~defect? Does it make
any difference if the supplier had no knowledge that his product was to
be so used? What is the effect of failing to warn a purchaser that a
radioisotope should not be used for particular purposes? What duty
rests on the manufacturer or supplier to know the propensities of his
product for causing injury? What liabilities may be imposed as a result
of statements made in advertisements? Can the scope of liability for
defects be limited by disclaimers and notices? These are only a few of
the many questions that must be answered. Some conclusions can be
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drawn on the basis of analagous cases involving product liability in
other types of endeavor. Therefore, we shall proceed to discuss some of
the significant features of the law governing the liability of suppliers
of goods and services, emphasizing throughout the landmark and
frontier cases and their possible applicability in the light of specific
atomic energy fact situations.
2.

Negligence
a. Historical Background

Although it is clear today in many jurisdictions that a supplier of
chattels is liable for injuries to any person caused by his negligent conduct, this was not the case less than a century ago. The liability of
suppliers for injuries caused by defects in chattels was considered to
extend only to those who were in privity with the supplier under the
contract of sale. Since this evolution in doctrine is of comparatively
recent origin and since there continues to be considerable doubt in some
jurisdictions as to the applicability of negligence and strict liability
doctrines, a discussion of the landmark cases will be helpful in supplying
the necessary perspective to deal with the new atomic energy situations.
The rule of law to the effect that the supplier of chattel was not liable
to persons not in privity was first announced in the English case of
Winterbottom v. Wright. 1 There the defendant had contracted with the
postmaster general to furnish a mail coach and keep it in repair. As a
consequence of the defendant's negligent failure to keep the coach in repair, the driver, who was in the employ of another contractor with the
postmaster general, was injured. Lack of a contractual relationship between the driver and the defendant was held to preclude liability, because "unless we confine the operation of such contracts as this to the
parties who entered into them, the most absurd and outrageous consequences, to which I can see no limit, would ensue." 2 This rule of law
protected the supplier from bearing certain burdens, but it failed to provide any redress for the persons injured by the supplier's negligence.
Only ten years after the Winterbottom case, the New York court in
Thomas v. Winchester 8 made an exception to the rule of no liability
to third parties. In that case the defendant negligently mislabeled, as a
harmless medicine, a jar of a poisonous extract of belladonna. The
plaintiff had purchased the poison from a physician who had obtained
10M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842).
/d. at 114.
s 6 N.Y. 397, 57 Am. Dec. 455 (1852).
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it from a druggist who in turn had purchased it from the defendant.
In allowing the plaintiff to recover, the court distinguished the fact situation from those in which a rule of non-liability prevailed, stating:
No such imminent danger existed in those cases. In the
present case the sale of the poisonous article was made to a
dealer in drugs, and not to a consumer. The injury therefore
was not likely to fall on him, or on his vendee who was also a
dealer; but much more likely to be visited on a remote purchaser, as actually happened. 4
The second landmark case in the development of the doctrine that
persons not in privity with a supplier could nonetheless recover damages
for injuries under negligence theories is Huset v. J. I. Case Threshing
Machine Co. 5 In allowing recovery to an employee of the purchaser of
a threshing machine which was inadequately shielded, the court outlined
three exceptions to the general rule of no liability in the absence of
privity. These exceptions, which were. to exert considerable influence
in future litigation, were said to be :
The first is that an act of negligence of a manufacturer or
vendor which is imminently dangerous to the life or health of
mankind, and which is committed in the preparation or sale of
an article intended to preserve, destroy, or affect human life, is
actionable by third parties. . . .
The second exception is that an owner's act of negligence
which causes injury to one who is invited by him to use his
defective appliance upon the owner's premises may form the
basis of an action against the owner. . . .
The third exception . . . is that one who sells or delivers
an article which he knows to be imminently dangerous to life
or limb to another without notice of its qualities is liable to
any person who suffers an injury theref:t;"om which might have
been reasonably anticipated. . . .8
In analyzing the court's statement of the exceptions, Professor Bohlen
forcefully brought out its incongruities. 7 He observed that under the
court's formulation of the rule, manufacturers of chewing tobacco and
drinks would be liable to persons not in privity, but the manufacturers of
automobiles, high-powered machines, boilers, etc. would· not be liable
for negligence since such articles are not intended to affect human life
and are not immently dangerous in their use when free of defects.
I d. at 409.
120 Fed. 86s (1903).
e !d. at 870-871.
1 Bohlen, "Liability of Manufacturers to Persons Other than their Immediate
Vendees," 45 L.Q. Rev. 343 (1929),
4

5
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Perhaps the best known case in the area of liability of manufacturers
to third parties is that of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company, 8 in
which Justice Cardozo wrote the opinion. There the plaintiff was injured when a wheel collapsed on a car manufactured by the defendant
and purchased by the plaintiff through a dealer. Although the wheel
came to the defendant from a supplier, the defect was such that reasonable inspection would have disclosed it. In holding the defendant liable
under negligence doctrines, the court said:
We hold, then, that the principle of Thomas v. Winchester
is not limited to poisons, explosives, and things of like nature,
to things which in their normal operation are implements of
destruction. If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasona:bly certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently
made, it is then a thing of danger. 9
The court, however, did indicate some limitations on this test, by
stating:
If to the element of danger there is added knowledge that the
thing will be used by persons other than the purchaser, and
used without new tests, then, irrespective of contract, the
manufacturer of this thing of danger is under a duty to make
it carefully. That is as far as we are required to go for the
decision of this case. There must be knowledge of a danger,
not merely possible, but probable. It is possible to use almost
anything in a way that will make it dangerous if defective.
That is not enough to charge the manufacturer with a duty
independent of his contract. . . . There must also be knowledge that in the usual course of events the danger will be
shared by others than the buyer. 10

The culmination of the establishment of a general rule of liability of
manufacturers based on negligence was reached in Carter v. Yardley &
Co., Ltd. by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. 11 In that case,
the plaintiff, a remote purchaser, had been injured by the use of perfume manufactured by the defendant. The court swept aside the distinction between things ''inherently dangerous" and others not so, stating
the rule to be as follows :
In principle, a manufacturer or other person owning or
controlling a thing that is dangerous in its nature or is in a
dangerous condition, either to his knowledge or as a result of
217 N.Y. 382, III N.E. 1050 ( 1916).
/d. at 389.
1o Ibid.
11 319 Mass. 92, 64 N.E.2d 693 (1946).
B
9
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his want of reasonable care in manufacture or inspection, who
deals with or disposes of that thing in a way that he foresees
or in the exercise of reasonable care ought to foresee will
probably carry that thing into contact with some person,
known or unknown, who will probably. be ignorant of the
danger, owes a legal duty to every such person to use reasonable care to prevent injury to him. 12
Instead of stating the rule in form of an exception to the general
rule as established in Winterbottom v. Wright the court stated:
The time has come for us to recognize that that asserted
general rule no longer exists. In principle it was unsound. It
tended to produce unjust results. It has been abandoned by the
great weight of authority elsewhere. 13
Thus in slightly more than a century the law has been completely reversed from a doctrine of non-liability of manufacturers to persons not
in privity by contract to a doctrine of liability for negligence. Not all
courts have had occasion to enunciate the broad doctrine of the Carter
case, but it can be expected that in most jurisdictions liability based
upon negligence will become the established rule of law. Although the
negligence doctrine as applied to product liability situations seems to be
established in most jurisdictions today, problems in its application still
remain. Furthermore, there appears to be some tendency in the cases
to impose what amounts to strict liability.
b. The General Nature of the Duty
In general, a supplier of chattels has a duty to use care and skill
when a reasonable, prudent man occupying the position of the supplier
would recognize that a failure to use such care and skill would cause an
unreasonable risk to other persons. 14 This duty is owed to every person who may foreseeably be injured by a failure .to exercise the care
and skill required. 15 The duty may be breached by several types of acts,
including a failure by the supplier to disclose the unfitness of the chattel
for the purchaser's purpose, a failure to exercise reasona:ble care in
manufacturing or inspecting the chattel, a failure to produce a safe
product as a result of errors in design, a misrepresentation of the quali12ld. at g6.
lSJd. at 104.
14 See James, "Nature of Negligence," 3 Utah L. Rev. 275, :28o (1953); James,
"Products Liability," 34 Tex. L. Rev. 44 (1955).
1s For a discussion of the foreseeability issue in atomic energy cases, see Chapter III,
supra.
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ties of the chattel or their fitness for a particular purpose, or a sale to a
person who is incompetent to handle the chattel safely. 18 Because of the
several forms which the negligence may take, the duty owed by the
supplier is often phrased more specifically in the cases and in discussions
of the product liability field. For example, the duty may be described
as a duty to disclose defects in the product or its dangerous nature or
as a duty to inspect. 17 Thus, the general duty owed by suppliers of
chattels is not expressed judicially, but it can be derived from an accumulation of the principles developed in the cases. Nonetheless, it is clear
that suppliers in the atomic energy industry undertake duties in respect
to their goods, a breach of which will result in the imposition of liability
under negligence doctrines.
c. By Whom. Is the Duty Owed?
The general duty to exercise reasonable care in conjunction with
supplying chattels extends to manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers, lessors, bailors, donors, 18 and even repairmen who return chattels with
knowledge of defects due to the repairs they were employed to undertake.19 In addition, it should be noted that the manufacturer may be
held liable for negligence, even if he did not produce the defective article
but incorporated it into the final finished product. 20
In connection with the atomic energy industry, the duty will extend
to all manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers of nuclear devices. Perhaps more important, however, is the fact that suppliers of non-nuclear
devices which are used in conjunction with reactors may subject themselves to tremendous liabilities if the failure of the device results in a
major nuclear accident. Thus, the unusual feature of the supplier's
liability in atomic energy is the vastness of the potential liability. For
example, the supplier of a defective gear may normally expect to incur
liability, but in all probability it will be confined to employees of the
purchaser and occasionally a limited number of other third parties.
Prosser, Torts §83 (2d ed. 1955).
See Restatement, Torts §388, and the several comments thereunder.
1 s Restatement, Torts §388, comment c (1934); James, "Products Liability," 34 Tex.
L. Rev. 44, 45 (1955), especially at Note 8 where cases are cited in which donors
have been held liable as well as cases which are contra. See also Prosser, Torts §83
at 493 (2d ed. 1955), indicating Dean Prosser's opinion that the gratuitous bailor or
donor only has the duty to disclose dangers of which he has knowledge.
to Restatement, Torts §388, comment c (1934). But see Hanson v. Blackwell Motor
Company, 143 Wash. 547, 255 Pac. 939 (1927).
20 MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company, 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916),
wheel supplied to car manufacturer by independent supplier.
16
11
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However, supplying a defective gear which causes a nuclear accident
may cause injury to hundreds and even thousands of persons, as well as
causing substantial property damage.
Because there is a practice in the atomic energy industry for one
group to design reactors or reactor components and another to engage
in their manufacture or construction, a question arises as to whether
the designers owe duties equivalent to those of the manufacturers of the
product. The Restatement of the Law of Torts 21 and Professor James 22
both take the position that negligence in design is a basis for recovery
against the manufacturer even where the product was designed by
others, although Professor James acknowledges that the courts have
been reticent in allowing recovery in cases based upon negligence in design where the manufacturer was responsible for the design. 23 We are
unaware of any cases holding a designer, as distinguished from a designer-manufacturer, liable to third persons injured as a result of use of
a chattel. In the case of architects the courts have refused to allow recovery by third persons injured by defects in design. 24 However, as
we shall note later in this chapter, the courts have generally followed
more restrictive rules in cases against building contractors and have
not allowed recovery when the building has been accepted, apparently
on the basis that the contractor has no control over subsequent acts concerning the realty and because of the lack of privity. When third parties
have initiated actions against architects for negligence in design, recovery has generally been denied on the same theories employed in the
building contractor cases. In contrast, the owners of the premises have
been successful in obtaining recovery for injuries caused by the negligence .of the architec.t. 25 However, in 1956 an Appellate Division of the
Supreme Court of New York held that an allegation of negligence by
an architect causing injury to a third person stated a cause of action. 26
Furthermore, the New York court even suggested that the architect
may be liable and the building contractor not liable because the building
contractor may have been justified in relying on the plans and specifica21

Restatement, Torts §§389. 398 (1934).
James, "Products Liability,'' supra note 18 at so et seq.
23 Ibid. For a discussion of the difficulties involved in seeking recovery for injuries
on the basis of negligence in design, see Katz, "Negligence in Design as a Basis of
Liability: The Auto Industry,'' 1956 Ins. L.J. 466.
24 See e.g., Geare v. Sturgis, 14 F.2d 2.;6 (1!)26).
25 See Annotation, "Responsibility of one acting as architect for defects or insufficiency of work attributable to plans,'' 25 A.L.R.2d 1o85 (1952).
26 Inman v. Binghamton Housing Authority, I App. Div. 2d 559, 152 N.Y.S.2d 79
( 1956).
22
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tioris. Therefore, the question of liability for negligence in design of
designers of chattels who do not also manufacture the product remains
doubtful. Nonetheless, we are of the opinion that the ultra-hazardous
nature of an improperly designed atomic device may lead the courts to
employ general negligence doctrines in suits by third parties against designers. Moreover, the general trend of the law in the field of product
liability has been to broaden the field of application of negligence concepts. Therefore, we conclude that there is considerable likelihood that
designers of chattels for atomic industry will be held to a general duty
similar to that owed by manufacturers.
One additional factor should be noted. The specific nature of the
duty owed by the various types of suppliers may differ. For example,
a retailer or wholesaler may not be subject to the same duty to inspect
a product .as the manufacturer. Similarly, the manufacturer may not
be under a duty to disclose to an ultimate purchaser the unsuitability of
his product for the particular use contemplated by the purchaser whereas
the retailer may be under such a duty when he knows of the contemplated use.
In the field of atomic energy a special problem exists because of the
activity of the federal government. The Atomic Energy Commission
actively engages in the production and marketing of radioactive byproduct materials, and the United States is the exclusive owner of special
nuclear material. 27 Furthermore, under contract arrangements the AEC
may supply research facilities, possible designs, and fuel refabrication
services. As a supplier of goods, is the United States liable for negligent acts on the same basis as private suppliers? Since the government can be held liable only to the extent of the waiver of its immunity
from suit, the answer lies in the applicable provisions of the Federal
Tort Oaims Act. 28 Generally, if injury results from the performance
of other than a discretionary act upon the part of government officials
and employees, the government has waived its immunity. Therefore,
it would appear that if the AEC supplies a negligently mislabeled radioisotope, the government may be held liable. However, if the negligence
consists of improperly licensing an unqualified person, the government
probably cannot be held liable because of the discretionary nature of the
27 Section 53e of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended in 1957, requires that
special nuclear licenses be subject to the condition that the licensee "hold the United
States and the Commission harmless from any damages resulting from the use or
possession of special nuclear material by the licensee" except to the extent that the
indemnification and limitation of liability provisions of the act apply.
28 28 U.S.C. §h346(b), 268o(a) (1950).
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negligent act. 29 An additional question is whether governmental liability
under the Federal Tort Claims Act can be based solely upon ownership
of special nuclear material, absent any showing of negligence. 80 In the
Texas City litigation, the Supreme Court answered this question negatively:
. . . [T]he statute requires a negligent act. So it is our
judgment that liability does not arise by virtue either of
United States ownership of an "inherently dangerous commodity" or property, or of engaging in an "extra-hazardous"
activity. 81
d. To Whom Is the Duty Owed?
When the courts in the last century required privity as a condition to
recovery for injuries occasioned by negligence in supplying a chattel,
the purchaser could, of course, fulfill that requirement in an action
against his immediate supplier. However, in the MacPherson case an
ultimate purchaser was allowed to recover from a remote vendor, and
since the date of that case the principle of liability for negligence has
been gradually extended to cover members of the purchaser's family, 82
the purchaser's employees, other users of the product, 88 casual by-standers, and even second-hand purchasers of the product. 84 However, not
every jurisdiction has had occasion to consider the extension of negligence doctrines to include non-users of a product, so soQle doubt exists
as to the exact legal situation now prevailing. For example, the Washington court has declined to hold a repairman liable to a guest-passenger for negligence in the repair of an automobile, 35 but the Kentucky
and Wisconsin courts have reached an opposite result. 88 The trend appears to be to enlarge the class to whom the duty is owing and thereby to
broaden the liability based on negligence doctrines.
Moreover, both the direct purchaser and in some cases the ultimate
purchaser may also be able to recover on the basis of either express or
29 For a discussion of the nature of discretionary acts, see Dalehite et al. v. United
States, 346 U.S. IS, 73 S.Ct. 9S6 (I9S3).
so For an interesting discussion of the possible goverrunental liability, see Hearing
before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on Governmental Indemnity, 84th
Cong., 2d Sess. pp. 109-114 (May 16, I9S6).
8 1 Dalehite et at. v. United States, supra note 29 at 4S·
82White Sewing Machine v. Fiesel, 28 Ohio App. 152, 162 N.E. 633 (1927).
ss Hoenig v. Central Stamping Co., 273 N.Y. 48S, 6 N.E.2d 4IS (1936).
84 Prosser, Torts §84, p. SOI (2d ed. I9SS).
as Hanson v. Blackwell Motor Co., supra note 19.
88 Olds Motor Works v. Shaffer, 145 Ky. 616, 140 S.W. 1047 (19II); Flies v. Fox
Brothers, 196 Wis. Ig(i, 218 N.W. Bss (1!)28).
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implied warranties. Recovery tinder warranty doctrines is based upon a
contractual type of liability and, as such, results in the impostion of a
kind of strict liability, as contrasted with negligence. Recovery on warranty theories will be discussed later in this chapter. The fact that a
purchaser may in some cases recover under either doctrine (negligence
or warranty) has resulted in confusion in the cases. In any event, suppliers of chattels in atomic energy industry must take account of both
doctrines in ascertaining the potential scope of their liability and in
devising methods of providing protection, either by limiting the basis
for recovery in warran_ty through contract terms or by seeking adequate
insurance coverage.
Because of the unusual nature of radiation, the most difficult question
confronting suppliers of chattels in atomic energy industry is whether
the duty is owed to remote non-users. Normally, a supplier whose negligence causes an accident can expect relatively few persons in areas
immediately adjacent to the chattel to be injured. But this may not be
the case in respect to defective chattels supplied in connection with
operations creating radiation hazards. For example, if the negligence of
a manufacturer of a reactor control mechanism causes the reactor to
melt-down and release radiation into the atmosphere, personal and property damage of outsiders may be measured in millions of dollars. Moreover remote and unexpected injuries may ensue, as for example if a
supplier's negJigence causes injury to a person who eats fruit covered
by radioactive wastes released several miles away.
Under ordinary negligence doctrines the duty to the remotely injured
person is resolved on the basis of foreseeability. It would appear that
once recovery based upon negligence is permitted, the same tests of
foreseeability should be employed in the atomic energy product liability
cases as used in other negligence cases. However, the Restatement of
the Law of Torts and Dean Prosser depart from the usual foreseeability
concepts employed in discussing negligence when they describe the liability of suppliers of chattels to third persons. Both express the liability
of the supplier in terms of persons who may be expected to be "in the
vicinity of the chattel's probable use." 87 A literal application of these
statements of the rule may suggest a more restrictive scope of liability
for suppliers of products in atomic energy cases involving radiation
injuries suffered in places far removed from the location of the chattel.
87 Prosser, Torts §84, p. 497 (2d ed., West Pub. Co., 1955). As expressed in the
Restatement, Torts §388 ( 1934), the supplier's liability is "to those whom the supplier
should expect to use the chattel with the consent of the other or to be in the vicinity
of its probable use."
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On the other hand, use of this.statement of the rule may result in even
greater liabilities because the statement takes no account of the device
employed in ordinary negligence cases of finding no duty in respect to
the "unforeseen" injured person. 88
It is doubtful whether any distinction can be justified between the
tests of duty in pure negligence cases and those applied to product liability cases. For example, in Margulies et al. v. Denner et al. 39 the owner,
the agent of the owner, the supplier of the product, the trucking company, and the truck driver were held jointly liable to a group of persons
who, while subway passengers, inhaled chlorine gas escaping from a defective tank in a truck when the driver, upon noticing the escape of gas,
stopped near a subway grating. It is difficult to conclude that the subway
passengers were in the vicinity of the probable use of the chlorine gas;
nonetheless the court found a duty on the part of the supplier to the
passengers, apparently on the basis of ordinary foreseeability tests.
As we shall see, the dangerousness of the product also plays a role in
determining the existence and nature of the duty! 0 Accordingly, it can
be expected tha1: a supplier of radioisotopes who ships them in a defective container will be held liable to persons exposed along the shipping
route. Moreover, all persons who may foreseeably be injured by radiation exposures caused by defective chattels will, in all probability, be
found to be among the class of persons to whom a duty is owed, no
matter how remote from the source of injury both in space and in time.u
e. The Dangerous Nature of the Product
In the MacPherson case Justice Cardozo indicated that liability for
injuries to third persons, not in privity, would be imposed if the manufacturer knew or should have known that .the product was a "thing of
danger." A thing of danger was defined as a product which is "reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently made." 42
Other cases 48 have also expressed the opinion that manufacturers would
See discussion of duty cases, supra Chapter III.
185 Misc. 139, 56 N.Y.S.:zd 856 (1945), aff'd 271 App. Div. 827, 65 N.Y.S.:zd 441
(1946), aff'd 297 N.Y. 562, 74 N.E.:zd 481 (1947).
40 See Restatement, Torts §293 (1934).
n Although some courts apparently attempted at one time to confine liability of
suppliers to personal injury cases, today similar rules are followed whether the damage
consists of injury to the person or to property. See Todd Shipyards Corp. v. United
States et al., 6g F. Supp. 6og (1947).
42 See quotes .from the MacPherson case, supra at note 9·
48 See, e.g., Huset v. ]. I. Case Threshing Machine Co., 120 Fed. 865 (1903).
88

89
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be held liable in the absence of privity if the product is "imminently
dangerous" or "reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril." 44
Similar language is often used by the courts today where the rules of
ordinary negligence have not been extended to the product liability
field.* 5 In some of these opinions there apparently is an intimation that
more than a simple breach of a reasonable standard of conduct is essential to establish liability of product suppliers. The dangerous nature of
a product, of course, aids in the establishment of whatever greater
breach of the standard of conduct may be required by the courts.
Because of the unusual dangers involved in radiation hazards, it
appears that certain products, such as radioisotopes, containers for
radioactive materials, reactor fuel elements,· and reactor control systems,
meet the "imminently dangerous" tests. On the other hand, such
products as electronic tubes, gears, bolts, pins, etc., which may be incorporated into a reactor do not seem to meet the tests. However, there
have been several decisions which have held similarly apparently innocuous articles to be "imminently dangerous," even including such
normally innocent items as shoes, bar stools, and children's toys.* 6 These
cases represent the trend toward the application of ordinary negligence
doctrines throughout the field of product liability although the courts
still are basing their decisions on an exception to the old no-liability rule
as stated in the MacPherson and other similar cases. In any event, it
would seem that where the courts stiii employ the exceptions, as distinguished from ordinary negligence concepts, many of the products
employed in atomic energy industry would appear to fall within the
ex~eptions, and therefore it is doubtful if the suppliers can expect to
avoid liability.
The dangerous nature of a product may have yet another effect on the
duty owed. The burden may be imposed upon the product manufacturer
to discover the possible dangers, and this duty may greatly increase the
standard of reasonable care applicable in respect to dangerous products.
For example, in Chapman Chemical Co. v. Taylor, et al./1 a manufacturer of 2-4-D weedkiller was held liable to a person whose cotton
crop, which was located three-quarters of a mile from the place of spray•• U.S. Radiator Corp. v. Henderson, 68 F.2d 87 (1933).
' 5 See cases listed by James, "Products Liability," supra note 18 at 61.
' 6 Pearlman v. Garrod Shoe Co., 276 N.Y. 172, n N.E.zd 718 (1937); S. Blickman,
Inc. v. Chilton, II4 S.W.2d 646 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938); Gittelson v. GothanJ Pressed
Steel Corp., 266 App. Div. 866, 42 N.Y.S.2d 341 (1943). For a more complete listing
of the cases, see James, supra. note 18 at 62.
47 215 Ark. 630,222 S.W.zd 820 (1949).
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ing by aircraft, was injured when wind caused the chemical to drift and
settle thereon. At the time, the manufacturer knew of the danger of the
chemical to certain crops but neither it nor other manufacturers apparently knew of the tendency of 2-4-D to drift farther than other types
of agricultural chemicals. Nonetheless, the Arkansas Supreme Court
approved the following instruction by the trial court to the jury:
It was the duty of the defendant Chapman Chemical Company before putting an inherently dangerous product on the
market to make tests to determine whether or not it would
damage crops of others; if you believe from a preponderance
of the evidence in this case that the 2-4-D dust applied . . .
[by the purchaser] . . . was an inherently dangerous product
liable to damage property of others, and that such tests were
not made, then you are told that the defendant Chapman
Chemical Company is negligent. 48
It is apparent that the court felt there was a duty to make more complete tests in respect to "inh.erently dangerous" articles. By its very
nature, the additional duty, in effect, established a higher standard of
care in dealing with the dangerous product. That the standard of care
may be affected by.the dangerous nature of a product is also indicated by
the Restatement's conclusion that a supplier who knows that a product
is unlikely to be made reasonably safe before being used is liable to
users and others in the vicinity of use even though the supplier has informed the purchaser of its dangerous character.49
For those products in the atomic energy field that can be described as
"inherently dangerous," it appears that additional duties and higher
standards of care will be imposed by the courts. Which products may
be so classified by the courts is a doubtful matter. As we have seen, some
rather commonplace products have been so classified in certain instances.
Radioactive materials having intermediate half-lives and emitting the
more dangerous gamma rays will probably be classified as "inherently
dangerous." Perhaps short-:lived isotopes or those emitting alpha and
beta radiation only may not be so considered. Possibly distinctions may
48Jd. at 642.
49 Restatement, Torts §Jl!g ( 1934). The section reads as follows:
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for another's use
knowing that the chattel is unlikely to be made reasonably safe before being put to
a use which the supplier should expect it to be put,· is subject to liability for bodily
harm caused by such use to those whom the supplier should expect to use the chattel
or to be in the vicinity of its probable use and who are ignorant of the dangerous
character of the chattel or whose knowledge thereof does not make them contributorily
negligent, although the supplier has informed the other for whose use the chattel is
supplied of its dangerous character.

738

TORT LIABILITY

be drawn by the courts on the basis of the likelihood of ingestion of the
particular material if it is harmful as an internal source of radiation.
A radiation detection device may be classified as inherently dangerous
or not, possibly depending on whether the supplier knows that failure
of the device may lead to harmful exposure of employees and others to
radiation. The lines will be drawn by the courts, often on the basis of
whether the supplier is more capable of bearing the economic loss caused
by the injury. However, this concept is seldom mentioned in the opinions
although it is recognized as being a very material factor by most legal
scholars. One statement may be made with some assurance; namely,
although the dangerous nature of the product will have a materia.! effect
upon the standard of care required of product manufacturers, there is
as yet no certainty about the extent to which it will affect suppliers
of the various kinds of products used in atomic devices. The law on this
subject will be shaped by future decisions.
f. Warnings of Danger and Assurances of Safety
There are a number of devices and products utilized in atomic industry which have dangerous aspects that are known to· the supplier.
For example, a processor of radioisotopes may supply tracers, some of
which may be safely used for diagnosis and treatment of humans but
others, harmful to humans, may be useful only in conjunction with
insecticides. Similarly, a supplier of reactor components may produce a
device which is suitable for thermal reactors but unworkable if used
with fast breeder reactors. Suppliers of radiation detection instruments
may know that certain devices may not be satisfactory for protecting
personnel of the purchaser from certain types of harmful radiation.
Moreover, because many aspects of atomic energy technology and the
nature of injury to humans remain unknown, though knowledge is constantly expanding, and because the theories of atomic structure still are
in a continuous state of evolution, suppliers of atomic energy products
must necessarily rely on knowledge currently existing although it may be
assumed to be incomplete. Since the suppliers may be held liable for
their negligent acts, among the most crucial questions to be answered
are: What warning must be given to the purchaser and user of atomic
energy products? What liabilities may result from a failure to warn?
What liabilities may result from giving assurances of safety when supplying an atomic energy product? What liabilities may result even
though warnings are given to the purchaser? It should be noted that
these questions involve the possibility of liability of a supplier in some
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cases even though no negligence can be shown in respect to the design
or manufacture of the product.
The importance of the necessity of providing warnings is indicated
by the Restatement's general rule governing liability of suppliers:
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel
for another to use, is subject to liability to those whom the
supplier should expect to use the chattel with the consent of
the other or to be in the vicinity of its probable use, for bodily
. harm caused by the use of the chattel in the manner for which
and by a person for whose use it is supplied, if the supplier
(a) knows, or from the facts known to him should realize,
that the chattel is or is likely to be dangerous for the use for
which it is supplied;
(b) and has no reason to believe that those for whose use
the chattel is supplied will realize its dangerous condition; and
(c) fails to e~ercise reasonable care to inform them of its
dangerous condition or of the facts which make it likely to be
so. [Emphasis added.] 60
Illustrative of the liability that may be imposed in conjunction with
an inherently dangerous product where no notice of danger is supplied
is the case of Noone v. Fred Perlberg, Inc. 61 In that case the manufacturer of a dress which was sized with an inflammable material was
held liable, the court stating the rule to be applied as follows :
The rule in this State is now settled that when a manufacturer sells an inherently dangerous article for use in its
existing state, the danger not being known to the purchaser
and not patent, and notice is not given of the danger or it cannot be discovered by reasonable inspection, the manufacturer
is legally liable for personal injuries received by one who uses
the manufactured article in the ordinary and expected manner.
[Emphasis added.] 82
In Ebers v. General Chemical Company 63 the defendant manufactured and marketed a new insecticide which the U. S. Department
of Agriculture had tested in several states successfully. In its advertising, after giving directions for the use of the insecticide which was
sold under the trade name E-D-E, the manufacturer supplied the following statement :
The foregoing information is supplied by us gratuitously
and is believed to be reliable and of value, but is in no way
Restatement, Torts §388 (1934).
268 App. Div. 149, 49 N.Y.S.2d 46o (1944), aff'd 294 N.Y. 68o, 6o N.E.2d 839
(1945).
62 I d. at 152.
5 8310 Mich. 261, 17 N.W.2d 176 (1945).
60
61
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guaranteed. The use of this material being beyond our knowledge and control and involving elements of risk to vegetation,
we do not make any warranty, express or implied, as to the
effects of such use, whether or not in accordance with directions or claimed so to be." 54
The plaintiff applied the insecticide as directed but nearly one-fourth of
his orchard trees died. Evidence was introduced by the plaintiff showing that in the following year both the defendant and the United States
Department of Agriculture had changed their directions for use to include a warning that the product should not be sprayed on the tree
trunks. The directiqns supplied to the plaintiff had recommended that
some of the chemical be sprayed on the trunk. Despite the disclaimer
the court held that the plaintiff has shown sufficient evidence of either
a failure to make satisfactory tests or a failure to provide adequate directions for use to warrant submission of the case to the jury. In reversing the lower court's ruling dir~cting a verdict for the manufacturer,
the court stated :
. . .. If it was negligent in placing such product on the market
in Michigan without proper field tests to determine its effect
on peach trees in this State, or if it gave improper direction for
the use and application of the product, it cannot escape responsibility for such negligence merely by adding a disclaimer
of warranty to its representation of safety. 511

Both of these cases demonstrate the necessity of giving warning or
adequate <;lirections for use to purchasers of products. The adequacy of
the warning or direction is, of course, a jury question, but it is clear
that the adequacy will be determined on the basis of knowledge which
should have been known. 56 · In the General Chemical Co. case, the court
infers that this knowledge should have been derived by tests in Michigan
because of different climatic and soil conditions even though the product
had been tested in a number of other states by the Department of
Agriculture.
In addition, in McClaMhan v. California Spray-Chemical Corp./ 1 the
Virginia Supreme Court seems to have concluded that, even where the
directions for use of a fungicide were not followed, the manufacturer
had a duty to provide warnings concerning the possible damages in ad54

Id. at 268.

u /d. at 274-275. See also E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., v. Baridon, 73 F.2d 26

(1934).
56 See Hopkins v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 199 F.2d 930 (1952).
117 194 Va. 842, 75 S.E.2d 712 (1953).
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clition to supplying directions for safe usage. A pamphlet supplied by
the 'defendant stated that the· chemical was not to be used later than
two weeks following petal fall, but the label on the container cautioned
against use "later than petal fall." However, in both instances the directions inferred that the reason for the warning was "a possibility of
residue remaining at harvest." In reversing the trial court, which had
set aside the jury verdict for the plaintiff, the court stated, in part:
It follows then, that a manufacturer of an economic poison
in giving direction for use is fulfilling only a part of his obligation to the purchaser. He is saying simply "Here is a way to
use this product which we guarantee will kill the weeds infesting your lawn or the scab infecting your orchard." Of course,
that way must be a safe way. The manufacturer by instructing
how to use is not necessarily saying, nor is he understood by
the purchasing public to say, "This is the only safe way to use
our product." 18
·
··
Two justices dissented. vigprously, stating :
The prohibition ~s to application "later than petal fall" was
positive, simple and direct. It could serve no purpose other
th<tn to warn of danger upon violation, a warning with special
meaning to experienced orchardists who know the condition of
the foliage on their "trees at the time of petal fall. No additional warning wa:s necessary· under the statutes. To say that
there should have been added a statement "Use only as directed, and not otherwise or damage may result," is a reflection
upon the intelligence of the plaintiffs.

* * * * *

. . . It having been established that no injury would have
been. incurred by plaintiffs had they observed the directions
and caution statement on the label . . . and the accompanying
pamphlet, it must logically follow that their default was a
proximate cause of the damage occasioned them. There is a
question of wisdom and fairness of subjecting defendant to
liability for damages under such circumstances. The majority
opinion fashions ·a broad, new law of negligence in conflict
with that which we have followed for many years,-one apt
to cause embarrassment in the future. 59
The applicability of these cases to atomic energy entrepreneurs is readily
seen. The supplier of a radioactive sterilizer or food preserver must
58 I d. at 862. The McClanahan case and several others concerning the duty to warn
are ably discussed by Dillard and Hart, "Product Liability: Directions for Use and
the Duty to Warn," 41 Va. L. Rev. 145 (1955).
59 /d. at 87o-871.
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not only provide directions for safe usage, but he may also be required
to warn against a possible dangerous usage, even though the Atomic
Energy Commission may have conducted experiments and even issued
statements concerning proper usage of the same or substantially similar
radiation sources.
A failure to give proper warning to the purchaser may also be the
basis for liability to third persons even if there is no evidence that the
manufacturer should have known of the danger at the time of the
purchase of the product, provided he becomes aware of the danger at a
later time. In DeVito v. United Air Lines, Jnc. 60 the plaintiff obtained
a judgment for wrongful death against the purchaser and manufacturer
of an aircraft, alleging negligence against the manufacturer for failure
to warn the purchaser that carbon dioxide may enter the cockpit of the
aircraft, thereby suffocating the pilots. The planes were purchased in
the spring of 1947 and the evidence of the carbon dioxide danger did not
come to the attention of the manufacturer until January 1948. The
manufacturer thereafter conducted tests but failed to tell the purchaser
of the potential danger and of the precautions to be taken to avoid suffocation.
Suppliers of products either directly or indirectly employed in conjunction with radiation sources may be subject to the extraordinary
duty, therefore, to keep abreast of the almost daily new technological
and theoretical develO'pments in order to inform past as well as future
purchasers of their products whenever evidence of danger is known to
exist or should have been known to exist. 61 The question of precisely
when a manufacturer may be charged with foreseeing harm so that he
has a duty to warn cannot b.e definitively answered. However, the courts
do not appear to have had too much difficulty in finding the duty where
the facts involved <~inherently dangerous" articles, of which there are
many in the atomic energy industry. The burden placed upon manufacturers of new products in respect to the duty to warn and fulfilling
that duty is not an easy one, especially with respect to prior purchasers.
As stated in Dillard and Hart :
In cases involving ne'W products, it is thus clear that a duty
to warn will depend on the extent to which knowledge of the
danger should reasonably be attributed to the manufacturer.
If the product is launched prior to <~adequate" testing, to at6098 F. Supp. 88 (1951).
6 1 Thornhill v. Carpenter-Morton Co., 220 Mass. 593, 1o8 N.E. 474 (1915), holding
the defendant liable although he had no knowledge of the dangerous character of the
product since he did not manufacture the article but sold it under his name.
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tribute knowledge would seem reasonable. Furthermore, if
products like drugs are launched while still in such a clinical
stage that the manufacturer cannot be sure of their effects, a
warning of that danger would also seem necessary. Paradoxically, the manufacturer should then be required to give warning of what he does not know. The paradox is an apparent one
only, since he does or should know that, in general, the product
is capable of harm.
Oearly, we have here an area in which "law," "scientific
knowledge," and the demands and price of "progress" sharply
react upon one another. They do so in a way which makes rational reconciliation of conflicting interests unusually difficult .
. . . [I]t would seem that the point at which the benefits of
experimentation should be permitted to outweigh the rights of
an injured plaintiff should be decided, not by a judicial balancing of interests, but by a common-sense jury determination of
what was reasonably to be expected in view of the nature of
the commodity and its foreseeable use." 62
The full extension of this duty remains to be ~orked out in future decisions by the courts.
Even when warnings are given to the .purchaser, or when warnings
would be unnecessary because of actual knowledge of the danger on the
part of the purchaser, the supplier may be held liable for failure to
warn actual users of the product, including secondhand purchasers. 68
For example, in Tomao v. A. P. De Sanno & Son,84 a manufacturer of
a grinding wheel was held liable for injuries sustained as a result of his
failure to indicate the maximum speed at which the wheel could be
operated even though the defendant contended that the wheel was sold
originally to the United States government. The court merely stated
that it was foreseeable that the wheel might be acquired from the
government by third persons. Similarly, in Beadles v. Servel, Inc., 65
the secondhand purchaser of a gas refrigerator was allowed to recover
for injur.ies because the manufacturer failed to provide notice of the
necessity of cleaning certain component parts that had a tendency to
clog after a lengthy period of operation. Where the warning has been
given to the purchaser, but not to the actual user of the product, liability
has also resulted. For example, in Rosebrock v. General Electric Company,68 the manufacturer provided a warning on the bill of shipment,
62

Dillard and Hart, supra note 58 at 159-100.
For a recent case indicating the difficulties encountered by a court in determining
the adequacy of a warning, see Jamieson v. Woodward & Lothrop, 247 F.2d 23 (1957).
64 209 F.2d 544 (1954).
65344 Ill. App. 133. 100 N.E.2d 405 (1951).
· 66 236 N.Y. 227, 140 N.E. 571 (1923).
63
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but failed to place a warning tag on the container to the effect that
certain blocks placed in a transformer for shipment should be removed
befor·e use. The warning on the bill of shipment was filed by clerks and
did not reach the personnel engaged in the unpacking and installation.
The manufacturer was held liable for his negligence in not giving warning suitable for those persons who actually engaged in the i~stallation
process. 67
Because of the dangerous nature of radioactive materials and devices
using radiation, these cases demonstrate the probable high degree of care
that must be used in giving warnings to purchasers and others who
may come into contact with the products. Certain symbols and _color
schemes to denote radiation hazards have generally been adopted. Following the standards of the industry will undoubtedly be essential, but
even these may not provide the kind of warning required to avoid liability. Adequacy of the warning is usually a jury question, with the results
in specific cases always in doubt, especially because the standards imposed may be relatively high since radiation is not capable of detection
by the human senses. 68
If the manufacturer gives assurances of the safety of a product for
the use intended, this fact alone makes it easier for injured persons to
show negligence in fulfilling the duty to warn. 69 Thus, even where a
warning was attempted to be given by directions concerning the use of
an inherently dangerous product, other statements assuring or even
intimating assurance of safety have made it difficult for the supplier to
show the exercise of reasonable care. 70 Moreover, providing assurances
of safety may give rise to a type of strict liability under theories of
6 7 See also Gall v. Union Ice Company, 1o8 Cal. App.2d 303, 239 P.2d 48 (1951).
In that case there was evidence that a letter had been sent to purchasers of the product
four years before the injury to the third party plaintiff warning of the danger. It also
appeared that several lots of the same article had previously been acquired by the
same purchaser and that the defendant had made a practice of attaching warning labels.
However, in. this instance, the defendant was held liable since there was no specific
evidence that the particular article had a warning label.
6&See Farley v. Edward Tower Co., 271 Mass. 230, 171 N.E. 639 (1930), and Maize
v. Atlantic Refining Co., 352 Pa. 5I; 41 A.2d 850 (1945),·as examples of cases showing the high standard of conduct for warnings that may be required and the dangers
involved in advertising which may detract from the warning.
11 9 See Tingey v. E. F. Houghton & Co., 30 Cal.2d 97, 179 P.2d 8o7 (1947), in
which the conrt upheld a verdict of liability of the defendant manufacturer to users for
failure to warn. The court stated at 103: "There is a particular need for a sufficient
warning where, as here, there is a representation that the product is not dangerous.
10 See e.g., Ebers v. General Chemical Co., swpr-a note 53; E. I. DuPont de Nemours
& Co., v. Baridon, supr-a note 55; and McClanahan v. California Spray-Chemical Corp.,
supra note 57
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express or implied warranty which will be discussed below. Furthermore, certain statements of assurance of safety may occasion liability
in a tort adion on the theory of deceit. 11 The courts have allowed recovery under theories of deceit even though an intent to deceive was
not proved to exist. 72 The classification of the cases as deceit, negligence,
or warranty is often extremely difficult because there is an overlapping
of theories of liability.
Representative of cases in which it is difficult to ascertain the precise
theory of liability is the case of Baxter v. Ford Motor Co. 13 There the
manufacturer had distributed to automobile dealers catalogues and
printed matter containing representations that the car windshields were
made of non-shatterable glass. The plaintiff was injured when a pebble
thrown by a passing car struck the windshield causing a piece of the
windshield to strike the plaintiff's eye. The court, holding the defendant
liable, stated that the plaintiff "had a right to rely upon the representations" even though there was no privity of contract, suggesting a theory
of liability based upon misrepresentation. However, at the same time
the court cited a number of cases holding suppliers of chattels liable in
the absence of privity because of the "inherently dangerous" quality of
the product. n
In Wennerholm v. Stanford University School of Medicine/ 5 the
California Supreme Court upheld, as sufficient to state a cause of action,
an allegation of fraud by the plaintiff who suffered blindness as a result
of taking drugs manufactured by the defendant even though the drug
was taken in accordance with a physician's prescription. The allegation
of fraud was that the defendant had by publication in newspapers, circulars, and elsewhere represented that the drug was harmless, that the
defendant knew that the drug was inherently dangerous and liable to
cause blindness, and that the plaintiff had relied on the representations.
The court stated :
The intept to deceive sufficiently appears . . . by the facts
alleged, from which it may be inferred that the alleged false
statements were made with the intention of inducing the public
to purchase the drug. 78 .
Prosser, Torts §86 (2d ed. 1955).
1 Harper and James, Law of Torts c. VII (1956).
7 8168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1932).
H In a substantially similar case, the Michigan court founded liability on the basis
of warranty where plaintiff alleged deceit and fraud, negligence, and breach of warranty. Bahlman v. Hudson Motor Car Co., 290 Mich. 683, 288 N.W. 309 (1939).
75 20 Cal..2d 713, 128 P.2d. 522 (1942).
16 I d. at 716.
11

12
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Cases are relatively rare, however, holding defendants liable to remote
purchasers of chattels on theories of misrepresentation or deceit. The
bases for liability of suppliers usually employed are either negligence
or warranty, 77 with the misrepresentation playing an important role in
showing the breach of the standard of conduct required or in establishing the warranty. Theories of misrepresentation or deceit are used, however, to establish liability to a purchaser when the product will not serve
the purpose for which it was purchased. For example, in Horrell v.
Santa Fe Tank and Tower Company 18 the supplier was held liable for
damages on the basis of a representation that his atmospheric-type cooling tower would cool the volume of water necessary for the purchaser's
refrigeration processes. 19 Liability of this type also holds warnings for
suppliers to atomic energy industry because the unique technological
problems involved may lead to representations of the suitability of a
product which proves to be false. For example, an ordinary valve may
be perfectly satisfactory for general industrial application, but because
of susceptibility to corrosion it may be entirely unsatisfactory for use
-in conjunction with radioactive materials. Therefore, suppliers of
standard products should exercise extreme caution in making representations concerning applications of their products in atomic energy operations.
It may be safely concluded that the duty to warn may be onerous for
suppliers of articles which either employ radiation sources or are used
. in connection with nuclear processes. If the product is inherently dangerous, the cases seem to require a high standard of care in fulfilling
the duty imposed. Moreover, we have also seen that the supplier may
be held liable to third parties even if he has provided warnings to the
purchaser. The extent of potential damage that may be caused by a de. fective component incorporated into a reactor is far greater than that
encountered in more usual types of industrial pursuits, so suppliers to
atomic industry should avoid unusual risks by exercising a very high
degree of care in giving adequate warning to purchasers and so far as
possible to third parties, thus assuring to the maximum possible degree
that no accident will result from a failure to warn of the dangerous
nature of the product.
See Prosser, Torts c. 18 (2d ed. 1955); Restatement, Torts §525 (1934).
117 Cal. App.2d II4, 254 P.2d 893 (1953).
19 See also Traylor Engineering & Manufacturing Co. v. National Container Corp.,
45 Del. Rep. 143, 70 A.2d 9 (1949).
11

18
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g. Effect of Qualifications of Purchaser
Suppliers of chattels may also be held negligent because of the probability that injuries will result from supplying chattels to incompetent
persons. The rule, as explained by the Restatement, is as follows :
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel
for the use of another whom the supplier knows or from facts
known to him should know to be likely because of his youth,
inexperience or otherwise, to use it in a manner involving unreasonable risk of bodily harm to himself and others whom
the supplier should expect to share in, or be in the vicinity of
its use, is subject to liability for bodily harm caused thereby to
them. 80
This statement of the rule raises a number of pr.oblems for suppliers
to atomic energy industry. It is generally realized that only highly
trained scientific and technological personnel are equipped to handle the
problems encountered in employing the fission' process or radiation
sources in research, medicine, or industry. Moreover, under the A:tomic
Energy Act of 1954 persons utilizing special nuclear materials (fissionable) or byproduct materials (radioactive) and operators of reactors
must be licensed by the Atomic Energy Commission. 81 In respect to
use of byproducts, licenses can be and are usually granted prior to the
installation of the activity, but in connection with the utilization of
special nuclear materials to produce electrical energy, the owners and
their operators need not, and normally will not actually, receive their
licenses until the installation is fully equipped and prepared for regular
operation. However, the owner of a reactor must obtain a construction
permit before building the facility. 82 To complicate the picture, the
Atomic Energy Commission has promulgated regulations which establish general licenses for particular uses and quantities of radioactive byproduct materials. The existence of a general license, in effect, means
that no individual licen'se is required for certain activities although the
participant may be required to comply with stated regulations. 83
The supplier of radioisotopes or devices directly or indirectly associated with the fission process. or the utilization of radiation sources
is confronted with several questions. Should the supplier demand that
his purchaser have a license? If a license is not essential or if general
licensing exists, must he investigate the competence of the purchaser?
Restatement, Torts §390 (1934).
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, §§81, 101, and 109.
82 !d. at §ISs.
83 10 Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 30.
80
81
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Can he rely on the fact that a license has been issued to prove that he
has not been negligent in supplying his prod~ct to the particular purchaser? If a construction permit has been issued for a reactor facility,
must he investigate the degree of competence of the purchaser in view of
the fact that the construction permit seems to require only a finding by
the AEC that there is "reasonable assurance" that the facility will prove
to be safe at a future date, namely at the time the reactor is ready for
operation ? 84 Where the license is issued to a corporation, must he investigate the CO!Tlpetence of the persons who will actually use special
nuclear or radioactive materials? Obviously, these questions relate to a
standard of care which must usually be resolved in relations to the facts
of specific cases, so no definitive answers are possible.
Possibly, an examination of the cases establishing liability for supplying dangerous products to children·or incompetents may, although they
are not too closely parallel, serve to indicate how some of these questions
may be answered when litigated.
Generally the cases establishing liability for what may be described
as a breach of duty in selection of a purchaser have involved sales to
children of firearms, 811 fireworks, 88 or inflammable substances, 87 or the
lending of motor vehicles to persons who were known by the lendor to be
either reckless or inebriates. 88 Recently, a New York court upheld, as
stating a good cause of action, an allegation that a wife was negligent
in allowing her husband to drive her automobile when she knew that her
husband had a dangerous heart condition. The plaintiff was injured
when the defendant's car swerved to the wrong side of the road during
a fatal heart attack suffered by the husband. 89 Manufacturers have also
been held liable for negligence because of illegal sales of explosives or
dangerous products to retailers. 8 ° For example, in Milton Bradley Co.
u xo Code Fed. Regs. fso.35.
See e.g., Neff Lumber Co. v. First National Bank, 12.2 Ohio St. 302, 171 N.E.
J27 ( 1930) ; Bernard v. Smith, 36 R.I. 377, 90 Atl. 657 ( 1914).
8& See e.g., Burbee v. McFarland, 114 Conn. 56, 157 Atl. 538 (1931); Bosserman v.
Smith, 205 Mo. App. 657, 226 S.W. 6oS (1920).
8 7 See e.g., Yachuk v. Oliver Blais Co., [1949) A.C. 386, 20 A.L.R. 2d 111 (1951);
Grieving v. La Plante, 156 Kan. xg6, 131 P.2d 8g8 (1942).
88 See e.g., Herrman v. Maley, 159 Miss. 538, 132 So. 541 (1931); Slaughter v.
Holsomback, 166 Miss. 643, 147 So. 318, (1933); Rounds v. Phillips, 166 Md. 151,
170 Atl. SJ2 ( 1934) ; Golembe v. Blumberg, 262 App. Div. 759, 27 N.Y.S.2d 692
(1941); but cf. Estes v. Gibson, (Ky) 257 S.W.2d 6o4 (1953), finding no liability
because the transaction was a gift.
89 Schneider v. Van Wyckhouse, 54 N.Y.S.2d 446 (1945).
eo See cases cited in Annotation, "Liability of manufacturer or wholesaler for injury
caused by third person's use of explosives or other dangerous article sold to retailer
in violation of law,'' I I A.L.R.2d 1028 (1950).
85
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of Georgia, Inc. v. Cooper/ 1 the defendant wholesaler sold fireworks
to a retailer in violation of a city ordinance. The son of the retailer
took a torpedo toy, which e:x.plodes when thrown on the ground, from the
store and threw it so as to explode near the plaintiff. The resulting explosion caused the plaintiff to lose the sight of his left eye. The Georgia
Court of Appeals held that a cause of action had been stated and that
the question of "proximate cause" should be determined by the jury.
Moreover, sales in violation of statute are classified in many jurisdictions as negligence per se if the plaintiff is a member of the class, and the
harm is of the type, designed to be protected by the legislation. 92
We have discovered no cases which have imposed liability on a supplier for furnishing a dangerous product to an adult person even where
there may have been knowledge that the adult person did not have sufficient technical skills to handle the product safely. However, it is possible that the courts may impose liability by analogy to the cases dealing
with children if the supplier has knowledge of incompetence and the
product is "inherently dangerous," such as radioactive materials. Probably liability would not be imposed in conjunction with sales of atomic
energy products, not radioactive in themselves, nor would it be imposed
if the seller has no knowledge of the incompetence. At the present time,
it appears that the seller of atomic energy products has no duty to investigate the degree of skills possessed by his purchaser. However, if
the sale is to a non-licensed person, where licensing is required, liability
to the purchaser and others may be imposed because of violation of the
statute, or the violation may create a presumption or constitute evidence
of negligence.
.
Lack of knowledge or competence on the part of a purchaser may
have some bearing upon the duty to warn. If purchasers of a product
are not likely to have knowledge of inherent dangers or dangerous uses,
the supplier may have to exercise a higher standard of care in providing
warnings in order to avoid liability under negligence doctrines. Representative of cases indicating that a high degree of care may be required
is J. C. Lewis Motor Company, Inc. v. Williams. 98 In that case the
plaintiff claimed injury as a result of inhaling carbon monoxide fumes
91

79 Ga. App. 302, 53 S.E.2d 761 (1949).
Prosser, Torts §34 at 161 (2d ed. 1955). Dean Prosser points out that in some
states a violation of statute creates a presumption of negligence and in a few only
evidence of negligence. Also violations of ordinances or regulations of administrative
agencies may be treated only as evidence of negligence even in those states holding
violations of statutes to be negligence per se.
9sss Ga. App. sJB, 69 S.E.2d 816 (1952).
92
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emanating from a tractor purchased by her husband, but operated by
her. The facts showed that the defendant supplier had failed to deliver a pipe which would have diverted the fumes away from the operator
of the tractor. Furthermore, the plaintiff's husband knew of the omission since he contacted the supplier on several occasions, and the supplier promised to place an order for the missing pipe. The instructions
supplied with the tractor contained no specific warning concerning the
danger of carbon monoxide, but did state, that to avoid fumes, the pipe
should be attached. The court held that the allegations were sufficient
for the case to go to the jury for a determination of the questions of
negligence of the supplier and possible contributory negligence on the
part of the plaintiff. The plaintiff only had a fifth-grade education but
the facts did not indicate the level of competence of her husband. It
would seem that a knowledge of the danger of carbon monoxide would
be almost universal among adults today; nonetheless, the cout:t found
that the jury should determine whether the supplier was negligent for
failing to warn. The case ilfustrates the proposition that suppliers of
radioactive materials and devices employing radiation must exercise extreme care in providing warnings, even though one might assume that
any AEC lic~nsee must know of the dangers involved.
h. Effect of Negligence by Others
Because of the complexities of our modern economic system, a number of problems arise in product liability cases concerning the effect of
negligence that may be committed by others. Generally speaking, negligent acts committed by persons other than the defendant supplier in
respect to the product may have one or both of two possible effects.
First, a negligent act of another may insulate the supplier from liability,
either because it proves that the supplier himself was not negligent, or
that his negligence was not the "proximate cause" of the injury. Second,
a negligent act of another may be the basis forshifting the economic loss
suffered as a result of a judgment against the particular supplier for
injuries sustained by the purchaser or third persons. The legal ramifications in respect to both of these possible effects are so complex, particularly because of the many possible factual variations, that we shall
merely suggest the major considerations involved.
· . Th~ pqssibility. that negligence of another may serve to insulate a
supplier from liability may be illustrated by a hypothetical atomic energy
case. Suppose X markets a portable reactor power installation into
which it incorporated a part negligemly manufactured by Y, and the

ENTERPRISE LIABILITY

751

defects cause a release of radioactive materials which results in bodily
injury to A, the purchaser, who sues X. Can X avoid liability by showing that Y produced the part and that X used reasonable care in selecting
Y as his supplier? A first consideration is the question whether X was
separately negligent for his failure to inspect or in his manufacturing
operations. In the MacPherson case, 94 the defendant had purchased the
defective part from another but the Buick Motor Company was not relieved from liability since it was found to be negligent in its inspection. 95
Accordingly, it would appear that if the supplier has been negligent, he
cannot successfully avoid liability to purchasers injured by the product
he assembled. However, and to the contrary, in similar cases an assembler has avoided liability, apparently on the basis that the degree of
care required of the assembler in inspecting the part is not as great as
that imposed upon the manufacturer of the part. 96 Professor James
suggests that these cases do not follow the moden~ rule imposing liability
on the pers.:m who represents the product as his own even though it is
actually manufactured by others. 97 To the extent that the cases deny
liability where the product is represented by the seller as his own, they
probably will afford little protection against liability of the seller in view
of the more recent decisions. However, it would appearthat they may
have some validity where the part bears the trade-name of the actual
manufacturer and the seller of the finished product is not equipped to
make the same type of inspection as the manufacturer. For example,
if, in our hypothetical portable reactor situation, the defective part was
an electronic control mechanism for the reactor and if that mechanism
bore the trade-name of Y after assembly of the reactor by X, it would
seem that X may avoid liability if his selection of Y' s product was reasonable and if he made reasonable inspections. The extent of the inspection required of X, of course, might be substantially less than that
required of Y for it might not be readily p~ssible to disassemble the device, and, furthermore, X may not be required to hold himself forth as
an expert in electronic mechanisms. However, because of the dangerous
qualities of reactors, the standard of care required of X would undoubtedly be higher than that encountered in respect to ordinary industrial products. In our survey of product liability cases, we have not
94

Sufwa note

20.

See also Witley v. Fyrogas Co., 363 Mo. 4o6, 251 S.W.2d 635 (1952); Sullivan v.
Manhattan Market Co., 251 Mass. 395, 146 N.E. 673 (1925).
96 Smith v. Peerless Glass Co., 259 N.Y. 292, 181 N.E. 576 (1932); Martin v.
Studebaker Corp., 102 N.J.~. 612, 133 Atl. 384 (1926).
97 James, supra note 18 at 192, 215. See cases cited therein at n.-142.
95
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discovered any case defining the liability of the manufacturer where the
defective part was a separate product assembled into the finished product
with the original manufacturer's label attached. Therefore the possible
effect of this fact upon liability remains conjectural.
It is clear, however, that the failure of any subsequent handler of the
product to fulfill his duty to inspect will not prevent a prior handler
who also had the duty to inspect from being held liable for his negligence. In Willey v. Fyrogas Co., 98 the plaintiff's husband was killed
in attempting to light a gas heater because a defective valve caused an
explosion. The manufacturer of the valve, the manufacturer of the
finished product, the wholesaler, and the retailer were all joined as defendants. The valve manufacturer and the manufacturer of the finished
product both argued that they were not liable because of the custom in
the trade for the retailer to make further tests at the time of installation.
The valve manufacturer further argued that the manufacturer of the
gas heater made tests that should eliminate his liability. The court
stated:
. . . The retailer's duty to test or his negligence in making
tests certainly does not discharge the manufacturer's duty to
also test and inspect and is not a defense to the manufacturer's
negligence in constructing the article or in failing to properly
test and inspect it. . . . The failure of the vendee to properly
inspect and test is within the foreseeable risk of the manufacturer. 99
The valve manufacturer, the gas-heater manufacturer, and the retailer
were held jointly liable. ·The wholesaler was not held liable since he
merely warehoused the heaters in their original crates until retail orders
were received. Therefore, subsequent negligent acts by others in merchandising processes from the supplier of raw materials to the retailer
will not immunize a prior handler or supplier from liability.
A more difficult question is whether negligence on the part of the purchaser or user of the product will permit the supplier to avoid liability
for his negligence. In those states not following comparative negligence
rules, it is generally recognized that contributory negligence and assumption of risk are defenses against liability even where negligence has been
established on the part of the defendant. 100 It is impossible for us to
363 Mo. 4o6, 251 S.W.2d 635 (1952).
!d. at 421. See also Foley v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Co., 363 Pa. I, 68 A.2d 517
(1949), and Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 166 F.2d !)OS (1948), discussed infra.
too See Prosser, Torts c. 10 (2d ed. 1955).
98
99
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consider the innumerable cases involving these defenses in negligence
actions in this study, but it should be pointed out that in the product
liability cases, Dean Prosser's statement that the courts are becoming
more reluctant to find contributory negligence as a matter of law and
that juries are "notoriously inclined" to enter verdicts for the plaintiff
where there has been evidence of contributory negligence 101 appears accurate.102 Representative of the possible obstacles to reliance on the
defense of contributory negligence where radiation injuries are involved
is the case of O'Connell v. Westinghouse X-ray Co., Inc. 103 There the
plaintiff, an experienced surgeon, claimed negligence on the part of the
manufacturer of an X-ray machine for failure to explain the proper
method of using the machine and for failure to provide a guard. The
plaintiff, who did not witness the demonstration of the machine, thereafter used it during operations and suffered severe burning leading to
the loss of three fingers. He also offered evidence. that the condition was
progressively deteriorating and that further amputations would be
necessary. The jury returned a verdict against the manufacturer for
104 On appeal, the
$100,000 which was sustained by the trial court.
Appellate Division found that the surgeon was contributorily negligent
as a matter of law, stating:
It may be doubted that the truth is that plaintiff, a surgeon
who had some experience with X-ray works, was ignorant of
the fact that the nearer the hand is placed to the source of the
X-ray beam, the greater the intensity of the beam falling upon
the hand. But that is plaintiff's own claim, and it cannot be
disregarded. If the purpose of the testimony is to lay the basis
for a legal contention that a surgeon who works on bones
under a fluoroscopic machine is not charged in law with knowledge of the factors determining intensity of effect upon the
body, and that the surgeon is entitled to rest upon the same degree of ignorance as a layman, then it must be held that even a
layman who attempts to set a fracture under a fluoroscopic
machine without knowledge that intensity varies with distance
is chargeable with contributory negligence as a matter of law.
101 I d. at 296.
10 2 See e.g., Pezzo v. Paterno, 277 App. Div. 496, 101 N.Y.S.2d 391 (1950), rev.
302 N.Y. 884, 100 N.E.2d 176 (1951), where the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court reversed on the ground that there
was contributory negligence as a matter of law, and the New York Court of Appeals
reversed the Appellate Division stating that the submission of the issue of contributory
negligence to the jury was proper.
103 16 N.Y.S.2d 54 (1939), rev. 261 App. Div. 8, 24 N.Y.S.:zd 268 (1940), rev. 288
N.Y. 486, 41 N.E.:zd 177 (1942).
1o• 16 N.Y.S.2d 54 (1939).
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The evidence in plaintiff's case not only fails to establish his
freedom from negligence, but establishes affirmatively as a
matter of law that he was heedless of his own safety. 106

Despite the rather positive assertions of contributory negligence on the
part of the surgeon by the Appellate Division, the Court of Appeals reversed, ordering a new trial. 106 The difficulties involved for suppliers
of devices that create radiation hazards are obvious. Even where knowledge of the danger may be assumed for persons in the same general class
as the plaintiff, the supplier cannot escape liability if the plaintiff can
show the absence of knowledge on his part and hence contributory negligence cannot be established.
The product liability cases where the plaintiff is a third person and
there is evidence of negligence by the purchaser or user are even less
susceptible to strict legal analysis. The problem i~ usually presented to
the jury in terms of "proximate cause," but often this concept embraces
the issue of duty and the standard of conduct. 107 Again, in the product
liability cases there is a marked tendency to find that the intervening
negligence was foreseeable so that the supplier is not relieved from
liability.
Consider the following hypothetical atomic energy fact situations :
r. A supplies a container for radioactive material which is defectively
constructed so that even a slight impact will cause it to break. B, in
transporting cobalt 6o in the container, negligently drives the truck
into a viaduct. C, a bystander, suffers radiation injuries: Is A liable
to C.?
2. X supplies a reactor control mechanism which is defective. Y, the
reactor operator, negligently permits an increase in power level and
the control mechanism fails causing a release of radiation injuring Z.
Is X liable to Z?
In both cases, it should be noted that the suppliers may be able to defend
successfully against suits by Band Y if the court or jury find they are
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law or fact. However,
A and C may nonetheless recover from the suppliers for the intervening
1°6 24 N. Y.S.2d at 270-271 ( 1940). Another issue involved was the nature of the
negligence of the manufacturer in respect to the guard. The court pointed out that
the omission of the guard was intentional since the purchaser wanted to keep dowri
the price of his gift to the hospital of the machine. This fact situation alone, absent
other allegations of negligence, raises the difficult question of what the supplier must
provide from the standpoint of safety of radiation devices even though the purchaser
does not want to pay the additional costs.
1 o6 288 N.Y. 486, 41 N.E.2d 177 (1942).
101 See Prosser, Torts c. 9 (2d ed. 1955).
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negligence may be considered foreseeable so that a jury determination
that A's and X's negligence was the "proximate cause" will be sustained.
An example of cases involving a similar fact situation is Benton v.
Sloss. 108 In that case the defendant used-car dealer obtained a partial
down payment for a car from a minor and permitted the minor to take
possession. The minor's father refused to sign the sales contract and
told the minor to return the car. After two unsuccessful attempts to
return it, the minor took the plaintiffs for a ride, and he raced with
another car. When a car coming from the opposite direction suddenly
appeared above a rise in the road, the minor tried to use the brakes, but
only the right brake worked. The car was thrown off the highway into
a telephone pole, thereby injuring the plaintiffs. They recovered judgments in the trial court against both the minor and the used-car dealer.
In sustaining the judgment against the used-car dealer the Supreme
Court of California stated:
. . . [The minor's] negligent driving was unquestionably a
cause of plaintiffs' injuries . . . . [The dealer's] negligence
was also a cause of those injuries, if it was a substantial factor
in bringing them about. . . . In the light of the evidence [the
jury] could reasonably conclude that because of the defective
brakes [the minor] could not avoid the collision. . . .
. . . The negligent conduct of [the minor] did not relieve
[the dealer] .from liability, for the likelihood of negligent operation of the vehicle was one of the hazards that [the dealer]
could reasonably foresee. 109
The conclusion to be drawn would seem to be that suppliers must accept
the risk that the extent of the injuries resulting from their own negligence may be increased by subsequent negligent acts of the purchaser or
user of the products. Intervening negligence is often found to be "foreseeable," and the determination of the issue is left to the juries under
the nebulous concept of "proximate cause."
There remains for discussion the possibility that all or a part of the
economic loss suffered as a result of a judgment against a product supplier may be shifted. The incidence of economic loss may be shifted by
contractual arrangements or, absent express agreement, by the operation
of certain legal factors. The former includes express agreements between the seller and the purchaser under which the purchaser of the
product promises to reimburse the seller for any losses that he may suffer for damages based upon defects in the product. It would also include
108

38 Cal.2d 399, 240 P.2d 575 (1952).

los I d. at 405.
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insurance. These pose no especially unique legal problems for atomic
energy suppliers except that they may afford no real protection if the
assets of the purchaser are insufficient to cover the liability or where the
insurance coverage is limited in amount. However, atomic energy suppliers should explore these possibilities in conjunction with their sales.
There is already some indication that "save harmless"· clauses are becoming standard practice in the atomic energy field.
The possibility of shifting the economic loss suffered as a result of
satisfying a judgment by seeking recovery of all or part of the moneys
paid to the injured from other persons is more tenuous. If two or more
suppliers of the same chattel, such as a part manufacturer, the assembler,
the wholesaler, and the retailer, are held jointly liable for a breach of
duty, such as the duty to inspect, in the same action, the plaintiff may
seek satisfaction of his judgment from one or all. ·If the plaintiff collects the judgment from only one of the defendants, that defendant may
seek contribution from the others who were held jointly liable. However, contribution is not generally available unless there is statutory
authority. 110 A discussion of the applicability of the statutes authorizing
contribution in various fact situations is beyond the scope of this study,
but the supplier who suffers the economic loss involved in a judgment
should investigate the potentialities of having others share the loss.
Indemnity may also be available as a possible means of shifting the
entire loss where negligent acts of others occur either prior or subsequent to the negligence of the person held liable to an injured person.
The law concerning indemnity, however, is highly confusing, 111 and for
some inexplicable reason there is a paucity of cases dealing with attempts by suppliers to seek recoveries from others whose negligence may
have caused the injury. The Restatement of the Law of Restitution contains the following :
Where a person has supplied to another a chattel which because of the supplier's negligence or other fault is dangerously
defective for the use for which it is supplied and both have become liable in tort to a third person injured by such use, the
supplier is under a duty to indemnify the other for expenditures properly made in discharge of the claim of the third person, if the other used or disposed of the chattel in reliance upon
uo See Davis, "Indemnity Between Negligent Tortfeasors: A Proposed ~tionale,"
37 Iowa L. Rev. 517 (1952).
111 Bohlen, "Contribution and Indenmity Between Tortfeasors," 21 Cornell L.Q. 552
(1936), 22 Cornell L.Q. 469 (1937); Hodges, "Contribution and Indemnity Among
Tortfeasors," 26 Tex. L. Rev. 150 (1947); Note, "Contribution and Indemnity Among
Tortfeasors in Minnesota," 37 Minn. L. Rev. 470 (1953); Davis, supra note 110.
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the supplier's care and if, as between the two, such reliance was
j ustifiable. 112
Most of the cases cited by the Reporters for this proposition, however,
have dealt with the right to indemnity of the purchaser-owner from the
supplier. 113 Nonetheless, the principle involved should be equally applicable to indemnity by the retailer against the manufacturer, etc. In
food product cases where under warranty doctrines a type of strict
liability may be imposed against the retailer, indemnity has been allowed
against the wholesaler and by the wholesaler against the packer. 114 In
two recent cases, manufacturer-assemblers have been unsuccessful in
recovering from their suppliers for defective parts or materials, apparently on the ground that reliance on the prior supplier was not justifiable. In Heath v. Channel Lumber Co. 115 the manufacturer of a ladder
settled for $57,500 a claim for injuries sustained by a workman when
the ladder broke. The manufacturer then sought indemnity for breach
of warranty from the lumber supplier who supplied fir instead of hemlock as ordered by the manufacturer. The court refused indemnity on
the ground that the plaintiff did not prove that the "efficient cause of the
structural failure of the ladder was that one of its railings was fir and
not hemlock without which circumstance the ladder would not have
broken." 116 Similarly in Maryland Casualty Co. v. Independent Metal
Products Co. 111 the plaintiff insurer, as subrogee of the manufacturer
assembler of the finished product, sought to recover the damages re
covered by a third person on the theory that it was the defendant part
supplier's negligence in manufacturing a tank for a truck trailer which
caused the injury. The ciaim for indemnity was disallowed apparently
because the insured Fruehauf Trailer Company actively supervised the
supplier's work and because actual negligence could not be established
although it seems that the injured person had no difficulty with this issue
in the prior litigation. 118 Indemnity, therefore, appears to be only a
4

4

Restatement, Restitution §93(1) (1937).
See Seavey and Scott, Notes on Restatement of Restitution §93 (1937).
See e.g.~ McSpedon v. Kunz, 271 N.Y. 131, 2 N.E.2d 513 (1936); Hughes
Provision Co. v. La Mear Poultry & Egg Co., 242 S.W.2d 285 (Mo. App. 1951).
See also Annotation, "Recovery for loss of business resulting from resale of unwholesome food or beverages furnished by another." 17 A.L.R. 2d 1379 (1951).
115 25 N.J. Super. 6, 95 A.2d 425 (1953).
116 95 A.2d at 429.
117 99 F. Supp. 862 (1951), 203 F.2d 838 (1953).
11s The difficulties in obtaining indemnity suggest that it may be advisable to have
prior suppliers or subsequent vendees joined in the original action as defendants. In
the Independent Metal Products Co. case, Fruehauf did tender the defense of the
original action to the supplier, but he refused to accept. "Vouching in" practice should
112

113
114
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remote possibility, but it exists and its possibilities should be explored by
atomic energy suppliers in specific cases where there has been prior or
subsequent negligence by other suppliers connected with the same chattel.
In summary, negligence by others may immunize product suppliers
from liability, the most significant factor being, of course, contributory
negligence on the part of the injured person. In addition, negligence by
others, either prior or subsequent to the negligence of the product supplier, may offer the possibility of obtaining reimbursement of sums paid
to satisfy claims of the injured. However, it appears that to date attempts to obtain reimbursement under indemnity theories have not been
too effectual. For the product supplier to atomic energy industry, the
most practicable approaches appear to be to obtain express agreements
from purchasers or to purchase comprehensive insurance coverage.
i. Problems of Proof
In the atomic product liability field, as applied to atomic energy industry, some of the most unique problems are encountered in respect to
the making of proof. As pointed out previously, the very nature of radiation injuries makes it difficult to prove causation in fact, 119 and there
are the innumerable unique problems of proof connected with cumulative
injuries, intervening causes, and peculiar injuries, such as genetic damage and shortened life span. All of these will appear in product liability
cases and solutions similar to those evolved for other negligence situations will undoubtedly be evolved by the courts. In product liability
cases involving negligence doctrines the plaintiff must show that an injury occurred because of the condition of the product, that the condition
was unreasonably dangerous, and that the condition resulted from the
defendant's negligence. 120 Each of these essential proof requirements
may prove to be insurmountable obstacles to the plaintiff in atomic
energy cases. In a highly scientific field it will frequently be extremely
difficult for an injured person to prove that it was a defective product
that caused a radiation injury. Possibly only the most exacting investi,.
gation would reveal the nature of a product defect that may have caused
·a reactor mett:.down. Moreover, the accident may destroy the evidence
of the defect. Even assuming that the injury may be traced to a defecbe carefully scrutinized for its possible effects. For a recent case in which General
Motors attempted unsuccessfully to. have a retailer joined as defendant for its failure
. to inspect the brakes so that General Motors could avoid liability, see Birdsong et al.
v. General Motors Corp., 99 F. Supp. 163 (1951).
ue See Chapter III, supra.
uo James, supra note 18 at 68-77.
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tive product, the plaintiff may have difficulty in establishing the negligence of the supplier. Atomic science is undergoing almost daily change,
and many theories are being subjected to complete reanalysis. Proof of
reliance upon the best known existing methods may prevent the case
from going to the jury because it may be impossible for the plaintiff to
establish the precise nature of the standard of care which the defendant
should have exercised in connection with the product. 121 If the product
or the processes in which the product is used are complex, proof of negligent acts will be especially difficult. Moreover, proof of governmental
inspection and certification, which may often be available for atomic
energy installations and particularly in respect to reactors, may be offered as proof of the exercise of reasonable care, and hence freedom of
negligence on the part of the supplier. 122 On the other hand, the doctrine
of res ips:t loquitur may assist the plaintiff in establishing negligence
on the part of a supplier. Although it is impo~sible in this study to
explore fully the implications of the doctrine, a brief discussion of its
use in a few cases wilt" demonstrate its possibilities for assisting to
establish negligence by suppliers of chattels.
In general discussions of res ipsa loquitur one of the stated requirements is that the defendant must have had exclusive control over the
instrumentality causing the injury. Literal application of this requirement would prevent application of the doctrine in product liability cases
involving suppliers once the product has passed into the hands of the
purchaser or user. Although some courts have held that the doctrine was
not applicable in such cases, 123 the modern and more commonly accepted
view is that exclusive control by the defendant at the time of the accident is not essential. Thus, in Gordon v. Aztec Brewing Co. 124 res ipsa
loquitur was applied against the bottler of the beverage in a case in
which the explosion of the bottle caused damage to the plaintiff notwithstanding the fact that intermediate handlers had been in control of the
product after it had left the possession of the bottler. 125 Moreover, the
doctrine has been applied in product liability cases against multiple de121 For an interesting analysis of the possible liability of Cutter Laboratories for
the recent polio vaccine deaths indicating that negligence probably cannot be established, see Note, "The Cutter Polio Vaccine Incident: A Case Study of Manufacturers'
Liability Without Fault in Tort and Warranty," 65 Yale L.J. 262 (1955).
122 For a discussion of the possible effects of inspection and certification as a defense
in the aircraft industry, see Hotchkiss, "Aircraft Manufacturers' Liability and the
Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938," 16 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 469 (1948).
128 See e.g., Kilgore v. Shepard Co., 52 R.I. 151, 158 At!. 720 (1932).
124
33 Cal.2d 514, 203 P.2d. 522 (1949).
1 2 5 See also Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944).
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fendants. In Nichols v. Nold 126 res ipsa loquitur was employed by the
plaintiff who was injured by an exploding bottle to establish liability
against the bottler, the distributor, and the retailer of a carbonated
beverage. Furthermore, as in other negligence cases, the inference of
negligence established by the doctrine is extremely difficult to refute.
For example, in Ortego v. N ehi Bottling W arks 127 the defendant offered considerable evidence tending to prove that because of the extreme
precautions taken there was no negligence on its part. Nonetheless, the
inference of negligence based upon application of res ipsa loquitur was
deemed sufficient to sustain the verdict against the bottler. The Louisiana Supreme Court, in commenting on this evidence, stated :
In fact [the defendants] are so strenuous in their arguments
and the proof adduced to sustain the same that if it were not
for the fact that the bottle in this case did actually explode
without the touch of human hands, we would have no other recourse than to hold that the bottle did not in fact explode. 128
In addition, res ipsa loquitur has been employed against suppliers of
chattels even where the product has been in use for an extended period
by the purchaser. In Ryan v. Zweck-W ollenberg C ompatJy 128 the plaintiff sought recovery from the retailer and the manufacturer of a refrigerator (Philco Corporation) for injuries suffered from electrical
shock received when she placed one hand on the refrigerator and the
other on a stove. The injuries were sustained in the spring of 1952, but
the refrigerator had been purchased by the plaintiff's daughter in the
spring of 1949. Moreover, in the interim the purchaser had moved the
refrigerator from one community to another. Nonetheless, res ipsa
loquitur was held to be applicable, reliance being placed on the fact that
the·defect was in a "sealed unit." The Wisconsin Supreme Court stated:
Because of the fact that the refrigerator in the instant case
had passed out of the possession of the defendant manufacturer approximately three years prior to the accident, Philco
maintains. that the principle of res ipsa loquitur cannot be in~
voked in behalf of the plaintiff to establish Philco's negligence
inasmuch as the ·refrigerator was not within the exclusive
control of Philco. If the refrigerator were a machine or appliance, such as an automobile or sewing machine, the moving
parts of which are capable of being operated by the user, defendant's point would be well taken. In case of injury resulting from the use of such a machine the inference would be
174 Kan. 613, 258 P.2d 317 (1953).
199 La. 599, 6 S.2d 677 (1942).
128 I d. at 007.
129 266 Wis. 630, 64 N.W.2d 226 (1954).
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just as strong that the defect causing the injury occurred as
the result of the operator's use as would the inference that the
same was due to some defect in manufacture, and therefore the
principle of res ipsa loquitur would not be applicable.
However, the operating mechanism of the refrigerator in
question, consisting of the motor and compressor, was hermetically sealed within a metal inclosure and is commonly referred to as a "sealed unit." The evidence in the record shows
that the sealed unit of the refrigerator causing plaintiff's injury was never opened or tampered with by anyone from the
time the refrigerator was removed from its original shipping
crate in which Philco had shipped the same, to the time of trial.
There was nothing in connection with such sealed unit for the
users of the refrigerator to operate. In the use of the refrigerator all that was done was to plug the electric cord of the
refrigerator into one of the electric outlets forming part of the
wiring system of the home. The testimony in the case definitely established that there was nothing in connection with the
wiring of the refrigerator outside of the sealed unit which
could have caused a short circuit. On the other hand, the evidence is undisputed that plaintiff did receive a severe electric
shock as a result of a short circuit in the refrigerator. The
inference, therefore, is almost inescapable that something inside of the sealed unit must have gone wrong to have caused
such short circuit. 130
The conclusion to be adduced by atomic energy suppliers from the
application of res ipsa loquitur in product liability cases is perhaps abundantly obvious. It apparently will be difficult to avoid application of the
doctrine, particularly where the product may be described as "inherently
dangerous." If the doctrine is applied, the plaintiff's burden in establishing negligence by the supplier is diminished considerably. In fact, it may
even be argued that the application of res ipsa loquitur amounts in its
effect to the imposition of strict liability in the particular case. Therefore, res ipsa loquitur may serve as a method of removing the substantial
difficulties confronting a plaintiff who suffers radiation damage in proving negligence by suppliers of chattels.

-

j. Summary

Throughout this discussion of liability of suppliers under general
negligence doctrines two themes predominate so far as atomic energy
130 I d. at 639-640. See also Peterson v. Minnesota Power & Light Co., 207 Minn.
387, 291 N.W. 705 (1940). But compare Jastrzembski v. General Motors Corp., 100 F.
Supp. 465 ( I95i), in which ·the court thought several months use of a car prevented
application of res ipsa loquitur to injuries caused by a defect in an automobile transmission because it was subjected to outside forces, namely use or abuse by the owner.

TORT LIABILITY

762

suppliers are concerned. First, general negligence doctrines are available as a basis for imposing liability, especially where the product can be
described as "inherently" or "imminently" dangerous, which will often,
if not normally, be the case where radiation injuries are involved. Second, the unusual scope of potential liability in a reactor disaster situation
creates serious risks for the supplier since a single accident may destroy
his business assets unless the potential economic losses can be avoided
by insurance coverage, by other legal devices, or through indemnification
under the recent amendments of the Atomic Energy Act, discussed below. Conversely, for those suffering injuries as a result of defects in
atomic energy products, it will be difficult to prove negligence by suppliers because of the uncertain and constantly changing state of scientific knowledge and because it will often be difficult to prove in fact that
radiation caused a particular injury.
3· Warranties
a. Express and Implied Warranties
Although warranty is generally considered today to be based on contract theory, it was originally based upon tort, and it still retains many
tort elements. 181 For suppliers an important factor is that a breach of
warranty results in the imposition of strict liability so that it is not
necessary for the injured to prove negligence. Warranties may take
one of two forms--either express or implied, and both are defined in
most jurisdictions by legislative enactments of either the Uniform Sales
Act or the Uniform Commercial Code. 182 The Uniform Sales Act defines an express warranty as follows :
Any affirmation of fact or any promise by the seller relating
to the goods is an express warranty if the natural tendency of
such affirmation or promise is to induce the buyer to purchase
the goods, and if the buyer purchases the goods relying
thereon. No affirmation of the value of the goods, nor any
statement purporting to be a statement of the seller's opinion
only shall be construed as a warranty. 188
The Uniform Commercial Code contains substantially the same definition. m What amounts to an express warranty in particular fact situar Williston, Sales §§195, rg6 (Rev. ed. 1!)48).
The Uniform Sales Act has been adopted in 36 jurisdictions and the Uruform
Commercial Code is now operative in Pennsylvania. The Commercial Code has also
been adopted, although not yet operative, in Massachusetts and Kentucky.
188 Uniform Sales Act §12.
18' Uniform Commercial Code §2-313.
181

182
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tions has been the subject of considerable litigation. 135 In this study we
cannot undertake a detailed analysis of the many problems involved in
determining the existence of an express warranty. However, since expr~ss warranties may result in the imposition of strict liability, caution
should be exercised by atomic energy suppliers during the negotiations
for sales of products and in the drafting of sales agreements. In addition, atomic energy suppliers who wish to avoid liability on the basis of
breach of express warranty should exercise care in the preparation of
advertising circulars and literature. In some cases, the advertising
represen,tations have been characterized as warranties extending even
to those not in privity with the advertiser. 186 For example, in Bahlman
v. Hudson Motor Car Co.m the defendant had issued advertising matter representing that its car had a seamless roof. The plaintiff claimed
reliance on this statement in purchasing the car from a dealer. He
claimed damages for head lacerations received when the car overturned;
the injury being caused by jagged edges along a welded seam in the
roof. The court held the car manufacturer liable, even though it was
conceded that the purchaser was negligent in operating the car, on the
ground that the "defendant's representations amounted to express warranties of quality and construction." 188 Once express warranty was
found, the court had no difficulty in dispensing with contributory negligence as a defense since warranty doctrines impose strict liability, the
only question being whether the breach was the "proximate cause" of
the in juries.189
In contrast with express warranties, over which the seller has a large
degree of control, warranties are often implied even though the seller
has apparently attempted to avoid all warranties in respect to his product.
Once again it is impossible for us to consider the many ramifications of
implied warranties,140 but the statutory treatment is, of course, significant. The Uniform Sales Act provides:
Subject to the provisions of this act and of any statute in
that behalf, there is no implied warranty or condition as to
See I Williston, Sales c. VIII (Rev. ed. Ig48>".
See Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., I67 Ohio St. 224. I47 N.E.2d 6I2
(I958). .
m 290 .Mich. 683,' 288 N.W. 30!f (I939).
13s I d. at 69«>.
139 See also Baxter v: Ford Motor Co., supra note 73, which may also be characterized as an express wiut:anty case. ·
140 See I Williston, Sales c. IX (Rev. ed. I948); Amram and Goodman, "Some
Problems in the Law of Implied Warranty/' 3 Syracuse L. Rev. 259 (I9s2).
185

136
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the quality or fitness for any particular purpose of goods supplied under a contract to sell or a sale, except as follows :
. ( 1) Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes
known to the seller the particular purpose for which the goods
are required, and it appears that the buyer relies on the seller's
skill or judgment (whether he be the grower or manufacturer
or not), there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be
reasonably fit for such purpose.
(2) Where the goods are bought by description from a
seller who deals in goods of that description (whether he be the
grower or manufacturer or not), there is an implied warranty
that the goods shall be of merchantable quality.
(3) If the buyer has examined the goods, there is no
implied warranty as regards defects which such examination
ought to have revealed.
( 4) In the case of a contract to sell or a sale of a specified
article under its patent or other trade name, there is no implied warranty as to its fitness for any particular purpose.
· ( 5) An implied warr~nty or condition as to the quality or
fitness for a particular purpose may be annexed by the usage
of trade.
( 6) An express warranty or condition does not negative a
warranty or condition implied under this act unless inconsistent therewith. 1 n

The Uniform Commercial Code has broadened the implied warranty provisions slightly, but the same general types of implied warranties remain. 1 • 2 The possibility that implied warranties of fitness and
merchantability under the statutes may expose atomic energy suppliers
to strict liability is apparent. Furthermore, it can readily be understood
from examination of the statutory language why the plaintiffs in product
liability cases often plead both negligence and breach of warranty with
the result that many cases are disposed of under warranty doctrines. 148
The availability of implied warranty theories to establish liability of
suppliers of chattels, however, is limited by a number of technical requirements. By far the most drastic limitation is the requirement of
u1 Unifonn Sales Act hs.
u2 Uniform Commercial Code §b-314. 2-JIS.
ua A recent Georgia statute, Ga. Laws, 1957, Act 342, provides:

The manufacturer of any personal property sold as new property, either
directly or through wholesale or retail dealers, or any other person, shall
warrant the following to the ultimate consumer, who, however, must exercise
caution when purchasing to detect defects, and, provided there is no express
covenant of warranty and no agreement to the contrary :
1. The article sold is merchantable and reasonably suited to the use
intended.
2. The manufacturer knows of no latent defects undisclosed.
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"privity of contract." Although we have seen that privity is no longer an
essential element under negligence doctrines, implied warranty doctrine
is not available to persons not parties to the contracts in a majority of
jurisdictions. 144 Moreover, there are a number of potential pitfalls even
for those in privity, such as the requirement of notice to the seller
within a reasonable time after the breach, the possible selection of an
inadequate remedy, and the necessity of showing reliance on the seller. 145
However, in nearly one-third of the states the privity requirement
has. been abandoned in respect to food, drugs, and economic poisons.u 6
Thus, there appears to be a development in the law of implied warranty
corresponding to that in negligence law in that the privity requirement
is being relaxed where the product is "imminently dangerous." A representative case is Burr et al. v. Sherwin-Williams Co. of California. 141
There the plaintiff sought recovery for damage to his cotton crop sustained from spraying the crop with a chemical, s.upplied by the defendant, which apparently contained 2-4-D, a weedkiller. The plaintiff alleged both negligence and breach of implied warranty. The trial court,
·after reading the provisions of the Sales Act, gave the following instruction to the jury :
If you decide that any of the provisions of the code section
. . . are applicable, and further decide that an implied warranty was made by the manufacturer, that warranty runs with
the goods to the ultimate consumer, there being no requirement
of privity of contract between the ultimate consumer and the
manufacturer. And if you further find that the manufacturer
breached such warranty, then it is liable for the damage caused
by such breach, regardless of negligence. 148

The California District Court of Appeals, after holding that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitttr was applicable in respect to the cause of action
based on negligence, concluded that the trial court's instruction was
proper. Although the affirmation of the jury verdict was justified on
grounds of negligence, the approval of the jury instruction on warranty
indicates the willingness of the court to relax the requirements of
privity when dealing with "imminently dangerous" articles.
See James, supra note I8 at I92, I9J-Ig6, and cases cited therein.
For an excellent discussion of these requirements in relation to product liability,
see James, .supra note IS at Igli-205. Also see I Williston, Sales c. IX (Rev. ed. z94f!) ;
Prosser, "The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality," 27 Minn. L. Rev. II7
( I94J).
146 Prosser, Torts §84, p. 507 (2d ed. I955).
141 (Cal. App.) 258 P.2d 58 (I95J).
148 258 P.2d at 64.
H 4
H 5
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The Supreme Court of Kansas also has allowed recovery under implied warranty doctrines in the absence of pri.vity. In Graham v. Bottenfield's Inc. 149 the plaintiff was injured by a hair preparation which
was purchased by the defendant distributor corporation from the manufacturer and was sold in the original container to a beautician who applied it to the plaintiff's hair. The plaintiff sought recovery for breach
of an implied warranty of fitness. The defendant distributor defended
on the grounds of no privity of contract and on the ground that it had
no duty to test the product. The court, in holding that plaintiff could
recover for breach of the implied warranty, discussed the food cases
and stated:

If the reasons . . . for recognizing the exceptions to the
general rule of the common law are to be followed and adhered
to we are forced to agree there is merit in appellee's position
that there is just as much reason for holding public policy,
which it is to be noted is the basic foundation for the imposition of liability under the doctrine of implied warranty . . . ,
requires, that a manufacturer, jobber or distributor who sells
[hair preparations] . . . impliedly warrants that preparation
as suited and fit for use . . . as there is for holding that food
manufactured and sold for domestic consumption is impliedly
warranted as wholesome and fit for that purpose or that glass
bottles when sold and/or delivered in connection with the sale
of liquid beverages are impliedly warranted to be in a safe and
noneXplosive condition. Therefore, on the basis of the .reasoning of such decisions and what is there said and held, consistency requires and we feel constrained to hold the scope of the
exception to the common law rule of caveat emptor . . .
should be extended to include sales of the product here in
question. 150
Despite the extensions of the implied warranty doctrine to cover those
not in privity in the food, drug, economic poisons, and cosmetic cases,
the courts have been reluctant to allow the use of implied warranty in
connection with other products. For example, in Wood v. General
Electric Co. 161 where the plaintiff sought to recover damages for a fire
au 176 Kan. 68, 269 P.2d 413 (1954).
lGO !d. at 74. See also DiVello v. Gardner Machine Co., 102 N.E.2d 289, 293 (Com
Pleas Ohio, 1951): " ... [T]his court is of the opinion that the sale of the grinding
wheel carried with it an implied warranty of merchantability and fit for the usages
designed and that such warranty extended to the workman of the vendee who was
injured in its ordinary use because of a latent defect and in the absence of contributory
negligence such workman could recover on the basis of a breach of warranty against
the party who sold the wheel to his employer."
1 51 159 Ohio St. 273, II2 N.E.2d 8( 1953).
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caused by a defect in an electric blanket manufactured by the defendant
on both theories of negligence and breach of implied warranty, the
Supreme Court of Ohio held that the implied warranty doctrine was not
available, stating:
Although a subpurchaser of an inherently dangerous article
may recover from its manufacturer for negligence, in making
and furnishing of the article, causing harm to the subpurchaser
or his property from a latent defect therein, no action may be
maintained against such manufacturer by such subpurchaser
for such harm, based upon implied warranty of fitness of the
article so purchased. . . . Here, there was no such privity
and hence no implied warranty upon the part of General Electric and no valid issue on that subject.u2
Nonetheless, the parallel history of recovery for negligence seems to
indicate further extensions of implied warranty doctrines in the product
liability field. For those atomic energy products -that fall into the category of food, drugs, or economic poisons, such as radioactive materials
that are to be used upon humans for medical tests or therapy, implied
warranty will be available to those injured by a defect in the product.
Other atomic energy products will escape strict liability on implied warranty theories until there are further extensions of existing rules of law.
However, the high degree of danger involved in certain atomic energy
products and the difficulties for the injured in proving negligence may
provide the type of case in which courts initially may allow recovery for
breach of implied warranty.
b. Effect of Disclaimers
Since liability under warranty doctrine arises either as a result of
express contract provisions or is implied by law as a part of the contract
of sale, it is generally recognized that by mutual consent the parties may
exclude all warranties, both express and implied. 168 However, in some
cases, such agreements have been denied effect on grounds of public
policy. This is especially true in the food cases.m Moreover, the courts
have been reluctant to find an exclusion of warranties unless the language of the sales agreement is absolutely clear. 155 Finally, the courts may
152

I d. at 279·

Both the Uniform Sales Act §71 and the Uniform Commercial Code §2-JI6 provide that agreements may be made to exclude all express or implied warranties.
154 See e.g., Linn v. Radio Center Delicatessen, Inc., 169 Misc. 879, 9 N.Y.S.2d 110
(1939).
155 See Note, 23 Minn. L .. Rev. 784 (1939), and cases cited therein; James, "Assumption of Risk," 61 Yale L.J. 141, 162 et seq. (1952); James, supra note 18 at 192,
210.2II.
1 53
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find a disclaimer of warranties to be ineffective because the purchaser did
not have proper notice of its existence, either because it was on the
package, on an invoice, in small print, etc. 1 ~ 8 Nonetheless, if care is exercised, atomic energy product manufacturers may make effective use of
disclaimers to limit liability under warranty theories.
In addition to disclaiming warranties, the supplier may also, by mutual
consent, disclaim any liability on his part under negligence doctrines if
public policy does not render the contract provision void. For example,
in Charles Lachman Co., Inc. v. Hercules Powder Co., Inc. 151 the plaintiff sought recovery under negligence doctrines for damages caused to
its carpets by use of a chemical manufactured by the defendant. The
contract provided, in part: "Seller makes no warranty of any kind,
express or implied, except that the materials sold hereunder shall be of
Seller's standard quality, and Buyer assumes all risk and liability whatsoever resulting from the use of such materials, whether used singly or
in combination with other substances." The court held that the contract
provisions were sufficiently broad to preclude recovery under negligence
theories, 158 stating :
The general rule is that one party to a transaction may
ordinarily contract to limit or eliminate his liability for negligence in performing his obligations. There is no rule of public
policy which makes such provisions ineffective, particularly
when the obligee is under no disadvantage by reason of confidential relationship, disability, inexperience or the necessities
of the situation. In the present case the parties were both
corporations engaged in large scale manufacturing. The plaintiff was under no compulsion to buy from the defendant and,
if it desired to buy from it, had the choice of accepting the defendant's terms or going elsewhere. 169
The court's statement indicates that there may be limitations on contracting away liability for negligence where one party is in a disadvantageous bargaining position. Such has often been found to be the
case where public utilities, common carriers, innkeepers, and public
warehousemen have attempted to limit liability. 180 However, for many
168Note, supra note ISS at 79S;

1

Corbin, Contracts §33 (I9SO).

m 79 F. Supp. 206 (1!)48).
1~8 See also Shafer v. Reo Motors, Inc., 20S F.2d 68s (19S3), where the Lachman
case is quoted with approval in holding a truck manufacturer not liable for negligence
where the contract provided, in part, that "this Warranty being expressly in lieu of
all other Warranties expressed or implied and of all other obligations or liabilities on
our part, and we neither assume or authorize any other person to assume for us any
liability in connection with the sale of our vehicles."
us Supra note IS7 at 207·
1eo See Prosser, Torts §ss, pp. 30S-307 {2d ed. 19SS), and cases cited therein.
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atomic energy suppliers there appears to be no public policy that would
render agreements to limit liability void.
However, disclaimers of warranty or liability for negligence will afford only limited protection to atomic energy suppliers in those instances
in which a defect in the product leads to a major reactor mishap. The
agreement between the supplier and his purchaser will have no effect on
liability for negligence to persons not in privity. Even the broadest type
of disclaimers of warranties and of liability for negligence will protect
the supplier only from claims of injury to the purchaser and his property.
They cannot be relied upon as a solution to the problem of the potential
large-scale damages for which atomic energy suppliers may be held
liable. They may, however, considerably reduce economic losses in those
cases where the negligence caused minimal injuries to those not bound
by the disclaimer. For example, if a defective control rod causes a reactor melt-down and if all radiation is contained within the building, the
liability of the supplier who has the protection of disclaimers will be
limited to satisfying the claims of persons irradiated within the building.
It will not include the reactor loss. Therefore, the usefulness of disclaimers in the atomic energy industry should not be minimized, provided purchasers will accept the products on the specified terms and
conditions.
4. Strict Liability
a. Common Law
It may be argued, and, we believe, quite effectively, that the extension
of negligence concepts, the liberal use of res ipsa loquitur, the greater
willingness to submit cases to juries, and the extension of implied warranty doctrines have carried us very close to the application of strict
liability rules in the product liability field. However, with one possible
exception, the courts have not as yet applied such rules against the
product supplier, and the cases still are analyzed in terms of negligence,
misrepresentation, or breach of warranty, even though a number of
legal writers appear to urge the imposition of strict liability. 181 The one
possible exception is the case of Chapman Chemical Co. v. Taylor 182
in which 2-4-D weedkiller sprayed from an airplane by a farmer drifted
three-quarters of a mile and settled on .the plaintiff's cotton crop. The
defendant was the manufacturer. Testimony indicated that neither the
101 See e.g., James, supra note 18 at 192, 215; Ehrenzweig, Negligence Without
Fault (1951).
182215 Ark. 630, 222 S.W.2d 820 (1949).
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manufacturer nor the user knew that 2-4-D had a propensity for floating much larger distances than experienced . with other agricultural
chemicals. Although the case may be analyzed in terms of negligence,
the Arkansas Supreme Court, in holding the manufacturer liable, suggested that strict liability rules applied to the manufacturer by stating:
We do not think the Chemical Company excused itself from
liability by the mere showing that it was unaware of the
peculiar carrying quality of the dust it was selling. Ordinary
care required that it should know in view of the dangerous nature of the product it was selling, and it was charged with the
knowledge which tests would have revealed. The case is therefore one in which the rule of strict liability should be applied. 183
If other courts apply strict liability rules when dangerous products
are involved, many atomic energy suppliers will be faced with potential
liabilities that might not exist if only negligence concepts were applied.
On the other hand, strict liability rules would assist injured persons in
overcoming the difficulties of ·proving negligence in the highly technical
atomic energy field. These difficulties may lead the courts to broaden the
application of strict liability in atomic energy cases so that eventually
liability in conjunction with any dangerous product may well be established under strict liability doctrines. ~
16

b. Under Statutes
Statutes may also be the basis of imposing strict liability in the product liability field or of imposing what amounts to strict liability by the
use of presumptions. For example, in many states violation of the pure
food and drug laws gives rise to a civil action for damages, and it is not
necessary to allege and prove specific negligence or knowledge on the
part of the maker or seller. 166 Under such circumstances the basis of
liability may be characterized as strict. Also, violation of statutory restrictions is treated as negligence per se by some courts while others
treat it as creating a presumption of negligence which must be rebutted
by the defendant. Only a small minority of courts treat violations of
statutes as mere evidence of negligence. 168 Thus, in most jurisdictions
168 !d. at 644. In Gotreaux v. Gary, 94 S.2d 293 (La. 1957), the Supreme Court of
Louisiana held the user of 2-4-D liable for damages caused by the drifting of the
weedkiller, applying a strict liability doctrine. The manufacturer was not a party to
the litigation, however.
164 See Chapter IV for a discussion of the applicability of strict liability to atomic
energy pursuits.
1ss See generally, Prosser, Torts §61, p. 345 (2d ed. 1955).
16 6 !d. at §34.
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statutory violations afford the plaintiff considerable assistance in proving negligence with the result that a type of strict liability may be said
to exist in fact. Atomic energy suppliers, therefore, must carefully avoid
violations of statutory standards that may be prescribed by the Congress
or the state legislatures. Violation of regulations of administrative
agencies in most states are apparently treated only as evidence of negligence,161 but in the atomic energy field the hazards are so unique that
perhaps violations of rules of the Atomic Energy Commission or state
health agencies may be held to be negligence per se. Once again, the
atomic energy supplier must exercise utmost care to avoid violations of
regulations. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 gives the Atomic Energy
Commission broad rule-making powers to protect the public health and
safety 168 and many of the regulations promulgated by the Commission
will apply to the activities of atomic energy suppliers.
5· Contractual Indemnification
Because of the magnitude of potential liability of atomic energy
product suppliers, there are indications that the suppliers are requiring
purchasers to execute sales contracts containing agreements to indemnify
and hold the suppliers harmless from any possible liabilities. Such agreements, of course, will afford protection to the supplier only to the extent
that the purchaser is able to bear the economic burden, either through insurance or otherwise. If the purchaser is unable to pay the claims of the
injured, the supplier must respond in damages to the injured parties.
If the federal government has agreed to indemnify the purchaser, the
supplier is probably as adequately protected from economic loss as he
can expect to be. Furthermore, under the recent governmental indemnity amendments to the Atomic Energy Act, the use of "save harmless"
clauses will provide even greater protection to atomic energy suppliers.
Therefore, atomic energy suppliers should examine thoroughly the possibilities of indemnity clauses in their sales contracts as a method of
shifting the economic loss incurred through a nuclear accident, with
the admonition, of course, that indemnity agreements will not insulate
_the supplier from loss if the purchaser is unable to pay.
6. Conclusion
We have sketched at length the several legal theories under which suppliers of atomic energy products may be held liable for injuries to third
167
168

Ibid.
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, §i6I (b).
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persons. We feel that it is abundantly clear that, even without further
expansions of strict liability doctrines, there are several available legal
avenues for imposing liability on atomic energy suppliers. In· our society there is a definite trend toward the establishment of enterprise
liability in conjunction with the sale of products in our economy. Undoubtedly the major compelling reason for this trend is the fact that the
supplier is more likely, than is the injured person, to be able to suffer
the economic losses or to take appropriate steps to minimize them. In
respect to atomic energy products we can expect a continuation of the
trend because of the unusual dangers involved. Therefore, atomic
energy suppliers should adopt two courses of action: ( 1) initiate all
necessary and reasonable procedures to assure that their products are
incapable of becoming the cause of radiation injuries and ( 2) take all
expedient legal steps either to avoid the imposition of liability or to
shift possible economic losses by taking advantage of insurance and
other contractual arrangements.
B. Liability of Building Contractors
Persons who design or construct fixtures and buildings expose themselves to liability for injuries to third persons at least during the construction period and possibly thereafter. In respect to atomic energy,
the problems of liability during construction of an atomic energy facility
are no different than those encountered in respect to any other building
activity. Hence they will not be discussed herein. However; we are concerned with liability problems arising after the building contractor of an
atomic energy facility has completed performance of his contract. Perhaps these problems can best be brought into focus through the use of
hypothetical fact situations. Suppose X, a building contractor, builds
a reactor building designed by A and supposed to be leakproof in case of
a reactor mishap. If a reactor accident occurs and radioactive gases
leak into the environment causing injuries to third persons, is X liable
if he followed A's design? Would X be liable if he knew that A's design
was improper? Would X be liable if during construction he made minor
variations in the design? Would X be liable if the owner accepted knowing of the changes by X? Would X be liable to third persons if he
warned the owner that the design was faulty or that the construction
should be inspected periodically? It will be noted that these questions
are substantially the same as those we have already considered in the
product liability field. The major difference here is that we are dealing
with a product which is likely to be large and stationary so that it is
treated as real property rather than personalty.

ENTERPRISE LIABILITY

773

The general rule in the United States appears to be that building
contractors are not liable to third parties who may be injured as a result
of the contractor's negligence after completion and acceptance of the
construction by the owner .169 Among the various reasons expounded
by the courts for the rule are ( 1) lack of contractual privity between the
parties, (2) the owner's intervening negligence as the proximate cause
of the injury, (3) lack of foreseeability of injury by the contractor, (4)
lack of control by the contractor over the design, and ( 5) lack of control
after completion of the work which prevents the contractor from correcting the defects. 170 It will be noted that most of these reasons no
longer have any application in the product liability field although they
were once employed to restrict the liability cif manufacturers of chattels.
As in the case of the rule of non-liability for defects in chattels supplied by a party not in privity, exceptions have in recent years been made
to the general rule in the case of contractors. Thus, where the completed work is turned over to the owner in a condition so negligently
defective as to be imminently dangerous to th-ird persons, recovery has
been allowed. 171 In Hale v. Depaoli 172 the builder of a house was held
liable for injuries sustained by the daughter of a tenant, when a railing
which had been installed eighteen years previously gave way and the
child was injured in a fall. An examination of the railing showed that
nails too weak for safety had been used. The opinion referred to the
doctrine of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company 178 as supporting
authority, despite the fact that that case concerned only a defective
chattel. The court stated that the general rule was one of non-liability,
and then proceeded to establish a significant exception, stating first, that
when an article is such as to place life and limb in peril when negligently
made, it then becomes a "thing of danger," and is subject to a rule of
liability under the MacPherson doctrine ; and, second, that when the
article is of an abnormally dangerous and noxious nature, the rule
against liability must give way, even in cases of defects in construction
169 For an extensive collection of the cases, see Annotation, "Negligence of building
or construction contractor as ground of liability upon his part for injury or damage
to third person occurring after completion and acceptance of the work," 13 A.L.R.zd
191 (1950).
110

Ibid.

Holmes v. T. M. Strider & Co., x86 Miss. 38o, xSg So. 518 (1939), defective
guard rail on bridge; Holland Furnace Company v. Nauracaj, 105 Ind. App. 574, 14
N.E.2d 339 (1938), negligent installation of furnace; Davey v. Turner, 55 Ga. App.
786, 191 S.E. 382 (1937), defective gas heater was installed and products of combustion escaping from a hose killed petitioner's daughter.
172 33 Ca1.2d 228, 201 P.2d I (1948).
178 Supra note 20.
111

774

TORT LIABILITY

or design of structures on land. This has, indeed, great significance for
atomic energy industry, because it may herald a blanket application of
the rule of liability to third parties against the builders of atomic installations.
While it is commonplace to find general statements in nearly all of the
opinions to the effect that the rule is still one of non-liability to third
parties, even aside from the widening exceptions, some cases have boldly
·obliterated all distinctions between chattels and realty and have adopted
identical rules of liability both for contractors and suppliers of chattels.
Two recent decisions are likely to figure prominently in cases dealing
with the failure of nuclear energy structures and the liability of their
constructors or designers. In 1944 a cyclindrical tank, designed, constructed, and installed by the Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Company for
the purpose of storing liquefied gas, exploded. Many persons were killed
or injured and much property damage ensued. Over a hundred claims
were filed against the defendant. Two test cases were tried, one in the
federal and the other in the Pennsylvania state court. In each case the
appellate courts expressly extended the doctrine of manufacturers liability to third parties to cases involving structures.
The federal decision, Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Company,m was the first one rendered. The plaintiff's decedent, Moran, was
an employee of the East Ohio Company, an operating public utility engaged in selling natural gas for both industrial and consumer use in the
City of Cleveland. To meet the problem of storing the gas so as to be
able to meet the consumer demand, which fluctuated according to the
seasons of the year, a plan was worked out whereby the gas was liquefied by subjecting it to temperatures 26o 0 below zero F. The condensation in volume attained by liquefying the gas was so great that 6oo
cubic feet of natural gas became one cubic foot of liquid gas. The gas
remained liquid as long as the temperature was kept at the extremely
low level. To contain the liquid gas and to keep it at the low temperature required, steel tanks were placed within outer tanks with cork
insulation between them, somewhat like the principle of a thermos
bottle. The defendants built three of these tanks and experience with
them proved satisfactory. Increased demand for gas led East Ohio to
seek further storage space. The defendants contracted to build a new
tank with twice the storage space of those first installed. The new tank
was cylindrical in design (rather than spherical as the earlier tanks had
been) and was completed and installed in May 1943. Thirteen months
later it exploded.
m 166 F.2d go8 (1948).
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The plaintiff presented two alternative theories of recovery. One
called for application of the doctrine of strict liability under Ohio law. 115
However, because the structure was not under the control of the defendant at the time of the explosion, the court held that the doctrine of
strict liability was not applicable. The second theory was negligence,
and the negligence alleged was that the defendants had installed a tank
of improper design, made of inferior materials. Conflicting evidence
on these subjects was adduced at the trial. The trial court refused to let
the. case go to the jury and entered an involuntary non-suit. In reversing this action of the trial court, Judge Goodrich, of the Circuit
Court of Appeals, stated:
The second theory of responsibility which the plaintiff urges
against the defendants is that the defendants were negligent
in the plans for the structure and materials used therein. Before we outline the plaintiff's allegations with regard to negligence there is a legal question to be met. Assume, for the
moment, that the plaintiff has alleged and shown negligence on
the part of the defendants in planning and erecting the structure. Does their responsibility extend to harm suffered by one
in the position of the plaintiff after the structure has been
turned over to the purchaser, East Ohio? . . . ·
The old rule was that the manufacturer of a chattel was not
responsible for injuries to others than his immediate vendee.
Exceptions grew up to the rule and the whole matter received
clarification by the New York Court of Appeals, through
Judge Cardozo, in what is now the leading case of Mac
Pherson v. Buick Motor Co. This decision puts responsibility
for an injury to one operating the car on one who negligently
manufactures a part of an automobile, and it is fair to call
the decision a landmark in tort law. An examination of the
Ohio authorities shows clearly, we think, that the principles
upon which MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. was decided are
part of the law of Ohio. They are, likewise, generally, though
not universally, accepted in modern law and are adopted in the
Restatement of Torts. 116
Recognizing that the doctrine of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company in itself was not enough to sustain the position of the plaintiff, the
court went on to explain the development of that doctrine in Ohio:
We need to find that those courts have taken, or would take,
one step more and possibly two. The first step is the manu175 Although the case was tried in the Pennsylvania district the lex loci delicti
was applicable.
176 I d. at 914-915.
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facturer's or supplier's responsibility, not merely to the ultimate consumer of the article, but to a person in the vicinity of
its use who is injured by the manufacturer's lack of due care.
This extension of the MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. doctrine is indicated in the Restatement and is clearly indicated to
be the Ohio law in the decision of White Sewing Machine Co.
v. Feisel. . . . We have no difficulty, therefore, in finding
that the Ohio law imposes liability on a manufacturer, not
alone to the ultimate consumer, but to one who might reason:ably have been expected to be in the vicinity of the chattel's
use. 17'
The second step to which the court alluded ·was whether or not the
doctrine was applicable to cases concerning realty. On this subject Judge
Goodrich continued with the statement that:
We have no doubt that an Ohio court confronted with the
question would, in accordance with the development of the
law shown in its previous decisions, extend the liability of the
manufacturer to negligence involved in building a structure
even though that structure was affixed on another's land. 178
Thus the MacPherson doctrine was extended to impose liability for
injuries to third parties other than the purchasers or ultimate users injured as a result of negligence in the construction of a structure usually
denominated as realty under property law rules.
The companion case, Foley v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 119
reached the same result by applying the same legal theories. There the
trial court had permitted the case to go to the jury on the negligence
issue, but when the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, the court
granted the defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed on the same principles
as those applied by the federal court. In so doing the court stated that
there was no logical basis for a distinction between chattels and realty
"and it would obviously be absurd to hold that a manufacturer would be
liable if negligent in building a small, readily movable tank which would
undoubtedly be a chattel, but not in building an enormously large and
correspondingly more potentially dangerous a one that legalistically was
classified as realty." 180
The older rule of non-liability for injuries caused by structures seems
to be uniformly followed in England. In a fairly recent case a builder
ld. at 915-916.
at 916
179 363 Pa. I (1949).
180 I d. at 34-35.
111
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was held under no duty, either to a future purchaser or to persons who
come to live in the house, to take care that it is well constructed and
safe. In Bottomley v. Bannister 181 a boiler had been installed which
was heated by a gas burner. No flue was provided to carry the gas outside, and the occupants, husband and wife, were killed by the poisonous
gas. The court found negligence, but since the case involved the installation of a structure on realty, the court held the chattel cases inapplicable
and recovery was denied. Donoghue v. Steven.son, 182 the English equivalent of the MacPherson case, raised certain doubts as to the validity of
the non-liability rule in the case of building contractors, but a later case,
0 tto v. Bolton and N orris/ 88 expressly differentiated between chattel
suppliers and builders and held the old rule still to be in effect. Certain
qualifications were made, however, in the Otto case, which although
mere dicta may forecast a weakening of the rule of non-liability even in
Britain. The court speculated on the result if the rule of liability as
stated in the Stevenson case should be applied to a case of negligent
construction of realty if the defect was not discoverable by the purchaser
on a careful inspection. It was the opinion of the court that the Stevenson case opened the door to p()ssible liability to third parties when no inspection by the occupant was to be expected or possible. This reasoning
could expose the designers and builders of atomic energy installations in
England to liability to third parties, if the defect in the construction or
design is so hidden that reasonable inspection would not disclose it.
The similarity between the explosion of pressurized gas in steel tanks
and the effect of loss of control of nuclear re.actors is too clear to escape
the notice of the courts in :the United States if the issue of liability of a
builder of atomic energy installations should ever arise. Even some of
the language used in the opinion of the Moran case is suggestive of the
likely results if a "burn up" of a nuclear reactor should occur. The
court noted that the plant was a novel experiment and a "poignant episode in the development of the kind of bold and ingenious engineering
for which Americans have become famous," lU a comment which is
particularly apropos in respect to nuclear reactors. Although technically the Moran and Foley cases could be limited in their future application, the logic of the cases is compelling and can be viewed as the
culmination of the slow process of equalization between the cases of
suppliers of chattels and those involving builders of structures on land.
181
182
188
18•

(1932) I K. B. 458.
s62.
( 1936) 2 K. B. 46.

<1932> A.

c.

Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 166 F.2d 908 at 911 (1948).
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Therefore, these decisions may well represent the law to be applied to
atomic energy enterprise with respect to the liability of designers and
builders of nuclear installations. If this should be the future development of the law, designers and contractors for real property structures
will be held liable under doctrines comparable to those now applied to
suppliers of chattels with similar results.
C. Protection Afforded Supplier Under the Indemnification Provisions
of the Atomic Energy Act

In 1957 the Atomic Energy Act was amended to place a limitation
upon the total public liability of atomic energy entrepreneurs and to provide for governmental indemnification. 186 These provisions, which were
discussed in detail in Chapter III, are specifically designed to provide
protection for suppliers of chattels, designers, and building contractors
whose negligence may possibly result in a radiation accident. The significant provision is the defini~ion of "person indemnified," which reads:
The term "person indemnified" means the person with
whom an indemity agreement is excuted and any other person
who may be liable for public liability.
In its report, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy indicated the
applicability of the indemnification provisions to suppliers of chattels by
stating:
The definition "person indemnified" means more than just the
person with whom the indemnity agreement is executed. In
the case of license this agreement will be executed with the
licensee. Where the Commission and a contractor decide to
take advantage of the provisions of this act, an indemnity
agreement will be executed with the prime contractor. The
phrase "person indemnified" also covers any other persons
who may be liable. For a licensee for a reactor, this would
mean in addition to the licensee that the indemnification extends to such persons as the subcontractors of the licensee, including those responsible for the design and construction of
the reactor and the supplying of parts. However, it is not
meant to be limited solely to those who may be found liable
due to their contractual relationship with the licensee. In the
hearings, the question of protecting the public was raised
where some unusual incident, such as negligence in maintaining an airplane motor, should cause an airplane to crash into
a reactor and thereby cause damage to the public. Under this
bill the public is protected and the airplane company can also
186

Public Law 85-256, Act of .Sept. 2, 1957.
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take advantage of the indemnification and other proceedings.
The proposed AEC limitation to those in privity with the
licensee was reconsidered by the Commission, and the Commission decided to accept the premise of the original bills
which would make the person indemnified any person who
might be found liable, regardless of the contractual relation. 188
The sweeping nature of the indemnification and limitation of liability
provisions removes the qtajor hazards of potential liability from suppliers of goods and services for atomic energy industry in that financial
protection is required for reactor installations. However, in respect to
certain licenses, namely those for domestic distribution of special nuclear material, source material, and byproduct material, the Commission does not have to require financial protection. If the financial protection is not required, an indemnification agreement by the Atomic
Energy Commission is also not required. Therefore, suppliers of goods
and services may not be protected under the federal legislation in respect
to some radiation injuries. However, financial protection will probably
always be imposed by the Commission as a condition of a license wherever the hazard is substantial. If the hazard is not unusual,. the suppliers should be able to obtain satisfactory private insurance coverage
or indemnification agreements from their customers. It should be noted,
however, that the existence of federal indemnification may have the
effect of broadening present liability concepts in the law and these concepts may be carried over eventually into other product liability cases
not involving atomic energy activities.
_
Although the indemnification provisions of the Atomic Energy Act
cover the major areas of liability which are of deep concern to atomic
energy suppliers, three limitations in the effectiveness of the indemnification provisions warrant attention. First, the definition of "public
liability" does not include liability for damage to property "at the site
and used in connection with the activity where the nuclear incident
occurs." Since reactor installations are very costly, product suppliers
will be faced with the potentialities of liability in tremendous sums if
the .purchaser can recover for property damage under theories of negligence, warranty, or strict liability. Therefore, suppliers should continue
to obtain indemnity agreements from their purchasers wherever possible. The second limitation arises out of the definition of "nuclear
incident" which is limited to "any occurrence within the United States."
If a supplier furnishes his products to purchasers for use in other
1ss H. Rep. 435, 85th Cong., xst Sess. 17 (1957).
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countries. or upon the high seas, and injuries occur outside the United
States· for which the supplier may be held lial;>le, the provisions of the
Atomic Energy Act will afford no relief. 187 Therefore, if atomic energy
suppliers are engaged in sales of products to be used outside the United
States, potential liability must· be examined with reference to the laws
of the foreign nations and the law of the high seas. A third limitation
on the effectiveness of the indemnification provisions may arise whenever the scope of the financial protection required and obtainable through
private insurance is less than the scope of possible public liability. Under
the Atomic Energy Act the indemnification provisions do not operate
unless the public liability is "in excess of the level of financial protection
required of the licensee." 188 Therefore, if the private insurance arrangements of the licensee have a shorter limitations period or if they do not
provide coverage for certain types of injury, the supplier who may be
liable under theories of strict liability, negligence, or warranty still faces
the possibility of substantial liability.
Although these limitations on the protection afforded by the indemnification provisions may affect some suppliers in certain phases of their
activities, generally the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, has
created a favorable cliinate for suppliers to atomic energy industry.
Unless some such indemnification were available, atomic energy suppliers ·would be forced to accept highly unusual monetary risks and
entrance into the supply industry would be discouraged. As further
studies are made in connection with foreign sales and activities, it is
entirely possible that other governments will provide similar protection
for atomic energy product manufacturers or an expansion of the indemnification provisions may be enacted by Congress. The Atomic Energy
Commission and the Joint Committee are continually studying the problems and any severe legal restraints on the development of peacetime uses
of atomic energy will undoubtedly be corrected.
187 Legislation providing indemnity protection for the proposed nuclear-powered
merchant shop, the U.S. Savannah, has been approved by the Senate Committee on
.Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and has been transmitted to the Joint Committee
on Atomic Energy .for further study. S. 31o6, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. ( 1958). Suppliers
are expressly indemnified if the amendments recommended by the Maritime Commission ·are included in the proposed legislation. See BNA Atomic Industry Reporter
54= 17 (1958).
188 Section 17oc, 42 U.S.C.A. §221o(c).
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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AND
RADIATION INJURIES*
I. INTRODUCTION
Because of the extensive harmful potential of the materials and techniques involved in utilizing atomic energy and radioactive materials,
radiation injuries to employees must be avoided wherever possible. To
this end, atomic industry may be required to follow a number of unique
personnel procedures not encountered in other industries. For example,
consideration must be given to revision of the work week if radiation
exposures become too hazardous for normal periods of time. Employers must also ascertain the significance of the age and sex of employees
in relation to potential radiation exposures. It is generally believed that,
due to rapid rate of development, persons under ·eighteen should not be
employed in work requiring exposure to ionizing radiation. Moreover,
the idea has been advanced, although it has not received any great degree
of acceptance, that persons over forty-five may be able to tolerate doses
of radiation double those considered safe for younger adults. Still
again, pregnant women should not be exposed because prenatal sensitivity to radiation is high. These and other related factors obviously
must be evaluated by employers in the assignment of work and personnel.
Once employees have been assigned to jobs associated with radiation,
suitable monitoring apparatus is essential. Any employee apt to be
working in locations where he will be exposed to radiation should be
issued a personal monitoring device, such as a film badge or a pocket
dosimeter, to measure the radiation received by him. Special problems
arise in connection with the handling of radioactive equipment and materials. Remote control devices have been developed which permit
handling of objects by means of tongs, mechanical hands, etc., while
the operator remains behind suitable shielding. Specialized tools and
methods have been devised to permit radioactive liquids to be handled;
pipetting, filtering, precipitation, and the like can thus be carried out
• The authors wish to acknowledge the research assistance in the preparation of this
manuscript of Rinaldo L. Bianchi, Graduate Research Assistant, University of Michigan Law School; Law Degree, University of Pisa (Italy), 1947; A.B., Wayne University, 1951; A.M., Wayne University, 1952; ].D., University of Michigan, 1955;
and John W. Birchall, Graduate Research Assistant, University of Michigan Law
School; A.B., University of Michigan, 1949; LL.B., University of Michigan, 1952.
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with minimum hazards to the operator. Employers must provide the
necessary equipment and facilities to avoid or to minimize radiation
exposure.
From the point of view of protecting employees from radiation hazards the waste disposal problem is also highly significant. Not only
must wastes be disposed Of at no risk to the surrounding area, but also
methods for accomplishing this must be devised with a view to protecting employees while handling the wastes or while working in the
vicinity of disposal sites or along the routes selected for transportation
of wastes. All areas involved in the disposal process will require regular
monitoring to assure that the level of radiation is not such as to imperil
employees. Wastes accumulating in work areas must be stored in suitably shielded containers.
An overriding consideration in this· field is that of supervision and
training. Employees will require constant supervision to make certain
that they understand and will take the necessary precautions. Specific
persons must be assigned tlie responsibility for radiation protection
measures, including checking the efficiency of protective devices as well
as detecting, with the use of the monitoring apparatus, the possible
presence of contamination.
Since the effects of radioactivity on the human body are cumulative,
at least when irradiations of a certain intensity occur and possibly also
regardless of the minuteness of the amounts received, it will become
necessary to maintain permanent records for the workers concerned, so
that their exposures may be adequately and accurately followed throughout the course of their various employments. Just as radiation hazards
must be· given a long-term evaluation, so too will long-term personnel
records become an integral part of operations in the atomic industry.
Complete medical supervision, covering not only the period of employment but also the prior medical history, will permit detection of conditions rendering a person unsuitable for work in a radioactive environment. Such evidences may be provided by examinations of skin, bone,
gonad, blood, and lung conditions, and complete records should be kept
as a matter of personnel routine.
Although the .first line of defense for atomic industry will be the
avoidance of radiation injuries by utilization of adequate radiation
safety measures, we must recognize that despite these efforts some such
injuries will be inflicted. For industrial accidents, in general, workmen's
compensation has been evolved as the method of supplying economic
protection to employees. The existing workmen's compensation statutes
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wanant re-examination to determine their adequacy in dealing with the
new hazards created by the advent of industrial application of atomic
energy. In identifying and discussing the problems likely to be raised by
specific provisions of the workmen's compensation laws in relation to
atomic energy injuries, it will be helpful to review briefly the several
types of statutes providing relief for injuries which might occur in
atomic industry. It is, of course, to be expected that the bulk of existing
legislative provisions in this field can be adapted to radiation injuries
without undue stress and will serve substantially the same policy ends
as effectively as under present conditions. Atomic industry will doubtlessly have its share of typical industrial accidents whose nature and
circumstances will not present any unusual difficulties. The fact remains, however, that the potential industrial applications of nuclear
energy may precipitate situations of unusually complicated and unexpected character and of sufficient frequency to w~rrant concern over the
adequacy oi certain aspects of present day compensation legislation. The
following review has the purpose of presenting a selective illustration
of areas of workmen's compensation law that may require amendment
so that we may not be totally unprepared for the proper disposition of
industrial radiation injury cases.
·

II. SCOPE OF COVERAGE UNDER EXISTING LAWS
Workmen's compensation legislation, now enacted in every state, imposes, in effect, strict liability for certain injuries arising out of the employment relationship. Under workmen's compensation the losses are
distributed throughout the industry by a liability insurance system with
the theory being that the consumer should eventually bear the financial
burden for injuries to employees. As we have already seen in connection
with common law tort liability rules, the peculiarities of atomic energy
and radiation injuries raise several new legal problems. An examination of selective workmen's compensation acts from the standpoint of
atomic energy and radiation injuries also, as we shall see, uncovers new
problems that must be resolved in the atomic age.
Since our discussion will be limited mainly to the possibilities of recovery for radiation injuries under existing compensation statutes, it
may be helpful to define the several types of radiation injuries with
which we are concerned primarily. For purposes of convenience, four
types of radiation injuries warrant attention. First, there is the "immediate radiation injury" which is occasioned by a harmful exposure
to radiation, fixed in time, and which results in radiation sickness or
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death, coterminously or shortly after exposure. Second, there is the
"delayed radiation injury" for which the cause (the harmful exposure)
can be fixed in time but in which the effect develops over a period of
time, or, conversely, the effect may be fixed in time but the harmful exposure occurs over an extended period. Third, there is the "cumulative
radiation injury" where the cause occurs over an extended period and
the effect also gradually develops. Fourth, there are the "distinctive
radiation injuries" which have unusual effects, not normally encountered
in other industrial pursuits, such as shortened life span, temporary or
permanent sterility, probable or possible genetic damage, or increased
susceptibility to disease, and which may occur as a result of any of the
three other types of injury.
Under most workmen's compensation acts the statutory language
covers two broad types of injuries; namely ( 1) "injuries by accident"
"arising out of and in the course of employment" and ( 2) "occupational
diseases." To be compensable, any injury suffered by an employee subject to the act must come within the definitions established for these
two general categories of injuries by the statutes. Therefore, in respect to radiation injuries, we will first examine the extent to which current statutory provisions provide cover~ge. Secondly, problems arising
out of successive injuries and successive exposures culminating in occupational diseases will be explored. Thereafter, the statutory provisions
relating to the bases of compensation awards will be examined to ascertain their adequacy when ~pplied to radiation injuries. ·
A. General Accidental Injury Coverage

i. Injury by Accident
Nearly all compensation statutes require that an injury be "accidental" to be compensable. "Accidental injury" or "injury by accident"
is not defined in the statutes, with the result that judicial construction
of these terms has been· essential. In construing these terms the courts
have universally required an element of unexpectedness, and most courts
have added the further requirement that an accidental injury must be
reasonably traceable to a definite time, place, and occasion or cause. In
respect to ·"immediate radiation injuries," where both the cause and
effect can be ascertaine9 immediately, there appears to be no doubt that
the statutory language is sufficiently broad to provide coverage. However, in applying traditional court tests difficulties are encountered in
respect to the "delayed radiation injuries." In specific non-radiation
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cases, the courts have reached divergent results in attempting to apply
definitions of "accidental" to similar injuries. The common but troublesome issue is the question of whether the injury must have resulted from
an unexpected and traceable external cause, or, in the alternative,
whether it is sufficient that the injury was sudden and unusual though
the immediate cause was not an external and unexpected event. The
resolution of this question, is of course, crucial if the radiation injury
is not compensable as an occupational disease.
In respect to "delayed radiation injuries," the cases of routine exposure, either to the elements or to conditions peculiar to the employee's
environment while at work, provide some analogies. Many courts have
distinguished between abrupt results on the one hand and subtle physiological disturbances on the other. For example, prolonged exposure to
either heat or cold, resulting in heat prostration or frostbite respectively,
has been held by most courts to give rise to an 3:ccidental and compensable injury/ though some courts stress the need for the· existence of
unusual conditions as contrasted with the usual exposure of the general public. A minority of courts have, however,. refused relief on the
ground that in certain jobs there is nothing unusual in being exposed
to heat or cold whether in greater or lesser degree in relation to the
normal exposure of the public, and thus the injury is held not to be a
sudden and unexpected accident, and no compensation is allowed. 2 In
atomic industry comparable cases may take the form of acute radiation
sickness caused not by sudden excessive_ irradiation, but by the effect of
cumulative exposures normal for the kind of employment. If the degree
of usual exposure in the particular employment test should be imposed
when dealing with immediately discernible radiation injuries, compensation may be unavailable. Such a result, however, may be seriously
questioned, and it is doubtful that even courts following th~ minority.
rule would apply the same test in radiation cases.
In contrast to cases of immediate, tangible injury; -cases involving routine exposures to the elements or to artificial conditions causing a latent
disease or the formation of degenerative conditions in .the organs or
tissues, have found the courts much inore reluctant to find an "accident."
1 See citations classified by state in i Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation
§38.40, n. 20 ( 1952) .
2 Beadle v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 172 Md. 541, 193 At!. 240 (1937) (heat stroke
suffered by employees whose duties were to remove heavy pieces of metal from furnace
with temperature of 1300 degrees); Savage v. City of Pontiac, 214 Mich. 626, 183 ·
N.W. 798 (1921) (freezing suffered: by fireman whose wet clothes froze on him and
whose neck was cover:ed by ice).
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When an employee incurs a disease from exposure to heat, cold, dampness, fumes, or dust, and the disease is not covered as an occupational
disease under the statute, a majority of courts deny compensation for
lack of accidental character of the injury. 8 The rule is tempered sometimes by the implication that if the exposure is of unusual occurrence
for persons engaged in the victim's type of work, the disease can be
held accidental.
A typical case illustrating the chief objection to the recognition as
accidental of slowly developing injuries from exposure to the weather
or to noxious substances, and indicating that the difficulty springs solely
from the traditional definition of "accident," is Deyo v. Village of Piermont.4 In that case a policeman's arthritis was aggravated from standing for hours in wet and freezing weather to direct traffic. The court
denied compensation, saying: ", .. [W]e do not think the interpretation of what constitutes an 'accident' should be extended to fringe cases
such as this, where there is no single incident which would be regarded
as an accident by the common man. There must be some element of
suddenness..:..._something catastrophic-and some incident immediately
noticeable." 6
A minority of courts hold compensable, as accidental, slowly developing injuries that result from greater exposure than that to which the
general public is submitted even if the exposure is a matter of routine
in the victim's type of employment. The fact that the exposure is peculiar to the employment is often a corroborative factor· in favor of
compensability for courts following this approach. 6
•
Any "delayed radiation injury" not compensable as an occupational
s Powell v. Taylor, I77 Pa. Super. 647, 112 A. 2d 4I5 (I955) (carpenter employed
for :over 3 years during which he used dusty and mouldy lumber which required
brushing and scraping before use, breathed and inhaled this material and became totally
disabled and afflicted with moniliasis. Medical expert was unable to state whether a
single contact with fungus spores or exposure over a period of time had caused the
disease. Held: compensation denied since neither an accident was shown nor a scheduled occupational disease); Davis v. Sunshine Mining Co., 73 Idaho 94. 245 P. 2d 822
(I952) (miner's tuberculosis from neither unusual conditions nor fortuitous eventr;
Hasbrouck v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. (Ohio, Ct. Com. Pleas) 99 N .E. 2d 329
(I95I) (victim overcome by fumes while mixing vat of alcohol and benzol; recovery
denied for lack of suddenness and unforeseeability and thus of accidental nature of
injury); see also citations by state in I Larson, supra note I at §38.50, n. 2I.
•283 App. Div. 67, I26 N.Y.S. 2d 523 (I953).
6 !d. at 69 and 525. ·
6 Black v. Creston Auto Co., 225 Iowa 67I, 28I N.W. I89 (I938) (lead poisoning
from inhaling poisonous fumes over a period of time); Webb v. New Mexico Pub. Co.,
47 N.M. 279. I4I P. 2d 333 (I943) (dermatitis from 6 months' use of irritating soap);
see also citations by state in I Larson, supra note I at §38.50, n. 2I.
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disease would presumably receive similar judicial treatment whenever
the injury was in the form of an aggravation of a latent disease or a
slowly developing deterioration of tissue or organs. The fact that radiation-caused ailments may include disorders heretofore beyond scientific
expectation and of a kind which may not be included within restrictive
lists of occupational diseases suggests a reappraisal of policies of the
law in this area for atomic energy industry.
"Cumulative radiation injuries," not covered as occupational diseases
under the statutes, raise similar problems of coverage under existing
legislation. The chief obstacle under many American statutes to compensability of gradual injuries of a clearly occupational nature consists
in the difficulty experienced in determining the exact time of their occurrence. This is essential for the purpose of satisfying the requirement of proving an "injury by accident," which has been generally
interpreted as calling for an accident and not including cases of slow
and often imperceptible deteriorations. When the element of suddenness
is totally absent for the reason that neither is the cause of an injury
an untoward and unexpected event nor is the result a clear-cut collapse
(for example, in a case of heat prostration), compensability has been
granted and denied alternately in the same state.
These cases are often difficult to distinguish from the accidental diseases discussed above. They include situations in which protracted exposures result in gradual physical deteriorations or diseases but where
both the cause and effect are gradual and span a considerable period of
time. Some courts have granted compensation in these cases by assimilating gradual injuries to the traditional conception of "injury by
accident," saying that each exposure produced a new trauma and constituted a small accident the repetition of which finally led to a compensable injury. 7 But some of the same courts have denied compensation in other similar cases because of absence of an accident sufficiently
definite in time. 8
Most of the radiation injuries caused by repeated exposures are, of
course, of a nature that would qualify for compensation under statutes
providing coverage for all occupational diseases, and the problem raised
by gradual injuries in the atomic industry can perhaps be solved best by
the amendment of compensation statutes where necessary to effect com7 E.g., Pan American Airways v. Willard, 99 F. Supp. 257 (1951) (skin disease
from exposure to tropical sun) ; Batesville White Lime Co. v. Bell, 212 Ark. 23, 205
·s.W. 2d 31 (1947) (inhalation of excessive dust for 23 years causing heart injury).
8 Compare cases listed by jurisdictions in I Larson, supra note I, at §Jg.Io, notes I6
and I].
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prehensive occupational disease coverage. Otherwise unexpected gradual
radiation injuries would be likely to remain uncompensated and thus
produce an incongruity difficult to defend when we realize that constant
though minimal and supposedly safe exposures to radioactivity are apt
to be routine for employees in atomic industry.
2.

"Arising out of and in the Course of Employment"

Another all but universal coverage provision in American compensation statutes is the requirement that the industrial injury must be one
"arising out of and in the course of employment." Forty-one states and
the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act 9 use this test. Utah has
modified the formula to read "arising out of or in the course of the
employment." 10 The statutes of North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Texas,
and Washington, and the United States Employees' Compensation Act
do not contain the "arising out of" portion of the formula. 11 West Virginia requires an injury "res~lting from" instead of "arising out of"
employment. 12 Wyoming has rejected the entire traditional approach
and requires that the injury be "incurred in the employment." 18 Wisconsin has replaced the "course of employment" phrase with the requirement that the employee be injured "while performing service growing
out of and incidental to his employment," u and the United States Employee's Compensation Act covers injuries "sustained while in the performance of duty." u
"Arising out of and in the course of employment" is normally said
to indicate two separate tests which must be met before an injury may
be held compensable. An injury is said to arise out of the employment
when a causal connection between the conditions of work and the resulting harm is apparent to the rational mind. While restrictive interpretations of this phrase in earlier years interposed additional obstacles
to compensability (such as the doctrine that an added peril resulting
from the conduct of the worker himself excluded the requisite causal
connection and the view that a hazard common to all mankind did not
33 U.S.C.A. §§901-950.
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-45 (1953).
11 N.D. Rev. Code §65-0102(8) ( 1943) ("arising in the course of employment");
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 77, §4II (1952); Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 8309, h (1956); Wash.
Rev. Code §51.o8.1oo (1951) (resulting from "a sudden· and tangible happening, of a
traumatic nature").
12 W.Va. Code Ann. c. 23, §4-1 (1955).
18 Wyo. Comp. Stat. Ann. §72-106 (1945).
HWis. Stat. Ann. §102.03 (1)(c) (1957).
15 5 U.S.C.A. §751.
9

10
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satisfy the "arising out of" test), the trend of recent decisions is to the
effect that it is enough if the employment was a contributing cause. Generally whether the employment is a sufficient contributing factor becomes a simple question of proof not subject to the ordinary tests used
to determine the presence of proximate cause in tort cases. Insofar as it
relates to the problems confronting atomic energy industry, this phase
of the law will be considered when we deal with the modes of establishing a causal relation between the work and the injury or disease.
The part of the coverage formula which may work a hardship in certain radiation cases is the requirement that an injury arise "in the course
of employment." This phrase implies that to be compensable, an accident must overtake an employee during working hours, or at a place
where he is reasonably expected to be while carrying on an activity incidental to his job. Generally the courts have held that manifestation of
the injury as well as origin must occur during the.course of employment.
This approach is likely to be unsatisfactory in atomic industry for the
reason that the effects of an overexposure may make themselves felt
hours after the workman leaves his place of employment.
There are at least two judicial decisions which, when considered in
relation to comparable radiation injury situations, illustrate the awkward solutions which the present coverage formula may inspire. In
American Motorists Insurance Co. v. Steel 16 an employee whose job
required the drilling of holes in metal suffered a severe injury when
sharp shavings, which had lodged in his eyebrows, fell into his eye. The
accident took place about fifteen minutes after the end of working hours
while the workman was on his way home. Because the harmful result
did not occur "during the course of employment," the injury was held
non-compensable. Again in Gill v. Belmar Construction Company 17 the
workman had negligently left a dynamite cap in his pocket and was badly
injured when it exploded the next morning while he was dressing in
his hotel room. The time and place of the accident not coinciding with
the employment, compensation was denied.
It is not difficult to imagine situations in atomic industry in which
delayed-action injuries will occur. Indeed, without resorting to imagina. tion, it is already possible to advance hypotheses _based on actual events
as reported in the press. For example, a worker on a construction project in Connecticut innocently carried away in his trousers pocket a capsule of cobalt 6o which was being used on the job for radiography of
16
t7

(Tex. App.) 229 S.W. ;!d 386 (1950).
226 App. Div. 616, 236 N.Y. Supp. 379 (1929).
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welds. The workman was interested in using the long string from which
the small, one and three-eights inch cylinder of deadly cobalt was hanging, and he was unaware of the radioactive nature of the contents.
After a general alarm had been given and a thorough search started, the
cobalt was found in the glove compartment of the worker's car. Final
information on the physical effect of this episode is lacking, but the construction worker is suing for $2oo,ooo damages. If he and perhaps
some of his companions in his car suffered radiation injuries, the rule
of the above two cases would probably exclude compensability.
3· Summary
Existing statutory prov1s1ons relating to accidental injuries appear
to cover adequately "immediate radiation injuries." However, in respect
to "delayed radiation injuries" or "cumulative radiation injuries," statutory language requiring an "accident" probably cannot be relied upon,
except in a minority of court.s, as a basis for awarding compensation.
Whenever the cause of an injury occurs over a prolonged period of time
or whenever the injury develops at a remote time, the courts have often
denied compensation because no "accident" can be established. Where
both cause and effect span lengthy time periods, even the more liberal
courts have found considerable difficulty in awarding compensation.
Therefore, for many radiation injuries, the general statutory provisions
relating to accidental injuries do not provide satisfactory coverage if it
is deemed desirable that radiation injuries be afforded the same treatment as other types of industrial injuries. However, satisfactory compensation for radiation injuries may be available under occupational
disease coverage provisions of the workmen's compensation acts.

B. Occupational Disease Coverage
Although they may occur occasionally, radiation "accidents" in all
probability will not constitute the major source of atomic energy injuries. Of greater concern are the "cumulative radiation injuries''
caused by chronic exposure, such as cataract, cancer, leukemia, leucopenia, bone necrosis, sterility, genetic mutations, shortened life span,
epilation, or injury to any of the various organs within the body. While
all these injuries can be caused by a single large dose of radiation, as in
the case of an accident, most of them can also be caused by repeated
exposures to low amounts of radioactivity.
Because of the manner in which these injuries develop, they resemble
those injuries which have typically been classified as occupational dis-
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eases under workmen's compensation statutes. Occupational diseases,
which ordinarily develop gradually, generally lack the character of
unexpectedness typical of industrial accidents. They are recognized as a
hazard inherent in continued exposure under the peculiar conditions of
the specific employment. The statutes which provide compensation for
occupational diseases, either by defining "injury by accident" to include
such diseases or by separate specific coverage, must be examined in each
state to determine their effectiveness as a means of providing compensation for "delayed" or "cumulative" radiation injuries for which compensation would not be awarded under the "accidental" injury proVISions.
Some of the statutes literally provide compensation for "all occupational diseases" and leave it to industrial commissions or the courts to
decide which diseases fit within the terminology. Others provide full
coverage by including within the scope of "injury" all known or even
unknown diseases which result from employment.18 A variation of this
type of legislation is found in statutes which include a list of diseases
for which compensation is provided, this device being known as "the
schedule type of coverage." The lists may be exclusive or non-exclusive.
Full coverage is achieved by those statutes which adopt a definite list of
diseases and then add a general clause which usually reads : ·"any and
all occupational diseases" or "all other occupational diseases." 19
A number of states, not having full coverage for occupational diseases, have adopted statutes providing coverage, specifically and apparently exclusively, for some radiation diseases. 20 The statutes of six
states that provide for occupational disease coverage by use of a schedule
do not cover radiation-induced diseases expressly, and it is doubtful
18

Alaska, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, North Dakota, Oregon, South Carolina, Virginia (alternative coverage), Washington, West. Virginia, Wisconsin. Under federal legislation
civil employees as well as workers falling under the Longshoremen's Act are similarly
covered.
1 9 New York, Ohio, Nevada, Rhode Island, and Utah.
20
Arizona (ulceration of skin or destruction of tissue due to roentgen rays or radium
emanations), Colorado (poisoning or disease caused by exposure to radioactive materials, substances, or machines, or fissionable materials), Georgia,· Kansas, Louisiana,
Oklahoma, Texas, Vermont (diseased condition caused by exposure to X-rays or radioactive substances), Idaho (radium poisoning or disability due to radioactive properties
of substances or to roentgen rays), New Mexico (all diseases directly traceable to
fissionable materials or radioactive materials), North Carolina (radium poisoning or
injury by X-rays), South D.akota (ulceration of skin or destruction of tissue due to
prolonged exposure to roentgen rays or radium emanations).
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whether they can be construed to include such disorders. 21 Two states
provide no coverage for occupational diseases. 22
I.

General Coverage

In respect to those statutes providing full coverage by the use of the
language "all occupational diseases," it is obvious that anything that can
be classified as an occupational disease will be compensable. This, of
course, leaves open the question of what constitutes an "occupational
disease," so as to come within the meaning of the statute. An occupational disease is generally defined as a disease which is peculiar to a
particular industrial process, trade, or occupation and which does not
arise from any single occurrence in the employment, but develops gradually. 2a
The problem of defining an occupational disease is one of attempting
to draw a distinction between those diseases to which the human race
as a whole is constantly subjected, and those diseases which are distinctively connected with the conditions under which the employee works. 24
Consequently, most of the definitions place emphasis upon the causal
relationship of the particular disease to the employment.
, The occupational disease statute of the state of Illinois defines occupational disease as follows : ,
In this act the term "Occupational Disease" means a disease
arising out of and in the course of the employment. Ordinary
diseases of life to which the general public is exposed outside
21 Alabama (specified dust diseases such as pneumoconiosis including silicosis,
anthraco-tuberculosis, aluminosis, etc.), Iowa (16 specific diseases), Maine (15 specified
diseases), Montana (a separate statute provides for payment of $6o.oo a month from
stat~ funds -for workers totally disabled from silicosis if they are residents of the state
of 10 years standing), New Hampshire (silicosis and other pulmonary diseases, anthrax,
lead poisoning, dermatitis venenata, and diseases caused by inhalation of poisonous gas
and fumes), Tennessee (full coverage permissible).
22 Mississippi and Wyoming.
2s " ••• an occupational disease is one which is due wholly to causes and conditions
which are normal and constantly present and characteristic of the particular occupation';
that is, those things which science and industry have not yet learned how to eliminate."
Cell v. Yale and Towne Manufacturing Co., 281 Mich. 564, 568, 275 N.W.250 (1937),
quoting -from Seattle Can Co. v. Dept. of Labor & Industry, 147 Wash. 303, 309, 265
Pac. 739 (1928).
24 Many of the cases which are used to define occupational disease are cases in which
the distinction between an occupational disease and an injury by accident was drawn
so as to label the particular injury uncompensable. This occurred in the situation
where there was no occupational disease law, and if the particular injury of the employee was labeled as an occupational disease, it could not be compensated as an "injury
by accident." Thus in reading cases, it is important to keep in mind the purpose for
which the distinction or definition of occupational disease is being made.
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of the employment shall not be compensable, except where the
said disease follows as an incident of an occupational disease
as defined in this section.
A disease shall be deemed to arise out of the employment,
only if there is apparent to the rational mind upon consideration of all the circumstances, a direct causal connection between the conditions under which the work is performed and
the occupational disease, and which can be seen to have followed as a natural incident of the work as a result of the exposure occasioned by the nature of the employment and which
can be fairly traced to the employment as the proximate cause,
and which does not come from a hazard to which workmen
would have been equally exposed outside of the employment.
The disease must be incidental to the character of the business
and not independent of the relation of employer and employee.
The disease need not to have been foreseen or expected but
after its contraction it must appear to have had its origin in a
risk connected with the employment and to have flowed from
that source as a rational consequence. 25
Some state statutes are briefer. For example, the Nebraska statute
reads:
The term "occupational disease" shall mean only a disease
which is due to causes and conditions which are characteristic
of and peculiar to a particular trade, occupation, process, or
employment, and shall exclude all ordinary diseases of life to
which the general public are exposed. 28
An even briefer statute defining "ocetipational disease" in terms of
causal connection is that of the state of Connecticut:
The words "occupational disease" shall mean a disease peculiar
to the occupation in which the employee was engaged and due
to causes in excess of the ordinary hazards of employment as
such. 27
In addition, some statutes provide coverage for occupational diseases
without providing any definition of what is meant thereby. In these
states it has been left to the courts to decide the limitations of the statutory language. The New York court, in Harman v. Republic Aviation
Corp., was required to define what was meant by the scheduled item
"any and all occupational diseases." Expressing itself in terms of causal
connection, the court said : ·
An ailment does not become an occupational disease simply because it is contracted on the employer"'s premises. It must be
2 5IIl.

Rev. Stat. c. 48, h72.36(d) (1955).
Neb. Rev. Stat. §48-151(3) (1943).
27 Conn. Gen. Stat. §7416 (1949).
26
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one which is commonly regarded as natural to, inhering in, and
incident and concomitant of, the work in question. There must
be a recognizable link between the disease ·and some distinctive
feature of the claimant's job, common to all jobs of that sort.
As this court observed in Matter of Goldberg v. 954 Marcy
Corp. (276 N.Y. 313, 318-319), an occupational disease is
one "which results from the nature of the employment, and by
nature is meant * * * conditions to which all employees of a
class are subject, and which produce the disease as a natural
incident of a particular occupation, and attach to that occupation a hazard which distinguishes it from the usual run of
occupations and is in excess of the hazard attending employment in general." 28

In contrast to the foregoing statutory and judicial definitions of occupational disease emphasizing an "affirm~tive" showing of the causal
relationship between the disease and the job, the state of South Carolina
has taken a negative approach. Its statUte provides :
The words "occupational disease" mean a disease arising out
of and in the course of employment, which is due to hazards
in excess of those ordinarily incident to employment and is peculiar to the occupation in which the employee is engaged. A
disease shall be deemed an occupatipnal disease only if caused
by a hazard recognized as peculiar to a particular trade, process, occupation or employment as a direct result of continuous
exposure to the normal working conditions thereof.
·
No disease shall be deemed an occupational disease when:
( 1) It does not result directly ahd naturally from exposure
in this State to the hazards peculiar to the particular employment;
( 2) It results from exposure to outside climatic conditions;
(3) It is a contagious disease resulting from exposure to
fellow employees or from a hazard to which the workman
would have been equally exposed outside of his employment;
(4) It is one of the ordinary diseases of life to which the
general public is equally exposed, unless such disease follows
as a complication and a natural incident of an occupational disease or unless there is a constant exposure peculiar to the occupation itself which makes such disease a hazard inherent in
such occupation;
(S) It is any disease of the cardiac, pulmonary or circulatory system not resulting directly from abnormal external
gaseous pressure exerted upo~ the body or the _natural entrance
into the body through the skm or natural onfices thereof of
foreign organic or inorganic matter under circumstances pe28298 N.Y. 285, 288, 82 N.E. 2d 785 (1!)48).
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culiar to the employment and the processes utilized therein or
(6) It is any chronic disease of the skeletal joints. 29
The basic question is : Do statutes, which theoretically provide full
coverage of occupational diseases, adequately cover radiation injuries?
As we have seen, the crucial element is the showing of causal connection
between a particular disease and the job. We must, then, determine the
extent to which causal connection between radiation injuries and the
occupations in which they are incurred can be proved. Consider, for
example, the dis~ses of cancer and leukemia. These are diseases to
which the general public is exposed, quite apart from employment. They
are also diseases which are caused by exposure to radiation. While it
has been shown that radiation does cause cancer, the mechanics of this
causation have not yet been thoroughly understood. It is impossible,
then, for even a medical expert to point to a particular case of cancer
and assert with confidence that it was caused by·exposure to radiation.
The same is true of leukemia. While a higher than normal incidence
rate of leukemia can be shown to occur among persons exposed · frequently to radiation, such as radiologists, it is still impossible to point
to any specific case of leukemia and conclude that it was caused by exposure to radiation. Thus, though we know that exposure to radiation
can cause these diseases, it is impossible at present to testify that the
occurrence of any of them in any individual employee is traceable to
radiation exposure.
It may in fact be easier on the basis of statistics for an employer to
disprove causation in radiation cases than for an employee to prove it.
For example, to satisfy the causation requirement under the Illinois
statute, it is necessary that the disease be one which can be "fairly
traced to the employment as the proximate cause, and one which does
not come from the hazards to which workmen would have been equally
exposed outside of the employment." In respect to the first requirement,
would it be sufficient to offer testimony to the effect that, because there
is a higher leukemia incidence rate among workers who deal with radiation, the occurrence of a particular case was incident to the employment?
.To answer affirmatively to this question, would, in effect, make the
employer an insurer against the risk of his employees coming down with
this particular disease. This would result from the fact that even
though the incidence rates themselves show that causes other than radiation produce a majority of the cases, the employer probably will be un29

S.C. Code §72-251 (1952).
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able to prove that any particular case of leukemia or cancer was caused
by circumstances external to the employment. .
The second statutory requirement, that the disease be one which does
not come from a "hazard to which workmen would have been equally
exposed outside of the employment," presents another troublesome
. problem of fact. The question is whether the cause of cancer or leukemia can be said to be due to the same "hazard," whether that "hazard"
is inside or outside of the employment. From available evidence, it
definitely appears that radiation can cause cancer or leukemia. However,
the sources of radiation are not confined to those artificially produced
in atomic energy plants alone. Everyone is subjected to the radiation
that comes from outer space and to the natural radiation caused by the
deterioration of the composition of the earth's surface. The amount of
such radiation to which a person is subjected varies according to the
location. Decomposition of the materials of the earth's surface in some
areas is higher than in others, and a person receives more natural radiation from outer space when he is in the higher altitudes. It is very questionable therefore whether cancer or leukemia could be said to be due
to a radiation "hazard" to which the workman would not have been
equally exposed outside of the employment. The Atomic Energy Commission has pointed out that the average dosage of radiation within its
plants is no greater than people generally receive from natural radiation.
As more is learned about the nature of these diseases and their causes,
it may be disclosed that natural radiation is too low to be a significant
factor. It could be true that cancer is caused by subjection to radiation
on an "exponential" basis and follows inevitably after exposure to a
certain amount of radiation, or that possibly it is caused by a "chance"
passage of radiation at any time. At the present time, however, adequate
information concerning the significance of natural radiation simply is
unavailable. Moreover, X-ray radiation to which people subject themselves voluntarily for medical or other purposes, also must be considered. Such exposure could qualify as a "hazard to which workmen
have been equally exposed outside of the employment." Therefore, the
problem of proving the causal connection essential to classifying a radiation injury as an occupational disease may prove insuperable.
A recent Illinois case, City of ChicOJ(Jo v. Industrial Commission
et al., 80 indicates the nature of the proof that probably will be required
to show the causal connection in radiation cases where compensation is
sought under the occupational disease provisions of the statute. In that
so 403

Ill. 1os, Bs N.E. 2d 66s (1949).
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case, an employee of the city's sewer department died from Weil's disease, a disease commonly transmitted from contact with the excreta of
diseased rats. The presence of rats near or around the sewers where
th~ decedent had worked was made to appear in the evidence. In affirming the denial of an award by the Industrial Commission, the court said:
The evidence in the case at bar clearly falls short of establish. ing such a causal connection. In its aspect most favorable to
plaintiff in error it shows merely that the disease from which
the death resulted is commonly transmitted from contact with
the droppings of infected rats, and that rats exist in the sewers
where decedent worked. There is no evidence that any such
rats were diseased or that the decedent came into contact with
any rat droppings. A mere possibility of contamination in the
course of employment is not sufficient to support an award of
compensation. . . . In the case at bar the presence of spirochetes at decedent's place of employment can be inferred only
by speculation. This cannot serve as proof ·of a direct causal
connection. 81
Thus the court required a showing of actual contact with the disease,
or the cause of the employee's disease, at the place of employment. The
fact that there were rats at the decedent's place of employment and that
these rats could have carried the disease was not sufficient. It was necessary to show that there were diseased rats at the place of employment.
The court distinguished this case from an earlier one, Arquin v. Industrial CommissionJ 82 where the disease had been treated as an injury by
accident. In that case, the court held that there was a causal connection
where an intern treating meningitis cases in a contagious ward had died
from meningitis. The evidence showed that the employee had been in
actual contact with the disease in the course of his employment.
Although no court demands absolute certainty in establishing the
occupational origin of a disease, the problems of causation are bound
to be very serious in atomic energy compensation cases especially because
the diseases caused by radioactivity are the same as those originating
from other causes. In other types of cases the courts have permitted
reasonable inferences drawn from medical testimony of probabilities to
justify the finding that certain diseases are occupational in nature. For
example, in Travelers Ins. Co. v. DonovanJ 83 the claimant, an employee
of the Red Cross, was assigned to duty in Kyoto, Japan, where he contracted tuberculosis. The evidence showed that the incidence rate of
81

/d. at 107-1o8.
349 Ill. 220, 181 N.E. 613 (1932).
88 125 F. Supp. 261 ( 1954).
82
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tuberculosis at Kyoto in 1951 was 1040 per 100,000 population, and
1090 per IOo,ooo population in 1952. This compared with an incidence
rate of 220.9 per 100,000 in 1951 and 215.7 per 100,000 for 1952 in
the District of Columbia, the employee's residence in the United States.
An award made on this basis was affirmed. The court remarked that
it was reasonable to conclude that the disease was contracted not only in
the course of the employment but also out of the employment, because
there was an aggravated risk as a result of work in an area with a high
incidence rate of tuberculosis. The chances were five times those in the
District of Columbia. Further, the court stated that, although in an
action for damages governed by common-law principles the causal relation between the employment and the disease could not be deemed
to have been established, different principles govern under workmen's
compensation laws.
In Zaepfelv. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. 34 the deceased had been
employed as a chemist by four successive employers. He had worked
for DuPont from 1936 to 1943, for a second employer from 1944 to
1946, for a third from 1947 to 1948, and for a fourth for two months
in 1948. He stopped work in 1948 because of illness, and in 1949, at the
age of thirty-nine, he died of aplastic anemia, a disease which impairs
the function of the marrow· in producing blood. A claim was filed
against all the employers, and it was alleged that exposure to chemicals
during deceased's employment caused the disease. The compensation
board found that the total disability was the result of poisoning from
benzol and benzine derivatives contracted while in the employment of
DuPont and causing an occupational disease. An award was made
against DuPont only, for no causal relation was found between the disease and the employment with the other three defendants. An autopsy
disclosed no trace of chemicals left from other employments. The
medical testimony was conflicting as to the cause of the anemia. But in
view of the general paucity of experience with aplastic anemia as an
industrial disease, the court expressed a willingness to accept less than
positive proof of causation. A physician's testimony to the effect that
" . . . the picture could well have begun at the time he was employed
handling the benzine ring products at DuPont" was held sufficient to
support the board's award. As to the use of the word "could," the court
remarked that it is highly probative, and that indeed such evidence is
preferable to a glib manifestation of certainty in these cases. Asked
whether other employments had anything to do with the disease, the
u284 App. Div. 693,134 N.Y.S. 2d 377 (1954).
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medical expert refused to exclude them but maintained that the disorder
was attributable to constant exposure to chemicals during the period of
employment. He could not, however, give details as to how other employments could have contributed to or aggravated the disease. In justifying the decision of the board, the court pointed out: "Neither the
spirit, purpose nor the language of the Workmen's Compensation Law
requires that, to become entitled to compensation his widow must establish the precise exposure which caused his death to an absolute certainty." 36 It is interesting to observe that if any trace of other chemicals
had been found in the deceased's body, other employers would probably
also have been held liable.
On the question of causal relationship, therefore; it is possible for a
court to take the view that a showing of exposure to radiation during
the course of employment and a showing of subsequent development of a
disease, which can be caused by radioactivity, sa.tisfy the requirements
of proof of the occupational character of the disease. This approach,
however, will tend to make the employer in atomic industry an insurer
against certain diseases such as cancer. On the other hand, if a greater
burden of proof must be sustained by the employee to establish the causal
connection, it is doubtful whether many of the cumulative radiation injuries will be found compensable as occupational diseases because of the
lack of sufficient scientific and medical evidence. It is to be hoped that
further discoveries of the specific nature of atomic energy injuries will
diminish the area of conjecture. For example, if it can be shown by
statistical evidence that it takes a cumulative dose of ninety roentgens to
cause a certain type of cancer, such as cancer of the breast, then unless
the employee could show that he was exposed to this much radiation during the course of his employment, he would have difficulty in proving a
causal connection. In the absence of such conclusive scientific data, however, it seems preferable to err on the side of providing compensation
for atomic injuries. If the existing statutory or judicial rules relating
to proof of causal connection appear to create an insuperable burden
for possible victims of radiation injuries, appropriate revision of the
statutes appears desirable.
2.

Schedule Type of Coverage

As previously mentioned, some statutes, instead of providing coverage
for "all occupational diseases," purport to compensate for only a prescribed, exclusive "list" of such diseases. There are several policy rea36

I d. at 696.
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sons underlying the adoption of the schedule type of legislation. Primarily, it is an attempt to limit the employer's liability, so that industry
will not be burdened with the cost of compensation for those diseases to
which the human race as a whole is subject. Another important consideration is that of "definiteness," which serves the worthy purpose of
reducing the amount of time and money employed in litigation over the
question of whether the disease involved in the case is or is not a compensable occupational disease.
An examination of the various statutory lists of the occupational disease laws reveals a considerable variation concernihg both the items included and the language employed. As indicated previously, in some
states no item of the schedule relates to radiation injuries. In other
states the schedules do incorporate items that have some relevancy to
atomic injuries and these will be examined with a view toward determining their adequacy.
a. Examples of Older Legislation

North Carolina. The North Carolina statute enacted in I935 reads:
The following diseases and conditions only shall be deemed to
be occupational diseases within the meaning of this article:
. . . (IS) radium poisoning or injuries by X-rays. 86
Unless a particular disease appears on this list, it is not compensable.
Twenty-six different items are listed as occupational dis.eases in the
North Carolina statute and only item IS pertains to radiation injuries.
Since today the use of X-rays in industrial processes probably exceeds the use of other radioactive materials or equipment, "injury by
X-tays" probably will, numerically speaking, cover the greatest share of
actual radiation injuries. However, as the use of newer atomic energy
devices becomes more prevalent, the inadequacies of the North Carolina
statute will become more apparent.
The statute also covers what is termed "radium poisoning." The use
of the generic term "poisoning" raises the question of whether the
"poisoning" referred to is that of a toxic nature, or one due to radioactive properties of the material mentioned in connection with it-in
this case, radium. The dictionary definition of a poison is "any agent
which, introduced into ·an organism, may chemically produce an injurious or deadly effect." 87 Adopting this definition, the term radium
88
87

N.C. Gen. Stat. §97-53 (1950).
Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary.
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poisoning would make compensable only those diseases wherein some
toxic consequences were produced chemically from the ingestion of radium compounds, thus excluding injuries caused by external or internal
radiation. However, most of the statutes which adopted the words
"radium poisoning" did so after the injuries suffered by the radium dial
painters in New Jersey were publicized. Thus, it would appear that this
language was directed toward covering that sort of injury. Since the
injury was not due to the toxic nature of the radium material, but due
to its radioactive properties, it is quite likely that the legislature meant
to provide compensation for any harm caused the body by ingestion
of radium. However, this is a disputable point. Some of the statutes
have avoided this difficulty through the use of the word "disability"
instead of the word "poisoning." Regardless of the scope of the term
"poisoning," the language of the statute is obviously limited to injuries
involving use of radium compounds only, and the language could be
construed to exclude compensation for occupational diseases due to
contact with other radioactive substances.
Accordingly there are several types of radiation injuries not covered
by the North Carolina statute. One class not covered is that caused by
the particle accelerators which produce high energy radiation, such as
the cosmotron, the betatron, the cyclotron, the synchrotron, and the Van
de Graaff machine. The development of cataracts due to chronic exposure to neutrons suffered by the scientists who experimented with the
cyclotron at the University of California illustrates the possibility of
such machines producing injuries which under a properly drafted statute
could be classified as occupational diseases. Similarly, the statute does
not cover injuries caused by types of radiation other than X-rays, such
as alpha, beta, and gamma radiation.
Another type of radiation injury not made compensable under the
language of the North Carolina statute is that which might be caused by
the nuclear reactor or atomic pile. The nuclear reactor and the chemical
separation plant needed to process the fuel elements are sources of tremendous amounts of radiation. Since it is anticipated that nuclear reactors will be used extensively in research, in the production of electricity, and otherwise, it would seem that a considerable number of
injuries might be anticipated from these sources. The North Carolina
statute makes no reference to injuries from such sources either specifically or by reference to "fissionable" material.
Te~as. The state of Texas provides another variation in the statutory language concerning the atomic energy injuries considered com-
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pensable as occupational diseases. The Texas occupational disease law
reads in part as follows:
Wherever the terms "injury" or "personal injury" are used in
the Workmen's Compensation Law of this state, such terms
shall be construed to mean damage or harm to the physical
structure of the body and such diseases or infection as naturally result therefrom. Unless from the context the meaning
is clearly to the contrary, such terms shall also be construed to
mean and include occupational diseases, as hereinafter defined.
The following diseases only shall be deemed to be occupational
diseases : (a) Poisoning by : (separate and distinct items are
listed including, for example, arsenic, chlorine, cyanide, hydrochloric acid, lead, nitric acid, phosphorus, sulphuric acid, and
zinc) . . . (h) Diseased condition caused by exposure to
x-rays or radioactive substances . . . . 88
Under this language it is readily apparent that the coverage is much
broader than that afforded under the North Carolina legislation. Although the Texas occupational disease law was enacted in 1947, indicating that the legislature should have been aware of the possibility of
injuries through the new uses of atomic energy, a number of problems
may be raised concerning the adequacy of the language. For example,
do the words "diseased condition" apply only to a degenerative physical
condition so that atomic injuries such as cancer and leukemia are covered
but sterility is not? In resolving this question, it should be kept in mind
that some of the early cases of injury from radioactive materials involved scientists who had experienced dermatitis and cancer. Also, the
nature of the injuries received by the radium dial painters was such that
the injury or disease grew progressively worse as time passed. In view
of .the fairly recent date of the Texas legislation, it is likely that the
term "diseased condition" would be broadly construed to include all
atomic energy injuries otherwise compensable under the statute. Moreover, the tendency on the part of the courts to give a liberal interpretation to the language of the workmen's compensation and occupational
disease statutes could induce a court to take this broader view.
A number of questions may be raised concerning the meaning of
"exposure to x-rays or radioactive substances." It may be argued that
the language covers only exposures to external sources of radiation. Because the radiation injury which is compensable, i.e., the "diseased condition," is accompanied by the phrase which links exposure to X-rays
88 Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 83o6, §zo ( 1956). The provisions of the Virginia statutes
are comparable in that they cover "Radium disability or disability due to exposure to
radioactive substances and X-Ray. . . ." Va. Laws 1958, H.B. 552, adding Va. Code
§65-43·
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and exposure to radioactive substances conjunctively and because exposure to X-rays can only be by external exposure, it may be that only
external exposure to radioactive substances was contemplated. Moreover, because those instances of poisoning intended to be compensable
are grouped together under _another subheading, the failure to include
certain radioactive materials which also have toxic effects may be interpreted to mean that, if such materials should result in toxic damage,
the poisoning would not be compensable. Therefore, the scope of
coverage for injuries resulting from ingestion of radioactive materials,
either because of their emission of radiation or because of their toxic
effect, remains conjectural.
More important is the question as to whether or not the fuel which
"burns" in a nuclear reactor, or the nuclear reactor itself, can be termed
a "radioactive substance." A radioactive element such as radium, or an
artificially produced radioisotope like cobalt 6o, js designated as radioactive because it is undergoing internal decay and ·in the process is giving
off radiations of one kind or another. But what about neutron bombardment from a nuclear reactor? It is questionable whether the nuclear
reactor itself could be thought of as a radioactive substance, because,
for one thing, the reactor needs more than simply "a substance," i.e.,
the uranium metal, in order to operate. Highly refined moderators,
control rods, and cooling devices are essential to the operation of a. reactor. Conceding that the uranium or plutonium is radioactive, and that
the nuclear reactor would give off some radiation from "substances,"
this would be insignificant compared with the radiation resulting from
neutron beam exposure. The functioning of the nuclear reactor does
not depend upon the radioactivity of uranium 235, but upon its fissionable quality. Therefore, it would be more correct to speak of radiations given off from a nuclear reactor as being due to "fissionable substances" rather than to radioactive substances. On this basis, the
statutory language "radioactive substances" seemingly would not include exposure to neutron radiation from a nuclear reactor. Similarly,
the Texas statute apparently provides no coverage for those injuries
which may be due to exposure to radiation produced by any of the high
energy machines, such as the cyclotron.
Arizona. Another example of a statute supplying coverage for occupational diseases by setting forth a schedule of compensable diseases
is that of the state of Arizona. This statute which was adopted in 1943
reads:
For the purposes of this Act only the diseases enumerated in
this section shall be deemed to be occupational diseases : . . .
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{I 2) ulceration of the skin or destruction of tissue due to the
prolonged exposure to roentgen rays or radium emanations. 89

The injuries covered under this statute are limited to only those
caused by prolonged exposure to either X-rays or radium emanations.~ 0
This limitation means the exclusion of many potential radiation injuries
previously discussed in respect to other statutes. The different concept
introduced by the Arizona statute is that of "radium emanations."
There are two possible meanings of this term. The one which seems
most plausible is that radium emanations are the rays given off by a
source of radioactivity consisting only of radium. In other words, the
emphasis is on the material, radium, and not on the qualities of the radiations. The other possible interpretation would include in the term all
rays given off from any radioactive material, not only those from
radium. The question is : Were the words "radium emanations" intended to mean the "type of rays" given off by any radioactive material
or just those from radium? Would gainina and beta rays given off from
cobalt 6o come within this language as well as gamma and beta rays
given off by radium? An affirmative answer would appear to be an
unwarrantable construction of the language. When the language was
adopted in· 1943, not much was known about the possibility of using
other forms of radioactivity. The fact that other radioactive substances
could be produced, which would give off the same types of rays as are
given off by radium, was not general knowledge. Therefore, the
coverage of occupational diseases provided for by this act is probably
limited to those injuries caused by exposure to either X-rays or radium.
Another limitation is imposed by the statement of the nature of the
injury for which recovery will be permitted. The act lists as compensable items, "ulceration of the skin and destruction of tissue." Since
an ulcer is described as anything that festers and corrupts like an open
sore, "ulceration of the skin" should cover an injury, such as cancer,
that could occur to the skin through exposure to radioactivity. Whether
heavy scar tissue would be included is questionable. There is also a
question concerning the language "destruction of tissue." Is this broad
enough to cover an injury that occurs to the cells, to internal organs such
as the spleen or liver, or to the bone marrow? Tissue is defined biologically as an aggregate of cells, with its intercellular substance, constituting
one of the structural materials of a plant or animal : for example,
epithelium tissue, nerve tissue, muscular tissue, and connective tissue.
se Ariz. Rev. Stat. §23-II02 (1956).
•o "Roentgen rays" are X-rays.
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Thus, since tissue encompasses any of the structural materials of the
body, it probably is broad enough to cover injury to any of the organs
of the body and to the bone. It would not include damage to individual
cells, as in the blood, but since blood deficiencies and excesses are usually
a consequence of damage to blood producing organs, adequate coverage
may also be provided by the definition. Though some of the atomic
energy injuries, such as cancer, are not really a destruction of tissue but
rather a malignant growth of tissue, they probably would be covered if
the statute is given a liberal interpretation.
In summary, the Arizona statute covers only injuries caused by exposure to either X-rays or radium. It does not cover injuries from other
sources of radioactivity now available in the form of radioisotopes, nor
is there coverage for injuries due to such instrumentalities as the nuclear
reactor. Except for the X-ray machine, no coverage is provided for
injury which can be traced to radiation given off by any of the high
energy machines.
Idaho. The schedule set out by the Idaho statute to provide compensation for radiation injuries reads as follows:
Compensation as provided in this chapter shall be payable for
disability or death of an employee resulting from the following
occupational diseases : . . . ( 6) radium poisoning by or disability due to radioactive properties of substances or to
Roentgen ray (X-ray) in any occupation involving direct
contact therewith, handling thereof, or exposure thereto. 41
This language, although adopted in 1939, would appear to cover most of
the possibilities of injury by radium, X-rays, or radioactive materials,
because it speaks of both poisoning and disability. However, toxic injuries are not included because the "poisoning" or disability must be
due to the radioactive properties of substances, not their chemical
properties. Thus radium poisoning is made to refer expressly to the
radioactive injury caused. There is nothing in the language which wouid
cover the neutron radiation given off from a nuclear reactor, because
such injuries would not be "due to radioactive properties of substances,"
but to their fissionable qualities. Nor is there any coverage provided for
injuries due to high-energy machines.
This statute, by using the words "in any occupation involving direct
contact therewith, handling thereof, or exposure thereto," makes compensability also depend upon employment in such an occupation. Would
this statute provide compensation for the office worker who happened
41

Idaho Code §72-1204 (IP49).
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to be in an area close to a radioactive substance? Would his occupation
be deemed to involve "exposure" to the radioactive material? His exposure would simply result from his having performed his duties in a
radioactive area. If the statute is interpreted to provide compensation
only for those occupations where, as a part of one's duties, there is direct
contact with, handling of, or exposure to radioactive materials, it is conceivable that many radiation injuries will be excluded.
b. Recent Legislation

New Mexico. Some of the states which have utilized the schedule type
of compensation law have attempted recently to modify their statutes to
provide more complete coverage for radiation injuries. The New
Mexico law, as amended in 1957, serves as an example:
For the purpose of this act only the diseases enumerated in
this section shall be deemed to be occupational diseases : . . .
(27) ulceration of the skin or destruction of tissue due to prolonged exposure to roentgen rays or radium emanations . . .
(32) diseases contracted by virtue of work connected with and
directly traceable to fissionable materials or radioactive materials and not specifically listed herein. 42
Since we have discussed statutory language similar to that used in
item 27 of this statute, we will not dwell upon the scope of its coverage,
except to say that it is apparently limited to injuries caused by exposure
to radiat~on either in the form of X-rays or that emitted by radium.
The new provision in item 32 includes any diseases which can be traced
directly to "fissionable" materials. Undoubtedly the legislature_ had in
mind the desirability of adding injuries resulting from the new uses of
atomic energy. Any injury due to an explosion, such as the setting off
of an atom bomb, or even the inadvertent reaching of the critical mass
of fissionable material, probably would be pin-pointed in time and would
doubtless be covered under the workmen's compensation law as an
"injury by accident," as distinguished from an occupational disease.
Therefore, it seems that the legislature intended to make compensable
occupational diseases caused by the operation of a nuclear reactor.
What is the meaning of "fissionable"? Does it include any element
which can undergo the fission process, in the sense of being split into
two or more fragments, or does it apply only to those elements able
u N.M. Stat. §59-10-45; N.M. Laws 1957, c. 246, §Io.
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to sustain a chain reaction? A statement from Glass tone indicates that
the word is used by scientists in the former sense:
Until 1947, fission had not been observed in any element of
atomic number less than 90, but in that year successful fission
of bismuth, lead, thallium, mercury, gold, platinum and tantalum was achieved in the Radiation Laboratory, Berkeley, by
means of alpha particles, deuterons or neutrons of very high
energy. . . .43
If this broad meaning is given to the word "fissionable," then the statute
would cover diseases caused by many of the elements. However, it
would seem more likely that the legislature intended to adopt the interpretation of that word as it is used in the Atomic Energy Act of 1946.
They probably meant to include within the term "fissionable materials"
only those materials capable of sustaining a chain reaction, such as
thorium, plutonium, or uranium 235. Another _question raised by the
language of item 32 is: Would an injury caused by fissionable material
be compensable when caused by radioactivity or toxicity, rather than by
the fissionable quality? For example, when plutonium is ingested, it has
a very deleterious effect upon the body, both of a toxic and of a radioactive nature. The language is probably broad enough to include such
injuries. It should be noted, however, that injuries arising in connection with thermonuclear (or fusion) processes may not be covered.
Colorado. On March 28, 1951, the state of Colorado added item
number 22 to its list of compensable occupational diseases :
The following diseases only shall be deemed to be occupational
diseases, and compensation as provided in this act shall be
payable for disability or death of employee resulting from such
diseases and from no others : . . . ( 22) poisoning or disease
caused by exposure to radioactive materials, substances, or
machines, or fissionable materials. 44
The words "poisoning or disease" are comprehensive enough to cover
the possibility of injury by exposure to an external source of radiation.
Also covered are injuries by ingestion of the material, causing either
toxic or radiation damage or both. The descriptive wording of the
sources of injury intended to be covered, i.e., "radioactive materials,
substances, or machines, or fissionable materials," is quite comprehensive. This language should be adequate to cover any disease or injury
caused by exposure to any of the radioactive or fissionable materials
4SG!asstone, Sourcebook on Atomic Energy 3-t9 (1950).
44 Colo. Rev. Stat. §81-18-9 (1953).
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with which we are now acquainted. On the whole, this statute represents one of the better attempts to describe comprehensively the instrumentalities which may produce radiation injuries.
Conclusion. In nearly every state having schedule type coverage for
occupational diseases, the existing statutory language is either nonexistent or unduly restrictive in coverage of atomic injuries that may
be classified as occupational. In view of the fact that many delayed and
cumulative radiation injuries will often not be compensable as "injuries
by accident," amendatory legislation broadening the coverage for radiation injuries as occupational diseases is indicated, following the example
of Colorado.
c. The Requirement of Causal Connection in Schedule Type
Statutes
The showing of causal connection between the injury or disease and
the employment is a requiretl)ent which appears to be highly regulated
in some of the statutes providing for a schedule of occupational diseases.
An example is the statute of New Mexico which reads:
The occupational diseases hereinafter defined are deemed to
arise out of the employment only if:
A. There is a direct connection between the conditions
under which the work is performed and the occupational
disease ; and
B. The occupational disease can be seen to have followed
as a natural incident of the work and as a result of the exposure occasioned by the nature of the employment; and
C. The. occupational disease can be traced to the employment as the cause ; and
D. The occupational disease does not come from a hazard
to which the employee would have been equally exposed outside of the employment; and
E. The disease is incidental to the character of the business
and not independent of the relation of employer and employee,
(the disease need not have been foreseen or expected, but,
after its contraction, it must appear to have had its origin in a
risk connected with the employment, and to have flowed from
that source as a natural consequence). . . .48
Under this law an employee with a radiation injury may have extreme
difficulty proving causation even though the injury appears on the
schedule. The same considerations discussed previously in connection
with the proof of causal connection under statutes providing coverage
48

N.M. Stat. Ann. §59-10-44-
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of all occupational diseases apply in the ·case of statutes employing
schedule type coverage.
3· Voluntary Coverage
Finally, some of the states have provisions whereby the employer may
elect coverage of "all occupational diseases" in lieu of the schedule. The
Tennessee statute provides:
Any employer may, in lieu of the schedule of occupational
diseases enumerated in section so- I 101, reject the same and
elect by written declaration filed with the division of workmen's compensation, department of labor, on a form provided
by it, to be bound in accordance with the Workmen's Compensation Law by the provisions of this section ·and section
so-1 104 relating to full coverage of all occupational diseases.
Thereupon the employer shall be liable for all occupational
diseases arising out of and in the course of the employment
pursuant to all the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Law.' 6
This provision has already been acted upon by the contractors of the
Atomic Energy Commission operating the Oak Ridge installations,
thereby affording compensation for radiation injuries not covered by
the compulsory coverage provisions of Tennessee law. In those states
where there may be some reluctance to expand the occupational disease
statutory provisions to include all types of atomic radiation injuries,
it would be desirable to at least permit expanded voluntary coverage, and
it is to be hoped that atomic energy entrepreneurs would take advantage
of the opportunities thereby afforded for satisfactory compensation of
such injuries.

C. Successive Injuries and Second Injury Funds
Among the problems besetting modern workmen's compensation
legislation is the case of two physical disabilities overtaking one man at
different times and while in the employ of different employers. The
combined effect of the injuries may be catastrophic although each accident by itself would give rise only to partial or total but only temporary
disability. The typical example is the case of a man who loses the sight
of one eye at one job and his other eye later at another job, thus becoming permanently and totally disabled. The vexing question in such
instances is whether the last employer should bear the cost of compensa46

Tenn. Code Ann. §so-11o3 (1955).
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tion for the whole final result or whether a system of apportionment of
the loss among several employers ought to be ~sed. The consequence of
failing to provide a sharing of the cost may be the resort to discriminatory practices against previously injured workers, who present too great
a financial risk, by refusing employment because of a prior minor injury.
Three general approaches· to this problem are followed in American
compensation statutes. The so-called "full responsibility" rule practically ignores the difficulty and places liability for the entire result on
the employer in whose employment a worker became disabled. At the
other extreme under some apportionment statutes the last employer is
held liable only for the amount of the injury suffered in the second
mishap, and the cumulative effect of the accidents is ignored.
Most states, including several having apportionment statutes, the
District of Columbia, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Longshoreman's
Act, have sought to achieve equitable compensation for employees and
fair relief for employers by instituting so-called second injury funds,
under which usually an employer is held liable for the portion of disability arising out of the injury which occurred in his employment,
while the fund contributes the difference between that amount and the
total amount to which the combined effects of the two injuries entitle
the worker. 47 These funds are financed in different ways. Usually they
are supported by charges imposed upon employers or their insurance
carriers in cases of death of employees without dependents. Some states
provide funds by assessments against carriers based on total premiums
collected or on compensation payments. A small number of states support the funds by special appropriations from the legislature.
In appraising the adaptability of existing second injury fund provisions to injuries suffered in private atomic industry, it should be noted
that some of the second injury fund provisions apply only when the
first injury consists of a listed injury, such as loss of use of an eye, leg,
arm, or other member of the body, which causes a permanent partial
disability, and the second injury produces the cumulative result of
permanent total disability through loss or loss of use of another member.
In other states, however, the second injury fund provisions are not
limited in their application to listed injuries compensable under the
fixed schedule of benefits. But even where the statutes are not limited,
some courts have stressed that the prime objective of the statutes is
maintaining the unimpaired competitive position of workmen in the
47 The only states which do not provide for a second injury fund are Florida,
Georgia, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, and Virginia.

AND RADIATION INJURIES

813

labor market and have denied the applicability of second injury fund
provisions where the prior injury had no effect on the subsequent employment or where the "second injury" caused a prior non-disabling injury to become disabling. If the second injury fund provisions are not
applicable, the last employer is held liable for the whole injury since the
nearly universal principle is that an employer takes an employee as he
finds him, and if an injury causes a disability aggravated by a previous
latent condition, the entire disability is compensable without weighing
the relative contributions of the two injuries. 48
Illustrative of the cases imposing liability on the last employer for the
entire e.Xtent of the ultimate injury is the case of Scott v. Alaska Industrial Board. 49 There the worker had been employed in mines since
19o6 with the exception of several years in construction work. Prior
to his disability he had worked in plaintiff's mine for thirty months.
His prior injury was silicosis which, however, had not yet manifested
itself at the time plaintiff hired him and therefore could not have
placed him at a disadvantage when seeking new employment. The new
injury was pneumonia, which, superimposed on silicosis, caused permanent total disability. The employer was held not to be entitled to recover
from the second injury fund the portion of compensation covering
effects in excess of the disability caused by pneumonia only. The court
was clear that recovery could be had under the statute only when the
prior disability or injury was "obviously manifested" so that the
employer may have been deterred from hiring the worker. In addition,
where the second accident or disease merely precipitates and renders
disabling a prior non-disabling condition, it was the opinion of the
court that the second injury fund legislation was inapplicable.
Radiation injuries are known to cause gradual deterioration of human
tissues, and often the date of disability is postponed indefinitely. Certainly they are not of the type that will normally cause the immediate
loss or loss of use of a member of the body except when amputations are
necessary. Moreover, the possible cumulative effects of irradiation are
not yet easily assessable. It is impossible for employers to appraise the
financial risk involved in employing personnel with prolonged experience in atomic energy work, and yet skilled and experienced men offer
the highest technical value. We must add to this the fact that the
nature of atomic industry is such that irradiation of personnel often
48 Only three states have special statutes on aggravation of disease:
California
Labor Code §4663; Kentucky Rev. Stat. §342.005 ( 1) ; North Dakota Rev. Code §650102(8).
4991 F. Supp. 201 (1950).
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cannot be totally eliminated, but only reduced to levels believed to be
safe. Consequently, a person applying for work in other than his
original place of employment in atomic industry may be suspect to a
prospective employer by reason of his experience in the field. If he has
by chance been involved in minor radiation accidents, but has never been
disabled even temporarily, it may nevertheless be unsound business practice for the employer to consider him for employment even in those states
that do not place full responsibility on the last employer. Such hesitation is made more understandable when we realize that the state of
present day knowledge of the biological effects of radiation is far from
perfect, and thus atomic industry is deprived of a basic yardstick for
calculating the gravity of the risk and the duration of possible complications and their financial import in terms of workmen's compensation
liability. Nevertheless, if the lack of adequate second injury fund provisions, as applied to atomic energy injuries, tends to restrict the potentialities of employment of employees suffering prior radiation injuries, liberalization of the applicability of the second injury funds seems
warranted.
D. Apportionment of Liability in Occupational Disease Cases
The problem of occupational diseases incubating for years before they
cause a disability, with the victim engaged in several employments in
the meantime, is· similar in nature to the difficulties which inspired
the creation of second injury funds. Its significance in relation to
private atomic energy industry is apparent, for radiation diseases frequently and, indeed, normally develop slowly, a fact which is demonstrated by the medical histories of persons exposed to excessive amounts
of radioactivity~ Such cases threaten to be among the most troublesome ftom the compensation point of view.
Under present American statutes most courts impose liability on the
employer or insurance carrier who assumed the risk as of the time when
the disease caused the disability, so long as the employment at that time
\yas of a kind contributing to the dis~se, regardless of the fact that the
condition was caused in part through employment by more than the last
employer. As an example, Willingham v. Bryan Rock & Sand Co. may
be cited. 50 In that case the deceased worker died of silicosis. He had
previously been twenty years in the employment of the person against
whom the claim for compensation was filed. Following his first employment, he was hired by a second employer for five months, and it was
5o

240 N.C. 281, 82 S.E. 2d 68 (1954).
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during this employment that he became totally disabled from the disease.
The second employer was joined as a defendant in the pending compensation case against the first employer and was held solely liable.
Though the last employer is held liable to the employee for the total
effect of a gradually maturing disability, several statutes nevertheless
provide for procedures whereby an apportionment of liabilities may be
had among previous employers whose employments contributed to the
disease. 51 The contribution to which each of several employers is subjected normally depends on the length of time spent in each employer's
service, although Minnesota has adopted a system under which the
compensation board can take into account the safety standards maintained by each employer in computing the share of contribution of each
employer. This system ought to appeal greatly to framers of compensation legislation for the atomic industry because of the incentive it provides to maintain the highest safety standards.
California has adopted an apportionment scheme by judicial decision.62 Under it a worker may recover fully from any insurance carrier
who has assumed the risk at anytime during the long period of incubation of the disease, and the carrier may recover contributions from other
carriers who insured the worker at some time during the several employments.
The administrative difficulties of the apportionment rule in cases in
which the period of incubation may last for years or even decades, as
it may in radiation diseases, and the virtual impossibility of showing the
proper causal relationship between injuries and employments in which
exposures to radioactivity occurred years prior to the disability, may
render the apportionment system as applied today rather unsatisfactory
when the attempt is made to enforce it in radiation injury cases. But,
on the other hand, the adoption of the rule imposing liability only on
the last employer who may have employed a workman for a relatively
brief period of time may be unfair. Statutory provisions to create devices similar to those used in connection with second injury funds and
intended to cover cases of slowly maturing occupational radiation-induced diseases are deserving of consideration for they may reduce the
problems of providing adequate compensation for employees of atomic
industry.
51 E.g., Mich. Stat. Ann. §17.228; Minn. Stat. Ann. §176.66(5); N.Y. Work. Comp.
Law §44.
52 Colonial Insurance Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 29 Cal. 2d 79, 172 P.
2d 884 (1946).
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E. Disability and Loss of Earning Capacity
I.

General Principles

Workmen's compensation and occupational disease statutes are subject to a limitation which permits compensation only for those injuries
resulting in total or partial disability. Unless an injury falls within
the definition of "disability," it is not considered compensable regardless of its seriousness. This restriction springs from the very basic
policies underlying the adoption of the workmen's compensation arid
occupational disease acts.
Among the reasons for the adoption of workmen's compensation
legislation was the fact that the cost of common law litigation often defeated its purpose. In many cases it consumed a good share of the proceeds of the final recovery of the workman. The time consumed in such
litigation, moreover, made it difficult for the employee to pay his medical
bills or support his family pending the outcome. Furthermore, the application of common law defenses to an action based upon negligence of
the employer made recovery highly speculative. Confronted with the
ever increasing number of injuries due to expanding industrialization,
the legislatures concluded that the cost of support a~d medical care resulting from these injuries should be borne by the industry which created them .. Workmen's compensation and occupational disease laws were
thus intended to make industrial employers "pay their way" and to
reduce litigation ·to a minimum.
Notwithstanding these factors underlying the adoption of all workmen's compensation and occupational disease legislation, there has been
cqnfusion regarding the basis for making awards for injuries. Some
legislatures have been concerned with making awards for injuries
which left employees in an impaired physical condition. Other legislatures have been more concerned with whether the employee was subsequently able to maintain his prior earning power, regardless of the
injury he had received.fia
In a tort action for personal injury, an "injury" to the person must
be shown. Under compensation statutes a showing of "disability" is
required to support an award. "Damages" in tort law and "compensan Although death benefits comprise a substantial category of workmen's compensation claims and occupational disease claims, no discussion will be devoted to them here
because there is apparently no significant difference between death caused by atomic
energy and death caused by any other source, regardless of whether compensation is
claimed under a workmen's compensation statute or under an occupational disease
statute.
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tion" under the statutes are different concepts. Therefore the extent
to which atomic energy injuries will constitute compensable disabilities,
taking into consideration the definitions used by the legislatures and the
interpretations of the statutory wording by the courts, warrants examination. Generally speaking, a personal injury, while normally sufficient
grounds for tort liability in another setting, may not be enough to entitle the injured person to compensation.
In deciding what constitutes either a total or partial disability, it
should be recognized that there are two determinants: ( 1) actual physical disability which is determined by the reduction in ability of the
claimant to use his body after the injury, e.g., the inability to see because
of cataract or to move because of muscular damage; and ( 2) loss of
earning power which is determined by the extent to which claimant's
injury subtracts from his attractiveness in the labor pool. These factors
are corollary to the policy considerations which prompted the adoption
of the workmen's compensation and occupational disease acts.
In most instances, both physical disability and inability to earn the
same wages occur simultaneously. But this is not necessarily the case.
At one extreme, it is conceivable that a workman can be made an almost
totally handicapped person, such as a quadruple amputee, but yet, by
perseverance and ingenuity, he may be able to earn a livelihood. Common sense would suggest that a man who has lost his arms and legs
has suffered a serious decrease in his earning capacity. It would seem
that the harm he has suffered physically should entitle him to compensation on the ground tha~ his capacity to earn has been destroyed so far
as his competitive position with his. fellow workers is concerned. To
deny him compensation becaus.e he develops a new means of earning a
living would be to penalize a person who is more industrious and
imaginative than the average. On the other hand, it is likely that a
worker who· has suffered an injury which only slightly impairs his
physical activity may not be able to find employment, and therefore has
suffered a severe diminution of his wage-earning capacity. This latter
situation may very well be the case when occupational disease is involved, especially is this likely to be true in radiation overexposure cases.
Since such radiation exposures have a cumulative effect, another atomic
energy employer may refuse to hire a man who has been previously
overexposed, for only a little additional exposure, even though small in
amount, may produce disability. The last employer may have to bear
the compensation payments because, as was noted in the preceding section, under most of the occupational disease laws the last employer is
responsible for the entire compensation.
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For classification purposes a four-fold subdivision of compensable
disabilities has been established. These are temporary total, temporary
partial, permanent total, and permanent partial. disability. Ordinarily,
there is little controversy regarding the loss of earning power under the
categories of temporary partial or temporary total disability. The
actual wage loss of the disabled employee can be determined directly
from the amount of time and wages the employee has lost. Permanent
partial and permanent total disabilities raise more complex questions in
both accidental injury and occupational disease areas. In these instances,
it becomes necesary to determine the employee's earning capacity after
the condition created by the injury has stabilized.
The first problem in dealing with atomic energy injuries is to determine how they will be classified as disabilities. Then, it must be
determined whether the disability is to be measured under the statutes
on the basis of physical condition or loss of earning power, or both, in
order to appraise the suitability of the solutions in respect to radiation
injuries.
2.

Application of General Principles to Atomic Injuries
a. Temporary Disabilities and Atomic Injuries from Accidents

Typical of the atomic energy injuries, which seem most likely to fall
into the category of temporary disabilities, either partial or total, are
the aftereffects, other than death, of a large single accidental overexposure to radiation. Radiation illness, due to a large overexposure to
radiation, goes through four phases within a period of months, after
which the immediately apparent effects either disappear or are latent.
During this period, the employee may be totally incapacitated. In determining the amount of compensation for temporary disabilities, the
problem becomes one of ascertaining the extent of the "disability" ( unless this particular injury has a prescribed compensation listed in a
statutory schedule). 64 "Disability" as used in a particular statute might
mean either or both of the factors hitherto named, i.e., physical incapacity or loss of earning capacity. However, in the temporary disability situation, the emphasis will be on loss of current wages. No
forecast as to the employee's loss of earning capacity in the future is
64 Typically, workmen's compensation statutes provide a specified weekly benefit for
temporary disabilities requiring loss of earnings and prescribe a maximum total compensation. For example, see N.Y. Workmen's Comp. Law §Is. It would be possible
to prescribe a fixed number of weekly benefits for a specific injury, however.
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necessary as would be true in the case of a permanent disability. In the
case of acute overexposure to radiation, the effects are likely to be severe
enough to warrant the assumption that the claimant will not be able to
earn anything for the period of the disability. If the particular injury
does not cause any loss of wages, compensation probably will not be
awarded because of the emphasis in temporary disability cases on actual
wage loss.
b. Permanent Disabilities and Atomic Injuries from Accidents
The atomic energy injuries which seem more likely to fall into the
categories of permanent partial or total disabilities are those of sterility,
genetic damage, leukemia, leukopenia, cancer, and shortened life span.
The "distinctive radiation injuries," such as sterility, genetic damage,
or shortened life span, may not fall within what is generally considered
a "disability," although the damage is permanep.t. This results from
the fact that these injuries may not result in wage loss or physical deterioration which affects the overall earning capacity. If the particular
requirements of the statute as to a loss of earning capacity are not met,
then regardless of whether the statute otherwise includes such an injury
within its scope, no recovery will be allowed.
In respect to those radiation injuries, such as cancer, which may be
classified as permanent partial disabilities, most states determine benefits
on the basis of decreased earning capacity, disregarding actual wage
loss. This will create some problems in relation to radiation injuries
unless they are covered by a schedule which provides a definite amount
of compensation. For example, certain seemingly permanent atomic
energy injuries, such as cancer, leukemia, leukopenia, and bone necrosis,
while definitely constituting physical impairment of the body, may not
result in decreased earning power in the immediate period after they are
contracted. That these injuries should qualify as physical disabilities
affecting earning power can be illustrated by the likelihood that if a person had cancer, even though medical treatment temporarily arrested its
development, his chances of future employment would be lessened. Since
another employer would not be likely to hire him, the cancer would cause
an actual decrease in the employee's earning potential thus warranting
compensation.
The experience in Illinois demonstrates the typical judicial construction given to statutes which determine disability in terms of loss of
earning capacity. Prior to 1955 the. Illinois statute read:

If, after the accidental injury ha:s b~en sustained, the employee
as a result thereof becomes partially incapacitated from pursu-

820

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
ing his usual and customary line of employment, he shall,
except in cases covered by the specific schedule set forth in
paragraph (e) of this section, receive· compensation . . .
equal to fifty per centum of the difference between the average
amount which he earned before the accident and the average
amount which he is earning or is able to earn in some suitable
employment or business after the accident. 56

The purpose of the statute was stated in Ridge Coal Mining Co. v.
Industrial Com mission:
The purpose of the act is to as nearly as possible give the injured employee fifty per cent of the difference between what
his earnings would have been had he not been injured and
what he is earning or is able to earn subsequent to the injury. 5 6
In that case an employer sought to terminate compensation payments
on the theory that the employee subsequently was earning higher wages.
The employer did not introduce any evidence of the employee's physical
condition. The court held that:
Since the plaintiff in error has contented itself with presenting
testimony only concerning the wages of the defendant in error,
and has offered no other evidence concerning the condition of
the defendant in error, its evidence is not sufficient to justify a
holding that the disability of ·the defendant in error has
ended. 67
Thus the court interpreted the statute to mean that the employee's physi~
cal condition must be ascertained, regardless of his earnings, before an
award will be terminated.
In a decision rendered by the same court the following year upon a
petition to reduce an award on the ground that in a new position the
employee had been able to work more days and thus earn more money
than he would have earned had he continued in his former occupation,
the court said : "Compensation is not based on physical or mental disability, except as it affects earning capacity, nor on opportunity to work,
but is based on previous earnings and earning capacity and is measured
by the loss of such earning capacity due to the accident." 58 In a very
recent case, however, involving an attempt by an employee to base his
u Ill. Rev. Stat. c. 48, h45(d) (1949). The statute now provides for compensation
equal to a minimum of 65% of the wage difference. Ill. Rev. Stat. c. 48, h38.8(d)
(1955).
56 314 Ill. 509, 512, 145 N.E. 643 (1924).
51 ld. at 517.
sa Consolidated Coal Co. of St. Louis v. Industrial Commission et al., 314 Ill. 526,
528, 145 N.E. 675 (1924).
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claim for compensation upon the fact that his wages were now less than
formerly, if overtime pay were excluded, the same court stated: "The
object of this provision is to compensate the injured employee for his
reduced earning capacity and, if any injury does not reduce his earning
capacity, he is not entitled to compensation." 59 From these cases, it can
readily be seen that the earning capacity test cannot be easily applied in
instances where there was no actual wage loss although some physical
impairment could be demonstrated. For "distinctive radiation injuries,"
such as shortened life span and sterility, providing compens~tion under
the loss of earning capacity test will be even more difficult unless statutes
are amended to cover such cases in schedules or otherwise.
Wisconsin has a provision in its statute which may have the effect of
permitting coverage of most atomic energy injuries. The Wisconsin
statute establishes a schedule of specific disabilities and relative disabilities and makes allowance for disfigurement. ~t also states:
For permanent partial disability not covered by the provisions
of sections 102.52 to 102.56 [schedule, application of schedule,
and disfigurement] the aggregate number of weeks of indemnity shall bear ,such relation to the number of weeks of
indemnity set out . . . as the nature of the injury bears to
one causing permanent total disability and shall be payable at
the rate of 70 per cent of the average weekly earnings. . . .80
By this language, an injury is made compensable on the basis of how
much the injury tends to impair, percentage-wise, bodily function. Interpreting this language, the court has stated that the legislature intended to put this kind of permanent partial incapacity on the same
plane with scheduled injuries. The effect of this is to make an injury
compensable much in the same manner as is true in the case of the
regular scheduled injuries. In a recent case the court" stated:
The general scheme of the statutes following the development
of schedule and relative injuries, all of which constituted a
permanent partial disability, indicates that the legislature
was concerned with bringing nonschedule and nonrelative disabilities into conformity with schedule and relative disabilities.
. . . Such a construction leaves no disparity between schedule
and relative injuries on the one hand, and nonschedule injuries
causing permanent partial disability on the other. This also
conforms to the practical necessities. During the healing
period it is possible to establish a wage loss because that is a
· past event. But since an award for permanent disability is to
69
80

Sroka v. Industrial Commission et at., 412 Ill. 126, 128, 105 N.E. zd 716 (1952).
Wis. Stat. Ann. hoz.44(3) (1957).
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be made for all time at the end of this period it must be based
upon some sort of prediction as to impairment of earning
capacity. It appears to us that the legislature has specifically
chosen in the case of nonschedule permanent partial disabilities
the method of comparing the severity of the injuries causing
such a disability with those causing permanent total disability.el

The case involved a salesman who had injured a vertebral disc while
lifting a refrigerator during a demonstration for a prospective customer. Following an operation to alleviate his condition, he again resumed his occupation as a salesman at higher wages than before the
injury. In this situation, the employee continued in the same work as
prior to the injury, and he earned more money, yet he was classified
as permanently partially disabled to the extent of twelve and a half
per cent, due to the loss of some motion in the spine. It would seem
that the award was really made because of the physical disability with
its resulting effect on the COJ11petitive earning capacity of the employee.
Since the court construed the statute to mean that the legislature intended to put nonschedule injuries on the same plane with schedule
injuries, it appears that the award was made without reference to
whether any diminished earning capacity is foreseeable. This treatment would permit compensation for atomic energy injuries because
the commission could simply consider the particular injury the emplqyee had suffered and could decide that it amounted to some percentage of· total disability. The employee would then be compensated
on this basis without having to overcome the obstacle of showing his
earning capacity had been specifically decreased. The effect is similar
to that of listing atomic energy injuries in the schedule. Even this type
of statutory provision, however, may be difficult to apply in respect to
such injurie~ as shortened life span and sterility. Moreover, as applied
to atomic energy injuries, insurance companies may have difficulty in
preparing contracts that are actuarily sound.
Generally, the post injury earnings used as the basis for computing
decreased earning capacity are those the injured employee is able to
earn in "any" kind of employment. However, a few states use earning
capacity "in the same employment" as the basis for computing the difference between prior and subsequent earnings. The advantages of
the latter approach to an employee are apparent. It would be quite
possible for a highly skilled craftsman to receive injuries that compel
61

Northern States Power Co. v. Industrial Commission, 252 Wis. 70, 75-76, 30 N.W.

2d 217 (1947).
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him to discontinue his particular craft. However, if he is able to obtain
employment as a common laborer, he might be able to earn some wages
for the period which elapses before he has to file his claim. If wages
earned in "any" employment were the criterion, the commission would
be obliged to use his potential earning capacity as a common laborer
in determining the disability award. In respect to atomic energy workers, the advantage of special training might be lost if an overexposure
is suffered which prevents continuing in the same job. The loss of the
value of this special training might go uncompensated if the employee
were able to earn equivalent wages under a statute which used "any
employment" as a basis of comparing a loss in earning capacity.
Michigan defines disability by reference to the same employment.
The statute states :
The word "disability" means the state of being disabled from
earning full wages at the work in which the employee was
last subject to the conditions resulting in disability. . . .62
In a case which arose under this statute an employee who had been
employed as a motor tester suffered an arm injury which rendered his
arm useless. Subsequent to his injury, he was employed as a motor
inspector at a slightly higher rate of pay. The court held that though
the occupations of the employee prior and subsequent to his injury
were closely related, they were not identical and the statute explicitly
provides that ability to work at the same employment is the statutory
test. The court stated :
Again, we must hold that this raises an equitable question
barred from consideration as the law now stands, and we
cannot hold that it was error for the board to award him compensation on the ground that from the time of the accident
he was wholly incapacitated from earning any wages in the
employment in which he was engaged at the time of the accident.68
Therefore, under Michigan law, an employee suffering an atomic energy injury preventing continuation in the same work would qualify
as disabled.
While the preceding discussion concerning the Michigan treatment
of compensability is limited to a consideration of whether the injury
is within the statutory definition of a compensable disability in the first
62 Mich. Stat. Ann. §I7.22o(a) (1950).
63

Geis v. Packard Motor .Car Co., 214 Mich. 646, 651, 183 N.W. 916 (1921).
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instance, subsequent earnings of the employee are taken into consideration under that part of the Michigan statute which provides:
The weekly loss of wages referred to in this act shall consist
of such percentage of the average weekly earnings of the
injured employee computed according to the provisions of
this section as shall fairly represent the proportionate extent
of the impairment of his earning capacity in the employment
in which he was working at the time of the injury, the same
to be fixed as of tbe time of the injury, but to be determined
ih view of the nature and extent of the injury: Provided,
The compensation payable, when added to his wage earning
capacity after the injury in the same or other employment,
shall not exceed his average weekly earnings at the time of
such in)ury. 64
.
Interpreting this proviso, the Michigan court in Markey v. S. S. Peter
and Paul's Parish 65 held that where the employee was regularly earning more money in a new and permanent employment subsequent to
the injury, the proviso became operative, and the employer was entitled
to an award stopping compensation.
At first glance it would· seem that under this type of legislation if
the employee subsequently earns equivalent or better wages, he will be
denied compensation. However, in Michigan, once the employee is
classified as ·having a compensable disability because he can no longer
earn full wages at his old employment, he becomes entitled to compensation. From this point on, in order to stop payments, it· is necessary
for the employer to show that the employee is again holding a job
which yields equal or higher wages. If such employment should cease,
the employee .does not have to show any actual change of physical
condition to have the compensation restored. The policy underlying
this approach is to encourage rehabilitation of the injured employee.
This system would seem highly suitable to meet the needs of employers
and employees in private atomic industry where, undeniably, injuries
. may have a marked impact on one's earning capacity in the indefinite
future though no serious diminution of earning ability may result in
the immediate or intermediate future, and, yet, on the employer's side,
it may be considered fair not to burden an enterprise on account of
damages which have not yet materialized. Of course, an extension of
the limitations period for recovery may be necessitated to render these
remedies meaningfulwhen applied to radiation injuries.
64
65

Mich. Stat. Ann. h7.161 (1950).
281 Mich. 292, 274 N.W. 797 (1937).
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Another provision in many of the statutes which may provide compensation for some of the atomic energy injuries is that which deals
wit}]. "disfigurement." Under these provisions, compensation is usually allowed, with a maximum limit, in case of any disfigurement to
the face, head, neck, or hands, when such disfigurement interferes with
the employee's future earning capacity. Such a provision may be used
to cover such disfigurements as resulted from the accident which occurred during the Eniwetok experiments. In that case some of the
personnel employed during the experiment picked up some "hot" equipment, seriously exposing their hands to radiation. The hands were
scarred. If a statute provided compensation for disfigurement to the
hands, then such an item would be compensable if it interfered with the
individual's earning capacity. Another item which might be included
within the term "disfigurement," is that of epilation, or loss of hair.
This would depend upon whether the loss of hair is permanent and
whether or not it could come within the definition of disfigurement.
Where a loss of hair could be shown to result in decreased earning
capacity, it might be compensable. Generally, the statutes do not define
disfigurement, but instead leave it to the discretion of the commission
in each case. The only general limitation is that the disfigurement must
be such that it may affect the future earning capacity of the employee
or influence a subsequent employer in deciding whether or not to hire
the claimant.
c. Occupational Diseases and Atomic Injuries
The question as to the meaning of "disability" also arises in connection with radiation injuries that may be classified as occupational
diseases, and problems similar to those discussed in connection with
accidental radiation injuries are encountered. Generally speaking, in
occupational disease legislation the emphasis is also placed upon diminished earning capacity.
In Michigan, disability is defined in terms of being unable to earn
full wages in the same occupation, but the compensation therefore is
measured by loss of earning capacity. The statute reads :
The word "disability" means the state of being disabled from
earning full wages at the work in which the employee was
last subjected to the conditions resulting in disability. . . .66
If an employee is disabled or dies and his disability or death
is caused by a disease and the disease is due to the nature of
66

Mich. Stat. Ann. §17.220(a) (1950).
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the employment in which such employee was engaged and was
contracted therein, he . . . shall be entitled to compensation
. . . for his disablement . . . all as provided in part 2 of this
act, except as hereinafter stated in this part: Provided, however, That if it shall be determined that such employee is able
to earn wages in another occupation, which shall be neither
unhealthful nor injurious and such wages do not equal his
full wages prior to the date of his disablement, the compensation payable shall be a percentage of full compensation proportionate to the reduction in his earning capacity. 67
Thus, when the employee is unable to earn fulJ wages at the work
in which he was last subjected to the hazards of the disease, he will be
considered disabled. However, the compensation he receives will depend directly upon the loss of earning capacity he has suffered.
Under the Wisconsin statute, compensation for occupational diseases is handled the same as for injuries by accident. "Injury" is defined as mental or physical harm to an employee caused by accident or
disease. 68 Therefore, the compensation provisions which are applicable
in the case of disability resulting from an injury by accident would
also apply to the case of an occupational disease. The Wisconsin approach, as discussed in the preceding section dealing with injury by
accident, is that of basing disability payments upon the percentage of
the actual incapacity as related to permanent total disability. The
employee is not disqualified from compensation simply because it can
be shown that at the time of filing the claim he is able to earn more
money than he did at the time of the injury.
In the occupational disease area, some states limit compensability to
those occupational diseases as a result of which the individual is totally
incapacitated, as distinguished from partial incapacity. A reason for
so distinguishing between partial and total incapacity probably lies in
the fear that, if partial incapacity were also made compensable, the
employer would be subjected to many claims for compensation based
upon minor difficulties. For example, the Idaho statute provides :
Except as hereinafter otherwise provided in this chapter,
"disablement" means the event of an employee's becoming
actually and totally incapacitated, because of an occupational
disease, from performing his work in the last occupation in
which injuriously exposed to the hazards of such disease; and
"disability" means the state of being so incapacitated. 69
67
68
69

Mich. Stat. Ann. §17.222 (1950).
Wis. Stat. Ann. h02.0I(Z) (1957).
Idaho Code §72-1205 (1949).
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Thus in Idaho the employee who is only partially disabled from an occupational disease would not be able to recover compensation for his
disability.
3· Summary
Under both the InJUry by accident and the occupational disease
statutory provisions, there is a requirement that for the injury or disease to be compensable, there must be a "disability." The general approach taken is that a showing of decreased earning capacity satisfies
the requirement of a disability. Most of the states also employ schedules which set out specific injuries and the amount of compensation
which will be awarded for them. Under the schedule system, it is usually immaterial whether or not any decrease in the earning capacity
can be shown. Thus if an item appears on the schedule, it may be compensable whereas otherwise it is not. It should be noted, however,
that most of the injuries caused by radiation do not fall within the
present coverage of the schedules unless amputation may be involved.
In the occupational disease area emphasis is placed upon whether or
not the disease only partially disables the employee. Some states require that the employee be totally disabled from performing his last
occupation for his disability to be compensable. The extent to which
the atomic energy injuries will be prejudiced by statutory language
requiring a disability will depend upon the extent that the atomic
energy injuries result in disabilities not affecting earnings, or not wholly
incapacitating the employee. As of this time, not enough is known of
_the atomic energy injuries to be able to say positively just what their
effect will be. From general considerations of the nature of these
injuries, and from the extensive use of monitoring systems, it would
seem that many cases of overexposure may be caught in the early stages
and result in a job shift of one kind or another. Also some of the
atomic energy injuries, such as sterility, will not result in any decreased
earning capacity. Therefore, it seems that the disability requirement
may exclude some of the atomic energy injuries from compensability.
III. MEDICAL BENEFITS
A. Hospitalization and Treatment Costs
In addition to financial assistance to injured workers, workmen's
compensation statutes in the United States provide for hospital and
medical care in varying d~grees. Roughly one-half of the statutes
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grant unlimited benefits as to both amount and period of time, while
the remainder limit benefits to certain maximum amounts and periods
of time.
In some states full benefits are authorized directly by statute, 70 and
in other states, although the statutes set maximum costs or periods of
time, equivalent unlimited benefits may result because the workmen's
compensation boards are given authority to extend medical aid up to
such amounts and for such times as they may consider necessary. 71
In many of the statutes prescribing medical care that is limited in
terms of time or costs, or both, the maximum rates are such that it
seems obvious that this legislation was conceived and enacted without
consideration being given to the unique needs of private atomic industry.72 Although many of these statutes were enacted years ago when
the legislatures could not have taken into account the problems likely
to arise from the utilization_ of the atom, several states have only_ recently increased their rates to levels that are still very modest notwithstanding the fact that the legislatures presumably were aware of the
forthcoming advent of private atomic industry.
When we consider the imperfect state of present day knowledge
concerning biological effects of radioactivity, and the further fact that
such knowledge as we now possess indicates that radiation injuries
and diseases frequently develop gradually and, even after resulting in
disability, may extend over long periods of time, it seems unquestion70 California, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Idaho (for occupational
diseases only for a reasonable length of time), Illinois (up to six months only in case
of silicosis or asbestosis), Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, New York, North
Dakota, Puerto Rico, Washington, Wisconsin, United States Longshoremen's Act,
and United States Civil Employees Act.
7i Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Indiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and South Carolina.
72 Alabama (maximum period 90 days; maximum amount $woo), Alaska (maximum period 4 years), Colorado (maximum period 6 months; maximum amount
$woo), Georgia (maximum period 10 weeks extendable once; maximum amount
$1125 ;-board may permit additional $375), Iowa (maximum amount $1500; commission may permit additional services up to $1000), Kansas (maximum period 120 days;
in case of occupational disease commission may authorize additional 90 days; maximum amount $2500), Kentucky (maximum amount $2500), Louisiana (maximum
amount $2500), Montana (maximum period 18 months; maximum amount $2500 which
may be increased by $1000), Nevada (maximum period 6 months, may be extended additional year; maximum amount in case of silicosis $1250), South Dakota (maximum
period 20 weeks ; maximum amount $1000) ; Tennessee (maximum period 1 year;
maximum amount $1500), Texas (maximum period 18o days), Vermont (maximum
amount $2500), Virginia (maximum period 1 year), West Virginia (maximum amount
$I6oo; additional $8oo may be authorized).
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able that they may result in extraordinarily high medical and hospitalization costs to be borne by afflicted employees. The inadequacy of
the arbitrary limits on medical benefits set by many statutes seems obvious when applied to accidents and diseases caused by overexposure
or by the cumulative effects of normal exposure to radioactivity.
There is another consideration indicating that full coverage for
medical benefits would be advisable in connection with radiation injuries. If experts in atomic medicine can be obtained to assist state
boards in radiation compensation cases, and if unlimited medical aid
is extended, publicly supervised treatment of such injuries and diseases will in the course of time make available to the states a backlog
of experience which can be used to advantage in regulating atomic industry with respect to health and safety problems. This may well
result in i:'J.creased efficiency in the prevention and cure of the major
effects of overexposure to radioactivity and in .consequent savings to
private atomic industry and to society generally.

B. Rehabilitation Provisions
Statutory provisions for the rehabilitation of disabled workmen are
relative newcomers to American workmen's compensation statutes.
Already more than twenty states as well as the federal compensation
acts provide varying degrees of assistance to injured employees for
training purposes aimed at returning them to useful lives in the same
or other employments which they can fill despite their disabilities. Artificial limbs and other appliances are included within the medical benefits available under practically all compensation statutes.
Many argue that this feature of workmen's compensation acts results in eventual savings to employers and insurance carriers who can
thereby avoid the expense of supporting permanently and totally disabled workers. In addition, under the Vocational Rehabilitation Act, as
amended in 1943,73 a cost-free state-federal program of vocational
rehabilitation is open to patients unable to pay.
The states are becoming increasingly aware of the advantages of rehabilitation provisions and many already provide allowances for
maintenance and travel while in training. One of the greater obstacles
to the full development of this legislative device to offer more meaningful compensation to men handicapped by industrial injuries is the
continued presence on the statute books of provisions limiting medical
78

57 Stat. 374.
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benefits to certain plainly inadequate maximum amounts and periods
of time.
Viewing the workability of present legislation on rehabilitation as
it concerns private atomic industry, it seems indisputable that the more
complete programs currently available will be highly useful. It is entirely possible that the sum total of irradiation of certain workmen in
atomic industry may, as the result of repeated accidents or accumulation of low level exposure, render them unfit to pursue further work
in exposed areas, for additional exposure might tip the scales so as to
precipitate serious disabilities. And yet these men may still be physically
and mentally healthy enough to fill positions not involving exposure
to radioactivity. When we consider that technicians and even rank and
file personnel in atomic industry must at present and in the foreseeable
future be possessed of skills which are acquired only through long
periods of training and application, it is readily understood that the
sudden destruction of their professional capabilities stemming from
the necessity of relinquishing their old pursuits may entail severe displacements in their economic life. Adequate provisions for the rehabilitation of such highly qualified personnel may well be deemed a
method of effectuating more fully the underlying policies of workmen's compensation legislation.
IV. LIMITATIONS PERIODS ON NOTICE OF INJURY AND
FILING OF CLAIMS
A. General Principles in Relation to Radiation Injuries

Among the restrictions, which may add difficulty to the compensability of injuries or diseases caused by the unique qualities of atomic
energy, are the requirements of giving notice to the employer and filing
of a claim for compensation within a specific time limit. Generally, depending on statutory variations, the injured or diseased employee must
give his employer notice of such injury or disease within a specified
short period of time, or as soon as practicable. Also, the injured employee must file his claim for compensation within a definite fixed
period ranging between three or six months and two years.
The objective of requiring notice to the employer is to enable him to
protect himself both by seeing that the injured employee gets adequate
medical treatment, so as to minimize damages, and by determining the
cause of the injury. This latter point serves the dual purpose of providing the employer a better opportunity to defend himself and of giv-
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ing him knowledge of any dangerous condition within the plant which
might be corrected before other employees are injured. For example, an
unduly delayed notice of an alleged occupational disease might prevent
the employer from making a reliable investigation. This would prejudice the employer, for he would be unable to gather the facts with
which to defend the claim.
Time limitations upon giving notice and filing claims may prove
especially troublesome because of the peculiar nature of atomic injuries.
In .an article dealing with the latent biological effects of radiation,
Dr. G. Failla of Columbia University wrote:
Radiologists in the early days, when the question of protection was not under study, got their hands particularly exposed
to large doses of radiation. They did not see much change
at first, but gradually skin changes started to appear. Warts
began to develop, and sometimes open sores started to develop.
It did not incapacitate them, but perhaps ten or fifteen years
later cancer developed in those regions which had shown a
considerable change in the appearance of the skin. Thus, you
see the latent period can be even twenty-five years. As a
matter of fact, there is a case on record in which cancer developed forty years after treatment. This patient was treated
in the early days for an abdominal tumor. It probably was not
a tumor because she lived forty years after the treatment.
In those days X-rays were not very penetrating and the treatment could not possibly have cured the tumor.
It is the latent period which makes the problem of protection extremely complicated, because the worst effects may not
appear until twenty-five or thirty years later. To predict the
dose today that would produce effects, or rather would not
produce effects, twenty-five years later is quite a problem. It
would be hopeless if we did not have the experience of many
radiologists who have been overexposed to radiation. We
have been able to watch them for long periods of time and see
what has happened to them, and thus we may arrive at our
permissible limits.
Cataracts are another result of overexposure. They do
occur from exposure to X-rays, and it also seems that neutrons
produce cataracts more readily than X -rays. As you probably
read in the papers, individuals who have worked with cyclotrons and had considerable local exposure to neutrons have
developed cataracts of various degrees. Some are rather badly
affected and some rather slightly. It takes, roughly, three
years following the exposure for cataracts to appear. The
latent period can be shortened if the dose is very large, but
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the height of the reaction really occurs at about the same
time. 14

In the atomic energy field, for such latent radiation injuries as cancer,
leukemia, leukopenia, anemia, cataracts, genetic damage, or sterility,
compensability may be barred, depending upon the nature of the applicable statute of limitations. Consideration must therefore be given
the various types of limitations expressed in the statutes regarding
notice and filing of claim.
B. Notice and Claims for Accidental Injuries
The problem arising under statutes granting compensation for accidental injuries is two-fold. Some states commence the running of
the period from the time of the "accident" which caused the disabling
condition. Other states date the claim period from the time of the
"injury."
Under the former type of.statute, notice must be given to the employer within so many days after the "accident," namely the harmful
exposure in the case of radiation injuries, and the claim must be filed .
with the commission within a number of months or two years at the
most after the same date. Under the "injury" type of statute the courts
are almost unanimous in holding that notice and claim periods begin
to run from the time a compensable injury becomes apparent. 75
An example of the "accident" type of statute is the Kentucky one
which reads :
No proceeding under this chapter for compensation for an
injury or death shall be maintained unless a notice of the accident shall have been given to the employer as soon as practicable after the happening thereof and unless a claim for
compensation with respect to such injury shall have been made
within one year after the date of the accident, or, in case of
1• Failla, "Biological Effects of Radiation," AEC, TID-388, March 12, 1951, pp.
65-66.
7D Compare the following:
Under "injury" type statutes: Acme Body Works v.
Industrial Commission, 204 Wis. 493, 234 N.W. 756 (1931) (cataract developed 6
years after accident compensable), English v. Industrial Commission, 73 Ariz. 86,
237 P. 2d 815 (1951) (injury from inhalation of gas fumes 5 years after leaving
employment; claimant entitled to a hearing). Under "accident" type legislation:
Lewis v. Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp., 159 Pa. Super. 226, 48 A. 2d 120 (1946)
(cataract developed 5 years after accident; claim barred),· Whitted v. Palmer-Bee
Co., 228 N.C. 447, 46 S.E. 2d 109 (1948) (cataract developed 18 months after steel
chip hit claimant's eye; claim barred), Central Locomotive & Car Works v. Ind.
Comm., 2go Ill. 436, 125 N.E. 369 (1919) (blindness 3 years after accident; claim
barred).
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death, within one year after such death, whether or not a
claim has been made by the employee himself for compensation.76
Any recovery for latent accidental injuries caused by nuclear radiation may well be barred under such a statute. Or at most, in the
absence of square precedents on the point, it may be an open question
whether the later development of an injury due to exposure to radioactivity can be compensated in cases in which a workman .was never
aware of any harmful effect until he became disabled. This happens
to be the present state of authority in Kentucky where it is clear that
if a worker has suffered a minor compensable accident he is absolutely
barred later from recovery for the worsening of his condition after the
running of the period of limitations. Thus, in Fiorella v. Clark 17 the
claimant k:lew immediately after a fall of about five feet from a grease
rack that he had suffered minor compensable injl,tries and received payment from his employer in _compromise of his claim. More than one
year later it became apparentthat the worker had suffered severe spinal
injuries. The statute was held to bar this claim, the court saying:
"The word 'accident' as used in our Statute does i10t mean the resulting
injury, but means the occurrence itself, the happening of which causes
the injury." 78 In the more recent case of Goode v. Fleischmann Distilling Corp., 79 the court, in reaching a result similar to that of the Fiorella
case, expressly left open the question whether, in the case of a latent
injury of a kind which was never preceded by a harmful event noticed
by the claimant, the statutory period would be tolled until it became
reasonably apparent that a compensable injury had been sustained.
The policy argument concerning the choice of the date of the accident as the time from which the period should begin to run, rather than
the time when the employee should become aware or actually becomes
aware of the fact that he has an industrial injury, probably lies in the
fact that the risk of permitting questionable claims to be compensated
would be much greater under the latter situation. In the case of latent
injuries, intervening factors beyond the employer's knowledge might
Ky. Rev. Stat. §,342.185 (1956).
Ky. 817, 184 s.w. 2d 208 (1944).
78 ld. at 824 See also Rutledge v. Sandlin, 181 Kan. 369, 310 P. 2d 950 (1957),
where workman suffered a severe blow which several months later required surgical
removal of a malignant tumor. In denying compensation, the court held that the statutory period started running with the day of the blow rather than with the day of the
discovery of the injury.
.
79 275 S.W. 2d 903 (Ky. 1955) ·
7&

77 2g8
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subsequently cause the injury. Further, with the passage of time it becomes increasingly difficult for the employer to defend.
In other "injury by accident" states, the period for giving notice
and filing claim commences as of the time of the injury. Thus, where
an injury is latent, compensability is not barred because the injury develops some time later. 80 The Mississippi statute, which starts the
period from the date of the injury, reads as follows:
No claim for compensation shall be maintained unless, within
thirty days after the occurrence of the injury actual notice
was received by the employer or by an officer, manager or
designated representative of an employer.... Regardless of
whether notice was received, if no payment of compensation
(other than medical treatment or burial expense) is made,
and no application for benefits is filed with the commission
within two years from the date of the injury or death, the
right to compensation therefor shall be barred. 81
Since the emphasis here is not upon the date of the accident but upon
the occurrence of the injury, latent atomic energy injuries should not
be denied compensability.
There is a further problem created where the employee does not
realize the occupational connection of his injury within the statutory
period following the manifestation of the injury. Does the period
commence running as of the time the employee knows that his injury
has an occupational connection, or when as a reasonable man he should
have known of the occupational connection? For example, the statute
of Missouri reads:
No proceedings for compensation under this chapter shall be
maintained unless a claim therefor be filed with the commission within one year after the injury or death, or in case payments have been made on account of the injury or death,
within one year from the date of the last payment. 82
The court, in interpreting this statute, which then had a six months
limitation, said: "It seems to be a well-settled rule in respect to latent
injuries that the six months' limitation for filing claims for compensation commences to run from the time it becomes reasonably apparent,
and discoverable, that the employee has sustained a compensable in8o This, of course, is subject to some other limitations within the statutes. For
example, the claim must be filed within 5 years after leaving the employment.
81 Miss. Code Ann. §6998-18 (1952).
.
82 Mo. Rev. Stat. §287430 (1949).
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jury." 83 Under this interpretation of the "injury" type of statute, the
period begins to run from the date the employee reasonably should
know of his injury. This is important in the radiation injury field
since the cause of some injuries may be difficult to determine.
Some states have attempted by statute to meet the problem of latent
injuries. In Louisiana compensation claims generally must be filed
within one year after the "accident"; however, in the case of latent
injuries that statute is extended to two years. The Louisiana statute
reads:
In case of personal injury . . . all claims for payments shall
be forever barred unless within one year after the accident or
death the parties have agreed upon the payments to be made
under this chapter or unless within one year after the accident
proceedings have been begun as provided in Parts III and IV
of this Chapter. Where such payments have been made in any
case, the limitation shall not take effect until the expiration of
one year from the time of making the last payment. Also,
where the injury does not result at the time of, or develop
immediately after the accident, the limitation shall not take
effect until the expiration of one year from the time theinjury
develops, but in all such cases the claim for payment shall be
forever barred unless the proceedings have been begun within
two years from the date of the accident. ~
8

The Louisiana court, in applying the above statute, has held that a
suit for a latent injury is maintainable only if it is commenced within
one year from the time the injury manifests itself, and within two
years of the date of the accident. 85 The limitation to two years, of
course, would be inadequate for some radiation injuries, but the statutory approach might be employed for a further relaxation of the notice
requirements in respect to latent radiation injuries.
Massachusetts has a provision for ameliorating the harsh effects of
the running of the period for the giving of notice and the filing of claim.
The law reads in part:
Failure to make a claim within the time fixed by Section 41
shall not bar proceedings under this chapter, if it is found that
it was occasioned by the mistake or other reasonable cause, or
if it is found that the insurer was not prejudiced by the
delay. . . . 88
83

Oeveland v. Laclede Christy Clay Products Company, (Mo. App.) 129 S.W. 2d

12, 16 (1939).
u La. Rev. Stat. tit. 23, §1209 (1950).
85 Hannafin v. Pelican Cracker Factory, Inc., (La. App.) 185 So. 479 (1939).
ss Mass. Laws Ann. c. 152, §49 (1957).
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The effect of this provision is to allow an even more liberal period of
time in which to file a claim, if the statutory excuses can be shown.
The statutory excuses give the court a wide area of discretion and, in
one case, were the basis for holding that seven years' delay in filing a
claim was not prejudicial as a matter of law. 87 It has also been held
that delay in filing a claim until the employee learned from his doctor
that his injury was probably caused by his work was for reasonable
88 On the other hand, the court has held that where delay is due
cause~
to mistake, the claim must be filed within a reasonable time after the
mistake is discovered. The court said that since the statute is silent, a
reasonable time will be assumed, and all circumstances should be considered.89
New · York has recently amended its statute creating a two year
statutory limitation period to exclude expressly certain types of atomic
energy industry injuries from the scope of the limitation. The New
York statute reads as follows:
The right to claim compensation under this chapter shall be
barred, except as hereinafter provided, unless within two years
after the accident . . . a claim of compensation shall be filed
.... The right of an employee to claim co~pensation under
this chapter for disablement caused by . . . blood or lung
changes or malignancies due to occupational exposure to or
contact with . . . beryllium, zirconium, cadmium, chrome,
lead or fluorine or to exposure to x-rays, radium, ionizing
radiation or radioactive substances, shall not be barred by the
failure of the employee to file a claim within such period of
two years, provided such claim shall be filed after such period
of two years and within ninety days after disablement and ·
after knowledge that the disease is or was due to the nature
of the employment. . . .90
This New York legislation obviously anticipates the problem of potential injuries and warrants consideration: by other states. However,
it is unfortunate that the exception is phrased in terms only of "blood
or lung changes or malignancies" since these may be restrictively interpreted so that the exception may not apply to some atomic energy
injuries such as sterility, damage to bone marrow,. or cataract.
87 The court would not overrule the finding of the commission that the employer was
not prejudiced by the long delay in Morris Gaffer's Case, 279 Mass. 566, 181 N.E. 763
(1932).
BBWheaton's Case, 310 Mass. 504, 38 N.E. 2d 617 (1942).
89 In re Carroll, 225 Mass. 203, 114 N.E. 285 ( 1916).
90 N.Y. Workmen's Comp. Law §28, as amended by N.Y. Laws 1957, c. 411.
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C. Notice and Claims for Occupational Diseases
Since occupational diseases are the result of chronic exposure to
hazards over a long period of time, one-anticipates more variety in the
selection of the particular event which will start the running of the
period. It is possible to choose ( 1) the time of the last exposure to
the hazardous conditions, ( 2) the time of termination of the employeremployee relationship, (3) the time of the actual disability, or (4) any
set period of years following exposure to the conditions which created
the disease.
In Arkansas, which treats occupational diseases as injuries by accident, the notice and filing of claim requirements are :
A claim for compensation for disability on account of injury
which is either an occupational disease or occupational infection shall be barred unless filed with the C()mmission within
two years from the date of the last injurious exposure to the
hazards of the disease. . . .91
This statute commences the running of the period as of the time of
the last injurious exposure., Thus, it would cover those injuries which
manifested themselves while the employee was still exposed to the
hazard, or within two years thereafter. If the employee continued to
work on the job and continued to be subject to the hazard, his latent
injury would be compensable. The statute does not cover the situation
where the employee was transferred to another department, or where
the operation creating the hazard was changed, if the incubation period
is longer ihan two years. Since radiation and ingestion of radioactive
materials can have a much longer latent period of development, the
relation of the statutory period to the last exposure is inadequate. 92
Under Utah law 93 a limitation is imposed upon "partial" disability
cases; the partial disability must result within two years following the
last day of exposure to the occupational disease to be compensable. If
the manifestation of the disease or injury simply resulted in a partial
disability two years after the last exposure to radiation or radioactive
materials, it would not be compensable.
A slightly different approach is taken by the Arizona statute which
91

Ark. Stat. §8I-IJI8(a)(2) (1957).
Some other states also have statutory language which sets the period of the
statute running, in relation to the time of the last exposure, but which cuts the period
off at different times, such as I year or 3 yeacs.
98 Utah Code Ann. §35-2-s6(c) (1953).
92
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speaks m terms of "disablement" rather than "last exposure," and
reads:
The right to compensation under this act for disability or
death from an occupational disease shall be forever barred unless written claim is filed with the commission. . . . ( 2) If
the claim is made by an employee and based upon a disease
other than silicosis or asbestosis it shall be filed within sixty
days after the employee first becomes disabled . . . .9 •
Under this statute, it would make no difference when the latent injury
or disease occurred because the period of the statute does not commence running until the employee is actually disabled. This could be
at any time after the employee had ceased to be exposed to the hazards
of radioactive materials. The language should cover all latent injuries,
including toxic or radiation ingestion injuries and injuries caused by
external exposure to radioactive materials.
However, there is the pos~ibility that the employee, even after his
disability occurs, may not discover its relationship to his employment
until the sixty day period has elapsed. This is especially true in the case
of latent. injuries caused by internal irradiation. In many cases the
injury may not appear for years after the exposure to radiation or
radioactive materials has ceased. Also, radiation-induced diseases such
as cancer or leukemia are not peculiar to persons working with radioactive materials. When the factor of time is coupled with the factor of
ignorance, the occupational link between the disease and the employment may be difficult to discover even by competent physicians.
Would the discovery of .occupational connection between the work
and the injury after the sixty day period had elapsed bar the claim?
This raises the question of whether "disablement" means not only the
actual condition of the injury, but also awareness of its cause. The
Pennsylvania court, under a similar statute which cuts off compensation unless notice is given the employer within ninety days after the
beginning of disability, has held in Roschak v. Vulcan Iron Works 95
that where an employee did not realize the industrial connection of his
disability within the time limit set by the statute, the date of disability
was the date he learned the occupational nature of his disease. In the
case, the physician did not inform the employee of the occupational
nature of his disease until seven months after he had discontinued
work, although he had been under constant medical ~are in the mean9•Ariz. Rev. Stat. §23-1224 (1956).
9 5 157 Pa. Super. 227,42 A. 2d 28o (1945).
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time. The court adopted a liberal rule of construction, stating that the
legislature could not have intended that the employee do the impossible,
i.e., file a claim when he was unaware that he had one. The court did
su~gest, as a limitation on this doctrine, that a possibility that the employee should have known of the industrial connection of the disease
would start the statute running. This construction gives the disabled
employee a reasonable opportunity to ascertain the industrial connection of his disablement before he is barred by the running of the
period.
The Ohio court by way of dictum took the opposite approach in
Raymotid v. Industrial Commission 96 applying the statute literally
without considering whether knowledge was present or not, saying,
"Just why these claimants indulged in these delays is a matter about
which this court is not informed nor permitted to concern itself." Under
a statute which required that a claim must be filed within six months
following the injury, "injury" being interpreted to include occupational
diseases, the California court said in Marsh v. Industrial Accident Commission: 97 "Rather, according to our view should the date of the injury be deemed the time when the accumulated effects culminate in a
disability traceable to the latent disease as the primary cause, and by
the exercise of reasonable care and diligence it is discoverable and
apparent that a compensable injury was sustained. . . . "
In Connecticut the statut.e does not commence to run until the employee is aware of the industrial connection of his disability:
No proceedings for compensation under the provisions of this
chapter shall be maintained unless a written notice of claim
for compensation shall be given within one year from the date
of the accident or from the first manifestation of a symptom
of the occupational disease . . . . For the purposes of this
section, "manifestation of a symptom" shall be deemed to
mean its manifestation to the employee claiming compensation, or to some other person standing in such relation to
him that the knowledge of such a person would be imputed to
him, in such manner as is or ought to be recognized by him as
symptomatic of the occupational disease for which compensation is claimed. 98
The Connecticut court has interpreted this language by stating that:
"The other implication arising out of the phrase in question is that there
96
97
98

140 Ohio St. 233, 42 N.E. 2d 992 (1942).
217 Cat. 338 at 351, 18 P. 2d 933 (1933).
Conn. Gen. Stat. §7442 (1949).
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must be a clear recognition of the symptom as being that of the occupational disease in question; however plain is the presence of the symptom itself, unless its· relation to the particular disease also clearly appears, there cannot be said to be a manifestation of a symptom of that
disease." 99
The Wisconsin statute is similar to the Connecticut statute and reads :
No claim for compensation shall be maintained unless, within
30 days after the occurrence of the injury or within 30 days
after the employee knew or ought to have known the nature
of his disability in its relation to his employment, actual notice
. was received by the employer. . . . Regardless of whether
notice was received, if no payment of compensation . . . is
made, and no application is filed with the commission within
2 years from the date of injury or death, or from the date the
employee or his dependent knew or ought to have known the
nature of the disability and its relation to the employment,
the right to compensation therefor shall be barred, except
. . . if the employer knew or should have known, within the
2-year period, that the employee had sustained the injury on
which the claim is based. 100
This. legislation has been interpreted fairly literally. In the case of
a nurse who had acquired tuberculosis by working in a hospital, but_
who knew of its connection to her employment more than two years
before filing her claim, the court _said in Reinhold v. Industrial Commission: 101 "The statute does not require absolute knowledge of this
relationship but simply that the applicant know facts indicating its'
likelihood. What she probably did not know at that time was that she
could get compensation. This is an error of law that we cannot relieve against." In Trustees, Middle River Sanitarium v. Industrial
Commission 102 where a nurse did not know she had contracted tuberculosis the court said : "What an employee thinks must be based on
something more than suspicion and conjecture in order to start the
running of the statute of limitations.. Such thought must be based
upon knowledge of, or upon reliable information regarding the nature
of his disability and its relation to his employment~"
Utah ~ommences the running of the period from the time of the
accrual of a cause of action, the statute reading:
99

Bremner et al. v. Marc Eidlitz & Son, Inc. et al., uS Conn. 666, 174 At!. 172

( 1934).

Wis. Stat. Ann. §102.12 (1957).
253 Wis. 6o6, 34 N.W. 2d 814 (1948).
1 02 224 Wis. 536, 542, 272 N.W. 483 (1937).
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The right to compensation under this act for disability or
death from an occupational disease shall be forever barred
unless written claim is filed . . . . (b) If the claim is . . .
based on a disease other than silicosis it must be filed within
6o days after the cause of action arises. . . .103
Since the statute permits the filing of the claim up to sixty days after
a "cause of action arises," it could be quite unlimited in scope of coverage for latent occupational diseases, depending upon when a cause of
action accrues in an occupational disease case. Such language could
be interpreted to mean that the period commences running as of the
time of ·the last exposure, as of the time of the disability, or as of the
time the employee is not only disabled but knows of the industrial
connection of his disablement. How the Utah court will interpret this
language in atomic energy injury cases is not known, but the present
attitude of the court is enlightening. In State Insurance Fund v. Industrial Commission 104 a welder became disabled due to the inhalation
of fumes over a period of twenty-two years, but was unaware of the
industrial connection of his disability; the court held that the period
of the statute had run against him. The welder had not filed the claim
within the sixty day limit, although the full facts or reasons therefor
did not appear. The court, in reaching its conclusion, said: ·
The cause of action arises in this kind of case when the employee suffers compensable disability under the act and could
by reasonable diligence ascertain that his disability was employment caused and by its nature compensable. . . . But if
on account of his own failure to press his case or have a complete examination made under circumstances which would
reasonably put him on notice that he was probably entitled to
compensation, he failed to discover that this disability was
compensable, then the fault is his own and he cannot re- .
cover. 108
Thus Utah tends to take care of the situation where the individual,
even though he is disabled, does not know of the industrial connection
of his disease in much the same manner as those states which use the
term "disability" and interpret it to mean the time when a disabled
employee, as a reasonable man, should know of the industrial connection.
Besides the limitations of the previously discussed language relating
1os Utah Code §35-2-4B(b) (1953).
104
10 ~

II6 Utah 279. 209 P.
I d. at 2B4-28s.

2d sss

(1949).
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to the time when the period commences to run for the giving of notice
or the filing of a claim, there are other broad. limitations, often in the
same statutes. These limitations are designed to cut off liability at
some final point, regardless of the fact that the statute may speak in
terms of the date of injury or disability as the point from which the
statute commences to run. ·
The statute of Connecticut contains such a limitation :
No proceedings for compensation under the provisions of this
chapter shall be maintained unless a written notice of claim for
compensation shall be given within one year from the date of
the accident or from the date of the first manifestation of a
symptom of the occupational disease . . . provided no claim
on account of an occupational disease shall be made by an
employee or his dependents against the employer in whose
employ the disease is claimed to have originated, except while
the employee is still in such employ, or within five years after
his leaving such employ. 106
The additional limitation that the claim has to be filed during the employment or within five years after its termination has the effect of
cutting off the period during which the claim may be filed, perhaps
even before it has begun to run. If the claim must be filed within one
year after the first manifestation of the disease and if the disease does
not even materialize within five years after the employment terminates,
then liability is cut off without regard to the period.
A distinction would probably be advisable in atomic energy industry
between employees still employed and employees who have left for
more than five years. Most of the concerns dealing with atomic energy
are. keeping records of the amount and. types of exposure to radiation
to which an employee is subjected. This is being done through the use
of film badges and various monitoring devices. Therefore, the employer may have some material available in the form of. records to use
as evidence in disputing latent injury claims by disabled employees.
This is a different situation from the case where the employer (e.g., in
a stone cutting or grinding operation) does not have any records of
the amount of dust to which any employee was exposed, and has,
therefore, to conduct the initial investigation when the claim is made.
In the atomic energy field, it would seem that since the employer should
maintain records, there would be less reason to cut off liability because
the passage of time operates.to the prejudice of the employer.
too Conn. Gen. Stat. §7442 (1949).
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The Michigan statute serves to illustrate a slight modification in
those provisions which might affect atomic energy injuries. The
Michigan statute reads :
No proceedings for compensation for an injury under this act
shall be maintained, unless a notice of the injury shall have
been given to the employer within three months after the happening thereof, and unless the claim for compensation with
respect to such injury, which claim may be either oral or in
writing, shall have been made within six months after the
occurrence of the same . . . Provided, however, That in all
cases in which the employer has been given notice of the injury, or has notice or knowledge of the same within three
months after the happening thereof, but the actual injury, disability or incapacity does not develop or make itself apparent
within six months after the happening of the injury, but does
develop and make itself apparent at some date subsequent to
six months after the happening of the same, claim for compensation may be made within three months after the actual injury, disability, or incapacity develops or makes itself apparent
to the injured employee, but no such claim shall be valid or
effectual for any purpose unless made within two years from
the date the personal injury was sustained . . . and Provided further, That in all cases in which the employer has been
given notice of. the happening of . . . said accident within
three months after the happening of the same, and fails,
neglects, or refuses to report said injury to the compensation
commission as required by the provisions of this act, the
statute of limitations shall not run against the claim of the
injured employee or his dependents, or in favor of either said
employer or his insurer, until a report of said injury shall
have been filed with the compensation commission. 107
Provision is made for an extended time in case of latent injuries,
provided that the employer has be~n given notice of the injury within
three months of the happening thereof. This statute also provides that
the statute of limitations will not run in the event that the employer
has notice or knowledge of the happening of the accident or notice of
the happening of the injury and does not report this information to the
industrial compensatiop commission. The notice requirements in respect to occupational diseases are made applicable by another section
which reads in part:
The requirements as to notice as to occupational disease and
death resulting therefrom and the requirements as to the
bringing of proceedings for compensation for disability or
101

Mich. Stat. Ann. §17.165 (1950).
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death resulting from such occupational disease shall be the
same as required in section 15 of part 2 of this act, except that
the notice shall be given to the employer ·within one hundred
and twenty days after the disablement. 108
Under the requirement of this section that notice of occupational disease be given to the employer within 120 days after disablement, the
court has held that notice must be given within such time after the
employee has knowledge or reasonable ground for knowledge of his
disability. 109 The provision of the Michigan statute which does not
allow the employer to plead the statute of limitations in regard to the
giving of notice unless he has filed a report of the injury, is somewhat
unusual. In a case involving benzol poisoning, where the employee
subsequently interviewed an official of the defendant company, and
the official had made the comment that he did not believe there was any
of the "stuff in the finishing room," the court said:
The reference to the "stuff in the finishing room" demonstrates that the official had knowledge of the fact that the
plaintiff attributed his condition to a substance in the room in
which he had worked, and, therefore, the defendant employer
cannot successfully claim in this case, . . . that, although
informed of plaintiff's condition, the employer was not told
that it arose out of and in the course of the employment. . . .
In the instant case, the employer had knowledge of the
plaintiff's contention within 73 days after the occurrence of
the disablement. It filed no report with the department and,
therefore, is estopped to plead the statute of limitations. 110
It should be noted that in accordance with an amendment made subsequently the commission promulgated a rule stating when and what
reports of injuries and accidents should be made. Thus, unless the
conditions of such injury or accident are such that a report has to be
made, the employer is not estopped. from using as a defense the statute
of limitations. 111 The pertinence of this particular provision to atomic
energy injuries lies in the fact that it will give relief from the notice
requirements of the statutes in those cases where the employer, with
notice or knowledge of the disability, fails to file a report. This might
be especially important in the cases of atomic energy injuries because
even though the employer may know of the disability, there may be
considerable confusion regarding the industrial connection of such
disability.
1os Mich. Stat. Ann. h7.229 (1950).
10 9 Finch v. Ford Motor Co., 321 Mich. 469.32 N.W. 2d 712 (1!)48).
11 0 Nicholas v. St. Johns Table Co., 302 Mich. 503, 516-17, 5 N.W. 2d 442 (1942).
· 111 Amamotto v. ]. Kozloff Fish Co., 317 Mich. 641, 27 N.W. 2d uS (1947).

AND RADIATION INJURIES

845

D. Summary
From the available evidence, atomic energy injuries often may be
of a latent nature. In workmen's compensation laws the "injury by
accident" statutes generally start the period for notice and the filing of
claims as of the date of the accident. However, some states start the
period running from the date that the injury appears. Another course
is that of making a statutory exception in the case of latent injuries.
Also, whereas some states do not start the period running until the
injury develops, others go one step further, and do not commence the
period running until the employee would also know of the industrial
connection of his injury. As for occupational diseases, some statutes
start the period running as of the date of the last injurious exposure to
the condition or hazard which caused the disease, while others commence it as of the time the disability appears. At least one statute starts
the period when a cause of action accrues. Many other limitations appear even where these requirements which concern the running of the
period are met. Some states impose an over-all limitation, such as one
year or five years, following the occurrence of the disability. Others
cut off· the clairn within so many years .after termination of employment. Of possible significance in atomic industry is the use of a provision that the employer may not use the defense of the statute of limitations if he does not file a report with the industrial commission. It
may be concluded, therefore, that th~ amount of coverage afforded
latent atomic energy injuries will depend in most cases upon the period
of time allowed, after exposure to radiation, for filing the claim or
giving notice. The application of notice and claim provisions to atomic
energy injuries can be determined fully only by experience. It already
seems evident that even on the basis of present knowledge of the nature
of these injuries, and the causal relation between them and atomic radiations, amendments. of the more restrictive statutes are desirable or
essential.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
Since atomic energy is already a significant factor in industrial operations and is destined to become even more important in our society,
it seems clear that workmen's compensation laws should be amended
to accommodate radiation injuries to the existing statutory patterns.
There seems to be no reason at this time to conclude that an entirely
separate compensation system is essential to deal adequately with the
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peculiar features of atomic energy. Therefore, we conclude that each
state should amend its laws to attain the following objectives:
I. Complete coverage of all radiation injuries sustained as a result
of an accident.
2. Complete coverage of all radiation injuries which may be classified as occupational diseases.
3· Sat-isfactory second injury fund provisions in order to assist persons who have suffered prior radiation injuries to secure additional
employment.
4· Apportionment of liability among employers where the worker
has been exposed in a number of employments and a cumulative radiation injury results. (More accurate scientific and medical data are
required before a satisfactory method of handling this objective can
be resolved. )
5· Medical benefit payments in i sufficient amount and for a sufficient period to provide essential medical care for persons suffering
·
radiation injuries.
6. Limitations period for filing notice of injury and claims sufficiently flexible to permit recovery for latent injuries and to permit
recovery when the injured person discovers the connection of his
employment to his injury.
It may be argued that these extensions of existing legislation will
unduly burden atomic energy entrepreneurs. However, it must be remembered that employees may still face serious handicaps in proving
that a particular injury was caused by radiation exposure. In fact, at
some future date it may become necessary to change the burden of
proof in respect to certain radiation injuries. Necessarily the workmen's compensation boards will have to exercise considerable discretion ·to assure that all real injuries are compensated and at the same
time deny compensation in those cases having tenuous or even imaginary bases. The boards have had considerable experience in drawing
similar lines under existing legislation, and it appears that they will
be able to administer efficiently statutory provisions designed to handle
radiation injuries. Furthermore, as experience is gained and as more
scientific information concerning radiation injuries is developed, it will
be possible to revise the governing legislation accordingly. Meanwhile, both employers and employees in atomic energy industry will find
it beneficial if the state legisiatures adopt statutes sufficiently broad to
award compensation for those sustaining injuries during the infancy
of the industry.

PART III
STATE REGULATION OF
ATOMIC ENERGY

Chapter I
INTRODUCTION

*

A prospective entrepreneur in the field of peaceful uses of atomic
energy is immediately faced with the task of investigating and evaluating existing and potential types of governmental regulation. Among
the crucial questions that must be answered are: (I) What types of
governmental regulation will be encountered in financing, constructing,
and operating atomic energy facilities? ( 2) What aspects of regulation will be unduly burdensome? ( 3) Can regulation be minimized
properly by selection of place of activity, or by selection of financial
and corporate organization techniques, or by requesting changes in
legislation and regulation? Similarly, those responsible for formulation of public policies must examine such questions as : (I) Are existing powers and regulations adequate from the standpoint of protection
of the public interest, health, and safety for application to atomic energy
activities ? ( 2) Do existing regulations unduly restrict the development of a new technology? ( 3) Should new legislative and administrative regulatory techniques be developed for the control of atomic
energy activities ?
The purpose of this study is to present a brief survey of the principal
types of state and interstate regulations likely to have application in
the development of an atomic energy industry both for the generation
of electric power and for other industrial uses. ·Although it is too
early to encounter any considerable number of statutes and regulations
dealing with the peculiar problems arising out of the use of fissionable
and radioactive materials, some explicit recognition of these issues has
already found its way into the books. Moreover, many aspects of the
development of atomic energy will be regulated extensively under
statutes originally adopted for other purposes but general enough in
nature to embrace atomic affairs. Since the earliest commercial utilization of atomic energy seems likely to be the production of electrical

* The authors wish to acknowledge the research assistance of Marvin 0. Young,
Legislative Analyst, Legislative Research Center, University of Michigan, member of
the Michigan Bar, A.B., Westminster College, ].D., Michigan, 1954; Ivor M. Richardson, Legislative Analyst, Legislative Research Center, University of Michigan,
Solicitor of the Supreme Court of New Zealand, LL.B., New Zealand, LL.M., S.J.D.,
Michigan, 1955; and Charle~ D. Olmsted, Research Assistant, Phoenix Project, University of Michigan, member of the Michigan Bar, LL.B., Michigan, 1957.
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energy, considerable emphasis will be placed upon state public utility
regulations which may affect the financing, construction, and operation of nuclear power reactors. In addition, state health and safety
regulations will be emphasized because of the hazardous aspects of the
utilization of fissionable and radioactive materials.
Federal, international, and certain types of state regulation will,
however, be .omitted from this discussion. For example, state labor
relations acts, various forms of social insurance laws, general corporation laws, and blue sky laws are not discussed, since they are applicable
to. industry generally and have no unique application to the atomic
energy field. Local zoning ordinances and building regulations are
likewise excluded, for they are too localized and varied in character,
·although, of course, they must be explored prior to embarking upon an
enterprise located in any particular locality. Furthermore, in the interests of brevity, the details of the specific legal problems arising out
of the statutes and regulations will not be discussed, the purpose of
this study being primarily to· provide a check list which atomic energy
entrepreneurs and governmental policy-makers may use as a basis for
further investigation of specific legal problems. Limited in this manner, this study will serve to reveal the scope and character of the legal
and policy problems raised by state regulatory enactments which must
be considered in formulating plans for the development of a peacetime
·atomic energy industry.
In order to reduce the breadth of the examination of state regulations.
affecting atomic energy developments, ten states. have been selected for
the study: California, Illinois, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, New
Y ark, Ohio, Pennsylvania, .Texas, and Wisconsin. Furthermore, because of the wide variatio~s found from state to state in the distribution of regulatory powers among various state and. local agencies, it
has been found preferable to analyze the effect of these powers according to type of regulation rather than type of agency.

Chapter II
PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION
The use of a nuclear reactor to generate electric power would undoubtedly subject the power plant to regulation as a public utility. All
ten of the states under study have created regulatory commissions,
commonly called public utility commissions or public service commissions, to regulate specified businesses said to be "affected with a public
interest" and known as public utilities. It should be noted at the outset,
however, that because electric companies are excepted from the jurisdiction of the Texas commission, an atomic energy electric power plant
in Texas would encounter no regulation by a state public utility commission, although it would be subject to a rate.-making power which
has been delegated to incorporated cities and towns. 1
The extent of the jurisdiction of the commissions in the nine states
other than Texas is, of course, determined by statute, subject to constitutional limitations. In considering the jurisdiction of the commissions in these nine states, the first question encountered is whether
an atomic energy power plant, engaged in generating electricity, falls
within the statutory jurisdiction of the state commissions. In the event
electricity is supplied directly to consumers, the power plant would
unquestionably be subject to regulation by the respective public utility
commissions. With the possible exception of Ohio, it also seems clear
that an atomic power plant which sells electricity at wholesale to other
electric companies would also be subject to the jurisdiction of the various state utility commissions. For example, the New York statute gives
the Public Service Commission jurisdiction over "the manufacture,
conveying, transportation, sale or distribution of . . . electricity" and
over "electric plants" and "persons or corporations owning, leasing or
operating the same." 2 The term "electric plant" includes "all real estate, fixtures and personal property operated, owned, used or to be
used for or jn connection with or to facilitate the generation, transmission, distribution, sale or furnishing of electricity. . . ." 3 It seems
clear that the language embraces an atomic power generating plant.
It would seem, moreover, that the definition is sufficiently broad to
1
2

Tex. Civ. Stat. art. 1119.
N.Y. Public Service Law §5(2).

3 /d., §2(12).
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include a separate corporation operating a nuclear reactor and engaged
in the business of selling heat energy to a generating station for conversion by the generating company into electric energy. In defining
terms such as "public utility," "electric corporation," and "electric
plant," the statutes of the other states are equally broad. 4
However, a different situation may prevail in Ohio. There, "public
utility" is defined as: "An electric light company, when engaged in
the business of supplying electricity for light, heat, or power purposes
·to consumers within this state." 3 The Ohio Supreme Court has held
that a plant supplying electric energy to other utility companies for
distribution is not a public utility within the Ohio statute, and the
statute has not been amended since this decision was rendered. 8 A corresponding provision defining a "gas company" 7 was amended in 1933
to include a person or corporation engaged in the business of supplying
artificial or natural gas to consumers or of supplying artificial gas to
gas companies or natural gas companies. 8 Thus, it is not unlikely that
the ·Ohio legislature may amend the statute in order to include an
electric company supplying electricity to other electric companies.
Nonetheless, only Ohio among the states having commissions regulating electric companies would seem to permit a general industrial firm
to avoid regulation by the device of selling power to existing utilities
rather than directly to consumers.
Assuming that the nuclear plant itself is denoted a public utility
and thereby subjected to regulation, what are the restrictions imposed
·upon one or a group of existing utilities in attempting to finance, construct, and operate a nuclear reactor for producing electricity? Moreover, what restrictions are imposed on investment by a general industrial firm in an atomic power corporation? In considering these
questions, four specific problems have particular significance : ( 1 )
regulation of the acquisition of aft atomic reactor by a corporation
organized for the specific purpose, or by an existing corporation ;
(2) restrictions affecting the purchase of voting common stock in an
atomic power corpor:ation; (3) regulation of transactions between
affiliated utility companies ; and ( 4) rate regulation.
'Cal. Public Utilities Code §§216, 217, 218; Ill. Stat. Ann. c. III 2/3, §10.3; Mich.
.Stat. Ann. §22.141; Mo. Rev. Stat. (1949) §§386.020(12), (13), (25); N.J. Rev. Stat.
(1937) §48: 2-13; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 66, §1102(17); Wis. Stat. (1957) §1g6.o1.
G Emphasis added. Ohio Rev. Code §4905.03(4).
8 The Southern Ohio Power Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, no Ohio St. 246,
143 N.E. 700 (1924).
7 Ohio Rev. Code §4905.03(5).
s See Orndoff v. Public Utilities Commission, 135 Ohio St. 438, 21 N .E.2d 334 ( 1939).

PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION

853

A. Regulation of the Ownership of an Atomic Reactor by a Corporation Organized for the Specific Purpose, or by an Existing
Corporation
The development by private capital of atomic energy for power .
production may take place under a variety of organizational forms.
An existing utility company may acquire an atomic reactor, owning
and operating it within its existing corporate structure. Or it may
be found advisable, at least during the experimental and developmental stage, to organize a separate corporation to construct and
operate the reactor. Several statutes which may be applicable, depending on the organizational pattern adopted, and which present problems
unique to the atomic energy business, must be consulted.
I.

Ownership of Nuclear Reactor by an Existing Corporation

Whether an existing public utility corporation could legally own
a nuclear reactor without altering its corporate powers depends, of
course, on the charter of the corporation involved. However, notwithstanding the uniqueness of the source of energy, it would seem that
generation of electric current, whatever the means used, and research
for improved methods of generation would be rather clearly incidental
to the business of supplying consumers with electric power; hence,
there is little likelihood that such a venture would be deemed ultra vires.
Actually, considerations other than corporate power to purchase a
nuclear reactor probably will be controlling in determining whether the
reactor should be owned by an existing public utility company or by
one created for the special purpose. These considerations include
financing, possible effect on rate determination, and damage liability
problems.
2.

Certificates of Convenience and Necessity

Obtaining a certificate of public convenience and necessity is frequently a prerequisite to the initiation of a new type of activity on
the part of a public utility. · Statutes of six of the ten states covered
in this survey specifically require that such a certificate be obtained
before an electric utility may construct a plant. Of these six statutes,
that of California is typical:
No . . . electrical corporation . . . shall begin the ·construction of a .... plant, or system, or of any extension
thereof, without having first obtained from the commission
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a certificate that the present or future public convenience and
necessity require or will require such construction. 9

Moreover, a certified copy of the corporation's charter must be filed
with the state commission, and any required municipal or county franchise must be obtained. 10 The statutes of Illinois, Michigan, Mi3souri,
and New Y ark are substantially the same. 11 The Wisconsin statute
is somewhat more elaborate and detailed than those of the above five
states. It permits the public service commission to require the utility
periodically to submit plans of proposed construction. Furthermore,
the commission is empowered to refuse a certificate if it appears that
the completion of the project
. . . (a) will substantially impair the efficiency of the service of such public utility; (b) provides. facilities unreasonably
in excess of the probable future requirements, or (c) will,
when placed in operation, add to the cost of service without
proportionately increasing the value or available quantity
thereof unless the public utility shall waive consideration by
the commission, in the fixation of rates, of such consequent
increase of cost of service. 12
Until nuclear reactors are proved to be commercially competitive, this
statute will undoubtedly have a substantial effect because of the probable high cost of constructing the early nuclear reactors. Moreover,
prospects of developing within a few years technological processes for
commercial utilization of the fusion process and improved methods of
using the fission process may lead public utility commissions to exercise cautiously their power to issue certificates of convenience and
necessity because of a possible high obsolescence factor in first commercial reactor designs. It is likely that a similar result will also be
reached in states that have adopted the California type of statute. As
will be noted later, the problem of rate determination is one that is
likely to assume considerable importance in the development of atomic
energy for power purposes.
The statutes of Pennsylvania, while not specifically requiring permission to build a plant, require, subject to minor exceptions not
relevant here, that a utility must obtain a certificate before acquiring
any kind of property from any person. 18 This seemingly would emCal. Public Utilities Code §woi.
!d., §ux)4.
nnt. Stat. Ann. c. 111 2/3, §56; Mich. Stat. Ann. §22.142; Mo. Rev. Stat. (1949)
§393.170; N.Y. Public Service Law §68.
12 Wis. Stat. (1957) §196.49(4).
1s Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 66, §1122.
9

10
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brace plant construction. 14 In addition, in Pennsylvania and also in
Missouri, the commissions are specifically given authority, in granting
certificates of convenience and necessity, to impose such conditions as
they deem reasonable and just. 15 These statutes obviously place great
power in the hands of these commissions.
New Jersey and Ohio do not require that a certificate of convenience
and necessity be obtained by a utility before it may construct a major
property addition. 16 As previously noted, Texas has no state commission with jurisdiction over electric companies.
It may be mandatory in some states to incorporate an atomic
power plant in the state in which it is to be operated in order to obtain
a certificate of convenience and necessity. An Ohio statute provides :
No franchise, permit, license, or right to own, operate,
manage, or control any public utility which is an electric light
company . . . shall be granted or transferred to any corporation not incorporated under the law of this state. 11
Substantially identical provisions are found in the laws of California,
Illinois, and Wisconsin. 18
3· Financing a Corporation to Construct a Nuclear Reactor
State statutes frequently regulate various aspects of public utility
financing .. The statutes of nine of the ten states under study require
that all proposed electric utility security issues be approved by the state
public utility commissions, subject to a few minor exceptions to be
noted later. Again, Texas is. the exception. 19 These statutes are almost certain to affect substantially the financing of early nuclear electric power plants, especially· for the reason that such developments
frequently take the form of cooperative action by several utilities or
possibly a combination of utilities and industrial corporations. Indeed,
it may appear that desired financing programs are precluded by the
applicable state regulatory statutes.
14 The state officials so reported to the Federal Power Commission; see FPC, State
Commission Jurisdiction and Regulation of Electric and Gas Utilities 24 (1948).
15 Mo. Rev. Stat. (1949) §393.170; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 66, §§1121, 1123.
16 FPC, State Commission Jurisdiction and Regulation of Electric and Gas Utilities

24 (1948).
11
18

Ohio Rev. Code §4905.62.
Cal. Public Utilities Code §704; Ill. Stat. Ann. c.

I II

2/3, §28; Wis. Stat. ( 1957)

§1¢.53.
19 FPC, State Commission.Jurisdiction and Regulation of Electric and Gas Utilities
26 (1948).
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New York and Wisconsin were the first states to create the modern
type of public utility commission with broad powers. Many states have
patterned their laws, to some extent, upon these pioneer statutes. 20
For this reason the New York utility financing statute will be examined in some detail.
The New York statute provides that an electric utility corporation
may issue stocks, bonds, notes, or other evidences of indebtedness if
it has obtained from the public utility commission an order authorizing such issue, stating the purposes to which proceeds thereof are to
be applied, and declaring that, in the opinion of the commission, the
money, property, or labor to be procured or paid for by the issue of
such stock, bonds, etc., is reasonably required. The purposes for which
such securities may be issued are enumerated : ( 1) acquisition of property, ( 2) construction, completion, extension, or improvement of plant
or distributing system, (3) improvement or maintenance of service, (4)
refunding, (S) reimbursement of moneys "actually expended from
income or from other moneys in the treasury of the corporation not
secured or obtained from the issue of stocks, bonds, notes or other
evidences of indebtedness. . . ." 21
As a matter of procedure, in New York, a public utility must obtain
a certificate of convenience and necessity authorizing construction of
a new plant before the public service commission can authorize the
issuance of securities to finance it. 22 A rather important judicial
decision holds that consent may be given for issuance of securities
only- for purposes designated in the statute. 28
The statutes of California, Illinois, Michigan, Missouri, and Ohio
contain provisions very similar to those of New York. 26 In each of
these statutes, construction of new facilities is stated to be a purpose
for which securities may be issued.
The New Jersey statute is less specific and provides merely that the
commission shall approve the proposed issue when the commission is
satisfied that the issue is in accordance with law, and the commission approves it as within authorized purposes. The executive officer of the
Board of Public Utility Commissioners in New Jersey has indicated
Trachsel, Public Utility Regulation III-112 (1947).
N.Y. Public Service Law §69.
22 People ex rel. N.Y. Edison Co. v. Willcox, 207 N.Y. 86, 100 N.E. 705 (1912).
2s P.S.C. v. N.Y. & Richmond Gas Co., 244 App. Div. 398, 279 N.Y. Supp. 824

2o

21

(1935).
2• Cal. Public Utilities Code §§816-819; Ill. Stat. Ann. c. I II 2/3, §21; Mich. Stat.
Ann. §22.101; Mo. Rev. Stat. ( 1949) §393.200; Ohio Rev. Code §4905.40.
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that, when confronted with a proposed security issue to finance an
atomic energy facility, the New Jersey commission would consider
the question as to whether or not such a plant could be expected to
produce electric energy at or below the unit costs of a conventional
plant. 25 In Pennsylvania and Wisconsin the commissions are empowered to take into account the present and probable future capital
needs of the public utility and "other relevant considerations" when
an application for approval of a security issue is presented. 26 Presumably, all of these states would consider the possibility of initial
reactors becoming obsolete at an early date because of improved tech-·
nology or because of the development of processes for commercial
exploitation of the fusion process.
The commissions of six states, California, Michigan, Missouri, New
Jersey, New York; and Ohio are authorized to require competitive
bidding on security issues, although none of them actually requires
it in all cases. 27 ·
··
In view of these statutes requiring a· commission permit to raise
funds by the issuance of securities, cooperative action may be precluded unless the corporate contribution can be drawn from surplus.
a. Exemption .of Short-Term Loans
Conceivably the request for a financing permit could be avoided
by resort to short-term loans. The New York statute permits an electric corporation to issue notes "for proper corporate purposes," payable at periods of not more than twelve months, without approval of
the commission. 28 Without further limitations, there is nothing to
prohibit a utility from renewing these notes from year to year. However, the New York commission seeks to combat this practice whenever possible, as for example by requiring as a condition for approval
of a bond issue that the company submit a plan for retirement of its
outstanding short-term notes. 29 There is some indication that the New
2s Letter from H. J. Flagg, dated Aug. 25, 1953. He a!so felt that the New Jersey
commission would not be faced with the problem for many years because of an adequate
supply of oil, coal, and natural gas providing for cheap thermo-electric generation in
New Jersey.
.
2s Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 66, §1243; Wis. Stat. (1957) §184.03.
21 FPC, State Commission Jurisdiction and Regulation of Electric and Gas Utilities
7 (1948).
28 N.Y. Public Service Law §69.
20 Re The Patchogue Electric Light Co., 73 P.U.R. (N.S.) 129 (1948). In this case,
unsecured notes were involved. However, the statutory language appears to cover both
secured and unsecured notes.
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York courts might hold such a condition unlawful as in excess of
the commission's powers, although no such d_ecision has actually been
rendered. 80 ' The Missouri statute is nearly identical with that of New
York. 81
In California, Illinois, and Pennsylvania; notes maturing in less
than one year are exempted, but limitations on renewal are included in
the California and Illinois statutes. 82 Michigan permits financing by
notes maturing within twenty-four months without the consent of the
Public Service Commission, but a refunding limitation is imposed. 33
In Wisconsin, obligations maturing in less than one year are exempt,
since such obligations are not included in the statutory definition of
"security," requir-ing approvat.B 4 In New Jersey and Ohio the statutes
are silent as to short-term obligations, but approval is required for
those payable at periods of twelve months or more, hence short-term
notes are exempted by implication. 85
Accordingly, the short-ten~ note possibility of financing cooperative
atomic power development is attended by numerous difficulties and is
by no means an assured method of avoiding regulation of security
issues.
b. New York Public Service Commission-Basic Principles
Certain other aspects of financing warrant mention at this juncture.
All that can be done at present is to suggest certain problems that
may have to be faced and the attitudes that seem to prevail among
public utility commissions.
The New York Public Service Commission indicates that approval
of public utility securities should be guided by seven basic principles :
( I) the issue must be for proper corporate purposes; ( 2) it must
be adequately supported by assets; ( 3) there must be a proper ratio
between funded debt and capital stock ; ( 4) the utility must show that
earnings will be sufficient to meet interest or dividends on securities
80 See 22 Fordham L. Rev. 77, 81 (1935). In Rochester Gas & Electric Corp. v.
Maltbie, 298 N.Y. 867, 84 N.E.2d 635 (1949), it was held that the commission had no
power to require, as a condition to approving a security issue, that a certain type
depreciation accounting be followed.
st Mo. Rev. Stat. (1949) §393.200.
82 Cal. Public Utilities Code §823; Ill. Stat. Ann. c. III 2/3, §21; Pa. Stat. Ann.
tit. 66, §1241.
ss Mich. Stat. Ann. §22.101.
S4 Wis. Stat. (1957) §184.01(3).
85 N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937) §48: 3-9; Ohio Rev. Code §4905.40.
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authorized ; ( 5) the utility must make an effort to obtain the best
terms possible ; ( 6) financing costs must be reasonable; ( 7) competitive bidding and public sale may be required in some cases. 36 Although similar policy enunciations have not been issued by other public
utility commissions, it may be expected that they will follow some, if
not all, of these principles.
Of these enumerated principles, two warrant special attention. The
ratio between funded debt and capital stock may cause difficulty. The
New York commission attempts to limit the proportion of bonds and
fixed interest obligations to a maximum of 6o% of the total capital
structure. 37 This limitation is significant because of the preference of
utilities for use of a higher percentage of debt obligations in high-cost
undertakings. 38
.
Again, the requirement of a showing that earnings will be sufficient
to meet interest and dividends on securities au~orized may prove to
be a subst:.mtial ·problem in view of possible high operating costs of
initial electric generating plants employing atomic fuel. This problem
seems intimately related to the matter of rate determination, and a
further discussion of it will therefore be deferred until the rate-making
problem is analyzed.
B. Restrictions Affecting the Purchase of Securities of an Atomic
Power Corporation
In the event that a separate corporation shou14 be formed to construct and operate a nuclear reactor generating plant, it is necessary
to determine what restrictions may be imposed upon the ownership of
stock in such a corporation. In this connection, it is desirable to consider the effect of state regulatory measures upon a form of organization that involves stock ownership of the nuclear reactor public utility
by existing electric utility companies and also by non-utility companies.
Related to this general problem is the more specific question of whether
either type of corporation has authority to acquire and own stock in
a nuclear generating plant company. Limitations on methods of
financing the purchase of such stock likewise demand attention.
N.Y. Annual Report of the Public Service Commission 13 (1951).
N.Y. Annual Report of the Public Service Commission 46 (1949).
8 8 For example, the projects undertaken by electric utilities to supply AEC installations with electricity at Portsmouth, O.hio and at Paducah, Kentucky. Re Ohio Valley
Electric Corp., 96 P.U.R. (N.S.) 143 (1952); Re Central lll. Public Service Co., 88
P.U.R. (N.S.) 28 (1951).
36

37
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I.

Regulation of Acquisition by Utility Companies of Stock in
Other Utility Companies

Many states require that the acquisition of voting stock of certain
types of corporations by other corporations be approved by a state
commission. In the electric utility area this requirement is very common. In eight of the ten states surveyed in this study, there is a
requirement that a public utility company must obtain the permission
of the public utility commission before it may acquire stock in another
public utility. Only the Michigan and Texas statutes fail to impose
such a limitation upon electric utilities. The ramifications of the statutes
vary considerably. In some instances, bonds as well as stock are included. 80 In seven states, approval of the public utility commission is
necessary when any amount, no matter how small, of the stock of one
utility is acquired by another utility.~ However, in Pennsylvania approval of the commission is required only when a public utility seeks
"to acquire five per centum or more of the voting capital stock of any
corporation." n
It is difficult to determine the standards that will be applied in determining whether in any particular instance the acquisition of stock
by one public utility in another utility will be approved. Statutes are
frequently rather general in nature, conferring broad discretionary
powers upon the commissions and typically requiring that the commission shall approve the acquisition if it is "consistent with the public
interest." •2 Other statutes are completely silent regarding the standards to be applied by the respective commissions. ~s In such states no
doubt the public interest criterion is also applied by implication.
On the other hand, the statutes of several states appear to be somewhat inore restricted in scope. For example, the California statute
apparently requires approval of the commission only when the stock to
be acquired is that of a utility "organized or existing under or by
virtue of the laws of this State." u In Illinois, New Jersey, and Wis0

8o Ill. Stat. Ann. c. III 2/3, §27(e); Mo. Rev. Stat. (I949) §393.I90(2); N.Y. Public
Service Law §70.
~o Cal. Public Utilities Code §852; Ill. Stat. Ann. c. III 2/3, §27(e); Mo. Rev. Stat.
(I949) §393.I90(2); N.J. Rev. Stat. (I937) §48: 3-10; N.Y. Public. Service Law §70;
Ohio Rev. Code §4905.48(D); Wis. Stat. (I957) §I!)6.8o(I) (b).
n Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 66, §n22(f).
.
u Ill. Stat. Ann. c. III 2/3, §27; N.Y. Public Service Law §70; Wis. Stat. (1957)
§1!)6.8o(3) •
~a Cal. Public Utilities Code §852; Mo. Rev. Stat. (1949) §393.190(2); N.J. Rev.
Stat. (1937) §48:3-10; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 66, §n22(f).
H Cal. Public Utilities Code §852.
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consin approval apparently is required only for the purchase of stock
in utilities operating within the state!3
Ohio has a somewhat unique statute concerning the necessity for
commission approval of stock acquisitions by public utilities in other
public utilities. The statute provides :
With the consent and approval of the public utilities commission:
{A) Any two or more public utilities furnishing a like
service or product and doing business in the same municipal
corporation or locality within this state, or any two or more
public utilities whose lines intersect or parallel each other
within this state, may enter into contracts with each other
that will enable them to operate their lines or plants in connection with each other.

* * *

(D) Any such public utility may purchase the stock of
any other such public utility. 46
·
These provisions apparently mean that acquisitions by one public utility
of the stock of another utility need be approved only if both are
operating in the same locality, or if their lines are parallel or intersect. 47
As a result of this type of regulation, existing utilities desirous of
investing in an atomic power corporation will have to obtain commission approval by showing the necessary prerequisites. A commission
policy opposing such investments will preclude public utilities from
engaging in a jointly sponsored enterprise to develop atomic power.
2.

Regulation of Acquisition by Non-Utility Companies of
Stock in Electric Utility Companies

Only three of the ten states under study require commtsston approval in case of a non-utility company seeking to acquire the capital
stock of an electric company. The New York statute provides: " . . .
[N]o stock corporation of any description, domestic or foreign, other
than a gas corporation or electric corporation . . . shall purchase or
acquire . . . more than ten per centum of the voting capital stock
issued by any gas corporation or electric corporation organized or
45 Ill. Stat. Ann. c. III 2/3, §10.3; N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937) §48: 2-13; Wis. Stat.
(1957) §Ig6.oi(I).
•a Ohio Rev. Code §4905-48.
47 33 Ohio Jurisprudence 521. Such a restrictive interpretation of the section has
been made by the Ohio Public Utilities Commission in respect to Clause (A); see
Re Cincinnati Gas and Electric Co. No. 827 (1916) O.P.U.C.R. 419, P.U.R. 1916
D 929; Re Cincinnati Gas and Electric Co. No. 3112 (1924) O.P.U.C.R. 122.
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existing under or by virtue of the laws of the state . . . " unless approved by the Public Service Commission. 48 However, the commission
may not act arbitrarily in refusing its approval. 49 A Missouri statute
is patterned after the New York provision.~ 0 The third state, New
Jersey, requires approval by the Board of Public Utility Commissioners when, as a result of the sale of any portion of the capital stock
of a public utility incorporated in New Jersey, there will be vested in
any corporation, domestic or foreign, "a majority in interest of the
outstanding capital stock of such public utility corporation." 51
Where non-utility companies must obtain commission approval to
purchase secu.rities of an atomic power corporation, a restrictive commission policy may prevent a jointly owned project. In view of the
substantial interest of chemical companies in nuclear reactor technology and resulting radioactive byproduct wastes and materials, these
regulatory provisions may have a particularly unique effect on possible cooperation among utility and chemical companies in atomic
eriergy affairs.
·
3· Financing the Purchase of Common Stock m an Atomic
Energy Power Plant
Financing the purchase of common stock in an atomic energy power
plant by existing electric utility companies presents some additional problems apart from the above-mentioned requirements that
security issues be approved by state public utility commissions, and that
security acquisitions by public utilities likewise be approved. Again,
the fact that several utilities may wish to join in a cooperative effort
during the early stages of the development of atomic power gives particular pertinence to these provisions. If any existing utility should
have insufficient surplus with which to finance such a purchase, and
should it desire to. issue stocks, bonds, or debentures to cover such
financing, approval by the state public utility commissions would be
needed in all states under study except Texas.
N.Y. Public Service Law §70.
New York State Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 227 App. Div.
18, 236 N.Y. Supp. 411 (1929), 26o N.Y. 32, 182 N.E. 237 (1932). The Appellate
Division held that the Public Service Commission had acted arbitrarily in refusing to
permit a New York electric utility to sell stock to a Delaware holding company. The
Court of Appeals in ruling that the order of the Appellate Division was not appealable
seemed to say, however, that the order of the Appellate Division did not limit or
destroy the discretion of the Public Service Commission.
~o Mo. Rev. Stat. (1949) §393.190(2).
~~N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937) §48: 3-10.
48

49See
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In an administrative proceeding to obtain authority to issue stocks
or bonds to finance the purchase of stock in an atomic energy corporation, there may be uncertainty as to whether or not it is a corporate
purpose for which the commission may approve a security issue. It
will be recalled that the statutes of New York, California, Ohio,
Michigan, Missouri, and Illinois enumerate the purposes for which a
public utility may issue securities. These purposes include : (I) the
acquisition of property; ( 2) the construction, completion, extension,
or improvement of its plant or distributing system; and (3) the improvement or maintenance of its service. The New York courts have
approved the action of the Public Service Commission interpreting
this statute to preclude approval of ·security issues for purposes other
than those enumerated. 52
The Ohio commission, under a nearly identical statute, had prior
to 1945 repeatedly held that securities of ano.ther company do not
constitute property, within the act, and that an issue for the purpose
of acquiring such securities cannot be approved. 53 Probably because
of these decisions, the Ohio statute was amended in 1945 to permit
a public utility to issue shares of common stock (bonds are not mentioned) to acquire or pay for shares of common capital stock of another public utility, when approved by the commission. But certain
limitations are imposed, including
requirement that the applicant
must acquire 65% or more of the issued and outstanding common
stock of the company whose shares are to be acquired. Moreover, the
public utility whose shares are to be acquired must be located in Ohio
or in an adjoining state so as to permit the operation of the properties
as an integrated system. 54 In August 1953 the general counsel of the
Ohio Edison Company was asked to comment on this statute. His
reply indicated that with respect to his company, the statute has not
been a problem, since they financed stock purchases in other utilities
from "uncapitalized capitalizable expenditures"; in other words, from
surplus. 55 However, in the absence of such reserve funds the Ohio
statutes would become an obstacle.
In states other than Ohio, the commissions might approve the issuance of stocks or bonds to finance the purchase of electric utility

a

P.S.C. v. N.Y. & Richmond Gas Co., 244 App. Div. 398. 279 N.Y. Supp. 824
(1935).
5 3 See 33 Ohio Jurisprudence, Public Utilities, §169<:, and cases cited therein.
54 Ohio Rev. Code §4905-40. On the amendment, see 33 Ohio Jurisprudence, Public
Utilities, §169<:.
.
55 Letter from D. Bruce Mansfield, dated Aug. 31, 1953.
52
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securities either on the theory that such securities constitute "property" or that they are being purchased for the "improvement or maintenance of service." 56 As hitherto noted, the statutes of New Jersey,
Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania are less specific than New York in regard
to the purposes for which securities of public utilities may be issued,
and accordingly in those states less difficulty could be anticipated.
Nevertheless, a prospective entrepreneur in the atomic reactor field will
be obliged to inquire of the state commissions to ascertain their views
concerning approval of a security issue to finance the purchase of common stock in an atomic energy power plant. A letter received from
the New Jersey Board of Public Utilities Commissioners_ indicates that
because the cost of generating electricity by the use of nuclear fuels
may prove to be higher than by conventional methods, the commission
will be obliged to consider this· factor in determining whether or not
to grant the necessary approval for a security issue. 57
C. Regulation of Transactions Between Affiliated Companies

Again, because some type of joint financing among public utilities
and non-utility corporations may be desirable during initial phases of
developing the atomic power industry, atomic energy entrepreneurs
are necessarily interested in the regulations that are imposed in respect
to the resulting intercorporate arrangements. In some instances this
regulation may be considered so unacceptable to some firms, particularly
non-utilities, that they may not consider it feasible to engage in a
joint venture.
It must be kept in mind that state commission regulation of utilities
vades not only with the statutes of the various states, but also with
the strictness or liberality with which the commissions and courts interpret the laws granting regulatory power to administrative agencies.
While certain commissions interpret their powers narrowly, others extend their regulatory authority to activities reached only by a broad
construction of the pertinent statutes. 58 This difference in basic approach is manifested especially in the area of regulation of intercorporate relations between public utilities and affiliates.
Transactions with affiliates can be regulated to some extent without
There are no reported court decisions defining these terms in other jurisdictions.
Letter from H. J. Flagg, Executive Officer, N.J. Department of Public Utilities,
dated Aug. 25, 1953.
&a See FPC, State Commiision Jurisdiction and Regulation of Electric and Gas
Utilities (r!)48).
56

57
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specific statutory authority, for such regulation is really an implied
part of the power to control rates in that the commission may consider the propriety and reasonableness of expenditures of utilities
subject to its jurisdiction. 59
However, expressly authorized state regulation of such relations began in 1930 when New York and Wisconsin specifically accorded
their commissions jurisdiction over these matters. 60 Because of
federal constitutional difficulties, the states have resorted to indirect
regulation of transactions with affiliated holding companies : by asserting judsdiction over contractual relations of all local utilities over
which they have jurisdiction, the states thereby reach affiliated companies regardless of whether they are domestic or foreign corporations. A 1932 United States Supreme Court decision upheld this type
of state control. 61 Today, only California, Michigan, and Texas, of
the ten states herein examined, do not have specific statutory provisions
for regulation of transactions with affiliates of public utilities. 62 The
other seven state commissions all exercise some degree of regulation
over contracts and transactions between affiliated companies.
On the basic preliminary question of what constitutes "affiliated
interests" the statutory definition is likely to be very comprehensive,
as in New York. There such interests are defined to include :
a. Every corporation and person owning or holding directly or indirectly five .per centum -or more of the voting
capital stock of such utility corporation.
b. Every corporation and person in any chain of successive
ownership of five per centum or more of voting capital stock.
c. Every corporation five per centum or more of whose
voting capital stock is owned by any person or corporation
owning five per centum or more of the voting capital stock of
such utility corporation or by any person or corporation in
any such chain of successive ownership of five per centum or
more of voting capital stock.
d. Every person who is an officer or director of such utility
corporation or of any corporation in any chain of successive
ownership of five per centum or more of voting capital stock.
e. Every corporation· which has one or more officers or one
or more directors in common with such utility corporation.
f. Every corporation or person which the commission may
~o

Barnes, The Economics of Public Utility Regulation 634-635 (1942).
0/d., 628.
61 Western Distributing Co. v. P.S.C. of Kan., 285 U.S. 119, 52 S. Ct. 283 (1932).
62 FPC, State Commission. Jurisdiction and Regulation of Electric and Gas Utilities
26-27 (1!)48).
6
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determine as a matter of fact after investigation and hearing
is actually exercising any substantial influence over the policies and actions of such utility corporation even though such
influence is not based upon stockholding, stockholders, directors or officers to the extent specified in this section.
g. Every person or corporation who or which the commission may determine as a matter of fact after investigation
and hearing is actually exercising such substantial influence
over the policies and actions of such utility corporation in
conjunction with one or more other corporations and/or persons with which or whom they are related by ownership
and/or blood relationship or by action in concert that together
they are affiliated with such utility corporation within the
meaning of this section even though no one of them alone is
so affiliated. 63
The Illinois definition is substantially similar, except that the
percentage of stock ownership is fixed at ten per cent, instead of five
per cent as in New York. 64 The Wisconsin definition is nearly identical with that of New York. 65 All three state commissions are empowered to obtain the names of all shareholders who own one per cent
or more of the voting capital stock of utilities under their jurisdiction.66 The Pennsylvania definition of "affiliated interests" also employs the five per cent stock ownership criterion as well as the "substantial influence" test. 67 New Jersey defines affiliated interests only in
terms of five per cent stock ownership. 68
As to the type of regulation imposed on affiliated interests, the
statutes in these states generally require that contracts providing for
management, construction, engineering, accounting, legal, financial,
or similar services must be filed with and approved by the state public
utility commissions, and that contracts found to be not in the public
interest may be disapproved by the commission. 69 The commissions
are also given the power to examine all necessary accounts and records
relating to transactions between affiliated interests. 70 These controls
68 N.Y. Public Service Law §no(2).
Ill. Stat. Ann. c. III 2/3, §8a.
Wis. Stat. (I957) §I¢.52(I).
66 Ill. Stat. Ann. c. III 2/3, §8a(I); N.Y. Public Service Law §no( I). Wis. Stat.

64
65

( I957) §I¢.02(4).

67 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 66,
68

§uoo(I).

N.J. Rev. Stat. (I937) §48: 3-7.I.
69 Ill. Stat. Ann. c. III 2/3, §8a(3); N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937) §48: 3-7.I; N.Y. Public
Service Law §uo(3); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 66, §I27I; Wis. Stat. (I957) §I96.52(3).
10 S~e Legis, "The Servicing Function of Public Utility Holding Companies," 49
Harv. L. Rev. 957, g82 ( I936) for general discussion of this type regulation. See also
Barnes, supra note 59 at 63o-655.
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are, of course, familiar to public utilities, but for many non-utility
industries, such controls are often considered so restrictive on management policies that management scrupulously avoids subjection to
the regulation. If financing an atomic power development in any area
is rendered more difficult by these provisions, a re-examination of the
desirability of the regulation may be warranted in order to encourage
development of the new technology.
The statutes of Missouri and Ohio do not employ the term "affiliated
interests," but the commission of each of these states has reported to
the Federal Power Commission that it has jurisdiction over transactions with affiliates. 71 In Missouri it seems that the Public Service
Commission regards the transactions between affiliates as within its
rate-makiug authority, although there appears to be no express statutory provision giving it this power of control. There are several provisions in the Ohio statutes dealing with the subject. One states that
when and as required by the Public Utilities Commission, "every public
utility shall file with it a copy of any contract, agreement, or arrangement, in writing, with any other public utility relating in any way to
the construction, maintenance, or use of its plant or property, or to
any service, rate, or charge." 72 Another Ohio statute provides that
if the consent of the Public Utilities Commission is obtained, "Any
two or more public utilities furnishing a like service or product and
doing business in the same municipal corporation or locality within
this state, or any two or more public utilities whose lines intersect or
parallel each other within this state, may enter into contracts with each
other that will enable them to operate their lines or plants in connection with each other." 73 In neither of these states is it clear what kinds
of transactions among affiliates are actually regulated since there are
no reported court decisions or statements of commission policy interpreting the scope of the commissions' powers.
Since it may be desirable in the early stages of development of the
atomic power industry to engage in a jointly financed product, these
provisions will also have considerable importance for atomic energy
entrepreneurs.
71

FPC, State Commission Jurisdiction and Regulation of Electric and Gas Utilities

27 (1948).
12
73

Ohio Rev. Code §4905.16.
/d., §4905-48(A).
.
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D. Rate Regulation Problems
The primary function of public utility commissions is the determination of rates that may be charged by the regulated public utilities.
Many of the regulatory powers conferred on public utility commissions, such as the sup~rvision over accounting, control of capitalization
and security issues, and regulation of intercorporate relations, are
added for the principal purpose of effectuating and perfecting control
over rates. 74 All of the states under study excepting Texas provide
for the regulation of electric rates by a state commission. In Texas
rate-making power is delegated to the governing body of each incorporated town or city. 75
The rate-making function of public utility commissions involves
many complex and technical concepts, and no attempt will be made here
to explain and discuss the many ramifications which have been the subject of extended discussion in legal periodicals and treatises. However,
several unique rate-making problems which may stem from the development and use of nuclear reactors for the production of electrical power
should be noted. These problems may be divided conveniently into
two categories : (I) the treatment of expenditures for research and
experimentation by existing electric utilities in the initial stages of the
development of atomic energy for power production, and ( 2) accounting and rate-making problems which may arise from the construction
and operation of a full-scale atomic power plant financed by private
capital.
I.

Expenditures for Research and Experimentation

At present, certain electric utility companies are expending considerable sums for research and experimentation in the use of nuclear reactors as a source of heat to generate electricity. The position taken
by the state utility commissions concerning the allowance of these
expenditures for rate-making purposes will have a significant bearing
upon the amounts utility companies are likely to spend for the development of this new form of heat energy. To the extent that these expenditures are allowed to be charged to operating expenses (or perhaps
capitalized and then amortized), they are of course being borne by
the consumer. It is important, therefore, to examine the considerations which will influence the decisions of the commissions and to
74
75

Barnes, supra note 59 at
Tex. Civ. Stat. art. 1119.

282.
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attempt to ascertain their attitude or probable attitude in regard to this
matter.
At present, nearly seventy-five per cent of the electrical power prodQced in the United States is derived from steam-electric plants utilizing coal, oil, and gas as fuels. The remaining twenty-five per cent is
produced in hydro-electric plants. The electrical power needs of the
United States have been increasing tremendously year by year; In
1953 the electric energy production was 442.7 billions of kilowatt hours
as contrasted with a total production of 141.8 billions of kilowatt hours
in 1940. Since available water power is limited, steam-electric production has been steadily gaining in relative importance as a power source. 16
As compared with 75.8 millions of kilowatt capacity available in 1951,11
it is estimated that by 196o the required generating capacity will be
about 164 millions of kilowatts, and by 1970, 205 millions of kilowatts.
In view of diminishing supplies of coal, oil, and gas used in steamelectric ger.eration, the importance of discovering a new source of heat
energy becomes obvious. Atomic energy appears to be an excellent
solution for increasing power needs, and the public will benefit. However, much research and experimentation will be_ necessary before
atomic fuels may be utilized as a source of energy at a cost competitive
with conventional fuels. Even the possibility of valuable byproduct
production still leaves the balance sheet in a questionable state. If
atomic energy does prove to be a cheaper source of energy, the public
will benefit even more. These considerations certainly seem to indicate
that public utility commissions will be fully justified in allowing substantial expenditures to be charged against operating expense for the
development of this new power source. Therefore, in rate proceedings,
allowances for the expenditures would seem to be eminently reasonable.
There are only a few reported rate cases in which allowance of
expenditures for research has been a contested issue. Of course, payments to affiliates for services have frequently been questioned by
utility commissions, but in such cases the question has usually been
whether the payments have .exceeded costs reasonably incurred by the
affiliate furnishing the services. 18 State utility commissions have allowed reasonable expenditures for advertising and promotional activiSee FPC, Thirty-Fourth Annual Report 7, 63 (1955).
Cisler, "Electric Power Systems and Nuclear Power," Atomic Energy-Industrial
and Legal Problems 62, 1952 Summer Institute, Univ. of Mich. Law School.
18 See, e.g., New Jersey Bell Tel. Co. v. N.J., 12 N.J. 568, 97 A.2d 6o2 (1953);
Michigan Bell Tel. Co. v. P.S.C., 332 Mich. 7, so N.W.2d 826 (1952).
16
11
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ties to be claimed in rate p'roceedings. 79 Somewhat more analogous to
the development of electric power from atomic energy are the allowances which have been made for costs of development of new wells by
the gas utility industry. Limited expenditures for research and for
development of new gas sources have been allowed as operating expenses in some cases 80 but large expenditures have usually been treated
as capital outlay. 81
The public utility commissions of the nine states (Texas being
excluded) have been surveyed in an effort to determine their attitude
toward expenditures for research and experimentation in the use of
nuclear reactors for power production. The commissions of three states
have indicated that they would allow "reasonable" expenditures for
such purposes. The Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission recently
in a rate proceeding allowed a "substantial sum" to be claimed .for this
purpose. 82 While such expenditures have not been involved in rate
cases in Michigan and Wisco.nsin, the public service commissions have
takeri official action by prescribing that the expenditures be charged
to Account No. 8o1, Miscellaneous General Expenses. 83 This accounting treatment results in the expenditures being allowed as operating
expenses in current rate-making proceedings. This procedure has' been
recommended by the Accounting Committee of the National Association Of Railroads and Utilities Commissioners (NARUC) :84 The
California Public Utilities Commission has indicated 'that no official
action has been taken in this matter. 85 No information on this specific
problem could be obtained from the other five state commi~sions.
'It seems probable that most public utility commissions will allow
79 See, e.g., United Ice & Coal Co. v._ Pa. Power & Light Co., 8g P.U.R. (N.S.)
432 (1951); Re Pacific Electric Railway Co., 96 P.U.R. (N.S.) 105 (1952).
so See, for example, Re Northern Nat. Gas Co., 95 P.U.R. (N.S.) 289 (1952); Re
Peoples Nat. Gas Co., 1921E P.U.R. 390; Re Clarksburg Light & Heat Co., 1917A
P.U.R. 577·
81 See, for example, Oarksburg Light & Heat Co. v. Public Service Commission,
84 W.Va. 638, 100 S.E. 551 (1920); Re Montgomery Gas Co., 1917C P.U.R. 924;
Re Mormarc Utilities Corp., So P.U.R. (N.S.) 53 (1949); Public Service Commission
v. Mount4in Fuel Supply Co., 73 P.U.R. (N.S.) 428 (1947).
82 Letter -from Leon Schwartz, Chairman, Pa. Public Utility Commission, Oct. 7,
1953·
8s Letter from John H. McCarthy, Chairman, Mich. Public Service Commission,
March 17, 1954; letter from George P. Steinmetz, Commissioner, Public Service Commission of Wisconsin, March 29, 1954.
84 Letter from George P. Steinmetz, supra note 83.
85 Letter from R. J. Pajalich, Secretary, Cal. Public Utilities Commission, April 15,
1954·
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reasonable expenditures for research and experimentation in the use
of atomic fuels to be charged to operating expenses in the rate-making
process. Most states do not have formal procedures whereby such expenditures can be approved in advance, but instead the question is determined by the allowance or disallowance in a subsequent rate proceeding.86 Therefore, companies contemplating such expenses will
presumably follow the usual practice of trying to obtain the informal
consent of the state commission before substantial expenditures are
incurred. In this connection it should be noted that the Pennsylvania
Public Utility Commission is authorized by statute to require public
utilities .to file budgets of estimated expenditures. The commission
may reject part or all of any contemplated expenditure found to be
"contrary to the public interest." If rejected at this stage, the expenditure will not subsequently be allowed in a rate or valuation proceeding.
If not rejected, the commission may nevertheless subsequently determine whether expenditures made under the budget were reasonable.87 In New Jersey, Ohio, and Wisconsin budgets are required by
regulation to be submitted in advance to the public utility commissions. 88 Since the statutes contain no provisions concerning such
budgets, it is doubtful if the commissions of the three latter states have
authority to reject proposed expenditures. In all probability, expenditures for atomic research may be charged to operating expenses, but
the possibility that a commission may later either reject them as unreasonable or require a portion to be capitalized and subsequently
amortized should not be overlooked. If the latter were done, the amount
thus capitalized would become a part of the rate base until written off
in subsequent years. 89
Apparently, the f~deral government is taking the position that the
taxpayers generally should bear some part of the costs of research in
the development of atomic energy for power production and other purposes. For example, under the agreement between the AEC and the
Duquesne Light Company for the construction and operation of the
nation's first full-scale atomic power plant, Duquesne supplied only a
portion of the reactor costs· plus the generating facilities; other costs
were absorbed by the federal government, with the electricity generated
86 Barnes, supra note 59 at 6os.
87 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 66, §1216.
88 FPC, State Commission Jurisdiction and Regulation of Electric and Gas Utilities
27 (1948).
89 See Burt and Highsaw, "Developmental Costs Under the Prudent Investment
Theory," 94 U. of Pa. L. Rev. I, II (1945).
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going through Duquesne's distribution system to consumers at rates
comparable to those charged for conventionally generated electricity.
The Power Demonstration Reactor Program of the AEC, initiated in
1955, also contemplates considerable federal financial assistance in the
form of research assistance without charge, research and development
contracts, and the waiver of certain source and special nuclear material
charges. 90 The object of this program is to promote the development
of nuclear reactors for power production in the hope that future development of the technology will produce a fully competitive operation.
Of course, no question concerning the propriety of research expenditures will arise in rate proceedings if the research costs are underwritten by a government subsidy, and in all probability, the federal
government will continue to contribute to the development of atomic
energy for peacetime uses. Private industry, however, is expected to
contribute financially to the costs of atomic research and experimentation even under the Power Demonstration Reactor Program. 91 Whenever such private contributions are made, the question of how they will
be treated for rate-making purposes will become important.
2.

Construction of a Full-Scale Atomic Power Plant

There is little doubt that after further research and experimenta~
tion in the use of atomic fuels, it will become financially feasible for
private capital to build electric power plants utilizing such fuels in
conjunction with conventional generating equipment. The commencement of such a program does not seem too remote, especially if favorable uses for byproducts can be developed. When this stage is reached,
several regulatory problems somewhat unique in the electric utility
field may arise. These problems can be understood only in the light of
certain fundamental postulates regarding the cost of power and the
role of a nuclear reactor in a power plant.
The cost of power from any source may be said to be comprised of
9o Power Demonstration Reactor Program: "First Round," AEC Release No. 589
(Jan. 10, 1955); "Second Round,'' AEC Release No. 695 (Sept. 21, 1955); "Third
Round,'' AEC Release No. 953 (Jan. 7, 1956). See CCH Atomic Energy La~ Rep.
ff3021ff.
91 Ibid. Also see Atomic Energy Act of 1954, §33, 42 U.S.C.A. §2053, which provides : "Where the Commission finds private .facilities or laboratories ·are inadequate
to the purpose, it is authorized to conduct for other persons, through its own facilities
. . . [such research and development activities] . . . as it deems appropriate to the
development of atomic energy. The Commission is authorized to determine and make
such charges as in its discretion may be desirable for the conduct of such activities and
studies."
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two major elements, first, operating expenses and fixed charges (including, among the former, labor, fuel, materials, and among the latter,
taxes, depreciation, and obsolescence) and second, return on capital
(including interest and dividends, these being limited to a fair return
on the fair value of the assets). In theory, the utility is entitled to
establish a rate schedule which will result in total revenue equal to
the aggregate of these costs. A conventional thermal-electric generating station may be considered as having two major components,
one providing steam from heat energy sources and the other generating
electricity by the use of the steam in the turbine. In an atomic power
plant, the latter component will be substantially the same, but a reactor
will be substituted as the heat source to produce steam. In a typical
thermal-electric generating station utilizing conventional fuels, approximately one half of plant cost per kilowatt of capability is attributed to each of these two components. 92 The. total per kilowatt cost
of installed capa(:ity of a conventional plant ranges between $1 so and
$250. 98 Present estimates of the per unit construction cost of a nuclear
power plant greatly exceed these figures. ~ Moreover, it is undoubtedly a fact that the first nuclear plants will suffer a very high rate of
obsolescence occasioned by the rapid development of the technology.
Furthermore, development of methods of commercially utilizing the
thermonuclear process may make present reactor technology obsolete
in a relatively short period. However, entrepreneurs in the field hope
that the resulting higher fixed charges and capital expenses can be
offset in two ways : by lower operating expenses, principally because of
lower fuel costs, and by the production and sale of byproducts. It will
be deemed feasible from a competitive cost standpoint to construct and
operate an atomic power plant when it appears that the reduction occasioned by fuel economies plus returns from the sale of byproducts
compensate for the increase in construction costs, plus the higher
obsolescence charges.
As noted earlier, before a new plant may be constructed it is necessary in most states to obtain a certificate of convenience and necessity
from the state public utility ·commission. In determining whether such
a certificate will be granted, or whether a proposed security issue to
finance the plant will be approved, one factor that will surely be taken
into account by most commissions is whether the new plant can be
9

92
93

Cisler, supra note 77 at 64-65.
AEC, Fifteenth Semi-Annual Report 17 ( 1954).

9~/bid.
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expected to produce electric energy at as low or lower a unit cost as a
plant of conventional design. 93 Until a nuclear plant can produce electric power at as low or nearly as low a per unit cost as that of existing
generating methods, it is doubtful whether necessary commission approval can be obtained (excepting always for the small margin allowable in the name of research and development). Increasing scarcity of
conventional fuels plus increased handling costs will certainly accelerate the time when favorable competitive costs can be shown, and
this is a factor to be considered by the commission. Furthermore, there
are already certain areas in the country where higher than average fuel
costs may possibly make an atomic reactor plant economically feasible
at the present time. In the absence of these conditions, there may be
a possibility of obtaining approval upon the condition that only a part
of the capital expenditure will be included in the rate base for future
rate-determination. Apparently this is a device that may be utilized
in at least one state, Wisconsin, 96 although it can not be regarded as
an attractive course of action for any utility concerned.
If a certificate of convenience and necessity is issued for the
construction of a nuclear plant which produces more expensive
power than that produced in conventional plants, there is no legal assurance that actual costs will be reflected in the rate base for the purpose of determining rates. The issuance of the certificate of convenience
and necessity by the state public utility commission merely represents
determination by the commission that the proposed oonstruction is in
the public interest. On subsequent rate proceedings the valuation of the
facility is determined de novo as a legal matter. In other words, the
issuance of the certificate does not commit the public utility commission
to any specific valuation although the facility must be given some value
since the certificate represents a determination that the construction was
in the public interest. In fact, most state public utility commissions consider several costs, inciuding reproduction cost, replacement cost, historical cost, and the original cost, in the valuation process. Therefore,
the atomic energy power entrepreneur has no legal assurance that he will
be able to recoup all costs through the established rate structure. If a
statute authorized the public utility commission to commit itself to a
specific valuation at the time of issuing a certificate of convenience and
necessity, the atomic energy entrepreneur would then be able to proceed

a

9 5 See especially Wis. Stat. (1957) §196.49. Letter from H. ]. Flagg, N.J. Board of
Public Utility Commissioners, dated Aug. 25, 1953.
9 6 See Wis. Stat. (1957) §196.49.
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with full knowledge of whether or not the consumer would be required
to bear some portion of the increased costs occasioned by a change in
generating methods at the time the atomic power plant is constructed.
But as a practical matter, and wholly apart from the question of statutory authority, state commissions probably will decline to make binding
decisions at the time of certifying the construction for the reason,
among others, that many of the estimates of cost will necessarily be
somewhat speculative in nature.
There are those who predict that all of the foregoing considerations
may result in several private utility companies refraining from building
nuclear power plants until they are actually known to be competitive with
existing methods. 97 When that time arrives the development of atomic
energy as a power source will not affect rates, except possibly in a downward direction if the new source produces relatively cheaper p·ower.
There is a· further aspect of the matter that demands consideration.
If it proves possible to produce and sell byproducts from an atomic
power plant in sufficient quantity to· ·affect the balance sheet ·materially
and thus to produce power at costs competitive with power from conventional fuels, several additional problems will be raised.
Today, there appear to be two primary t,Ypes of-marketable atomic
energy byproducts. 98 First, fissionable material may be produced and
sold; secondly, radioisotopes arid radioactive waste· products of value
may be produced, refined; and sold. Fissionable materials have value
as the initial charge for new reactors, as fuel replacements for nonbreeding reactors, and for military purposes. Reactor-produced radioisotopes will also yield substantial revenues, for they are being used in
increasing quantities by industry, medicine, and agriculture. As of the
end of June 1957,4,109 organizations in the United States were licensed
to use radioisotopes by the AEC, 99 and the number of users and shipments continues to increase. Furthermore, an increasing number of
new uses of radioisotopes by industry, medicine, and research can be
expected as the technology advances.
One problem of a unique character arises. out of . the. fact that under
97 This proposition was suggested by Leon Schwartz, Chairman, Pennsylvania Public
Utility Commission, in a letter dated Oct. 7, 1953.
98 "Byproducts" is used in a broader sense here and is to be distinguished from that
used in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Under Section ue, 42 U.S.C.A. §2014(e),
"byproduct material" means any radioactive material except special nuclear material
(fissionable material) produced in the processes of producing or utilizing fissionable
material.
99 AEC, Twenty-Second Semi-Annual Report 31 (1957).
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the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the federal government takes title to
all special nuclear material (fissionable material) produced in private
operations. 100 Lawful private producers are to be paid a "fair price" 101
for their product. Moreover, the federal government has retained a
monopoly over the distribution of fissionable materials, and normal
competitive pricing and sales thereof are not to be expected in the near
future. In respect to radioactive byproducts, under Section 81 of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the AEC is authorized to distribute, "with
or without charge,'' radioactive byproduct materiaP 02 To date the practice of the AEC has been to distribute radioisotopes at cost. Accordingly, as to fissionable materials the only market is the government; and
as to other radioactive materials, the cost prices established by the federal government probably will have to be met by private utilities producing the same products. Therefore, abnormal market conditions are
to be expected, and this fact not only has its bearing on rate regulation,
but it presents some unusual problems of federal-state relations.
Another important question is the effect of the production and sale
of byproducts on rate-making. Public utility commissions may treat
the byproduct aspect of a nuclear reactor business in one of two ways,
each of which will bear a definite relation to the establishment of power
rates.
First, the byproduct operations may be treated as an entirely separate
and distinct activity. In that event, costs directly attributed to each
activity will have to be accounted for separately, and costs attributable
to both activities will have to be properly allocated between them. 108
100 42 U.S.C.A. §2072. "Special nuclear material" is defined as plutonium, uranium
enriched in the isotope 233 or in the isotope 235 or any other material determined by
the Commission to be capable of releasing substantial quantities of atomic energy.
101 42 U.S.C.A. §2072.
10 2 /d., §2n1. Radioisotopes for biomedical, agricultural, and medical research are
available to domestic users at 20 per cent of catalog price. AEC Release No. 627 (April
21, 1955).
1os In several cases collateral operations of a utility have been treated as entirely
separate for purposes of rate making. See, for example, Re Farmers Elevator Co.,
1g28A P.U.R. 469 (North Dakota) (grain elevator and electricity); Re Estelline
Telephone & Electric Co., 1917F P.U.R. 151 (South Dakota) (telephone and electricity); Milwaukee Electric R. & Light Co. v. Milwaukee, 1919D P.U.R. 504 (Wisconsin) (heating and electricity); Re Manchester Street Railway, 19 N.H.P.S.C.R.
421 (1937) (New Hampshire) (street railway and electricity); Re Lockport Light,
Heat & Power Co., 12 P.U.R. (N.S.) 413 (1935) (New York) (steam and electricity); Monticello v. Blue Mountain Irrigation Co., Case No. 148g (Oct. 29, 1935)
(Utah) (irrigation and electricity); Re Northwestern Electric Co., 36 P.U.R. (N.S.)
202 (1940) (FPC) (steam heating and electricity); Re Arkansas Power & Light
Company, 55 P.U.R. (N.S.) 129 (1944) (Arkansas) (water, street railway, steam
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The allocation of costs will be most difficult in regard to a nuclear reactor. A requirement that a large percentage of the costs be attributed
to the separate and distinct byproduct operation will make electricity
rates lower but may make the byproduct operation unprofitable. At the
same time a different allocation of costs could conceivably make the byproduct operation extremely profitable. The method of allocation of
costs will undoubtedly be prescribed by most public utility commissions.
Except for Texas, all states examined in this study grant to their commissions a board authority over accounting. 10• Furthermore, in several
states there are statutes which relate specifically to accounting aspects
of non-utility business of a public utility. For instance, an Illinois
statute provides :
·
The Commission may require every public utility engaged
directly or indirectly in any other than a public utility business,
as defined by law, to keep separately in like manner and form
the accounts of all such other business, and the Commission
may provide for the examination and inspection of the books,
accounts, papers and records of such other business, in so far
as may be necessary to enforce any provision of this Act. The
Commission shall have the power to inquire as to and prescribe
the apportionment of capitalization, earnings, debts and expenses fairly and justly to be awarded to or borne by the ownership, operation, management or control of such public utility
as distinguished from such other business. 105
A second method of treating the byproduct operation would be to
regard it as an integral part of the utility operation and, in establishing
electricity rates, to include in the total estimated income, revenues anticipated from byproduct sales. This method has been employed in respect
to certain gas utility byproducts such as coke, tars, and gasoline. 108
Moreover, in cases in which a subsidiary or affiliate has refined certain
heat, ice, and electricity) ; Re Consolidated Gas, Electric Light & Power Co., 61 P. U.R.
(N.S.) 94 (I94S) (Maryland) (gas, steam heat, merchandising, and electricity);
Detroit v. Detroit Edison Co., so P.U.R. (N.S.) I (I943) (Michigan) (steam heating
and electricity, where there was no physical interdependence).
104 FPC, State Commission Jurisdiction and Regulation of Electric and Gas Utilities
22 (I!)48).
1os Ill. Stat. Ann. c. III 2/J, §12. See also Ill. Stat. Ann. c. III 2/J, §8. Substantially
identical provisions relating to electric companies may be found in Mo. Rev. Stat.
(I949) §J9J.I40(I2); and N.Y. Public Service Law §66(IJ).
toe See Re Uniform System of Accounts, I9I7D P.U.R. I22 (New York); Re
Los Angeles Gas & Electric Corp., I9I9D P.U.R. I40 (California); Re Portage
American Gas Co., 26 Wis. R.C.R. 369 (I922); Green Bay v. Wisconsin Public Service
Co., I922B P.U.R. 67I (Wisconsin); Re Wisconsin Gas & Electric Co., I922C P.U.R.
829 (WISconsin); Re Great.Falls Gas Co., I922D P.U.R. 385 (Montana).
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byproducts, public utility commissions have required the parent utility
to include in its estimated revenues a substantial percentage of the net
proceeds from sales, even though the contract between the utility and
subsidiary or affiliate may have established a different percentage. 107
. Thus, when the revenues from byproduct sales are substantial, they will
be reflected in lower electricity rates.
To· summari"ze, whether the production and sale of byproducts is
treated as an entirely distinct activity or as an integralpart of the utility
operation of an. ~tomic energy facility, the byproduct aspects of the
busin,ess will have a definite effect on rate-making. The greater the
net proceeqs of the byproduct activity, the lower will be the cost of
electricity.
One additional aspect pertinent to rate-making should be mentioned.
Public utility commissions may seek to impose, as a condition on the
issuance .of a certificate of public convenience and necessity for the construction of an atomic power facility, the requirement that the utility
will not charge higher· rat~s ·,than those permitted for electricity produced by a conventional facility. Whether or not the imposition of
such· a condition permissible under existing law is perhaps questionable, for statutory authority is ordinarily not explicit, and the commissions have apparently not hitherto attempted to impose such limitations
under other circumstances. 108 As a matter of policy, it would seem inadvisable for commissions to impose such conditions, since they would
·unduly hamper the development and use of the new technology. Only
~through experience in operation can it be expected that the most· eco. nomical methods of utilizing atomic energy will be achieved. N onethe·less, it·must. be recognized that the cost estimates of an atomic energy
facility will be examined by the utility commission and will be taken
: itito consideration in connection with the issuing of certificates. · In fact,
,it would be extremely difficult for a commission to decide that a reactor
plant producing electricity at a cost, for example, twice that of conventional plants should. be regatded as constructed "in the public interest,"
at least if the costs 'are to be borne by the consumer by th~ i~position of

is
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:

, 1or See, for example, United Fuel .Gas Co, v.- Kentucky Railroad Cqmmi!\sion, 278

U.S. 300, 49 ·s. Ct. 150 (1929); CM.rleston v. Public Service Commission, 95 W.Va.
120 S.E. 328 (1924) ;. East Qhio Gas Co: v. Cleveland, Z?·: P.U.R. (N.S.) 387
(1939) (Ohio); Hope ·Natural <;;as Co. v. FPC, 134 F.2d 287, 47. P.U.R. (N.S.) 129
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However, under the Federal Power Act,, licenses' co11t;tin liftlitations requiring
that rates b~ computed uP<>n the basis of or,iginal ~ost and·that excess earnings be ,kept
·in reserve. See 16 U.S.C.A. §§8o3 et seq.
·
10s
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higher rates. Thus, the probable fixed charges and capital expenses and
treatment of revenues from sale of byproducts will receive careful consideration both in issuing certificates of public convenience and necessity
and in subsequent rate proceedings.
E. Conclusions
By way of summary of the foregoing discussion of the effect of public
utility regulation statutes on atomic energy development we may observe that:
· ( 1) Industrial development of atomic energy for power purposes
poses several unique financial problems for an existing stabilized public
utility and all pertinent statutes and regulations must be carefully analyzed before any particular financial organization or arrangement can
be agreed upon ;
( 2) Moreover, advance approval of many types of expenditures in
the highly l·egulated public utility industry appears desirable if the economic costs are to be borne by the consumers ; and
(3) Finally, the accounting treatment of atomic energy byproducts
costs and revenues should be ascertained at the earliest possible date
because of the potential effect upon utility rates.
· In some instances, it will doubtless happen that unfavorable public
utility commission orders will preverit particular utilities from establishing nuclear reactor facilities, and especially will this be true if no opportunity for recoupment of costs is provided. Such action may make
the raising of capital difficult, if not impossible, of achievement. On
the other hand, if lower power costs may eventually be expected, it
would seem that most public utility commissions will look favorably
upon investments by existing utilities in nuclear reactor power facilities.

Chapter III
HEALTH AND SAFETY REGULATION
As with many industrial operations, proper precautionary measures
must be taken in making industrial use of atomic energy if serious
hazards to employees and the general public are to be avoided. The use
of atomic energy presents a number of unique hazards, not so much
from sudden atomic accidents, although these may occur, as from the
cumulative effect of exposure to excessive radiation, the damaging effects of which may not be known for many years. However, the general nature of the hazards is known and so are the techniques for preventing or minimizing them. In the program of the Atomic Energy
Commission, expenditures for radiation protection of workers as well
as the public consume a substantial portion of the total expenditures for
atomic energy development,1 Under the Atomic Energy Act, the Commission has imposed rather stringent health and safety standards, not
only on operations in government-owned installations, but also upon
licensees who obtain and use fissionable materials and radioisotopes for
private research and other purposes. 2 The experience of the Commission clearly indicates that the application of rigorous health and safety
standards makes it possible to use atomic energy for many, if not most,
peacetime purposes without endangering the health of workers or the
public generally. 8
Excessive radiation may become dangerous to health and even life in
either of two ways. Due to close physical proximity to an external
source of radiation, such as might result from inadequate shielding of
radioactive materials or improper disposition of radioactive wastes, the
human body may be injured by exposure to the source of radiation. Another type of radiation injury which can be even more serious than external radiation results from the ingestion of food, liquids, or gases
contaminated by radioactivity. Radioactive particles which are ingested
may remain lodged inside the body until the radioactivity has spent
itself, which in the case of certain isotopes may be greatly in excess of
1

AEC, "27 Questions and Answers About Radiation and Radiation Protection," 16

(1951).
210 Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 20 ("Standards for Protection Against Radiation"), reprinted as Appendix A, Item 1.
a AEC, Eighth Semi-Annual Report, "Control of Radiation Hazard in the Atomic
Energy Program" (1950).
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the life of the victim. This is referred to as internal radiation. Even
small amounts of either type of radiation can have a very harmful effect
on both animal and plant life. Therefore, in industrial use of atomic
energy, the problem of protection against radiation hazards is a very
important one. Not only are the hazards insidious in nature, just as with
several other industrial operations, but the precautionary measures are
often very expensive.
In 1954, in asking Congress to amend the Atomic Energy Act of
1946 to allow private industry to enter the field, President Eisenhower
recomm~nded the continuation of provisions authorizing the Atomic
Energy Commission to establish minimum health and safety standards
to govern the use and possession of fissionable and radioactive materials.4 As a result, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, like the 1946 Act,
gives the Commission a broad authority to establish such standards. 5
This authority presents some unique problems for federal-state relationships in thr~ regulation of health and safety with respect to industrial
users of atomic energy.
Whether or not Congress intended to pre-empt the field of radiation
health and safety regulation of Atomic Energy Commission licensees
from state control, and the extent to which it may constitutionally do
so, are questions for which no very clear answers exist at the present
time. Prior to and at the time the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 was
passed, Congress has very little to say on the subject, and the act itself
does not contain an unequivocal statement of intent. Similarly, the case
authority on the general subject of federal pre-emption in other areas of
government activity is in a state of some confusion. Because the purpose
of this chapter is to examine the general pattern of state health and
safety regulation in the ten states selected for study-to consider the
types of state agencies which may be involved, their respective jurisdictions, and the nature of their powers-analysis of the pre-emption questions is deferred until Chapter V of this Part where recent state
radiation health and safety regulations are discussed in some detail. In
this chapter it is assumed that state agencies may exercise power in
respect to those radiation hazards regulated by the Atomic Energy
Commission.
There are three general categories of state agencies which may possess
specific authority under existing statutes to regulate various health and
4 Message of the President to Congress, dated Feb. 17, 1954, New York Times,
Feb. 18, 1954, p. 8, col. 8.
5 42 U.S.C.A. §§2133, 2134.
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safety aspects of the use of atomic energy for industrial purposes. If
private industry constructs plants which utilize. nuclear fuels to generate
electricity, the public utility commissions may have such authority.
Furthermore, state labor departments or industrial commissions 6 are
typically given authority to promulgate rules and regulations to protect
the health and safety of employees. Finally, state and local health boards
or departments usually exercise extremely broad powers over matters
of health and safety. Thus, both labor and health agencies are likely to
possess powers affecting the operation of atomic energy power plants
even though public utility commissions also have regulatory powers in
this area. In fact, the following discussion will demonstrate the confusing pattern of potential regulation and the overlapping jurisdiction
of regulatory agencies in every state embraced in this study.
A. Public Utility Commissions
In the ten states surveyed in this study, most of the public utility commissions have been given general statutory authority that would permit
the establishment· of health and safety regulations relating to the construction and operation of atomic energy power plants. Since the first
privately owned nuclear power generating station is yet to be built, there
has been no occasion for the issuance of health and safety regulations
by state public utility commissions relating to the operation of such a
plant, but the authority is there ready to be exercised at the appropriate
time. Actually, some of the commissions have not attempted to assert
their health and safety regulatory powers, even in respect to conventional plants, and Texas, as previously indicated, has no state utility
commission with jurisdiction over electric utilities.
· In California, Illinois, and Missouri the state utility commissions are
granted statutory authority to require a public utility, by special or general order, to construct, maintain, and operate its plant, equipment, and
premises in such manner as to promote and safeguard the health and
safety of its employees and the public generally. 7 However, none of
these commissions has exercised its powers in this respect. 8
6 The name of the agency exercising rule-making power over the safety of employees
varies from state to state.
·
1 Cal. Public Utilities Code §768; Ill. Stat. Ann. c. III 2/3, §6I; Mo. Rev. Stat.
(I949) §J86.JIO,
s See Cal. Adm. Code, tit. 20, for regulations of the Public Utilities Commission.
Letter from Marvin P. Moore, Secretary of the Missouri Commission, March IS, I954·
The Illinois Commerce Commission has not replied to a specific inquiry concerning
health and safety regulations and available published records reveal no exercise of the
authority.
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The Wisconsin Public Service Commission has power to "make reasonable· rules, regulations, specifications and standards for the installation, operation and maintenance of all safety devices and measures." 9
Another section of the Wisconsin statutes provides that every public
utility which owns, controls, or operates any wires over which electricity
is transmitted "shall construct, operate and maintain such wires and the
equipment used in connection therewith in a . . . safe manner. . . ." 10
The commission may also order "any alteration in construction or loca-·
tion or change of methods of operation required for public safety .
11
• • •"
. As a matter of practice, in Wisconsin the Public Service Commission collaborates with the Wisconsin Industrial Commission in the
preparation of the Wisconsin Electric Safety Code, and these two commissions administer the code jointly. 12 The Public Service Commission
administers that part of the code having to do with outside plant and
equipment, and the Industrial Commission administers that relating to
inside equipment. 18 This method of demarking lines of authority serves
to alleviate possibilities of duplicating and inconsistent regulation by the
two agencies. In other states the extent of the jurisdiction exercised by
these .two types of agencies is not so clearly defined.
The New York Public Service Commission is given authority to investigate methods employed in manufacturing electricity, and it has
power "to order such reasonable improvements as will best promote the
public interest, preserve the public health and protect those using such
gas or electricity and those employed in the manufacture and distribution thereof. . . ." 14 Many years ago, in 1913, an order was promulgated by the Public Service Commission relating to safeguarding and
protecting employees from injury resulting from generating equipment,
but it was revoked in 1932.15 ·No other regulations relating to the health
a11d safety of employees have been found. Moreover, it should be noted
.that the term "factory," as defined for purposes of the jurisdiction of
the New York Labor Department, excludes generating plants of public
utilities subject to the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission. 16
Wis. Stat. (1957) §195.03(18).
!d., §196.74·
11 /bid.
12 Provision is made for this type of joint administrative action in Wis. Stat. (1957)
§20.90418 Letter from George P. Steinmetz, Commissioner, Wis. Public Service Commission, March 29, 1954H N.Y. Public Service Law §66(2).
15 5 N.Y. Official Compilation of Codes, Rules & Regulations 1435, 1437 (1945).
1s N.Y. Labor Law §2(9).
9

10
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But whether the statutory definition means that the Public Service Commission is intended to have exclusive jurisdiction over the adoption of
standards to protect the health and safety of employees of electric plants
utilizing nuclear energy is apparently far from clear. 11
The Ohio Public Utilities Commission is given general supervision
over the marmer in which public utilities are operated with respectto the
"adequacy or accommodation afforded by their service, the safety and
security of the public and their employees." 18 The commission also
may require that repairs, improvements, or additions be made to the
plant or equipment of any public utility "in order to promote the convenience or welfare of the public or of employees. . . ." 19
In Pennsylvania the service and facilities of public utilities must conform with regulations and orders of the Public Utility Commission, and
every public utility "shall make all such repairs, changes, alterations,
substitutions, extensions, and improvement!i in or to such service and
facilities as shall be necessary or proper for the accommodation, convenience, and safety of its patrons, employees, and ·the public." 20 A
letter from the chairman of the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission
states : "While this Commission has express authority over matters of
safety of workers and this would extend by implication to atomic energy plants the matter rarely comes up for adjudication." 21
The Michigan and New Jersey statutes are somewhat less specific in
granting authority to the utility commissions to prescribe health and
safety regulations. The Michigan commission, however, apparently assumes that a general grant of power is sufficient. The Michigan statute
vests power in the Public Service Commission to "regulate all rates,
fares, fees, charges, services, rules, conditions of service and all other
matters pertaining to the formation, operation, or direction" of public
utilities. 22 Under this language, the Public Service Commission has
promulgated an extensive set of regulations applicable to electric utilities,
which includes provisions to protect employees. 28 The only relevant New
11 Doubts were raised by letters from George H. Kenny, Ass't Counsel, N.Y. Public
Service Commission, March 5, 1954, and Irving R. Tabershaw, Director, Division of
Industrial Hygiene, N.Y. Dept. of Labor, March 25, 1954.
18 Ohio Rev. Code §4905.o6.
19 I d., §4905.38.
2o Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 66, §1171.
21 Letter from Leon Schwartz, Chairman, Pa. Public Utility Commission, March 26,
1954·
22 Mich. Stat. Ann. §22.13 (6).
2s Mich. Adm. Code (1954) R 460.501 et seq., especially R 400.530-R 400.538 and
R 46o.56o-R 46o.565.
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Jersey statute is one which provides that the Board of Public Utility
Commissioners may require any public utility to furnish "safe, adequate
and proper service and to maintain its property and equipment in such
condition as to enable it to do so." 24 This provision seems to be directed
primarily at the kind of service rendered rather than at the protection of
employees, but it might, like the Michigan statute, be construed broadly
to give the board jurisdiction over the safety of employees.

B. . Labor Departments and Industrial Commissions
All ten states selected for this study have created some form of a state
labor department or industrial commission to administer their labor
laws. One of the primary functions of these labor agencies is the protection of the health and safety of employees, and accordingly the labor
agency is usually given rule-making power to promulgate regulations
safeguarding the health and safety of workers. ·
Many state labor agencies are evincing considerable interest in regulations relating to the use of fissionable and radioactive materials. As
will be noted later, some states have already promulgated extensive regulations covering the use, handling, and storage of radioactive substances,
and several other states plan to adopt similar regulations in the near
future. Probably most of the state agencies will follow substantially the
recommendations contained in handbooks published by the Nation~l
Bureau of Standards on problems of radioactivity. 25 The extent of the
jurisdiction of the labor agencies varies from state to state. In most
states the agency is given jurisdiction over employers and employees
N.J. Rev. Stat. ( 1937) §48: 2-23.
Several letters from state labor agencies indicated this intention. The recommendations contained in these handbooks are formulated by the National Committee on
Radiation Protection and its subcommittees. The handbooks available thus far include:
No. 23, "Radium Protection"; No. 27, "Safe Handling of Radioactive Luminous Compounds"; No. 41, "Medical X-ray Protection"; No. 42, "Safe Handling of Radioactive
Isotopes" ; No. 48, "Control and Removal of Radioactive Contamination in Laboratories" ; No. 49, "Recommendations .for Waste Disposal of Phosphorus-32 and IodineIJI for Medical Users"; No. so, "X-ray Protection Design"; No. 51, "Radiological
Monitoring Methods & Instruments"; No. 52, "Maximum Permissible Amounts of
Radioisotopes in the Human Body and Maximum Permissible Concentrations in Air
and Water" ; No. 53, "Recommendations for the Disposal of Carbon-14 Wastes" ;
No. 54, "Protection Against Radiations from Radium, Cobalt-6o, and Cesium-137";
No. 55, "Protection Against Betatron-Synchrotron Radiations up to 100 Million Electron Volts"; No. 56, "Safe Handling of Cadavers Containing Radioactive Isotopes";
No. 57, "Photographic Dosimetry of X- and Gamma Rays"; No. sB, "Radioactive
Waste Disposal in the Ocean"; No. 59, "Permissible Doses from External Sources
of Ionizing Radiation"; No, 61, "Regulation of Radiation Exposure by Legislative
Means"; No. 63, "Protection Against Neutron Radiation Up to 30 Million Electron
Volts." All are available from the U.S. Government Printing Office at nominal prices.
24

25
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wherever located. Because the employment relation is emphasized, the
labor agency would seem to be without power to regulate safety standards for other persons, such as the self-employed person and the independent contractor, although the applicability of the statutes to the independent contractor is by no means clear. Therefore, under this type
of statute there is a possible gap in the regulation by labor agencies of
the use of atomic energy. But it is an extremely small gap, because most
uses of atomic energy will undoubtedly involve employment of persons
in the usual sense. Certainly any electric utility operation would involve
an employer-employee relationship.
Another type of statute found in many states gives the labor agency
jurisdiction over types of operations, typically "factories" or "manufacturing establishments." Under such statutes the jurisdiction of the
agency will depend on the definition of these terms. Some states undertake to define further these terms, while others are silent as to their
meaning. There are few cases in which it has been necessary to decide
whether or not an electric utility is a "factory" or "manufacturing establishment." Certainly the weight of authority supports the view that
an electric generating plant is a manufacturing establishment, 26 and it
would seem also that the term "factory" would normally cover electric
utilities. 27 However, as to certain potential users of radioactive byproducts, such as hospitals, laboratories, etc., it is doubtful whether the
·statute will apply.
Because of the differences in the statutory patterns in the states under
··discussion, a state by state analysis seems to be the best method of surveying the kinds of powers possessed by state labor agencies, 28 together
with questions of possible overlapping jurisdiction, and the current state
of regulation 'With respect to the use of radioactive substances.
· r. California

At least three provisions of the California labor statutes should be
. noted for possible bearing on the regulation of uses of radioactive sub26 See Annot., "What is a 'manufacturing establishment' within meaning of regulatory statutes," g6 A.L.R. 1351 at 1354 ( 1935).
' 27 See Annot., "What is a 'factory' within statutes relating to safety and health of
employees," 163 A.L.R. 447 at 473 ff. (1946).
28 Because many electric plants using nuclear power will still use steam boilers in
their operations, it will 'be necessary for the industry to comply with any applicable
state regulations. Nearly all states have statutes relating to the operation, inspection,
and licensing of steam boilers. See, e.g., cat. Labor Code §§7681 et seq.; Ill. Stat.
Ann. c. 24, §§23•72 et seq.; Mich. Stat. Ann. §17:132; N.Y. Labor Law §204'; Ohio
Rev. Code §§41oJ.OI et seq.
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stances. One provision requires that every "factory or workshop in
which one or more persons are employed" shall be ventilated so as to
render harmless, so far as practicable, all injurious gases, vapors, dust,
or other impurities which may be produced, 29 and criminal sanctions are
provided for violations. 30
Another statute requires the owner of every "factory" to register
with the Division of Labor Statistics and Research, and also to furnish
certain pertinent inforination. 81 "Factory" is defined as " . . . any factory, workshop, m.ill, or other manufacturing establishment where five
or more persons are employed." 82 Although there is little authority on
the matter, it is quite likely that an atomic power plant would be considered a "factory" for the purpose of this statute, 38 and therefore any
such plant built in California would be required to register. Chemical
plants built to process radioactive substances would seem likewise to
be .subject to registration under this statute. 84
The most significant California statute, however, is that which confers
industrial safety rule-making authority on the Division of Industrial
Safety. 35 The division is given "power, jurisdiction, and supervision
over every employment and place of employment in this State" in order
to enforce all laws and lawful orders relating to the protection of the
life and safety of employees. 5 6 "Employment" is defined to include "the
carrying on of any trade, enterprise, project, industry, business, occupation or work . . . or any process or operation in any way related
thereto. . . ." 8 ,.. "Place of employment" is defined to include "any
place, and the premises appurtenant thereto, where employment is carried
on, except a place the safety jurisdiction over which is vested by law
in any State or Federal agency other than the division." 88 It was noted
previously that in California the Public Utilities Commission is given
authority to make rules and regulations to promote and safeguard the
2s

Cal. Labor Code §2351.

30
81

I d., §2354·
I d., §2601.

32

I d., §26oo.

See supra notes 26 and 27.
The Division of Labor Statistics and Research has the duty to inform various
health authorities of the location of factories registered with it. Cal. Labor Code §26o4.
35 I d., §65oo.
38 I d., §6312.
87 Id., §6303.
88 I d., §6302. An opinion of the Attorney General holds that the division's power is
confined to the premises where the labor is performed. 13 Cal. Op. Atty. Gen. 48
( 1949).
33

34
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health and safety of employees in public utility plants. 89 Since an atomic
power plant would be classified as a public utility, does the statute mean
that because the Public Utilities Commission has safety jurisdiction over
plant employees, the Division of Industrial Safety does not? A 1953
statute seems to answer this question in the negative, for it is there
provided that the "jurisdiction vested in the division shall in no instance,
except those affecting exclusively the safety of employees, impair, diminish, or in any way affect the jurisdiction of the Public Utilities Commission. . . . " 40 Therefore, the division apparently has jurisdiction
over the safety of employees in public utility plants, and the similar
power previously vested in the Public Utilities Commission is displaced.
Under this statutory authority over "employment" and "places of
employment," and without any legislative authority to regulate radiation hazards specifically, the Division of Industrial Safety has promulgated a somewhat extensive set of regulations as a part of the "General
Industry Safety Orders" establishing minimum standards for employees
exposed to ionizing radiation: 41 These regulations are discussed in detail and compared with the standards of the Atomic Energy Commission and the National Committee on Radiation Protection and Measurement in Chapter V.
There are other General Industry Safety Orders which may be applicable to. establishments in California using radioactive substances.
There are regulations establishing minimum standards for the prevention of harmful exposure of employees to dusts, fumes, mists, vapors,
and gases/ 2 and other regulations create minimum standards for the
use, handling, and storage of hot, flammable, poisonous, corrosive, and
hazardous substances in all places of employment except laboratories. 48
The General Industry Safety Order concerning radiation protection
does not explain its effect on these orders.
2.

Illinois

The Illinois Health and Safety Act of 1937 44 is applicable "to all
employers engaged in any occupation, business or enterprise in this
State, and their employees," except farming and coal mining operaCal. Public Utilities Code §768.
Cal. Labor Code §68o1.
u Cal. Adm. Code tit. 8, §§38oo et seq. The pertinent General Industry Safety
Orders are set forth in full in. Appendix A, Item 2.
42 Cal. Adm. Code tit. 8, §§4100 et seq.
48/d., §§4140 et seq.
44 Ill. Stat. Ann. c. 48, §§137.1-137.21.
89

40
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tions. 45 The Industrial Commission, an agency of the State Department
of Labor,4 6 is given authority to administer the act 47 and to make rules
to protect the life, health, and safety of employees.' 8 However, to effectuate these purposes, the act limits the Industrial Commission by
providing that it "shall make such rules only for :
(a) The proper sanitation and ventilation of all places of
employment to guard against personal injuries and diseases.
(b) The arrangement and guarding of machinery and the
storing and placing of personal property to guard against personal injuries and diseases.
(c) The prevention of personal injuries and diseases by
contact with any poisonous or deleterious materials, dust,
vapors, gases or fumes." 49
While no rules relating specifically to radiation or radioactivity have
been adopted under this act, 50 it would appear ~at the commission has
power to adopt regulations affecting various aspects of the use of radioactive materials. Clause (a) would authorize regulations in regard to
air contamination and the disposal of radioactive wastes, Clause (b)
would authorize the regulation of shielding and the storage of radioactive materials, and Clause (c) would authorize rules for monitoring,
maximum exposures, and the safe handling and use of radioactive substances. However, the commission is expressly denied power to make
any rule requiring the "submission of any plan, specifications or other
in formation concerning- any proposed installation, alteration, construction, apparatus or equipment . . ." 51 and therefore no procedure can
be established requiring advance approval of radiation installations.
In 1951 the Illinois Industrial Commission issued regulations relating to labeling in the use, handling, and storage of substances harmful
to the health and safety of employees. 52 The regulations provide for
the labeling of containers of substances "known to constitute a health,
45

/d., C. 48, §137.2.
/d., c. 127, §§5.03, 43.o6.
47 /d., C. 48, §137.1.
48 /d., c. 48. §137·3·
49 /d., c. 48, §I37·4- There are two other clauses which relate to artificial atmospheric pressure and scaffolds.
50 Ill. Health and Safety Act and Health and Safety Rules (1953). These rules
are required by statute to be published annually, and they are obtainable from either
the Secretary of State or the Industrial Commission under a recent administrative
procedure act. Ill. Stat. Ann. c. 127, §268.
51 111. Stat. Ann. c. 48, §137.3.
52 Ill. Health and Safety Rules, Industrial Commission (1953), Part "]".
46

STATE REGULATION

890

poison, fire or explosion hazard." 58 Such regulations would probably
apply to radioactive substances, since they constitute a health hazard
and because poisons are defined as substances known to be "so toxic to
man as to afford a hazard to health . . . ." 54
It ~as noted previously that broad powers are granted to the Illinois
Commerce Commission regarding the health and safety of employees
and the public in the operation of public utilities. 55 In a rather recent
case, it was argued that the authority given to the Industrial Commission under the Health and Safety Act gave that commission exclusive
jurisdiction over matters relating to the health and safety of employees,
and consequently by implication repealed the provisions of the Public
Utilities Act giving jurisdiction to the Commerce Commission over the
employees of public utilities. However, the Illinois Supreme Court
rejected this argument on the well-recognized principle that a statutory
construction which would result in repeal by implication of another
statute is not favored, and that there must be an irreconcilable repugnancy to justify an inference of repeal. The court, therefore, enforced
a Commerce Commission order applicable to railroad employees. 56 Apparently, the decision means that both the Industrial Commission and
the Commerce Commission may prescribe rules and regulations establishing standards covering the use of radioactive materials and maximum radiation exposures in atomic energy power plants if built in
lllinois. 57 This type of overlapping jurisdiction is confusing and objectionable.
3· Michigan
No general rule-making authority has been given to the Department
of Labor in Michigan, consequently no general safety regulations are
5Sfd., §I, Rule I.
54fd., §I, Rule 2(b).
55 Ill. Stat. Ann. c. III 2/3, §6I.
56 Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Elgin, Joliet and Eastern R. Co., 382 Ill.
55, 46 N.E.2d 932 (I94J).
57 One fact, peculiar to 111inois, which should be noted, is that the· industrial hygiene
program is administered by the State Labor Department [U.S. Federal Security
Agency, Public Health ServiCe, "Directory of State and Territorial Health Authorities
-I952,'' p. 20], in contrast to other states in which this program is a function of the
Department of Health. The statute provides that the Department of Labor shall
prosecute any violation of law relating to the inspection of factories, provided that
"before any prosecution is instituted based upon the laboratory findings of any industrial hygiene unit of the Department of Labor, any person dissatisfied with such findings shall be entitled to have an independent review by the central laboratory of the
Department of Public Health." 111. Stat. Ann. c. 48, §59.I5.
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in existence. 5 8 However, a statute requires that the owner of any factory operating "machinery of every description" must equip it with
"proper safeguards." The "commission" or "factory inspector" shall
determine whether machinery and equipment are properly guarded. 59
The Commissioner of Labor also has authority to order the installation
of proper and adequate ventilation devices to preserve the health and
safety of persons in "manufacturing, mercantile and other establishments." 60 Apparently, the conclusion to be drawn is that, while no generally applicable regulations can be adopted by the Department of Labor
in Michigan, it has authority to deal with specific plants on an individual
basis regarding industrial safety hazards.
Under existing statutes, perhaps the Public Service Commission
would be more likely to adopt regulations establishing minimum safety~
standards in the use of radiation sources than would the Department of
Labor. It was noted earlier that the Public Service Commission has
promulgat:!d employee health and safety regulations applicable to electric
utility plants. If nuclear energy were used in such a plant in Michigan,
iUs conceivable that the Public Service Commission would formulate
health and safety regulations to cover the peculiar hazards incident to
such operations. Moreover, "the investigation and prevention of hazards associated with industrial operations is a function of the Division
of Occupational Health," of the Michigan Department of Health, and
that agency has recently promulgated comprehensive radiation safety
rules, 61 Thus, in Michigan there is also the potentiality of at least three
regulatory agencies having jurisdiction to regulate matters of radiological health, and inconsistent action could create a regulatory "maze"
for atomic power. installations.
4: Missouri
The Industrial Commission of Missouri, which controls and supervises the work of the Department of Labor and Industrial Relations, has
authority to approve or disapprove all rules or regulations promulgated
by any division ~ithin the department. 62 One of these divisions is the
ss Regulations with respect to workmen's compensation, employment of women and
minors, steam boilers, and elevators do exist. Mich. Adm. Code (1954) R 4o8.201R 4o8473.
so Mich. Stat. Ann. §17.25.
60 /d., §17-33·
61 On February 14, 1958, a very comprehensive set of regulations .governing the use
of radioactive isotopes, X-radiation and all other forms of ionizing radiation published
by this division, became effective in Michigan. Mich. Adm. Code (1954, Supp. No. 13).
62 Mo. Rev. Stat. §286.o6o(4).

892

STATE REGULATION

Division of Industrial Inspection. 68 Within one month after the occupancy of any factory, workshop, or mill, the Director of Industrial Inspection must be notified thereof, 64 and thereafter annual reports are
required to be made to the director by every "factory, foundry or
machine shop or other manufacturing establishment doing business
within this state." 65 All machines and machinery used in "manufacturing, mechanical, and other establishments" must be "safely and securely"
guarded to prevent injury to employees. In the alternative, notice of
dangers must be posted when it is not possible to guard the equipment.
The director may order necessary alterations, additions, or repairs to
enforce compliance. 66 Any person operating any machine which generates poisonous gases in its operation (this might embrace radioactive
gaseous wastes) must provide the machine with a hood connected to a
blower or suction fan. 67 Apparently, the director does not possess specific authority to promulgate generally applicable safety regulations, but
he can order necessary alterations or additions to protect the health and
safety of employees "of any establishment." 68 In this respect the situation in Missouri is somewhat similar to that prevailing in Michigan.
There are special provisions relating to the prevention of occupational
diseases in the Missouri statutes which are more or less applicable to
the hazard associated with radioactive' materials. Every employer carrying on any "work, trade or process which may produce any illness or
disease peculiar to the work or process carried on, or which subjects the
employee to the danger of illness or disease incident to such work, trade
or process . . . "shall provide approved and effective devices or methods
to prevent industrial or occupational diseases. 69 This statute would
seem to embrace the uses of radioactive materials which involve radiation hazards. Certain processes are declared especially dangerous to the
health of employees. Included among them is any process involving certain enumerated metals "or any poisonous chemicals, minerals, acids,
fumes, vapors, gases, or other substances," in which these substances
are "generated or used, employed or handled by the employees in harmful quantities, or under harmful conditions, or come in contact with in
a harmful way.
" 70 If radioisotopes are considered a "poisonous
68
64
65

/d., §286.uo.
/d., §292.010.

I d., §291.090.

66 /d.,
6T /d.,
68Jd.,
69Jd.,
70 /d.,

§292.020.
§2!)2.120.
§292.18o.
§2l)2.JOO.
§2!)2.310.
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chemical," their use by employees would be within the letter of the
statute. Radioactive materials may and probably will be considered
"poisonous substances." 71 If these special provisions apply to an ~
ployer, he must provide working clothes and "adequate and approved
respirators." Moreover, employees subject to the hazards must be examined monthly by a physician. 72 Employers subject to these special
provisions must also provide sanitary and adequate dressing rooms and
lavatories/8 maintain working areas in a sanitary condition," take
prescribed measures to prevent and remove dust,n and post prescribed
notices. 7_8 The extent of the applicability of these provisions will have to
be worked out from time to time as occupational hazards result from the
radioactive substances.
5· New Jersey
The statutes of New Jersey do not precisely define the extent of the
jurisdiction of the Department of Labor and Industry, but apparently
it is broad enough to include factories and other establishments as well
as extending to the employment relationship, and the commissioner has
a general rule-making authority to enforce provisions of the labor laws
he administers. 11 Several statutes and regulations may possibly be relevant to the use of radioactive materials.
One New Jersey statute requires that every person "engaging in any
productive industry within the supervision of the department" shall
register with the Commissioner of Labor and Industry. 78 An occupational disease statute provides : "Every employer shall, without cost to
his employees, provide reasonably effective devices, means and methods
to prevent the contraction by them of any illness or disease incident to
the work or process in which they are engaged." 78 Certain special
precautions are necessary with respect to especially dangerous processes,
but these are so defined as to include only those relating to the manu71 See St. Joseph Lead Co. v. Jones, 70 F.2d 475 (1934) and Langeneckert v. St.
Louis Sulphur & Chemical Co. (Mo. App. 1933) 65 S.W..2d 648, for broad interpretations of the word "poisonous."
7 2 Mo. Rev. Stat. §292.330.
TBJd., §292.J6o.
u I d.~ §292.J8o.
15 /d., §292.J90.
16ld., §292420.
11 N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937) §34: 1-20, as incorporated by §34: 1A-6 (Cum. Supp. 19481950). See also id., §34: 1A-3(e).
18Jd., §34: 6-141.
19 /d., §34: 6-48.
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facture of certain lead compounds. 80 Other statutes require proper ventilation to render harmless any gases, vapors, dust, or other impurities
injurious to health that may be generated in any manufacturing establishment,81 and for proper safeguards to be placed on all machinery. 82
Existing regulations of the New Jersey Department of Labor and
Industry include a listing of "permissible concentration limits of vapors,
gases, fumes, mists, dusts and radiant· energy" applicable to "all places
of employment." 83 In these regulations, radiant energy is defined as
"energy derived from radio-active substances or shortwave radiation
which, upon exposure, may have a toxic and injurious effect on the
body." These limits, which are discussed in Chapter V of this Part, do
not conform with the current standards of the Atomic Energy Commission or the National Committee on Radiation Protection and Measurement. In 1954 and 1955 the New Jersey Department of Labor and Industry indicated that it was in the process of formulating comprehensive
rules and regulations to cover all types of radiation hazards. 84 These
regulations were to follow the recommended standards of the National
Committee on Radiation. Protection and Measurement, except that a
qualifying board was to be appointed to review applicants for certification. Furthermore, a substantial filing fee, based on the value of the
installation, was to be exacted so that, in effect, the proposed New Jersey
code would establish a licensing system for users of radiation sources.
It does not appear that these regulations have. been promulgated.
The Public Health Council of New Jersey, an official state agency
having jurisdiction over general public health problems, has promulgated regulations relating to radiation. In the Sanitary Code, it is provided that "X-ray machines and all other sources of radiation shall be
shielded, transported, handled, used and kept in such manner as to prevent users thereof and all persons within effective range thereof from
being exposed to excessive dosage of radiation." 85 Maximum exposures, however, are not prescribed. 86
80 I d., §34 : 6-49.
81/d., §34: 6-61.
82 /d., §34: 6-62.
sa State and Federal Labor Laws, New Jersey Edition, 434 (1953).
84 Letters from J. Lyman Brown, Deputy Commissioner, N.J. Dept. of Labor &
Industry, March 9, 1954, June I, 1955.
85 N.J. State Sanitary Code, June 22, 1953, pamphlet, p. 22.
se New Jersey labor regulations also require that safety committees be organized in
plants under the jurisdiction of the Department of Labor and Industry. These committees supervise safety inspection work, devise methods to avoid accidents, and insure
that new employees are properly instructed as to hazards and that employees are
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6. New York
New York's Department of Labor, headed by an Industrial Commissioner,87 contains the Board of Standards and Appeals 88 which has
broad authority to promulgate rules and regulations to effectuate various
provisions of the labor laws. 89 Rules may be made to minimize personal
injuries and diseases and to require "reasonable and adequate" protection for the lives, health, and safety of employees. 90 Rules adopted by
the board constitute the Industrial Code. 91
New York statutes also require the registration of "factories" with
the Industrial Commissioner. 92 In addition, there are provisions requiring the guarding of machinery in factories, 93 and others requiring adequate ventilation and removal of "gases, fumes, vapors, fibers or other
impurities" from factories. 94 However, "power houses, generating
plants and other structures owned or operated by a public service corporation or a municipal corporation other than ·construction or repair
shops, subject to the jurisdiction of the public service commission"
are excluded from the definition of factory. 95 Therefore, an atomic
energy installation used exclusively to generate electrical energy would
seemingly not be subject to the jurisdiction of the Industrial Commissioner over "factories."
However, it seems probable that the Board of Standards and Appeals
could make certain rules applicable to atomic energy power plants, even
though such plants would not be subject to the provisions relating to
"factories," for it is provided that: "Whenever the board finds that any
industry, trade, occupation or process involves such elements of danger
. to the lives, health, or safety of persons employed therein as to require
special regulation for the protection of such persons . . . ," the board
may make rules to guard against these dangers by requiring licenses, by
educated in safety practices. Safety inspectors are required, and weekly safety inspections must be made. Slightly different regulations apply to three categories of plants:
I to so employees, ISO to soo employees, and over soo employees. There are other
requirements as to first aid facilities, emergency hospital, and a dispensary, including
the items of equipment that must be on hand in each of these units. State and Federal
Labor Laws, New Jersey Edition,.493-SOO (I9SJ).
87 N.Y. Labor Law §10.
88 /d., §12-a.
89 /d., §Z?-a.
90 /d., §28(1).
91 /d., §§29. 200.
92 /d., §2SO.
93 /d., §2S6.
94 /d., §299.
95/d., §2(9).
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requmng medical supervision of persons employed, and by "other
appropriate means." 96 It is the opinion of tne counsel to the Labor
Department that this provision authorizes the board to make rules applicable to power plants even though th~y are subject to the general
jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission. 97
Under this provision, the Board of Standards and Appeals of the
State Department of Labor has, in fact, issued regulations relating to
radiation protection. 98 The code, effective December 15, 1955, is very
extensive, and its purpose is to offer reasonable and adequate protection in "every place where any employee in the course of his work may
be exposed to radiation in excess of one tenth the permissible weekly
dose" except medical, dental, veterinary, and educational institutions,
clinics, and officers which are subject to the provisions of the Sanitary
Code. 99 The provisions of both the Labor and the Sanitary Codes, which
apply to sources of radiation, are discussed and compared in Chapter V.
Since the New York State Department of Health has also issued
regulations covering ionizing radiation, it should also be noted at this
point that the Division of Industrial Hygiene in the Department of
Labor administers all laws relating to industrial hygiene for the Department of Health. 100 But when a condition resulting from the operation of a business, plant, or public utility constitutes a threat to the
general public health, as distinguished from that of employees only,
the jurisdiction of the Department of Health will probably be paramount.101 Furthermore, the regulations of the Labor Department do
not apply to hospitals, medical clinics, dental offices, podiatry offices,
veterinary clinics, educational institutions, and commercial, private, or
research laboratories performing diagnostic procedures or handling
equipment of material for medical use which are subject to the provisions of the New York State Sanitary Code promulgated by the Health
Department.102
96Jd., §28(2).
97 Quotation in letter from Irving R. Tabershaw, Director, Division of Industrial
Hygiene, N.Y. Dept. of Labor, March 25, 195498 N.Y. Industrial Code Rule No. 38.
88 N.Y. Public Health Law, Appendix, State Sanitary Code, c. XVI.
100 Federal Security Agency, "Directory of State and Territorial Health Authorities
-1952," 39; letter from Earl W. Murray, Counsel, N.Y. Dept. of Health, Feb. 15,19541o1 People ex rel. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R. v. Willcox, 200 N.Y.
423. 94 N.E. 212 (I9II).
102 N.Y. Industrial Code No. 38, Reg. JS-6.
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7· Ohio
The Ohio Department of Industrial Relations has jurisdiction over
"every employment and place of employment. . . . " 103 It has the duty,
among others, to administer and enforce the general laws of Ohio relating to "manufacturing" and "electrical" establishments and all other
laws protecting the life, health, safety, and welfare of employees.' 04
Statutes require that the employer furnish safe employment; i.e., furnish
and use safety devices, safeguards, methods, and processes which will
protect employees. 106
All shops and factories, which are defined to include manufacturing
and electrical establishments/06 are subject to inspection by personnel
of the Division of Workshops and Factories, and the division may order the owners of these establishments to correct dangerous, unhealthy,
or unsanitary conditions. 107 Furthermore, numerous requirements are
imposed on owners and operators of shops and factories relating to
safety precautioils/08 accident reports/ 09 notices to be posted on dangerous machinery, 110 and additional safety rules. 111
Although independent of the Department of Industrial Relations, the
key rule-making agency in matters of employee health and safety appears to be the Industrial Commission, 112 which has broad authority to
adopt rules and regulations prescribing safety devices, safeguards, or
other means or methods to protect the life, health, and safety of employees.118
It should be noted at this point that the Ohio Department of Health
promulgated regulations in 1947 for the prevention and control of diseases resulting from toxic fumes, vapors, mists, gases, and dusts applicable to every place of employment.m One regulation provides that
"No employer shall use or permit to be used in the conduct of his busi1oa Ohio Rev. Code §4101.03.
10 4 Jd., §4101.02(B).
105 I d., §§4101.11, 4101.12.
108 I d., §4107.01.
107
ld., §4107-07·
108 I d., §4107.23.
109 I d., §4107.13.
110 I d., §4107.25.
111 I d., §4107.26.
11 2 The Industrial Commission is not a part of the Department of Industrial Relations, Ohio Rev. Code §121.04, but apparently the Industrial Commission performs the
rule-making functions for the department. See §§4101.o6, 4121.22. See also, §§4121.02
to 4121.09 for establishment and organization of the Industrial Commission.
113 I d., §4121.13.
11 4 Mimeographed regulations of the Ohio Dept. of Health.
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ness, manufacturing establishment or other place of employment, any
process, material or condition known to have an adverse effect on health,
unless reasonable provisions have been made to prevent injury to the
health of the employees and of the public." 115 Radiation exposures are
limited too. 1 roentgen per day, 116 which was the old standard. Regulations also exist with respect to ventilation, 111 personal protective equipment,118 isolation of hazardous operations, 119 and posting notices and
giving periodic instruction to employees regarding radiation hazards. 120
However, these Ohio Department of Health regulations do not contain
the amplification of standards contained in detail in California and New
York regulations. The failure to include standards in respect to h_andling, storage, and disposal of radioactive materials and to provide a
more detailed listing of permissible exposures can be attributed largely
to the fact that the Ohio regulations were adopted when relatively little
technological information was available. Nonetheless, the action of the
Ohio Department of Health in respect to places of employment coupled
with the seemingly broad jurisdiction of the Ohio Department of Industrial Relations in respect to matters of employee health and safety
further demonstrates the confusion in jurisdiction over atomic energy
affairs among several state agencies.

8. Pennsylvania
In Pennsylvania the situation is somewhat confused by the existence
of both a Department of Labor and Industry having broad rule-making
powers and an Industrial Board 121 which not only has rule-making
powers of its own 122 but also must approve or disapprove all regulations
promulgated by the Department of Labor and Industry. 128
The most important legislation is the Health and Safety Act of
1937,124 which grants the Department of Labor and Industry power
to make rules and regulations to effectuate the provisions of the act.
The statute extends to every "establishment" in the state, which. is de115

I d., Reg. 247.

110 Ibid.

Jd., Reg. 248, 249.
!d., Reg. 251.
11s I d., Reg. 252.
12o !d., Reg. 254121 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 71, §§13, 63.
122 !d., §§1442, 1443, 1444.
128 I d., §§565, 574·
124 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, §§25-1 to 25-15.
117

11s

HEALTH AND SAFETY REGULATION

899

fined as "any room, building or place . . . where persons are employed
. . . except farms or private dwellings . . . . " 125 All establishments
must be "constructed, equipped, arranged, operated, and conducted as
to provide reasonable and adequate protection for the life, limb, health,
safety, and morals of all persons employed therein." 126 All toxic and
noxious dusts, fumes, vapors, and other atmospheric impurities which
create a condition of danger to employees must be removed, or if that
is impractical, employees must wear personal protective devices. 127 Recognizing hazards of ~adioactivity, in 1953 the Pennsylvania legislature
added the underlined words to the following provision :
When employees, due to the nature of employment, are
subject to injury from flying particles, falling objects, sharp
or rough surfaces or materials, hot, corrosive or poisonous
substances, acids or caustics and injurious light rays or harmful radioactive materials, they shall be provided with and shall
wear goggles, other head and eye protectors; gloves, leggings,
and other personal protective devices. 128
Other Pennsylvania statutes require proper ventilation, sanitation, 129
and proper guarding of machinery 180 in all establishments within the
state. Thus, in Pennsylvania, as in other states, there are several possibly applicable statutes governing atomic energy health and safety problems, and at least two state agencies apparently have rule-making power
so that inconsistent regulations may prove overly burdensome on the
new atomic energy industry.
In 1955 the Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry indicated that it intended to issue a comprehensive set of radiation health
and safety regulations to protect persons within its jurisdiction, 181 but
it was subsequently decided to establish an "Interdepartmental Committee and prepare regulations in which both the Department of Labor
and Industry will be vitally interested. . . . It is the intent of the Interdepartmental Committee to have the Department of Health police the
regulations and the Department of Labor and Industry enforce
them." 182 As of February of 1958 no regulations had been promulgated
by this committee.
125fd.,

§25-1.

126fd., §25-2(a).
127

ld., §25-2(e).

12Bfd., §25-2(h).
1 29

Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, §§19, 25-3.
I d., §§ 19, 25-7131 Letter from John R. Torquato, Secretary of Labor and Industry, June 2, 1955.
182 Letter .from William L. Batt, Jr., Secretary of Labor and Industry, Feb. 17, 1958.
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9· Texas
Texas has not created an industrial board or commission with authority to adopt rules and regulations establishing health and safety
standards for employees. There is, however, a Bureau of Labor Statistics, headed by a Commissioner 188 whose duties involve the gathering
of data, making reports, and reporting to the appropriate authority the
violation of any law with respect to employment. 184 Under a chapter
entitled "Protection of Female Employees" are found several provisions which require that factories and establishments be kept free
from poisonous or noxious gases and injurious dust arising from any
process/ 85 and that wastes be removed and disposed of "in such manner
as not to cause a nuisance." 186 The Commissioner of Labor Statistics
is authorized to inspect any factory or other establishment where five
or more persons are employed and to require the correction of any unsanitary or dangerous condition. 181 But since the title of the statute
embracing these provisions refers to the health, safety, and comfort of
employees of establishments where females are employed, this statute
may only be applicable to plants or establishments which employ women,
even though the body of the statute does not seem thus to limit its applicability.188 Hence, the extent of the authority of the Commissioner
of Labor Satistics is not clear from a study of the statutes.
However, the Texas State Department of Health has general rulemaking authority to require that industrial establishments provide adequate protection for the health and safety of workers. 139 A statute
administered by the State Department of Health provides that no employer shall use in the conduct of any place of employment "any process,
material, or condition known to have any possible adverse effect on
the health of any person . . . employed therein unless arrangements
have been made to maintain the occupational environment to the extent
that such injury will not result." 140 The Department of Health is required to make available information concerning maximum allowable
concentrations of toxic gases and concerning environmental standards
188

Tex. Civ. Stat. art. 5144.

/d., arts. 5145-5149.
136 /d., art. 5174.
186 /d., art. 5175.
137 /d., art. 5179·
184

See Texas Laws, Fourth Sess. 1918, p. 132.
Tex. Civ. Stat. art. 4477-1, §19(c), as interpreted in a letter from V. M. Ehlers,
Director, Bureau of Sanitary Engineering, Tex. State Dept. of Health, March I, 1954.
uo Tex. Civ. Stat. art. 4477-1, §19(a).
188
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which pertain to the health and safety of employees of industrial establishments.141 Pursuant to the above authority, the Department of
Health issued Regulations on Radiation Exposure which became effective in September of 1956. These regulations, which are discussed in
Chapter V, follow the recommendations of the National Committee on
Radiation Protection and Measurement.
10.

Wisconsin

In Wisconsin under the act which establishes the Industrial Commission,142 it is made the statutory duty of every employer to furnish
a safe place of employment and to do everything reasonably necessary
to protect the "life, health, safety, and welfare" of employees and "frequenters." 143 The terms "place of employment" and "employment" are
defined broadly to include all activity wherein any person is, directly or
indirectly, employed by another for direct or indirect gain or profit,
except in private domestic services and agricultural operations. 144
The Industrial Commission has been given very broad rule-making
powers to ascertain and determine reasonable safety devices and safeguards and to adopt standards to protect employees and "frequenters"
of places of employment.w It is further provided that local regulatory
bodies, such as city councils or boards of health, shall not be deprived
of power over places of employment, but in case of conflict with an
order of the Industrial Commission, the latter shall amend or modify
the local order .148
Unquestionably, the Industrial Commission would have jurisdiction
over an atomic power plant built in Wisconsin. Moreover, the fact that
such a plant would be subject to the Wisconsin Public Service Commission seemingly has no effect on the powers of the Industrial Commission
over the same plant. 147 As was noted earlier, the Industrial Commission
and the Public Service Commission collaborate in the preparation and
administration of regulations affecting electric utility plants.
ld., §19(b).
Wis. Stat. (1957) §§IOI.OI it seq.
14 3 I d., §IoJ.(J6. A "frequenter" is a person other than an employee who may be in
a place of employment "under circumstances which render him other than a trespasser."
Jd., §101.01(5).
W•Jd., §IOI.OI(l), (2).
H5 /d., §§IOI.IO(J), (4), (5); §101.09.
U6Jd., §IOI.I6(I).
147 Letter received from 0, T. Nelson, Director of Safety and Sanitation, Wisconsin
Industrial Commission, dated Feb. 19. 1954.
141

142
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The Industrial Commission has adopted a .number of regulations
relating to industrial safety which would be applicable to uses of radioactive materials. 148 An order prescribing maximum permissible exposures, as amended April 2, 1954, stipulates 0.3 roentgen per week. 149
Uranium is included on the list of toxic dusts, fumes, and mists, and the
allowable limit for uranium in soluble compounds is 0.05 milligrams
per cubic meter and 0.2 5 milligrams per cubic meter in insoluble compounds. m Other regulations require adequate ventilation, protection
from dusts, proper disposal of exhaust materials, and personal protective devices. 151 Many other regulations are in force relating to specific
operations or specific hazards. 152
·
As with other states it is apparent that more than one agency has
jurisdiction to promulgate regulations governing the health and safety
of atomic energy operations. However, the cooperation between the
· Public Service Commission and Industrial Commission in Wisconsin
has served to ameliorate potentialities of inconsistent or overlapping
regulations that may have a' detrimental effect on growth of atomic
energy industrial pursuits.
I I.

Conclusion

The analysis of the foregoing statutory provisions concerning labor
safety regulatory agencies reveals that the statutes and regulations
applicable to an atomic energy industry vary considerably from state to
state, but that in all the states covered by this study some type of regulatory agency has been granted sufficient power to have some authority
over users of nuclear power and radioisotopes. A failure on the part
of persons entering the atomic field to assess existing and prospective
statutes and regulations may lead to wasteful expenditures if basic redesigning or supplemental equipment are required subsequently by order
of a state labor agency. The establishment of an atomic energy industry
where a state agency has regulatory power, but has not yet exercised the
power, will be even more difficult to handle, since a later adoption of
regulations may even cause temporary suspension of operations. Therefore, consultation with appropriate agencies appears advisable to determine in advance the permissible scope of activity.
us These regulations are available in pamphlet and mimeographed .form from the
Industrial Commission. They will be cited simply by number.
uo Order 2002.
no Ibid.
151 Orders 2003 to 2021.
u2 See General Orders on Safety, Orders I to 83.
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Undoubtedly the most significant aspect of the present state regulatory pattern is the conflict of jurisdiction of state agencies in matters
of employee health and safety. Not only do the public utility commissions typically have regulatory powers, but also labor departments and,
in some instances, health departments are authorized to issue regulations
relating to employees and places of employment. Moreover, as we
progress to an examination of ( 1) the general powers of health departments in respect to the health and safety of members of the general
public and ( 2) the powers of other typical state agencies, the confusing
and overlapping jurisdictions of the several agencies will appear to have
even a greater possibility of seriously impeding the exploitation of
atomic energy if unreasonable duplication of effort is required on the
part of the atomic energy industry.

C. Health Departments and Boards
All ten states selected for study have established state health departments and, in addition, ·have provided for various local boards of health.
In the past, it would appear that the health departments have been
primarily concerned with standards and measures to protect the general
public, leaving specific safety regulations for employees to appropriate
labor agencies. However, recent experience indicates that this may not be
the case with respect to radiation hazards : of the seven comprehensive
state radiation health and safety codes in effect as of April 1958, only
two were promulgated by labor agencies, and, of the five issued by health
departments, four are designed to protect empl9yees as well as the
general public.
Of all the state agencies which may regulate radiation hazards, the
powers of the state health departments and boards appear to be the most
significant. For the most part, the regulations of the departments of
labor and the public utility commissions are limited in their application
to places within the control of the person subject to the regulations.
Quite obviously these boundaries are not recognized by either direct
radiation or by disseminated radioactive materials which may contaminate the surface and underground waters, sewage systems, and the
atmosphere of the state. Adequate employee protection standards do not
necessarily assure that the health of the general public outside the radiation installation will be safeguarded against radiation hazards caused by
products containing radioactive materials or radioactive stack gases,
for example. While it appears that the state health departments have
the broadest health and safety powers and, therefore, are in the best
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position to give radiation hazards the sort of comprehensive attention
required, it is unfortunately difficult to draw a clear line of demarcation between those matters which may be regulated by state health
agencies and those matters which fall into the regulatory sphere of other
state agencies. As is indicated in Chapter V of this Part, only New York
has made any attempt to solve the jurisdictional problem, and that solution is not altogether satisfactory. Moreover, since both local boards
of health and local legislative bodies may possess general powers over
public health and safety, the problems created by overlapping jurisdiction are compounded. 153 It is desirabl~, therefore, to examine the general scope of the existing statutory powers of state and local health
agencies, together with possible limitations thereon, in order to form
some appraisal of the extent to which they will bear upon atomic
enterprise.
I.

State Health Departments

The state health departments of the ten states studied typically ha.ve
"general supervision of the interests of the health and lives of the
people of the state," 1114 and are given power "to adopt, promulgate, repeal and amend rules and regulations consistent with law for the protection of the public health." 11111 Under the Ohio statute conferring
rule-making power on the Public Health Council, the Attorney General of Ohio has ruled that the council has authority to adopt regulations
establishing maximum allowable conc~ntrations for substances used in
industry which are dangerous to public health. 166 As indicated in the
discussion of labor department regulation, the Ohio Department of
ns See Zullo v. Bd. of Health of Woodbridge Tp., 9 N.J. 431, 88 A.2d 625 (1952),
indicating that a local board of health and a municipality had concurrent jurisdiction
to regulate trailer camps.
164 111. Rev. Stat. c. 127, §55.02. See also Mo. Rev. Stat. (1949), §192.020; Ohio
Rev. Code §3701.13; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 71, §1403, tit. 73, §532; Wis. Stat. (1957)
§140.05(1).
155 Cal. Health & Safety Code §102. Substantially similar provisions:
Ill. Rev.
Stat. c. III I/2, §22; Mich. Stat. Ann. §147; Mo. Rev. Stat. (1949) § 192.020 (the
Missouri statute extends only to "infectious, contagious, communicable or dangerous
diseases." A letter from the Missouri Division of Health, dated March 17, 1954,
written by L. E. Ordelheide, Director, Bureau of Public Health Engineering, indicates
that the Division of Health feels that it has authority under this statute to adopt
regulations prescribing maximum radiation exposures although they have not yet done
so); N.J. Rev. Stat. §26:xA-7 (Cum. Supp. 1945-47); N.Y. Public Health Law
§225(3); Ohio Rev. Code §3701.34; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 71, §532; Tex. Civ. Stat.
art. 441&1; Wis. Stat. (1957) §I40.05(3).
111e 1945 Op. Atty. Gen. (Ohio) #009.
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Health has in fact issued regulations governing places of employment.m
In Michigan an inter-office memorandum to the Attorney General stated
that the State Commissioner of Health has sufficient powers to issue
"regulations concerning persons dealing in or operating with radioactive or fissionable materials." 158 As a result the commissioner has recently promulgated health and safety regulations pertaining to all
sources of ionizing radiation in Michigan. 159 While the memorandum
considered it doubtful if a registration requirement could be sustained
under the existing powers, the Michigan regulations nevertheless contain such a provision. In contrast, it apparently was believed necessary
to extend the powers of the health departments in Colorado, Connecticut,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, and South Dakota to
authorize them to regulate radiation hazards, for the legislatures of each
of these states have recently enacted appropriate statutes. The Colorado Board of Health is authorized "to establish and enforce standards
for exposure to environmental conditions, including radiation, that may
be deemed necessary for the protection of the public health." 160 In
Connecticut the State Department of Health may incorporate into the
Sanitary Code regulations governing the operation of any source of
ionizing radiation or the production, transportation, storage, possession,
or disposition of radioactive materials. 181 These regulations are to be
based on the standards of the Atomic Energy Commission or, in lieu
thereof, upon the latest recommendations of the National Committee on
Radiation Protection and Measurement. Registration requirements are
specifically authorized. Massachusetts conferred a more limited authority upon its Department of Public Health in a statute which directs it
to "prescribe and establish rules and regulations to control the transportation, storage, packaging, sale, distribution, production and disposal of radioactive materials which may affect the public health," 182
but the statute does not authorize the promulgation of regulations concerning the use of radioactive materials. Similarly, sources of radiation
which do not consist of radioactive materials are not covered. Furthermore, the act specifically states that the powers of the Department
Supra note II4Inter-office Memorandum to Attorney General T. M. Kavanaugh from Assistant
Attorney General R. A. Derengoski regarding the rule-making powers of the State
Commissioner of Health, dated Nov. 8, I955·
159 Mich. Adm. Code (I954, Supp. No. IJ). These regulations are examined in
detail in Part III, Chapter V, infra.
18o Colo. Rev. Stat. §66-I-7(2I).
161 Public Acts of Conn. I957, Public Act IS4.
162 Mass. Ann. Laws c. I I I.
UT

158
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of Labor and Industries to establish regulations for the protection of
the health and safety of employees against radiation hazards are not
impaired. In 1958 the New Jersey legislature enacted a "Radiation
Protection Act" establishing a Commission on Radiation Protection
within the Department of Health and empowering the Commission to
adopt rules and regulations to prohibit and prevent "unnecessary radiation." 163 The New York Public Health Law was amended in 1955 to
authorize the Department of Public Health to regulate the "public
health aspects of the use of ionizing radiation and the handling and disposal of radioactive wastes." 164 Similarly, the Oregon Board of Health
in 1957 was directed to promulgate regulations and standards for the
safe use, handling, disposal, and control of all radiation sources within
the state after it had conducted a two-year study of the problems. 165
Finally, the South Dakota Department of Health is authorized to "develop comprehensive policies and programs for the evaluation and determination of hazards associated with the use of radiation" and to
"adopt, promulgate, and enforce such rules and regulations as may be
necessary." 166 These statutes are analyzed in greater detail in Chapter V
of this Part as are the regulations of the health departments of Connecticut and New York, which were promulgated pursuant to the above
authorization.
Another general power commonly given to state departments of
health is the power to investigate complaints involving nuisances or potential hazards to life and health and to require the abatement of any
such nuisance. 167 In some states the abatement of nuisances is left to
local boards of health. 168
For illustrative purposes, two statutes may be noted. In Ohio it is
provided that any industrial establishment which produces industrial
wastes must submit plans for the treatment and disposal of such wastes
to the State Department of Health. These plans must be approved before the plant may be constructed. 169 Under the California statutes,
the State Department of Health is empowered to abate "contaminaN.J. Laws 1958, c. n6.
N.Y. Public Health Law §201 (1)(s).
163 Ore. Laws 1957, c. 399.
166 S.D. Laws 1957, H.B. 826.
167 Cal. Health & Safety Code §2o6; N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937) §26: 2-43; N.Y. Public
Health Law §2o1(o), §§1300, 1301; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 71, §1403; Wis. Stat. (1957)
§146.14(1).
168 For detailed provisions, see below.
169 Ohio Rev. Code §3701.19.
168
164

HEALTH AND SAFETY REGULATION

907

tion." 170 "Contamination" is defined as a condition which results from
the disposal of industrial wastes of such a nature as to create an actual
hazard to the public health. 171 Contamination is also made a crime. 172
These two statutes illustrate the two different approaches to the problem; i.e., advance approval on the one hand and subsequent action on
the other.
Other states considered in this study have not yet adopted radiological health regulations, but some of them use as a guide to determine
the existence of possible health hazards the standards adopted by the
American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists or by
official bodies such as the United States Public Health Service, the National Bureau of Standards, or the Atomic Energy Commission. 173
2.

Local Health Agencies

Each of the ten states examined in this study has also established
some form of health regulation at the city and county levels. In addition, many states have provided for the organization of township health
boards and health districts which may be comprised of nearly any possible combination of political subdivisions. Usually these local health
boards are invested with powers very similar to those of the state
health departments, except that the territorial jurisdiction of the
local health agency, of course, is limited, and the local health board is
normally subject to the paramount authority of the state department
of health. 174 As might be expected, there is considerable divergence in
the types of health boards authorized by the various statutes. However,
the powers conferred on the agencies appear to be somewhat similar,
whether the boards are established at the city, township, county, or a
hybrid district level.
a. Cities
In some states incorporated cities and towns are given authority to
pass such ordinances as may be deemed necessary fo-r the protection of
the health of the inhabitants. 175 Other states authorize the creation of
Cal. Health & Safety Code §$412.
§S4IO(e).
172Jd., §5461.
173 Letter from L. E. Ordelheide, Director, Bureau of Public Health Engineering
(Missouri) March 17, 1954.
174 See, e.g., N .]. Rev. Stat. ( 1937) §26: 3-64; Pa. Code Ann. tit. 71, §14o6.
17 6 Cal. Health & Safety Code §soo; Ill. Stat. Ann. c. 24. §§23-81, 42-1 et seq.;
Mich. Stat. Ann. §§S.IJJI, s.IJJ7, 5·1757; Mo. Rev. Stat. (1949) §§7I.78o, 7J.IIO(Io),
74.133(1), 77.56o; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 53, §§38oo-II, 9673, 13329; Tex. Civ. Stat. arts.
1015, 1072.
110

171Jd.,
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city health boards which are invested with powers to make rules and
regulations necessary for the protection and preservation of the public
health. 176 It is possible that an industry located within the corporate
limits of a municipality may even be subject to regulation both by municipal ordinance adopted by the city council and by administrative regulation promulgated by a local health board. 177 Only detailed examination of the regulations applicable in any given area can resolve the
complexities of the situation.
b. Counties
Again the statutory provisions are diverse. In Texas and Missouri
health regulation at the county level is not very extensive. In Texas
the statutes provide that a "City-County Health Unit" may be formed
in any county containing an incorporated city which has a population
of not less than 90,000 nor more than 120,000.118 The City-County
Board of Health is authorized to make rules and regulations "to promote and preserve the health of the county." 179 Apparently, this is the
only instance of county health regulation in Texas. In Missouri rulemaking power over public health matters is granted to the county court
(a governing body) but only in counties having an assessed valuation
of $3oo,ooo,ooo or more. 180
Each of the remaining eight states covered by this study provides for
some form of health regulation either by a county health board or by
the governing body of the county. In California and Illinois the governing body of each county is given power to adopt ordinances and
regulations for the protection of the public health. 181 In Ohio townships and villages in each county constitute a general health district, 182
and the board of health of a general health district "may make such
orders and regulations as are necessary for . . . the public health, the
prevention or restriction of disease, and the prevention, abatement, or
suppression of nuisances." 188 County health boards in Michigan, New
176 Ill. Stat. Ann. c. 24, §42-5; Mich. Stat. Ann. §5.1764; N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937)
§26: 3-64; N.Y. Public Health Law §§3o8(e), 371; Ohio Rev. Code §3709.20; Pa.
Stat. Ann. tit. 53, §12198-2307; Wis. Stat. (1957) §141.01(5).
177 See Zullo v. Bd. of Health of Woodbridge Tp., supra note 153.
us Tex. Civ. Stat. art. 4436a-1, §1.
179 ld., §2.
18o Mo. Rev. Stat. (1949) §192.300.
181 Cal. Health & Safety Code §450; Ill. Stat. Ann. c. 34. §§25, 148, 149.
182 Ohio Rev. Code §3709.01.
188 /d., §37Q9.21.
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Jersey, New York, and ·wisconsin are given authority to promulgate
rules and regulations to protect the public health . 184
The power to abate or suppress nuisances is normally a corollary of
th~ rule-making power. In 1951 Pennsylvania passed a rather elaborate
"Local Health Administration Act." 185 This act, applicable to all but
first-class counties/ 86 authorizes the creation of county or joint-county
departments of health 187 which are given broad rule-making power to
make regulations "for the prevention of disease, for the prevention
and removal of conditions which constitute a menace to health, and for
the promotion and preservation of the public health generally." 188 In
1943 Illinois passed a somewhat similar act providing for county or
multiple-county public health departments. 189 However, under this act,
the county health board recommends to the county governing board the
adoption of ordinances, rules, and regulations necessary to promote and
protect public health, which latter board has power to promulgate the
ordinances, rules, and regulations. 190
c. Townships
In at least four states township boards of health may also exist. In
Michigan each township board is a board of health, 191 with authority
to make regulations concerning nuisances or causes of sickness and to
abate nuisances. 192 Likewise in Illinois and New Jersey rule-making
powers may be exercised by township boards of health. 193 In Pennsylvania the governing authorities of townships are empowered to make
such regulations as may be deemed necessary for the health and safety
of the inhabitants of the township.m
d. Health Districts
Many states also authorize the consolidation of political subdivisions
into "hybrid" health districts. For example, California provides that a
18• Mich. Stat. Ann. §§I4..I6I, 14..166; N.J. Rev. Stat. ( 1937) §26: 11-26; N.Y. Public
Health Law §§Jo8(e), 347; Wis. Stat. (1957) §140.og(6).
185 For a general discussion of this act, see Stahl and Earley, "The Pennsylvania
Local Health Administration Law.of 1951," 13 U. of Pitt. L. Rev. 232 (1952).
186 This excludes only Philadelphia, id. at 248.
187 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 16, §4205.
188/d., §4211 (c).
189 Ill. Stat. Ann. c. III I/2, §§20e el seq.
190 /d., §20e13; id., C. 34, §25.12.
191 Mich. Stat. Ann. §14..61.
192/d., §§14..63, 14.,68.
19 3 Ill. Stat. Ann. c. 34, §§148, 149; N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937) §§26 :3-9, 26:3-64, 26:3-47.
1e• Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 53, §19093-702 (XXIX).
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local health district may be formed from either incorporated or unincorporated territory of one or more counties. 195 Illinois authorizes
towns or road districts to be combined to form "public health districts." 196 Rule-making power is not given by express statutory provision to the governing boards of either of these types of districts, but
by liberal statutory interpretation they may be deemed to have such
power. 191 In Michigan, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin political subdivisions may join· in the creation of a consolidated
health district, consisting of two or more counties, two or more municipalities, or two or more existing health districts. 198 In New Y ark "partcounty health districts" may be established in counties containing one
or more cities having a population of so,ooo or more. The cities themselves are excluded from such districts. 199 These health districts which
are merely combinations of other health districts or counties have the
same powers as the component elements had before combination.
3· Conclusion
This somewhat cursory examination of state and local health agencies
and their powers is sufficient to indicate that an atomic energy entrepreneur will assuredly be confronted with a legion of health boards,
commissions, and agencies when he embarks upon his atomic enterprise. He should consult with both state and local health agencies at the
earliest possible planning stage. In spite of the fact that few of these
agencies have established regulations governing the use of radioactive
and fissionable materials, the legal power to do so exists. Therefore,
the entrepreneur will necessarily have' to assume the burden of ascertaining to the best of his ability the probable scope of health regulation.
As an initial proposition, it would appear advisable to err on the side
of safety by installing all proved types of safety equipment designed
for the protection of the public health. However, prohibitive costs may
constitute a substantial deterrent to following that course of action, and
the possibility will always remain that subsequent administrative regulations may result in the necessity of expensive changes in equipment or
manner of operation.
.
Cal. Health & Safety Code §903.
Ill. Stat. Ann. c. III I/2, §I.
.
197 Cal. Health & Safety Code §936; Ill. Stat.' Ann. c. Iii I/2, §17(3).
1 9 8 Mich. Stat. Ann. §I4.I67; N.J. Rev. Stat. §26: 3A1-2 (Cum. Supp. 1951-52);
Ohio Rev. Code §§3709.07, 3709.10; Pa. Code Ann. tit. 16, §4205; Wis. Stat. (1957)
§140.09(I) (a).
,
·
·199 N.Y. Public Health Law §340(2);
195

198
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The burden thus placed on new atomic energy ventures to guess the
extent of future health regulation suggests, of course, that the state
and local health agencies should be induced to adopt extensive regulations as promptly as feasible. However, a general unfamiliarity with
atomic energy health hazards prevails among state and local officials,
and reliable scientific data as to the effect of radiation on human life is
not yet available. Moreover, the technical nature of the requirements
of standards adequate to afford safety against radiation is not generally understood although knowledge is increasing rapidly. These
factors would seem to necessitate an attitude of extreme caution on the
part of state and local health officials. Unduly burdensome health regulations may serve to delay or even prevent the establishment of a new
industry in the community. On the other hand, too lax regulations· may
result in serious impairment of public health and safety. This dilemma
is not one that is easily resolved, but on balance. we are led to the conclusion that the wiser course is to avoid the promulgation of exhaustive
health standards until such time as more reliable scientific data is available. Meanwhile, general regulations not only may provide a sufficiently
definite pattern to justify industrial expenditures but they also may be
adaptable to changing conditions.
D. Summary of State Health and Safety Regulations
The foregoing examination of the health and safety regulatory agencies and powers of the ten selected states makes it evident that in each
state at least one, and in most cases, two or more state or local agencies
have been given by statute sufficient power to regulate health and safety
conditions for atomic energy enterprises. It is true that the precise reasons for conferring jurisdiction upon a labor department differ from
those which result in the power being given to a health department or
a public service commission .. The labor department is primarily concerned with health and safety of employees; the health department is
primarily concerned with the health and safety of the general populace;
and the public service commission is responsible for the conservation of
public interests in connection with public utilities and their operation.
The regulations evolved by the different agencies for these separate purposes may happen to be identical or they may be so divergent as to be
absolutely impossible of simultaneous achievement. When the latter
situation prevails, and it is very likely to happen unless proper cooperative measures are taken, atomic energy enterprises will find themselves
operating in violation of at least one set of valid regulations and as a
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result becoming subject to consequent penalties. Then, too, there will
be the very considerable waste of effort by the state and the regulated
industry. Of course, the potentiality of inconsistent regulation by different state and local agencies already exists for industries other than
atomic, but it generally has been avoided in fact by cooperative efforts
among the several agencies. It is to be hoped, and perhaps expected,
that the agencies will cooperate in a similar manner in regard to atomic
affairs, and that they will adopt regulations which will be consistent
and not impose insuperable burdens upon a new industry.

Chapter IV
MISCELLANEOUS REGULATION
A. Disposal of Wastes
Many industrial processes require the disposal of large quantities of
noxious waste materials in the course of their operations. Since improper disposal of industrial wastes may endanger the health, safety,
or comfort of persons or may be detrimental to property rights, special
types of governmental regulation have been evolved to control such
action. In the interests of public health, many states have established
water pollution control programs which may restrict the disposal of
certain types of industrial wastes. Also, in the. interests of conserva•
tion, laws are frequently enacted protecting fish and wildlife by prohibiting the discharge of harmful or poisonous substances into waters
of the state, and such laws may serve indirectly to regulate waste disposal. The prevention and abatement of air pollution in some states,
especially in metropolitan areas, is another type of regulation of disposal of industrial waste products. Finally, the law of public and private nuisance, affording remedies to. public officials as well as private
individuals, may be invoked to restrict or prohibit the discharge of waste
materials produced in industrial processes.
Waste products created in operations involving the use of atomic
energy are unique and potentially even more dangerous than ordinary
industrial wastes since they may contain substantial amounts of radioactivity. Radioactive wastes produced in reactor operation or in other
utilization of atomic energy may be found in the form of either solids,
liquids, or gases. Since either existing. or future regulation of industrial waste disposal will no doubt embrace the disposal of radioactive
wastes as well, an examination of the various types of regulation is
desirable.
The subject of radioactive wa.Ste disposal has received express legislative or administrative attention in a number of states recently. In
California "no person shall bury, throw away, or in any manner dispose of radioactive wastes in such a manner as to endanger the lives
or health of human beings." 1 The California Department of Public
Health is authorized to issue written orders prohibitiitg dispositions in
1

Cal. Health & Safety Code §§256oo to 25004.
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violation of this statute and to seek injunctions against violators of
these orders. Similarly, the South Dakota Department of Health is
authorized to "issue, modify, or revoke orders prohibiting or abating
the discharge of radioactive material or waste into the ground, air, or
waters of the state." 2 Violations of these orders are deemed misdemeanors upon each day in which they occur. 8 Since the term "radioactive materials" may be construed to include radioactive wastes under
the laws of Connecticut,' Massachusetts, 6 New York, 6 and Oregon, 7
persons disposing of radioactive wastes in these· states are subject to
the appropriate regulations of the respective health departments. In
Wisconsin the county board of each county with a population of soo,ooo
or more is authorized to regulate the discharge of radioactive materials
into the open air. 8 The problem of radioactive waste disposal has received administrative attention in the health department regulations of
Connecticut, 9 Michigan/0 New York, 11 Perinsylvania,12 and Texas. 13
The above· mentioned statute~ and regulations are discussed in greater
detail in Chapter V of this Part.
I.

Water

Pol~ution

Regulation

· Liquid radioactive wastes may result from several possible operations, including using water as a reactor coolant, u processing radioactive
materials by chemical means, and .using radioisotopes in industry and
laboratories. 16 If these wastes find their way into streams, they may
become potential health hazards by invading domestic water supplies or
by affecting fish or vegetation.
2

. 8

S.D. Laws 1957, H.B. 826, §4(7) •

ld.,

§9.

.

' Conn. Public· Acts 1957, Public· Act I 54, §2.
• s Mass. Ann. Laws. c. x1i, §5:8: : .
- 6 N.Y. Public Health Law §2o1(1)(s).·
'·ore. Laws I957, c. 399. §3. .
s Wis. Stat. (1957) §59.07(53).
.
D Conn. Sanitary Code c. Ill, §18I-I-z87, §M.
10 Mich. Adm. Code 1954, Supp. No. 13, R 325.1312.
· n N.Y. Sanitary Code c. XVI, Reg. 9·
12 Regulation 433, Radiation Protection, Pa. Dept. of Health, §14.
1a Regulations on Radiation Exposure, Texas Dept. of·Health, §14.
u Water used as a coolant becomes contaminated with radioactivity, creating a form
of water pollution. At the Hanford AEC installation the water is held in a basin to
permit decay of most of the radiation picked up by the soluble salts in the water before
it is returned to the Columbia River. AEC, "Handling of Radioactive Wastes in the
Atomic Energy Program," 7 (1951).
16 Jd. at 15-17.
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Because pollution of streams and lakes from sewage and industrial
wastes has become a very serious problem, statutes regulating water
pollution have been enacted in most states. Water pollution boards or
commissions, often associated with the state health departments, have
been created by many of the states covered by this study. Some of the
boards are given administrative discretion to determine what constitutes
"pollution." Some statutes apparently define industrial wastes broadly
enough to encompass radioactive wastes. Many states require that permits be obtained from the water pollution board before wastes of any
kind may be discharged into waters of the state. Moreover, nearly every
state has a statute which absolutely prohibits the discharge of "harmful" or "poisonous" substances into the waters of the state. In the
event that deleterious substances likely to injure fish or wildlife are discharged into waters, conservation laws may be involved. Criminal sanctions may attach, or perhaps permits from conservation commissions
may be necessary.
Solid radioactive wastes include the products of fission taken from
atomic reactors together with such items as contaminated clothing, contaminated metals used as equipment, pipes, or shielding, contaminated
buildings, and residues from the incineration of radioactive wastes. The
control of many of these hazards lies within the sphere of state agencies
having jurisdiction over matters of health and safety. However, several
statutes, notably those of California, Ohio, artd Texas, cover industrial
waste disposal irrespective of whether water pollution is involved.
Because of the differences in the regulatory pattern of the ten states
examined in this study with respect to the regulation of industrial waste
disposal, water pollution, and the role o£ the conservation department, a
state-by-state analysis will again be. necessary.
a. NewYork
In.1949 New York enacted a rather comprehensive program of water .
p<;>ilution' control. T~e. Water Pollution Control Board, created within
the ·Department of Health, is given wide administrative discretion with
respect to fixing standards of water purity, the classification of various waters, etc. 16 A general prohibition against pollution· makes it unlawful to discharge any organic or inorganic matter into waters of the
state .that· will cause or contribute to a condition in contravention 'Of
standards adopted by the board. 17
te N.Y. Public Health Law §1209.
17

/d., §1220.
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A significant feature of the New York statute is the licensing power
granted to the board. Subject to a few minor exceptions, it is necessary to obtain a permit from the board before any person may:
(a) make or cause to make any new outlet for the discharge
of sewage, industrial waste or other wastes, or the effluent
therefrom, into the waters of this state, or
(b) construct or operate and use a new disposal system
for the discharge of sewage, industrial waste, or other wastes
or the effluent therefrom, into the waters of the state. . . .18
"Industrial waste" is defined as : "any liquid, gaseous, solid or waste
substance' or a combination thereof resulting from any process of industry, manufacturing, trade, or business or from the development or
recovery of any natural resources, which may cause or might reasonably
be expected to cause pollution of the waters of the state in contravention
of the standards adopted as provided herein." 19
In addition to the license which must be obtained from the Water
Pollution Control Board and 'even though the Commissioner of Health
is a member of the board, 20 it will probably be necessary for businesses
utiliz~ng nuclear energy also to obtain the written permission of the
Commissioner of Health himself. 21 On this point the New York statute
provides:
No person, corporation . . . · shall place . . . or cause to
be discharged into any waters of this state, in quantities injurious to th~ public health, any . . . substance, chemical or
otherwise, or any refuse or waste matter, either solid or liquid,
from any . . . shop, factory, mill or industrial establishment;
unless 'express permission to do so shall have been first given in
writing by the commissioner. . . . 22
This permission may be given to an industrial establishment "whenever
the public health and purity of the waters shall warrant it," subject to
conditions as the public health may require. 28 Discharges into certain
waters are absolutely prohibited. ~ The provisions, requiring the permission of the Commissioner of Health and prohibiting the discharge
2

!d., §I2JO.
I d., §1202(e).
20 !d., §1205.
21 /d., §1232 indicates that in certain cases permission of the Department of Health
is not required, but this is only true when a permit is not required from the Water
Pollution Control Board under §1230(4).
22 I d., §uso( 1).
23/d., §n6I(I).
uSee id., §§IISI to nss.
18

19
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of waste into certain waters, are, however, currently effective only until
April, i959. 25
In addition to the public health statutes, the New York conservation statutes prohibit the discharge of any deleterious or poisonous substance into the waters of the state which may be injurious to fish life.
This is an absolute prohibition; i.e., no administrative authority to permit deviations is conferred. Violation constitutes a public nuisance and
is subject to abatement and possible criminal penalties. 28
b. Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania also has adopted a comprehensive program of water
pollution control, in many respects similar to that of New York. Under
a ·water pollution control act enacted in 19.37, a Sanitary Water Board,
a part of the Department of Health, is charged with the administration
of the program.27 "Industrial waste" includes any liquid, gaseous, or
solid substance which results from any industry and which cause5 pollution. 28 The Sanitary Water Board is empowered to determine when
pollution exists and to establish ·standards to define pollution. 28
As in New York, the Pennsylvania statute provides that it is unlawful to "erect, construct or open" any establishment which in its operation results in the discharge of industrial wastes causing pollution unless a permit is first obtained from the board approving the proposed
process for treatment of the wastes. 110 All plans for the proposed construction of a plant or process to treat the wastes must be submitted to
the board before construction.81 This requirement of advance consultation with the Sanitary Water Board, before construction involving potential pollution is initiated, is burdensome but advantageous from
both the standpoint of the public and that of the operator. 82
A Pennsylvania conservation statute provides that no person shall
allow any substance of any kind or character which is deleterious, destructive, or poisonous to fish to be discharged into any waters of the
u I d., §u68.
N.Y. Conservation Law art. IV, §18o.
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 35, §§69I.I. et seq.
28 I d., §691.1.
ze Ibid.
211
27

so Jd., §691.J07.

I d., §691.Jo8.
See Note, 100 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 225 (1951), for a discussion of Pennsylvania's
water pollution regulation. See Commonwealth v. New York and Pa. Co., 367 Pa. 40,
79 A.2d 439 (1951), and Commonwealth v. Sonneborn, 164 Pa. Super. 49J, 66 A.zd 584
( 1949) for prosecutions under this statute.
81

s2
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state unless it is shown to the satisfaction of the Board of Fish Commissioners that every reasonable and practicable means has been taken
to abate and prevent the pollution of the water. 83 This prohibition is
somewhat less severe than that set forth in the New York conservation statutes.
c. Ohio
In 1951 Ohio passed a comprehensive water pollution control act
patterned on the Pennsylvania statute.84 Like the New York and Pennsylvania water pollution boards, Ohio's Water Pollution Control Board
is within the Department of Health. 811 The board has power to issue
and deny perll).its for the discharge of industrial wastes into waters of
the state; 88 and in order to avoid a possible determination after installa.:.
tion that an operation is polluting the waters of the state,87 it is necessary
to obtain a permit in advance from the board. 88
As in New York, it appears necessary to obtain the consent of the
Director of Health before discharging industrial wastes into the waters
of the stat~, despite the fact that he is also the chairman of the Water
Pollution Control Board. 39 The Department of Health is given general jurisdiction over the disposal of industrial wastes, and it is necessary to obtain the approval of this department relative to the ma~er of
disposal of these wastes. 40 It is important to note that the supervisory
power is not confined to disposal of wastes into waters, as it is in New
York and Pennsylvania, but includes disp<:>sal in any manner. Furthermore, the department is given specific power to prevent pollution by
adopting and enforcing regulations relative to the discharge of in.:
dustrial wastes into waters of the state!1 It also has the power to
approve processes and plans for the treatment of such wastes! 2
The Ohio statutes· also create· a Water Resources Board in the Department of Natural ReSources. This board has power to prevent the
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 30, §200.
See 12 Ohio St. Law ]. 376 ( 1951), for brief anaiysis of this act.
8G Ohio Rev. Code §6111.02.
86 /d., §6III.03(1).
87 "Pollution" is defined very broadly, id., §61 11.01 (A).
88 !d., §6n1.04.
39 I d., §6~ I 1.02.
•o /d., §§3701.19, 3701.20.
u /d., §3701.21.
42 /d., §3701.59.
s8

84

a
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contamination of underground waters, 43 but its principal authority is
concerned with water conservation, use, and supply. 44
Ohio has established still another sanction for the protection of the
state's waters. A 1948 opinion of the Attorney General of Ohio 45
indicates that when the habitat, food supply, and other environmental
conditions of fish are threatened with injury or destruction by pollution of waters of the state, the Director of Natural Resources 46 may
bring an action for an injunction or for damages. The statute upon
which such an action would be based provides that no person shall
corrupt or render unwholesome or impure a watercourse, stream, or
water."
Furthermore, various types of control districts may be formed under
Ohio statutes to regulate nearly every conceivable aspect of water usage.
At least three kinds of districts have control over the discharge of
wastes and water pollution : conservancy districts, 48 sanitary districts, 49
and regional water and sewer districts. 50 If any of these districts are
in existence and embrace an area considered for the location of an
atomic energy generating plant, it is essential that the board of directors
or trustees be consulted and any necessary approval obtained from
them.
d. Wisconsin
Like New York and Ohio, Wisconsin has a dual set of controls over
water pollution. The State Board of Health is vested with general
jurisdiction over the waters of the state, 51 and it is necessary to obtain
the approval of this board before using streams to dispose of industrial
wastes. 5 2 The State Health Officer is also a member of the Committee
on Wa_ter Pollution. 5 3 This committee, having general jurisdiction over
water pollution,. may require the submission and approval of plans for
the installation of systems· and devices for disposing of industrial
43

!d., §1521.04(F).

44

/d., §1521.()4.

45

l948 Ohio Op. Atty. Gen. #4095.
Ohio Rev. Code §1501.01.

48

47

/d.,
/d.,
49 /d.,
50 /d.,

§3767.13.
§§6101.01 et seq..
§§6115.01 et seq.
§§6119.01 et seq.
u Wis. Stat. (1957) §144-0J.
52 /d., §144.04.
58 /d., §144.52.
48
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wastes. 64 It is unlawful to deposit any acids, wastes, or refuse arising
from the manufacture of articles of commerce or any other substance
deleterious to fish life into any of the waters of the state, unless it is
done in compliance with the orders of the Committee on Water Pollution.55 The constitutionality of this regulatory scheme has been attacked on the ground that parts of the statute are indefinite and uncertain, there being no standard or guide set forth to govern the actions
of the Committee on Water Pollution. The attack failed, and the
statute was sustained by the Wisconsin Supreme Court. 56
The powers of the State Board of Health and the Committee on
Water Pollution overlap, but these agencies apparently cooperate and
issue joint orders. In 1944 a joint order was held to be uJtra vires and
hence invalid on the ground that different modes of judicial review
were authorized for each of the two agencies. 57 However, a year later
the legislature promptly remedied this defect by the addition of a statutory provision expressly permitting the issuance of a joint order. 58 Thus,
the concurrent nature of the jurisdiction of the Health Department and
the Committee on Water Pc;>llution is expressly recognized in Wisconsin, 69 whereas the situation in New York and Ohio is somewhat more
uncertain in this respect. However, the Wisconsin statutes retain indi-:vidual jurisdiction for both the Committee on Water Pollution and
State Board of Health when either or both agencies assume jurisdiction in a situation involving pollution. eo
e. ·Illinois
In 1951 Illinois passed a new comprehensive water pollution statute. 61
A Sanitary Water Board, with extensive regulatory powers, was created, together with a Water Pollution Control Advisory Council. 62 The
statutory definition of "industrial waste" is nearly identical with the
New York definition, quoted above. But it is interesting to note that
64

65

/d., §144.53.
[d., §29·29·

56 State ex rei. Martin v. City of Juneau, 238 Wis. 564, 300 N.W. 187 (1941).
Other constitutional arguments made, including improper delegation of legislative and
judicial powers to both the State Board of Health and the Committee on Water
Pollution, were likewise rejected.
, .
57 American Brass Co. v. State Board of Health, 245 Wis. 440, 15 N.W.2d 27 Ci944).
68 Wis. Stat. ( 1957) §144.565.
.
69 See id., §144.535.

eo

Ibid.

61

Ill. Stat. Ann. c. 19, §§145.1 et seq.

62Jd., §145·3(e).
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Illinois attempts a broad definition of "pollution" 63 whereas New York
leaves the establishment of standards to the discretion of the Water
Pollution Control Board.
It is necessary to obtain a permit from the Illinois Sanitary Water
Board before constructing, installing, or operating any establishment
which will cause the discharge of wastes into the waters of the state. 64
In addition, river conservancy districts may be organized under the
Illinois statutes for the purpose of preventing water pollution. 65 However, it is provided that the authority of the Sanitary Water Board shall
not be superseded, 66 which would seem to mean that if a permit is obtained from the Sanitary Water Board to discharge waste into a stream,
the trustees of a river conservancy district would have no power to
interfere.
Furthermore, sanitary districts, primarily concerned with sewage
problems, may be organized under various Il.linois statutes. 67 The
board of tmstees of a sanitary district has authority to prevent pollution of any waters from which any city or town obtains its water supply,68 and any person proposing to discharge industrial waste within a
sanitary district must obtain a permit from the trustees of the district. 69
Finally, the Department of Conservation has general authority to
take measures to prevent water pollution to preserve fish and ·game and
to cooperate with other departments to prevent water pollution. 70 Another statute empowers the attorney general to bring an action to recover
the reasonable value of any aquatic life destroyed by pollution of waters
of the state. 11 Moreover, it is a public nuisance to corrupt or render
unwholesome or impure the waters of any stream to the prejudice of
others. 72
f. California
A somewhat different water pollution regulation scheme is in effect
in California. In 1949 the Dickey Water Pollution Act was passed
which creates a State Water Pollution Control Board and nine resa I d., §145.2(a).
64 I d., §145.11.
65 I d., c. 42, §§383 et seq.
66 I d., c. 42, §409.
6 7 Id., c. 42, §§299, 319.1, 320.
68 I d., §326aa.
69 I d., §326bb(J).
10 I d., c. 127, §6Ja(6).
a I d., c. s6, §16o.
72 I d., c. 38, §466.
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gional water pollution control boards. 78 The state board is concerned
only with formulation of policy, research, and administration of the
financial aspects of water pollution, 14 whereas the regional boards are
charged with the abatement, prevention, and control of water pollution and nuisances. 76 It is the appropriate regional board which must
approve any proposed discharge of industrial waste and which prescribes
requirements with respect to the treating of these discharges. 76 Each
regional board also has power to investigate any source of water pollution or nuisance within its region and to order an abatement thereof. 71
The act was designed to coordinate the actions of various state agencies regulating water pollution. 78 While power to regulate water pollution was not taken away from other state agencies, it is no longer
necessary to secure a permit from the State Health Department in order
to dispose of wastes, and this would see'? to be a thoroughly worthy
achievement. 79
The California Water Pollution Act-contains the usual definitions
which are substantially similar to those of the other states discussed
above·, except that the definition of "contamination" is somewhat unique
in its breadth and scope :
"Contamination" means an impairment of the quality of the
waters of the State by sewage or industrial waste to a degree
which creates an actual hazard to the public health through
·poisoning or through the spread of disease. "Contamination"
shall include any equivalent effect resulting from the disposal
of sewage or industrial waste, whether or not waters of the
State are affected. 80
The matter of "contamination" is not mentioned elsewhere in the Water
Pollution Act. However, the Health and Safety_ Code employs definitions identical to those of the Water Pollution Act,81 and that code prohibits the discharge of industrial waste which will result in contamination, pollution, or nuisance. 82 Contamination is also made a crime 83
78

Cal. Water Code §§13000, 13010, 13040.
§§13022 to 13024.

!d.,
75 !d.,
76 !d.,
11 !d.,
74

§§13052, 13003.
§13054·
§§13055 to 13064.
T8 I d., §13000.

"California's Water Pollution Problem," 3 Stan. L. Rev. 649, 65o-52 (1951).
Emphasis added. Cal. Water Code §13005.
81 Cal. Health & Safety Code §5410.
82 I d., §5411.
79

80

83

!d., §5461.
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and the Health Department is charged with the abatement of any contamination, 84 although pollution and nuisance are referred to the appropriate regional water pollution board for action. 85
.Moreover, the California statutes make it unlawful to cause any substance or material deleterious to fish, plant life, or bird life to pass
into waters of the state of California. 86 The Fish and Game Commission is required to report any condition of pollution to the appropriate
regional water pollution control board. 87
g. New Jersey
New Jersey has adopted a unique pollution control system. It has not
created a specific water pollution board to regulate pollution. Rather, .
the statutes leave this matter to the State Department of Health.
Sprinkled liberally throughout the statutes are provisions which prohibit the discharge of any kind of polluting matter into the waters of
the state. 88 It is necessary to obtain the consent of the State Department
of Health before any "harmful" or "deleterious" matter may flow into
the waters of the stafe.89
Moreover, the persori responsible for the operation of any "factory,
workshop or place for the manufacture of materials or goods" must
obtain a written permit from the Health Department before it may be
established in any watershed in the state above the point a~ which any
public supply of potable water is taken. 90 The permit is required even
though no discharge of wastes into. the waters of the state is contemplated. The Health Department must also be furnished with information concerning any processes established or intended to be established
for the purification or treatment of industrial wastes. 91
Industrial establishments in New Jersey must also give consideration
to the possible existence of sanitary sewer d~strict authorities. These
may be established by any first- .or second-class. county when a stream
flowing through the county is subject to pollution. 92 "Sewage" is defined
to include industrial wastes and any other matter having a tendency
/d., §§5412, 54(io.
/d., §5413.
86 Cal. Fish & Game Code §481 (1944).
s7 Id., §481.5.
88 See, e.g., N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937) §§58: 10-1,58: 1()-5, 26:3B-489 I d., §s&: 12-3.
oo /d., §58: 1()-7.
91 I d., §58: 1o-17.
92 /d., §40:36A-1.
84

85
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to pollute streams and watercourses. 98 A 1953 amendment prohibits the
disc~rge of any polluting n:tatter into the wat~rs of any stream or river
incl1:1ded within the sewer district established by a county. ~ Finally,
New Jersey has made it a crime to discharge into waters of the state
any deleterious or poisonous substance which is injurious to or disturbs
the habits of fish. 95
9

h. Michigan
In Michigan water pollution is subject to regulation by the Water
Resources Commission. 9 ·6 The commission is empowered to establish
pollution standards for the various. bodies of water in the state and has
authority to "make regulations and orders restricting the polluting
content of any waste material or polluting substance discharged or:
sought to be discharged into any lake, river, stream, or other waters of
the state.'' 97 The jurisdktion of the commission extends to both surface and. underground waters as well as the Great Lakes. 98 It is
unlawful to discharge any substance which is harmful to the public
health, fish, and wildlife, or to lawful en~erprises.
The statutes make no , provision f()r obtaining a permit, but undoubtedly industrial managers should consult the Water Resources.
CQmmission when an industry plans to use water from a stream or lake
or to discharge wastes into such waters.
In Michigan the Conservation Commission is given general power to
prevent water pollution an:d to encourage the propagation of game and
fish. 100 Again, there seems to be no requirement that a license be obtained; rather, it is made a violation of the conservation statutes to discharge wastes into the waters of the state if they will tend to "stupefy;
injure or kill" any fish. 101 The State Health Department's broad powers
over problems of general public health also extend to matters of water
pollution, and therefore, as in· other states, overlapping jurisdiction in
problems of water pollution presents unusual problems for atomic energy
industries.
99

/d., §40: 36A-19.
N.J. Laws 1953. c. 389.
95 I d., §23 : 5-28.
96 Mich. Stat. Ann. §3.521.
97 I d., §3.525.
9s I d., §J.522.
99 I d., §J.526.
100 Jd., §IJ.J.
101 /d., §IJ.I67I.
98
94
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Texas

Texas has not established an administrative agency with authority to
regulate water pollution, although in 1953 a five-member water pollution
council, without regulatory powers, was created. 102 The function of
this council is to collect and disseminate information relating to water
pollution, its prevention, and abatement.
However, water pollution is made a crime in Texas. 108 The Penal
Code defines pollution as rendering the water unfit "for one or more of
the beneficial uses for which such water was fit or suitable prior to the
introduction of such substance, material, or thing," or is detrimental
to public health, game, birds, fish, etc. 104 Insofar as fish are affected by
pollution, enforcem·ent power is given to the Game and Fish Cominission.105
Moreover, the State Board of Health has power to enjoin water
pollution/0" and it is Unlawful tO StOre, dispOSe Of, Or depOSit WaSteS
which will pollute surrounding land or contaminate well waters to the
extent of endangering public'health. 1o1 ·
· ·
·
The Texas statutes also provide for the esta}?lishment of several
types of districts which relate to vario~s .aspe~s of water use, supply,
and control. These districts are normally established by counties or a
combination of counties. "Water Co~trol and Improvem~nt Districts"
may be organized to protect, presc:;rve, and restore the purity and sanitary condition of water 108 and to .control, process, and dispose of industrial wastes. 109 "Water Control and Preservation Districts" may be
organized to control and preserve the purity of the waters within the
district. 110 Other types of districts authorized in Texas include "Underground Water Conservation Districts," 111 "Fresh Water Supply Districts," 112 "Levee Improvement Districts," 113 "Drainage Districts," tu
102 Tex. Laws 1953, H.B. No. 448, c. 353:
103 Tex. Civ. Stat. art. 7577.
to4 Tex. Penal Code art. 698b.
105/bid.
106 Tex. Civ. Stat. art. 4444107 /d., art. 4477-1, §4(c).
tOBJd.,
t09Jd.,
tto /d.,
111 /d.,
112 /d.,
118 I d.,
114/d.,

arts. 788o-2, 788o-3.
art. 788o-Ja.
art. 7&>9.
art. 788o-3c.
art. 7881.
art. 7972.
art. &>97.
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"Conservation and Reclamation Districts," 115 and "Navigation Districts." 118 Industrial planners must consult the directors of these districts, if they exist in the county, in connection with the planning of an
irtdustry which may 'use water in any way.
j. Missouri
Missouri adopted a statute in I957 which establishes a program of
-_water pollution. control similar to those of New York, Pennsylvania, and
Ohio. 117 .As in those states, the principal feature of the program is the
establishment of a Water Pollution Board, organized within the Department of Public Health and Welfare, which is empowered to issue
and deny permits for the disposal of wastes into waters of the state.
The statute directs that "No person, without first securing from the
~oa~d a permit, shall construct, install or modify .;,tny system for .disposal of sewage, industriat wastes, or other wastes . ~ . 'when the disposal . . . ' constitute~ pollutio~ as defined in this act." ~is '
. The Water Pollution Board may requir~ t~e subinis~ion of such plans
and sp~cifications as it dee111s rele~ant in cot;mection with the iss:uance
of permits ·and is empowered to determine whether or: not the proposed
discharge will "cause a condition contrary to· the public interest." 119
The board is also given the power to determine wheri pollution exists
and to establish standards of water purity for any waters of the state. 120
The Missouri statutes also contain a provision prohibiting the disch~rge of any deleterious substance which is injurious to fish life into
any stream in the state; however, the State Conservation Commission
has authority to grant exceptions to industries. 121
k. Conclusion
Although the statutory and regulatory pattern concerning water pollution varies from state to state, it is dear that 'atomic ·energy industries
will be required to meet some rather positive standards if waste products
are to be discharged into the waters of any state. In fact, close supervision of the disposal of wastes seems imperative in the public interest
!d., art. 8194.
!d., art. 8198.
117 Mo. Stat. Ann. §§204.010-204.170 (1957).
118 /d., §204.030.
115

118

119/bid.

12o

Ibid.
§252.210.

121/d.,
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because both the toxic and radioactive nuclear wastes are highly dangerous to the public health particularly where the streams constitute a
source of water for human consumption.
It should be noted that under certain types of statutes, some atomic
energy activities may not be regulated at the present time under statutes
governing water pollution. For example, where the statutes govern
only industrial activity, research laboratories and hospitals may not be
subject to regulation. Nonetheless, use of radioactive materials and
their disposal through conventional sewerage and drainage systems may
so pollute bodies of water as to constitute a definite health hazard.
Therefore, in those states where discharges of certain radioactive materials into state waters are not controlled under present statutes,
amendatory legislation appears advisable and will doubtless be forthcoming as soon as the hazards become known in legislative halls.
The foregoing review of the statutes. reveals that water pollution is
in many states subject to regulation by several different agencies. This
duplication of effort and overlapping of jurisdiction raises once again
the problem of administrative conflicts. Obviously, coordination of the
several health and safety regulations affecting atomic energy enterprises is desirable. This coordination can be achieved either by cooperation among the agencies or by transferring all atomic energy health
and safety regulatory powers including control of water pollution to one
agency. The latter course has much to be said in its favor, especially
if all types of specialization can be represented within the regulatory
agency. In the absence, however, of the creation of a single authority,
persons desiring to engage in atomic energy activities must consult with
all regulatory agencies exercising health and safety powers. Certainly
they should encourage cooperative efforts among those agencies.
2.

Regulation of Air Pollution

Several types of operations which utilize atomic energy may produce
radioactive particles which will create a hazard if discharged into the
air. Radioactive gases may result from air-cooled reactor operations,
chemical processing operations, refining operations of uranium ores,
laboratory uses of radioisotopes, and incineration of radioactive wastes,
byproducts, or contaminated apparel or materials. 122 To prevent dangerous atmospheric contamination near Atomic Energy Commission
installations, high stacks have been utilized for the discharge of radio122

AEC, "Handling Radi<;>active Wastes in the Atomic· Energy Program," .11-15

(1951).

928

STATE REGULATION

active gases, thus causing them to be diluted with uncontaminated air. 123
In addition, the Commission has engaged in meteorological surveys and
has instituted a program of area monitoring in the vicinity of installations such as Brookhaven, where air-cooled reactors are in operation. 124
Insofar as employees may be adversely affected by the presence of
radioactive gases in the place of employment, the powers of public
utility commissions, labor departments, and health departments will be
involved. However, if the atmospheric contamination extends outside
the installation itself the public health may be endangered. Radioactive
particles may be inhaled or deposited on plants which may in turn be
eaten by animals or people. Notwithstanding the use of high stacks and
the processing of the gases in connection with air-cooled reactors or
chemical operations, adverse weather conditions may render hazardous
otherwise satisfactory operations. Under the general authority granted
to ·various state and local health agencies,· regulations may be promulgated which establish limits for permissible contamination of the atmosphere from smoke and other ·foreign substances.m Municipalities also
have· broad powers to pass ordinances regulating matters of air pollution, such as smoke emission. These· powers can and doubtless will be
used to regulate contamination by radioactive gases.
In recent years, becaus~ of the "smog" conditions prevailing in many
industrial communities, interest in air pollution control has grown. Because it was felt that the prevention and reduction of air ccmtamination
could not be handled adequately by local legislative bodies, 126 the California legislature in 1947 passed a comprehensive statute providing for
the creation of air pollution control districts. In 1954 the New Jersey
legislature also enacted comprehensive legislation for the control of air
pollution. 121 Detailed examination of the California and New Jersey
statutes seems desirable. 128
Under the California statute, each county is declared to be an air
12s !d.,

at 7-8.
I d., at 12-13.
126 In Bd. of Health of Weehawken Tp. v. N.Y. Central R. Co., 4 N.J. 293, 72 A.2d
5II ( 1950), the defendant railroad was charged with the violation of a smoke ordinance
passed by the Board of Health of the Township of Weehawken by the operation of its
power plant. The New Jersey Supreme Court upheld a conviction under this ordinance,
holding that local boards of health may regulate and control air pollution in the interest
of public health and welfare by barring the excessive emission of smoke.
126 Cal. Health & Safety Code §§24198 to 24341.
121 N.J. Laws 1954, c. 212.
12s In 1953 the Illinois legislature created a commission to study air pollution and
recommend regulatory legislation. Ill. Laws 1953, S. 204.
124
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pollution control district. 129 Before a district can function, however,
the board of supervisors of the county must hold a public hearing to
determine the need of such a district. 180 The board must find that two
conditions exist prior to adopting a resolution activating the district :
(I) that the air in the county is polluted with air contaminants so that
it is injurious to health, or is an obstruction to the free use of property,
or is offensive to the senses of a considerable number of persons; and
( 2) that it is not practicable to rely on the enactment and enforcement
of local county and city ordinances to prevent air pollution. 181 "Air
contaminant" is defined to include "smoke, charred paper, dust, soot,
grime, carbon, noxious acids, fumes, gases, odors, or particulate matter,
or any combination thereof." 132 Although the definition does not expressly include radioactively contaminated air, it appears to be sufficiently b:·oad to encompass. this type of contamination. If a district
is authorized to function, the following statutory prohibition is operative:
A person shall not discharge from any source whatsoever
such quantities of air contaminants or other material which
cause injury, detriment, nuisance or annoyance to any considerable number of persons or to the public or which endanger
the comfort, repose, health or safety of any such persons or
the public or which cause or have a natural tendency to cause
injury or damage to business or property. 133
Any violation of this provision may be enjoined or punished criminally.184 It is expressly provided, however, that the legislature does not
intend to occupy the entire field or to supersede any local rules and
ordinances imposing higher standards.m
The county board of supervisors constitutes the air pollution control
board/ 36 but it is required to appoint an air pollution control officer. 181
The air pollution control board is granted broad rule-making authority,188 including power to make and enforce orders directing the reduction of the amount of air contaminants 139 and power to require that
Cal. Health & Safety Code §24200.
I d., §24203·
131 I d., §24205·
132 I d., §24208.
13S I d., §24243·
134 I d., §§24252, 24253.
135 I d., §§~47. 24248.
136 I d., §2422(>.
137 Id., §24222.
us I d., §24200.
139 I d., §2.¢)2.
129

130
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a permit be obtained from the air pollution control officer before a
structure is built or a contrivance is operated which may produce air
containinants. 140 This permit may be withheld unless it is shown that
air contamination will not result. 141 Any applicant for or holder of a
permit may be required to furnish information disclosing the nature,
extent, quantity, or degree of air contaminants which are or may be
discharged from any source.ua However, the air pollution control
board or a court, after hearing, may grant variances either from the
regulations or from the statute itself when "necessary." 148 The board
may "exercise a wide discretion in weighing the equities involved," a•
and it may prescribe different requirements applicable to certain industries or persons.uG
It may be concluded that California has a rather complete and farreaching system of regulating the air pollution, and since the discharge
of radioactive particles is in all probability included in the definition of
air contaminants, careful CO!Jlpliance by atomic energy users will be
necessary if the contemplated use involves a discharge of radioactive
gases into the atmosphere.
In contrast to California, the problem of air pollution in New Jersey
is handled on a state rather than a local basis. In 1954 the New Jersey
legislature created an Air Pollution Control Commission within the
Department of Health. 146 The commission has power to promulgate
rules and regulations controlling or prohibiting air pollution throughout the state.u 7 "Air pollution" is defined as "the presence in the outdoor atmosphere of substances in quantities which are injurious to
human, plant or animal life or to property, or unreasonably interfere
with the comfortable enjoyment of life and property throughout the
State . . . and excludes all aspects of employer-employee relationship
as to health and safety hazards." 148 Clearly, release of radioactive
gases and substances into the atmosphere falls within this broad definition. Persons engaged in· operations which may result in air pollution
may be required to register and file reports containing information
HOId.,

§2¢J.

Jd., §24264H2 I d., §242()9.

Hl

148 I d., §24291.
lH Jd., §24297·

I d., §242¢.
N.J. Laws 1954, c. 212.
147 Id., §9.
14G

14 6

148

I d., §2.
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"relating to location, size of outlet, height of outlet, rate and period of
emission and composition of effluent. . . . " 149
The New Jersey Air Pollution Control Commission is authorized to
establish county air pollution control associations to which rules of
strictly local application must be submitted for discussion and report. 150
However, the county associations act only in an advisory capacity. 151
Rules and regulations of the commission are enforced by the State
Commissioner of Health/ 52 and the Department of Health may seek
injunctive relief to prevent violations, and fines may be imposed for
continuing violations. 153
Although none of the other states covered· by this study has comprehensive air pollution legislation/ 54 it should be noted that several
cities have adopted ordinances concerning air pollution.m However,
some of the ordinances refer only to smoke abatement, and they probably will be inapplicable to radioactive gases discharged ·into the air.
Conclusion: State· agencies created especially for the control of air
pollution are not yet as· commonly established as are agencies for the
control of water pollution. However, a definite trend ·in the direction
of the creation -of such agencies has resulted largely because of the increasing recognition of the "smog" problem in industrial areas. Moreover, in many instances existing powers of state departments of health
are sufficiently broad to embrace control of air pollution. Therefore,
atomic energy enterprises which involve the release of radioactive gases,
vapors, and dusts into the atmosphere can expect regulation by some
state agency and perhaps by a local government agency as well, depending, of course, upon location of the plant facilities.
Because the release of large amounts of radioactive materials into
the atmosphere may be dangerous to surrounding populations and property, strict precautionary safety measures are definitely indicated, and,
indeed, industry will no doubt exert extraordinary efforts in this direc:tion. States which do not have agencies possessing authority to control
14 9

I d., §8.

Jd., §§II, 12.
151 I d., §§II et seq.
150

152

]d., §17.

153

Jd.,

§I!).

,

In Wisconsin counties having a population of 500,000 or more are specifically
authorized to regulate air pollution by ordinance. Wis. Stat. (1957) §59.07(53).
155 For a good discussion of city ordinances, see "Smog-Can Legislation Oear the
Air?" I Stan. L. Rev. 452 (1949). For a recent conviction' under New York City air
pollution control authority, ~ee People v. Tatje, 121 N.Y.S.2d 147 (1953). From this
case it appears that in 1952 the city created a Department of Air Pollution Control.
1H

STATE REGULATION

932

the discharge of dangerous substances into the atmosphere will no doubt
be so equipped as soon as the legislature is informed of the existence
of the problem. In states which have agencies with regulatory power
as yet unexercised, the necessary investigation and study of air pollution problems will doubtless commence at an early date so that rules
and regulations can be promulgated before atomic energy activities
cause an extra-hazardous public health problem.
3· Nuisances
Thus far in this study, primary emphasis has been placed on state
regulatory agencies which have been given statutory powers to regulate
some of the aspects of peaceful uses of atomic energy. Now, however,
we should turn briefly to an examination of the pertinent legal principles
of the law of nuisance since under these principles some regulation of
uses of atomic energy will 'be imposed by courts acting either at the
instance of private individuals or of public officials. Even though applicable zoning ordinances and health regulations are complied with, a
type of judicial zoning regulation may result from industrial operations
which occasion harm or discomfort to individuals in the vicinity of the
installation. Since radiation hazards may, and at the outset probably
will, be greatly feared by those who live near plants utilizing atomic
energy, account must be. taken of the fact that such persons may institute legal actions to restrict operations thought likely to .create these
dangers. The law of nuisance will afford a basis for this type of action.
It has been said that "There is perhaps no more impenetrable jungle
in the entire law than that which surrounds the word 'nuisance.' " 156
It is obvious that a subject so vast and confused cannot be examined
in detail in this study. We can, however, suggest some of the problems that may arise under the application of the fundamental propositions which are a part of the law of nuisance. Abundant authority is
available, but most cases provide little guidance since each case turns
largely on its own fact situation. However, cases involving power plants
and gas plants may have some special significance and will therefore be
noted.
Nuisances are usually divided into two somewhat unrelated and
separate categories : public nuisances and private nuisances. As will be
seen, these involve different ideas and require separate discussion.
158

Prosser, Torts 549 (1941).
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a. Public Nuisances
Public nuisances are minor criminal offenses ansmg out of acts
which cause interference with the public health, safety, morals, comfort, or qmvenience. 167 To be considered public, the nuisance must
affect an interest common to the general public in the exercise of public
rights, rather than rights belonging and peculiar to one or more individuals.158
Public nuisances are often defined by statutes, but definitions so
given are often couched in very general terms. Violations of water
pollution, smoke, or zoning ordinances are often made public nuisances.
Statutes or ordinances also frequently declare that establishments which
emit offensive odors are public nuisances. 159 The New York statutes
define a public nuisance as any act or omission which, among other
things, "1. Annoys, injures or endangers the comfort, repose, health
or safety of any considerable number of persons. . . . 4· In any way
renders a considerable number of persons insecure in life, or the use of
property." 160 These provisions have been .held to be declaratory of the
common law. 161 Under the New York type of statute, the operation of
an atomic energy establishment which discharges radioactive materials
into the streams or gases into the atmosphere might be held to annoy
or endanger the comfort, health, or safety of a considerable number of
persons and hence to violate the statute. However, a public nuisance
may be held privileged if it is authorized by the legislature. 162 The
crucial question, of course, is what conduct has been so authorized.
Another defense that may be effective in certain unusual circumstances
is the fact that the public has an overriding interest in the activity, such
as in essential war production. In such event, the defendant is relieved
of criminal though not civilliability. 163 Remedies available to the state
are either injunction or imposition of fines or other penalty. If a private
individual can show special damage to. himself, he may have a cause
of action for injury.m
151

ld. at 566-573 (1941).
at 568.
159 See· Anno., "Validity, construction, and application of statute or ordinance declaring plant or establishment which emits offensive odors to be public nuisance,'' 141
A.L.R. 285 (1942).
16o N.Y. Penal Code §1530.
161 People v. Borden's Condensed Milk Co., 165 App. Div. 711, 151 N.Y. Supp. 547
(1915); People .v. Gaydica, 122 Misc. 31, 203 N.Y. Supp. 243 (1923).
1 6 2 See Note, "Nuisance and Legislative Authorization," 52 Col. L. Rev. 781 (1952).
1ss See People v. Amecco Olemicals, 18o Misc. 1014. 43 N.Y.S.2d 330 (1943).
164 Prosser, Torts 569 (1941).

158 !d.
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b. Private Nuisances

A private nuisance is created when an unreasonable interference is
inflicted upon an individual's use or enjoyment of land. There are two
principal kinds of such interferences: { 1) actual physical injury to
land, such as damage to a structure caused by vibration or blasting,
pollution of water, or injury to buildings or plant life resulting from
the discharge of harmful substances, and {2) disturbance of the comfort or convenience of the occupant of land, such as by unpleasant or
harmful odors or gases, or storage in the vicinity of highly dangerous
materials. 1611 An important feature of any liability incurred as a result
of acts involving such interferences is the fact that the fault of the
actor is immaterial; i.e., liability may result whether the act is intentional, negligent, or entirely without fault. 168 In short, nuisance- giving rise to liability is a type of damage or injury, rather than a type of
conduct. Most of the litigation involving private nuisance has dealt
with the broad question of the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct, and the issue is essentially one of resolving the conflicting interests
of landowners. 167 In a sense, therefore, the law of private nuisance becomes a process of judicial zoning in which the nature of the locality
and the public interest involved are two important factors weighed by
the courts.
The two types of legal relief available against a private nuisance are
an action at law for damages and injunctive relief in equity. 168 Under
the latter remedy, a court may in rare instances completely restrain the
operation of a plant which creates the nuisance. More often the court
will require that the plant be shut down unless additional equipment is
installed or care taken to eliminate the nuisance. 169 In contrast to the
public nuisance it should be noted that legislative authorization, such as
the grant of a franchise or permit by a branch or agency of a government, does not create a privilege in favor of a private nuisance, especially
those that cause substantial injury, since this would amount to condemnation without payment of compensation.170 Neither is it any deI d. at 573-575·
I d. at 553-557·
1 6 7 I d. at 58o.
168/d. at sBS.
1 6 9 Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. Gault, 198 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1952) ;
Price v. Philip Carey Mfg. Co., 310 Pa. 557, 165 Atl. 849 (1933).
17 0 Churchill v. Burlington Water Co., 94 Iowa 89, 62 N.W. 646 (1895); Rosenheimer v. Standard Gas Light Co., 36 App. Div. I, 55 N.Y. Supp. 192 (1898); 37
A.L.R. 801 (1925); Note, 52 Col. L. Rev. 781, 784 (1952). For a discussion of the
possible effect of zoning ordinances on private nuisance actions, see Beuscher and
1611
166
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fense that the best available devices or equipment are being employed
in the operation of a plant since liability is not based on fault but arises
from the injury itsel£.1 71
Private individuals, normally adjoining landowners, have brought
numerous actions against public utility companies both for damages
and for injunctive relief. In a substantial number of cases relief by
way of damages for nuisance has been allowed, 172 but courts have been
reluctant to enjoin the operation of such plants. In reaching such conclusions, reliance has been placed on such factors as the quasi-public
character of the industries, the adequacy of the damage remedy, the
nature of the area where the plant was located, the cost required to
move the plant if enjoined, and the fact that the best available devices
to prevent injury to adjoining landowners were being used. 173
The ger.eral principle that an equity court will weigh the advantage
to be gained by the plaintiff against the injury _suffered by the public
before rest,·aining the operation of an industry is said to be especially
applicable in the case of public utilities. 174 However, in a few instances,
courts have temporarily restrained the operation of gas or electric power
plants, by requiring that additional protective devices be installed and
that the plant be shut down unless these are installed. 175 For example, in
Judson v. Los Angeles Suburban Gas Company a decree enjoining the
gas company "from conducting and operating the gasworks and manufactory . . . in such a manner as to cause or permit smoke, gases or
offensive smells or fumes to be emitted therefrom or to be precipitated
therefrom upon the property of the plaintiff" was affirmed. 176 In Anstee
v. Monroe Light and Fuel Co. the gas company was perpetually enjoined from making further deposits of industrial waste that polluted
neighboring soil, the gas company was required to alter its smokestack
to abate a smoke nuisance, and in addition damages were awarded. 117
Morrison, "Judicial Zoning Through Recent Nuisance Cases," 1955 Wis. L. Rev. 440,
453-457; Comment, 54 Mich. L. Rev. 266 (1955).
171 Rosenheimer v. Standard Gas Light Co., supra note 170; Pritchard v. Edison
Electric Illuminating Co., 92 App. Div. 178, 87 N.Y. Supp. 225 (1904).
1 72 See cases collected in 37 A.L.R. 8oo at 812-813 (1925).
173 Elliott Nursery Co. v. Duquesne Light Co., 281 Pa. 166, 126 At!. 345 (1924);
Jedneak v. Minneapolis General Electric Co., 212 Minn. 226, 4 N.W.2d 326 (1942);
Riedeman v. Mt. Morris Electric Co., 56 App. Div. 23, 67 N.Y. Supp. 391 (1900);
Parker v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., so Cal. App. 264, 195 Pac. 6o (1920).
174 37 A.L.R. 8oo at 802 (1925).
175 Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. Gault, supra note 16g; Price v. Philip
Carey Mfg. Co., supra note 169 (power plant of a manufacturing company) ; English
v. Progress Electric Light~ Motor Co., 95 Ala. 259. 10 So. 134 (18g1).
176 157 Cal. 168, 173, to6 Pac. 581 (1910).
17 7 171 Wis. 291, 177 N.W. 26 (1920).
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In· the light of these decisions, careful consideration must be given
to the location, construction, and operation of industrial plants utilizing
atomic energy, for conceivably such a plant could be partially or wholly
restrained as a nuisance if injury to landowners resulted. Furthermore,
because of the exceptionally dangerous character of atomic energy activities, a court would probably have less difficulty than in cases of
conventional plants in holding the owners of an atomic energy plant
liable for damages. 118
c. Conclusion
Although a full development of the law of public and private nuisance·
is beyond the scope of this study, the foregoing brief mention of its
ramifications suffices to show that it may serve in some instances as a
regulatory device effectuated by the courts under common law principles.
Since nuisance law is invoked only through litigation involving specific
factual settings, it is impossible to draw any but the most general conclusions. However, so far as atomic energy plants are concerned, it is
clear that both public officials and private persons may commence litigation with some likelihood of success, particularly if the atomic enterprise creates a hazardous or even an annoying condition in its vicinity.
Atomic energy entrepreneurs undoubtedly will have to exercise exceptional prudence in selection of location especially since limited public
knowledge of the subject coupled with the fears engendered by ·the
mystery of atomic forces may easily precipitate troublesome litigation.
Specific governmental authorization for a particular installation may
provide a defense against the charge of committing a public nuisance,
but the authorization will not provide a defense in respect to actions for
private nuisance. Accordingly, sites embracing large exclusion areas
well removed from populated centers seem advisable wherever possible,
not only as a means of protection of the public against possible accidents,
but also from the standpoint of avoiding monetary liability and regulation through court orders.
B. Diversion of Waters
If a nuclear reactor or other atomic energy plant utilizes large quantities of water, 179 diverted from regular watercourses, an additional
problem arises. Many states have enacted statutes which restrict the
See Part I of this volume.
The .full-scale atomic power plant built at Shippingport, Pennsylvania, by the
AEC and Duquesne Light Company employs water as a coolant.
11s

11e
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diversion of water, and, unauthorized diversion of substantial quantities
thereof may constitute a public or private nuisance. Most of these
statutes were enacted for other specific purposes; e.g., some of them are
concerned with the building of dams or other obstructions in watercourses, with impeding the navigability of streams, with preventing the .
free passage of fish, or preserving water supply facilities. However,
some of the language in these statutes may be broad enough to be applicable to the withdrawing of sizable quantities of water for industrial
uses, even though it is subsequently returned to the body of water from
which it is taken.
Obviously, states which are faced with the problem of water scarcity
are more likely to regulate_ the use of waters than are states that have
no such problem. In varying degrees five of the ten states surveyed in
this study fall within this category.
Texas and California are among those western states which follow
the law of "prior appropriation" with respect to water use. In these
states it is necessary to obtain a permit from an appropriate state agency
before water may be appropriated or diverted. 180 These state agencies
are given authority to reject an application if the use is detrimental to
the public interest. Elaborate systems of priority are set up to obtain
the most beneficial use from the available water.
New Jersey requires that a permit be obtained from the Division of
Water Policy and Supply if, in designated areas, water is to be taken
from subsurface or percolating sources in excess of 100,000 gallons
per day. 181 In Pennsylvania it is necessary to obtain a permit from the
Water and Power Resources Board in order to change, diminish, or
appropriate water from any body of water in the state. 182 This permit
is required regardless of whether the stream is navigable or non-navigable. It is expressly made unlawful to divert water for use in the
generation of electricity without such a permit. 183
Ohio is another state in the category of those which regulate the use
of water rather closely, but it appears to do so on a local level only,
through the granting of permission for the organization of various
-types of local water control districts. In an area where one of these
districts has been formed, it is necessary to obtain the consent of the
1 8° In Texas the permit must be secured from the State Board of Water Engineers,
Tex. Civ. Stat. art. 7492· In California the permit is obtainable from the Dept. of
Public Works, Div. of Water Resources, Cal. Water Code §xzsz.
181 N.J. Rev. Stat. §s8: 4A-z (Cum. Supp. 1945-47).
182 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 71, §.468.
18a Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. JZ, §594-
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governing board prior to making use of waters within the district. In
addition, the board of directors of a conservancy district, the board of
directors of a sanitary district, and the board of trustees of a regional
water and sewer district are given the authority to "prescribe the
permissible uses of the water supply provided by the district" by
regulation. 184
The possible existence of various types of local water districts authorized by statute must be checked and taken into account before an
industry may select any given plant location. As was noted above in
the discussion of pollution, both Texas and Illinois authorize various
types of local water districts. Those authorized by the Illinois statutes
seem primarily concerned with pollution problems, 185 but those authorized by Texas statutes are concerned as well with water usage. 186 California, too, provides for the formation of various types of local water
districts. 187
It may be necessary to secure the consent of a state agency when
water from a particular stream is desired for industrial use. For example, the appropriation of water from the Delaware River is stringently controlled by at least three states: New Jersey, New York, and
Pennsylvania/ 88 as well as an interstate agency, as will appear below
in the discussion of interstate compacts.
Several different statutory objectives may be involved in the statutes
under consideration. In several states it is deemed a public nuisance to
obstruct or impede the passage of any navigable river or waters without
legal authority. 189 In others the statutes are apparently directed toward
the maintenance of streams for navigable purposes. In at least two
states there are provisions which prohibit the obstruction of streams so
as to impede the free passage of fish. 190 Exceptions may be made by
184 Ohio Rev. Code §6IOI.I9(4)
(conservancy districts); §6II5.23(c) (sanitary
districts); §6n9.o8(c) (regional water and sewer districts).
1113 But see Ill. Stat. Ann. c. III 2/3, §§223-228, which authorize the establishment
of "Water Authorities." The board of trustees appears to have some control over
water use, although the act seems directed primarily at pollution of underground waters.
1 B6 See, e.g., Tex. Civ. Stat. art. 7622 (water improvement districts), art. 788o-3c
(underground water conservation districts), art. 7881 (fresh water supply districts).·
18 7 See, e.g., Cal. Water Code §§30,000 et seq. (county water districts) ; §§34,000
et seq. (California water districts).
1 8 8 N.]. Rev. Stat. §58: 18-r; N.Y. Conservation Law, §§ 501 et seq.; Pa. Stat. Ann.
tit. 32, §§815.1 et seq.
189 Ill. Stat. Ann. c. 38, §466; Mich. Stat. Ann. §9.334; Mo. Rev. Stat. ( 1949)
§236.240; Ohio Rev. Code §3767.13.
190 Mich. Stat. Ann. §13.1657·
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the Conservation Department in Michigan. 191 The statutes of Missouri
and Wisconsin seem primarily concerned with the construction of
dams. 192 In Wisconsin the Public Service Commission has jurisdiction
over the level and flow of water in navigable streams, 193 and water
declared surplus by this commission may be diverted. 194 Missouri
provides for a condemnation procedure to divert water when used in
connection with the generation of electric power for sale to the public. 195
Whether this statute may be used for obtaining water for cooling
purposes in an atomic reactor rather than in conjunction with hydroelectric power is uncertain.
Several unique Michigan statutes should also be noted. One provides
that the stage of water in any watercourse shall not be altered without
the written consent of the commissioner having jurisdiction over all the
bridges and culverts passing over the watercourse. 198 Another statute
gives authority to each county board of supervis.ors to "permit or prohibit the construction of any dam or bridge over or across any navigable
stream." 197
Another possible source of restriction upon the use of streams stems
from common law remedies available to riparian owners for an injury
to their water rights. This type of remedy may take the form of
either a suit for damages or an injunction against unreasonable use or
pollution. 198 It is important also to note that statutes which outlaw or
regulate water pollution in all probability do not displace the common
law rights to abate pollution. 199
The existing statutes do not cover the possible problem of substantially increasing water temperature which may occur in the operation
of a nuclear reactor.
Conclusion: The consuming of large quantities of water in an atomic
energy enterprise, such, for example, as a water-cooled nuclear reactor,
may in several states necessitate approval by state and local governmental authorities. Although the problems involved are not especially
unique as applied to atomic energy industries, nevertheless state and
191 Ibid.
19 2Mo. Rev. Stat. (1949) §236.om; Wis. Stat. (1951) §31.02.
193 Wis. Stat. (1957) §31.02.
194 I d., §31.14195 Mo. Rev. Stat. (1949) §§236.010 to 236.28o.
198 Mich. Stat. Ann. §9.1195.
197 I d., §5.J44.
198 See, e.g., Note, 100 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 225 at 227-231 (1951), where Pennsylvania
·
common law remedies are di~cussed.
199 Commonwealth ex rei. Shumaker v. New York & Pa. Co., supra note J2.
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local control of water diversion represents one more factor that must
be considered by atomic entrepreneurs in determining the type of
facility and its location.
C. Regulation of Radioactive Materials as Drugs or Dangerous
Substances

The use of radioactive materials in medical therapy and industrial
operations has increased rapidly and can be expected to continue to increase as new applications and better techniques are discovered. Since
radioisotopes can be produced as byproducts of any type nuclear reactor,
it is probable that many owners of nuclear reactors will find themselves
engaged in the sale of radioactive materials to medical, research, and
industrial consumers. As a result, two additional types of state regulation may be encountered : namely, regulation of sale of drugs and
regulation of transportation of dangerous substances.
At least four types of state statutes exist which may have some
application to the manufacture, sale, and use of radioisotopes in connection with the study and treatment of diseases. Since the California
statute books contain all four of these types and since the scheme of
regulation in California in respect to drugs and poisons is quite extensive, its statutes will be examined in some detail. Similar provisions
in the statutes of the other nine states will be indicated, together with
other pertinent provisions not found in the California statutes.
California, as well as the other nine states covered in this study, has
a statute regulating the pharmacy profession which provides for the
licensing of pharmacists and pharmacies and establishes a State Board
of .Pharmacy. 200 In addition to regulating the sale of drugs at retail,
the statute requires that any manufacturer of drugs obtain a permit
from the State Board of Pharmacy. 201 New York, Pennsylvania, Texas,
and Wisconsin similarly require the registration of drug manufacturers.202 The California statute also states that "Except as otherwise
provided in this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to manufacture
. . . any drug, poison, medicine or chemical . . . unless he is a regis2 oo Cal. Business & Professions Code §§4000 et seq.; Ill. Stat. Ann. c. 91, §§55.1
et seq.; Mich. Stat. Ann. §§14.721 et seq.; Mo. Stat. Ann. c. 338; N.J. Rev. Stat.
(1937) §§45: 14-1 et seq.; N.Y. Education Law §§6&n et seq.; Ohio Rev. Code c.
4729; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 63, §§291 et seq.; Tex. Civ. Stat. art. 45~; Wis. Stat. ( 1957)
§§151 et seq.
2o1 Cal. Business & Professions Code §4084.
2o2 N.Y. Education Law §68o5 (5) ; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 35, §794; Tex. Civ. Stat.
art. 45~, §17; Wis. Stat. (1957) §151.04(4).
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tered pharmacist. . . ." 208 However, since a corporation cannot be a
registered pharmacist, this provision must mean that a manufacturer
of drugs must either be a registered pharmacist or comply with the provision requiring that a manufacturer obtain a permit from the State
Board of Pharmacy. Pennsylvania, Texas, and Wisconsin require the
supervision of a registered pharmacist "or other qualified person" in
the manufacture of drugs. 204 The State Board of Pharmacy is also
given broad administrative authority to regulate the manufacture of
drugs for the protection of the public. 205 In view of these statutes, it
may be necessary for an atomic energy enterprise, if it produces byproduct radioisotopes to be used_in medical diagnosis and therapy, to register
with the state board of pharmacy and to comply with any applicable
statutes or regulations governing the manufacture of drugs.
A second category of statutes which must be taken into consideration
are the pure drug acts, many of them patterned a:fter the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act. These statutes commonly prohibit "adulteration" and "misbranding" of drugs. Elaborate statutory definitions
of these two terms are set forth, and drug manufacturers are required
to comply. 206 Another provision found in many of the pure drug acts
relates to "new drugs," and typically a new drug may not be sold unless
it has been approved under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
or approved by the state board of pharmacy. 207
A third category of state statutes establishes special regulations for
"dangerous drugs." For instance, California statutes define a "danger-·
ous drug" as any drug unsafe for self-medication. Certain specific drugs
are listed as dangerous, with power given to the Board of Pharmacy
to add others to the list. 208 Certainly many, if not most, radioisotopes
would fall within this definition. Manufacturers of dangerous drugs
must be registered with the Board of Pharmacy and keep a record of
sales of such drugs to wholesalers, pharmacies, and laboratories. 209
Cal. Business & Professions Code §4030.
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 35. §795; Tex. Civ. Stat. art. 4542a, §17; Wis. Stat (1957)
§151.04(4).
20 5 See, e.g., the rule-making power granted to the California State Board of
Pharmacy, Cal. Business & Professions Code §4009.
20 & Cal. Health & Safety Code §§26200 to 26385; Ill. Stat. Ann. c. 91, §55.1 1; Mich.
Stat. Ann. §14.781; Mo. Stat. Ann. §1g6.015; N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937) §24:5-1; N.Y.
Education Law §68o8; Ohio Rev. Code §§3715.o8, 3715.11 ; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 35,
§§781 to 8os; Tex. Civ. Stat. art. 4471; Wis. Stat. (1957) §97.25.
2 07 Cal. Health & Safety Code §26288; Mo. Stat. Ann. §1g6.105; N.J. Rev. Stat.
§24: 6A-1; N.Y. Education Law §68og.
2os Cal. Business & Professions Code §§4211, 4240.
20s I d., §§4217, 4227· Wisconsin also has a statute regulating the sale of dangerous
drugs. Wis. Stat. (1957) §I5I.o7.
2oa
20 4
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The fourth type of state statute which may have some significance
to producers of radioisotopes is that relating to poisons. The California
statute lists compounds and preparations which are deemed poisonous,
and gives power to the Board of Pharmacy to add others to the schedule when required in the interest of public health. 210 Other statutes
define a poison as any drug, chemical, or preparation which is likely to
be destructive to human life in quantities of sixty grains or less, 211 or
for some purposes any substance likely to be destructive of human life in
quantities of five grains or less. 212 These statutes typically require that
specified labels be attached to the container containing the poisonous
substances and that records be kept of their ~ale. The probable applicability of these statutes should be taken into account by concerns intending to market radioisotopes.
D. Transportation of Radioactive Materials
The transportation of radioactive materials may also be regulated
by several federal, state, and local agencies. Although the Atomic
Energy Commission apparently has power to regulate the transfer of
radioactive materials, the Commission has subordinated its authority
to the federal agencies having jurisdiction over the various types of
carriers. 218 As a result, the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Civil
Aeronautics Board, the U. S. Coast Guard, and the Post Office Department have issued detailed regulations governing the transportation of
radioactive substances under their authority to regulate transportation
of "explosives and other dangerous articles." 214 However, the authority
of the federal agencies, other than the Post Office, is generally limited
to interstate commerce· so that matters of intrastate commerce are
governed by state and local laws and regulations.
In each of the ten states studied, a state agency has general supervisory powers over the railroad and motor vehicle common carriers.
Typically, common carriers are denoted "public utilities" and are subject to the jurisdiction of the public utility commissions. However, in
21o Cal. Health & Safety Code §§20703, 20&Jo. See also Ill. Stat. Ann. c. 38, §184;
Mich. Stat. Ann. §14-745; Mo. Rev. Stat. (1949) §338.090; N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937)
§45: 14-19; N.Y. Education Law §6813; Ohio Rev. Code §3719.32; Tex.. Penal Code
art. 726; Wis. Stat. (1957) §15I.I0(1).
2n Mich. Stat. Ann. §14.745; N.Y. Education Law §6801 ( 16) ; Ohio Rev. Code
§4729.02(D); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 35, §901.
212 N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937) §45: 14-19; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 35, §902.
21s BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 281.1.
214 For a compilation of the .federal regulations, see AEC, Handbook of Federal
Regulations Applying to Transportation of Radioactive Materials (1955).
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some states the trucking industry is regulated by a separate agency.
In California, Illinois, Michigan, Missouri, New York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania the public utility commissions have been granted sufficiently
broad powers to establish health and safety standards for the transportation of radioactive materials by all types of common carriers. 215 In
New Jersey the Public Utilities Board has broad rule-making powers
in respect to railroad safety, 216 but the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles
is given only a limited power in respect to the trucking industry to
regulate the construction and equipment of vehicles. 217 In Texas only
the State Highway Commission seems to have sufficiently broad powers
to issue regulations covering transportation of radioactive materials. 218
In Wisconsin the Public Service Commission has jurisdiction over
both railroads and motor vehicles, but its power to make rules and
regulations covering procedures to be followed in transporting radioactive substances is not clear. For example, th~ commission is vested
with power and authority to "supervise and regulate such common motor
carriers in all matters affecting their relationship with the public . . .
to the end that adequate service at reasonable rates shall be afforded." 219
The power to regulate health and safety matters is thus not expressly
granted, but probably is implicit since it is made the duty of every common motor carrier to "furnish reasonable, safe and adequate service and
facilities." 220 Similarly, in respect to railroads in Wisconsin, every
railroad is directed to adopt "reasonably adequate safety measures and
install, operate and maintain reasonably adequate safety devices for
the protection of life and property." 221 But this general terminology is
followed by a sentence authorizing the commission to require the
installation of a block system. This probably limits the authority of the
commission to regulate only those safety matters connected with equipment and practices in moving f-reight; the authority apparently does
not extend to regulation of such matters as amount of material, packaging, warnings, etc.
Two statutes, 222 enacted in New York and Pennsylvania, which are
215 Cal. Public Utilities Code §761; Ill. Stat. Ann. c. III 2/3, §§32, 49, 61; id., c.
95 I/2; §§282.4,· 282.14; Mich. Stat. Ann. §§22.53, 22.543; Mo. Rev. Stat. (1949)
§386.310; N.Y. Public Service Law §49(2); Ohio Rev. Code §§4905.04, 4921.04; Pa.
Stat. Ann. tit. 66, §§1183, 1186.
2 16 N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937) §48: 2-23.
217
I d., §39= 3-43·
21s Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 911b, §4(a).
219 Wis. Stat. ( 1957) §194-18(9).
22o I d., §194.29.
221 I d., § 195.26.
222 N.Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law §16-c; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 75, §715.
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substantially identical in nature and regulate the transportation of dangerous articles· by motor vehicle, should also be mentioned. It is made
unlawful to transport by motor vehicle over the highways of the state
any dangerous article (which is defined to include radioactive materials)
in a manner that will unreasonably endanger persons or property. The
transporting motor vehicle must be conspicuously marked to indicate
the danger, but an exemption is granted when applicable regulations of
the Interstate Commerce Commission have been followed.
In addition to the authority of state agencies having direct jurisdiction over common carriers, it should be noted that the labor departments and health departments typically are granted such broad powers
in respect to the health and safety of employees and the public that
they may also attempt to regulate the transportation of radioactive materials. 228 Furthermore, local governmental units may also have authority to regulate transportation of radioactive substances. Therefore,
we find once again an imposing array of state and local agencies potentially capable of exercising jurisdiction in respect to the same activity.
E. Regulation by Interstate Compact
The interstate compact was little used until the 1920's,224 but recent
years have seen' a great increase in the application of this device in
various regulatory fields, including conservation of natural resources,
control and improvement of navigation, civil defense, education, flood
control, labor legislation, and stream pollution. 225 Both Congress and the
Supreme Court have encouraged the use of the interstate compact as a
means of solving problems essentially regional in character 228 which
do not readily lend themselves to solution by the states acting
individually.
Several compacts recently entered into by two or more states have
established interstate administrative agencies. The compacts of greatest
significance with respect to the development of atomic energy for
industrial uses are those relating to water pollution. However, the interstate compact may conceivably be used to regulate other activities affecting the use of atomic energy in the future. Therefore, in addition to
consulting and obtaining the necessary permission from appropriate
228 See discussion of general powers of the labor and health departments, supra,
Part III, Chapter III.
224 Zimmerman, The Interstate Compact Since 1925, 3 (1951).
225 Note, 100 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 130, 131 ( 1951) ; Book of the States 20 ( 1952-53).
22 8 See, e.g., New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 2g6, 313, 41 S.Ct. 492 (1921);
Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 71 S.Ct. 557 (1951); Water Pollution Control Act of
1948, 33 U.S.C.A. §466a(c); 36 Stat. g61 (1911).
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state agencies, an industry planning a venture into this new field of
activity should also investigate the existence of interstate agencies as
another possible instrumentality of governmental regulation.
Since the landmark Colorado River Compact, approved by Congress
in 1928, 227 the compact has been employed extensively in regard to
water problems common to several states. In the western states, including Colorado, New Mexico, Texas, Wyoming, Idaho, Nebraska, North
Dakota, South Dakota, and Kansas, numerous compacts have been
formed relating to matters of water allocation since scarcity of water
is a crucial problem in these states. 228 These compacts would assume
significance if a nuclear reactor employing large quantities of water as a
coolant were built in any of these states.
In the eastern and midwestern states, a number of compacts directed
toward the problem of pollution of interstate streams have been negotiated between states and approved by Congress .. Various factors have
accounted for the increasing use of the interstate compact in this area,
including especially the increasing number of instances of pollution of
interstate waters and the reluctance of the Supreme Court to enjoin
pollution at the instance of one state suing another. 229
Some of the more significant water pollution compacts merit discussion. Compacts to be examined will be primarily those involving the
states selected for this study in connection with regulation at the state
level. These compacts may be divided into two principal categories :
(I) compacts which create administrative agencies, some of which have
enforcement powers; and ( 2) compacts which create committees to
collect and disseminate information and to make recommendations to
the states. Since the second type does not involve regulatory powers,
they are of little significance for present purposes, although action taken
as a result of recommendations of the committees may have importance
in the future.
I.

Compacts Creating Joint Administrative Commissions
a. Commissions with Enforcement Powers

The following are representative interstate compacts pursuant to
which enforcement powers are conferred upon administrative commissions:
(I) Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation Compact. The Ohio River
227

45 Stat. 1057 (1928).
Zimmerman, supra note 224 at 16, contains citations to many of these compacts.
229 Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 26 S.Ct. 268 (1906); New York v. New Jersey,
supra note 226.
228

946

STATE REGULATION

Valley Water Sanitation Compact, drawn in 1936, became effective in
1948 when the requisite number of states ratified it. 230 The signatory
states are Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia. The compact creates the Ohio
River Valley Water Sanitation Commission, which is authorized to
adopt, prescribe, and promulgate rules, regulations, and standards for
administering and enforcing provisions of the compact. All industrial
wastes discharged into the Ohio River or its tributaries must be modified
or treated to protect the public health or to preserve the waters for other
legitimate purposes as determined to be necessary by the commission
after investigation, due notice, and hearing. The commission is empowered to order a person to discontinue, modify, or treat any discharge
of industrial waste, and the orders are enforceable in any court of general jurisdiction. In addition, the commission is ordered to make surveys
and recommendations and reports to the various signatory states. 231
(2) Tennessee River Basin Water Pollution Control Compact. The
purpose of the Tennessee River Basin Water Pollution Control Com,.
pact is to promote the effective control and reduction of pollution in the
waters of the Tennessee River basin. 282 The signatory states are Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, Tennessee, and
Virginia. The compact has not yet come into effect for it still requires
enactments by certain state legislatures and approval by the Congress.
When it comes into operation,Z 38 it will give the commission established
under the compact 284 powers in respect to the Tennessee River basin
somewhat similar to those possessed by the Ohio River Valley Water
Sanitation Commission over the Ohio River basin.
(3) Delaware River Basin Water Commission Compact. The Delaware River Basin Water Commission Compact involves New York,
New Jersey, Delaware, and Pennsylvania. Apparently, all states have
approved except Pennsylvania. 285 According to its terms, it is not to
2 30 Zimmerman, supra note 224 at 7, n. 33· Dyer v. Sims, supra note 226, concerned
the validity of this comp~ct, and the court's opinion contains background material as
well as some of the provisions of the compact.
281 The text of this compact may be found in Ohio Rev. Code §6II3.01; Pa. Stat.
Ann. tit. 32, §816.1; 54 Stat. 752 (1940).
282 For text of the compact, see Tenn. Laws 1955, c. rsr.
283 It enters into force when enacted into law by Tennessee and one other of the
signatory states and approved by Congress. I d., art. XII.
284 I d., art. II.
285 See II Del. Code Ann. ( 1953) tit. 23, §901-904, annotation to §902. See also
N.Y. Unconsolidated Laws §1581.
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become effective until approved by all four states; 236 moreover, Congress has not yet approved the compact.
When it becomes effective, the Delaware River Basin Water Commission will have power, among other things, to "exercise an essential
governmental function of each of the signatory states, for the purposes
of developing, utilizing, controlling, and conserving the water resources
of the Delaware River Basin in order to insure an adequate water
supply. . . ." Among the primary purposes is the assurance of an
"adequate minimum flow in the Delaware River for the protection of
public health, for the benefit of industry and of fisheries . . . , for
recreation, for general sanitary conditions, for the dilution and abatement of pollution, and for the prevention of undue salinity. . . ."
It would seem imperative that an industry contemplating the use of
large quantities of water consult this commission if and when the
compact goes into effect.
(4) Interstate Sanitation Commission. The Interstate Sanitation
Commission was created by a tri-state compact, negotiated in 1935
between New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut. 237 The boundaries of
the Interstate Sanitation District established by the compact and the
waters embraced by it are defined rather precisely in the agreement. In
general, the compact is aimed at abating and reducing the pollution of
harbor, coastal, and tidal waters and tributaries of tidal waters.
The commission is given power to classify and establish standards of
purity for the various bodies of water embraced within the district.
Unless properly treated, sewage or other polluting matters may not be
discharged into the waters in the district. Enforcement powers are
granted to the commission, as well as authority to issue orders. These
powers have been exercised in at least one instance, and a New Jersey
court has enforced the commission order by a mandatory injunction
directed against the discharge of sewage by a municipality. 288
The commission must be consulted in the event that coastal, estuarial,
or tidal waters of any of the .signatory states are considered for use by
an atomic energy establishmc:;nt. Moreover, the commission has recently
been authorized to study air pollution in the New York-New Jersey
area. 239
286/bid.
237

N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937), §§32:18-1 et seq. See also, 49 Stat. 932 (1935).
Interstate Sanitation Commission v. Weehawken, 141 N. ]. Eq. 536, 58 A.2d 530
(1!)48).
2so N.Y. Laws 1954, c. 321.
28 8
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b. Commissions without Enforcement Powers
The following are representative interstate ·compacts conferring advisory authority but not granting administrative enforcement powers:
(1) New England Interstate Water Pollution Control Compact.
The New England Interstate Water Pollution Control Compact embraces the states of Maine, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island,
Vermont, New Hampshire, and New York. Congress and all of the
states have approved the compact. 240 According to Article I, the compact
shall apply to :
. . . [S]treams, ponds and lakes which are contiguous to
two or more signatory states or which flow through two or
more signatory states or which have a tributary contiguous to
two or more signatory states or flowing through two or more
signatory states, and also shall apply to tidal waters ebbing and
flowing past the boundaries of two states.
The New England Interstate· Water Pollution Control Commission is
given rule-making authority and is required to "establish reasonable
physical, chemical and bacteriological standards of water quality satisfactory for various classifications of use." 241 The commission is not
authorized to issue permits or orders. However, appropriate state
agencies (i.e., agencies regulating health and water pollution) are
charged with establishing treatment programs to meet these standards.
Each signatory state pledges itself to provide for the abatement of existing pollution and for the control of future pollution of the waters
concerned. 242 Hence, all enforcement powers are retained by the individual signatory states. Of course, there is a possibility that the United
Sta.tes Supreme Court may enforce the compact obligations.
(2) Bi-State Development District. The Bi-State Development District is the result of a compact between Illinois and Missouri. It was
approved by Congress in 1950. 248 The purpose of the compact is to
establish a metropolitan development district, consisting of the city of
St. Louis and several surrounding counties. The Bi-State Development
Agency created pursuant to this interstate agreement is given power to
"plan, construct, maintain, own and operate bridges, tunnels, airports
and terminal facilities and to plan and establish policies for sewage and
6r Stat. 682 (1947).
art. V.
art. VI.
2 4 8 64 Stat. s68 ( 1950) ; see also, Ill. Stat. Ann. c. I27, §6Jr- I ; Mo. Stat. Ann.
§70.J70.
24o

2 41 /d.,
2 4 2 I d.,
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drainage facilities." 244 Apparently, this agency will act as a general
planning agency for this area. 245
While the agency has no direct powers of enforcement with respect to
matters of water pollution and use, nevertheless as a planning and rulemaking agency it has policy-forming authority, and it would seem
advisable to consult it should an industry contemplate the use of waters
in the area covered by the compact.
(3) Interstate Commission on the Delaware River Basin. The Interstate Commission on the Delaware River Basin might be termed a
"joint advisory commission," created pursuant to a compact between
New York, New Jersey, Delaware, and Pennsylvania. 248 The compact
outlines detailed requirements for the disposal of wastes in the Delaware
River basin. The basin is divided into four zones, and it has been said :
"For the bdustry operating in one of these zones or planning to build
there, the agreement provides an exact pictur~ of what will be required." 247 No .enforcement powers are given to the commission, its
powers being purely advisory. The Delaware River Basin Water Commission Compact, discussed above, now in the process of being adopted
by the same four states, will have enforcement powers and is a product
of the recommendations of this older commission. ·
(4) Columbia Interstate Compact. The Columbia Interstate Compact
was signed in 1955 by the states of Idaho, Montana, Oregon, Washington, Nevada, Utah, and Wyoming. It will become effective when ratified
by the first four states listed above and approved by Congress. 248 Under
the compact, the Columbia Interstate Compact Commission will have
advisory powers in respect to the utilization of the water and other
related resources of the Columbia River basin. It is of particular interest
for the purposes of this study to note that specific power is given the
commission to prepare and recommend plans for achieving the most
efficient use of the hydroelectric power resources in the basin and for
controlling pollution of waters of the Columbia River system. 249
2.

Compacts Creating Informal Advisory Commissions

Several compacts establishing purely advisory commissions on water
pollution have been entered into by different groups of states. These
2H

64 Stat. 569 (art. III) (1950).

See Zimmerman, supra note 224 at 12.
for test, see Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. J2, §815.31.
2 47 tomment, "Statutory Stream Pollution Control," 100 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 225, 237
(1951).
24 8 For the text of the compact, see Idaho Laws 1955, c. 185.
24 9 Art. V, §C(J) and art. VIII, §B of the compact respectively.
2• 5

2• 8
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compacts are of little significance at present, except insofar as they may
lead to future compacts or statutes which may be recommended bythe
respective commissions. These compacts typically embrace a particular
river basin, and give the commission authority to make investigations,
disseminate information, and make recommendations to their respective
signatory states. The signatory states typically agree to cooperate in the
abatement of existing pollution, to prevent future pollution, and to
enact uniform legislation for the abatement and prevention of water
pollution. 250
Another type of agreement, even more informal, provides simply that
departments of health of several states agree to cooperate with each
other and with the United States Health Service in abating and preventing water pollution. Apparently these agreements create a committee which meets periodically, discusses mutual problems of water pollution, and makes suggestions. Beyond this the committee cannot go. 251
Illustrative of such agreements and the corresponding signatory
states are: Upper Mississippi River Drainage Basin Sanitation Agreement (Minn., Ind., Iowa, Wis., Ill., Mo.) ; Missouri River Basin Sanitation Agreement (Colo., Kan., Mo., Neb., Iowa, Minn., Mont., N.D.,
S.D., Wyo.); The Great Lakes Drainage Basin Sanitation Agreement
(Minn., Wis., Ill., N.Y., Pa., Ohio, Mich., Ind.).
Also to be mentioned are joint resolutions between water pollution
commissions of two or more states. For example, Minnesota has joined
with Wisconsin in at least two joint resolutions, one in 1952 and the
other in 1953. By the terms of these resolutions each signatory state
agrees to require certain minimum treatment of wastes to prevent water
pollution. Another jojnt resolution was entered into by the states of
Illinois, Iowa, and Wisconsin in 1952, with essentially the same provisions as the resolutions between Wisconsin and Minnesota.
3· Conclusion
It will be important for any private industry contemplating the establishment of a plant utilizing nuclear .power or otherwise using nuclear
energy in such manner as to affect interstate streams to take into consideration any interstate compacts that may be applicable and to consult
with the interstate commissions whether the commissions have enforce2 50 See, e.g., Interstate Commission on the Potomac River Basin, 54 Stat. 748 (1940),
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 32, §741.
2 51 These compacts do not ordinarily get into the state statute books, but are matters
of informal public record.
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ment or merely advisory powers. If the particular commission has enforcement powers, then clearly an industry will be subject to them. In
the case of a commission with only advisory powers, a private industry
would nevertheless be well advised to follow its recommendations. The
commission's proposals may be implemented by statutes of the states
party to the compact. Moreover, good public relations will demand that
the industry adopt the health and safety standards recommended by the
interstate commission. Furthermore, a failure to adopt the recommended standards may serve as evidence of negligence, if persons or
property are injured, and actions are brought in the courts to recover
damages.

Chapter V
RECENT STATE ATOMIC ENERGY LEGISLATION
AND REGULATION
In recent years a number of states have recognized some of the problems inherent in the peaceful uses of atomic energy and have enacted
legislation, promulgated regulations, or taken other executive action.
Although this legislation and regulation cannot be easily classified,
basically state action expressly concerned with atomic energy problems
seems to fall into three categories : ( 1) legislation or executive action
creating study commissions to investigate the problems involved and
recommend solutions; ( 2) legislation to encourage atomic energy activities and establish eduf<ition programs; and (3) legislation and regulations to control radiation hazards.
A. Study Commissions
Before a state invokes any of its powers, reason suggests that it first
determine what problems are involved and in what directions solutions
are most likely to lie. This is especially true where the state proposes
to anticipate the development and effect of a new scientific, industrial,
agricultural, and medical instrument and source of energy. Investigations of this magnitude require the concerted efforts of representatives
of a number of disciplines.
Recognizing the dimensions and complexity of the problem posed by
the peaceful uses of atomic energy, many states, either individually or
as members of a geographic region with similar interests, have established special investigating, study, and planning commissions to determine the scope and purpose of any state program. These commissions
have been established by both legislative and executive action. All of
them have sought to focus the minds of a representative group of experts upon the problems of promoting and integrating the utilization of
atomic energy into the activities of the state or region. Most of them
are of a temporary character, existing until such time as their recommendations are tendered to the governor or to the legislature.
Typical of this approach are the actions of Georgia, Illinois, New
Jersey, and South Carolina. In 1955 the Illinois legislature established
the Atomic Power Investigating Commission by statute. 1 The commis1

Ill. Laws 1955, S.B. 577.
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sian consists of the directors of public health, civil defense, and public
welfare (who are members ex officio), three members from the General
Assembly, three from labor, three from industry, and three from scien~e. The commission was charged with the duty of making a thorough
investigation and study of the economic and social impact of the peaceful uses of atomic energy upon the state and submitting a report of
the results and recommendations to the governor and the General Assembly within two years. In 1957 another statute was passed to continue
this organization for another two years. 2
A permanent Nuclear Advisory Commission, consisting of not less
than twenty, nor more than forty, members (representing agriculture,
power, medicine, public health, education, industry, labor, banking,
insurance, law, government, and such other fields as the governor
deemed ad_visable), was created by a resolution of the Georgia legislature in 1957. 3 Its duties include making a study. as to the best possible
means of achieving the social and economic benefits of nuclear energy,
keeping itself advised on all phases of nuclear energy development, keeping the governor informed and advised, and determining whether additional legislation is necessary. By virtue of a recommendation in the
resolution that no legislation relating to nuclear energy be introduced or
enacted unless first approved by the commission, it has been made, in
effect, a clearing house for legislation.
A fifteen member Atomic Energy Commission was authorized by a
joint resolution of the New Jersey legislature in 1956 for the purpose
of conducting a similar study. 4 And in 1956 the New York legislature
created the Joint Committee on State's Economy, which is authorized
to make a thorough study of the effect of the advance in the civilian use
of atomic energy upon the economy of the state and of the measures to
be taken in relation thereto. The South Carolina Senate, by resolution,
amended its rules to create a Committee on Atomic and Nuclear Energy
for purposes similar to those of New York.D
The governors of Arkansas, Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts,
Michigan, New Hampshire, Ohio, Tennessee, and Washington have
revealed an independent concern. with atomic energy problems by appointing study committees to assist them. 8
2

Ill. Laws 1957, S.B. 65o; 2 CCH. Atomic Energy Law Rep. 1[17,215.
Ga. Laws 1957, H. Res. 24-5oa; 2 CCH Atomic Energy Law Rep. 1[17,191.
4 N.J. Laws 1956, Jt. Res. 16; 2 CCH Atomic Energy Law Rep. 1[17,337.
5
S.C. Laws 1957, S. Res. 455; 2 CCH Atomic Energy Law Rep. 1[17,443.
8 Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc., "State Activities in Atomic Energy," (mimeo.
Feb. 1957).
3
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In addition to the above state measures taken independently, several
regional organizations have been established to make studies concerning
the social and economic impact of atomic energy. Sixteen southern
states, 7 through the Southern Regional Education Board, conducted a
study program which resulted in the presentation of a report to the
Southern Governors' Conference in I956. The report pointed out two
principal areas of state action-to control and to develop the use of
atomic energy. The report also recommended (I) that each governor
appoint a special assistant for atomic energy matters, ( 2) that existing
state agencies continue to exercise existing regulatory authority in their
respective areas of activity, (3) that each state study its existing laws
and regulations applicable to nuclear energy, and (4) that state development and promotional agencies re-evaluate their practices and programs
to include the atom. These recommendations covered the field of agriculture, atomic power, general industrial applications, manpower, education, medicine, and public health. 8
Having received this report and recommendation, the Southern
Governors' Conference, in turn, recommended that individual states
create a state nuclear energy advisory committee for the purpose of (I)
reviewing the work conference report, ( 2) recommending state programs, and ( 3) advising the state governor on atomic energy matters.
The Georgia Nuclear Advisory Commission, described above, is an
example of the recommended organization. It also was suggested that
the chairmen of the various state advisory commissions serve as members to a regional advisory council. 9
On February 8, 1954, the New England Committee on Atomic
Energy was established by a resolution adopted at the New England
Governors' Conference. It consisted of twelve members, selected by the
chairman of the Conference from nominations submitted by the s1x
New England governors, 10 and was to make a survey concerning :
7

Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland,

Mis~issippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia,

and West Virginia.
8 Supra note 6, p. 3·
9/bid. At the request of the Regional Advisory Council on Nuclear Energy of the
Southern Governors Conference, the Southwestern Legal Foundation of Dallas, Texas
has undertaken a study to ascertain the feasibility and advisability of an interstate
compact pertaining to nuclear energy among the sixteen states represented at the
conference. On September 1, 1957 the Foundation published its interim report on "The
Feasibility of a Southern Regional Compact on Nuclear Energy." The report contains
a general discussion on the areas of state responsibility, plus tentative remarks regarding areas for interstate coordination and separate state action.
1o Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New Hampshire, and Vermont.
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(I) The interests of New England in the development of
atomic energy, present and potential, for peaceful purposes,
particularly in the field of power generation;
( 2) The extent and effectiveness of present efforts in this
field on the part of the New England state governments, educational institutions, private associations, industrial and business firms and individuals;
(3) Measures appropriate for both public and private organizations which would stimulate and enlarge New England's
participation in the atomic energy program; and
( 4) Such other matters relating to atomic energy as in the
judgment of the Committee should be brought to the attention
of the Conference. 11

In July of I955 the committee submitted an extensive report in which
it concluded that the effect of the 1954 Atomic Energy Act was to open
a new phase of state and private atomic activity; that such activity called
for " . . . an industrial base in which scientific and engineering talent,
supported by mechanical skills, is the indispensable element" ; that, while
atomic power was not then economically competitive, since New England
was a high power cost area, it should be in the forefront of atomic
power development; that the new phase in atomic activity affects state
governments in at least three of their traditional capacities: (I) "The
exercise of the police power for the protection of the health, safety, and
welfare of the citizen"; (2) " . . . the exercise of . . . [the police]
power with respect to financial, insurance, and rate regulation as new
atomic industries are financed and come into being" ; and ( 3) ". . .
the capability of the state to encourage and enhance the development o£
new industrial activity through promotion, dedication of resources, and
sound tax policy." 12
Also included in the committee's report were its recommendations (I)
to the states-that they undertake a legislative program similar in
concept to that contained in a suggested state statute (discussed below
in this chapter) ; ( 2) to Congress and the AEC-that some federal
atomic energy installations, an AEC administrative office, and a library
of classified technical information be located in New England; ( 3) to
New England educational institutions-that they should undertake to
construct research reactors and to institute appropriate training programs on all phases of atomic energy; and ( 4) to New England indusu New England Committee on Atomic Energy, "Atomic Energy and New England,"
app. (i) (1955).
12 /d. at 2.
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trial and business leaders-that atomic energy uses, opportunities, and
enterprises should be aggressively pursued. 18
B. State Promotional Programs
A number of states have acted to establish special administrative
agencies charged primarily with the task of encouraging atomic energy
development, and, in some instances, secondarily with some minor
regulatory functions. In respect to these promotional efforts there is
an understandable lack of specificity. It is doubtful if these states
regard their actions as anything but tentative, and it is obvious that all
of them desire to move with caution. There is a noticeable reluctance
to adopt any measures which are as revolutionary in nature as atomic
energy itself. None of the states appears much inclined toward fresh
experiments in the business of covernment. Certainly their actions do
not manifest anything like the magnitude of concern which caused
Congress to establish the Atomic Energy Commission, with its extraordinary powers, in 1946. Of cours_e, in justice to the states, it should
be pointed out that this conservatism probably is due in large part to
the existence of the AEC as well as to a justifiable perplexity as to
just what areas of influence the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 leaves
open to them. On the other hand, should the states desire to exercise
their traditional prerogatives in the field of atomic energy, they will
have to take a bolder line than has been taken thus far.
Unlike Congress, none of the states has vested its promotional and
control powers and duties with respect to atomic energy in one agency
or treated both aspects of such a program in one statute. For the most
part these subjects have been separately provided for, and, especially in
regard to regulation, existing state agencies have been utilized.
By far the most popular statutory scheme for state promotion (and
some control) of atomic energy is that recommended by the New England Committee on Atomic Energy. This committee's "Model Act to
Coordinate Development and Regulatory Activities Relating to the
Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy" a has been followed in Arkansas/11
Connecticut, 18 Maine, 11 Massachusetts, 18 New Hampshire, 19 Ohio, 20
Ibid.
u /d., app. (iii); reprinted as Appendix B, Item
u Ark. Stat. Ann. §§82-1401 et seq.
16 Conn. Gen. Stat. §§1933d et seq.
17 Me. Rev. Stat. c. sz-A, §§1-7.
18 Mass. Ann. Laws c. 6, §§85-93.
19 N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. c. 162-B, §§r-6.
2o Ohio Rev. Code §§4163: 01 et seq.

1s
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and Washington. 21 Furthermore, recent enactments of Florida, 22
Rhode Island, 23 South Carolina/• and Tennessee 25 indicate that they
gave close attention to the recommendations of the New England Commi.ttee. Because of the widespread legislative recognition afforded the
New England Model Act, a discussion of its significant features is
warranted.
In an interim report, published on December 27, 1954, the New
England Committee on Atomic Energy recommended to the attention
of the member states an act which was designed :
( 1) to provide the basis for a single harmonious system of
atomic energy regulatory activity within each state through
the exercise of coordinate federal and state regulatory powers,
(2) to open the way for orderly and intelligent study, within
each affected state administrative area, of the new problems
pi:>sed by privately financed atomic energy enterprise . . .
and
(3) to provide a focus within the state for atomic energy
matters-as well as a basis for regional and state coordination-by the creation, on the staff of each governor, of a Coordinator of Atomic Energy Development. 28
In the first ·section of this statute the enacting state declares itself
to be in accord with " . . . the action of the Congress of the United
States in enacting the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,'' and that it intends
to". . . cooperate actively in the atomic energy program" and exercise
its police powers in a manner" . . . so as to conform, as nearly as may
be, to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and regulations issued thereunder."
Section 3 of the act directs a number of affected state departments and
agencies, such as the departments of public health, labor, highways, etc.,
to". . . initiate and pursue continuing studies as to the need if any for
changes in the laws and regulations administered by . . . [them] . . .
that would arise from the presence within the state of special nuclear
materials and by-product materials and from operation herein of production or utilization facilities." This section also authorizes the governor to direct other departments and political subdivisions of the state,
which are not specified, to initiate similar studies. Pursuant to these
Wash. Rev. Code c. 4J.J9.
Fla. Stat. Ann. c. 290.
2a R.I. Gen. Laws tit. 42, c. 27, §§1 et seq.

21

22

2•
215

2&

S.C. Code 1.952, §§1-391 et seq.
Tenn. Code Ann. §§53-3101 et seq.

Supra note

II

at

s.
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studies, each department or agency is" . . . to make such recommendations for the enactment of laws or amendment~ to laws administered by
it, and such proposals for amendments to the regulations issued by it, as
may appear necessary and appropriate."
This section reflects the realization that the problems involved are not
amenable to any one solution, since conditions may be expected to change
rapidly and move in unexpected directions, and that the experience of a
number of existing state agencies can be utilized advantageously in this
continuing endeavor to maintain a flexible promotional program. Presumably, within the limitations of its budget and the qualifications of its
personnel or those it can afford to hire, each department is free to conduct its investigation as it sees fit. It should be noted that all of the
states which have enacted this statute apparently have assumed that the
existing agencies were adequate to the task. None has expressly authorized the establishment of specialized organizations within .the departments and agencies for this purpose. As will be pointed out below,
several states have created a special advisory board to which the departments and agencies have access, and a recent amendment to the Maine
statute authorizes the advisory board to obtain technical advice from
the AEC as well as to cooperate with the federal government in performing functions relating to atomic energy. 27
A significant feature of the act in general, and Section 3 in particular,
lies in the fact that none of the departments and agencies mentioned
are given any new authority to promulgate regulations concerning
atomic energy matters or to institute anything except a study program.
However, the act apparently contemplates the issuance of regulations
by state departments and agencies, under existing statutory authority,
for, in Section 4 (c), it provides that :
No regulation or amendment to a regulation applying specifically to an atomic energy matter which any such department or
agency may propose to issue shall become effective until 30
days after it has been submitted to the Coordinator [of
Atomic Development Activities]. . . .
It should be noted, however, that whatever implication this provision
carries with it is obscured by a noticeable absence of standards. The
only thing offered by way of a guide is that the state intends to exercise
its powers in such a manner as " . . . to conform, as nearly as may be,
to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and regulations issued thereunder."
Although this standard will assist departments and agencies concerned
27

Me. Rev. Stat. c. sz-A, §7.
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with radiation safety regulation, it is not much help to those agencies
which are charged with other types of regulatory activities.
Section 4 of the act provides for the establishment in the state's administrative hierarchy of the office of Coordinator of Atomic Development Activities. The only qualifications for this officer are that he be
a "citizen of this state." In New Hampshire he also must be selected
from among the commissioners of the various departments and agencies.28 Under the Model Act he is to be appointed by the "Governor and
Council," while in Arkansas/ 9 Connecticut, 80 and Washington, 81 the
governor alone may appoint, and in Ohio the advice and consent of the
Senate is required. 82
The duties of this official are: (I) to coordinate the studies, recommendations, and proposals of the several departments and agencies
". . . with each other and also with the programs and activities of the
Department of Industrial Development of the State," and like activities
in other states and with the policies and regulations of the AEC; ( 2)
to ". . . keep the Governor and Council and the several interested departments and agencies informed as to private .and public activit~es
affecting atomic industrial development"; (3) to further such atomic
industrial development " . . . as is consistent with the health, safety,
and general welfare" of the people of the state; and ( 4) to represent
the state's interest in regional atomic activities and in cooperation with
the federal government.
Essentially, the coordinator has no appreciable powers unless he
could be said to derive some as". . . deputy to the Governor in matters
relating to atomic energy." Quite obviously, the success of this office
largely depends upon the personal persuasiveness of the individual
appointed. In this connection, the provision in Section 4 (c), requiring
submission of all proposed regulations to the coordinator thirty days
prior to their effective date (" . . . unless, upon a finding of emergency
need, the Governor by order waives all or any part of this 30 day
period"), may prove of some assistance to the coordinator. Also, it
should be noted that the several departments and agencies are directed
to keep the coordinator fully and currently informed as to their activities
relating to atomic energy. The New England Committee has likened
these provisions to those contained in the 1954 Atomic Energy Act
2s N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. c. 162-B, §4.

Ark. Stat. Ann. §82-1404.
Conn. Gen. Stat. §193&1.
31 Wash. Rev. Code §43·39.050.
32 Ohio Rev. Code §4163.04.
29

30
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requiring advance notice of proposed AEC action to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in Congress.
According to the New England Committee, Section 4 " . . . is premised on the proposition that what is everybody's business is nobody's
business and therefore seeks to make sure that atomic development and
regulation is somebody's business." 83 One wonders just how much of a
"somebody" this coordinator is in the states listed. None of the enacting states has seen fit to provide compensation for him on a fulltime basis.
Sections 2 and 5 combine to form the only direct regulatory provisions of this act. Section 2 simply provides that no persons within the
state shall carry on any activity with respect to "special nuclear material,
byproduct material, production facility or utilization facility," for
which type of activity an AEC license or permit is required by federal
law, without first obtaining the license or permit. Section 5 authorizes
the state attorney general to apply to an appropriate court for an order
enjoining any person who is violating, or is about to violate, Section 2.
No criminal penalties for violation of Section 2 are provided.
The drafters of this act have indicated that there may be some doubt
as to whether, in the absence of a war emergency, the AEC's authority
reaches as far as the licensing requirements of the 1954 Atomic Energy
Act would extend it. Therefore, Section 2 is intended to remove the
possibility of a jurisdictional "no-man's land," without imposing licensing burdens and expenses upon the states, and, also, to discourage possible challenges of the federal licensing power. 84 There may be some
question as to whether a user of byproduct material (material not owned
by the federal government), who is not in interstate commerce or in an
activity affecting interstate commerce (assuming that this is possible
any longer), is within the regulatory jurisdiction of the AEC. The
fact cannot be ignored, however, that since the AEC is the principal
supplier of byproduct materials today and practically all other sources
of supply clearly come under federal regulation, should this intrastate
user fail ~o comply with federal regulations, further supply of byproduct
material could be denied to him. 85 Thus, it is doubtful if Section 2
Supra note n at 66.
I d. at 64- On the extent of the congressional power to regulate in the atomic
energy field see Estep, "Federal Control of Health and Safety Standards in Peacetime
Private Atomic Energy Activities," 52 Mich. L. Rev. 333 (1955).
85 The Radiation Products Company of Dallas, Texas, a licensed user of radioisotopes, has been ordered by the AEC to cease temporarily operations involving radioactive materials, pending a public hearing on possible modification, suspension or revocation of the company's license. AEC Release No. A-28, Feb. 10, 1958, indicated that
88

u
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is necessary to sustain the federal licensing and regulatory provisions in
even the shadow areas of federal jurisdiction. Nevertheless, it is useful
in that it authorizes a state authority, which is closer to the scene, to
en.force a state law and thus to act directly in protecting the interests of
the state and its citizens.
If the combination of Sections 2 and 5 should ultimately prove necessary, the question may arise as to whether Section 2 is an unconstitutional delegation of state legislative power because the licensing requirements are subject to future changes by Congress and the AEC, thereby
automatically effecting a change in state law. The drafters of the act
have pointed out that "Section 2 seems reasonably safe from attack,
however, since it merely uses the possession of a federal license as a fact
indicating that the possessor is a fit person to engage in the activity to
which the license applies." 88
The federal constitutional question as to wh~ther a state, in effect,
can enforce in this fashion a federal regulatory program where Congress may have pre-empted the field will be considered at a later point
in this chapter.
The key terms used in Section 2-"special nuclear material, by-product material, production facility . . . [and] . . . utilization facility"are defined in Section 7 in such a way as to keep their meaning consistent with federal definitions under the 1954 Atomic Energy Act. The
scope of the act and the radiation hazard with which it manifests some
concern is no broader than the federal program. Several sources of radiation, which are fairly abundant, are not covered by the act: X-ray
machines, various types of particle accelerators, radium, and source material. It was felt that source material does not present a significant
radiation hazard and . that its inclusion might embarrass activities
involving ores containing small quantities of uranium. Recently, however, the Maine legislature amended its act to include source materiaJ.S 7
Commissio_n inspectors had discovered that the company had transferred at least two
radioactive cobalt 6o sources, of approximately one curie each, to persons not licensed
by the AEC to receive them. The hearing was scheduled for 10 :oo a.m., Feb. 24, 1958,
in Dallas, but was postponed by the AEC. 2 CCH Atomic Energy Law Rep. 1T9517.
88 /bid. Regarding the question .of state constitutional law, the New England Committee said: "Section 2 is like a statute conferring certain privileges on persons who
have been admitted to the bars of other states. Statutes of this sort are not considered
unconstitutional by the fact that the requirements for admission to the bar may be
changed by other states in the future. And a state may condition the transport of
intoxicating liquor through its territory on the fact that the consignee in another state
may lawfully receive it. Carter v. Virginia, 321 U.S. 131, [64 S. Ct. 464] (1944)."
87 Me. Rev. Stat. c. 52-A, §§1-7. The term "source material" is defined and inserted
between the terms "special nuclear material" and "byproduct material" wherever they
occur in the Maine statute.
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Several of the states which have followed the recommendations of
the New England Committee have made significant additions to .the
Model Act. While creating the position of coordinator, Massachusetts,
Ohio, and Washington have also established atomic energy advisory
boards. Massachusetts' "Commission on Atomic Energy" consists of
seven members (one of whom is the coordinator, who is also the chairman) appointed by the governor with the advice and consent of the
Council for five year terms. They are to be representative of industry,
labor, and science. The duties of this commission are: (I) to keep
fully and currently informed as to atomic energy developments and activities ; ( 2) to consult with and advise the coordinator ; and ( 3) to
render an annual report. There are to be at least four meetings of the
commission annually.88
Ohio's Atomic Energy Advisory. Board consists of eleven members,
appointed by and serving at the pleasure of the governor. The coordinator is a member; labor, management, and medicine are represented by one member each ; · two members are persons with scientific
training in the atomic energy field ; and the five remaining members
need not have any particular qualifications. This board is: (I) to review
the studies, policies, and activities of the state departments and agencies;
(2) to review atomic developments within the United States and elsewhere; (3) to make recommendations to the governor; and (4) t~
furnish the coordinator, or any state department, such technical advice
as may be required upon all matters relating to the production or use
of atomic energy and the protection and welfare of persons employed in
industries so engaged. 89
The Washington Atomic Energy Advisory Council consists of five
members, appointed by the governor. No qualifications for these persons nor duties for the council are stipulated. The coordinator is to act
as executive secretary to the council. 40
In Maine, in addition to being entitled to a thirty day notice of proposed regulations, the coordinator may (within this time) notify the
governor of his objections and reasons therefor. After discussion with
the affected department or agency, and within fifteen days after receipt
of objections from the coordinator, the governor may declare the proposed regulation valid and effective or invalid and ineffective. 41 This
Mass. Ann. Laws c. 6, §88.
Ohio Rev. Code §4I63.05.
40 Wash Rev. Code §4J.J9.o6o.
41 Me. Rev. Stat. c. 52-A, §,SI.
38
89
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provision appears to be something of an improvement over that contained in the Model Act.
The Tennessee statute does not create the position of a coordinator,
but establishes a seven to ten member "Advisory Committee on Atomic
Energy," with duties identical with those of the coordinator under the
Model Act. This committee is authorized to obtain full-time administrative and consultant staff assistance with the concurrence of the governor. The statute also omits the injunction provision.~
:Promotion commissions have been established in Florida and Rhode
Island by statutes which are conceptually similar to the New England
Model Act. The Florida Nuclear Development Commission consists of
nine members appointed by the governor for terms concurrent with his.
It is authorized to appoint a salaried, executive director and to employ
such personnel as may be necessary. Essentially, its duties are: ( 1) to
coordinate all local and state nuclear energy activities ; ( 2) to promote
and support programs of education, research, and information; (3) to
provide for and work with groups in the state relative to ·problems of
regulation, insurance, safety, and public health as related to nuclear
energy; ( 4) to assist and attract nuclear energy industries; and ( 5) to
advise and make legislative recommendations to the governor. 43
The Rhode Island Atomic Energy Commission consists of five members appointed by the governor for overlapping terms of five years.
Basically this commission is to make a study of the need for changes
in state laws and regulations, advise and make recommendations to the
governor and the General Assembly, coordinate development and regulatory activities relating to industrial and commercial uses of atomic
energy, and cooperate with the AEC and similar commissions of other
states. 44
2

C. State Statutes and Regulations to Control Radiation Hazards
A number of states have recently enacted statutes or promulgated
regulations which are specifically designed to control some or all radiation hazards. These warrant extended discussion because of the predominant concern of the states in respect to the health and safety of
their citizens. The discussion of state laws in Chapter III of this Part
concerned the general powers and duties of the public utility commissions, the labor departments and industrial commissions, and the state
~ 2 Tenn.

Code. Ann. §53-3104.
•a Fla. Stat. Ann. §290.o6..
44 R. I. Gen. Laws tit. 42, c. 27, §§I,

2.
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departments of health, as they might affect sources of radiation. That
material will be alluded to only when it · is ~ecessary to indicate .the
authority for recent radiation health and safety regulations. It should be
noted that where, for example, the departments or agencies of certain
states have been granted specific powers under recent radiation hazard
legislation, this' does not mean that the corresponding departments and
agencies of states not mentioned do not have similar powers under
general health and safety legislation; it merely means that the legislatures of the other states have not bestowed those powers upon their
respective state departments arid ·agencies· with radiation health and
safety control specifically in mind.·
It should also be noted that this discussion is limited to recent state
regulatory action concerning radiation health and safety matters. State
control.o;f atomic energy matters has broader connotations than mere
health and safety regul(ltion; various f~rms of economic regulation also
are likely to be imposed. The f~ct remains., however, that, to date, no
state appears ,to. have inwlced it~ ·powers so as to .regulate specifically
the economic aspects of atomic energy activities, with the exception of
Massachus.etts. which recently amended. its. insurance ~ws in the matter
of issuing and classifying poli~ie~. insuring against nuclear energy
hjizards, 411
Tht),actions .c?.n the part of the states with respect to radiation hazards
range everywhere from no state action to the. issuance and .enforcement
of very comprehensive .regulations by at least one, and in one case, several state agencies .. At the present time slightly less than one-half of
the states have taken no official action regarding the problem. 48 Some
of these states, however, are in the preliminary stages of preparing
legislative and administrative solutions. 47
Mass. Ann. Laws §§175: So, 175: IliA.
These states include Alabama, Arizona, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana,
Maryl;md, Minne.sota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico,
North Carolina, Oklahoma, Vermont, and West Virginia.
47 Indiana is ·reported to be regulating exposures to ionizing radiation .from shoefitting fluoroscopes, and the State Board of Health indicated in December of 1956 that
it was revising its hospital licensing regulation on radiation protection. In addition, the
board reported that it had made several joint inspections of byproduct users with AEC
officials. Supra note 6 at 8.
The Kansas State Board of Health has indicated that it is carrying on "a small
non-regulatory radiological health program" and that it has been making joint inspections with AEC officials. It also has established a "Radiological Health Advisory
Committee," which is reported to be working upon a proposed bill to place control
of radiation under the board. This bill is said to be modeled upon the recommendations
411

48
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Affirmative and official action to protect the public against radiation
hazards has been taken by both the legislatures and state agencies, pursuant to existing powers. Where the legislatures haveacted, some have
vested radiation safety rule-making and enforcing powers in state agencies, while others have acted only to impose certain duties upon radiation
source users or possessors in the interests of public health and safety,
and a number of legislatures have merely directed that studies be made
regarding radiation hazards. As for administrative action, a few state
agencies have issued very comprehensive radiation safety regulations,
but the majority of those which have acted, have'iherely concerned themselves with limited aspects of the problem.
I.

Legislative Action
~.

Legislation Granting Rule-Making and Enforcing Powers

The legi!'latures of Colorado, Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, and South Dakota have recently enacted
statutes to confer upon their respective public health agencies the power
to promulgate and enforce radiation health and safety regulations of
general application .. With maximum economy and Illinimum guidance
the powers and duties of the Colorado State Board .of Beal$ were
extended so as to authorize it". . . to establish and enforce standards
for exposure to environmental conditions, i'n~luding radiation, that may
be deemed necessary for the protection of the public health." 48
In a somewhat less obvious fashion the Connecticut State Department of Health appears to have been similarly empowered by a statute
which specifies that:
No person, firm, corporation, town, city or borough shall operate or cause to be operated any source of ionizing radiation ·
or shall produce, transport, store, possess or dispose of radioactive materials except under conditions which comply with
of the National Committee on Radiation Protection and Measurements, as published in
National Bureau of Standards Handbook 61. Supra note 6 at 8.
..
The Minnesota Department of Health has reported its intention to ask the 19S7
legislature to grant it specific authority to make and adopt regulations relating to the
control of ionizing radiation. Supra note 6 at 10.
While the Missouri Division of Health claims authority under existing law, it has
not promulgated radiation safety regulations. It has employed, however, a radiological
health physicist. Supra note 6 at 11.
The New Mexico Department of Public Health has reported that a bill similar to
that suggested by the NCRPM will be introduced to the legislature in 1957. Supra note
6 at 12.
48 Colo. Rev. Stat §66-1-7(21).
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· regulations that may be incorporated in the sanitary code or
with orders imposed by the state department of health for the
protection of the public health. 49
The standards which are to be followed by the State Department of
Health are specified in the succeeding sentence which reads :
Such regulations or orders shall be based to the extent deemed
practicable by the state department of health on the regulations
of the United States atomic energy commission, . . . entitled
· "Standards for Protection Against Radiation," or, if such
regulations of the United States atomic energy commission
should be deemed inappropriate by the state department of
health, on the latest recommendations of the national committee on radiation (protection and measurements), as published by the United States department of commerce, national
bureau of standards. 50
Furthermore, this section specifies that radiation sources shall be utilized
at the lowest practical level " . . . consistent with the best use of the
radiation facilities or radioactive materials involved." 51 The section
also requires that proposed sanitary code regulations pertaining to radiation sources be su~mitted to the Connecticut Coordinator of Atomic
Development Activities thirty days before they are to become effective. 62
The sanitary code regulations which have been issued by the State Department of Health pursuant to this authority are discussed later in
.
·
this Chapter.
In addition to authorizing the promulgation of radiation safety regulations, the Connecticut statute also provides for registration by " . . .
each person, firm, corporation, town, city or borough conducting or
planning to conduct any operation within the scope of this Act . . .
with the state department of health." 58 The department may require the
registr~nt to state" . . . the qualifications of the supervisory personnel,
the protective measures contemplated . . . and such other information
as it determines is necessary." 5' Re-registration is required where
modifications are made which will increase the amount of radiation. A
number of exemptions to the registration requirement are stated, the
~ost significant of which is that for X-ray devices used by or under
the supervision of persons licensed to practice the several healing arts.
49
50

Conn. Public Acts 1957, Public Act 154,
Ibid.

U[!Jid.

52/bid. See also Conn. Gen. Stat. §1938d.
58/d., §J.
U[!Jid.

§2.
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It is finally specified that the registration is not intended to imply state
approval of the manner in which the radiation activities are carried out.
Apparently, Connecticut has no desire to have its registration require-:
ment construed as a licensing procedure; the State Department of
Health has no discretionary authority to withhold a registration certificate. In this connection, however, it should be remembered that Connecticut law does necessitate the procurement of an AEC license or
permit by those pers~ns intending to carry on atomic energy activities
within the state for which licenses are required by federallaw. 55
Shortly after the above statute was enacted the Connecticut General Assembly directed the Commissioner of State Police to make". . .
reasonable regulations concerning the safe storage and transportation
of hazardous chemicals," 56 which are so defined by the act as to include
"radioactive materials." 57 "In adopting such regulations, said commissioner may be guided by recognized national ·standards for the prevention of damage to property and injury to life." 58 While these
regulations are not to apply to· "electric companies," 59 the authority,
nevertheless, overlaps that of the State Department of Health, thus making for a fruitful area of conflict, especially since this subsequent statute
does not mention any requirement that the regulations first be submitted to the State Coordinator of Atomic Development Activities before they can become effective. Inspections to determine if there is
compliance with the commissioner's regulations are to be made by the
local fire marshal of each town, city, or borough. 80
In 1955 a somewhat narrower or more limited authority to issue radiation health and safety regulations was conferred upon the Department of Public Health by a Massachusetts statute which provides :
The department shall, from time to time, after a public hearing
and subject to the approval of the governor and council, prescribe and establish rules and regulations to control the transportation, storage, packaging, sale, distribution, production
and disposal of radioactive materials which may affect the
public health or the health of persons exposed to radioactivity
or ionizing radiation.. · .. Nothing in these rules and regulations shall be inconsistent with those now or hereafter estabConn. Gen. Stat. §1935d.
Conn. Public Acts 1957, Public Act 353, §2.
57 /d., §I.

55

G6

58/d., §z.
59/bid.
60 /d., §4-
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lished by the National Burea,u of Standards relative to the
handling and disposing of radioactive materials. 81

The .omissions of the word "use" among the activities to be regulated
and of "radiation installation" or "radiation source" among the objects to be controlled, obviously leaves a great deal uncovered by this
regulatory .authority. Perhaps it was felt that the hazards not provided
for would be regulated by other authority, for the statute further
stipulates :
Nothing in this section shall prevent the department of labor
· and industries from establishing rules and regulations for the
protection of the health and safety of employees against ionizing radiation in any place of employment. . . . 82
Wpatever the rationale, as yet no radiation health and safety regulations have been forthcoming from any Massachusetts agency, and in
September of· 1957 the Department of Public Health was authorized
and directed "to make a study and investigation of regulatory and protective measures pertaining to radioactive materials" with which "related departments and. agencies shall cooperate." 68
Lik~ that of Connecticut, Massachusetts law requires the procurement of an AEC license or permit by those persons intending to carry
on atomic energy activities within the state for which licenses or permits
are required by federallaw. 6 '
. Under a I9S8 act, New Jersey has created a Commission on Radiation Protection within the State Department of Health empowered to
formulate such rules and regulations "as may be necessary to prohibit
and prevent unnecessary radiation." e•a "Unnecessary radiation" is defined as the use of gamma rays, X-rays, alpha and beta particles, and
other atomic or nuclear particles "in such manner as to be injurious or
dangerous to the health of the people or the industrial or agricultural
potentials of the State." 84 b Regulations may be adopted by the commission only after a public hearing preceded by thirty days notice and
may not become effective until sixty days following adoption. 6 k No
regulation concerning unnecessary radiation adopted by any local government agency shall be effective until submitted to the commission for
Mass. Ann. Laws c. III, §sB.
Ibid.
8s Mass. Acts and Resolves 1957, c. Io6.
8' Mass. Ann. Laws c. 6, §92.
8•a N.J. Laws 1958, c. u6, §7.
8•b !d., §2(c).
8•e I d., §7.
8t

82
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approval. 64 d The Commission on Radiation Protection is limited to the
rule-making function, and the duties of administration and enforcement of rules promulgated by it are delegated to the Department of
H~alth. The statute directs that the department, among other things,
"Require registration of sources of radiation," and "Inspect radiation
sources, their shielding and immediate surroundings and records concerning their operation for the determination of any possible radiation
hazard." 64 e The department is also invested with broad powers to
issue general and emergency orders to prevent violations of any regulations of the commission and to obtain injunctions against violations
of such orders. 64t
As was mentioned in Chapter III of this Part, the New York Public
Health Law was amended in 1955 so as to add to the functions, powers,
and dutie£. of the Department of Public Health the supervision and
regulation of the ". . . public health aspects of the use of ionizing
radiation a:1d the handling and disposal of radioactive wastes." 65 Pursuant to this authorization, the department has issued comprehensive
regulations, which will also be discussed later. Apparently, this grant of
power was not intended to preclude regulation by other agencies of the
state having health and safety responsibilities, for, without any express
authority to issue radiation health and safety regulations specifically,
the New York Department of Labor also has incorporated such regulations in its Industrial Code. These regulations, and the manner in
which they conflict with those of the Department of Public Health, will
be discussed under the heading of "Administrative Regulation."
In July of 1957 the Oregon legislature directed the State Board of
Health to promulgate regulations and standards for the safe use, handling, disposal, and control of all radiation sources within the state, 66
except. those " .... emitting nonhazardous quantities of radiation." 67
To this authority, however, is added the rather curious condition that
the board is to promulgate these regulations and standards only " . . .
after making a two-year study of the problem." 68
In the matter of standards, it is indicated that " . . . the public policy
of this state [is] to encourage the constructive uses of radiation and
64d I d., §17.
Ue]d., §g.

64f Id., §§II-IJ.

N.Y. Public Health Law §201(1)(s).
Ore. Laws i957, c. 399, §3.
67 Id., §465
66

6BJd., §J.
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to control any associate harmful effects." 69 Any regulations promulgated must conform with this policy. 7° Furthermore, the act directs
the board to appoint a Radiation Advisory Committee to advise it upon
". . . matters relating to radiological health and radiation protection." 71 The committee is to consist of five persons who, by training
and experience, are qualified to advise the board on such matters.
No regulations have been or could be made effective, as yet, by the
Oregon State Board of Health pursuant to this authority, but certain
standards and regulations were recommended before the statute was
enacted. 72
Pursuing a declared policy nearly identical to that of Oregon, 73 the
South Dakota legislature has directed the State Department of Health to
. . . develop comprehensive policies and programs for the
evaluation and determination of hazards associated with the
use of radiation, and for their amelioration/ 4
and to
adopt, promulgate, and enforce such rules and regulations as may be necessary to implement or effectuate the
powers and duties of the [Department] . . . under this
Act. 70
Other duties of the Department under this act are: ( 1) to". . . advise,
consult, and cooperate" with local, state, interstate, and federal agencies and with affected groups and industries; 76 ( 2) to ". . . collect and
disseminate information relating to the determination and control of
radiation exposure hazards"; 77 and (3) upon request, to " . . . render
opinions concerning such plans and specifications on the design and
shielding for radiation sources as may be submitted before or after construction, for the purpose of determining the possible radiation hazard." 78 Furthermore, the department has the power: (I) to " . . . encourage, participate in, or conduct studies, investigations, training,
research, and demonstrations relating to the control of radiation haz69Jd., §I.

I d., §J.
I d., §5.
72 Recommended Standards and Regulations for Occupational Health, Ore. Bd. of
Health, Jan. I956, c. II, §2.9 and app. I.
' 8 S.D. Laws I957, H.B. 826, §I; 2 CCH Atomic Energy Law Rep. 1!I7.557·
14Jd., §4(I).
10 !d., §4(6).
To !d., §4(2).
77 !d., §4(5).
78 !d., §4(8).
TO
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ards"; 79 (2) to " . . . issue, modify, or revoke orders prohibiting or
abating the discharge of radioactive material or waste into ground, air,
or waters of the state"; so and (3) to " . . . make inspections of radiation sources, shielding and. immediate surroundings for the determination of any possible radiation hazard." s1
Like the Connecticut law discussed above, and the suggested act of
the National Committee on Radiation Protection and Measurement,s 2
from which much of its language was taken, the South Dakota statute
makes it unlawful for any person: ( 1) " . . . to produce radiation, or
to produce, use, store, or dispose of radioactive materials, unless he
registers in writing with the . . . [Department]"; (2) " . . . to modify, extend, or alter programs involving the production of radiation or
the production, use, storage, or disposal of radioactive materials unless
he notifies the . . . [Department]"; or ( 3) to do any of the forementioned " . . . except in accordance with the·provision of this Act
and rules and regulations promulgated thereunder." ss It also is unlawful " . . . for any person to expose any other person to diagnostic
or therapeutic radiation" unless he is, or is under the direction of, a
person licensed to practice the "healing arts" or dentistry in South
Dakota.s4 Apparently, the Department of Health may prescribe methods
and amounts of diagnostic and therapeutic radiation even as to persons
so licensed since the act does not contain any limitation which would
prohibit it from doing so.
Violations of the South Dakota statute, or orders or rules promulgated pursuant to it, are deemed misdemeanors upon each day in which
they occur, and the Attorney General, at the request of the department,
is directed to seek injunctions against such violations.s 5 While this
statute does not specifically so provide, it nevertheless implies that the
State Department of Health is to have exclusive jurisdiction over radiation hazards in South Dakota.
While no general rule-making authority as to radiation hazards appears to have been bestowed specifically upon any state agency of Wis79/d., §4(4).
§4(7).
S 1 Jd., §§4(9), 7, 8.
S 2 See National Bureau of Standards Handbook 61, "Regulation of Radiation Exposure by Legislative Means," at 27 (Dec. 9, 1955).
ss S.D. Laws 1957, H.B. 826, §5.
S4Jd., §6.
S5Jd., §g.

so /d.,
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consin, a recent enactment of that state authorizes the county board of
each county, having a population of soo,ooo or more, to
. . . regulate by ordinance within the territorial limits of
such county the ejection, discharge or emission into the open
air of smoke, and solids, liquids, gases, fumes, acids, burning
embers, sparks, cinders, soot, particulate wastes or dusts, including their radioactive fractions or counterparts, from any
chimney, smokestack, vest, fuel burning equipment, open fire,
apparatus, device, mechanism, substance, material or premises;
. . . prescribe rules and standards in aid of such regulations ;
. . . provide for commencing actions to enjoin acts, threats of
acts and the procuring or suffering of acts to be done in violation of such ordinance. 88
b. Legislation lmposing Certain Duties upon Radiation
Source Users or Possessors but Not Conferring RuleMaking Authority upon State Agencies
State legislation imposing· a bare minimum of regulation is to be
found in the laws of Arkansas, 87 Maine,S8 New Hampshire, 89 Ohio, 90
South Carolina, 91 Tennessee, 92 and Washington, 98 which, following the
New England Model Act, provide :
No person shall manufacture, construct, produce, transfer, acquire or possess any special nuclear material, by-product material, production facility, or utilization facility, or act as an
operator of a production or utilization facility wholly within
this State unless he shall have first obtained a license or permit
for the activity in which he proposes to engage from the
United States Atomic Energy Commission if, pursuant to
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the Commission requires a
license or permit to· be obtained by persons proposing to
engage in activities of the same type over which it has jurisdiction.9•
These statutes, as well as similar laws in Connecticut and Massachusetts, have been discussed above.
In addition to the previously discussed laws of Connecticut and South
8&Wis. Stat. (1957) §59.07(53).
87 Ark. Stat. Ann. §82.1402.
8s Me. Rev. Stat. c. 52-A, §3.
89 N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. c. 162-B,. §2..
so Ohio Rev. Code §4163.02.
91 S.C. Code §1-394.
92 Tenn. Code Ann. §53-3102.
98 Wash. Rev. Code §43·39.030.
94 Supra note 14 at 64-

RECENT STATE LEGISLATION

973

Dakota, statutes of Illinois, North Dakota, and Wyoming also impose
upon the radiation source user or possessor the duty to register the
source with a state agency.
The effect of two recently enacted Illinois statutes is to authorize the
Department of Public Health :
To register and inspect locations or facilities where radiation
machines are used or where radioactive material is being produced, transported, stored, disposed or used for any purpose. . . .95
and to require:
Every operator of a radiation installation . . . [to] . . .
register such installation with the Director of the Department
of Public Health . . . before said installation is placed in
operation. 96
Re-registration is required in the event that there is " . . . any change
in such imtallation which might increase or decrease the number of
sources, source strength, output or ene~gy of radiation produced." 97
Registration forms are prescribed by the department and are to contain
the following information: "the name of the operator; the location and
a designation of the confines of the installation; a statement of the type
and strength of the sources of radiation expected to be produced, used,
operated, stored or disposed of within the installation and the approximate total number of each type; and such other information as the
Department may deem necessary." 98 Registration is not intended to
imply approval of the installation. Operators of registered installations
are required to notify the director within thirty days after discontinuance of operations. 99 Specific provision is made for a number of exemptions from the registration requirements for non-hazardous sources of
radiation. 100
The Illinois Department of Health is authorized to inspect and investigate". . . the premises and operations of all radiation installations
in . . . [the] state, whether or not such installations are required to
be registered." 101 The operation of an unregistered radiation source
is en joinable, and is made a misdemeanor on each da:y "such offense con96 111. Ann. Stat. c. xz;, §ss.J2.
96 Ill. Ann. Stat. c. III I/2, §§194-200.
97 /d., §I95·
98/bid.
99/bid.
100 [d., §Ig6.
101/d., §197.
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tinues. 102 The only express purpose of these Illinois statutes is to aid
the Department of Public Health in " . . . studying and evaluating the
potential hazard to the health of the people of this state caused by the
increasing use and operation of . . . [radiation] machines and installations." 108 No new authority is granted to the Department to promulgate radiation protection rules and standards, nor is it authorized to
refuse acceptance of registration by any source of which it does not
approve.
As for North Dakota and Wyoming, it is not entirely clear what was
intended by the legislatures of those states, for, while they speak of
registration, they appear to have provided for licensing. The North
Dakota statute designates the State Department of Health as the "registration" agency/ 04 and further requires:
Each manufacturer, processor, and refiner of radioactive isotopes and each hospital, clinic, manufacturing establishment,
research or educational institution, experiment station, processing mill, or other institution or place of business or process
where radiation is produced or radioactive materials are used,
manufactured, processed, packaged, refined, produced, disposed or concentrated shall register .105
The State Health Officer is directed to issue a certificate of registration
to the applicant, but it appears that he is only required to do so
. . . upon satisfactory completion and submission of the registration form supplying the required information to determine whether the health of the public or persons working
in such establishments may be adversely affected by using,
manufacturing, processing, packing, refining, disposing, producing, or concentrating of such radioactive isotopes and
materials. 108
Apparently, if the information supplied by the registrant does not indicate that the installation will be safe, the State Health Officer is under
no obligation to issue a certificate. Since the act makes it a misdemeanor
to operate without a certificate, it would appear that this statute has all
the indicia of a licensing law. Notice, however, that the above provision
only applies to " . . . establishments . . . using, manufacturing, . . .
[etc.] radioactive isotopes and materials." It does not speak of sources
of radiatio-n involving no radioactive materials, and presumably, the
State Health Officer has no discretionary authority to withhold a regis!d., §§x98, 199.
Ill. Ann. Stat. c. 127, §55·32·
N.D. Laws 1957, c. 185, §3.
105 !d., §4.
108 I d., §5.
102
1o8
1o 4
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tration certificate regarding such sources. It seems doubtful that the
distinction was made intentionally.
The Wyoming statute appears to effect a licensing law in the same
fashion as does that of North Dakota; however, it clearly applies only
to places connected with radioactive materials, as distinguished from
those producing radiation. The statute reads :
Each hospital, clinic, manufacturing establishment, research
or educational institution, experiment station, processing mill,
or other institution or place of business or process where radioactive isotopes or materials are used, manufactured, processed, packaged, refined, produced, disposed or concentrated
shall be registered with the State Department of Public
Health. 101
The statute further provides :
The Director of the Department of Public Health, upon receipt of a properly executed application for registration and
upon satisfactory compliance by such applicant with regulations and limits that are or shall be in effect governing the
same exposure to such isotope or material, shall issue to the
applicant a certificate of registration. 108
Operation of the above mentioned installations without a certificate of
registration is deemed to be a misdemeanor; 109 therefore, the person
can be prohibited very effectively from operating should his registration form fail to satisfy the director as to the safety of the operation.
It is possible to argue that, in a rather backhanded way, the above
statute authorizes the Wyoming Department of Public Health to issue
regulations governing the exposure to radioactive isotopes and materials, though it would be difficult to conceive of a less precise manner
of doing so. Apparently, none has been promulgated.
c Legislation Directing That Studies Be Made as to Radiation Hazards
In addition to the above considered statutes of Arkansas, 11° Connecticut,111 Florida, 112 Illinois/u Maine/ 14 Massachusetts/ 16 New Hamp107 Wyo. Comp. Stat. §63.1301.
108 /d., §63.1302.
109 /d., §63.1303.
Ark. Stat. Ann. §82-1403(a).
Conn. Gen. Stat. §1937d{a).
112 Fla. Stat. Ann. §2go.o6(5).
na Ill. Ann. Stat. c. 127, §55.32.
114 Me. Rev. Stat. c. 52-A, §4(!).
115 Mass. Ann. Laws c. 6, §91 ( 1) and Mass. Acts and Resolves 1957, c.

11o
111

ro6.
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shire, 116 North Dakota, 111 Ohio,118 Rhode Island, 119 South Carolina,120
Tennessee, 121 and Wyoming, 122 legislative action in Georgia, New Jersey,
and Virginia indicates that these states are concerned at the present time
with the problems of protecting persons and property against radiation
hazards, at least to the extent that the problems are being studied.
While the Georgia Nuclear Advisory Commission seems to be more in
the nature of an economic development commission, the resolution by
which it has been established contains language which indicates that
the governor and the General Assembly wish to be informed upon this
subject " . . . with a view toward determining whether any legislation
is necessary or advisable for Georgia." 12,8 Similarly, the New Jersey
Commission for Atomic Energy Study has been directed" . . . to make
studies of the need for changes in the laws and regulations administered
by any department of the State that would arise from the presence
withi,n the State of special nuclear material and by-product material and
from the operation in the State of production or utilization facilities," 124
and the Virginia Adviso~:y. Legislative Council also has received similar
orders and authoi-ity; 125
2 ..

Administrative Action

· ~· C~mprehensive Radiation Health and Safety ,Regulation
Government agencies .of. California, Coimecticut, Michigan, New
York, Pennsylvania, and Texas have issued comprehensive regulations
to protect employees or both employees and the public from radiation
ha~ards. It is interesting to notice that those of the CaHfornia Division
of Industrial Safety, 126 the Mic}tigan Department of Health/ 27 the New
York Department of Labor/ 28 . the Pennsylvania State Department of
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. c. 162-B, §3(l).
N.D. Laws 1957, c. 185.
11 8 Ohio Rev. Code §4163.03.
119 R.I. Gen. Laws tit. 42, c. 27, §2.
12o S.C. Code §1-395(1).
121 Tenn. Code Ann. §S3-3IOJ.
122 Wyo. Comp. Stat: §63.1301.
1 28 Ga. Laws 1957, H. Res. 24-5oa; 2 CCH Atomic Energy Law Rep. Ur7,19I.
1 2 ' N.J. Laws 1956, Jt. Res. 16; 2 CCH Atomic Energy Law Rep. t[17,337·
125 Va. Laws 1958, S. Res. 29.
12a Cal. Adm. Code tit. 8, §§38oo-386r; 2 CCH Atomic Energy Law Rep. UU 17,75117,766. Reproduced in Appendix A, Item 2.
121 Supplement No. 13 to 1954 Mich. Adm. Code, pp. 41-70 (Feb. 14, 1958); 2 CCH
Atomic Energy Law Rep. UU17,871-17,89I. Reproduced in Appendix A, Item s.
12s N.Y. Industrial Code, Rule No. 38; 2 CCH Atomic Energy Law Rep. UU17,90117,973. Reproduced in Appendix A, Item 3·
11a
11 7
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Health, 129 and the Texas Department of Health 130 were issued pursuant
to the general authority of these organizations, while only those of the
Connecticut State Department of Health 131 and the New York Department of Public Health 182 were promulgated pursuant to legislation authorizing them to reguiate radiation hazards specifically. In none of
these states, nor in any others for that matter, has a new agency been
created for the purpose of enforcing radiation safety standards and
regulations, and only in New Jersey has a new agency been created to
promulgate such regulations. With the exception of New Jersey, in
each of the above mentioned states the radiation regulations have been
issued, and are being enforced, by existing agencies whose principal concern is health and safety. However, especially in New York, it does not
appear that these agencies have exclusive· authority within their respective states to regulate radiation hazards. Moreover, with the possible
exception of Cotmecticut, 133 none of these state~ has established a system wherehy the regulations of different agencies within the same state
are to be made uniform and consistent with one another. Again with
the exception of Connecticut, 184 none of these states requires by statute conformity with the standards of the AEC, although a measure of
conformity has been achieved. nevertheless, especially in Connecticut
and Michigan which have issued regulations most recently. This matter
of conformity with AEC standards is mentioned (and considered in
greater detail beiow) for two reasons : (I)" most of the state radiation
regulations· (and all of the comprehensive ones) apply to persons a~.d
activities licensed by the AEC, and ( 2) this assertion of state powers
in a federally regulated area obviously ra,ises a constitutional question
upon which the conformity of state standards with those ofthe AEC
will have some effect. Conflict~ and inconsistencies ~et~een state and
federal regulations, as they apply to atomic energy activities, .should
be avoided as much as possible since they cannot help but have an ad~
verse effect on the industry, and, except in the rare case, there is no
129 Regulation 433, Radiation Protection, Pa. Dept. of Health; 2 CCH Atomic
Energy Law Rep. UUI8,ooi-I8,oi8.
1~0 Regulations on Radiation Exposure, Tex. Dept. of Health; 2 CCH Atomic
.
Energy Law Rep. UUI8,351-I8,373.
13.1 Conn. Sanitary Code c. III, §I81-1-z87; 2 CCH Atomic Energy Law Rep.
UUI7,79I-17,8og.
132 N.Y. Public Health Law, State Sanitary Code c. XVI; BNA, Atomic Industry
Reporter z6s: 611-619. Reproduced in Appendix A, Item 4·
133 Conn. Gen: Laws §1938d creates the position of coordinator of atomic. development activities.
·134 Supra note 49·
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scientific or practical justification for them. Moreover, lack of uniformity between the states and variance from federal standards will
tend to increase the possibility that the United States Supreme Court
will declare an inconsistent state regulation to be an unconstitutional
invasion of a federally pre-empted area of activity. 185
All of the comprehensive state regulations are a blend (in varying
proportions, as between states) of "performance" and "specification"
type provisions. 186 As might reasonably be expected, these regulations
tend to be of the performance type as to matters about which the least
is known. For example, none of them attempts to specify how a nuclear
reactor is to be shielded. This considerable problem is avoided by the
simple expedient of establishing maximum permissible exposures of
persons near the reactor and requiring that personnel and work areas be
monitored to determine the extent of actual exposure. Thus, the physical
arrangements by which· radiation is to be kept below the maximum
limits are left to the discretion of the owner or user under penalty of
violating the law should those arrangements prove insufficient. This
burden, however, is preferable·to premature regulations that attempt the
incredibly complex (if not impossible) task of 'specifying the dimensions and design of containment barriers for all sizes and types of
nuclear reactors under all conditions of operation ·and in all sorts of
locations.
Other matters, about which considerably· more is known or about
which no doubt could exist, are covered by specification type provisions.
All of these comprehensiv~ regulations, for example; contain detailed
sections concerning standard warning labels, signs,· and signals, except
those of California.· Some of them, .especially those. of Michigan which
were published most recently, are fairly specific in connection.with the
use and installation of sources of ~adiation, such as X-ray machines,
which are relatively less complex than nuclear reactors .and have been
.exhaustively studied over a longer period of time.
laG The problem of federal pre-emption of atomic energy health and safety regulatiOns is discussed in the last part of this chapter.
.
tso For a detailed discussion of performance and specification type regulations in ~e
atomic energy field, see: Blatz, "State and Federal Radiation Safety Regulations,'' an
address delivered at the Nuclear Engineering and Science Congress at Cleveland, Ohio
in December 1955, mimeographed by the Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc. ; Tabershaw
and Harris, "Administrative Probl~ms in Radiation Protection,'' Nucleonics, Vol. 12,
No. 12, pp. 8-13 (December 1954); Taylor, "State Control of Protection Against
Ionizing Radiation," American Journal of Roentgenology, Radium Therapy and Nuclear
Medicine, Vol. LXXI, No.4, pp. 691-702 (April 1954); Taylor, "The Achievement of
Radiation Protection by Legislative and Other Means,'' Progress in Nuclear Power,
Series VIII-The Economics of Nuclear Power, pp. 418-429 (1957).
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A comparison of the regulations of California, which were last revised in January of 1955, and of Michigan, which became effective on
February 14, 1958, and those of the other states which were issued
during the interim period, may justify the observation that there appears to be a trend toward greater specificity. Certainly, those of
Michigan are considerably more detailed and comprehensive than are
the regulations of California. Moreover, if the regulations of Connecticut and Michigan are any indication,_ the recent tendency appears
to be toward adopting the general standards of the AEC, at least where
the state regulations affect federallicensees. 137
To give some indication of these trends, the comprehensive state
radiation health and safety regulations are discussed in the order in
which they have made their appearance-starting with California and
ending with Michigan.

( 1)

California

The California General Industry Safety Orders on "Radiation and
Radioactivity" were promulgated to establish minimum standards for
the protection of employees from injurious levels of ionizing radiation.188 The general scheme of these regulations is to provide maximum
permissible exposure limits for employees; to require radiation safety
supervision by competent technical personnel and safety instruction of
employees regularly or frequently exposed; to require radiation monitoring of exposed employees and work locations containing sources of
radiation and records of these surveys and measurements; and to provide certain operating rules relative to maintenance of protective devices, handling and disposition of radioactive materials, and warning
signs or signals.
The California regulations contain repeated references to National
Bureau of Standards handbooks and reflect an obvious desire to conform to the standards of the National Committee on Radiation Protection and Measurement. 139 However, in this they are not altogether
137 A recently proposed, but asyet ineffective, set of regulations for New York City
would simply define "maximum permissible dose" as that "dose rate recommended by
the National.Committee on Radiation Protection and Measurement." 2 CCH Atomic
Energy Law Rep. 1T17,974, §2IJ.OI(d).
138 Supra note 126, §38oo.
139 The National Committee on Radiation Protection and Measurement (NCRPM)
was formed in 1929 as the Advisory Committee on X-ray and Radium Protection upon
the recommendation of the International Commission on Radjplog\c;al Protection. It
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successful, nor do they conform with AEC standards in all respects.
Maximum ·permissible exposures are expressed in rads, whereas. the
AEC and the NCRPM use the rem (or millirem) as the unit of measurement.14~ Relative biological effect factors are included, howe~er, so
that conversion from rads to rems may be made. Such a conversion indicate~ that California may have been anticipating the apparent trend in
the direction of lower permissible limits, for its weekly exposure standards are lower than the current weekly standards of the AEC and the
has since expanded the scope of its concern to include all known sources and types of
ionizing radiation. The NCRPM is sponsored by the National Bureau of Standards
and governed by representatives of participating organizations. The reports and recommendations of the NCRPM are published in National Bureau of Standards handbooks.
14° The reader will recall, from the discussion in Part I, Chapter I, that there are a
number of units in which quantities of various kinds of radiation may be expressed :
the roentgen, the rep, the rad, and the rem. The roentgen is the quantity of X or
gamma radiation such that the associated corpuscular emission per 0.001293 grams. of
air produces, in air, ions carrying one electrostatic unit of quantity of electricity of
either sign. (National Bureau of Standards Handbook 59 at 6.) It is not a unit of
absorbed dose, but will result in the absorption of 83 ergs of energy in one gram of
dry air at standard temperatUre and pressure or about 94 ergs of energy in one gram
Qf soft tissue. The limitations of this unit are that it applies only to X and gamma
ra~ation arid it d~?es not express the amount of energy absorbed ·by various types of
target material.
, The ·rep, or roentgen-equivalent-physical, is a unit of any nuclear radiation (alpha
or. beta particles, neutrons, protons, etc.) that results in 93 ergs of energy being
absor~ in one gram of soft tissue, and thus it is comparable to the roentgen. (National
Bureau of Standards Handbook 59 at 6.) It shares one of the limitations of the
roentgen in that it does not indicate the amount of energy absorbed by substances with
a greater density than soft tissues.
· The rad was adopted in 1953 to signify the unit quantity of absorbed dose due to
anY kind of ionizing radiation that would cause one gram of any target material to
abSorb ioo ergs of energy. It is a measure of the energy imparted to matter by
ionizing particl~ per unit mass of irradiated material at. the place of interest. (National
Bureau of Standards Handbook 59 at 6; National Bureau of Standards Handbook 61
at 38.)
All three of. the above units
subject to a third limitation: they do not express
the unit of radiation in terms of its biological effect upon the target material or, what
is more important, in terms of its effect on various types of human tissue. While all
kinds of ionizing radiation are capable of producing the same kinds of biological effect,
their ability to do so is not the same. In producing some effects, certain radiations
are more effective than others, in the sense that a smaller absorbed dose of these
radiations is required to produce a given degree of effect. This "biological effectiveness"
depends upon the type of result under consideration, the specific ionization of the particular type of radiation, the type of cell or tissue, the organism studied, the conditions
of exposure, the time distribution of the dose, etc. Insofar as possible, "rehi.tive biological effectiveness" factors (relative to that of lightly filtered X-rays generated at
potentials of 200 to 300 kilovolts) have been determined empirically, or estimated, for
particular biological' systems and for various types and energies of radiation.
In the protection problem it is sufficient to consider the effects of radiation on certain

are
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NCRPM. 141 Dose limits are prescribed for the "whole body" and the
"hands," as measured in the basal layer of the epidermis, instead of
following the more elaborate anatomical breakdown of the federal regulations.142 As for allowed concentrations of radioactive materials in
the atmospheres of workrooms, the California regulations express the
maximum limits in much less precise terms than do the AEC regulations or the NCRPM recommendations. 143 Unlike the AEC, CalHornia
makes no distinction as to employees under eighteen years of age/ 44 nor
is the NCRPM recommendation allowing double doses for persons over
critical organs, which are generally taken by the AEC and the NCRPM as the skin,
blood-forming organs, gonads, and lenses of the eyes, and for certain potential effects
on these organs under specified modes of exposure.
The combination of RBE factors and the rad unit of absorbed dose (the rep before
1953) has r~ulted in a fourth unit-the rem or roentgen-equivalent-man. The rem
is defined as the quantity of any radiation such that the energy imparted to a biological
system (cell, tissue, organ, or organism) per gram of liVing matter by the ionizing
particles present in ·the region of interest, has the same biological effectiveness as an
absorbed dose of I rad from lightly filtered X-rays generated at potentials of 200 to 300
kilovolts. (National Bureau of Standards Handbook 61 at 39-) Therefore, a dose in
rems is equal to the dose in rads multiplied by the appropriate RBE factor, or, conversely, a dose in rads equals the dose in rems divided by the appropriate RBE factor.
For particulate ionizing radiation, such as alpha and beta particles, neutrons, protons,
and deutrons, both the-AEC and the NCRPM have elected to express exposure limits
in rems or millirems (a one-thousandth part of a rem). As for X- and gamma radiation, the NCRPM continues to express exposure limits in millirads. Due to the inaccuracies implicit in arriving at a particular RBE factor, many scientists feel that it
is best to do as the California Division of Industrial Safety has done, and specify
exposure limits in rads and indicate the estimated RBE factor on which the particular
limit is based.
Hl For example, conversion (from rads to rems) of the California exposure limits,
where the entire body is exposed and the absorbed dose is measured in the skin, indicates that no more than 500 millirems is permitted. Under the same conditions, the
regulations of the AEC and the recommended standards of the NCRPM would allow
6oo millirems of any radiation to the skin and 1500 millirems of any low penetrating
radiation (with a half-value-layer of less than one millimeter of soft tissue.) 10 Code
Fed. Regs. §20.101. National Bureau of Standards Handbook 61 at 52.
u2 The regulations of the AEC and the recommendations of the NCRPM break
down weekly dose limits into three conditions: (1) type of radiation, (2) conditions
of exposure, and (3) critical organs affected. Conditions of exposure include exposure
of the whole body, the hands and forearms, feet and ankles, and head and rieck. Under
these conditions of.exposure permissible doses are given for the skin, the blood-forming
organs, the gonads, and the lenses of the eyes. 10 Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 20, App. "A"
and National Bureau of Standards Handbook 61 at 56.
us In the California regulations permissible concentrations of radioactive materials
in the air of workrooms is expressed in the form of only two classes: alpha emitters
and beta and gamma emitters. In the NCRPM recommendations such concentrations
are expressed for each radioisotope. National Bureau of Standards Handbook 61 at 56.
u• 10 Code Fed. Regs. §20.101 (c).
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forty-five followed. 145 Finally, the California regulations do not limit
the exposure of non-employees or regulate the amount of radiation in
areas other than employment locations.
To insure that the exposure standards are met, the California regulations require that all radiation operations are to be under the supervision of competent technical personnel, who are described as persons
capable of evaluating radiation hazards and specifying protection techniques. Furthermore, employees must be under the supervision of a
competent medical expert, and those who are regularly exposed must
be instructed in radiation hazards and methods of protection. 146
To determine whether radiation is being kept within the prescribed
limits, workrooms and other locations containing radiation machines
or radioactive materials are to be monitored and inspected periodically
or according to a schedule established by the Division of Industrial
Safety. Exposed employees are to wear monitoring devices as well,
and permanent records of dosage measurements are to be kept. 147
Also included in the California regulations are certain general operating rules. If monitoring indicates that protective devices are defective, operations are to be terminated until the defects are remedied,
and employees who have been exposed to excessive radiation are to be
referred immediately to the medical supervisor. 148 Wherever unsealed
radioactive materials are handled, adequate ventilation must be provided, radioactive wastes are not to be allowed to accumulate, immediate
decontamination is to be undertaken in the event of accident, eating is
forbidden, and adequate protective clothing is to be worn. 149 Radioactive materials stored in workrooms are to be enclosed and shielded, and
other storage areas are to be isolated by construction or location and
ventilated if the material is not contained. 150 General orders regarding
the placement of warning signs at locations where radiation may be encountered and on containers of radioactive materials are provided.m
Special orders for radium dial painting are provided which prohibit dry
application and require ventilation hoods. Also included are specifications as to radium compound containers and brushes as well as rules
regarding their use. 152
145

National Bureau of Standards Handbook 61 at 52.
Supra note 126, §§38o2(a) and (b), 3811, 3812.
141 ld., §3&>4.
usJd., §38os.
149 I d., §38o6.
tso I d., §38o7(a) and (b).
Utfd., §§38o7(c), J8o8.
tUJd., §3810.
146
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The California regulations prohibit the operation of "totally protective installations" while employees are within· the confines of the barrier.
Automatic interlocks are required on the entrances, at least one of which
must operate from the inside, and visible or audible signals are required
while ionizing radiation is being produced. 153
(2)

New York

New York is the only state which at the present time has more than
one set of comprehensive radiation health and safety regulations. In
September of 1955 Chapter XVI of the New York State Department
of Health's Sanitary Code became effective. The following December
Rule Number 38 of the New York Department of Labor Industrial
Code also became effective; it applies "to every place where any employee in the course of his work may be exposed to radiation in excess
of one tenth the permissible weekly dose" except medical, dental, veterinary, and educational institutions, clinics, and offices, which are subject
to the provisions of the Sanitary Code. 154 Unfortunately, it is not entirely clear whether the Sanitary Code may be applied to installations
subject to the Industrial Code. (This matter i-s considered in more
detail below.)
The scheme of both sets of New York regulations is to establish
performance standards, in the form of maximum permissible doses of
~adiation to persons (other than persons receiving radiation diagnosis
or treatment), and then to provide a system of safety and medical
supervision, registration and reporting, monitoring and inspection, and
operating rules and specifications to insure that the exposure standards
are met.
In essential respects the maximum permissible radiation dose limits
of the two New York regulations are similar; however, sufficient di fference does exist to cause difficulty. Both the Sanitary and the Industrial Codes establish limits to radiation from sources which are outside
and inside the body. The limits of radiation exposure to sources outside the body are very nearly identical with the current permissible
exposure standards of the AEC 155 in that the same unit ( millirems),
time period (week), conditions of exposure (whole body, hands and
forearms, etc.), anatomical scheme (skin, blood-forming organs, gon§§38oi(d), JBog.
Supra note 128, §38-1. See also the definition of "radiation installation" in the
Sanitary Code, supra note 132, Reg. 1 (g).
155 10 Code Fed. Regs. §20.101 and App. "A".
153/d.,
154
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ads, and the lenses of the eyes), and amounts are specified. 158 The Industrial Code, however, does appear to contain a drafting error or
oversight. Under the heading "Permissible Weekly Dose Limit" it is
provided that :
For employees whose entire body or major portion thereof is
exposed to radiation of very low penetrating power from external sources : 300 mrem in the lenses of the eyes; I 500
mrem in any other part of the body. m
It seems doubtful that this means what it says, for such a dose to the
gonads or the blood-forming organs is not recommended. The provision probably was intended to read like that of the Sanitary Code:
"1500 mrems in the skin" (of any other part of the body). 158
Both sets of New York regulations limit the exposure to sources of
radiation inside the body by specifying the allowable concentrations of
radioactive materials in air and water ingested by the persons to be
protected. Included in the Industrial Code is a table which sets forth
the maximum permissible average concentrations of inhaled or ingested
radioactive materials in microcuries per unit of air or water,m which
is identical with a table found in the federal regulations. 180 No such
table is included in the Sanitary Code, which simply refers to "nationally recognized limits" and, more specifically, to National. Bureau
of Standards handbooks, in stating permissible concentrations. 161 Presumably, a change in these nationally recognized standard~ is expected
to produce an automatic and corresponding change in the permissible
concentration limits of the Sanitary Code.
The Sanitary Code also differentiates between the exposure of persons inside and persons outside of the radiation installation. Operations are to be carried on so that persons outside shall receive no more
than one tenth the dose to which persons inside the installation may be
subjected. Persons under eighteen years of age are to receive no more
than one tenth of "inside" dose no matter where they are located. 182
The Industrial Code also observes this AEC rule 188 of limiting the dose
to minors, and while theoretically these exposure limits are designed to
156Supra note 128, §38-6; Supra note 132, Reg. 4.
Supra note 128, §38-6.1 (2).
158Supra note 132, Reg. 4(b)(2).
uo Supra note 128, §38-6.1 (7) and Table I.
18o xo Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 20, App. "B", Table I.
181 Supra note 132, Reg. 4(c).
182Jd., Reg. 4(e) and (i).
18310 Code Fed. Regs. §20.101(c).
157
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protect employees only, the AEC distinction between dose levels in "restricted" and "unrestricted" areas is observed as well by a provision
that commands the owners of all radiation sources so to shield, isolate,
protect, or otherwise arrange and control them as to avoid exposure of
their own or another's employees outside the installation to radiation in
excess of ten per cent of the permissible inside dose. 164
Both the Sanitary and the Industrial Codes follow the AEC and the
NCRPM practice of allowing weekly doses up to three times the basic
limits if during the thirteen week period the total dose does not exceed
ten times the general weekly limits. 165 Only the Sanitary Code, however,
is in accord with the NCRPM practice of authorizing double doses to
persons forty-five and older in special cases. 166
Both New York codes require the registration of radiation installations, and the Industrial Code requires registration of "mobile sources"
as well. 167 By virtue of the fashion in which the term "installation" is
defined by the two sets of regulations, however, double registration
should not be required of any source. Registration under the Sanitary
Code must include a summary of the radiation safety program, while
the Industrial Commissioner merely need be informed as to the name
and qualifications of the person in charge of radiation protection. A
change in the character of the radiation installation Which might increase exposure is considered a new installation and requires re-registration under the Sanitary Code, while, under the Industrial Code, the
Commissioner is to be advised of such changes. 188
Radiation safety supervision, in the form of a person or persons responsible for all necessary precautions, is required by both sets of New
York regulations. The Sanitary Code merely requires that "all radiation installations shall be operated by or under the direction of a competent person who shall be responsible for all necessary safety precautions." 189 No qualifications are stated. The Industrial Code, on the
other hand, contemplates more elaborate supervision: a "radiation
safety supervisor" for each source and a "radiation safety officer" for
sources creating a "high radiation area or a high airborne concentration
area." High standards of technical competence are specified for the
Supra note 128, §38-S-4I d., §38-6.2; supra note 132, Reg. 4(b) (4); 10 Code Fed. Regs. §20.101 (a) (2);
National Bureau of Standards Handbook 61 at 55·
166 Supra note 132, Reg. 4(h); National Bureau of Standards Handbook 61 at 52.
187 Supra note 128, §38-4; supra note 132, Reg. 2.
·
188 Ibid.
189 Supra note 132, Reg. s.
184

185
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radiation safety officer, while the radiation safety supervisor only need
be instructed and trained by an officer. 110
Radiation safety instruction of all persons working with radiation
equipment or radioactive materials is required by both New York
codes. 111 The Industrial Code also requires that employees who work
in radiation areas be informed of the presence of radiation and instructed in necessary measures for protection. 172
Monitoring of radiation installations is required by the Sanitary and
Industrial Codes, as is personnel monitoring; however, the details of
these surveys are treated somewhat differently under the two codes.
The Sanitary Code requires surveys of radiation installations where
radioactive material is present, but not contained in a sealed source, at
least once a month. Other installations, where radiation equipment or
sealed containers of radioactive materials are used, must be surveyed
upon original establishment and whenever changes are made or physical
condition; may cause changes. Records of these surveys and measurements must be kept for a period of five years, and must be open to inspection by health officials. 113 The Industrial Code does not specify when
radiation surveys are to be made; however, the records of those which
are made must be maintained indefinitely and may be inspected by the
"attending physician of any person who may have undergone exposure"
as well as by the Labor Commissioner.m The personnel monitoring
required by both sets of regulations applies to all persons who may possibly·receive routinely a weekly radiation dose in excess of one fourth
the maximum permissible dose.m In high radiation areas, the Industrial Code also ,requires personnel monitoring of any employees when
the dose rate may exceed 100 mrems in any one hour. Individuals may
obtain a summary statement of their exposure records under either set
of regulations.
The Sanitary Code requires annual physical examinations of all persons who might regularly ingest or inhale radioactive materials in concentrations exceeding one quarter of the maximum permissible amounts,
and persons subject to external radiation are to be examined too, but
the code does not specify how often. 176 The Industrial Code apparently
Supra note 128, §§38-5.2, 38-5.3.
/d., §38-s.n; supra note 13Z, Reg. s(a) and (b).
112 Supra note 128, §38-5.10.
11a Supra note 132, Reg. 12.
174 Supra note 128, §§38-7.1, 38-8.3.
175 /d., §38-9; supra note 132, Reg. 6.
11s Supra note IJ2, Reg. 7.
110
111
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assumes that physical examinations will be given, since records of them
must be maintained, 177 but the regulations do not specifically require
such examinations.
Reporting to appropriate officials in the event of excessive exposures
to individuals is necessary under both sets of New York regulations,
although the conditions are somewhat different. Under the Sanitary
Code doses in excess of five times the maximum permissible weekly
dose must be reported within three days to the health officer having jurisdiction, 178 whereas ingestion of "an excessive amount of radioactive
material" or total thirteen week doses in excess of ten times the permissible weekly dose must be reported to the Labor Commissioner
within seven days of discovery under the Industrial Code. 179 The Sanitary Code also requires reporting, by telephone or telegraph, to the
health officer having jurisdiction of the following events : the discharge
of excessive amounts of radioactive wastes; the. spillage, loss, or theft
of radioactive materials; incidents affecting the security of storage
places ; and other circumstances giving rise to radiation hazards. This
requirement must be observed by the person in charge of any radiation
installation, irrespective of whether it is registered with the Department
of Health. Furthermore, physicians are required to report all cases of
radiation injury or illness, caused by non-therapy radiation, to the New
York State Department of Health. 180 Presumably, radiation injury or
illness caused by diagnostic procedures do have to be reported.
The Industrial Code contains a brief directive as to storage of radioactive materials not in use, requiring that they "be stored in properly
shielded and secured containers." 181 Such a requirement is only implicit in the Sanitary Code, but the operator of a radiation installation
is directed to maintain an accurate account of all radioactive materials.182 On the other hand, control of radioactive waste disposal is
only implicit in the Industrial Code, 183 whereas the Sanitary Code contains specific provisions on this subject. 184 Neither the standards of the
AEC nor the recommendations of the NCRPM have been followed,
however, for the provision of the Industrial Code merely prohibits the
Supra
Supra
179 Supra
180 Supra
181 Supra
182 Supra
188 Supra
tst Supra
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178

note
note
note
note
note
note
note
note

128, §38-8.
132, Reg. 6.
128, §38-6.3.
132, Reg. 16.
128, §38-n.
132, Reg. 15.
128, §38-54
132, Reg. 9.
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discharge of radioactive wastes into the environment in a manner that
will lead any person to receive a dose in excess of one tenth the occupational dose, Where waste discharges of two or more users into the
same environment are additive, they must either enter into a mutual
agreement, "each to limit his release, so that the total comes within the
permissible limit specified," or the State Commissioner of Health will
make the determination as to each. This provision of the Sanitary Code
is not directed simply to radiation installations required to register under Regulation 2. The question is whether it applies to installations
subject to the Industrial Code. In view of the broad grant of authority
to the New York State Department of Health to supervise and regulate
the "public health aspects of the use of ionizing radiation and the handling and disposal of radioactive wastes," 185 and the all inclusive phrasing of Regulation 9, the implication is that disposal of radioactive
wastes by all users in New York comes under the Sanitary Code.
Other provisions included in the Sanitary Code, but not in the Industrial Code, are those whi'ch require the filtration equivalent of at
least two millimeters of aluminum and automatic, four minute, shutoff
timers on diagnostic X-ray equipment, 188 automatic interlocks and signs
or signals on radiation therapy rooms, 187 and prescribe installation and
operation· specifications for shoe-fitting fluoroscopes. 188 Instead of
simply banning shoe-fitting fluoroscopes (which seems to be the most
sensible course), the New York State Department of Health has chosen
so to burden and restrict their use and operation that it is difficult to
see how anyone would find it profitable to use one. Finally, the Sanitary
Code requires the identification of cadavers containing radioisotopes,
specifying that a report accompany every cadaver containing more than
five millicuries of radioactive material. Autopsies of such cadavers are
not to be commenced without the consultation and advice of a hospital
radiation safety officer. 189
(3)

Pennsylvania and Texas

The radiation health and safety regulations of Pennsylvania and
Texas became effective in October and September of 1956, respectively.
The departments of health of both these states closely followed the
Supra note 65.
Supra note 132, Reg. 8.
187 ld., Reg. IJ.
188/d., Reg. 19.
189/d., Reg. II.
1 85
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suggested regulations of the NCRPM 190 with the result that their
regulations are very nearly identical. These regulations are applied to
"the use of all radiation, radiation machines, and radioactive materials,"
and are intended "to insure the maximum safety to all persons at, or in
the vicinity of, the place of use, storage, or disposal thereof." 191 The
regulations, however, are not intended "to limit the kind and amount
of radiation that may be intentionally applied to a person for diagnostic or therapeutic purposes by, or under the direction of, a physician
or dentist," nor do they apply to radiation machines not in use and
certain specified quantities of radioactive materials which are considered
to be harmless. 192
The general plans of these regulations are similar to those previously
discussed in that they prescribe maximum permissible doses ; impose
responsibility for radiation safety upon a designated person; require
area and personnel monitoring, registration, keeping of survey and
dosage records; and include operating rules relative to the storage of
radioactive materials, disposal ·of radioactive wastes, radioactive contamination controls, and information labeling.
The maximum permissible doses allowed by the Pennsylvania and
Texas regulations are identical with those suggested by the NCRPM in
December of 1955. 193 Exposures to external sources of radiation are
specified according to type of radiation, conditions of exposure, and
critical organs affected. 194 Internal radiation exposures are controlled
by limiting concentrations of radioactive materials in air and water used
by individuals to those prescribed for each radioisotope. 195 Maximum
permissible radioisotope concentrations in air and water are given for
occupational areas, in terms of an eight and a twenty-four hour work
day, and for non-occupational environments into which radioactive
wastes are discharged. 196 These concentrations are nearly the same as
those required by AEC regulations. 197 Unlike the AEC standards, no
distinction is made as to minors in occupation areas and double exposures are allowed for persons over forty-five in certain situations. Like
the AEC standards, however, exposures up to three times the basic
National Bureau of Standards Handbook 61 at 36.
Supra notes 129 and 130, §1.
192/d., §4.
19S National Bureau of Standards Handbook 61 at 41, 51-59.
1 9 4 Supra notes 129 and 130, §§7b, 15d, and Table 2.
t95fd., §7e and Table s.
1 00/d., §§14d(1), 15g, and. Table 5·
197 10 Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 20, App. "B", Tables I and II.
1no
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weekly dose are allowed provided the total quarter-year dose does not
exceed ten times the basic weekly limit. 198 No yearly limits are specified.
Sections entitled "Responsibility" require that "all work performed in
an installation where radiation may be present shall be under the direction of a person responsible for the radiation safety therein." Imposed
upon this person are the duties of : informing himself and persons who
may be exposed as to radiation hazards, safe working practices, and
necessary safeguards; accounting for radioactive materials; insuring
adequate shielding; and conducting exposure surveys. 199 It is interesting to notice that in the NCRPM recommendations and the Texas regulations the person responsible for radiation safety "shall insure beyond
reasonable doubt" that certain things are done, while those of Pennsylvania require that he "shall take all necessary precautions" that the same
things are done. 200 A second change and an addition found in the
Pennsylvania regulations regarding "responsibility" indicate that a
higher duty of care is imposed in this state. It is there provided that the
person responsible for radiation safety
. . . shall take all necessary precautions that every employee
and authorized visitor shall use such safety devices as are
furnished for his protection and carry out all radiation safety
rules that concern or affect his conduct. 201
Under the NCRPM recommendations and the Texas regulations, this
is the responsibility of "every employee and authorized visitor" and not
the safety officer alone. Furthermore, to this section the Pennsylvania
Department of Health has appended the statement:
The designation of a person responsible for radiation safety
shall in no way relieve the owner, management, or user from
responsibility for compliance with the provisions of this regulation.202
"Any person using or operating any radiation machine, or storing,
manufacturing, using, or handling any radioactive material" in Pennsylvania or Texas must register with the state health department. In
New York the installation or mobile source is to be registered by the
owner or the organization conducting the business or activities carried
on within the radiation installation. Obviously the Pennsylvania and
198/d., §2o.ror(a) (2); supra notes 129 and 130, §rsd.
199 Supra notes 129 and 130, §ro.
2oo

Ibid.

201 Supra note 129, §rob(ro).
2021d., §rob( II).
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Texas regulations impose the duty to register on a considerably broader
group of persons. The registration must include an estimate of further
acquisitions during the year, and acquisitions causing radiation in excess of the estimate must be registered promptly. Acknowledgement of
registration does not imply state approval of any feature of the radiation
operation. 203
Regularly scheduled radiation surveys are required for all accessible
areas in the vicinity of a radiation-producing source where there is a
reasonable possibility that a person could receive more than one quarter
of the maximum permissible dose. Personnel monitoring is required
for all persons who may possibly receive a dose in excess of the same
amount. 204 Records of these measurements are to be kept available
indefinitely for health department inspection, and, upon termination of
a person's employment, and at the request of the department, a summary record of the person's exposure is to be forwarded to the health
department. In addition, accidental exposures in excess of five times
the permissible amounts must be reported within seven days of their
discovery. 205
The provisions of the Pennsylvania and Texas regulations which
concern the storage and handling of radioactive materials and the disposal of radioactive wastes are more elaborate than those of California
and New York. They are, nevertheless, performance type rules in that
they establish operation and construction standards and do not specify
dimensions or details of design. 206
( 4)

Connecticut

The Connecticut radiation health and safety regulations were adopted
by the State Department of Health in October of 1957, and were the
first set of comprehensive state regulations that became effective after
the AEC issued its "Standards for Protection Against Radiation." 207
Under these regulations, "when the source of radiation is outside the
body, the maximum permissible doses for persons occupationally engaged in radiation work" are not to exceed "those established for the
purpose by the United States Atomic Energy Commission." Similarly,
"when the source of radiation is within the body, radiation dosages"
2o3

Supra notes 129 and 130, §6.

I d., §8.
205 I d., §9.
204

206

!d., §§n, 12, 14.
Code Fed. Regs. Pt.

207 10

20

became effective on Feb. 28, 1957.
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are to be controlled "by limiting the average rates at which radioactive
materials are taken into the body by inhalation or by ingestions" and
the average concentrations of radioisotopes are not to exceed "the
maximum permissible concentration established by the United States
Atomic Energy Commission." Persons under eighteen years of age
and persons not occupationally engaged in radiation work are not to
receive more than ten per cent of occupational dose. 208 Although it can
be seen that the Connecticut Department of Health intended to follow
the standards of the AEC, some variance exists, for they have applied
a different distinction. Prescribing "occupational" and "non-occupational" doses (as the NCRPM has done) is not the same as prescribing,
as does the AEC, doses for "restricted" and "unrestricted" areas. The
term "restriCted area means any area access to which is controlled by
the licensee," except residential space. 209 The AEC, therefore, applies
the same limits to all persons in the restricted area, whereas Connecticut
applies two different limits depending upon whether or not the person
exposed is "occupationally engaged in radiation work." The Connecticut
standards also differ from those of the AEC in that they do not appear
to allow any weekly doses in excess of the basic limits.
Subsequent modification of the Connecticut standards, so as to con~
form with changes in AEC and NCRPM standards, is contemplated in
a section which provides :
Whenever the United States Atomic Energy Commission or
the National Committee on Radiation Protection [and Measurement] publish modifications in their respective standards
or recommendations, such modifications shall be operative
·within the scope of this regulation immediately upon the issuance of an emergency order by the department to interested
parties including registrants. 210
Annual registration of radiation installations and mobile sources is
required in Connecticut, as well as re-registration "when any increase is
contemplated in the number of sources, the source strength, the output
or .the types of radiation energy involved." 211 Only the owner of the
installation or mobile source, however, is required to register. 212 •
The Connecticut regulations require personnel monitoring and regularly scheduled area radiation surveys under conditions similar to those
Supra note 131, §E.
10 Code Fed. Regs. §20.3,(a) (12) .
210 Supra note 131, §N.
2u I d., §C.
212 Supra note 131, §F.
208
2o9

.
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imposed by the Pennsylvania and Texas regulations. 213 Individual personnel exposure records and records of radioactive materials released
into the environment must be maintained. 214 "Any exposure of twentyfive rems or more" is to be reported to the State Department of Health
within twenty-four hours, and "an accidental exposure of a person to
three rems or more" is to be "promptly reported." Loss or theft of
radioactive materials is to be "immediately reported." 215 Supervision
of all radiation installations and mobile sources, by a "person qualified
to evaluate radiation hazards and to advise with respect thereto," is
required, as is medical consultation service by a qualified, licensed
physician. 216
The operating rules of the Connecticut regulations are, for the most
part, of the performance type. Storage of radioactive materials, for
example, must be done in such a manner that "no person will inadvertently receive a dose in excess of the limits" specified in the section on
maximum permissible doses. 217 No specifications are provided regarding storage places or containers. Similarly, "all work with radioactive
materials" is to be "carried out under such conditions as to minimize
the possibility of any contamination that would result in any person's
being subjected to radiation levels exceeding those specified" in the section on maximum permissible doses. More specifically, however, where
contamination of a person or his clothing is possible, " ( 1) both shall
be monitored, ( 2) persons' bodies shall be decontaminated, [and] ( 3)
clothing shall either be decontaminated or disposed of in a manner
approved by the department." 218
The section of the Connecticut regulations on "disposal of radioactive wastes" is similar to the provisions of the AEC regulations 219 and
allows the discharge of radioactive wastes into the air, water, or sewage
systems and the burial of radioactive wastes under virtually the same'
conditions as does the AEC. Where two or more owners are discharging radioactive wastes into the same environment, they must file a statement of their agreed prorated releases for approval of the State Department of Health, or the Department may arbitrarily assign quantities to .
them severally.
213

Supra notes

2a I d.,

215/d.,
210
217

Jd.,
/d.,

218/d.,
219 I d.,

129 and 130 at §6. National Bureau of Standards Handbook
§G(a) and (b).
§G(c) and (d).
§§H, 1.
§].
§K.
§M. 10 Code Fed. Regs. §§20.JOI-20.J04.

61

at 41.
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( 5)

Michigan

In November of 1957 the Michigan Department of Health adopted
a comprehensive set of radiation health and safety regulations which
became effective on February 14, 1958. While the Michigan regulations are not to be construed as limiting "the intentional exposure of
patients to radiation for the purpose of medical diagnosis, medical
therapy, or medical research conducted by duly licensed members of the
healing-professions," they apply "to all persons who receive, possess, or
use materials or devices capable of emitting ionizing radiation," except
certain exempted sources which have no significant effect on health. ~
By virtue of Part I of the Michigan regulations the State Health
Commissioner is to appoint the members of the Commissioner's Radiation Committee, which is to consist of nine members, each of whom is
to be selected on the basis of his "recognized knowledge in the field of
radiation." The purpose of this committee is to review "these regulations at least once annually and at such other times, not to exceed four
times a year, as may seem necessary." The Commissioner acts as chairman of the committee. 221
These regulations are to be enforced by personnel of the Michigan
Department of Health, but the "Commissioner may delegate authority
to county, city or district health departments to enforce" them. 222
Following the method of the AEC, the Michigan regulations establish permissive dose levels and concentrations in "controlled" and "uncontrolled" areas as well as allowed concentrations of radioactive
effluents in "uncontrolled" areas. The permissible weekly exposure
standards for persons in controlled areas are identical with the current
sta~dards of the AEC for "restricted" areas as to units, amounts, conditions of exposure, and critical organs affected. Also authorized are
exposures up to three times the basic weekly dose if the quarter year
dose does not exceed ten times the permissible weekly limit. Exposures
of persons under eighteen in controlled areas must be kept to ten per
cent of the basic dose. The AEC limits for allowed concentrations of
airborne radioactive materials in controlled areas are followed. This
22

22 0

Sufwa note 127, R. 325.1305.

The function of the committee is advisory only. Committee approval of radiation
health and safety regulations is not a condition precedent to effectiveness, however
prior approval of a majority of the members of the State Council of Health is required.
See Mich. Stat. Ann. §14-7.
222 Supra note 127, R. 325.1304. It might be added that the local boards of health
appear to have ample authority to issue their own regulations concerning radiation.
See Mich. Stat. Ann. §§14.63, 14-64.
221
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section also contains a rule limiting the "maximum permissible accumulated dose, in rems . . . [to] 5 times the number of years beyond the
age of 18." Moreover, no annual increment is to exceed fifteen rems. 223
Michigan, therefore, apparently is the first state to follow the recent
recommendations of the NCRPM and the cumulative dose standard
which the AEC is now applying in its own installations. 224
Permissible levels of radiation in uncontrolled areas in Michigan are
also identical with the current standards of the AEC. 225 Registration
of a radiation source is to include information on "anticipated average
radiation levels and anticipated occupancy times for each uncontrolled
area involved," and may include "proposed limits on levels of radiation
in uncontrolled areas." Should it be demonstrated "that the proposed
limits are not likely to cause any individual to receive a dose in any
period of 7 consecutive days in excess of w%" of the basic dose for
controlled areas, "the state health commissioner may approve the proposed limits." 226 The succeeding subsection imposes limits on concentrations of radioactive materials released into the atmosphere of uncontrolled areas which are identical with AEC requirements. 227 Here,
again, the registrant must include "information as to anticipated average concentrations and anticipated occupancy time for each uncontrolled area," and he also must include "proposed limits of concentrations . . . released into the air in uncontrolled areas." Curiously
enough, "if the registrant demonstrates that it is not probable that any
individual will be exposed to concentrations in excess of the limits
specified," the Commissioner u1.uill approve the proposed limits." 228
The reasons for this distinction are obscure.
228

I d.,

R. 325.I309.1.

The NCRPM proposal to limit the maximum permissible accumulated dose to
five rems per year for any age beyond eighteen was announced in a preliminary statement dated January 8, I957- I CCH Atomic Energy Law Rep. 1!4034. This rule was
subsequently incorporated into the National Bureau of Standards Handbook 63, "Protection Against Neutron Radiation Up to 30 Million Electron Volts." A statement of
the AEC, issued December IO, I957, announced the approval for use in its own facilities
and those of its contractors the new maximum permissible accumulated doses of the
NCRPM. It also announced that it was currently considering amending IO Code Fed.
Regs. 20 to make this regulation consistent with the new recommendations. I CCH
Atomic Energy Law Rep. 1!4050.
22 5 Supra note IZ7, R. 325.I3<>9.2.2.
226 I d., R. 325.1309.2.1. The language of this provision is nearly identical with that
of 10 Code Fed. Regs. §20.102 except that the AEC "will approve the proposed limits"
if the conditions are met.
2 24

227
22s

Jd., R. 325-1309·3·
I d., R. 325.I309·3-I. Under the federal regulations "there may be included in any

application .for a license or for amendment of a license proposed limits upon concen-
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While the Michigan Department of Health has taken practically all
of the language of Section 9 on "basic standards" from the AEC regulations, it also has deemed it necessary to add a paragraph which contains rules and packaging specifications for radioactive materials which
are transferred or moved through uncontrolled areas. 229
Registration of "all sources of ionizing radiation" with the State
Health Commissioner "by the legal owner, user or an authorized representative" is required in Michigan. In addition to the name and
address of the person registering, and the above mentioned items, the
name, training, and qualifications of the individual responsible for
safety, and the location, type, and capacity of the radiation source is
to be included in the registration. Installation changes which materially
increase the potential health hazard must receive the prior approval of
the Commissioner. 280
Except for the above reference in the registration section to the "individual who will be appointed by the owner or user to see that the radiation source is safely used arid stored," the Michigan regulations are
silent on the subject of radiation safety personnel. Neither do these
regulations mention medical supervision or required physical examinations.
In the event of excessive exposures, the rule of the AEC is followed,281 and the subsequent exposure of the individual must be reduced
to ten per cent of the basic limit until such time as the average dose
over the period is within acceptable limits again. 282 In addition, the
following incidents must be reported to the State Health Department
by phone and telegraph : ( 1) within six hours--exposures of individuals to twenty-five rems or more or "the release of radioactive materials which, if averaged over a period of 24 hours, would exceed
5,000 times" the limits specified for uncontrolled areas; ( 2) within
twenty-four hours-exposure of an individual to three rems or more,
or the release of radioactive materials which would exceed 500 times
the limits specified for uncontrolled areas. Written reports of all incidents involving exposures in excess of the specified limits are required
within thirty days. 283
trations of licensed and other radioactive material released into air or water in unrestricted areas as a result of the applicant's proposed activities." 10 Code Fed. Regs.
§20.10J(a}.
229 /d., R. 325.1309.2.3.
280 /d., R. 325.13o6.
281 10 Code Fed. Regs. §20.105.
282 Supra note 127, R. 325.1310.1.
288 /d., R. 325.1310.2.
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By way of precautionary procedures, the Michigan regulations require that "each registrant shall make or cause to be made such surveys
as may be necessary for him to comply with the regulations"; and that
"each individual who enters a high radiation area" or "who enters a
controlled area under such circumstances that he receives, or is likely
to receive, a dose in excess of 25% of the limits specified in . . . these
regulations," shall have and use personnel monitoring equipment. 234
Radiation safety instruction is required for any "individual working in
or frequenting any portion of a controlled area." 235 Registered materials stored in uncontrolled areas must be secured against unauthorized
removal, and unattended X-ray apparatus must be secured against unauthorized use. 236 Caution signs, labels, and signals, which are virtually
identical with those employed by the AEC, are required. 237
Radioactive waste disposal into sanitary sewage systems or by burial
in the soil is allowed in Michigan under conditions identical with those
imposed by the AEC. Registrants also may apply to the State Health
Commissioner for approval of proposed disposal procedures which
are not otherwise authorized in the regulations except for disposal to
surface waters. 288
Parts VII through XI of the Michigan regulations establish operating procedures and detailed specifications for industrial radiographic
installations, medical radiographic installations, dental radiographic installations, fluoroscopic shoe machines, and miscellaneous types of X-ray
installations. Industrial radiographic installations are subdivided into
four classes depending upon their capacity and amount of use. While
the term "industrial radiographic installation" refers primarily to X-ray
devices, it also includes those "utilizing high intensity sealed sources
of radioactive materials" (in other words, "byproduct materials" which
are licensed by the AEC). The most curious feature of these provisions regarding industrial radiographic installations is that they contain
234 /d., R. 325.1311.1 and .2. Except for "personnel occupationally exposed to ionizing
radiation from diagnostic equipment,'' who must wear film badges "for at least 13
consecutive weeks during each calendar year" and for whom records must be kept in
a permanent file (R. 325.1318.1.8), the Michigan regulations are silent as to whether
records must be kept of radiation surveys and personnel monitoring.
235 /d., R. 325.1311-5.
236/d., R. 325.1311.6 and .7.
237
!d., R. 325.1311·3·
2 BS/d., R. 325.1312. Due to the fact that the Michigan Water Resources Commission controls the dumping of-contaminants into the surface waters of the state (Mich.
Stat. Ann. §§3.521-3.533), the State Health Commissioner does not have the authority
to allow a system which contemplates such disposition.
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their own permissible dose levels for personnel working in or adjacent
to the enclosure area. This dose level is 100 milliroentgens per week,
which is considerably lower than the basic standards of Section 9· 1 and
the current standards of the AEC for licensed byproduct material
users. No distinction is made as to conditions of exposure or critical
organs affected. It would appear that in Michigan, commercial users
of byproduct materials in sealed containers (but not unsealed sources)
must limit exposures of employees to one third the amounts allowed by
the AEC.
b. Partial Radiation Health and Safety Regulation
Government agencies of Colorado, Florida, Kentucky, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, Utah, West Virginia, and Wisconsin
have issued regulations which impose some sort of radiation exposure
limits. These regulations are characterized as partial since they cover
only this limited aspect of radiation health and safety and are not concerned with such problems as waste disposal, personnel monitoring, area
radiation surveys, etc. Most of them are confined to industrial radiation
hazards from X-rays, gamma rays, and atmospheric concentrations of
radon and thorium. In addition to the above, regulations of Arkansas,
Delaware, and Indiana indicate an intention by those states to control
some phase of radiation hazards.
Of the states having partial regulations concerning exposure limits,
only those of Colorado and New Jersey purport to cover all forms of
radiation. Colorado regulations limit exposures to X-rays, gamma rays,
alpha and beta rays, and thermal neutrons to o.os rems per day. 239 By
using the day, instead of the week, as the exposure period, and by failing to make appropriate refinements regarding conditions of exposure,
critical organs affected, and the location or employment status of the
person exposed, these regulations are, in general, at variance with the
standards of the AEC and the current recommendations of the
NCRPM. New Jersey, on the other hand, avoids the embarrassment of
such variance by using a standard which is all but meaningless. The
regulations of the New Jersey Health Department specify:
. . . [All] sources of radiation shall be sealed, transported,
handled, used and kept in such manner as to prevent all users
thereof and all persons within effective range thereof from
being exposed to excessive dosage of radiation. 240
2su Regulations-Occupational Diseases Reportable in Colorado, Colo. Dept. of
Public Health, Reg. J.
240 Chap. VI-Radiation Regulations, New Jersey Public Health Council, eff. Dec.
IS, 1952·
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"Excessive dosage" is not defined. However, in view of the fact that
New Jersey has created a new rule-making commission, discussed
earlier, the likelihood is great that more definite standards will soon be
forthcoming.
General variance from the current standards of the NCRPM is found
in the regulations of Florida, 241 New Hampshire, 242 Oregon, 243 West
Virginia/ 44 and Wisconsin, 245 which simply limit exposures to X-rays
and gamma rays, under all industrial conditions, to 0.3 roentgens per
week, as well as in Ohio, where the general exposure limit is o. I roentgens per day. 246 Greater conformity with NCRPM standards is found
in the regulations of the Kentucky Department of Health, which limit
the occupational exposure to X-rays and gamma rays to 300 milliroentgens for the whole body, 450 milliroentgens to the lenses of the eyes,
and I 500 milliroentgens to the skin of the hands, forearms, feet, ankles, head. and neck. 241 The only Utah regulation which purports
to regulate exposures limits the " . . . atmospheric concentration of
the immediate daughters of radon . . . [to] 300 micro-microcuries
per liter," us which differs from the standard of the AEC.
While the environmental sanitation regulations of Arkansas do not
limit exposure to radiation, it is required that :
In all places of employment where recognized health hazards
exist from . . . radiation . . . [and] radioactive materials,
. . . the employer shall provide pre-employment medical examination and periodic medical examination thereafter. The
employer shall also provide warning signs . . . in prominent
sites around the plant and shall periodically instruct all employees regarding the health hazards connected with their
241 Regulation for Control and Prevention of Occupational Diseases, Fla. Industrial
Commission, Reg. 8, revised 1957.
242 Reg. 2-Maximum Allowable Concentrations of Toxic Materials, N.H. Dept. of
Health, adopted July 16, 1954243 Recommended Standards and Regulations for Occupational Health, Ore. Bd. of
Health, issued Jan. 1956..
244 Regulations of the W.Va. Bd. of Health, c. 6, Industrial Hygiene.
245 Wis. Adm. Industrial Code §20.02(4).
246 Regulations for the Prevention and Control of Diseases Resulting from Exposure
to Toxic Fumes, Vapors, Mists, Gases and Dusts in Order to Preserve and Protect
the Public Health, Ohio Dept. of Health, Reg.· 254-47, adopted Feb. 16, 1946.
24 7 Regulations for Control of Occupational Environments and the Prevention of
Occupational Diseases, Ky. Bd. of Health, adopted May 1956.
2 4 8 General Safety Orders, Reg. 2, Industrial Commission of Utah, adopted Aug. 25,
1955·
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duties and the best preventative measures and methods to
protect themselves therefrom.u 9

In Indiana the only regulations regarding radiation hazards concern the
operation of shoe-fitting fiuoroscopes. 250
Pursuant to its general authority 201 the Delaware Board of Health
has promulgated a curious regulation which will probably be more hindrance_ than help, for it specifies :
No person shall manufacture, distribute, offer for sale, store,
keep, install or dispose of any radioactive material or any
device containing radioactive material which is capable of
causing injury or death to human beings or animals without
first securing a written permit from the State Board of
Health. . . . The State Board of Health reserves the right to
deny any permit when there is unsatisfactory proof that the
material or device will not be a hazard to health. 262
This regulation does not apply to hospitals, clinics, physicians, veterinarians, or dentists.
D. Summary of State Atomic Energy Legislation and Regulation
The foregoing examination of recent state atomic energy and radiation hazard legislation and regulation reveals considerable state interest
and activity in the field since the Atomic Energy Act was amended in
1954. It is apparent from this examination that many states, after the
example of the federal government, regard atomic energy as an appropriate subject for both governmental encouragement and control in the
public interest. However, the promotional programs are, for the most
part, still in only tentative form, They do little more than indicate a
vague policy of encouragement, suggesting the need for further study
of the problems involved. Some of the states have created commissions,
either temporary or permanent, to conduct these studies and suggest
fruitful courses of government action. While none of the states have
responded to the impact of atomic energy upon society with anything
like the political innovations of Congress, a few have recognized the
need for intra- and inter-governmental coordination to assure consistent
249 Ark. Bd. of Health, Rules and Regulations Pertaining to Environmental Sanitation in Manufacturing Establishments, §3.9.
280 Supra note 6 at 8.
281 Del. Ann. Code tit. 16, c. 1, §122.
252 Del. Bd. of Health, Regulations Governing the Manufacture, Distribution, Sale,
Storage, Installation, and Disposal of Radioactive Sources, Materials, or Devices, §II,
adopted Dec. 5, 1955.
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state action, establishing for this purpose the position of coordinator of
atomic development activities. Beyond this, however, there is no indication that the states intend to concentrate and centralize state powers to
d~l with matters affecting the development and utilization of atomic
energy in one officer or agency.
As might well be expected, the subject of radiation hazard control has
received somewhat more comprehensive treatment by some of the states
than has the subject of promotion. The need and the urgency for state
action in this area is more obvious and more easily justified in terms of
traditional political principles. It is encouraging to observe these states
establishing programs to control radiation hazards at a time when significant damage is yet to occur and the privately controlled atomic
energy industry is still in its infancy. Not only does this serve to reduce
the possibility of future injury,- but it also serves the interests of the
regulated industries by informing them before their entry into the field
as to the design and operational standards which will be imposed upon
them, thus avoiding much of the expense of subsequent structural
·
modifications.
It is somewhat less encouraging to observe the failure of the state
legislatures to avoid multiple regulation of radiation hazards by several
agencies within the state. None of the states has followed the advice of
the NCRPM and bestowed exclusive authority to regulate radiation
hazards on one agency. Neither has any state expressly subdivided the
field among existing agencies or provided a means by which the regulations of all agencies can be made uniform and consistent. Fortunately,
the tendency seems to be to adopt the standards of the AEC or the
NCRPM regardless of whether directed to or not, so that there probably
will be less conflict between the regulations of various state agencies
themselves, and between them and the AEC regulations, than might be
feared.
This last feature becomes especially important when it is evident that
many of the states have every intention of concurrently regulating the
activities of AEC licensees. The comprehensive state radiation health
and safety regulations make no distinction between sources of radiation
licensed and controlled by the AEC and those which are not. By and
large, however, they impose no additional burden on licensed activities
other than registration and reporting to designated state officials. If
there are some dissimilarities between state and federal regulations, they
are not of the sort which makes simultaneous observance of both standards impossible. It remains to be seen whether concurrent federal-state
regulation is authorized.
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E. The Problem of Federal Pre-emption
1.

Introduction

The comprehensive nature of the powers granted the Atomic Energy
Commission under the Atomic Energy Act in the field of radiation
health and safety regulation raises the pivotal question of whether all
or part of the field has been so occupied by the federal government as to
preclude state action. In view of the fact that Congress has failed to
clarify the matter of pre-emption and, to date, no court has ruled on
the question, considerable uncertainty exists concerning the validity of
state radiation health and safety regulations. Therefore the possible
solutions to the question of the possibility and extent of federal preemption must be sought by recourse to the principles employed by the
courts in resolving the same type of question in analogous cases.
If Congress had not asserted national powers and established a federal program to promote and control atomic energy, the states undoubtedly could regulate all radiation hazards created by others than the federal government itself. The mere existence of constitutional power in
the federal government does not preclude the exercise of state police
powers with respect to all matters which might be made subject to
national powers. For example, regarding the commerce power, which is
one of the principal powers upon which the Atomic Energy Act is
based, the Supreme Court has said :
Although the commerce clause conferred on the national
government power to regulate commerce, its possession of that
power does not exclude all stat(! power of regulation. 258
Where the commerce power is unexercised by Congress, the states may
enforce laws for the protection and safety of society, although they
affect interstate commerce, except "where the subject matter requires a
uniform system as between the States." 254
Even if Congress undertook the promotion and exclusive control of
every phase of atomic energy development and utilization except that of
public health and safety, there would be little doubt of the states' authority to protect this interest as long as the regulation did not materially interfere with the federal program. It scarcely could be asserted
that the national interest in promoting the development and utilization of
atomic energy by private persons is so great as to preclude state regulation of the very substantial hazards to life and property involved.
268
254

Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 76I, 766, 6s S. Ct. ISIS (I94S).
Leisy v. Hardin, I3S U.S. 100, Io8-I09, IO S. Ct. 68I (IB9o).

RECENT STATE LEGISLATION

1003

The situation with respect to atomic energy hazards, however, is not
as posed above. Congress, in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 255 has
definitely asserted its powers to control atomic energy in the interest
(among others) of public health and safety. As indicated in Section
2 of the act, the constitutional bases of the federal health and safety
program are the powers of Congress : ( 1) to provide for the common
defense and security, 256 ( 2) to regulate interstate and foreign commerce,257 and (3) to make all needful rules and regulations respecting
the. territory or other property belonging to the United States. 258 The
phrase "health and safety of the public" and terms of similar import are
used repeatedly throughout the act. 259 Of greater significance, however,
is the elaborate and comprehensive program of radiation hazards control which Congress has created, for it raises the problem : to what
extent ha~ ·Congress pre-empted the field of health and safety regulation in connection with atomic energy activities?
In exercising any one of the above mentioned powers, Congress, if it
so desires, may pre-empt state regulation of matters within the scope of
the national power. In discussing federal supremacy and the commerce
power, the Supreme Court has said :
Congress has undoubted power to redefine the distribution of
power over interstate commerce. It may either permit the
states to regulate the commerce in a manner which would
otherwise not be permissible . . . or exclude state regulation
even of matters of peculiarly local concern which nevertheless
affect interstate commerce. 260
Similarly, where Congress has undertaken to legislate pursuant to its
defense powers, the Supreme Court has declared that state law in conflict
therewith, which would be valid but for the congressional act, must
give way to federal supremacy. 261 Again, where a state has attempted
Pub. L. 703, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954), 42 U.S.C.A. §§2011 et seq.
U.S. Const., Art. I, §8, cis. 11-14.
257 Id., Art. I, §8, cl. 3·
25s I d., Art. IV, §3, cl. 8.
2 5 9 The phrase "health and safety of the public," or ·phrases of similar import, may
be found in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 at §§2b, 2d, 2e, 3d, np, nv, Jla(S), 31c,
41b, 53b, 53e(7), 63b, 81, 103b, IOJd, 1043, 104h, 104c, 104d, 144(a) (4), 161b, 161e,
161i, 182:1, and 186c, 42 U.S.C.A. §§2012(b), 2012(d), 2012(e), 2013(d), 2014(t),
2014(aa), 2051a(5), 2051(c), 2o61(b), 2073(b), 2111, 2133(b), 2133(d), 2134(a),
2134(b), 2134(c), 2164(a)(4), 2201(b), 2201(e), 2201(i), 2232(a), and 2236(c).
26o Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, supra note 253 at 769.
261 In Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92, 66 S.Ct. 438 (1946), the sale by the State of
Washington of timber from school lands was held subject to the maximum price
prescribed by the OPA under the authority of the Emergency Price Control Act of
World War II. Cf. Hulbert v. Twin Falls County, 327 U.S. 103. 66 S.Ct. 444 (1946).
255
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to regulate the distribution of federally owned chattels to private persons and exact the payment of inspection fees,_ the court has said:
. . . [W]here, as here, the governmental action is carried on
by the United States itself and Congress does not affirmatively
declare its instrumentalities or property subject to [state]
regulation or taxation, the inherent freedom continues. 282
It is clear that Congress has the power to regulate many aspects of
radiation health and safety 283 and, when it desires to do so, may preempt the field as to these matters. Our question is, therefore, twofold :
(I) to what extent did Congress intend exclusive federal regulation, and
( 2) to what extent are there any limits to the exclusiveness of federal
regulation? In the light of analogous cases there is considerable uncertainty as to pre-emption of regulation of non-federal activities. The
bulk of this study, therefore, is devoted to pre-emption in this area.
There are a few areas, however, where regardless of congressional
intent there may be no power .to pre-empt, and these will be discussed at
the end of the chapter. The one matter that warrants no discussion is
the question of the power of the states to regulate the activities of federal agencies or of contractors carrying out the work of such agencies.
because the answer is clearly that no such power exists. 28•
2.

The Permissible Limits of State Health and Safety Regulation
of Atomic Energy Activities
a. Explicit Provision Allowing State Regulation

The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 contains only one express reference
to the problem of pre-emption. Section 271 provides:
Nothing in this Act shall be construed to affect the authority
.or regulations of any Federal, State, or local agency with
respect to the generation, sale, or transmission of electric
power. 285
282 Mayo v. United States, 319 U.S. 441, 448, 63 S. Ct. 1137 ( 1943). In this case
federal officers shipped federally owned .fertilizer into Florida for distribution to
farmers there under the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act. The Supreme
Court held that Florida could not enforce its statute requiring inspection of fertilizers,
labeling, and payment of inspection fees.
288 On the power of the federal government to control radiation health and safety
see Estep, "Federal Control of Health and Safety Standards in Peacetime Private
Atomic Energy Activities," 52 Mich. L. Rev. 333 (1954).
284 In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 10 S. Ct. 658 (189o); Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U.S.
51, 41 S. Ct. 16 (1920); Pittman v. Home Owners' Loan Corp., 3o8 U.S. 21, 6oS. Ct.
15 (1939); Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1, 62 S. Ct. 43 (1941); City of
Cleveland v. United States, 323 U.S. 329, 65 S. Ct. 28o (1945).
286 §271, 42 U.S.C.A. §zo18.
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It might be argued from this explicit, but limited, recognition of state
regulatory power that Congress intended to exclude every other form of
state action. Such an argument, however, would ignore the real basis
of the provision. There appears to have been considerable concern in
Congress lest the AEC become a super power administration. 266 The
provision was clearly intended to avoid such an event. Senator Clinton
P. Anderson, a member of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and
a principal author of the act, pointed out to the Senate that:
The Commission has no special competence in the field of
electric energy distribution and seeks no responsibility in the
field. Its functions should be limited, as the bill contemplates,
to those areas in which the Commission does have special competence or responsibility. These areas include the review of
design criteria, the supervision of construction, and decisions
on the technical qualifications of applications to operate nuclear
plants, on health and safety standards, and on security safeguards.267
Thus Section 271 apparently was intended as a limitation upon the
powers of the Commission and not as the single exception to federal
pre-emption. It may also be noted that the Senator did not specify
exclusive Commission control within the areas of "special competence."
There is nothing in the Congressional Record to suggest that his attention was directed in any way to the pre-emptive question.
The whole pre-enactment legislative history of the "1954 act in fact
is barren of any indication that Congress was even aware of the preemption problem with respect to health and safety regulation. For what
it is worth in determining the intent of Congress when the act was
passed, however, there have been several subsequent manifestations of
congressional concern with the problem in the form of bills or recommendations to amend the act. On January 23, 1956, Representative
Carl T. Durham introduced a bill to amend the act which would ( 1)
authorize and direct the Commission "to cooperate with the States in
the formulation of standards for regulating the health and safety aspects
of the atomic energy field"; and ( 2) direct the Commission "to relinquish the jurisdiction of health and safety in the areas specified in the
certificate" six months after the date upon which the "Commission
receives from the governor of any State a certificate to the effect that
266 See the Congressional Record for July of 1954 for debates on this subject.
267 100 Cong. Rec. 10559 (July 15, 1954), quoting a statement by Chairman Strauss
of the Atomic Energy Commission.
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the State has an agency competent to exercise jurisdiction" in a specified
field of radiation hazard regulation. 268
A somewhat more cautious solution was offered by Senator Anderson
in a bill introduced on July 26, 1956, which would ( 1) authorize and
direct the Commission "to cooperate with the States in the formulation
of standards regulating the health and safety aspects and other aspects
of the atomic energy field" and ( 2) authorize the Commission "to
negotiate compacts or agreements with the States relating to health and
safety aspects . . . of the atomic energy program prior to their submission to the Congress for approval." Pursuant to these compacts,
"the Commission (would be) authorized to turn over such areas to the
States for regulation as it finds the States are competent to assume such
powers." 269
While the AEC has declined to issue an administrative interpretation
or adopt an official position on the extent to which Congress intended
that it share its regulatory jurisdiction with the states, it has. established a program to advise, consult, and cooperate with state officials. 270
Furthermore, in June of 1957, the Commission transmitted a proposed
amendment to the Joint Committee which was intended "to provide clarification of the Commission's authority in dealing with the states in
carrying out the Commission's regulatory functions, and, more importantly, to define the role of the states in regulating in those areas of radiation, health and safety protection regarding which Congress has delegated responsibilities to the Commission." 271 This amendment would
authorize the AEC "to cooperate with any State or group of States in
carrying out the Commission's responsibilities for protecting the health
and safety of the public from radiation hazards incident to the processing and utilization of source, byproduct, and special nuclear material."
It also provided that :
Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to prevent the States from
adopting, inspecting against, and enforcing standards, not in
conflict with those adopted by the Commission, for protecting
the health and safety of the public from radiation hazards
incident to the processing and utilization of source, byproduct,
H.R. 8676, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956).
S. 4298, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956).
21o AEC, Twenty-first Semi-Annual Report 128-129 (1957).
2 71 Letter dated June 1957 (exact date not known) to Rep. Carl T. Durham, Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, from Chairman Lewis Strauss of the
Atomic Energy Commission. The letter was accompanied by a copy of the Commission's "Proposed Amendment to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Section 274
Cooperation with the States," and an "Analysis" of .the proposed amendment.
268
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and special nuclear material, Provided, that this subsection
shall not be deemed to authorize any State to exercise licensing
responsibilities concerning those aspects of activities with
regard to which the Commission has licensing responsibilities,
and Provided further, that State radiation standards shall not
apply to facilities operated by the Government or facilities
operated under contract with and for the account of the
Government. 272
An analysis, which accompanied the proposed amendment, pointed out
that:
By· "not in conflict with," we mean that the states cannot
relieve anyone from compliance with the Commission's radiation standards, but could impose, if they so chose, more restrictive standards. 273
To this was appended the pious hope that the states would consult with
the AEC before imposing more restrictive standards.
Inasmuch as Congress has not acted on any of these proposed amendments, it may be claimed that pre-emptive effect was intended in the
1954 act and, furthermore, that the inaction indicates that Congress is
disinclined to change the situation. On the other hand, it may be
claimed that the inaction suggests that no change is necessary, since
the 1954 act was not intended to have pre-emptive effect in the first
place. Legally, however, the use of either conclusion is not justified
because congressional intent should be determined as of the time of
enactment of the particular legislation. No more can be claimed for
these unsuccessful amendments and congressional inaction than that
they may suggest present intent which may be quite different from
original intent. 2 u
The failure of these amendments to obtain congressional approval,
however, does occasion the necessity for a fairly extended study of the
pre-emption problem under the 1954 act. Apparently, Congress desires
to evaluate more completely state attitudes and programs and the extent
of the integration with the health and safety regulations of the AEC
/d., §274(b).
!d., "Analysis" at 2.
274 Evidence of a failure by Congress to adopt amendments would seem to lack
probative value. Moreover, to one concerned with the theory of interpretation, it
seems completely unjustified to use such evidence as any indication of the earlier
legislative intent and certainly silence is not the way to comply with constitutional
methods of passing amendatory laws. See the related suggestion by Justice Rutledge
in Cleveland v. United State.s, 329 U.S. 14, 67 S. Ct. 13 (1946). It is recognized, of
course, that use has occasionally been made of such material by the court.
272
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before acting definitively. Meanwhile the states and Commission licensees are faced with uncertainties and must seek guidance from the
decisions of the Supreme Court involving the most nearly similar
circumstances to determine the implied permissible limits of state regulation. In any event, none of the proposed amendments seems a satisfactory solution, and it is to be hoped that Congress will not take action
on the pre-emption problem without considering the many problems
and policy questions that necessarily are involved. 275
b. Implied Pre-emption and State Regulation
Absence of express manifestation of congressional intent does not
conclude the matter of federal pre-emption. In numerous situations,
where Congress has undertaken to regulate in areas with which the
states also are concerned, the Supreme Court has found or, if the reader
prefers, has supplied an implied ·pre-emptive intent. In these situations,
however, the court seldom :(inds complete federal pre-emption. The
question of whether there has been implied pre-emption in a general
area of regulation simply does not lend itself to categorical yes or no
answers. The court has shown itself to be quite painstaking in applying
a rather complex rationale to determine whether or not Congress
impliedly intended to preclude the particular state action under consideration. The purpose of this study is to determine what specific types
of state health and safety regulation of radiation hazards and AEC
licensees will be allowed under the I954 act if it is not amended in any
of the ways discussed above. In the light of many analogous cases, it
appears that, while definite limits may be anticipated, some types of state
action will be permitted.
( I) Analogous Cases Involving the Implied Pre-emption
Question
For purposes of illustrating the doctrine and methods developed by
the Supreme Court to establish pre-emption wh_ere congressional intent
is buried in the interstices of the statutory language, the following areas
of analogy have been chosen: (I) labor-management relations and
unfair labor practices in industries affecting interstate commerce; ( 2)
health and safety regulation in connection with vehicles and products
in interstate commerce; and ( 3) several miscellaneous cases having
2 7 5 See Cavers, "Legislative Readjustments in Federal and State Regulatory Powers
over Atomic Energy," 46 Cal. L. Rev. 22 ( 1958), for a critical discussion of the
proposals for amendment.
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pertinency to the pr9blem. In each of these areas the Supreme Court
has found exclusive federal control of some matters and allowed, or
indicated that it would allow, concurrent exercise of state police powers
with respect ~o others.
(a) Labor Cases
Over the last twenty years more cases involving the question of implied federal pre-emption have arisen in the field of labor relations and
unfair labor·practices than in any other. To avoid the industrial strife
which was 'interfering with the normal flow of commerce as well as
jeopardizing the "public health, safety, and interest" Congress enacted
the National Labor Relations (or Wagner) Act in 193 5. 276 The declared
purpose of the Wagner Act was to encourage the practice and procedure
of collective bargaining and to protect the full freedom of workers to
associate, 0rganize, and designate representatives of their own choosing. The act gave the National Labor Relations Board the power
to· prevent an employer from engaging in certain unfair labor practices,
as that term was defined in the act, and the power to promulgate rules
and regulations necessary to carry out the provisions of the act. In
1947 ~ongress enacted the Labor Management Relations (or TaftHartley) Act, which re-enacted most of the earlier law and gave to the
NLRB additional powers to prevent labor organizations and their
agent-s from committing enumerated unfair labor practices. 277
Several statements of the Supreme Court found in cases involving
federal labor legislation may quite possibly be applicable in solving the
problem of congressional intent in adopting the Atomic Energy Act.
First, the court has said that the subject matter of federal labor legislation "is not so 'intimately blended and intertwined with responsibilities
of the national government' that its nature alone raises an inference of
exclusion." 278 This remark seems equally applicable to the non-military
aspects of atomic energy. Second, regarding express congressional intent, the Supreme Court has said :
Congress has not seen fit to lay d<;>wn even the most general
of guides to construction of the [National Labor Relations]
Act, as it sometimes does, by saying that its regulation either
shall or shall not exclude state action. 279
276
211

29 U.S.C. §§151 et seq. (1946).
29 U.S.C.A. §§141 et seq.

278 Bethlehem Steel Co. v. State Board, 330 U.S. 767, 772, (YJ S. Ct. 1026 (1947),
citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66, 61 S. Ct. 399 (1941), as authority for the
proposition.
279 Bethlehem Steel Co. v. State Board, supra note 278 at 771.
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The same may well be said of Congress in enacting the original Atomic
Energy Act of 1946 and the subsequent 1954 act. Third, when confronted by this situation, the Supreme Court .declared:
It long has been the rule that exclusion of state action may be
implied from the nature of the legislation and the subject matter although express declaration of such result is wanting. 280
Thus should the Supreme Court be confronted with a case in which an
AEC licensee is charged with violating a state health and safety law,
the labor cases may be examined as furnishing precedents.
Several distinctions between labor-management regulation and radiation hazard control require comment before the cases are examined.
Unlike the federal program of radiation health and safety, which filled
a regulatory vacuum and anticipated both the events it was designed to
prevent and the growth of activities subject to its standards, the federal
program of labor-management regulation entered a field of national
chaos, characterized by confli~ting and anachronistic state laws and consequent labor unrest. It may be argued that the historical background
of labor legislation gives greater force to an assertion of pre-t!mption
than do the circumstances out of which the AEC program arose. While
it appears that federal labor legislation became necessary, in large part,
because of state laws, it was partly because of the absence of effective
controls and the scarcity of qualified personnel at the state level that
the federal radiation health and safety program became necessary. Perhaps the Supreme Court will find it more difficult to ascribe pre-emptive
effect to an act of Congress, where, at the time of passage, there were
no state regulations in competition or conflict with congressional policies.281 Contrawise, it may be argued that, since governmental action
was urgently needed and the states had taken no action with respect to
radiation hazards arising out of atomic energy activities prior to the
1954 act, Congress felt compelled to pre-empt the field in its entirety.
As a further cautionary note, it should be pointed out that the type
and purpose of federal regulation of these two subjects are not the
same. Federal labor legislation and the cases arising under it are concerned primarily with rights and obligations of employers and employees. 282 Only occasionally does public .health and safety become a
central issue in this area; when it does, as is pointed out below, the
court is inclined to treat state action with exceptional solicitude. In the
280

I d. at 772.

281

See California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 736, 6g S. Ct. 841 (1949).
See Automobile Workers v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634, 78 S. Ct. 932 (1958).
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protection and enforcement of economic rights and obligations, it may
be argued that the national interests in uniformity and consistency demand centralized administration. Where the public health and safety
are in jeopardy, however, it may be argued that the national interests in
uniformity and consistency are subordinate to the local interest in swift
and effective action to eliminate the hazard. Furthermore, labor disputes and unfair labor practices have a way of advertising themselves
which assists centralized administration, whereas radiation hazards are
far from obvious to either the persons who are causing them or those
who are_ injured. To exclude the states entirely from seeking out and
eliminating these hazards places a heavy burden upon the AEC, a burden which scarcely seems justified by the advantages of exclusive federal
control, absent affirmative showing of state incompetence and obstruction. It must be recognized to the contrary, however, that in the labor
field Congress was not really concerned with physical health and safety,
while in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 it was very much concerned
with this very matter. This difference is discussed below.
(i) Labor Cases Finding Federal Pre-emption
The fundamental concern of the Supreme Court in considering state
action within the labor-management relations regulation area is with
conflict--conflict with federal standards, whether established by Congress or the NLRB, and conflict with their application to a particular
labor dispute. To illustrate, in Hill v. Florida 288 a state law provided
that business agents of labor unions must be licensed, and no person was
eligible for a license who had not been a citizen of the United States
for more than ten years, who had been convicted of a felony, or who
was not a person of good .moral character. Violation of the statute
was deemed a misdemeanor. The Florida Attorney General invoked the
statute against Hill and the union he represented since Hill had not
applied for a license. In reversing the judgment of the state court
against Hill and the union, the Supreme Court stated :
The declared purpose of the Wagner Act . . . is to encourage
collective bargaining, and to protect the "full freedom" of
workers in the selection of bargaining representatives of their
own choice. . . . Congre~s attached no conditions whatsoever
to their freedom of choice in this respect. Their own best
judgment, not that of someone else, was to be their guide.·
"Full freedom" to choose an agent means freedom to pass
upon that agent's qualifications. 284

u.s.

283

325

2 8'

I d. at 541.

538, 65

s. ct.

1373 (1945).
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Accordingly, since the state act imposed on the "full freedom" of employees to bargain collectively limitations which were in excess of those
Congress thought necessary, the state law was found to be an obstacle
to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives
of Congress. The court also pointed out that:
. . . Congress did not intend to subject the "full freedom"
of employees to the eroding process of "varied and perhaps
conflicting provisions of state enactments." 283
The court found the "intent" of Congress not from any language dealing with pre-emption but from this very general policy of freedom to
choose.
A conflict between state and federal law was held to be fatal to a
Michigan statute in Automobile Workers v. 0'Brien. 288 Here the union
struck against the Chrysler Corporation without conforming with prestrike procedures imposed by state law. The strike, which was called
to obtain higher wages, was. conducted peacefully. Michigan law, in
effect, delayed the time when a strike could be called beyond the time
specified by the Taft-Hartley Act and, unlike the federal law, required
majority authorization for any strike. These conflicts, plus the fact
that the matter clearly was· within the jurisdiction of the NLRB and
WaS covered by federal law, caused the tourt to decide that Congress
had occupied the field and closed ·it to this type of state regulation although the federal act said nothing about its provisions ex~luding state.>
action.
Where Congress has provided certain procedures to. deal with particular emergency situations, state attempts to deal with local emergencies
for which no special provision is made by federal law may also be held
to conflict with federal poliCy. In Bus Employees v. Wisconsin Board 281
the validity of the Wisconsin Public Utility Anti-Strike Law, which
prohibited any group of public utility employees from engaging in a
strike that would interrupt essential public services,' was at issue. Although the Taft-Hartley Act contains special procedures to deal with
strikes that might create national emergencies, it does not prohibit
strikes by public utility employees for higher wages and says nothing
about local emergencies. The Wisconsin statute, however, was held to
be in conflict with federal labor legislation.
The general principle illustrated by these three labor cases is that a
I d. at 542·
339 U.S. 454. 70 S. Ct. 781 (1950).
28 7 340 U.S. 383, 71 S. Ct. 359 (1951).
283
288
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state may not act where its action may constitute an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress as stated or implied in a statute, thus conflicting with federal
policy. Precise opposition of the state act to the federal act or complete frustration of the purposes and objectives of Congress is not required. The mere fact that it is possible for the person subject to both
federal and state controls to comply with the requirements of both does
not remove the implication of pre-emptive congressional intent. Apparently state action that conflicts with federal policy will not be allowed
even though the state law is not concerned with the same aspects of the
regulated subject or even though Congress has not acted to occupy the
entire field subject to regulation. The extent to which Congress has
occupied a field of regulation, or authorized a federal agency to do so,
is significant, however, in deciding if there is implied pre-emption, as
we shall see in later cases.
A second group of labor cases illustrates how far the Supreme Court
will go to find a conflict and therefore pre-emption where the state acts
within the quasi-legislative jurisdiction of a federal agency.
_In Bethlehem Steel Co. v. State Board 288 the New York Labor Relations Board had certified a union as bargaining agent for the company's foremen at a time when the policy of the NLRB was to refuse
certification of foremen's unions (even though it had the power to
certify them). 2811 The NLRB had taken the position that to permit them
would obstruct the purposes of the Wagner Act. The union had not
petitioned the NLRB for certification as a bargaining agent. The court
held the state action invalid since the federal statute was general and
inclusive on the subject of union certification and, pursuant to its delegated powers, the NLRB had promulgated comprehensive regulations
effectively governing the subject. The failure of the NLRB to exercise
affirmatively their full authority and certify foremen's unions was said
to take on "the character of a ruling that no such regulation is appropriate or approved pursuant to the policy of the.statute." 290 The matter
was within the rule-making jurisdiction of the NLRB. Thus the state
could not act to authorize bargaining agents which the NLRB could,
but did not, recognize.
The Bethlehem rule is applicable even where the NLRB has not
established a standard at all if the choice of standards is left to its disSupra note 278.
Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 67 S. Ct. 789 (1947).
290 Supra note 278 at 774- .
288

289
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cretion. In La Crosse Telephone Corp. v. Wisconsin Board 291 the state
law, under which the Wisconsin board acted, provided that a majority
of the employees in a single craft, division, department, or plant of an
employer might elect to constitute that group a separate bargaining unit.
Since the Wagner Act left the matter of bargaining units to the discretion of the NLRB, enforcement of the state law was not allowed even
though the NLRB had not authorized different bargaining units for
the company's employees. The court decided that Congress intended
that the NLRB have exclusive authority to determine the nature of
bargaining units.
A third group of labor cases illustrates another refinement of the
bases of federal pre-emption and demonstrates the Supreme Court's
reluctance to allow the states to act within the quasi-judicial jurisdiction
of a federal agency. The NLRB has been authorized to conduct investigations and hearings to determine whether certain "unfair labor practices" have been committed and to issue appropriate orders. Furthermore, the board may petition any United States Court of Appeals for
the enforcement of its order or for an appropriate temporary relief or
restraining order. As a result of the pre-emptive effect found to be
implicit in this grant of power in Garner v. Teamsters Union/ 92 a state
court was not authorized to issue an injunction, on the petition of an
interstate trucking firm, against a union attempting to coerce the petitioner into compelling or influencing his employees to join the union.
The petitioner's grievance was cl~rly within the quasi-judicial jurisdiction of the NLRB under the Taft-Hartley Act and, therefore, was
impliedly outside state power. Similarly, a strike by a union as a result
of a jurisdictional dispute with another union over competing work
claims for their respective members could not be enjoined by a state
court as a "restraint of trade" in Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. 298
because the activity amounted to an unfair labor practice under the TaftHartley Act and jurisdiction over such matters had been, though only
by implication, pre-empted by the authority vested in the NLRB. The
Weber case controlled in Teamsters Union v. N.Y., N.H. & H.R. Co. 294
where respondent railroad brought an action in a state court to enjoin
the union from interfering with its "piggy back" truck-trailer operations by persuading employees of trucking companies to refrain from
291

336 U.S. 18, 69 S. Ct. 379 (1949).
346 U.S. 48s, 74 S. Ct. 161 (1953).
298 348 U.S. 468, 7S S. Ct. 48o (19SS).
294 3SO u.s. ISS. 76 s. Ct. 227 (I9S6).
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delivering loaded trailers to respondent's railroad yards. While respondent's own labor relations were not subject to the provisions of the
Taft-Hartley Act, the case was held to be within the exclusive jurisdicti~n of the NLRB since the union's activities might be an unfair labor
practice or protected by the act. In either case, it was for the NLRB,
and not the state, to decide. Each of these cases was concerned with
possible conflict-that is, the possibility that the state would enjoin a
union act with respect to which the NLRB might take a different view,
even though it had not done so yet.
The recent case of Guss v. Utah Labor Board 295 shows the lengths
to which the Supreme Court will go in finding pre-emption where a
general and inclusive statute grants quasi-judicial power to a federal
agency to decide specific cases. In that case the employer was doing
interstate business but in an amount less than the ·jurisdictional minimum required by the rules of the NLRB. 298 The union filed a complaint
with the :t-:LRB's regional director, alleging an unfair labor practice
covered by federal law. Jurisdiction was declined on the ground that
the employer's operations were predominantly local in character. The
union thereupon filed the same complaint with the Utah board which
granted relief. Section ro(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act, which authorizes
the NLRB "to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor
practice . . . affecting commerce," provides :
. . . [T]he Board is empowered by agreement with any
agency of any State or Territory to cede to such agency jurisdiction over any cases in any industry (other than mining,
manufacturing, communications, and transportation except
where predominantly local in character) even though such
cases may involve labor disputes affecting commerce, unless
the provision of the State or Territorial statute applicable to
the determination of such cases by such agency is inconsistent
with the corresponding provision of this subchapter or has received a construction inconsistent therewith. 297
Noting that the use of the term "affecting commerce" indicated that
"Congress meant to reach the full extent of its power under the com353 u.s. I, 77 s. Ct. 598 (1957).
Budgetary limitations and other considerations have prevented the NLRB from
exercising jurisdiction over all cases in which interstate commerce is affected. In 1950
the Board published standards, largely in terms of yearly dollar amounts of interstate
inflow and outflow, that had to be met before jurisdiction would be assumed (26
L.R.R.M. 50). These jurisdictional standards were revised upwards in 1954 (34
L.R.R.M. 75).
2er §toa, 29 U.S.C.A. §r6o.(a).
295

296
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merce ciause;" 298 the Supreme Court emphasized the following uncontroverted fads: ( 1) the employer's business affected commerce within
the meaning of the act, and the NLRB had jurisdiction even though it
had dedined the exercise of its authority; ( 2) the act expressly covered
the· alleged unfair labor practice; and ( 3) the NLRB had not ceded
jurisdiction over the matter to the Utah Labor Board in the manner
authorized ~y Section lo(a). In the Bethlehem Steel case the separate
opinion of Justice Frankfurter had pointed out that the effect of the
majority opinion was to deny that the NLRB could cede jurisdiction
to the states under the Wagner Act to decide labor disputes. Since that
decision iinrnediately preceded passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, the
court concluded that Congress must have known of this limitation.
Therefore, it also concluded that Section 10( a) provided the exclusive
means by which the· states could be given jurisdiction over labor cases
falling within the quasi-judicial i>ower of the NLRB. While regretting
the creation of this jurisdictional "no-man's-land," the court nevertheless set aside the action of the 'Utah board.
In Meat Cutters v. Fairlawn Meats 299 and San Diego Building
Trades Council v. Garmon 800 the same result was reached in similar
fact situations. In the Faif'lawn case, however, the court refrained from
deciding whether a state might possibly frame and enforce an injunction aimed narrowly at a trespass by union pickets on land owned or
leased by the employer. The Ohio court had based its injunction on the
erroneous premise that it had the. power to reach the union's conduct in
its entirety, but this power was impliedly precluded by the provisions of
the federal statute.
From these three cases we might fairly say that, where a general
and inclusive federal statute delegates quasi-judicial power to a federal agency and contains a provision which specifies the manner in
which the states can be given jurisdiction over matters falling within
that of the federal agency, the state may not act unless jurisdiction is
expressly ceded to. it, even though the federal agency decides not to
exercise its full authority.
(ii) Labor Cases Finding No Federal Preemption

Assuming that a state act affecting interstate labor matters is authorized in the absence of any federal regulation, the first determination
Supra note 295 at 3.
353 U.S. 20, 77 S. Ct. 6o4 (1957).
800 353 U.S. 26, 77 S. Ct. 6o7 (1957).
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made by the Supreme Court, in a dispute in which pre-emption is asserted, is whether or not the specific subject of the state action is regulated under federal law. To illustrate, in AUen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Board 301 the Wisconsin board, pursuant to comprehensive state
labor legislation, had ordered the union to cease and desist from mass
picketing,· threatening employees desiring to work, obstructing entrance
to and egress from the employer's factory, and picketing the homes of
non-striking employees. The Supreme Court refused to invalidate the
state action even though many provisions of the Wisconsin labor code
were in conflict with the Wagner Act; it looked at oilly those provisions
of the state law that authorized the specific order given .. Starting with
the initial premise that an "intention of Congress to exclude States from
exerting their police power must be clearly manifested," 802 the court
determined that: ( 1) the Wagner Act did not delegate to the NLRB
the authority to regulate the particular kind of union conduct in question; (2) the federal scheme of control was not so pervasive as to suggest exclusion of supplemental state regulation; and. (2) the board's
order did not affect the status of employees; cause forfeiture of collective bargaining rights, or impair other rights protected by the Wagner
Act. While the objectives of the union's actions were protected by federal law, its methods were neither protected nor prohibited. Since
union violence could scarcely be deemed essential to the assertion of
collective bargaining rights, the court concluded that it could be prohibited by state action.
An ·attitude of congressional indifference, rather than pre-emptive
intent, was found in International Union, United Automobile Workers
v. Wisconsin Board. 303 During a period of deadlock in collective bargaining negotiation, the Wisconsin board asserted the power under
state law to order the union to cease and desist from its tactic of calling
union meetings at irregular times during working hours without advance notice to the employer or informing the employer of the demands
or concessions these tactics were meant to obtain. The court pointed out
that neither the Wagner Act nor the Taft-Hartley Act permitted or
forbade this type of harassing union conduct. The only union methods
or tactics made illegal by the Taft-Hartley Act were those which restrained or coerced employees or employers in the exercise of rights
protected by the act. Non-coercive union tactics could not be con301315 U.S. 740, 62 S. Ct. 820 (1942).
302 I d. at 749·
303 336 U.S. 245, 6g S. Ct.· 516 (1949).
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trolled by the NLRB. Policing of such conduct, therefore, remained
with the states.
These two cases illustrate the general proposition that the state may
act where the federal statute leaves unregulated some aspects of the
general field. The absence of specific federal controls of the particular
subject ofstate action is said to imply a policy of congressional indifference to the state action even though Congress has brought other
subjects in the general field under federal control. Of course, this proposition may not be cited in support of a state action which conflicts,
directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, with the federal policies
reflected in federal statutes or administrative regulations in the same
field.
An exception to the rule of construction applied in the Garner, Weber,
and Teamsters Union cases-"that the states may not assert their police
powers with respect to matters within the quasi-judicial jurisdiction of
a federal agency-is found in United Automobile, Aircraft & Agricultural Implement Workers v. Wisconsin Board. 80' In this case the union's
activities and the Wisconsin board's order were similar to those described in the Allen-Bradley decision. Subsequent co~gressional action,
however, had placed a different complexion on the matter, for the TaftHartley Act declared it to be "an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents- ( I) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7·" 806 Section 7 protects such rights as that of employees to refrain from joining or assisting a union. Thus, in contrast to the situation in Allen-Bradley, "the
National Labor Relations Board might have issued an order similar to
that of the State Board." 808 It had not done so, however. In holding
that Wisconsin, nevertheless, might enjoin violent union conduct, the
Supreme Court said :
As a general matter we have- held that a State may not, in the
furtherance of its public policy, enjoin conduct "which has
been made an 'unfair labor practice' under the federal statutes" . . . But our post-Taft-Hartley opinions have made it
clear that this general rule does not take from the States
power to prevent mass picketing, violence, and overt threats of
violence. The dominant interest of the State in preventing violence and property damage cannot be questioned. It is a matter
of genuine local concern. Nor should the fact that a union
commits a federal unfair labor practice while engaging in
'351 U.S. 266, 76 S. Ct. 794 (1956).
§8(b), 29 U.S.C.A. §Is8(b).
808 Supra note 304 at 271.
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violent conduct prevent the States from taking steps to stop
the violence. . . .
The States are the natural guardians of the public against
violence. It is the local communities that suffer most from the
fear and loss occasioned by coercion and destruction. We
would not interpret an act of Congress to leave them powerless
to avert such emergencies without compelling directions to that
effect. 307
Several facts which may narrow the scope of this exception to the general rule of construction must be mentioned. The old Wagner Act declared the power of the NLRB to prevent the enumerated unfair labor
practices to be "exclusive." This term was omitted from the TaftHartley Act although the old language, to the effect that the power of
the NLRB to prevent unfair labor practices "shall not be affected by
any other means of adjustment or prevention that has been or may be
established by agreement, law, or otherwise," 308 was retained in the
new act. :W_oreover, Senator Taft had explained to the Senate that state
action to prevent threats to public health and safety was not disturbed
by the NLRB's authority to control coercive union methods. 309 While
these matters were mentioned by the court, the decision appeared to
rest primarily upon considerations of the "dominant interest of the
State" under the circumstances.
To summarize, even where the federal labor act is general and inclusive and delegates quasi-judicial power to a federal agency to prohibit
labor activities which seriously threaten the public health and safety,
the state also may act to prevent violent conduct in labor disputes which
may cause personal injury or property damage. The court has thus
demonstrated a greater reluctance to find implication of federal preemption where matters of public health and safety assume significant
proportions. How significant must the threat to public health and safety
be? A comparison of the United Automobile Workers and Bus Employees 310 cases suggests that the threat of damage to person or property must be of immediate and violent nature--that is, a situation calling for quick intervention by officials close to the scene. The public
inconvenience, discomfort, and more remote threat to health and safety
occasioned by the strike of public utility employees in the Bus Employees case did not justify a similar exception.
307

ld. at 274-275.
§10(a), 29 U.S.C.A. §16o(a). ,
93 Cong. Rec. 4437 (May 2, '1947).
310 Supra note 287.
·
308
309
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Lest the United Automobile Workers case be given greater significance than it may be entitled to, one further thought needs to be
mentioned. The federal labor laws are not primarily intended to protect public health and safety.. They do so collaterally, of course, but
other considerations-principally economic, political, and social-are
paramount. This feature may have caused the court to reach the conclusion that Congress did not intend to pre-empt state regulation of
matters where the public health and safety are central. Faced with a
federal act like the Atomic Energy Act, where health and safety is of
central concern to Congress, the court may not feel justified in carving
out a similar exception.
A recent labor case, Automobile Workers v. Russell,311 helps to explain the criteria of implied pre-emption in this area of federal action.
In this case Russell, a non-union electrician, had been prevented from
working for a period of five weeks by the striking union. Mass union
pickets, by .force of numbers and by threats of bodily injury to Russell
and of damage to his property, denied him entrance to the employer's
plant. The union.conduct was clearly an unfair labor practice under the
Taft-Hartley Act. Alleging that the union wilfully and maliciously
prevented him from working, Russell brought suit in an Alabama court
for compensatory damages for his loss of earnings and mental suffering, plus punitive damages. He obtained a judgment in the amount of
$w,ooo, of which roughly $500 was for lost wages. On appeal the
union asserted that the jurisdiction of the state court had been preempted by Congress and vested exclusively in the NLRB inasmuch as
the union acts complained of were unfair labor practices under the TaftHartley Act and Section w(c) of that act authorized the NLRB to
award back pay to employees unable to work as a result of union discrimination suffered by them, if the award effectuated the policies of
the act. 812 The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment for Russell,
pointing out that Section IO(c). power to order affirmative relief was
merely incidental to the primary purpose of Congress to stop and to
prevent unfair labor practices. The court reasoned that ( 1) awards for
back pay were purely discretionary and not compulsory, (2) only
awards which would "effectuate the policies" of the act were authorized,
and (3) Congress had not established a general scheme to award full
compensatory damages. In response to the union's assertion that pre811 Supra note 282. Cf. International Assn. of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S.
617, 78 S. Ct. 923 (1958).
au §ro(c), 29 U.S.C.A. §r6o(c).
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emption is implied where there is a possible conflict of federal and state
remedies, the court said :
Our cases which hold that state jurisdiction is pre-empted are
distinguishable. In them we have been concerned lest one
forum would enjoin, as illegal, conduct which the other forum
would find legal, or that state courts would restrict the exercise
of rights guaranteed by the Federal Acts.
In the instant case, there would be no "conflict" even if
one forum awarded back pay and the other did not. There is
nothing inconsistent in holding that an employee may recover
lost wages as damages in a tort action under state law, and also
holding that the award of such is not necessary to effectuate
the purposes of the Federal Act.SlS
Certain features of this case are important in considering its significance. The ·first of these is the distinction drawn by the court between that which Congress directs and that which it merely authorizes
a federal agency to do. Apparently the court is more apt to conclude
that pre-emption was not intended as to matters which Congress has
only authorized a federal agency to control. This distinction and the
reasons for it are illustrated more fully in several of· the health and
safety regulation cases discussed later. The second feature of this case
which is important for our purposes is contained in the first of the
above-quoted paragraphs. That statement emphasizes the court's apprehension regarding possible federal-state conflict. Moreover, it specifies the type of conflict-that is, the possibility that the state will prevent that which the federal agency allows, and vice versa. Necessarily,
the "unfair labor practices," which the Taft-Hartley Act prohibits, cannot be defined or described with sufficient exactitude and precision to
make enforcement of the law an automatic and mechanical process.
Except in the extreme case, this is not the sort of matter with respect to
which no two tribunals could reasonably differ. The carefully framed
conditions in the proviso of Section 10( a), which allows the NLRB
to cede jurisdiction over some matters to the states (discussed above
in connection with the Cuss case), reflect congressional realization of,
and concern with, this fact. It is not surprising, therefore, to find the
Supreme Court declaring the jurisdiction of the NLRB to be exclusive, except under circumstances where state action obviously does not
conflict with congressional policy or impair administration of federal
law. Finally, in the second paragraph quoted above we find a distinction which further illuminates the sort of conflict which implied prests Supra note 282 at 644-645.
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emption seeks to avoid. The court has said, in effect, that there is
nothing inconsistent in allowing a state to do what a federal agency
may, but need not, do if the policies which each seeks to effectuate are
different. The NLRB, in a situation such as that in the Russell case,
could award back pay if this would effectuate the policies of the TaftHartley Act-namely, to inhibit the occurrence of an unfair labor practice. The state act, on the other hand, might have been intended to
effectuate any one or more of several policies which had little to do with
labor peace: (I) to give compensation for. wrongful in jury; ( 2) to
discourage and penalize intentional tortfeasors; or ( 3) to protect persons and property from physical harm.
(iii) Summary of Labor Case Pre-emption
Principles
The principles applied by the Supreme Court to find by implication a
pre-emptive congressional intent in labor legislation are somewhat elusive. Nevertheless, certain conclusions appear to be justified by the
cases. The court's central -concern has been with conflict, or the possibility of it, between federal policy and state action. That conflict can
be one of statutory substance, in the sense that state and federal statutory policies and standards regarding the same matter are not consistent,
or it can be a conflict arising out of the exercise of powers granted to
an administrative agency. The conflict need not be head-on, and it is
not necessary that the state act be definitely incompatible with already
formulated federal standards. The court has said that Congress intends to exclude any state action that creates an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress,
even when the state law or other action will produce results probably
incompatible with federal policy. Where Congress has granted quasilegislative powers to a federal agency, pre-emption is implied on the
theory that Congress does not intend the· regulated activities to be burdened by any substantive standards in addition to those which the federal agency is authorized to impose. Moreover, the grant to a federal
agency of power to decide particular cases implies that in a situation
where enforcement of federal standards by a multitude of state tribunals might well produce inconsistent results, Congress has granted
an exclusive power to the agency. The mere fact that Congress has
established certain controls in a general field, however, does not raise
a presumption of pre-emption as to all state action in the same field.
Absent express congressional declaration of complete pre-emption,
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where the federal statute leaves unregulated some aspects of its subject,
Congress is deemed to have been indifferent to state action in the unregulated phases of the general field if the action does not otherwise
conflict with federal policies. Even where the federal act is broad and
inclusive and delegates quasi-judicial power over matters which affect
public health and safety to the federal agency, the Supreme Court is
reluctant to declare the state powerless to avert a local, immediate, and
substantial hazard to persons and property in the area. If the state
action does not make illegal what is legal under the federal act, or vice
versa, and if the state acts in a fashion which is entirely consistent
with what the federal agency would do under the circumstances, the
court will not always find congressional intent to exclude state action
to protect public health and safety.
(b) Health and Safety Regulation Cases
Congress has often invoked its commerce powers to regulate products
and vehicles in interstate or foreign commerce in the inte.rest of public
health and safety. It has done this for any one or more of several
reasons: (I) because the mere existence of . the commerce power,
though unexercised, severely limited the ability of the states to regulate
effectively the matter independently; ( 2) because independent and uncoordinated state regulation would, or had, produced conditions burdening and frustrating commerce; or ( 3) because the states had not
assumed the responsibility to regulate. To these we might well add
another reason which appears to be applicable to federal health and
safety regulation of atomic energy activities : ( 4) because, at the time
regulation was deemed necessary, most of the activities were being
conducted by the federal government, or its contractors, and most of
the governmental experience in radiation health and safety regulation
had been acquired by the federal government.
In this area of regulation Congress frequently has neglected to specify
what effect its statute is to have upon state regulation of the same or
similar matters. As a consequence the Supreme Court has been obliged
to determine congressional intent from the nature of the legislative subject, the purposes and objectives of Congress, the language, scope, and
structure of the statute, the character, powers, and duties of the federal
agency having enforcement responsibilities, and the action (or inaction)
of the federal agency. Federal pre-emption, however, is not determined
merely from consideration of the federal policy and action; the Supreme
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Court also considers the nature and effect of the state action upon the
federal scheme of regulation.
The cases involving federal health and safety regulation probably
furnish the closest analogy to the problems confronting the states in
regulating atomic energy hazards, but one difference which may prove
significant should be mentioned. All of these cases involve actual interstate movement of products or vehicles. Consequently, when the state
attempts to regulate these products or vehicles it may be close to encroaching upon matters which, in the opinion of the Supreme Court,
require uniform national regulation if they are to be regulated at all
because differing health and safety standards of the various states will
unduly burden the interstate flow of goods. Congress has stated that
"the processing and utilization of source, byproduct, and special nuclear material affect interstate and foreign commerce," 814 but movement
of goods across state lines is not an important factor, except in the
shipment of radioactive materials and the atmospheric or hydrologic
dispersal of radioactive effluents. While it is not asserted here that
Congress lacks the power to pre-empt the regulation of matters which
only "affect" commerce (indeed, the Supreme Court has stated in one
case that, by using this term, "Congress meant to reach the full extent
of its power under the Commerce Clause.") ,m it is possible that local
interests in assuring adequate protection may be afforded more significance by the Supreme Court where the subjects of health and safety
re~lation merely "affect" rather than "move in" interstate commerce.
In the health and safety regulation cases the Supreme Court has
revealed a special solicitude for state action. In one case it has said:
The principle is thoroughly established that the exercise by
the State of its police power, which would be valid if not
superseded by federal action, is superseded only where the repugnance or conflict is so "direct and positive" that the two
acts cannot "be reconciled or consistently stand together." 816
The application of the principle is strongly fortified where the
State exercises its power to protect the lives and health of its
people. 817
814 §zc, 42 U.S.C.A. §2012(c) [Emphasis added].
au Guss v. Utah Labor Board, supra note 295 at 3.
8 16 Kelly v. Washington, 302 u.s. I, 10, s8 s. Ct. 87 (1937).
SlT ld. at 13.
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(i) Health and Safety Regulation Cases.Finding Federal Pre-emption
As in the labor cases, the fundamental concern of the Supre~e Court
in·the health and safety cases is with actual or possible conflict-that is,
conflict with health and safety standards specified by Congress or by a
federal agency which is directed or authorized to set standards and
conflict with the administration of the federal health and safety
program. To illustrate, in Erie R.R. Co. v. New Y ark 318 the defendant
railway had been convicted of violating the New York Labor Law
which specified that telegraphers employed to space trains were not to
be on duty more than eight hours per day. The violation took place
on November I, I907· Eight months earlier Congress had approved the
"Hours of Service" Act which authorized the employment of telegraphers for nine hours, if employed during the day and night, and for
thirteen hours when employed only during the day. The maximum
hours prescribed by the federal act, however, were not to take effect
until March of Igo8. In reversing the conviction, the court concluded:
. . . [T]he "Hours of Service" law of March 4, I9<)7, is the
Judgment of Congress of the extent of the restriction necessary. It admits of no supplement; it is the prescribed measure
of what is necessary and sufficient for the public safety and of
the cost and burden which the railroad must endure to secure
it. 819
It should be noted that the state law conflicted with the federal statute
in two senses : (I) the state standard was to be imposed during the
period which Congress had given to the railroads to make necessary
adjustments; and ( 2) the state standard was more strict than that
which Congress felt necessary. The court specifically mentioned the
first type of conflict, and the quoted statement seems to imply the
second.
At the very least, this case stands for the proposition that, where
Congress itself specifies a health and safety standard for a matter affecting interstate commerce, the Supreme Court will not allow the states
to impose higher standards concerning the same matter, for the congressional act is said to be accompanied by an intention that no greater
burden will attend the matter than Congress has deemed necessary.
Furthermore, where Congress has provided a period of grace to the
U.S. 671,34 S. Ct. 756 (1914). See also Northern Pacific Ry. v. Washington,
Ct. I6o (1912).
sto I d. at 683.
31 8233

222

u.s. 370, 32 s.
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affected activity, the states may not act to nullify its effect. Had Congress not acted at all with respect to hours of service, the New York
law would have been valid, but, Congress having acted, the states will
not be allowed to frustrate the accomplishment and execution of its
full purposes and objectives. Unanswered by this case is the question
of whether a state "hours of service" law, identical in all respects with
the federal law, could have been enforced after the federal standards
became effective.
Because of the complexities of health and safety regulation, Congress usually directs or authorizes a federal agency to establish health
and safety standards and delegates to it the authority to enforce them
rather than set up the standards in the statute itself. Here, also, state
action may be pre-empted. For example, the Agricultural Appropriation
Act of 1917 directed and authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to
impose plant quarantines and to prevent or control the interstate shipment of any class of nursery stock or any other class of plants, fruits,
vegetables, roots, bulbs, seeds; or plant pre>ducts capable of carrying
any dangerous plant disease or insect infestation whenever he determined such measures were necessary to prevent the spread of a dangerous plant disease or insect infestation. The Secretary was also authorized to issue rules and regulations providing for inspections, disinfection,
certification, and the method and manner of delivery of any article
capable of carrying plant diseases and insect infestation. Similar powers
and duties were given as to importation of the same articles into the
United States, and criminal penalties were specified for violations of
the provisions of the act or the Secretary's orders and regulations. In
Oregon-Washington Co. v. Washington 820 the federal act was held to
preclude an attempt by the Washington Director of Agriculture toestablish a quarantine against alfalfa hay and meal from certain areas of
Utah, Wyoming, Colorado, Oregon, and Nevada which were infested
with the alfalfa weevil. The court said :
It is impossible to read this [federal] statute and consider its
scope without attributing to Congress the intention to take
over to the Agricultral Department of th~ Federal Government the care of horticulture and agriculture of the States,
so far as these may be affected injuriously by the transportation in foreign and interstate commerce of anything which by
reason of its character can convey disease to and injure trees,
plants, or crops. All the sections look to a complete provision
for quarantine against importation into the country and quar820

:z7o U.S. 87, 46 S. Ct. 279 (1!)26).
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antine as between the States under the direction and supervision of the Secretary of Agriculture. 321
In answer to the suggestion that the states might act in the absence of
any action by the Secretary of Agriculture, the court replied:
The obligation to act without respect to the State is put directly upon the Secretary of Agriculture whenever quarantine, in his judgment is necessary. When he does not act, it
must be presumed that it is not necessary. 822
It might be inferred from the first statement quoted that, from the
very pervasiveness of the scheme of federal regulation, the Supreme
Court was compelled to reach the conclusion that Congress intended to
pre-empt regulation of the matters covered bythe federal act. In only
one of the cases in this discussion (a recent and highly controversial
case involving sedition against the federal government) ,828 however, has
the Supreme Court appeared to pose this as a separate and complete test
of pre-emption. It is submitted that the second statement, rather than
the pervasiveness of the federal scheme of regulation, contains the
principal basis of the decision. The test implicit in that statement is
the familiar one of conflict. The Secretary of Agriculture was directed
to impose a plant quarantine should he determine that such a measure
was necessary to prevent the spread of dangerous plant diseases or
insect infestations across state lines. His power in this respect was
quasi-legislative. If the Secretary did not impose a quarantine, it followed (in the court's opinion at least) that none was necessary, and, if
not necessary, it also followed that the state action was in conflict with
federal policy. That being the case, the Supreme Court was compelled
to conclude that state action of this sort was precluded.
From this case we may fairly conclude that, where a general and allinclusive federal statute directs (not just authorizes) a federal agency
to establish health and safety standards, as circumstances require, the
Supreme Court will not allow the states to impose different or higher
standards concerning matters within the scope of the federal grant of
power. Where the federal agency has acted to establish the appropriate
standard, a different or higher state standard constitutes an actual conflict; where the federal agency has not acted, any state standard constitutes a possible conflict. Either situation is fatal to the validity of the
state act. It may be worth while to mention that, following the Oregon821

8 22
8 23

/d. at 99·
/d. at 102-IOJ.
.
Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 76 S. Ct. 477 (1956).
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Washington case; Congress promptly intervened by further amending
the federal statute to permit the states to impose quarantines in situations overlooked by the Secretary of Agriculture. 824 Like the earlier
Erie Railroad decision, this case did not throw any light upon whether
the state might have supplemented federal law by making it a state
offense to import the specified articles into the state in violation of a
quarantine imposed by the Secretary of Agriculture.
Not only may states be precluded from establishing health and safety
standards different from those established by a federal agency pursuant
to congressional directive, but they also may be prevented from doing so
wh~re the federal agency is only authorized, but not obligated, to establish a particular safety standard. For example, in Penn. R.R. Co. v.
Public Service Commission 825 the laws of Pennsylvania forebade the
operation of any train consisting of U.S. mail or express cars without
a railed platform, thirty inches in width, attached to the rear end of
the rear car. The Postmaster General, with congressional authorization, had issued regulations concerning the construction of mail cars
when used as the end car. Furthermore, the ICC, pursuant to the
authority granted it by the Safety Appliance Act, had issued elaborate
regulations pertaining to "Caboose Cars without Platforms." In reversing the order of the state Public Service Commission requiring
compliance with the state law, the Supreme Court noted that the specifications and equipment of the railroad's end cars on mail and baggage
runs were: ( 1) matters calling for uniform laws; ( 2) covered by detailed and comprehensive federal regulations; and (3) in compliance
with those federal regulations. While it would have been possible for
the railroad to comply with both federal and state regulations, the Supreme Court inferred from the detailed and comprehensive federal
regulations that no more was necessary to assure safety than what the
federal regulations required. Therefore, the state requirement indirectly
conflicted with federal policy.
A similar question was raised in Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line 828
where the railroads claimed that the federal Boiler Inspection Act, as
amended in 1915 and 1924, had occupied the field as to regulation of
locomotive equipment used on interstate railways and therefore precluded enforcement of state laws requiring automatic firebox doors and
cab curtains during the winter season. Amendments to the Boiler In824

44 Stat.

a25

2so
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1926).

u.s. s66, 40 s.
8 28 272 u.s. oos, 47 s.

Ct. 36 (1919).
Ct. 207 <1926
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spection Act gave the ICC authority to establish health and safety
standards for the entire locomotive and tender. Pursuant to this authority the ICC required a number of safety devices, but automatic
firebox doors and cab curtains were not among them. The Supreme
Court held the state laws to be unenforceable against the railroad. It
was assumed that the state acts were a proper exercise of the police
power, that there was no direct conflict between state and federal requirements, and that the interference with commerce was only incidental.
Nevertheless, since Congress had authorized the ICC to establish all
safety features for interstate locomotives and tenders, and the ICC had
exercised that power extensively, the court felt compelled to assume that
Congress could not have intended the imposition of additional state
safety requirements.
The feature that distinguishes these two cases from the OregonWashington decision is that appropriate action was merely authorized in
the two railroad cases while it was obligatory in the quarantine case.
The implication of pre-emptive intent becomes quite as strong, however, when the authorized federal agency has effectively exercised its
power by establishing comprehensive and detailed safety standards. The
significance of this distinction will become more readily apparent when
we consider subsequent cases where the states have been allowed to establish safety standards within an area where the quasi-legislative authority delegated to a federal agency has not been exercised as to the
particular safety matter.
One case which is apt to prove especially troublesome to a state seeking to establish and enforce a radiation health and safety program is
Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson. 827 Under federal law the production of renovated butter was taxed and regulated by the federal government. This law authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to inspect
places of manufacture and storage of both the ingredients (i.e., packing
stock butter) and the renovated butter and to confiscate the finished
product should it be found unwholesome or deleterious to health. State
law conferred upon the Alabama Board of Agriculture and Industries
the power to promulgate and enforce rules and regulations in regard
to foods and drugs. Under this authority the Alabama commissioner
condemned packing stock butter held by petitioners for renovation.
Seventy-five per cent of petitioner's packing stock butter came from
outside of the state, and ninety per cent of the renovated butter was
shipped in interstate commerce. The action was brought to enjoin
8 27

315 U.S. 148, 62 S. Ct. 491 ( 1941).
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enforcement of the state law on the ground of federal pre-emption. In
rev.ersing the judgment of the state court and ruling in petitioner's
favor, a divided court ( 5 to 4) pointed out :
. . . [The federal Act] left the states free to act on the packing stock supplies prior to the time of their delivery into the
hands of the manufacturer and to regulate sales of the finished
product within their borders. But, once the material was definitely marked for commerce by acquisition of the manufacturer, it passed into the domain of federal control. . . .
Confiscation by the state of material in production nullifies
federal discretion over ingredients. 328
The majority opinion also stated:
Congress hardly intended the intrusion of another authority
during the very preparation of a commodity subject to the
surveillance and comprehensive specifications of the Department of Agriculture. To uphold the power of the State of
Alabama to condemn tht: material in the factory, while it was
under federal observation and while federal enforcement
deemed it wholesome, would not orily hamper the administration of the federal act but would be inconsistent with its requirements. Whether the sanction used to enforce the regulation is condemnation of the material or the product is not
significant. Since there was federal regulation of the materials,
there could not be similar state regulation of the same subject.829
While the fact was not cited in support of the majority opinion in this
case, Justice Frankfurter acknowledged in his dissenting opinion that
in proposing this legislation the Department of Agriculture " . . . did
ask Congress to make some restrictions upon the authority which had
been exercised by the states in reguiating the manufacture and sale of
butter for the protection of their citizens." 830 It is not unreasonable to
assume that this legislative history and the attitude of the Department
of Agriculture influenced the decision. Several cases considered later
suggest that an intention upon the part of a federal agency to exclude
or allow state action may affect the court's decision.
Several other features of this case require comment. There was
nothing hazardous, to either the employees or the public generally, in
the renovated butter manufacturing process itself. Thus there was little
local interest in the safety of the manufacturing process since the prod/d. at 168.
!d. at 169.
8So !d. at 177.
328
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uct was only dangerous when consumed, and, by express limitation, the
court's decision did not prevent the state from condemning unwholesome raw materials prior to the time they were acquired by an interstate manufacturer. Moreover, the decision did not prevent the state
from regulating the sale of the finished product within the state's borders. It was not necessary, therefore, for the court to hold the state
powerless to protect the health and safety of its people. It was only
necessary for the court to conclude that the state could not regulate
in a manner that might .possible conflict with or impair the administration of a comprehensive federal health and safety program.
( ii) Health and Safety Regulation Cases
Finding No Federal Pre-emption
A careful study of the decided cases leads one to conch.tde that the
Supreme Court is somewhat reluctant to declare that an act of Congress
has pre-emptive effect, particularly where this would leave the states
powerless as to health and safety matters where the local concern is
great. Thus the fact that the federal government has entered a field of
regulation does not alone lead the court to infer a pre-emptive congressional intent as to the entire field of regulation. To illustrate, in
Reid v. Colorado 331 the defendant had been convicted of violating a
state law prohibiting any person from bringing or driving cattle or
horses into the state, between April I and November I, from any place
south of the 36th parallel, unless they had been held at a. place north
of the parallel for at least ninety days prior to importation or unless
the shipper obtained a certificate from the State Veterinary Sanitary
Board indicating that the animals were free from all infectious or
contagious diseases and had not been exposed to such diseases during
the ninety days prior to inspection. The defendant appealed on the
ground that the state law was repugnant to the Federal Animal Industry Act of 1884, alleging that the animals had been inspected,
found healthy, and certified by an inspector of the Federal Bureau
of Animal Industry; Under the federal act the Secretary of Agriculture
was authorized: (I) to conduct a study of livestock diseases and methods of suppression; ( 2) to frame appropriate rules and regulations for
certification to the states; and (3) to control the export of diseased
livestock from ports of the United States. Furthermore, the act made
it unlawful to drive or transport in interstate commerce any livestock
331

187

u.s.

137, 23

s. ci.

92 (1902).
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known to be affected with any contagious, infectious, or communicable
disease. Pointing out that persons transporting livestock in interstate
commerce might not know them to be diseased, the court concluded
that the state and federal acts did not cover the same ground and,
therefore, that. there could be no direct conflict between them. Because
the federal act also contemplated state action, the state act did not
indirectly conflict with federal policy. Apparently, the inspection and
certification by the federal officer was gratuitous since the Animal
Industry Act did not give to any agency the authority to issue a certificate that could be considered as authorizing transportation of livestock
in interstate commerce. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction,
holding that the state was free to take reasonable steps to control importation of diseased livestock and to determine whether disease was
present.
In Savage v. Jones 882 a Minnesota citizen sought to enjoin the
enforcement of an Indiana statute regulating the sale, and requiring a
statement of the ingredients formula, of concentrated commercial livestock food on the ground that it was repugnant to the Federal Pure Food
and Drugs Act of 19o6. The federal act dealt with the subject of
adultered and misbranded foods, making it unlawful to misrepresent
the ingredients of foods, but did not require a disclosure of ingredients.
The court concluded that Congress had not occupied the field and that
the state law could be imposed without impairing the administration
of the federal act.
The subject of diseased cattle arose again in Mintz v. Baldwin 888
where the plaintiffs, cattle importers, sought to enjoin the enforcement
of an order of the New York Commissioner of Agriculture prohibiting
the· delivery of certain cattle into New York from Wisconsin. The
cattle were accompanied by a Wisconsin certificate indicating freedom
from Bang's disease, but, as required by New York law, there was
nothing to show that the herd from which the cattle came was similarly free from disease. The plaintiff argued that two federal acts had
pre-empted the field of cattle importation regulation. The Cattle
Contagious Diseases Act of 1903 authorized and directed the Secretary
of Agriculture to establish rules and regulations concerning interstate
transportation from any place where he had reason to believe livestock
diseases existed. Furthermore, the act specified that whenever an inspector of the Bureau of Animal Industry issued a certificate showing
88 2

225 U.S. 501, 32 S. Ct. 715 (1912).
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that he had inspected any cattle from a diseased area and found them
free of communicable disease, the cattle might be shipped, driven, or
transported in interstate commerce without further inspection or the
exaction of any fees. The Cattle Contagious Diseases Act of 1905
authorized the Secretary to establish quarantine districts and to control
livestock shipments from such areas. Wisconsin had not been quarantined, and the plaintiff's cattle had not been inspected by a federal
officer. The Supreme Court held that Baldwin's order did not conflict
with the act of 1905 because the shipments were not made from a federally quarantined area. Moreover, that order did not conflict with the
act of 1903 because no federal inspection had been made or certificate
issued. Applying the principle of construction that specification of exclusive federal actions negatives pre-emption in areas not specified, and
finding that federal inspection and certification under the act of 1903
were only exclusive if actually made, the court concluded that this act
did not otherwise limit state powers. Th~ Oregon-Washington case 884
was distinguished on the grounds that the Plant Quarantine Act
involved in that decision covered the whole field and did not, "by specification of the cases in which action under it [should] be exclusive,
disclose the intention of Congress that, subject to the limitations defined,
state measures [might] be enforced." 385 In reality the scope and
coverage of the two Cattle Contagious Diseases Acts seems no less
pervasive than was the PlanF Quarantine Act in the earlier case; however, the second basis of distinction appears sound. To this we might
add that in the earlier case the state officer ordered a complete prohibition against importation of the offending article into the state, whereas
in the Mintz case the effect of the New York Commissioner's order was
not so drastic; the cattle could be brought into the state if both the
individual animals and the herd from which they came were certified
to be free from Bang's disease. A further basis of distinction is to
be found in the acquiescence of the Department of Agriculture to enforcement of state measures to suppress Bang's disease. This fact was
mentioned by the court, and suggests that the administrative agency
may make the decision to exclude or allow state action, at least in areas
where it is authorized, but not directed, to act.
In Kelly v. Washington 336 the owner of a fleet of motor-driven (nonsteam) tugs sought a writ of prohibition against enforcement of a state
Supra note 320·
Supra note 333 at 3,52 •.
836 Supra note 316.
884
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law providing for the inspection and regulation of every vessel operated
by machinery but not subject to inspection under federal law. Federal
acts and regulations regarding vessels on the navigable waters of the
United States were detailed and elaborate, but they did not provide for
inspection of the hulls and machinery of motor-driven tugs that did
not carry passengers or freight for hire or had a gross tonnage of less
than 300 tons. Therefore, it followed that inspection of the hulls and
machinery of the plaintiff's vessels by state officials to insure safety and
seaworthiness was not in conflict with any express provision of federal
law or regulation. On the question of pre-emption by virtue of the
negative implication of elaborate, but less than comprehensive, federal
laws, the court said :
It would hardly be asserted that when Congress set up its
elaborate regulations as to steam vessels, it deprived the State
of the exercise of its protective powers as to vessels not propelled by steam. The fact that the federal regulations were
numerous and elaborate does not extend them beyond the
boundary they established. 887
It should be noted that the state officials were merely inspecting hulls
and ma,chinery to determine safety and seaworthiness. The state law
was not being applied in such a manner as to require the owners of the
vessels to build, modify, or operate the vessels according to state
specifications and rules. By way of dictum on this matter, the court
said:

If, however, the State goes farther and attempts to impose
particular standards as to structure, design, equipment and
operation which in the judgment of the authorities may be
desirable but. pass beyond what is plainly essential to safety
and seaworthiness, the state will encounter the principle that
such requirements, if imposed at all, must be through the
action of Congress which can establish a uniform rule. 338
From time to time each of these four cases has been cited to support
the proposition or inference that, where federal acts leave some matters in a general field unregulated, a policy of federal indifference to
state action is indicated, and the state may regulate if its action does
not otherwise constitute an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution
of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. In each of these cases
the court concluded that no conflict was indicated. And, in the Reid and
Mintz cases, the court demonstrated a willingness to place the state
887
8BB

I d. at IJ.
I d. at 15.
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action outside of the scope of rather comprehensive schemes of federal
regulation.
Other cases also illustrate this willingness of the court to allow state
action in areas covered by a general and inclusive federal statute which
delegates quasi-legislative authority to a federal agency. In Welch v.
New H a.mpshire 339 the State Public Service Commissioner had suspended the appellant's state certificate to use state highways. It was
shown that in 1937 the appellant violated a state law which forbade the
operation of motor vehicle carriers by a driver who had been continuously on duty for more than twelve hours. The Federal Motor Carrier
Act of 1935 imposed upon the ICC the duty to regulate interstate
common and contract carriers by motor vehicle. To this end the ICC
was expressly authorized to establish reasonable standards with respect
to qualifications and maximum hours of service of employees and safety
of operation and equipment. Pertinent regulations specifying no more
than ten hours of continuous duty were promulgated by the ICC in
1937, but the effective date was postponed until January of 1939. The
decision in this case, rejecting the appellant's assertion of federal preemption and affirming the action of the state agency, is in striking contrast to Erie R.R. Co. v. New York 840 which was distinguished. As in
the Erie case, the violations occurred after enactment of the federal
law and promulgation of the federal hour standards but before those
standards became effective. Unlike the situation in the Erie case, however, those hours standards were not established by Congress in the
statute itself but by the ICC. Moreover, the ICC was authorized, but
not directed, to establish the standards. The court stated that if the
federal act had imposed a duty on the ICC to prescribe qualifications
and hours of service the state law would have been pre-empted in 1935.
Since it was only authorized to do so, however, the court would not
infer that Congress intended to supersede a state safety measure prior
to the taking effect of a federal measure found suitable to put in its
place. One further distinction should be noted : the state law allowed
more hours of continuous operation than did the deferred federal regulation. In the Erie case, the drcumstances were reversed.
Pursuant to the authority granted to it by the same statute, the ICC
promulgated regulations establishing minimum qualifications for drivers
of motor vehicles, including taxicabs, operating as carriers in interstate
and foreign commerce. A San Diego County ordinance required taxi839
84 0
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cab drivers to make written application for an operator's permit to the
sheriff and to pay a fee of $z.oo. Applicants were examined as to their
knowledge of the ordinance, the Vehicle Code, traffic regulations, and
county geography. The permit could be denied a person of "bad moral
character," a person convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, an
unsuccessful examinee, and a person who had violated any provision
of the ordinance. In Buck v. California 341 the court held that the
county ordinance could be applied to drivers of cabs making trips
between Mexico and points in the county, pointing out that the ordinance
did not conflict with any federal law, that the operation of taxicabs is a
local business, and that commerce is affected only indirectly. Since the
ICC had established only minimum driver qualifications, the court concluded that :
This does not prevent the state or a subdivision thereof, in the
exercise of its police powers, from providing additional specifications as to qualifications, not inconsistent or in conflict with
the regulations of the· Interstate Commerce Commission.
Especially is this true since the regulations of the Commission
are only minimum. 842
In Terminal Assn. v. Trainmen s•s the Supreme Court sustained the
order of the Illinois Commerce Commission requiring the appellant to
.provide cabooses on all designated runs within the state in order to
protect the lives and health of employees. Appellant was a corporation
engaged in performing terminal services for a number of railroads in
and around East St. Louis. It operated several yards for the sorting,
classification, and interchange of cars. Appellant claimed congressional
occupation of the field by virtue of the Boiler Inspection Acts, the
Safety Appliance Acts, the Interstate Commerce Act, and the Railway
Labor Act, in that they authorized the ICC to prescribe requirements
as to the use of cabooses in the type of railroad activities being carried
on by appellant. Despite this acknowledged authorization, however, the
ICC had not established any requirements respecting the use of cabooses
on switching and sorting runs. While the ICC could have regulated the
matter and certainly had issued comprehensive regulations concerning
other railroad activities, neither the general and inclusive power nor the
extensive exercise of that power by the ICC implied pre-emptive intent
as to local matters of public safety upon which no action had been taken.
341

343 U.S. 99, 72 S. Ct. 502 (1952).
/d. at 101-102.
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On frequent occasions since the statement was made by Holmes in
1915 in the case of Charleston & Car. R.R. v. Varnville Furniture
Co., 844 the Supreme Court has said that when "Congress has taken the
particular subject-matter in hand coincidence [of state law] is as
ineffective as opposition." The statement, however, was dictum in that
case, since the state law did not coincide with federal law, and it is
believed that a careful study of the health and safety cases will bear out
the assertion that it has been no less gratuitous when it has been
repeated. In California v. Zook 845 the Supreme Court was presented
with a situation in which state and federal law did coincide. A 1947
California statute prohibited the sale or arrangement of any transportation over the public highways of the state if the carrier did not have
an ICC permit. The Motor Carrier Act had substantially the same provision; however, until 1942, the ICC had declined to require permits of
persons engaged in "casual, occasional, or reciprocal" transportation.
In that year the ICC regulations were amended to require "share-theexpense" passenger carriers to obtain a permit. Respondents operated a
travel bureau in Los Angeles and admitted selling and arranging transportation to Arizona on a "share-the-expense" basis in vehicles operated
by drivers who did not hold ICC permits, but demurred to the criminal
complaint on the ground that the law invaded an exclusive congressional
domain. In support thereof they invoked the familiar phrase of the
Varnville decision. A sharply divided court (5 to 4) refused to be persuaded by the "logic" of this argument and upheld the conviction for
violation of state law. While state boundaries had been crossed on the
trips for which respondents had made arrangements, the court concluded that the state interest was not outweighed by the national interest.
The theory that coincidence is as ineffectual as opposition and that state
laws aiding enforcement of federal laws are invalid was specifically
rejected. The court pointed out that the Varnville principle assumes
that Congress has taken the particular subject matter in hand to the
exclusion of state law. Where the question to be answered by the court
is whether Congress has prohibited state action, application of the
principle would be unsound. The court said :
The "coincidence" rationale is only an application of the first
principle of conflict with national policy. The phrase itself
simply states the familiar rule. If state laws on commerce are
identical with those of Congress, the Court may find congres844
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sional motive to exclude the states. . . . But the fact of identity does not mean the automatic invalidity of state measures.
Coincidence is only one factor in a complicated pattern of facts
guiding us to congressional intent. 846

Several factors appeared to be significant to the majority. (I) The
state and federal laws did not collide or conflict, and enforcement of
the state law would not impair administration of the federal law. To the
contrary, the court said :
It is difficult-to believe that the I. C. C. intended to deprive itself
of effective aid from local officers experienced in the kind
of enforcement necessary to combat this evil-aid of particular
importance in view of the I.C.C.'s small staff. 347
( 2) The state law pertained to a matter of great local interest; a traditional subject of state regulation. (3) No conflicting state laws on this
subject existed in 1942 when the ICC amended its regulations. The
court felt that "it would be startling to discover congressional intention
to 'displace' state laws when there were no state laws to displace when
Congress acted." 348 This absence of state law demonstrated the purpose "to provide rather than displace local rules-to fill a void rather
than nationalize a single rule." uo (4) The ICC did not express an
intention to supersede state laws. The court pointed out that since the
ICC's order requiring permits of "share-the-expense" passenger carriers
was issued after the court had determined that California could regulate
interstate passenger transportation in a similar fashion~ 8 ~ 0 it ". . .
would expect the federal agency to be specific if it intended to supersede state laws." 861
It must be recognized that to the state seeking to regulate the activities
of AEC licensees in the interest of public health and safety the Z ook
case offers but a slender and tenuous margin of authority. Of the majority group only Justice Black remains on the court in 1958, whereas
two of the minority, Justices Douglas and Frankfurter, still sit. It also
must be added that the language in the opinion is in rather striking contrast to that of the court in Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 862 a later case which
is discussed (and distinguished) below.
I d. at 730.
Id. at 737.
848 !d. at 735·
849 ld. at 736.
8 5 ° California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109, 61 S. Ct. 930 ( 1941).
851 Supra note 281 at 737.
8G2 Supra note 323.
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Through the Welch, Buck, Terminal Assn., and Zook cases there
appears to run a common thread. In each of them the state had
established and enforced a safety standard in an area covered by a
general and inclusive federal law which delegated the authority, but did
not impose the duty, to regulate the same general area to a federal administrative agency. In each of them federal-state conflict was found to
be absent in spite of schemes of federal regulation. On the basis of these
four cases we may fairly conclude that the Supreme Court will not
find implied congressional intent to exclude state action where a general
and inclusive federal statute delegates the power (but does not impose
a specific duty) to determine its specific application to a federal agency :
( 1) if the federal agency has not established a safety standard similar
to that which the state is imposing to alleviate a: local hazard ; ( 2) if the
federal agency has established only minimum safety standards and the
local need for additional standards is great; (3) even where extensive,
similar, federal regulations have been issued, if the state action relates to
what may be considered a separable or distinct segment of the matter
which is within the scope of the federal act but which appears to have
escaped the attention of the federal agency and is of substantial local
interest; and (4) even where federal safety standards have been established, if the state standard is identical and its enforcement will not materially interfere with the administration of the federal act. In every
case, of course, the state action must not otherwise conflict with, or
stand as an obstacle to, the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress. It als<:> is important to note that in
several of these cases, in which the federal agency is authorized but
not obligated to act, the Supreme Court appears to assume that Congress
also authorized the federal agency to determine whether its regulation
would be exclusive or not.
(iii) Summary of Health and Safety Case
Pre-emption Principles
As in the labor cases, in determining whether Congress intended to
exclude state health and safety regulation, the central concern of the
Supreme Court is with conflict, or the possibility of it, between federal
and state policies and actions. Moreover, in this area there are few
substantive rules since the solution is essentially a task of statutory construction. The one clear rule flows from the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution 853 and is manifested in the court's examination of the
a5s U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2.
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particular situation for possible conflict. The remaining principles are
simply inferences to be drawn from certain factual considerations.
Among these considerations are : (I) the pervasiveness of the federal
scheme of regulation; ( 2) the burden on interstate commerce imposed
by local regulations as balanced against the local interest in the subject
of regulation; ( 3) whether safety standards are prescribed by Congress
in a statute or are to be issued by a federal agency; ( 4) whether Congress has directed a federal agency to take appropriate action or merely
authorized it to do so; (5) the comprehensiveness and effectiveness of
federal agency action in the regulatory field generally; ( 6) whether the
federal agency has acted upon the particular subject or, in the event that
it has not acted, its reasons for not acting; ( 7) whether the federal
agency, which has been authorized to act by Congress, has indicated that
its regulations are to be exclusive; ( 8) the practical feasibility of exclusive federal control; ( 9) whether state action preceded or succeeded
federal action in the field; ( IO) whether state safety standards are
higher, in addition to, or identical with those imposed by federal law;
and (I I) whether enforcement of state standards will interfere with
administration of federal law.
(c)

Other Pre-emption Cases

The question of implied congressional pre-emption also has been considered by the Supreme Court in. two cases involving alien regulation
and national security and in three cases addressed to the rather narrow
problem of the applicability of federal safety standards and licensing
procedures for carrying on interstate activity as these affect property or
action of a state or a subdivision thereof.
( i) National Security and Alien Regulation
Cases
In 1941 the Supreme Court decided the case of Hines v. Davido-

witz 354 where the validity of the Pennsylvania Alien Registration Act
of 1939 was challenged. The assertion was made that the Federal Alien
Registration Ad of 1940 and other federal laws dealing with aliens had
pre-empted the field. Under the state act aliens, eighteen years or over,
were required to register annually with the Department of Labor and
Industry, to carry an alien registration card at all times, to show the
card upon demand to any officer of the Department of Police, and to
854

Supra note 278.

RECENT STATE LEGISLATION

1041

exhibit the card when applying for a driver's license or registering a
motor vehicle. Discretionary authority to prescribe the information
registrants were to supply was given to the department, which was to
classify the registrants and furnish a copy of the classification ~o the
Pennsylvania Motor Police. Violations of the state act could be punished by fine or imprisonment, or both. Under the federal act aliens,
fourteen years or over, were required to register only once at a local
post office. No registration card was issued or required to be carried.
The registration and fingerprint records were forwarded to the Department of Justice where the information was kept secret and confidential.
It could be made available only to those persons or agencies authorized
to receive it by the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization,
with the approval of the Attorney General. ·Only wilfull failure to
register subjected the alien to criminal penalties. Other federal laws provided a comprehensive program to regulate the admission and deportation of aliens and the means by which they might acquire citizenship.
While other issues were raised on the appeal, the case was decided on
appellee's contention that "by its adoption of a comprehensive, integrated
scheme for regulation of aliens-including its 1940 registration actCongress [had] precluded state action like that taken by Pennsylvania." 855 The order of the federal district court enjoining enforcement of the state law was affirmed by the Supreme Court.
Two features of this case were pointed out by the court which distinguish it from a case involving the competing interests of the federal
and state governments to regulate health and safety matters. Referring
to alien control laws, the court said :
. . . [I]t is also of importance that this legislation deals with
the rights, liberties, and personal freedoms of human beings,
and is in an entirely different category from state tax statutes
or state pure food laws regulating the labels on cans. 856
Referring to the subject of alien regulation, the court also said:
. . . [T]he regulation of aliens is so intimately blended and
intertwined with responsibilities of the national government
that where it acts, and the state also acts on the same subject,
"the act of Congress, or the treaty, is supreme; and the law
of the State, though enacted in the exercise of powers not
controverted, must yield to it." 857
I d. at 61.
I d. at 68.
857 I d. at 66.
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From the quoted premise it followed that Congress could establish
an exclusive system of regulation-not that it had done so merely by
acting. The court went on, however, to point out that :
. . . [W]here the federal government, in the exercise of its
superior authority in this field, has enacted a complete scheme
of regulation and has therein provided· a standard for the
registration of aliens, states cannot, inconsistently with the
purpose of Congress, conflict or interfere with, curtail or
complement, the federal law, or enforce additional or auxiliary
regulations. 868
Thus the court's analysis began with two questions: ( 1) did Congress
establish a standard for the registration of aliens as a part of a complete scheme of alien regulation?; and, ( 2) did "Pennsylvania's law
[stand] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress?" 359 An examination of the Alien
Registration Act of 1940 and the other federal laws mentioned above
indicated to the court that Congress had established a uniform system of
alien regulation. Congressional history, since repeal of the Alien and
Sedition Acts of 1798, revealed a consistent opposition to laws requiring
aliens to register annually, to carry identification cards, to exhibit such
cards on demand, or to pay a registration fee. Therefore, since the federal act contained a minimum of such requirements, and since those not
included had been rejected by Congress from time to time, it followed
that the state act was inconsistent with the purposes and objectives of
Congress.
In Pennsylvania v. N elson/ 60 a 1956 case, the respondent, an acknowledged Communist Party member, had been convicted in a state court
for violation of the Pennsylvania Sedition Act, in that he knowingly
advocated the overthrow of the federal government. Under the state
law indictment for sedition could be initiated upon an information made
by a private person, and conviction could result in a fine of up to $10,000
or imprisonment up to twenty years or both. Under the Smith Act of
1940, as amended, knowing advocacy of the "duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying the government of
the United States or the government of any State . . . by force or
violence," was made a federal crime, punishable by a fine of up to
$10,000 or imprisonment up to ten years, or both. 861 A Smith Act
868[/Jid.

uo !d. at 67.
note 323.
861 §I, 18 U.S.C.A. §2385.
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indictment could be initiated only by federal officers acting in their
official capacity. In addition to the Smith Act Congress had enacted
several other laws to meet the Communist conspiracy. The Internal
Security Act of 1950 required annual registration and reporting by
"Communist-action" and "Communist-front" organizations, and the
Communist Control Act of 1954 declared the Communist Party of the
United States to be an instrumentality of a conspiracy to overthrow the
government of the United States and that its role as an agency of a
hostile foreign power rendered its existence a clear, present, and continuing danger to natural security. Knowing members of the Communist
Party were made subject to certain provisions and penalties of the
Internal Security Act. It should be mentioned that, after his conviction
in the state court, Nelson had been indicted, convicted, and sentenced in
a federal district court for conspiracy to violate the Smith Act. 362 "The
acts proven in the Federal Court to effectuate the alleged conspiracy
consisted of practically the same matter as was offered against Nelson
in the trial in the State Court." 863 On review the Supreme Court.
affirmed the decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, which had
reversed the conviction, on the ground that federal law pre-empted the
field.
The Supreme Court's analysis of the pre-emption problem in this
case is significantly different from that employed in the Hines case and
other cases discussed above. The court's language appears to establish
much more precise and strict criteria of federal pre-emption than had
been applied in earlier cases. Before examining these tests of federal
pre-emption, however, a word or two is necessary to indicate the limits
of the decision. It is to be noted that Nelson was convicted under state
law for knowingly advocating the overthrow of the federal government.
No evidence was offered to show that he had committed any seditious
acts directed against the state or local governments. In view of these
facts the Chief Justice in his prefatory remarks carefully pointed out
that:
. . . [The decision in this case does not] limit the right of
the State to protect itself at any time against sabotage or
attempted violence of all kinds. Nor does it prevent the state
from prosecuting where the same act constitutes both a federal
offense and a state offense under the police power. 364
362 United States v. Mesarosh (Nelson}, u6 F. Supp. 345 (1953), aff'd 223 F.zd
449 (1955), cert. granted 350 U.S. 922, 76 S. Ct. 218 (1955).
s63 Commonwealth v. Nelson, 377 Pa. 58, 71, 104 A.zd 133 (1954).
864 Supra note 323 at 500.
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In other words, the holding that the state could not make criminal an
act intended to further the overthrow of the federal government when
federal law proscribed that act was not intended by the court to mean
that the state was prevented from protecting itself from the same act if
it was actually directed against the state as well, even though the Smith
Act also made it a federal crime to attempt the violent overthrow of
state governments.
In the Nelson case the court appears to have taken the three factors
discussed in the Hines case and made .separate and self-sufficient tests
for pre-emption of each. The court said:
In this case, we think that each of several tests of supersession
is met.
First, "the scheme of federal regulation [is] so pervasive
as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room
for the St4tes to supplement it" . . .885
Second, the federal statutes "touch a field in which the federal interest is so domina,nt that the federal system [must] be
assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws of the same
subject" ·. . . 888
. Third, enforcement of state sedition acts presents a serious
danger of conflict with the administration of the federal
program. 887
To find the pervasive scheme of federal regulation, upon which an
app~rently conclusive presumption of pre-emptive congressional intent
wa~ based, the court examined the combined scope of the Smith Act, the
Internal Security Act of 1950, and the Communist Control Act of 1954.
Apparently, where federal laws are in pari materia, the Supreme Court
may find a pre-emptive effect in the earlier law by virtue of later enactments establishing regulation in. tl:te general field if the consecutive
increments add up to "pervasiveness." Having found in these three
federal statutes " . . . a congressional plan which [made] it rea.sonable
to determine that no room [had] been left for the States to supplement it," 888 the court quoted the familiar phrase of the Varnville case
to conclude that coincidence was as ineffective as opposition. On its
facts this case does not differ from others in which federal pre-emption
has been found for the court did find conflict with federal law or
impairment of its administration. It does appear to depart from the
earlier cases, however, in the conclusively pre-emptive effect which the
aor. Jd. at 502.
see I d. at 504·
ser I d. at sos.
se8 I d. at 504-
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court assigns to pervasiveness of the federal scheme alone. While the
congressional plan considered in this case is no more pervasive than
that established by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, it likewise is no
more pervasive than the system of laws under which the NLRB or the
ICC operate. It is difficult to believe, therefore, that the court, in a sitnation where its second and third tests are not met, would prohibit state
action simply because Congress has been very active in the field.
As authority for the second test applied in the Nelson case the court
cited Hines v. Davidowitz. In that case, however, the dominant national
interest in the subject of federal regulation was emphasized to support
the proposition that .the states could not regulate the subject inconsistently with the purposes and objectives of Congress. The mere fact that
the federal interest was dominant did not inevitably lead to a conclusion
of pre-emption, absent conflict. In any event, the very terms of this test
limit its application to matters affecting national sovereignty or, at the
least, to matters which require uniform national standards. To modify
the court's own phrase, it would be difficult to imagine the court saying,
"Congress having thus treated . . . [the radiation ha~rd] as a matter
of vital national concern, it is in no sense a local enforcement
problem." 86•9
In the third test applied by the court in the Nelson case there is found
the one clear case for implied federal pre-emption-that based on actual
or possible conflict. On the facts of this case there was a serious danger
of conflict between the enforcement of the state sedition act and the administration of the federal program. In 1939 the federal government
had asked local authorities not to intervene in matters of national security and to turn over in formation regarding subversive activities immediately and unevaluated. It was recognized that the threat of subversion
must be met on a coordinated, nationwide basis and not as isolated incidents within the states. For purposes of broader strategy the federal
government might not want to prosecute ·certain individuals in the hope
of catching a larger group spread over a number of states. The laws of
forty-two states on this subject were examined, and some of them were
found to be vague and without fundamental safeguards. Moreover,
the Pennsylvania statute was said to present a peculiar danger of interference in that it allowed initiation of indictment on the information of
a private person, thereby presenting the opportunity for the indulgence
of personal spite and hatred. The court concluded that Congress, which
had provided other means for the initiation of an indictment, could not
have intended the defense of the nation to be a private undertaking.
ses I d. at

sos.
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It is difficult to ascertain the full import of the Nelson decision for
the future, and it has been severely criticized by the Senate Judiciary
Committee. 870 If the court intends to apply the "pervasive federal
scheme" test of pre-emption in the manner indicated by Chief Justice
Warren's language, little remains to the states in a large number of
regulatory areas, including health and safety regulation of atomic
energy activities. In view of the limitations recognized by the court in
Nelson and the enormous difficulties which would attend such a result,
however, it seems unlikely that the court will apply such a deceivingly
simple rule of construction where the issue is almost always very complex without a showing of actual or possible conflict between federal
and state law.
( ii) Vehicle Weight Regulation Cases

The last three cases to be considered are treated separately from the
health and safety regulation. cases because, while the federal acts or
standards concerned health and safety, the state laws were concerned
primarily with the conservation of state highways. In South Carolina
Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros. 811 the Supreme Court held that, in.
the absence of national legislation covering the subject in its relation
to interstate commerce, a state might adopt regulations limiting the
weight and width of vehicles that used its highways in order to conserve
them and promote safety thereon if those regulations did not discriminate against interstate motor carriers. No question of federal preemption as a result of the Federal Motor Carrier Act of 1935 was
raised, but in Maurer v. Hamilton 872 the interstate motor carrier appealed on the ground that the act impliedly pre-empted regulation of
these matters by delegating such power to the ICC. For purposes of
this study the case is chiefly interesting for the light it casts upon the
question of whether or not Congress constitutionally can pre-empt
regulation of a matter where the state has a proprietary interest and the
effect of federal action is to deny to the state the power to conserve its
870 The Nelson decision has inspired a number of bills in Congress which seek to
disavow the congressional intent ascribed by the Supreme Court in connection with
the Smith Act. Furthermore, many of these proposals would go so far as to prohibit
the court from finding implied pre-emptive effect in any federal legislation (past,
present, or future) unless such a result is expressly declared by Congress. At the
urging of the Justice Department the Senate Judiciary Committee has been persuaded
to omit the general pre-emption proposal. N.Y. Times, April 29, 1958, p. I, col. 3·
8 71 303 u.s. 177, s8 s. Ct. sw (1938).
s12 309 u.s. s98. 6o s. Ct. 726 (1940).
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property by such regulations as it feels to be necessary. Unfortunately
for our purposes the court avoided answering this question by finding
that Congress had not intended to pre-empt although it did acknowledge
th~ existence of the problem. One of the reasons for concluding that
pre-emption was not intended, however, was that in testifying at the
hearing on the act before the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce,
an official had expressed the ICC's doubts as to the power of Congress
to authorize it to establish a minimum weight standard, below which the
states could not go, in view of the states' ownership of highways and
their interests in conserving them.
In Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines 373 a somewhat different question
was presented to the court. The issue was whether Ilinois might bar an
interstate motor carrier from using state roads for a specified time as
punishment for repeated violations of state highway weight regulations.
The respondent held a certificate of convenience and necessity issued by
the ICC under authority of the Motor Carrier Act. While it had been
determined earlier by the court that a state's regulation of weights and
distribution of loads carried on interstate trucks did not conflict with the
federal act, it was decided in the Castle case that no power remained
in the states to determine what carriers could or could not operate in
interstate commerce. The Motor Carrier Act authorized the ICC to
revoke, suspend, or modify a certificate of convenience and necessity,
but only after a hearing and finding that the carrier had willfully failed
to comply with the provisions of the act or regulations promulgated
under it. Presumably, the ICC could also do this for repeated violations
of state laws. "Under these circumstances," the court said, "it would
be odd if a state could take action amounting to a suspension or revocation of an interstate carrier's commission-granted right to operate." 874
In response to the claim that without the power of suspension the state
was without appropriate remedies to enforce its laws, the court said that
the conventional forms of punishment appeared adequate. Furthermore,
the state might petition the ICC for appropriate action regarding the
carrier's right to operate.
c. The Nature and Scope of the Federal Health and Safety
Program
The cases examined above make it clear that, in considering the preemptive effect of federal legislation, the Supreme Court looks to the
373

814

348 u.s. 61, 75
/d. at 64.

s.

Ct. 191 (1954).
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purpose, nature, and scope of federal regulation to determine if there is
any room left for state action and, if so, wh~ther the state action is
within the limits indicated. It is necessary first, therefore, to consider
briefly the salient features of the radiation health and safety provisions
of the I954 act and the regulatory scheme adopted pursuant to them.
In creating the AEC, Congress has established a federal agency with
broad administrative, quasi-judicial, and quasi-legislative powers, among
others, to promote, implement, and control the development and utilization of atomic energy for peaceful purposes to the maximum extent consistent with public health and safety. Congress obviously felt that, under
the circumstances, federal regulation of health and safety matters
generally was a necessary adjunct to the national atomic energy program. In response to this necessity Congress directed the Commission
to take certain steps to protect health and safety and authorized the
Commission to undertake others. For purposes of analyzing the preemption question this program must be separated into its two principal
phases : (I) precautions taken to assure safety before operation of a
radiation source or· commencement ·of an atomic energy activity; and
( 2) measures taken to assure safety after construction or installation
and during operation or use. Generally speaking, the Commission has
been directed to provide the first type of precaution and authorized to
provide the second. Also, with· respect to the fiTst type of precaution,
the Commission has fashioned its standatdsto the requirements. of each
proposed activity. or installation, whereas· the regnlations :providing fO"r
operating safety are of a more general clia:racter; applying to licensees
or classes of licensees. There is, perhaps, some justifieation for finding
a third distinction within the· federal health and safety program which
may- prove significant. Congress has manifested greater concern as to
the hazards associated with production and utilization facilities, where
critical masses of special nuclear m:ateri"al are present; than in the case
of hazards arising out of the use of byproduct materials.

all

(I) Federal Precautions Preceding,Operation
To. protect health and insure safety Congress has. "authorized" the
Commission to issue licenses for speci;:tl nuclear material, source material, byproduct material, production and utilization facilities, and
facility operators. 876 The use of the term "authorized" is misleading,
however, for the act definitely contemplates the pursuit of atomic energy
875

2137·

§§53a, 63a, 81, 103, 104. 107,42 U.S.C.A. §§2073(a),·209J(a),~ln,·2IJJ!.2IJ4,
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activities by private persons for their own purposes, and such activities
are declared unlawful unless a license has been issued. 376 With minor
exceptions, therefore, the net effect of the licensing provisions of the
1954 act is to direct the Commission to license any non-federally owned
or conducted atomic energy activity if the Commission decides to allow
the activity at all. Furthermore, the act provides that" . . . the Commission shall establish, by rule, minimum criteria for the issuance . . ."
of source and special nuclear material licenses" . . . depending upon the
degree of importance . . . to the health and safety of the public," 877
and "shall not permit the distribution of any byproduct material to any
licensee . . . who is not equipped to observe . . . such safety standards to protect health as may be established by the Commission.'' 878 In
respect to commercial or research and development licenses to operate
production or utilization facilities, " . . . no license may be issued to any
person in the United States, if in the opinion of the Commission, the
issuance of a license to such person would be inimical . . . to the
health and safety of the public." 379 Both commercial facility and research and development facility licenses have received special congressional attention. The Price-Anderson amendment of 1957 gave statutory status to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards. The
Committee is directed to " . . . review safety studies and facility license applications referred to it and . . . make reports thereon, . . .
advise the Commission with regard to the hazards of proposed reactor
safety standards, and . . . perform such other duties as the Commission may request." 880 The preferred status of research and development facility licenses, as opposed to commercial facility licenses, is
illustrated in a provision which directs the Commission". . . to impose
the minimum amount of regulation consistent with its obligations under
[the] Act . . . to protect the health and safety of the public." 381 In
connection with license applications generally, the Commission may require the applicant to furnish such information as it deems necessary to
determine " . . . the technical and financial qualifications of the applicant, the character of the applicant, the citizenship of the applicant, or
any other qualification of the applicant . . . [deemed] appropriate for
the license." 882 In addition, applicants for facility licenses must ".
876

§§57a, 62, 81, 101, 42 _U.S.C.A. §§207(a}, 2092, 2111, 2131.
§§53b, 63b, 42 U.S.C.A. §§2073(b}, 2093(b}.
878 §81, 42 U.S.C.A. §2111.
879 §103d, 42 U.S.C.A. §2133d.
8 8° Pub. L. 85-256, §s, Ssth Cong., 1st Sess., 42 U.S.C.A. §2039.
a8t §104, 42 U.S.C.A. §21J4.
382 §182a, 42 U.S.C.A. §2232(a).
877
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state such technical specifications, including information of the amount,
kind, and source of special nuclear material required, the place of use,
the specific characteristics of the facility, and such other information as
the Commission may, by rule or regulation, deem necessary in order to
enable it to find that the utilization or production of special nuclear material . . . will provide adequate protection to the health and safety of
the public. Such technical specifications . . . shall . . . be a part of
any license issued." 883
The above mentioned provisions of the act make it obvious that Congress has charged the Commission with the responsibility of making as
certain as is reasonably possible that each proposed private atomic energy
activity, especially a production or utilization facility, will not be inimical
to the public health and safety before the activity commences or the
facility goes into operation. In response to these directives, the Commission has promulgated regulations prescribing general licensing standards.884 These regulations do not attempt to spell out specific safety criteria. Instead, the burden is on the applicant to prove safety to the Commission's satisfaction. Basically, the licensing regulations require each
applicant to furnish information that will enable the Commission to determine that ( 1 ) the applicant, or his employees, are qualified by training
and experience to use the material or facility for the purposes requested
in accordance with the Commission's "Standards for Protection Against
Radiation" ; 885 ( 2) the applicant's proposed equipment and facilities are
adequate to protect health arrd minimize danger to life or property; and
(3) the applicant's proposed procedures to protect health and minimize
danger to life or property are adequate.
In licensing of production and utilization facilities the Commission is
especially painstaking. Prior to submission of the application informal
discussions may be held to outline the broad objectives of reactor hazards
analysis. A preliminary hazard report accompanies the application. This
report must be submitted by the Commission to the Advisory Committee
on Reactor Safeguards where the application is for a commercial facility,
for one leading to the demonstration of the practical value of such a
facility for industrial or commercial purposes, or for a testing facility. 888
Before issuance of a construction permit, the Commission must have
sufficient information to provide reasonable assurance that a facility of
the general type proposed can be constructed and operated safely at the
888 Ibid.
884

ro Code Fed. Regs. Pts. 30, 40, so, 55, 70.

885 ro Code Fed. Regs. Pt.
s8e

20.

Pub. L. 85-256, §6, 8sth Cong., rst Sess., 42 U.S.C.A. §2232(b).
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proposed location. From the time the construction permit is issued until
initial operation, inspectors from the AEC's Division of Inspection are
supposed to observe details of construction, tests of equipment, and preoperational integrated test runs. If, after completion of construction and
review of the final hazards summary report, including the statement of
proposed operating procedures, and only if the Commission finds the
facility can operate safely, the construction permit may be converted into
an operating license under such safety restrictions as the Commission
deems necessary. 387
Ultimately, the Commission hopes to develop detailed standards,
codes, and regulations for facilities, but, while the industry remains in
its developmental stage, the Commission feels it undesirable to do so. 388
Under the present procedure, when a license is issued by the Commission, it amounts to a federal determination that the qualifications of the
particular licensee, his equipment and facilities and their location, and
his operating procedures offer assurance of radiation safety.
(2) Federal Measures to Assure Safety During Operation
The 1954 act does not contain any express directives to the Commission as to how it is to carry out its health and safety program once a
license has been issued. In fact, the act does not even state that it must
do so, although there is the implication throughout the whole act that
Congress expects as much. If the duty is n~t clear, however, the authority is, for Section 161 provides:
In the performance of its functions the Commission is authorized to-b. establish by rule, regulation, or order, such standards
and instructions to govern the possession and use of special
nuclear material, source material, and byproduct material as
the Commission may deem necessary or desirable to promote
the common defense and security or to protect health or to
minimize danger to life or property:
i. prescribe such regulations or orders as it may deem
necessary . . . (3) to ·govern any activity authorized pur387 AEC, Twenty-first Semi-Annual Report 120-125 (1957). Under §1700 of the
Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §22100, as added by Pub. L. 85-256, 85th Cong.,
1st Sess., financial protection may be required for the issuance of licenses for research
reactors under §104c. Applications for licenses for research reactors under 104c are
not required to be submitted to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards for
review unless so specified by the Commission. §182b, 42 U.S.C.A. §2232b.
388 AEC, Twenty-first Semi-Annual Report 121-122 (1957).
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suant to this Act, including standards and restrictions governing the design, location, and operation of facilities used in the
conduct of such activity, in order to protect health and to minimize danger to life or property.
p. require by rule, regulation, or order, .;uch reports, and
the keeping of such records with respect to, and to provide for
such inspections of, activities and studies of types specified
in section 3 I and of activities under licenses issued pursuant
to sections 53, 63, 81, 103, and 104, as may be necessary to
effectuate the purposes of this Act . . . .889
This language makes it clear that the Commission has broad authority
to prescribe operating standards and procedures, to require the keeping
of records and the submission of reports pertinent to health and safety,
and to inspect licensed activities and facilities.
Pursuant to this authority, the Commission has issued performance
type regulations on "Standards for Protection Against Radiation," 890
which apply to all persons who receive, possess, use, or transfer source,
byproduct, or special nuclear material under a general or specific license
from the Commission. The regulations prescribe maximum permissible
limits of radiation for persons in "restricted areas" (an area access to
which is controlled. by the licensee) and "unrestricted areas." Also
included are provisions for personnel monitoring and area radiation
surveys, protective devices, records and reports, radiation safety instruction, safe handling of radioactive materials, caution signs and signals,
and disposal of radioactive wastes.
While the basic responsibility for safety. of operation is upon the
licensees themselves, all licensees, from those operating major facilities
to those using compa.ratively small quantities of byproduct materials, are
subject to periodic inspections to assure compliance with regulatory
standards and the terms and conditions of the licenses. Users of ura·
nium, thorium, and byproduct materials are inspected by personnel of
the inspection sections of the Commission's Operations Offices. Inspec·
tion of licensed production and utilization facilities, however, is made
by the Division of Inspection in Washington. 891
(3) Enforcement of Federal Safety Standards
The 1954 act contains a number of provisions specifying the manner
in which its provisions and Commission regulations shall be enforced.
ss9

§161, 42 U.S.C.A. §2201.

Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 20.
AEC Rei. No. 1018, April 4, 1957.
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The most obvious enforcement mechanism is the Commission's authority
(and in some cases, duty) to deny, suspend, and.revoke licenses. The
Commission may revoke a license (I) "for any materia~ false statement
in the application," ( 2) for any reason that would have justified refusal
to issue a license originally, (3) "for failure to construct or operate a
facility in accordance with the terms of the construction permit or
license or the technical specifications in the application," or (4) "for
violation of, or failure to observe any of the terms and provisions of
[the] Act or of any regulation of the Commission." 892 Furthermore,
upon revoqttion of the license, the Commission may take possession of
all special nuclear material held by the licensee. 893 While the act does
not declare byproduct material to be subject to recapture or seizure, this
is implied since it does provide that :
The Commission . . . shall recall or order the recall of any
distributed [byproduct] material from any licensee, who is not
equipped to observe or who fails to observe such safety standards to protect health as may be established by the Commis•
ston
. . . .8114
Apparently, this also is a condition of the byproduct material license. 895
Acts and practices which, in the judgment of the Commission, constitute or will constitute a violation of the act or any regulation or order
of the Commission may be enjoined by an appropriate court on the
petition of the Attorney General, 898 and severe criminal punishment may
be imposed upon persons who wilfully violate, attempt to violate, or
conspire to violate, any provision of the act or any regulation or order
issued by the Commission under its general authority. 897
It is readily apparent that the federal program to protect health and
maintain safety in connection with atomic energy activities is as comprehensive and pervasive as any confronting the Supreme Court in the
cases considered earlier. What power, then, do the states retain to regulate atomic energy activities with r"espect to health and safety?
§186a, 42 U.S.C.A. §22J()(a).
§186c, 42 U.S.C.A. §2236(c).
894 §81, 42 U.S.C.A. §2n1. Under this section, the Commission has acted to suspend
or revoke licenses in two instances involving a Texas company. See "Temporary Order
and Order to Show Cause," 23 Fed. Reg. noo (Feb. 19. 1958), BN A, Atonnc Industry Reporter 4: 6o-61 ; Radiation Products Company, 23 Fed. Reg. 2817 (April. 26,
1958). The actions of the Commission in these cases are discussed infra at Part IV,
note 455.
395 10 Code Fed. Regs. §30.52.
896 §232, 42 U.S.C.A. §2~.
a9r §§222, 223, 42 U.S.C.A. §§2272, 2273.
892
893
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d. Permissible Limits of State Action

The writers believe that the above question cannot be answered categorically. Because the solution appears to lie in determining what Congress impliedly intended to pre-empt, we submit that the Supreme Court
probably will apply those principles of statutory construction which will
effect a result in the particular case which is most nearly consistent with
the objectives of the 1954 act and with the regulatory scheme adopted
under it. In reality there is not one pre-emption question but many-as
many as there are types of state health and safety actions affecting
federally regulated atomic energy activities. Each of these questions
can only be answered by considering the particular .state action in
relation to the system of federal law and administrativ~ action as well
as the nature of the matter regulated.

(I) State Regulation of Radiation Hazards Not Covered by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954
The scope of the 1954 act and the Commission's health and safety
progt;am is limited to activities involving "byproduct material," "source
material," "special nuclear material," "production facilities," and "utilization facilities," as these terms are defined in the act. 898 Other sources
of radiation, such as X-ray and fluoroscopic devices used in medicine,
dentistry, and science generally, as well as in commerce and industry,
are not controlled by the federal government regardless of whether or
not they affect interstate and foreign commerce. Also not covered by
the 1954 act are atomic particle accelerators, naturally occurring radioisotopes (other than sour~e materials), and isotopes made radioactive by
processes· other than exposure to radiation in utilization or production
facilities. Since these sources of radiation fall outside the scope of
federal regulation established by the 1954 act, it follows that no limit
upon the exercise of the state police power to regulate them is implied.
We have seen in Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Board, 899 International Union, United· Automobile Workers v. Wisconsin Board/ 00
Reid v. Colorado," 01 Savage v. Jones/ 02 Mintz v. Ballhuin/08 and Kelly
v. Washington/ 04 that, where federal law leaves some matters in a gen42 U.S.C.A. §2014
Supra note 301.
400 Supra note 303.
401 Supra note 331.
4 0 2 Supra note 332.
403 Supra note 333·
404 Supra note 336.

8os §u,
899

RECENT STATE LEGISLATION

1055

era! field (i.e., radiation health and safety regulation) unregulated, a
policy of indifference to state action is indicated, and the state may act
if its action does not otherwise constitute an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress or
unduly interfere with interstate commerce.
(2) State Regulation of Non-Radiation Health and
Safety Hazards Connected with Federally Licensed
Activities
Congress has said, "The .processing and utili~tion of source, byproduct, and special nuclear material .must be regulated . . . to protect
the health and safety of the public." 405 In its repeated references to
the "health and safety of the public" Congress has not expressly limited
the meaning of this term to radiation health and safety. .Obvio1;1sly,
non-radiation hazards may be involved in many of the activi~ies and
facilities licensed by the Commission. Does the "special competence" of
the Commission described by Senator Anderson, 406 and to which the
Commission's functions are limited, extend this far? It should not be
asserted seriously that the use of a radioactive thickness gauge would
give the Commission the power to regulate, for example, the entire process of rolling steel or manufacturing tires in the interests of public
health and safety. In contrast, however, it is somewhat more plausible
to say that the Commission has the power to control all the health and
safety features of a production or utilization facility for the reason that
in such a facility nearly all the features ultimately relate to some matter
affecting radiation health and safety. In view of the legislative history
it is difficult to escape the conclusion that Congress was concerned only
with the uniquely hazardous characteristics of the specified materials
and facilities.
In any event, since the Commission has not construed its responsibility to extend beyond radiation hazards, the question is largely academic. Cases such as Welch v. New Hampshire, 401 Buck v. California/ 08
and Terminal Assn. v. Trainmen 409 indicate that the states may act to
control matters within the scope of a broad and inclusive federal statute
which delegates to a federal agency the power to determine specific
§2d, 42 U.S.C.A. §2012(d).
Supra note 2&;.
401 Supra note 339·
408 Supra note 341.
40 9 Supra note 343·
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application, if the federal agency has not exercised its powers with respect to the particular subject of state action, unless the federal agency
believes the action to be unnecessary. It scarcely could be claimed that
the Commission's failure to prescribe standards for non-radiation hazards associated with licensed activities is tantamount to the decision that
such hazards need not be regulated. Therefore, whether the AEC does
or does not have the power to regulate non-radiation hazards associated
with licensed activities, we may fairly conclude that the state and local
governments may require licensees to comply with laws and regulations
pertaining to electrical wiring, plumbing and sanitation, structural design and materials, fire prevention and equipment, elevator design and
safety features, ventilation, safety features on non-radiation machinery
and equipment, and other matters not directly related to radiation safety.
Quite obviously some of these state and local laws could apply to
objects for which the AEC has provided standards and specifications in
the construction permit or license. The Commission may require, for
example, the installation of a particular type of removable floor-covering
material in places where there is a possibility of radioactive material
spillage. Local building codes and industrial safety codes also may contain specifications for floors in similar establishments. The building
code may require floor joists of specified minimum dimensions, a specified distance apart, and flooring material of a particular thickness and
strength. The industrial safety code may require the installation of a
relatively permanent "non-skid" floor-surfacing material. · Despite the
fact that they pertain to the same general object, no conflict would exist
between the federal requirement and the building code specifications
since they are intended to serve different purposes; and imposition of
the· local requirement often will not prevent or hinder compliance with
the Commission's specification. However, in some situations it is conceivable that, even though the purpose of the state industrial safety requirement is different from that of the AEC's regulations, the state
requirements may constitute an obstacle to compliance with the federal
safety feature. Cases such as Hill v. Florida, 410 Automobile Workers
v. O'Brien,m and Erie R.R. Co. v. New York m indicate that in such a
situation the state industrial code requirement may not be imposed on
the licensed installation. Other cases, such as Allen-Bradley Local v.
Wisconsin Board,m International Union, United Automobile Workers
uo Supra
411 Supra
n2 Supra
413 Supra

note
note
note
note

283.

286.
318.
301.
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v. Wisconsin Board, 414 Reid v. Colorado, 415 Savage v. Jones, 416 Mintz v.
Baldwin,411 Kelly v. Washington/ 18 Welsh v. New Hampshire, 419 Buck
v. California/ 20 and Terminal Assn. v. Trainmen, 421 however, suggest
that in this situation the federal pre-emption would be only partial. For
example, the state still may require the installation of "non-skid" floorsurfacing material to prevent slippage, if it is easily removable in the
event of spillage, and otherwise meets the Commission specifications.
The general position here asserted is that the states may specify design
features, specifications, materials, and other safety features aimed at
non-radiation hazards, even though they affect objects touched by federal specifications, if the state requirements do not prevent the licensee
from complying with Commission requirements or make it unreasonably
difficult to do so. In this sense, we believe that the state or local government may require the submission of installation plans and specifications
to an appropriate official and insist upon the issuance of a building permit before construction. In similar fashion, the issuance of an AEC
license to use byproduct materials for purposes of medical therapy
would not excuse the physician from obtaining a state license to practice
medicine.
Since the only health and safety determination made by the Commission at the present time is that a particular production or utilization facility is radiologically safe for a proposed site, it seems entirely
probable that the Supreme Court would not deny to the states, or local
governments, the power to exclude the facility from the particular location altogether, if the reason for doing so is not related to radiation
health and safety and the facility is not owned by the federal government. While the case is not likely to arise, inasmuch as the AEC has
indicated that it would respect local zoning ordinances concerning matters other than radiation protection, 422 the holder of a facility construction permit from the Commission could be prohibited by a state from
Supra note 303.
Supra note 331.
Supra note 332·
417 Supra note 333·
41 8 Supra note 316.
419 Supra note 339·
420 Supra note 341.
421 Supra note 343.
4 22 In the analysis accompanying the proposed amendment to the 1954 act which
Chairman Strauss sent to Rep. Carl T. Durham in June of 1957, it was admitted that
". . . the states have respons~bilities for zoning and use of water resources by industrial
facilities." Supra note 271.
4H

415
416
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building in an area zoned against commercial and industrial establishments. The issuance of a construction permit indicates no more than
the fact, as determined by the Commission, that there is reasonable
assurance of radiation safety. The issuance does not suggest that the
Commission has determined that operation of the facility in the particular location will not affect the health and safety of the public in some
other objectionable manner, such as by substantially increasing truck
traffic on residential streets. The conclusion is not applicable, however,
to establishment of such facilities owned by and operated for the federal government for its own purposes. Likewise, if the zoning ordinance discriminates against production and utilization facilities, however, it falls within the scope of the federal health and safety program
and different principles of pre-emption apply. This situation is discussed below.
(3) State Regulation of Radiation Hazards Covered by
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954
When the state undertakes radiation health and safety regulation of
persons, materials, devices, facilities, and activities licensed or otherwise regulated by the AEC, it clearly is acting within the scope of a
general and all-inclusive federal statute which imposes certain regulatory duties and bestows even broader powers upon a federal agency.
Furthermore, the AEC has issued comprehensive· radiation safety
standards, by regulation or order, covering the subject of radiation
health and safety. Nevertheless, we believe that some state regulation
of radiation hazards remains permissible.
(a) State Precautions Preceding Operation
Essentially radiation health and safety precautions preceding operation, as indicated earlier, may be reduced to three official determinations
by the AEC : ( I ) that the persons in charge of the atomic energy activity are qualified to operate safely; ( 2) that their proposed operating
and accident procedures to protect health and minimize danger to life
and property are adequate; and ( 3) that the nuclear materials, devices,
and facilities will be so disposed, designed, installed, constructed, and
used as not to endanger life, health, or property. Each of these determinations is associated with the federal program of licensing. Obviously, they are not absolute determinations. They are no more than
scientifically informed predictions which are translated into installation
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designs, specifications, and operating procedures. Starting with empirically determined safe radiation dosage levels (which are largely predictions themselves and none too certain at this time), the engineer
and the scientist attempt to incorporate those design features and materials into the radiation device or facility that will keep exposures of
persons below the acceptable levels. The complexities of the situation
are such that, at the existing level of the art or science, safety cannot
be guaranteed. Every atomic energy activity involves a calculated risk,
and approval for licensing merely indicates that the risks have been
reduced to an acceptable percentage.
There are a number of features of the federal licensing program
which indicate that it probably will be found to have pre-empted the
field, thus precluding a parallel state licensing program. Among these
are the following :
First. The federal licensing scheme to control the development and
utilization of atomic energy, as established by Congress and implemented
by the AEC, is extraordinarily pervasive, probably more pervasive than
any regulatory scheme considered by the Supreme Court in analogous
cases discussed above. Furthermore, the Commission's licensing system is but a pari of an intensive program to promote the public and
private development and utilization of atomic energy. The tendency of
the court to regard the feature of "pervasiveness" as one manifestation
of implied pre-emptive intent is illustrated in Bethlehem Steel v. State
Board, 428 La Crosse Telephone Corp. v. Wisconsin Board/ 24 Garner v.
Teatmsters Union, 425 Weber v. Anheuser-Bush, Inc./ 26 Oregon-Washington Co. v. Washington, 421 Penn. R.R. Co. v. Public Service Commission,428 Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line,429 Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson,430 Hines v. Davidowitz/31 and Pennsylvania v. Nelson. 482 It is also
significant that quite recently Congress has made the federal system of
licensing production and utilization facilities even more pervasive than
it was originally by giving statutory standing to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards!33
423
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Second. By forbidding all non-federal atomic energy activities unless
carried on under a Commission license and by authorizing the Commission to issue appropriate licenses, Congress, in effect, has directed the
AEC to establish and administer a comprehensive licensing program.
Automobile Workers v. Russel/,'34 Oregon-Washington Co. v. Washington, 435 and Welch v. New Hampshire 486 suggest that the Supreme
Court finds stronger indication of pre-emptive intent in areas where
Congress has directed a federal agency to act than in those where the
agency is merely authorized to act.
Third. The Commission has been directed to establish minimum criteria for the issuance of source and special nuclear material licenses.
These criteria are to be based, in part, upon considerations of public
health and safety. Moreover, in connection with research and development facility licenses, as opposed to commercial facility licenses, the
1954 act directs the Commission to impose the minimum amount of
regulation consistent with public health and safety. The context rather
clearly suggests that, in the interest of promoting the study, development, and utilization of atomic energy, Congress has cautioned the Commission to avoid burdening the science and development of the industry
with any requirements except those essential to public health and safety.
Lest any essential requirements be overlooked, however, all· commercial,
research and development, and testing facility applications must be referred to, reviewed by, and publicly reported on by the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards. It seems evident, therefore, that any
state licensing requirement which imposes a higher radiation safety
standard than that which the Commission finds consistent with public
health and safety would necessarily conflict with congressional policy as
expressed in the 1954 act. In Hill v. Florida 431 a state licensing requirement, together with license qualifications which Congress had not
thought it necessary to impose, were found to be in conflict with congressional policy encouraging collective bargaining and thus invalid.
Similarly, in Automobile Workers v. O'Brien 488 state imposed conditions on the doing of an act allowed by a federal law which imposed
less stringent conditions than those of the state were found to be
pre-empted.
Fourth. The 1954 act clearly reflects the realization by Congress that
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standard safety designs and specifications were not feasible at the time
the act was passed. Therefore, while Congress directed that a licensing program be established and that steps be taken to assure safety before operation, it left the details of this program to the informed discretion of a federal agency it had created largely for the purpose. This is
re-emphasized in the Price-Anderson amendment which raises the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards to statutory status and provides for review by the ACRS of each facility license application. It
scarcely need be mentioned that the Commission is far better qualified
to establish and administer the essentials of a licensing program than
any comparable state agency. Subsequent Commission action and the
close attention it gives to each license application indicate· that the sort
of standardized safety specifications which can be applied in a comparatively automatic or mechanical fashion are still a development of the
future. In this type of atomic energy regulation, expert judgment is
especially imperative. The AEC has even indicated in its proposed
amendment to the 1954 act that an exclusive system of federal licensing
is desirable. 439 These facts may well lead the Supreme Court to conclude
that the policy of Congress and the AEC is to maintain the sort of
flexibility which centralized administration makes possible so as to encourage experimentation and variation in the part of licensees in the
hope of obtaining both greater economy and safety. This does not appear to be the time, for example, for the state to specify the precise
amount, design, and type of shielding material that is necessary to
operate a nuclear reactor or other atomic energy device, and it is doubtful that Congress intended the almost inevitable frustration of its policies by such state licensing specifications. The La Crosse Telephone
case 440 suggests that the Supreme Court will find implied congressional
intent to pre-empt any state act, the effect of which is to standardize
matters left to the discretion of the AEC where the Commission has
indicated flexibility and variation is desirable to effectuate the purposes
of the act.
Fifth. The AEC is exercising the full measure of its licensing power,
and where it has exempted certain classes or quantities of byproduct and
source material, or kinds of uses or users, from the requirements of a
"specific" license, it has done so after a finding that no unreasonable
risk to the health and safety of the public will result. Insofar as radiation hazards are concerned, there do not appear to be any gaps in the
439
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Commission's licensing program. Those matters which are not covered
by general radiation health and safety standards are covered by more
detailed and individually tailored specifications in the license itself. Not
only does the Commission study the proposed atomic installation itself
and the radiation safety precautions within it, but it also gives due consideration to all of the local geographic (i.e., population density, etc.),
geologic, and meteorologic features as well. In short, when the license
is issued, the Commission, pursuant to congressional directive, has determined that the particular licensee is qualified to construct and operate
a particular atomic energy installation in a specified location, for specified purposes, and in a specified manner. We have seen in Penn. R.R.
Co:v. Public Service Commission and Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line 441
that the implication of pre-emptive intent becomes quite strong when
the authorized federal agency has effectively exercised its power by establishing comprehensive and detailed safety standards.
Sixth. That there is real efficacy and feasibility in an exclusive federal licensing program, at least at the present time, is especially seen in
the case of an atomic energy production or utilization facility, the existence of which is not likely to escape the Commission's attention since
the federal government owns all special nuclear material. As in the case
of union certification and unfair labor practices which are brought to
the attention of the NLRB by the parties involved, most proposed atomic
energy activities, and therefore the potential hazards they entail, will be
brought directly to the attention of the Commission either by the parties
intending to act or by other parties possibly affected by the action!42 It
is more likely that the Commission will receive notice of proposed hazardous activities than of actual hazardous conditions after an atomic
energy activity becomes operational. The AEC is not only the principal
source of atomic energy materials but also is the best informed organization in the nation on the subject of their use, and so it becomes advantageous for the person proposing to undertake a regulated activity
to take his problems of installation design and other preliminary matters
of radiation safety to the Commission. Furthermore, we may rely upon
others, such as state health agencies, unions, and adjacent property
owners, to bring these matters to the attention of the Commission should
those who are required by law to do so fail in this respect, and there
Supra notes 325 and 326.
example of this is the intervention of the United Automobile Workers in the
construction of a reactor by the Power Reactor Development Company. See In the
Matter of Power Reactor Development Company, AEC Dkt. F-16, "Notice of Hearing
Order," 21 Fed. Reg. 78o9 (Oct. 12, 1956), BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 52:40.
Ht

'* 2 An

RECENT STATE LEGISLATION

1063

is no public hazard in the pre-operation situation if we wait for action
by the more expert federal agency.
Seventh. Reason and experience both suggest that any parallel system of state licensing, predicated on considerations of radiation health
and safety, will inevitably conflict with the federal licensing program.
Clearly, the Supreme Court is not likely to ascribe to Congress an attitude of indifference toward state licensing requirements which might
prevent activities authorized by the Commission because of possible
radiation hazards which the Commission has found to be insignificant
or non-existent. Hill v. Florida, 448 Automobile Workers v. 0'Brien, 444
and Bus Employees v. Wisconsin Board 445 suggest that any state radiation health and safety licensing requirement in addition to, or in excess
of, Commission requirements would be found to stand as an obstacle
to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives
of the 1954 act and would not be allowed by the Supreme Court. Such
independent state action would very likely tend to discourage activities
which Congress clearly wants to encourage. Furthermore, we have seen
in Erie R.R. Co. v. New York 448 that, where Congress imposes burdens
on a regulated activity in the interests of health and safety, the implication arises that this is the prescribed measure of what is necessary and
sufficient for the purpose as well as the cost which must be sustained
to secure the degree of safety desired. In other cases, such as OregonWashington Co. v. Washington 447 or Welch v. New Hampshire, 448
the court has indicated that a similar implication arises where Congress
has directed a federal agency to establish the appropriate safety standard. Even if, for example, the state were to specify dimensions of
shielding materials, basing those dimensions on radiation exposure
limits identical with those of the AEC, the effect of the state action
would be to standardize safety features left to the discretion of the
Commission and which the Commission prefers to specify on a case-bycase basis. There is not one but a variety of ways of building a nuclear
reactor or a radiation device in order to obtain a desired degree of
safety. There is considerable merit, which probably appealed to Congress, in a system which allows the applicant and the Commission to
agree on the alternatives to be employed without the intrusion of state
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officials. To modify the court's phrase in the Cloverleaf case, state
licensing requirements would nullify federal discretion over the designs,
specifications, and other radiation safety features of atomic energy installations and devices. 449 In the last analysis, then, any parallel state
system of radiation safety precautions preceding operation probably
would either conflict with the federal licensing system in a substantive
sense or it would impair administration of the program. Either event,
or the· possibility of either event, has generally been held fatal to the
state action. At the very least, such a parallel state system would be
superfluous expense to both the Commission licensee and the state.
In the light of the above considerations, it seems reasonably safe to
assume that the Supreme Court will hold that Congress has prevented
any state or local government from requiring a person, who is licensed
or otherwise authorized by the Commission, to obtain prior state or local
permission to operate if the granting or denying of that permission is
predicated upon an independent analysis or standards of radiation
health and safety. This does not include, however, state or local action
which is designed to alleviate an actual radiation hazard arising out of
a federally licensed activity and also constituting a violation of the Commission standards. This type of state action involves regulatory measures during operation and is considered below. It was pointed out
previously that the statutes or regulations of several states appear to
require prior approval by a state official. While the Jaws of North Dakota. 450 and Wyoming 451 require registration, they are so phrased as
also to suggest that permission of state health officials is required. The
regulations of the Delaware Board of Health definitely require a permit
which may be denied " . . . when there is unsatisfactory proof that the
material or device will not be a hazard to health." 452 Although the
Michigan Department of Health regulations requiring registration may
not be construed as a licensing provision, the State Health Commissioner has reserved discretionary authority to approve : ( I) proposed
limits on levels of radiation in uncontrolled areas; ( 2) proposed limits
on concentrations of radioactive materials released into the atmosphere
of uncontrolled areas; (3) installation changes which materially increase the potential health hazard ; and ( 4) radioactive waste disposal
Supra note 327, quoted supra note 328.
N.D. Laws 1957, c. 185, §§4, 5·
451 Wyo. Comp. Stat. §63.1302.
4n Del. Bd. of Health, Regulations Governing the Manufacture, Distribution, Sale,
Storage, Installation, and Disposal of Radioactive Sources, Materials, or Devices, §II,
adopted Dec. 5, 1955.
449
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procedures not otherwise authorized by the regulations. 453 In view of
the foregoing discussion, these state requirements, as applied to Commission licensees, are probably not valid .
.Local zoning ordinances which clearly discriminate against atomic
energy uses and facilities, merely because they constitute radiation hazards deemed undesirable by the community, will probably suffer the
same fate as state licensing requirements. Such an ordinance would
obviously conflict with a determination by the Commission that a licensed use or facility will not create an unreasonable hazard in the
particular location. A more difficult question is presented, however, by
a zoning ordinance which discriminates against a production or utilization facility for reasons which are not connected with health and safety.
For example, in response to a policy which seeks to promote intensive
industrial development in an area and thereby increase local property
tax revenues and employmel).t possibilities, the local government may
zone against commercial reactor facilities because the use of large tracts
of land as exclusion areas around reactors, rather than as conventional
industrial sites, would lower assessment value and the number of jobs
available. While the Commission is not likely to license a facility for
such a location, since its policy is to respect the desires of the community,
the situation might arise. There appears to be nothing in the 1954 act
which would preclude enforcement of such an ordinance if its revenue
raising or job promoting purpose is bona fide. It is possible, of course,
to frame such a discriminatory zoning ordinance without revealing the
reason behind it upon which validity depends. The case of Village of
Euclid v. Amber Realty Co. 454 suggests, however, that in such a case
the Supreme Court will not hesitate to look behind the ordinance to
determine its real purpose if its validity depends thereon. This statement is not meant to imply in any way that the federal government
could not condemn land free of local zoning restrictions in order to construct a government facility if it so desired.
Several other possibilities for state action are offered in the area of
radiation regulation preceding operation. \Vhereas the state probably
may not impose licensing requirements of its own, the Zook 455 case
suggests that the state may make it unlawful for any person to do any
of the things for which a Commission license, construction permit, or
458 Supplement No. 13 to 1954 Mich. Adm. Code pp. 41-70 (adopted Feb. 14, 1958),
Regs. J25.1309.2.1, 325-1309-3. 325.1300.2, J25.I3I2.2.I.
454 272 U.S. 365, 47 S. Ct.. 114 (1926).
41>5 Supra note 281.
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other authorization is required, without first obtaining the appropriate
authorization from the Commission. The enforcement of such a provision, by injunction or by the imposition of criminal sanctions, would
not conflict with the federal licensing program. There would be little
or no likelihood of the state prohibiting that which the federal law
authorizes. Unlike the situation in the Nelson case/ 56 violation of a
state law to this effect definitely affects local as well as national interests. Also, there is less justification for the claim that the threat
must be met on a nationwide basis, for no national or international
criminal conspiracy is involved. There would seem to be no need for
secrecy or delay in prosecution as suggested in the Nelson case. Such
a situation can be distinguished from that presented in the Cloverleaf
case m where the state act was said to nullify federal discretion over the
regulated process. Such a conclusion is necessary to sustain the validity
of the New England type of statute and seems justified in the light of
applicable Supreme Court cases.
Further opportunity for state action is presented within the administrative procedures of the AEC. Section 189 of the 1954 act provides
that:
In any proceeding under this Act, for the granting, suspending, revoking, or amending of any license or construction
permit, or application to transfer control, and in any proceeding for the issuance or modification of rules and regulations
dealing with the activities of licensees, . . . the Commission
shall grant a· hearing upon the request of any person whose interest may be affected by the proceeding, and shall admit any
such person as a party to such proceeding. 458
This section also requires that a hearing be held on each application for
a commercial or research and development facility license, whether requested or not. Under the act "person means . . . any State or any
political subdivision of, or any political entity within a State." 459 Thus,
should the state feel that the public health and safety are not served or
adequately protected by a proposed activity or facility, it may petition
the Commission for a hearing on the matter or petition to intervene in
a facility license hearing. 460
In order to facilitate prompt state action notice to the state of the
45 6
457
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existence and character of radiation activities and facilities within the
state's borders is essential. While there appears to be sufficient preemptive effect in the 1954 act to preclude state licensing or the imposition of state safety measures in excess of those provided by Congress
and the AEC, this should not prevent the states from requiring the
registration of radiation sources, activities, and persons so engaged.
A state statute requiring registration only does not directly affect the
right of any person to carry out activities authorized by the Commission, and it does not affect the manner of conducting federally authorized activities or the physical characteristics of the nuclear device or
facility. It seems doubtful if the rationale applied in Hines v. Davidowitz,461 or any other case discussed above, could be successfully invoked
to defeat state registration, unless it is a disguised form of licensing.
Obviously, the registration of radiation sources and activities is not so
intimately blended with responsibilities of the national government as
to give rise to an inference of pre-emption. Furthermore, it pertains to
the very subject-matters of public health and safety-which Justice
Black distinguished in the Hines case as being in "an entirely different
category" for purposes of federal pre-emption/ ~ and Congress certainly has never manifested a consistent opposition to state registration
statutes in the interests of public health and safety. Lastly, whatever
additional burden is imposed upon a Commission licensee, by reason
of a state registration requirement, is only minimal. It should also be
pointed out that a state radiation source registration requirement can
be sustained for reasons not directly related to radiation hazard regulation. State workmen's compensation commissions, water and wildlife
conservation organizations, fire departments, and other state and local
agencies may require the information for purposes of administering
their respective programs. These clearly provide sufficient reason to
justify a state placing such a minimal burden upon a licensee.
6

(b) State Regulatory Measures During Operation
The task of regulating the use and possession of nuclear materials and
facilities during operation is essentially one of establishing operating
standards and inspecting to determine whether the standards are met.
To this end Congress has authorized, but not directed, the Commission
to establish operating standards, instructions, and procedures, to require
records and reports relative to radiation safety, and to inspect licensed
Supra note 278.
462/bid., quoted supra note 356.
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activities and facilities. Manifestly, the establishment of any operating
radiation health and safety standard, as it affects AEC licensees, falls
within the scope of a general and inclusive federal statute which delegates quasi-legislative power to the Commission. In this area of federal
regulation there are no gaps in the congressional plan of control which
might indicate to the Supreme Court a policy of congressional indifference to state action. Similarly, there are few, if any, gaps in the Commission's radiation health and safety standards. In short, Congress and
the Commission have occupied the field of atomic energy safety standards, both before and during operation. Accordingly, cases such as
Penn. R.R. Co. -v. Public Service Commission 468 and Napier v. Atlantic
Coast Line 464 indicate that in this situation the states may not impose
any operating radiation health and safety standards in addition to those
imposed by the Commission. These cases stand for the proposition
that where a general and inclusive federal statute confers quasi-legislative authority upon a federal agency and the federal agency has effectively exercised its authority by establishing comprehensive safety standards, the states may not add refinements or impose a higher safety
standard since to do so would conflict with the federal policy reflected'
in the uniform national standard. State action of this nature imposes a
heavier burden upon Commission licensees. The additional cost of:
meeting the higher state standard tends to discourage developments in
which Congress has affirmatively manifested an interest. Such being·
the case, it seems reasonably certain that the states cannot establish and
enforce radiation exposure limits against Commission licensees which
are more strict than those of the Commission. An attempt by the state
to do this indirectly would probably be just as futile. For example,
while the Commission has not specified the number of hours per day
or week that an employee may work in a radiation installation, exposure
limits are expressed and are to be adjusted in terms of hours of employment.m Should a state impose a regulation establishing a twenty hour
work-week in production and utilization facilities in order to reduce exposures to below the Commission limit, the chances are that the Supreme
Court would pronounce the state regulation invalid.
At the present time the Commission has two systems of exposure
limits in effect. One of them, the weekly and quarter-year limits set
forth in the Commission's "Standards for Protection Against Radia463
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tion" applies to all licensees. The other applies to Commission activities
and those of its contractors, but not to licensees. 466 The second system
of limits reduces annual permissible exposures to one third of that
allowed under the earlier system. Ultimately the Commission intends
to hold licensees to the newer limit, but it has postponed application for
several years because of the substantial economic impact on existing
installations and facilities. At least one state, Michigan, has anticipated
the Commission and imposed the new accumulated annual dose limit
upon users of federally licensed materials. 467 This state act obviously
conflicts with federal policy, and it is doubtful if Michigan can enforce
the higher standard against a federal licensee, even though the Commission intends to do so eventually, for the effect of the Michigan action is
to remove the period of grace offered by the Commission's postponement. The significance of this fact is indicated in Erie R.R. Co. v. New
York. 468 The doctrine of the Welch decision 469 is not applicable for in
that case there was no federal standard in effect at the time the state
hour law was violated, the state standard was not as strict as that which
the ICC intended to apply in the future, and the ICC had not delayed
effectiveness to give interstate motor carriers time to make necessary
adjustments.·
One possible exception to the above limit on state operating standards
exists as to disposal of radioactive wastes by release into sanitary sewage
systems. Pursuant to its general authority, the Commission has specified
the amount and manner of such disposition. It has even exempted
excreta from individuals undergoing medical diagnosis or therapy with
radioactive materials from any limitations. 470 Conceivably Commission
authorized discharges of radioactive wastes into publicly owned sewage
systems may result in conditions which local sanitation officials deem
unsafe and necessitate the enlargement, improvement, or other modification of the system at local expense. The analogy between this situation
and that where the state has imposed a lower weight limit for interstate
motor carriers operating on state owned highways is obvious. The state
or local government perhaps has an even stronger argument in connection with the sewers in that there is considerably less federal subsidy
than in the case of interstate highways, and the public sewer is scarcely
in interstate commerce. The Supreme Court's language in Maurer v.
AEC Manual, c. 0524, "Permissible Levels of Radiation Exposure."
Supra note 453, R. J25.IJOC).I.I (J).
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Hamilton 471 at least suggests that state or local public ownership of a
sewage system raises some question of whether Congress can pre-empt
in this area. While it is entirely certain that the federal licensee could
not release any greater quantity of radioactive wastes into a publicly
owned sewage system than the Commission has specified, it is fairly
arguable that the state or local government may impose a higher standard if federally authorized discharges will result in substantial expense
to the state or a political subdivision. As in the Maurer case, there is
a good possibility that the court would simply avoid the question by
finding that Congress had not intended to pre-empt regulation of this
matter.
A determination that the states may not establish and enforce higher
radiation health and safety standards, or fill the gaps in the AEC's program does not conclude. the matter of state standards or enforcement,
for the question of whether the states may establish and enforce identical operating radiation health and safety standards still remains. It is
curious that this question has been litigated infrequently in the Supreme Court. Practically all of the cases have involved situations where
state action differed in some essential respect from federal law or might
produce a different result, either because the standards were irreconcilable or because the state presumed to tread upon matters over which a
federal agency exercised discretionary authority on a case-by-case basis.
The basic standards-that is the permissible doses and levels of radiation and environmental concentrations of radioactive effluents-used by
the AEC in operational regulation are the same as those used by its
safety experts in analyzing a proposed use or facility and in requiring
incorporation of appropriate safety features into its design. A distinction exists, however, in the manner in which the standards are applied
before and after operation. Where the standards are applied in licensmg a proposed nuclear use or facility, they are applied affirmatively to
determine what the applicant must do to assure future safety. By extremely complex calculations and estimates the standards are translated
into facility designs, specifications, and materials, which become, in effect, regulations for the particular facility. In contrast, where the
standards are applied to regulate activities during operation-after installation or construction-they are applied negatively to indicate what
the licensee must not do, regardless of whether or not the facility or
installation conforms with the license specifications. As an example,
he must not expose the whole body of any person in the area subject to
471
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his control to more than 6oo millirems of any radiation with a halfvalue-layer greater than one millimeter of soft tissue during any one
week. 472 The fact that he has furnished the radiation source with the
specified type and amount of shielding material does not excuse him
from complying with the standard. Since the basic standards are expressed in terms of measurable units, the calculations necessary to compare actual radiation and concentration levels with permissible limits
are fairly simple and straightforward; comparatively little scientific
expertise is necessary in determining whether existing uses and facilities meet the basic standards. Even less expertise is necessary to
determine whether the licensee is complying with safety standards providing for specified warning signs and signals, personnel monitoring
devices, protective clothing, radiation safety instruction, personnel exposure and radioactive material accounting records, and accident and
injury reports. The point of this discussion is that once the operating
radiation health and safety standardsare established by the AEC, there
is no logical reason why any qualified state official should not be able to
determine compliance. This is particularly true in the case of byproduct
material uses, where the problems of regulation are less complex than
in the case of a nuclear facility. Whether or not the state official would
be qualified to order affirmative action to correct a hazardous condition
in a nuclear reactor is, of course, a different matter, but, at least, he
could order the cessation of activities and the evacuation of personnel
until appropriate action has been taken.
Unfortunately, "the life of the law is not logic," and, to make matters
worse, Congress is even less circumscribed by logical considerations
than are the courts. Pre-emptive intent is just as effective where the
result is unreasonable as it is where reason supports it. The Supreme
Court undoubtedly would prefer a sensible solution to a pre-emption
problem, but anyone familiar with Guss v. Utah Labor Board 473 should
know that it cannot supply one if it believes that Congress intended
otherwise. It is necessary, therefore, to apply the doctrines of the
analogous cases .
. In Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson 474 the Supreme Court said that
state officials could not enter a factory to inspect and condemn the raw
materials of a food manufacturing process, found to be unwholesome
and deleterious to health, when that process was subject to federal
supervision and a federal agency had authority to condemn the finished
472
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product for the same reasons. Notice, however, that there was little
local interest in the safety of the manufacturing process since there was
nothing hazardous in the manufacturing proce.ss itself; the product was
only dangerous when consumed, and, by express limitation, the court's
decision did not prevent the state from condemning unwholesome raw
materials prior to the time they were definitely marked for commerce
by the manufacturer's acquisition. Neither did the decision prevent the
state from regulating the sale of the finished product within the state's
borders. In other words, the pre-emptive effect found by the sharply divided court did not entirely prevent the state from protecting the health
and safety of the local public.
In California v. Zook> 415 a later case and one in which the court was
again divided five-to-four, the court, in effect, said that it would not
presume federal pre-emption as against state enforcement of a law
which prohibited precisely the same thing prohibited by federal administrative regulations where (I) state enforcement would not impair administration of the federal law, ( 2) the state law pertained to
public health and safety, (3) neither Congress nor the federal agency
had expressed any pre-emptive intent, and ( 4) federal action preceded
state regulation of the same matters. The court also was influenced by
the practical need for effective state aid to help enforce the federal requirement. It might be added that under the Federal Motor Carrier
Acts, Congress arid the ICC had established a system of regulation about
as pervasive as the federal system of radiation health and safety
regulation.
It is submitted that, if a state establishes and enforces operating radiation health and safety standards identical with those of the AEC, the
rationale of the Zook case is likely to be applied in any case involving
a challenge of the state action, though one should not forget that only
one of the majority and two of the dissent on that case are now on the
court. The second, third, and fourth of the above conditions would be
satisfied in such a case, and the principal question would be whether
state action impairs administration of the Atomic Energy Act by the
Commission. In the Nelson case m any state action was held to impair
administration of federal laws intended to meet the national emergency
arising out of the Communist conspiracy. It was certainly arguable
that it was to the nation's advantage that the threat be met by a coordinated national program. In the labor area the standards are quite ·
475
476

Supra note 281.
Supra note 323.

RECENT STATE LEGISLATION

1073

general and the disputes usually require quasi-judicial solution; the
possibility for conflict between state and NLRB decisions, even where
the same general standards are applied, is great. The Oregon-Washington case 477 presented a condition of possible impairment. The state was
asserting the power to do precisely what federal law directed the Secretary of Agriculture to do should circumstances, in his judgment, so
required. Determination of the necessity for the specified action, however, involved an analysis of many complex facts and the exercise of
considerable expert judgment. Even so, had the Washington law
merely prohibited the importation into the state of alfalfa hay and meal
from areas quarantined by the Secretary of Agriculture, without his
certification, the result probably would have been different. In essence,
the state was presuming to establish a regulation which the Secretary
was directed to issue upon a finding of urgent need. Since he had not
done so, the case turned on irreconcilability of standards, and not so
much on impairment of federal administration of fixed health and
safety standards.
None of the above types of impairment of federal law administration
need occur if the state ( 1) adopts and enforces operating radiation
health and safety standards identical with the current standards of the
Commission, (2) carefully refrains from adopting any standard inconsistent with or stricter than those of the Commission, and (3) does
not invade any area of regulation in which the Commission applies a
flexible standard to the particular situation. The only safe course is for
the state to cooperate with the AEC and aid in the enforcement of federal standards in every way, emphasizing maximum safety and avoiding
futile assertions of state independence.
(4) Enforcement of State Safety Standards
While it is felt that the pre-emptive effect of the 1954 act probably
does not prevent all state health and safety regulation of AEC licensees,
there is some question remaining as to permissible methods of state enforcement of such standards. Obviously, the method least calculated to
raise the issue of federal pre-emption would be a state petition or other
request to the Commission to take appropriate action where state inspectors discover a violation of federal-state health and safety standards. This method seems especially desirable where the violation is of
the sort that is not likely to cause immediate injury to persons or property and the short delay occasioned by such a procedure is comparatively
4 77

Supra note

320.
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unimportant to public health and safety. Where a violation poses an
immediate threat to safety, however, or where the licensee has wilfully
violated radiation health and safety standards, the state may find it
advisable and necessary to take more direct action such as by injunction and possibly criminal prosecution.
In order to enforce its radiation health and safety standards, orders,
and regulations, the Commission is empowered to deny, suspend, modify, or revoke its licenses, to seize byproduct and special nuclear materials in the possession of a violator, and, through the Attorney
General, to seek injunctions or orders enforcing compliance against
violators. Furthermore, under the direction of the Attorney General,
willful violators may be prosecuted criminally. From this it could be
argued that there is no room for duplicating state enforcement procedures. The Zook case suggests, however, that it would be permissible where the activity is clearly contrary to federal standards. The
local interest in the safety of the local public is more, and the impact
on the federal program is much less, than when a state is trying to punish someone for attacking the federal government, as in the Nelson
case. Therefore, an attempt by the states to enforce federal standards
would seem well worth the try.
There seems to the writers to be more than sufficient reason for the
states to adopt a radiation hazards regulatory statute of the kind discussed in Chapter VI. There is sufficient radiation hazard from activities and sources which are not within the scope of the federal scheme to
justify a comprehensive state program. In addition, there is every
reason why a state should at least establish a registration center and
collect that information which is necessary to permit the state to protect
its own government personnel (e.g., fire fighters, industrial safety inspectors), to administer such programs as workmen's compensation, and
to allow it to represent the interests of the state generally in proceedings
before the federal agencies. Even more pertinent is the scope of state
regulation which in our opinion is still permissible in spite of the pervasive federal regulations. Moreover, the states should act now to
establish expert staffs and gain experience so that in the future they
may represent fairly to Congress that Congress should re-delegate many
radiation health and safety functions to the states. It is our belief that
until the states demonstrate their capabilities through existing and
efficient staffs and programs Congress will not revise the Atomic Energy Act in respect to radiation health and safety, and perhaps even
should not do so. Radiation hazards are too great to risk non-regulation
or ineffective regulation.

Chapter VI
FUTURE STATE REGULATION OF ATOMIC
ENERGY: A SUGGESTED STATE ACT
A. General Observations
The foregoing examination of state legislation and interstate compacts makes it abundantly clear that atomic energy industry is destined
to be subjected to comprehensive health and safety regulation at state,
interstate, and local governmental levels. Considerable statutory authority to regulate already exists although with varying degrees of completeness in the several states, and certainly with most unsatisfactory
overlapping, indefiniteness, and multiplicity of jurisdiction. Order must
be brought out of this statutory chaos.
So far as administrative regulations are concerned, the states, with
the notable exceptions of California, Connecticut, Michigan, New
York, Pennsylvania, and Texas, have not seen fit to adopt comprehensive codes of regulations dealing specifically with the rather unique
radiation hazards. To the extent that fede~al regulations issued by the
Atomic Energy Commission, the Interstate Commerce Commission, and
other federal agencies provide an adequate safeguard for the general
public, the cautious approach of the states toward establishing definitive
regulations is commendable. This is particularly true in view of the
fact that knowledge of atomic energy injuries at the present time is
somewhat limited, and development of proper precautionary techniques
has not as yet been possible. Hasty, ill-conceived standards may prove
unduly burdensome, even to the extent of preventing or at least retarding the establishment and growth of the new industry. However, if at
some time in the future serious industrial accidents take place as a result of radiation, the responsible state agencies will be placed in a most
embarrassing position unless proper and adequate health and safety
regulations are adopted at the state level. Therefore, it can only be concluded that the basic statutes will be amended to provide adequate administrative authority and comprehensive health and safety codes will
be forthcoming in the near future, at least in those states that are likely
to be participating in the early development of atomic enterprise. 1
1 For a brief resume of state activities regarding radiation protection, see Atomic
Industrial Forum, Inc., "State Governmental Activitie~ Relating to Radiation Protec-

1075

1076

STATE REGULATION

To the atomic energy entrepreneur the maze of statutes and prospective health and safety regulations imposed and to be imposed by numerous state and local agencies presents a most foreboding picture. If
such regulations are inconsistent with each other, as may easily prove
to be the case when they are adopted by different state agencies with
overlapping jurisdiction, it may even prove to be impossible for an
atomic industry to comply faithfully with them. Moreover, the cost of
compliance with unduly prolix and unnecessarily duplicating regulations may even preclude economic utilization of atomic energy. The
potentialities inherent in the atom appear to be very great indeed, and
the prospective -benefits to mankind seem well worth attaining. Nevertheless it is a fact that in some of its applications at least, and especially
in connection with the development of electric power through use of
nuclear heat sources, the possibilities do not yet seem to be economically
attainable in most portions of the United States. The new industry has
a considerable distance to go before it can enter the market in the low
cost power areas on a fully competitive basis. It is therefore little short
of imperative that state and local regulation of atomic activities_ be
reduced to the most economical possible basis consistent with proper
safeguarding of employees and the general public. It is necessary that
clear-cut, direct, and consistent regulatory schemes be adopted, taking
full cognizance of the latest technology, and that they be no more stringent than the necessities of health and safety demand.' Otherwise,
peacetime uses of atomic energy may be unreasonably handicapped.
How can inconsistencies, undue prolixity, and unnecessary duplication
of effort be avoided? How can the latest and best technology be brought
to bear on the state regulatory process? First of all, a comprehensive,
competent, and properly integrated state administrative plan must be
established by statute after careful consideration of the various- possibilities. Several principal types of state administrative organization
seem to be worthy of consideration.
r. Utilization of Existing State Agencies

There are many who will argue in favor of use of existing agencies
to cover the atomic field, making arrangements through cooperating
committees for informal interchange of ideas, and thus seeking uniformity and avoiding overlapping jurisdiction by cooperative solution
tion," Dec. I, 1955 (mimeo.). For a compilation of all foreign, federal, and state laws
and regulations concerning radiation protection, see World Health Organization, National Laws and Regulations on Radiation Protection (July 1955).
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of problems that affect two or more agencies. If this method is adopted,
it will doubtless become necessary to amend state legislation to extend
the powers of some or perhaps all of the agencies thus to include the
new and unique problems raised by atomic enterprise that would otherwise not be covered. Pursuant to this plan of utilizing existing agencies
each agency would be responsible for preparing and promulgating the
necessary regulations, and each would be empowered to issue the
requisite orders to compel compliance with its own jurisdictional field.
If this method of administrative control is utilized, it will be necessary
for each of the several agencies, that is, the public utilities commission,
the labor department, the health department, the water resources board,
and perhaps others, to obtain the services of persons properly trained
to deal with radiation health and safety problems. It will not be an easy
matter to muster such personnel, for properly qualified candidates are
in short supply; and this method will be relatively expensive from the
standpoint of the state payroll. Moreover, the elimination of overlapping jurisdiction and conflicting regulations by such informal cooperative means will be only partially successful, and, therefore, although
this scheme of administrative organization will preserve existing jurisdictional boundary lines and possibly for that reason would prove to be
more acceptable to existing state administrative authorities, it will
nevertheless prove to be relatively cumbersome and expensive from the
standpoint of the state and burdensome from that of industry. It is
this plan which is at present operative in New York State, and it has
already resulted in two comprehensive health and safety codes--one
issued by the New York Department of Health 2 and the other by the
New York State Department of Labor. 3
2.

Utilization of an Official Coordinator

The plan involving the use of existing agencies but adding to the
proposed by the New England
payroll an official "coordinator,"
Committee on Atomic Energy, has been discussed in detail in Chapter V.
As indicated there, a number of state legislatures have enacted legislation patterned on this proposal! There is much to be said in favor of the
coordinator plan as it has been evolved by the New England Committee
on Atomic Energy. It preserves the existing agency authority and

as

2 N.Y. State Sanitary Code c. XVI, effective Sept. I, 1955. The code is set forth in
Appendix A, Item 4·
3 N.Y. Industrial Code No. 38, effective Dec. IS, I9SS· The code is set forth in
Appendix A, Item 3·
• See Part Ill, c. V, text at notes I4-25.
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extends it wherever necessary to cover atomic activities. In addition, it
makes full use of the principle of cooperation with the United States
Atomic Energy Commission, which, of course, possesses the largest
available amount of technical knowledge and understanding of the subject matter. There is much to be said for such cooperation. However, in
view of the fact that the coordinator will have no powers of enforcement
and no means of compelling agencies to adopt or refrain from adopting
any particular policies or practices, his position will be far from enviable.
Since his directing authority is nil, his effectiveness will be dependent
upon his personal powers of persuasion, backed to whatever extent is
feasible by the chief executive of the state. This is a dubious device for
carrying on complex day-by-day administrative functions.
3· Utilization of a Central Agency Plan
This plan would involve the creation of a new central agency to deal
with atomic energy problems .wherever they may arise within the jurisdiction of the enacting state. Such a plan has in fact been proposed by
the National Committee on Radiation Protection. The report of that
committee has been published as a National Bureau of Standards handbook.5 In the recommended draft of a bill contained in this report,
Section 3 provides for the establishment of an independent State Radiation Control Agency in charge of a director assisted by a State Radiation Technical Advisory Board of five members.
By Section 4 of the proposed bill, the agency is given the power "to
develop comprehensive policies and programs for the evaluation and
determination of hazards associated with the use of radiation and for
their amelioration." It is further given the power and the duty of consultation and cooperation with the other agencies of the state and those
of the federal government and other state and interstate agencies. It is
given authority "to adopt and promulgate such rules and regulations as
may be necessary to further the purposes of the act," and it is expressly
given authority to incorporate by reference the recommended standards
of nationally recognized bodies in the field of radiation protection such
as the National Committee on Radiation Protection and the American
Standards Association. The agency is also given authority "to issue,
modify, or revoke orders prohibiting or abating the discharge of radioactive material or waste into the ground, air, or waters of the state."
5 National Bureau of Standards Handbook No. 61, "Regulation of Radiation Exposure by Legislative Means," Dec. 9, 1955. The recommended legislation is set forth
in Appendix B, Item 2.
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It is authorized to render opinions upon plans and specifications relative
to the design and shielding of radiation sources. It is empowered to
make inspections of radiation sources and to report known or suspected
deficiencies.
By Section 5 it is required that every person who generates or produces ionizing radiation or who produces, uses, stores, or disposes of
radioactive materials must register in writing with the agency, thus
giving the agency the requisite information concerning the existence
and utilization of radioactive sources within the state.
By Section 6 the agency is authorized to classify and identify radioactive sources, exposures, and hazards, and to adopt standards of protection. Sections 7 and 10 provide authority for the making of inspections and giving notice of deficiencies, and Sections 8, 9, and 12 are
concerned with such matters as proceedings before the agency in the
case of violations, the notice that must be given, and the opportunity for
a fair hearing before the entry of the order. Suitable provisions are
made for review of agency decisions by courts of competent jurisdiction.
A centralized agency such as that proposed by the National Committee on Radiation Protection apparently would cut across the jurisdictional areas of numerous existing state agencies (something that the
agencies are not likely to welcome), and the fact that industrial establishments throughout the state would be subject to an additional regulatory agency would create additional problems from the standpoint of
industry. Furthermore, the creation of an additional agency with extensive enforcement powers, including the necessity for carrying on a
system of inspections, would entail substantial expense and require
sizable appropriations from the state treasury. On the other hand, with
but a single agency responsible for atomic matters, a maximum of
technical expertness would result, and the concentration of authority
over atomic energy in such agency would minimize or eliminate the
necessity of other state agencies obtaining the services of the all too
rare technical experts in the atomic field. Although the National Committee plan has both advantages and disadvantages, it would seem that,
everything considered, the latter outweigh the former and the likelihood
of such an agency being actually established in any state is remote indeed.
4. A Proposed Specialized Rule-Making Agency Plan
A consideration of the advantages and disadvantages inherent in each
of the foregoing plans for the promulgation and enforcement of atomic
regulations leads to another proposal-one which will divide the neces-
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sary functions into two categories, namely, rule-making in the atomic
regulatory field on the one hand, and inspection and enforcement on the
other, each in the hands of a separate administrative organization. The
task of prescribing and promulgating rules and regulations in the field
of atomic energy will involve comprehensive and detailed knowledge
of a new field of technology which is changing rapidly and is only partly
understood at the present time. Such a task might well be delegated to
a small, specially constituted body of experts, selected because of knowledge of atomic energy and skill in working out appropriate rules and
regulations to protect employees and the general public from radiation
injuries. After- promulgation, such regulations could fairly readily be
enforced by the existing agencies which already exercise jurisdiction
over specified areas of industrial activity within the state, that is, the
department of labor, with respect to the health and safety of employees,
the department of public health, with respect to matters affecting the
general public, the public service commission, with respect to transportation of radioactive materials and other phases of its specialized
jurisdiction, the conservation commission, with respect to its areas of
interest, and other state and local agencies according to their specified
powers and duties.
Some such bifurcation of the functions of state administration in the
atomic energy field would, like all of the other plans, have both advantages and disadvantages. On the favorable side, it can be said that the
formulation of regulations would be carried on by a specialized, technically competent group, and since only one agency would be exercising the
rule-making power, the inconsistencies rendered likely by a multiple
rule-making plan would be eliminated. With respect to inspection and
enforcement, the utilization of existing agencies, personnel, and procedures would minimize the impact upon the state payroll and would also
minimize the number of inspection visits to be received each year by
industry subject to inspections. The inspectors of the existing agencies
would not be required to possess high technical qualifications in the
atomic energy field. Certain rules of thumb and mechanically obtained
measurements would suffice for most purposes and a small amount of
inservice training would take care of the necessities of the situation. In
short, this bifurcation plan would seem to have a considerable number
of advantages, not the least of which is it does not disturb the vested
interests of existing agencies, a real political fact of life.
On the other hand, uncertainties may result in the interpretation of
regulations because of the fact that the agency which makes the regula-
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tions is not engaged in the enforcement process. Although there are
disadvantages to this plan, we believe it is the best possible approach, at
least at this stage of development of atomic energy technology, to the
creation of sound methods of handling the governmental problems which
are destined to arise from peacetime applications of this new and
unique type of energy.
a. Registration versus Licensing
A comprehensively drafted statute setting up an organization for the
handling of the regulatory problems of atomic energy will include many
items. Among others, it will include a statement of policy. It will certainly include definitions--definitions of radiation, radioactive material,
radiation producing equipment, and other items. It will create any
necessary new agency and provide for its organization and staff. It will
set forth the powers and duties of the agency, including the necessary
quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial authority. It will establish requisite
procedures pursuant to which agency business is to be handled.
Among the most important items for consideration, however, is the
question of utilizing registration or licensing as the method pursuant to
which the agency will acquire the requisite information concerning
the individual radioactive operations in progress throughout the state.
There is, of course, a third possibility-i.e., neither registration nor
licensing, but instead reliance may be placed upon the adoption of regulations, the establishment of an adequate inspection scheme, and the use
of the injunction and criminal sanctions for enforcement. However,
in view of the fact that this third named possibility imposes an undue
burden upon state administration, it is likely that legislation in the field
will resort to either registration or licensing as a means of placing in the
hands of the agency the names, locations, and details of the activities of
the various industries subject to regulation.
Registration merely requires the filing of a document stating the
facts; licensing requires the issuing of a permit to operate. The former
is the less cumbersome device; the latter is by far the more undesirable
procedure, for it is necessary for the agency to establish arrangements
pursuant to which applications for licenses can be reviewed, hearings
held, if necessary, and decisions reached in individual cases. This is
burdensome and expensive. Accordingly, both the New England Committee on Atomic Energy and the National Committee on Radiation
Protection recommend registration rather than licensing, and all arguments seem to favor this conclusion.
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Uniformity of Regulation

There is one other substantive feature of the regulatory legislation
under consideration which should be mentioned. This is the very great
desirability of uniformity of regulation, not only within each state but
between states, at least states within a given region, and between the
states and the United States. It is a fact that the United States Atomic
Energy Commission possesses a more complete understanding of the
necessities in the field than does any other agency in the country. Accordingly, it should provide leadership, and state agencies should accept
this leadership in connection with the establishment of the standards of
health and safety. The states can well afford to take advantage of federal experience and understanding, and in so doing they will not in any
sense be surrendering state sovereignty. Indeed, they will be exercising
such sovereignty in a wise and effective manner, always with the full
recognition of the fact that any state which desires to do so, can depart
from the federal standard, either by imposing more stringent requirements, or by way of relaxation, except in cases where federal control has
pre-empted the field.
In order to conform with this principle of uniformity, state legislation should authorize state agencies in adopting the detailed health and
safety codes to take advantage of United States Atomic Energy Commission regulations, either by incorporating by reference or adopting
their substance if that be deemed preferable.
c. Public Utility Rate Regulations
The foregoing discussion has been concerned primarily with health
and safety regulations to be adopted by state agencies. Different considerations apply when dealing with public utility rate and service regulation. In regard to these matters, it is clear that the state public utility
commission must have plenary control over such matters as the kind and
quality of service to be rendered, accounting for capital expenditu.res,
operating costs, fixed charges, depreciation and obsolescence allowances,
rate bases, rate schedules, and all of the rest of the apparatus of utility
regulation. 6 These matters must be left in the hands of the same agency
as that which is given responsibility for the regulation of the rates and
services of utilities deriving their energy from conventional sources.
This study of state regulatory measures likely to affect atomic utili6 See remarks of John H. McCarthy, Chairman, Michigan Public Service Commission, "Atomic Energy from the Regulator's Point of View," made before the Section
of Public Utility Law, American Bar Association (Aug. 23, 1955).
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zation for peaceful purposes is revealing in several significant respects.
It reveals the almost incomprehensible maze of existing statutes and
regulations. It indicates the need of bringing order out of chaos to
protect the public and at the same time facilitate the rapid development
of a new and useful area of industrial enterprise. It suggests that
imaginative and careful constructive work lies ahead, both in the drafting of the basic statutes to handle the subject matter and in the preparation and promulgation of the detailed codes of regulation that within
the near future will be necessary for the protection of public health and
safety in this new and unique field of endeavor.
B. A Suggested State Act
1.

Introduction

Be~use

the utilization of atomic energy is destined to become
increasingly important in the American industrial complex, and radiation sources will be more exhaustively employed in medical and research
installations, the states are faced with the questions of what phases of
this new force warrant state governmental regulation; what should be
the nature of the regulation; and what should be the governmental
organizational pattern to accomplish the objectives of any desired regulatory pattern. The answers to these questions are not easily resolved
because of the singularly unique manner in which atomic energy has
been developed as a military, scientific, technological, industrial, and
research instrument under the aegis of the federal government during
World War II as a military project and since then by the Atomic
Energy Commission in accordance with the provisions of the Atomic
Energy Acts of 1946 and 1954.
Setting aside temporarily the purely legal problem of federal preemption, as a practical matter the states are not equipped to engage in
the production of special nuclear material, military research and production, large scale reactor research, and major basic scientific research of
the type now carried on by the Atomic Energy Commission. To the
extent that there remains a need for these types of activities, it would
appear that the federal government is the logical repository for these
functions. Nor are the states likely in the immediate future to be in a
position of being able to cope adequately with the problem of reactor
technology and safeguards. Even if the states were able to maintain
competent staffs, there ·probably would be a wasteful duplication of
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effort at the individual state leveP Despite these observations, however,
there remain significant areas of activity, predominantly in the field
of health and safety, which are of legitimate state concern. At this
juncture it appears that the states must accept certain responsibilities
on their own initiative. Otherwise, the federal government will assume
the activities with the resulting diminution of the role of the states in the
federal system. It is not necessary here to reiterate the arguments
against further centralization of regulatory functions in Washington
which the states are capable of handling themselves. It is our opinion,
however, that these arguments validly apply to certain phases of governmental regulation of atomic energy, and we therefore propose the
enactment of comprehensive state legislation to deal with those problems
created by atomic energy which the states as a practical matter can
assume effectively at this time.
In Chapter V the question of federal pre-emption of health and safety
regulation under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 was examined at
length. In the absence of judicial determinations, it is impossible to
state precisely those areas of state health and safety regulation of atomic
energy activities which will be sustained as a matter of constitutional
law. Nonetheless, the expansion or clarification of the role of the states
by federal amendatory legislation probably will be achieved only upon
demonstration by the states of their willingness to accept their responsibilities, so definitive action by the states is called for at an early date.
The powers of the Atomic Energy Commission under existing legislation appear sufficiently broad so that the states could act with AEC
approval without raising the question of constitutionality. Section 161
of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 provides in part:
In the performance of its functions the Commission is
authorized to. . . f. with the consent of the agency concerned, utilize or
employ the services or personnel of any Government agency
or any State or local government . . . to perform such function on its behalf as may appear desirable. . . .8
The AEC has already expressed its desire to receive the cooperation of
the states with the ultimate goal of turning over to the states at least a
portion of its inspection responsibilities. As explained by Curtis A.
Nelson, director of the AEC's Division of Inspection:
It is the Commission's plan to assist the states in every way
possible in the training of personnel, particularly those used
T The interstate compact device might be a method of establishing practical, economic
staffs for this function.
842 U.S.C.A. §2201(£).
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in the inspection field dealing with health radiology. We have
a number of training programs and expect to have more.
Some of the states are themselves setting up training programs. Further, we plan to contact the governor of each state,
or his designee, in due course of time, to seek agreement as to
how the state and the Commission can productively cooperate.
Ordinarily we would hope to end up by designating a group
of isotope licensees to be inspected by the appropriate state
agency. This obviously could be done only after the state was
equipped with the necessary technical resources.
In order for these plans to work properly and in order to
avoid duplication of effort, it would be necessary for the state
inspection agency to inspect against federal standards and
regulations. It would be necessary that the Commission receive copies of the reports prepared by the state inspectors in
the case of each inspection made.
In the event a licensee was found to be in noncompliance
with his license, the. Commission would expect to take appropriate action. We do not expect to accomplish this type of
cooperation overnight, but to plan ahead for a working agreement as each interested state is adequately prepared to take on
the additional burden. 8
In 1956 a bill was introduced in Congress whereby greater power would
be given to the states in respect to regulation of health and safety. The
bill proposed the addition of a new section of the Atomic Energy Act
to read as follows :
The Commission is authorized and directed to cooperate
with the States in the formulation of standards for regulating
the health and safety aspects of the atomic energy field within
those areas in which the Commission is now authorized. . . .
Whenever the Commission receives from the governor of any
State a certificate to the effect that the State has an agency
competent to exercise jurisdiction in any portion of the health
and safety aspects of the Atomic Energy Commission, then
the Commission is directed, on the day six months after the
date of the receipt of that certificate, to relinquish the jurisdiction of health and safety in the areas specified in the
certificate. 10
Undoubtedly, this bill would receive more favorable consideration if
the states had already taken positive action to enter the field of health
and safety regulation.
Elsewhere in this volume, 11 the unusual nature of the radiation hazard
8 Address before Regional Advisory Council on Nuclear Energy, Atlanta, Ga., Feb.
1957; BN A, Atomic Industry Reporter 265.5 ( 1957).
to H.R 8676, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956).
11 Part I, c. I.

2,
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created by atomic energy has been explained. It cannot be disputed that
governmental health and safety regulation i? essential in the public
interest. Traditionally, the state has been the governmental unit responsible for the health and safety of its citizens. As atomic energy
becomes more commonplace than it is today, there appear to be no practical obstacles to the states' undertaking their traditional role in the field.
Some may argue that only the federal government can obtain the staff
essential for the task because of the shortage of trained scientific and
technical personnel. In respect to reactor technology and hazard evaluation, this argument has validity today and may continue to have validity
in the relatively near future. However, in respect to the uses of radioactive materials and routine reactor safety measures the states should
be able to acquire as adequate staffs for inspection as can the federal
government. If the activity remains largely federal, the AEC will have
several field offices for the function as any effective inspection system
requires almost continuous activity at the installations creating radiation
hazards. These staff organizations could be as easily maintained at the
state level. On balance, it appears desirable to treat the health and safety
aspects of atomic energy in accordance with conventional federal-state
lines of authority as rapidly as possible.
Aside from those radiation hazards over which the Atomic Energy
Commission exercises health and safety jurisdiction, there are three
major radiation sources over which the federal government today
exercises no control. These are the radiation hazards created by the
utilization of X-ray machines, particle accelerators, and radium. The
health problem created by these sources are of utmost importance in the
whole radiological health field, and even though the states were to
relinquish all regulatory power in those areas covered by federal legislation, it is eminently desirable that the states exercise more complete controls over these radiation sources. In fact, it appears that the greatest
health hazards are currently created outside the arena of activities of
the Atomic Energy Commission and its licensees. The nature and extent
of these hazards have only recently been fully appreciated as a result of
the extensive research in problems of radiological health stimulated by
the advent of atomic energy. Because only the states today can regulate
these hazards, affirmative state action is necessitated. Thus, the states
must equip themselves to handle those radiological health problems of
sole state concern, thereby making it even more practicable for the states
also to take the responsibility for the health and safety of their citizens
in relation to those activities licensed and regulated by the AEC.
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In addition to the radiation health and safety problem, the states also
have a legitimate interest in promoting the development and utilization
of atomic energy within their borders and in continually studying existing state laws and regulations with the view of recommending revisions
whenever unusual problems arise adversely affecting atomic energy
activities. At the present time, it does not appear that any radical innovations will be necessary for the satisfactory accommodation of atomic
energy into the legal structure. However, minor but nonetheless significant changes may be required, and the states should have an established
organization examining the various potential solutions and recommending the precise nature of desirable revisions of legislation or administrative rules.
As indicated previously in this chapter, any number of state governmental organizational patterns may be employed to accomplish the
objectives of an atomic energy state regulatory program. On balance,
after full consideration of the purpose of any state program and the role
of existing state governmental agencies, we believe that the most adequate state structure would be attained by : ( I ) creating an office of
Director of Atomic Energy Activities; ( 2) establishing a Radiation
Safety Standards Board composed of the Director and the heads of
existing state agencies concerned with atomic energy developments; and
(3) establishing a Scientific Advisory Committee on Atomic Energy
composed of scientifically trained personnel having considerable experience in atomic energy affairs. The Director would be a full-time
state official charged with the duties of : (I) acting as adviser to the
governor; ( 2) advising and consulting with the federal government,
interstate agencies, other states, and state and local governmental
agencies; (3) developing comprehensive state policies and programs for
developing atomic energy and for evaluating and determining radiation
hazards; ( 4) acting as chairman and chief administrative officer of the
Radiation Safety Standards Board; ( 5) acting as a non-voting secretary of the Scientific Advisory Committee; and ( 6) submitting reports
to the governor and legislature. In addition, the Director would be
authorized to train personnel in matters relating to the promotion of
atomic energy and the control of radiation hazards and to utilize the
services of other governmental agencies to carry out his duties upon
the consent of the agencies involved. The Radiation Safety Standards
Board would be charged with the responsibility of adopting radiation
safety rules and regulations, developing state policies and programs,
making continuing studies, and submitting reports to the governor and
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legislature. The Scientific Advisory Committee, to be composed of parttime personnel, would. have the duties of reviewing all proposed rules
of the Safety Board and submitting written opinions concerning their
desirability, and of reviewing policies and programs and providing scientific and technical guidance upon request of the Director. In adopting
safety rules, the Safety Board would designate the appropriate state
agencies to be charged with the enforcement of the rules.
This recommended organization has the advantages of making atomic
energy the major responsibility of a state official, utilizing existing state
officials concerned with atomic energy in the rule-making process,
affording scientific personnel in an area where expertise is essential, and
utilizing existing state agencies to enforce radiation safety rules. Moreover, the cost of establishing such an organization would be minimal
since the only full-time personnel required is the Director and such
enforcement personnel as may have to be added to existing staffs. The
costs of the program could be recovered by the state in the form of registration fees paid by persons utilizing atomic energy and radiation
sources. Because the preparation of an appropriate fee schedule requires
·careful study, the Radiation Safety Standards Board should report its
recommendati~ns on the matter to the legislature as soon as possible
after the establishment of the agency.
In addition to establishing a state organization charged with general
promotional programs in respect to atomic energy and with establishing
and enforcing radiation safety rules, state legislative enactments should
include appropriate provisions for registration and reporting so that the
government is kept fully informed of all hazards within the state and
for enforcement of the statutory requirements and any radiation safety
rules, Furthermore, existing state agencies should be charged with the
responsibility of reporting to the governor and legislature recommended
revisions of other laws of the state that may be affected by atomic
energy developments. ·
For the purpose of accomplishing what the authors believe to be a
desirable program for state action at this time and in accordance with
the conclusions explained previously, the authors have drafted the following Model State Act to Promote Atomic Energy and Control
Radiation Hazards. 12
12 The model act was drafted in 1957 by Dean E. Blythe Stason, Prof. Samuel D.
Estep, Prof. William J. Pierce, and Charles D. Olmsted (research assistant) of the
University of Michigan Law School at the request of the Governor of the State of
Michigan. After the Governor's Advisory Committee on Atomic Energy made certain
changes, the bill was introduced in the Michigan 6gth Legislature on Feb. 13, 1958, by
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Model State Act to Promote Atomic Energy and Control
Radiation Hazards: Text and Comments
1.

Declaration of policy; purpose

{a) The State of
desires to encourage widespread
participation in the development and utilization of atomic energy for
peaceful purposes to the maximum extent consistent with the public
health and safety and declares the policy of the state to be:
(I) to cooperate actively in the program established under the
United States Atomic Energy Act of 1954, and through the exercise of
state powers, to encourage and effect the optimum orderly utilization of
atomic energy for peaceful purposes consistent with the public health
and safety; and
( 2) to the extent that the presence of radiation sources within
this state constitute a hazard to the public health and safety, to provide
for the exercise of the authority of the state so as to establish a uniform
and harmonious system of regulation consistent with the standards of
the federal government and other recognized bodies in the field of
radiation safety.
{b) The State of
recognizes that the impact of atomic
energy has resulted in new conditions calling for changes in the laws of
the state, and rules issued thereunder, with respect to the public health
and safety, working conditions, workmen's compensation, transportation, public utilities, industry, insurance, agriculture, education, and the
conservation of natural resources, and therefore declares the purpose of
this act to be :
( 1) to establish and coordinate responsibility within the state
government for the state's part in promotion and control of public and
private atomic energy affairs ;
( 2) to provide technical atomic energy advisory services for the
executive and legislative bodies of this state and its political subdivisions;
(3) to provide for promulgation of uniform radiation safety rules
and for their coordination with the corresponding regulatory program
of the federal government and the recommended standards of nationally
recognized bodies in the field of radiation safety;
{4) to provide for the regulation of public and private use and
Reps. Phillips and Copeland, as House Bill No. 303 and referred to the Committee on
Ways and Means of the HQuse of Representatives. The bill was not enacted during
the 19.s8 session.
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possession of radiation sources within this state in the interest of the
public health and safety;
(5) to provide penalties for violations _of radiation safety rules
and orders ; and
( 6) to provide for continuing studies as to the need for changes in
the law of the state to encourage the optimum development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

Comment
This general purpose section has a twofold purpose :
( I) to establish a general legislative policy ; and ( 2) to declare the
public interest in atomic energy and to indicate the desirability of
regulation of radiation hazards consistently with standards employed
by the federal government and other recognized bodies in the field of
radiation safety.
Section

2.

Definitions

As used in this Act( a) "Advisory Committee" means the Scientific Advisory Committee
on Atomic Energy established by Section 5 of this Act.
(b) "Atomic energy" means all forms of energy released in the course
of nuclear fission or nuclear transformation.
(c) "Byproduct material" means any radioactive material (except
special nuclear material) yielded in or made radioactive by exposure to
the radiation incident to the process of producing or utilizing special
nuclear material.
(d) "Director" means the Director of Atomic Energy Activities appointed under the authority of Section 3 of this Act.
(e) "Government agency" means any political subdivision or any
officer, department, bureau, division, board, authority, agency, commission, or institution of this state or any political subdivision, except
the judicial branch and the legislature.
(f) "Operator" means any individual who manipulates the controls of
a utilization or production facility.
(g) "Person" means any individual, partnership, association, jointstock company, public or private corporation, or government agency.
(h) "Production facility" means any equipment or device capable of the
production of special nuclear material in such quantity as to be of
significance to the common defense and security of the United States,
or in such manner as to affect the health and safety of the public.
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(i) "Radiation" means gamma rays and X-rays, alpha and beta particles, high speed electrons, neutrons, protons, and other nuclear particles
or electromagnetic radiations capable of producing ions directly or
indirectly in their passage through matter, but does not include sound
or radio waves, or visible, infra-red, or ultra-violet light.
(j) "Radiation safety rule" means every rule, regulation, or order of
general application, including any amendment or repeal thereof, adopted
and promulgated by the Safety Board pursuant to this Act.
(k) "Radiation source" means any radioactive material or any instrument, equipment, machine, installation, or other device used for the
production of radiation.
(I) "Radioactive material" means any material, solid, liquid, or gas,
that emits radiation spontaneously.
(m) "Safety Board" means the Radiation Safety Standards Board
established by Section 4 of this Act.
(n) "Source material" means uranium, thorium, or any other material
which the Safety Board declares by rule to be source material after the
United States Atomic Energy Commission by regulation has made a
similar determination ; or ores containing one or more of the foregoing
materials, in such concentrations as the Safety Board declares by rule
after the United States Atomic Energy Commission by regulation has
made a similar determination.
( o) "Special nuclear material" means ( 1) plutonium and uranium enriched in the isotope 233 or in the isotope 235, and any other material
which the Safety Board declares by rule to be special nuclear material
after the United States Atomic Energy Commission by regulation has
made a similar determination; or ( 2) any material artificially enriched
by any of the foregoing.
(p) "Utilization facility" means any equipment or device, except an
atomic weapon, capable of making use of special nuclear material in such
quantity as to be of significance to the common defense and security of
the United States, or in such manner as to affect the health and safety
of the public, or peculiarly adapted for making use of atomic energy in
such quantity as to be of significance to the common defense and security
of the United States.

Comment
The meanings of the terms used in this act are identical or consistent
with those of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, or, where additional
terms are included, with those used by the National Committee on Radi-
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ation Protection and Measurement. Consistency is particularly important because atomic energy affairs have such broad interstate and international ramifications and are subject to both federal and state control.
The definition of "atomic energy" is taken from the federal statute ; 13
however, for purposes of this act, it is used primarily in connection with
the promotional program and not with health and safety regulation. It
should be noted that while the meaning of this term is sufficiently broad
to include both fission and fusion processes, it does not include all
forms of energy which can give rise to harmful radiations.
The key terms used in connection with the health and safety program
are "special nuclear material," "byproduct material," "source material,"
"production facility," "utilization facility," "operator," "radiation,"
"radiation source," and "radioactive material." The first six terms are
used in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954/' and the federal definitions
have been followed insofar as possible, or necessary. However, because
these terms are not entirely s.atisfactory, in light of the state's broader
radiation health and safety problem, they are only used in Section S(a)
which prohibits activities for which an AEC license is required unless
such a license is obtained. It was necessary to modify the definitions of
several of these terms to avoid the possibility of an unconstitutional
delegation of state power to the AEC. 13
The definition of the term "radiation" follows the NCRPM definition; 16 however, certain changes were deemed advisable to avoid pos.:
sible omission. The definition is sufficiently broad to cover the possible
discovery of new types of injurious radiation.
Because of the fact that some sources of radiation, such as radium
and other spontaneous radiation emitters, may constitute hazards to
heaJth irrespective of how or whether they are being used, and whether
they are stationary or in transport, it was necessary to include both a
general term, "radiation source," which includes both materials and machines, and a more limited term, "radioactive material." As defined,
68 Stat. 923 (1954), 42 u.s.c.A. §2014(c).
68 Stat. 922-4 (1954), 42 U.S.C.A. §2014.
u Under the terms of this act, the Safety Board has the power (within prescribed
limits) to determine what is "source material" and "special nuclear material." It is
believed that the imposition of a limitation on this power, which would first require a
similar determination by the AEC, does not involve an unconstitutional delegation of
state power to a federal agency.
16 The term "radiation" is defined by the NCRPM as "gamma rays and X-rays,
alpha and beta particles, high-speed electrons, neutrons, protons, and other nuclear
particles; but not sound or radio waves, or visible, infrared, or ultraviolet light."
National Bureau of Standards Handbook 61 at 27.
18

H
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"radiation source" provides broader coverage than would be achieved
by using only those terms defined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
Section 3· Director of Atomic Energy Activities: appointment, qualificat£ons, term, salary, duties, and powers
(a) The Governor, with the approval of the Senate, shall appoint a person having training and experience in radiation protection, or a related
science, to be Director of Atomic Energy Activities. In submitting any
nomination for the position of Director to the Senate, the Governor
shall set forth the training, experience, and other qualifications of the
nominee. The Director shall serve at the pleasure of the Governor, and
he shall receive an annual salary of $
.. The Director shall not
engage in any business, vocation, or employment other than that of
serving as Director of Atomic Energy Activities. The Department of
- - - - - - - s h a l l provide suitable office facilities for the Director.
(b) The Director shall( 1) act as adviser to the Governor on all atomic energy matters
and, as deputy to the Governor, advise, consult and cooperate with
the federal government, interstate agencies, other states, government
agencies of this state, and other persons and groups, public and private,
in furtherance of the purposes of this Act;
( 2) with the consent of the Governor, represent the interest of the
state in communications, negotiations, transactions, and other dealings
with the federal government, interstate agencies, and other states concerning atomic energy and radiation safety matters;
(3) submit reports at least once each year, and at such other times
as the Governor may direct, to the Governor and to the Legislature concerning developments in atomic energy and radiation safety matters and
make such recommendations as should be considered by them ;
(4) serve as a member of (e.g., the commission of economic
development) ;
( 5) serve as chairman and chief administrative officer of the
Safety Board;
( 6) serve as secretary, without vote, of the Advisory Committee;
( 7) develop comprehensive policies and programs( a) for the evaluation and determination of radiation hazards
to guide the Safety Board and government agencies charged with the
enforcement of radiation safety rules; and
(b) for the development and utilization of atomic energy for
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peaceful purposes to guide (e.g., the commission of economic development) and other government agencies ;
(8) receive and maintain the following records, reports, and written opinions, and disseminate the information therein contained to any
interested and affected government agency in accordance with the rules
issued by the Safety Board :
(a) registration records required by Section 8 of this Act
and the rules promulgated by the Safety Board;
(b) other reports required to be submitted to the Director by
Section 8 of this Act and the rules promulgated by the Safety Board;
and
(c) written opinions of the Advisory Committee required to
be submitted by Sections 4 and 5 of this Act; and
( 9) collect and disseminate information relating to the promotion
of atomic energy for peaceful purposes and radiation protection to any
government agency and to any interested person or group.
(c) The Director may·
( 1) accept and administer loans, grants, or other funds and gifts
from the federal government and from other sources, public and private,
for carrying out the purposes of this Act;
( 2) encotirage, participate in, or conduct studies, investigations,
research, and demonstrations deemed necessary and desirable to further
the purposes of this Act;
(3) employ, train, and prescribe the powers and duties of such
persons as may be deemed necessary and desirable to assist him in carrying out the provisions of this Act; and
(4) train and instruct the personnel of other government agencies
in matters relating to the promotion of atomic energy and the control of
radiation hazards upon the request of the government agencies concerned.
(d) The Director shall utilize the services and personnel of other
government agencies to assist him in carrying out his duties under this
Act insofar as practicable and with the consent of the government
agencies concerned.

Comment
Section 3 creates the office of Director of Atomic Energy Activities
to be filled by a person who is experienced in radiation protection or a
related science and who will devote his full energies and time to the
duties of the office. Atomic energy is of sufficient importance to the
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state to warrant making the problems of radiation protection and promotional programs the responsibility of a state official. Moreover,
coordination of state activities is desirable in at least three senses : (I)
coordination of the policies, regulations, and actions of the several interested state agencies and officers; ( 2) coordination of the state program
with those of the federal government and other states; and (3) coordination of the promotional and regulatory phases of the state program.
Essential coordination can be achieved through the creation of the office
of the Director.
The duties imposed under Section 3 (b) and designed to establish his
position as the state official primarily responsible for state atomic energy
affairs include : (I ) acting as adviser to the governor and, as deputy
to the governor to advise, consult, and cooperate with the federal government, interstate agencies, other states, and state and local governmental agencies and private groups ; ( 2) representing the state, with
consent of the governor, in negotiations with agencies outside the state;
(3) reporting to the governor and legislature; (4) serving as a member
of the state's economic or industrial development commission; (S) serving as chairman of the Radiation Safety Standards Board; ( 6) serving
as secretary of the Scientific Advisory Committee; ( 7) developing comprehensive state policy and programs for the determination and evaluation of radiation hazards and for atomic energy promotional programs;
(8) receiving and maintaining records, reports, and opinions required
under the act; and ( 9) collecting and disseminating information relative
to atomic energy affairs.
The most important duty of the Director is that of chairman and
chief administrative officer of the Radiation Safety Standards Board.
As the only full-time member and the only member required to have experience in radiation protection, it is contemplated that the Director will
play a major role in the development and promulgation of radiation
safety rules and standards. Although enforcement of the rules is the
responsibilty of other state agencies. under the act, the general powers
are sufficiently broad to assure that the Director will be informed of
enforcement problems so that whatever additional action is called for
can be taken by either the Director or the Radiation Safety Standards
Board. Knowledge of new problems will be available by reason of the
fact that the Director is responsible for receiving and maintaining all
records, reports, and opinions required under other sections of the act.
At this time one of the most compelling needs is the availability of a
state official to represent the state in negotiations with the AEC. When-
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ever problems of state-federal relations arise today, the AEC is faced
with the task of negotiating with several state officers, none of whom
may represent all state and local agencies. As a result, the AEC may
avoid negotiations merely because of the complexities involved. With
the approval of the governor under Section 3 (b) ( 2) the Director can
act as representative of the state in negotiations. It should be noted,
however, that the Director cannot commit the state to any particular
program affecting another state agency without that agency's approval
or definitive legislative or executive action.
The discretionary powers of the Director include : (I) accepting and
administering loans, grants, or gifts; ( 2) participating in or conducting
studies, investigation, and research; and ( 3) employing and training
personnel to assist him in carrying out his duties. Since the enforce~
ment of radiation safety rules is the responsibility of other state
agencies, it is. expected that the Director will be assisted by a rather small
staff organization.
Section 4· Establishment of the Radiation Safety Standards Board;
composition, powers, and duties
(a) There is hereby established a Radiation Safety Standards Board
consisting of (I) the Director of Atomic Energy Activities, who shall
be chairman, (2) (e.g., the state health commissioner), (3) (e.g., the
public service commissioner), (4) (e.g., the labor commissioner), and
(S) (e.g., the state police commissioner). The members shall have equal
responsibility and authority. The powers and duties of the Safety Board
shall be exercised only in accordance with a majority vote of the entire
membership.
(b) The Safety Board shall( I) develop comprehensive policies and programs for the evaluation, determination, and control of radiation hazards in this state;
( 2) adopt and promulgate, in accordance with Section 6 of this
Act and as may be deemed necessary and advisable to protect persons
and property, all radiation sa'fety rules relating to (a) radiation safety
standards, (b) enforcement of radiation safety standards, (c) registration, keeping of records, and submission of reports in connection with
radiation sources, and (d) dissemination of information contained in
the records and reports to government agencies ;
(3) make continuing studies and submit reports, from time to
time, to the Governor and to the Legislature concerning radiation dis-
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aster problems and the need for changes in the laws of the state to
protect persons and property ; and
( 4) make a study and submit a report to the Governor and to the
L~gislature concerning the establishment of a schedule of gradual
annual registration fees for radiation sources to defray the costs of the
administration and enforcement of this Act, including the radiation
safety rules promulgated by the Safety Board.
(c) The Safety Board may( I) order the Director to encourage, participate in, or conduct
studies, .investigations, training, research, and demonstrations relating
to the control of radiation hazards, the measureme?t of radiation, the
effects on health of exposure to radiation, and related problems;
( 2) render opinions, upon request, concerning such plans and
specifications on the design and shielding of radiation sources as may be
submitted before or after construction, for the puq~ose of determining
the possible radiation hazard ; and
(3) order the Director to convene the Advisory Committee or to
request written opinions from its members in connection with any matter relating to radiation safety.

Comment
Section 4 creates the Radiation Safety Standards Board which is
charged primarily with the task of promulgating radiation safety rules.
Aside from purely political or economic considerations, it appears desirable that the heads of other state departments or agencies having enforcement responsibilities under the act should have the power to adopt
radiation rules. These representatives of other agencies will be able to
assess the capabilities of their agencies and are more qualified to determine the respective jurisdictions of the state agencies concerned with the
various radiation safety problems. Although these officers may not be
trained specifically in radiation safety, their broader regulatory experience is invaluable. The task of training is offset by the presence of the
Director of Atomic Energy Activities and the availability of the Scientific Advisory Committee for consultation and recommendations concerning the content of specific rules. Although all state agencies having
an interest in atomic energy affairs are not included in the recommendations, it is believed that the membership should not exceed five in
order to prevent the Board from becoming unwieldy as an administra~
tive body.
Section 4(b) imposes upon the Board the duties of: (I) developing
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comprehensive policies and programs for the evaluation, determination,
and control of radiation hazards; (2) promulgating rules relating to
radiation safety standards, enforcement of radiation safety standards,
registration, maintenance of records and reports, and dissemination of
information; (3) making studies and reports to the governor and legislature concerning radiation disaster problems; and ( 4) studying the
problem of registration fees and reporting thereon.
The Safety Board is authorized to direct one or more state agencies
to be responsible for the enforcement of specific radiation safety rules.
It is expected, of course, that unnecessary duplications will be avoided,
not only in the ·interest of economy, but also to minimize the burdens
imposed on the persons using radiation sources. Although the Director
is charged with the responsibility of receiving and maintaining records
and reports, the Safety Board is given the power to adopt regulations
affecting this responsibility.
The "radiation disaster" problem, including both war disaster and
major reactor mishaps, requires careful study and perhaps the enactment
of new legislation or even constitutional revision. Among the possible
types of action that may be necessary in the event of a radiation disaster
are mobilization of the state's mili~ry and police forces, large-scale
evacuation efforts, seizure and destruction of contaminated private
property, and decontamination of property and persons. To date, the
radiation disaster problem has not received careful deliberative efforts
at either the federal or state levels, and it appears desirabie that some
state agency should undertake the task of studying the problems involved
and making recommendations as to feasible courses of action.
In view of the fact that many states have fiscal problems in establishing new governmental agencies, some method of financing of a state
atomic energy program is essential. Since the users of radiation sources
may be in a position of being able to pass the costs of a radiation safety
program to the consumer of the products, it appears feasible that a
major percentage of the costs to the state could be recovered through
registration fees. The precise form the fee schedule should take, however, cannot be accurately ascertained until the nature of radiation
sources within the state is compiled. The registration requirements under
the act will provide essential information as to the potential hazard
created by each radiation source and the probable scope of state supervision and inspection. On the basis of this information the Safety Board
will be capable of making explicit recommendations concerning the
establishment of an equitable fee schedule.
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Under Section_4(c) the discretionary powers of the Safety Board are
set forth. Because existing governmental agencies will enforce radiation
safety rules, those agencies will require considerable assistance from
qualified persons to instruct personnel in procedures and measurements.
Furthermore, as new uses of radiation emerge, a qualified person should
make an investigation to determine the best method of protecting the
public health and safety against possible hazards. It is therefore suitable
for the Director, as a qualified person in radiation safety, to undertake
the$e tasks at the request of the Board which is representative of the
state agencies.
Although the Board is not a body of radiological safety experts, it
has the necessary means available to render opinions, upon request, concerning plans and specifications of installations employing radiation
sources. Although the recommended statute of the National Committee
on Radiation Protection and Measurement makes this requirement mandatory, in some instances, particularly in respect to new reactor designs,
the state personnel will not be qualified to render opinions. The opinions,
although purely advisory and not binding, in respect to installations
where the radiation problems are well understood would, of course, be
helpful to the potential user of a radiation source in that expensive alterations to conform to state standards may be avoided. Two arguments
have been advanced in opposition to the creation of even a discretionary
power to render opinions. First, it has been contended that during the
initial phases of a state program that the state officials involved will be
so burdened with other duties that it is inadvisable to assign even a discretionary power. Secondly, the question of the possible effect on
litigation regarding injuries to persons and property in the event of a
failure to seek an advisory opinion has been raised. On balance, it has
been concluded that the discretionary power should be granted to the
Board in the belief that some major assistance could be rendered users
even during the earlier period of the state program and that the impact
upon tort litigation will be relatively insignificant.
Section S· Establishment of the Scientific Advisory Committee on
Atomic Energy; composition, qualifications, appointment,
term, compensation, functions, and duties
(a) There is hereby established a Scientific Advisory Committee on
Atomic Energy to consist of five persons, who each have training and
experience m a science related to the development and utilization of
atomic energy for peaceful purposes, and representing, as a group,
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the broadest possible range of training and experience in atomic energy
matters. The members of the Advisory Committee shall be appointed by
the Governor for terms of five years, except that initial appointments
and filling of vacancies shall be so made that the term of one appointed
member expires each year. The members of the Advisory Committee,
while engaged in the work of the Advisory Committee, shall be entitled
to receive compensation at$
per diem and reimbursement for
actual and necessary traveling and subsistence expenses. The Advisory
Committee shall meet or submit written opinions, or both, at the request
of the Director.
(b) Within thirty days after submission of a proposed radiation safety
rule by the Safety Board, as provided in Section 6 of this Act, the
Advisory Committee shall submit a written opinion to the Director as
to the desirability of the rule. When requested by the Director, the
Advisory Committee also shall ( r) review the policies, programs, and
rules developed and promulgated pur-suant to this Act; ( 2) make such
recommendations a:s are deemed necessary and desirable; and ( 3) give
technical advice and assistance on matters relating to the promotion and
control of atomic energy in this state.

Comment
Section 5 creates the Scientific Advisory Committee on Atomic Energy, composed of five persons trained in sciences related to the development and utilization of atomic energy. The Committee is to be
composed of part-time personnel paid on a per diem basis so that highly
qualified persons can be attracted to accept the positions.
Section S(b) requires the Advisory Committee to submit written
opinions on proposed safety rules within thirty days after their submission by the Radiation Safety Standards Board. Through this device,
technologically competent review of proposed rules will be achieved.
The Safety Board, however, has final authority in deciding the precise
nature of radiation safety rules. Upon request by the Director, the
Advisory Committee also is directed to review the state policies and
programs, to make suitable recommendations, and to give technical
advice and assistance on atomic energy matters.
While the act bestows final authority upon the Safety Board to
promulgate relations, this subsection is designed to assure that they
are necessary and adequate. In effect, the Advisory Committee is an
entirely independent board of technical experts which not only advises
and assists the Safety Board in establishing radiation safety standards

FUTURE STATE REGULATION

1101

and issuing regulations, but also must publish its opinions on the desirability of each rule before it becomes effective. These opinions are
received and kept on file by the Director, and are intended to indicate
how well the regulations conform with current scientific thought.
It should be noted that the Advisory Board is not limited to giving
advice and assistance on radiation safety matters. Through the Director,
this body is available to give technical advice and assistance on any
atomic energy or radiation matter to any agency of the state government.
Section ·6. Promulgation of radiation safety rules
(a) The Safety Board shall have the exclusive authority in this state to
adopt and promulgate radiation safety rules relating to ( 1) radiation
safety standards, (2) enforcement of radiation safety standards, (3)
registration, keeping of records, and submission of reports in connection
with radiation sources, and (4) dissemination of information contained in the records and reports to government agencies. In adopting
and promulgating a radiation safety rule, the Safety Board shall designate the government agency or agencies which shall enforce the rule. In
making the enforcement agency selection, the Safety Board shall give
due consideration to the technical qualifications and to the enforcement
powers and jurisdiction of the individual government agencies.
(b) Except where the rules and standards of federal agencies or nationally recognized bodies in the field of radiation safety are deemed inadequate for this state, the Safety Board, in the interest of uniformity, shall
make its radiation safety rules consistent with federal rules or, in the
case of radiation hazards not regulated by federal agencies, with the
recommended rules and standards of nationally recognized bodies in the
field of radiation safety, such as the National Committee on Radiation
Protection and Measurement or the Ameriean Standards Association.
(c) In promulgating radiation safety rules the Safety Board shall comply with the provisions of (e.g., the state administrative procedure act).
Not less than thirty days before final approval of a proposed radiation
rule, the Safety Board shall submit the proposed rule to the Advisory
Committee for its review and recommendations, except that, upon his
finding of emergency need, the Governor may waive all or any part of
the thirty day period.

Comment
Section 6 (a) establishes the jurisdiction of the Radiation Safety
Standards Board in respect to radiation safety rules and authorizes the
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Safety Board to determine enforcement agencies by rule. The Safety
Board is given exclusive jurisdiction within . the state to promulgate
radiation safety rules relating to radiation safety standards, to enforce
radiation safety standards, registration, record maintenance, and submission of reports, and dissemination of information contained in records and reports to government agencies. In selecting the enforcement
agency, the Safety Board is to consider the technical qualifications of
the state agencies and the powers and jurisdiction of the state agencies.
However, the section does not impose any rigid requirements in selecting enforcement agencies so that complete flexibility is possible.
Section 6(b) recognizes the desirability of uniformity in the field
of radiation safety standards and therefore directs the Safety Board to
adopt, whenever possible, regulations consistent with standards employed by the federal government or nationally recognized bodies in the
field of radiation safety.
Section 6 (c) requires the Safety Board to comply with the provisions
of the state administrative pr'ocedure act in relation to rule-making. In
addition, the Safety Board is required to submit its proposed rules to the
Scientific Advisory Committee for review and recommendations thirty
days before final approval. The governor is given the power to waive
all or part of the thirty day period. If a state does not have a state administrative procedure act, it may be desirable to add provisions relating
to the rule-making process including notice of proposed rule-making to
interested persons, opportunities for interested persons to submit written
opinions, and hearings.
Section 7· Enforcement of radiation safety rules; powers and duties
of enforcing government agencies
(a) Only those government agencies authorized by the Safety Board,
pursuant to Section 6(a) of this Act, shall have the power and the duty
to enforce the radiation safety rules of this state. The enforcing government agencies shall receive from the Director such information and technical advice and assistance as he is capable of providing and as is necessary for the enforcement of radiation safety rules.
(b) The enforcing government agency shall have the power to enter at
reasonable times upon any public or private property wherein a radiation
source exists for the purpose of inspecting and investigating conditions
and examining records relative to the purposes of this Act and the radiation safety rules the government agency is authorized to enforce. If
such inspection and examination indicates that the radiation source does
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not constitute a hazard to persons and property and is in compliance
with radiation safety rules, the owner, operator, or user shall be so notified in writing by the government agency.
( c_) When, in connection with a radiation source within its enforcement
jurisdiction, a government agency finds that an emergency exists requiring immediate action to protect persons and property from radiation hazards, it shall, without notice or hearing, issue an order reciting
the existence of such emergency and requiring that such action be taken
as it deems necessary to meet the emergency. Any person to whom such
order is issued shall comply immediately. On application to the government agency, the person to whom the emergency order has been issued
shall be afforded a hearing by the government agency within thirty days
and in accordance with the provisions of (e.g.; the state administrative
procedure act). On the basis of such hearing the government agency, in
its final order, may continue such emergency order in effect, revoke it,
or modify it.
(d) When, in connection with a radiation source within its enforcement jurisdiction, a government agency finds that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that a radiation hazard exists or that there is a continuing violation of radiation safety rules, but which does not constitute
an emergency requiring immediate action to protect persons and property, it shall give written notice to the alleged violator or violators specifying the grounds of the complaint and the action to be taken to correct
the alleged violation. This notice shall require that the alleged violations
be corrected or that the alleged violator or violators appear before the
agency at a time and place specified in the notice. The notice shall be
delivered not less than thirty days before the time set for the hearing.
Before any order issued under this subsection shall become final, the
government agency shall afford the alleged violator or violators an opportunity for hearing, and, on the basis of evidence produced at the hearing, shall enter such final order as will best effectuate the purposes of
this Act and the radiation safety rules it is authorized to enforce.
Written notice of such final order shall be given to the alleged violator
or violators and to such other persons as may have appeared at the
hearing and made written request for notice of the order. The notice
and hearing required by this subsection shall conform to the provisions
of (e.g., the state administrative·procedure act). The final order of the
government agency under this subsection shall become binding on all
parties to the hearing within thirty days after notice of it has been sent
to the parties, unless it· shall be appealed to the courts as provided in
(e.g., the state administrative procedure act).
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(e) In the event of a violation of an emergency order or a final order,
the government agency shall immediately apply to the circuit court of
the county wherein the violation occurs for an order to restrain and
enjoin the persons responsible for such violation. In any action for an
injunction brought pursuant to this subsection, any findings of the government agency after hearing or due notice shall be prima facie evidence
of the fact or facts found therein. No bond shall be required when such
injunctive relief is sought upon the application of the government
agency, the attorney general, or the prosecuting attorney of any county.
(f) Any person aggrieyed by a final order issued by a government
agency authorized to enforce radiation safety rules is entitled to judicial
review thereof in the circuit court in the county wherein the person
resides or has a place of business in the state or in the circuit court for
------County, within thirty days after personal service of the
final decision of the government agency or within thirty days after
the mailing thereof, if notice is given by mail. Judicial review of this
final decision shall be controlled by the provisions of (e.g., the state
administrative procedure act).
(g) Government agencies acting under the authority of this section
shall give written notice to the Director of all emergency and final
orders within
days after issuance and of all applications for
injunction within
days after filing with the court.
(h) Except as specifically provided in this section, nothing in this Act
shall be construed as extending any government agency's jurisdiction
over persons, property, or activities within this state.

Comment
Section 7' establishes the procedures and methods for the enforcement
of radiation safety rules. Subsection (a) defines the jurisdiction of the
enforcing governmental agencies and provides that the Director shall
render technical advice and assistance to the agencies. Subsection (b)
authorizes the enforcing agency to inspect and investigate facilities.
In addition, the agency is to give written notice to the owner, operator,
or user of a radiation source if -it finds that the radiation source does
not constitute a hazard and that there is compliance with the radiation
safety rules.
Section 7 (c) authorizes the enforcing agency to enter emergency
orders whenever immediate action is necessary to protect persons and
property. Although the emergency orders may be issued without notice
and hearing, a hearing within thirty days is required upon application
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of the affected person. Meanwhile, compliance with the order is required. The hearing procedure is governed by the applicable provisions
of the state administrative procedure act. After the hearing, the government agency may enter a final order continuing, revoking, or modifying the emergency order.
Section 7(d) authorizes the enforcing agency to give written notice
of alleged violations whenever an emergency situation does not exist.
The notice is to specify the nature of the hazard or violation and· the
action deemed necessary by the agency to correct the violation. A hearing is required before the entry of a final order, and after entry thereof,
judicial review may be obtained in accordance with the provisions of the
applicable state administrative procedure act. If the state does not have
general legislation covering administrative procedures, the statute should
be amended to include basic provisions relating to notice, hearing, and
judicial review.
Section 7 (e) authorizes the government agency to apply to the appropriate state court for necessary injunctions whenever there is a continuing violation of an emergency or final order. The findings of the
government agency are made prima facie evidence of the facts, and the
government agency is relieved of any bonding requirements when seeking injunctive relief. Section 7 (f) assures that any aggrieved person
may receive judicial review of agency action which. is final. Section
7(g) requires the enforcing government agency to give written notice
of any emergency or final order to the Director so that he may be kept
currently informed of all enforcement problems. The Director will be
able to inform the Safety Board of any problems requiring revision of
rules or statutes. Section 7(h) assures that the statute will not be construed as extending the jurisdiction of any government agency except
as specifically provided.
Section 8. United States licenses or permits required; registration of
radiation sources required; compliance with radiation safety
rules required
(a) No person shall manufacture, construct, produce, use, transfer,
acquire, or possess any source material, byproduct material, special
nuclear material, production facility, or utilization facility, or act as an
operator of a production or utilization facility within this state unless
he shall have first obtained a license or permit for the activity from the
United States Atomic Energy Commission, if pursuant to the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, as amended, a license or permit is required.
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(b) No person shall produce radiation or produce, use, transport, store,
or dispose of radioactive materials, or modify, extend, or alter such
activities, except in accordance with the provisions of this Act, the
radiation safety rules promulgated thereunder, or emergency or final
orders issued to such person by a government agency authorized to
enforce radiation safety rules.
(c) Subject to exceptions provided by the rules of the Safety Board,
every person who produces radiation or produces, uses, transports,
stores, or disposes of radioactive materials, shall register annually in
writing with the Director in accordance with rules established and on
forms provided by the Safety Board. If the person modifies, extends, or
alters such activities, he shall amend his registration accordingly. The
Safety Board may by rule exempt from the requirements of registration
persons who produce minimal quantities of radiation or who produce,
use, transport, store, or dispose of minimal quantities of radioactive
materials which· the Safety Board determines have no substantial effect
on the public health and safety.

Comment
Section 8 requires compliance with the licensing and permit provisions
of. the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, compliance with radiation safety
rules and lawful orders entered in accordance with the provisions of the
act, and registration of radiation sources. Section 8 (a) is similar to
Section 2 of the New England Model Act, and, while perhaps not essential, the provision may serve a useful purpose in the event that constitutional difficulties prevent enforcement of existing AEC licensing
practices. Section 8{b) establishes the positive requirement that each
person producing radiation or producing, using,, tra.nsporti!lg,, storing,
or disposing of radioactive materials comply with radiation safety rules
and emergency or final orders issued in accordance with the I>rovi~ion.s
of the act.
Section 8 (c) requires the same persons to register annually with the
Director and to amend registrations if activities are modified. The
Radiation Safety Standards Board is empowered to exempt persons
from the registration requirements if the Board determines that there
is no substantial public health and safety problem involved. The registration requirement assures that the Board will have knowledge of all
radiation hazards. Although the AEC now informs state officials of
the issuance of federal licenses, the registration requirement is essential
to ascertain the natute of radiation hazards not covered by federal legis-
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lation. The Safety Board is to establish rules for registration and, in
respect to a single radiation source, more than one person may be required to register if the Board finds such a requirement beneficial. This
may be particularly desirable whenever, for example, the owner of the
radiation source has no control over the utilization of the source.
Section 9· Penalties
(a) Any person who violates any provision of Section 8 of this Act
or any radiation safety rule promulgated pursuant to this Act shall, upon
conviction, be subject to a fine of not more than $b---(b) Any person who willfully violates any provision of Section 8 of
this Act or any radiation safety rule promulgated pursuant to this Act
shall, upon conviction, be subject to a fine of not more than $~>---
or imprisonment for not more than
, or both. Each day on
which such violation occurs shall constitute a separate violation.
(c) Any person who violates any emergency or final order issued pursuant to Section 7 of this Act by a government agency authorized to
enforce radiation safety rules shall, upon conviction, be subject to a
, or imprisonment for not more than
fine of not more than $
- - - , or both. Each day on which such violation occurs shall constitute a separate violation.

Comment
Section 9 establishes criminal penalties for three types of offenses :
( 1) simple violations of radiation safety rules, (2) willful (i.e., knowing and intentional) violations of radiation safety rules, and (3) violations of emergency or final orders. As to the second and third types,
each day on which a violation occurs constitutes a separate offense.
While the amount of the fines and the duration of the imprisonments
is not specified, it is felt that the penalties should increase in the order
in which the offenses are listed. On this matter, however, it should be
pointed out that the state, in prescribing the magnitude of the penalties,
would pe well advised to consider those established by the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, for the Supreme Court has indicated that state
penalties in excess of those provided by federal laws concerning the
same offense are a factor to be considered in deciding in favor of federal
pre-emption. 11 Under federal law a willful violation, or conspiracy to
violate, a radiation safety regulation of the AEC may " . . . be pun17

See the dissenting opinion in California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725,

(1!)4.8).

69 S. Ct. 841
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ished by a fine of no more than $5,000 or by imprisonment for not more
than two years, or both." 18
Section

10.

Conduct of studies concerning changes in laws and rules
with a view to the promotion of atomic energy uses

The following state agencies are directed to initiate and to pursue
continuing studies as to the need for changes in the laws and rules administered by them in order to encourage the optimum development of
the peaceful uses of atomic energy in this state, and, on the basis of such
studies, to make such recommendations to the Governor and to the
Legislature for the revision of laws as may appear necessary and
appropriate :
(a) The department of economic development, particularly as to
opportunities for atomic energy industries.
(b) The department of public instruction, particularly as to the need
·
and facilities for scientific instruction and training.
(c) The department of agriculture, particularly as to the uses of atomic
energy in agriculture.
(d) The department of insurance, particularly as to the insurance of
persons and property from hazards to life and property resulting from
atomic energy development.
(e) The department of workmen's compensation, particularly as to the
time and character of proof of claims of radiation injuries and the
extent of compensation allowable therefor.
(f) The public service commission, particularly as to the participation
by public utilities in projt:cts and research looking to the development
of production and utilization facilities of commercial and industrial use.
(g) Such other government agencies as the Governor may direct and
for the purposes specified by him.

Comment
With respect to a similar provision the New England Committee on
Atomic Energy stated :
This section is premised on the supposition that study will
disclose a need for a number of changes in existing laws and
regulations to take care of new conditions created by atomic
development for peaceful uses. The statutory directive will
justify the use by the several departments and agencies of
their personnel in making the studies thus called for, a step
that some of them might otherwise be reluctant to make. 19
1s 68 Stat. 958 ( 1954), 42 U.S.C.A. §2273.
19

Atomic Energy and New England 65 (1955).
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Non-applicability of this Act

(a) Nothing in this Act, or in the radiation safety rules promulgated
pursuant to this Act, shall be construed to apply to installations owned
or operated by the federal government or to radiation sources operated
by the federal government, unless such application is specifically authorized by the federal government.
(b) Nothing in this Act, or in the radiation safety rules promulgated
pursuant to this Act, shall be construed to limit the kind or amount of
radiation that may be intentionally applied to a person for diagnostic or
therapeutic purposes by, or under the direction of, a duly licensed
member of the healing professions.

Comment
Section I I (a) recognizes the overriding power of the federal government in relation to its own activities and property. Radiation sources
owned and operated by other than the federal government but for the
federal government are not exempted, but federally owned installations
operated by private contractors are exempted.
Section I I (b) prevents any restriction upon the kind or amount of
radiation intentionally employed for diagnostic or therapeutic purposes
by persons duly licensed under state law. However, radiation safety
rules may be established for medical radiation sources in respect to
shielding, the storage of radioactive isotopes, exposure to personnel,
and other matters. Only the exposure to which a patient may be submitted for diagnostic or therapeutic purposes is exempted.
Section

I2.

E.~isting

rules preserved; pending proceedings

(a) Until a superseding radiation safety rule has been promulgated by
the Safety Board, all health and safety laws or rules concerning radiation shall remain in effect and shall be enforced in the same manner as
if this Act had not been adopted.
(b) AU proceedings pending and all rights and liabilities existing,
acquired, or incurred, at the time this Act takes effect, are hereby saved,
and such proceedings shall be consummated under and according to the
law in force at the time such proceedings are or were commenced. This
Ad shall not be construed to alter, affect, or abate any pending prosecution, or prevent prosecution hereafter instituted under such repealed
section, chapters, or acts for offenses committed prior to the effective
date of this Act; and ail prosecutions pending at the effective date of
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this Act, and all prosecutions instituted after the effective date of this
Act, for offenses committed prior to the effective date of this Act, shall
be continued or instituted under and in accordance with the provisions
of the law in force at the time of the commission of such offenses.
Section 13. Effective date; exception
(a) This Act shall take effect - - - - - (b) The provisions of Section 8(c) of this Act shall not be effective
until sixty days after the effective date of this Act as to persons engaged
in activities requiring registration at the effective date of this Act.

Appendix A
ITEM 1
ATOMIC ENERGY CoMMISSION

10

Code Fed. Regs. Part

20

STANDARDS FOR PROTECTION AGAINST RADIATION
GENERAL PROVISIONS

§ 20.1 Purpose. (a) The regulations in this part establish standards for
protection against radiation hazards arising out of activities under licenses
issued by the Atomic Energy Commission and are issued pursuant to the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (68 Stat. 919).
(b) The use of radioactive material or· other sources of radiation not
licensed by the Commission is not subject to. the regulations in this part;
However, it is the purpose of the regulations in this part to control the possession, use, and transfer of licensed material by any licensee in such a
manner that exposure to such material and to radiation from such material,
when added to exposures to unlicensed radioactive material and to other unlicensed sources of radiation·in the possession of the licensee, and to radiation therefrom, does not exceed the standards of radiation protection prescribed in the regulations in this part.
§ 20.2 Scope. The regulations in this part apply to all persons who receive, possess,·use or transfer byproduct material, source material, or special
nuclear material under a general or specific license issued by the Commission
pursuant to the regulations in Part 30, 40, or 70 of this chapter.
· § 20.3 Definitions. (a) As used in this part:
{i) ·"Act" means the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (68 Stat. 919) including any· amendments thereto ;
( 2) "Airborne radioactive material" means any radioactive material
dispersed in the ·air in the form of dusts, fumes, mists, vapors, or gases ;
(3) "Byproduct material" means any radioactive material (except special
nuclear material) yielded in or made radioactive by exposure to the radiation
incident to the process of produci~g or utilizing special nuclear material;
(4) "Comm~ssion" ~ean's the Atomic Energy Commission or its duly
autliorized representatives ;
.
·
(5) "Governnient agency" means any executive department, commission, independent ~stablishment, corporation, wholly or partly owned by the
United -States of Americci.which is an instrumentality of the United States,
llll
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or any board, bureau, division, service, office, officer, authority, administration, or other establishment in the executive branch of the Government;
(6) "Individual" means any human being; ·
(7) "Licensed material" means source material, special nuclear material,
or byproduct material received, possessed, used, or transferred under a
general or specific license issued by the Commission pursuant to the regulations in this chapter ;
(8) "License" means a license issued under the regulations in Part 30,
40, or 70 of this chapter. "Licensee" means the holder of such license;
(9) "Person" means (i) any individual, corporation, partnership, firm,
association, trust, estate, public or private institution, group, Government
agency other than the Commission, any State, any foreign government or
nation or any political subdivision of any such government or nations, or
other entity; and (ii) any legal successor, representative, agent, or agency
of the foregoing;
.
( 10) "Radiation" means any or all of the following: alpha rays, beta
rays, gamma rays, X-rays, neutrons, high-speed electrons, high-speed protons, and other atomic particles; but not sound or radio waves, or visible,
infrared, or ultraviolet light;
( 1 1) "Radioactive material" includes any such material whether or
not subject to licensing control by the Commission;
( 12) "Restricted area" means any area access to which is controlled by
the licensee. "Restricted area" shall not include any areas used as residential
quarters, although a separate room or rooms in a residential building may
be set apart as a restricted area ;
( 13) "Source material" means any material except special nuclear material, which contains by weight one-twentieth of one percent ( 0.05 percent
or more of (i) uranium, (ii) thorium, or (iii) any combination thereof;
( 14) "Special nuclear material" means (i) plutonium, uranium 233,
uranium enriched in the isotope 233 or in the isotope 235, and any other
material which the Commission, pursuant to the provisions of section 51
of the act, determines to be special nuclear material, but does not include
source material; or (ii) any material artificially enriched by any of the foregoing but does not include source material ;
( 15) "Unrestricted area" means any area entry into which is not controlled by the licensee, and any area used for residential quarters.
(b) Definitions of certain other words and phrases as used in this part
are set forth in other sections, including ;
( 1) "Airborne radioactivity area" defined in § 20.203 ;
( 2) "Radiation area" and "high radiation area" defined in § 20.202 ;
(3) "Personnel monitoring equipment" defined in § 20.202;
(4) "Survey" defined in § 20.201;
( 5) Units of measurements of dose ( rad, rem) defined in § 20-4;
( 6) Units of measurement of radioactivity defined in § 20.5.
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§ 204 Units of radiation dose. (a) "Dose," as used in this part, is the
quantity of radiation absorbed, per unit of mass, by the body or by any portion of the body. When the regulations in this part specify a dose during
a period of time, the dose means the total quantity of radiation absorbed,
pei: unit of mass, by the body or by any portion of the body during such
period of time. Several different units of dose are in current use. Definitions
of units as used in this part are set forth in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this
section.
(b) The rad, as used in this part, is a measure of the dose of any ionizing
radiation to body tissues in terms of the energy absorbed per unit mass of
the tissue. One rad is the dose corresponding to the absorption of 100 ergs
per gram of tissue. (One millirad (mrad) =0.001 rad.)
(c) The rem, as used in this part, is a measure of the dose of any ionizing
radiation to body tissue in terms of its estimated biological effect relative
to a dose of one roentgen (r) of X-rays. (One millirem (mrem) =!M>OI
rem.) The relation of the rem to other dose units depends upon the biological effect under consideration and upon the conditions of irradiation. For
the purpose of the regulations in this part, any of the following is considered to be equivalent to a dose of one rem :
(I) A dose of I r due to X- or gamma radiation;
( 2) A dose of I rad due to X-, gamma, or beta radiation ;
(3) A dose of 0.1 rad due to neutrons or high energy protons;
(4) A dose of 0.05 rad due to particles heavier than protons and with
sufficient energy to reach the lens of the eye ;
If it is more convenient to measure the neutron flux, or equivalent, than
to determine the neutron dose in rads, as provided in subparagraph (3) of
this paragraph, one rem of neutron radiation may, for purposes of the regulations in this part, be assumed to be equivalent to I4 million neutrons per
square centimeter incident upon the body; or, if there exists sufficient information to estimate with reasonable accuracy the approximate distribution
in energy of the neutrons, the incident number of neutrons per square centimeter equivalent to one rem may be estimated from the following table:
Number of neutrons
per square centimeter
equivalent to a dose
Neutron energy
of 1 rem
Thermal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . g6o X 10"
0.0001 mev................................ 4Bo X 10"
o.oi mev. . ................................ 48o X 10"
0.1 mev. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ¢X 10"
mev. . . . . . • . • • . . . . . . . • . . • . • . . . . • . . . . . . . 38 X 10"
1 mev. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 X 10"
8
2 mev. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
19 X I0
3 mev. and higher.... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 X 108

o.s

§ 20.5 Units of radioactivity. (a) Radioactivity is commonly, and for
purposes of the regulations in this part shall be, measured in terms of dis-
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integrations per unit time or in curies. One curie (c) = 3·7 X 1010 disintegrations per second (dps)=2.2XIo12 disintegrations per minute (dpm). A
commonly used submultiple of the curie is the microcurie (p.c). One p.c=
0.000001 c=3.7X I04 dps=2.2X 106 dpm.
NoTE: Many radioisotopes disintegrate into isotopes which are
also radioactive. In expressing maximum permissible concentrations in air and water of these materials, as in Appendix B of this
part, the activity stated is that of the parent isotope. In some cases,
the fact that daughter products may contribute to the total dose
has been taken into account in the determination of the maximum
permissible concentration of the parent isotopes. In the tables of
Appendix B of this part this is indicated by writing Ba140 +La140 ,
Sr90 + Y 90 , Rn 222 +dr, Ra 226 +! dr, etc.
ExAMPLE. In Column I, Table I, Appendix B, the maximum
permissible concentration of Ba140 in air for occupational use is
2 X 10-7 p.cjm!. This is the maximum permissible concentration regardless of whether or not any of the La140 which may have resulted from the decay of the Ba140 is present or not. However, the
value given for BA 140 is less than it would be if La140 were a stable
isotope, not only because of the possibility of La140 in the air but
principally because, if the Ba140 is inhaled, its radioactive decay
in the body will result in the production of La140 in the body.
(b) Radon. Airborne radioactivity of radon and its decay products may
be determined by measurement of the activity of one or more decay products
on dust filtered from the air. For purposes of the regulations in this part,
the limit prescribed here will be considered to be met if the measured radioactivity of one or more decay products (for example, RaC') does not exceed
that which would result from the occurrence, at the time of sampling, of
I X 10-7 microcuries, per. milliliter of air, of RN 222 and each of its short-lived
decay products, RaA, RaB, RaC, and RaC'. For this purpose, due allowance shall be made for changes in the radioactivity of the measured decay
products from time of sampling through the period of measurement.
(c) Natural uranium and natural thorium. Natural uranium and natural
thorium occur as mixtures of isotopes of the respective elements. In the
case of uranium or of thorium, the number of microcuries shall be determined by dividing the total rate, in dpm, of alpha emissions from the
mixture by 2.2 X 106 dpm per p.c.
§ 20.6 Interpretations. Except as specifically authorized by the Commission in writing, no interpretation of the meaning of the regulations in
this part by any officer or employee of the Commission other thah a written
interpretation by the General Counsel will be recognized to be binding upon
the Commission.
§ 20.7 Communications. All communications and reports concerning the
regulations in this part, and applications filed under them, should be addressed to the Atomic Energy Commission, 1901 Constitution Avenue NW.,
Washington 25; D. C., Attention: Division of Civilian Application.
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PERMISSIBLE DosES, LEVELS, AND CoNCENTRATIONS

§ 20.IOI Exposure of individuals in restricted areas-(a) Exposure to
radiation. (I) Except as provided in subparagraph ( 2) of this paragraph,
no. licensee shall possess, use, or transfer licensed material in such a manner
as to cause any individual in a restricted area to receive in any period of
seven consecutive days from radioactive material and other sources of radiation in the licensee's possession a dose in excess of the limits specified in
Appendix A of this part.
(2) A licensee may permit an individual in a restricted area to receive a
dose in excess of the limits established in subparagraph (I) of this paragraph : Provided, ( i) That the dose during any period of 7 consecutive days
does not exceed three times the limits specified in Appendix A of this part,
and (ii) that the dose during any period of I3 consecutive weeks does not
exceed IO times the limits specified in Appendix A of this part.
(b) No licensee shall possess, use or transfer licensed material in such a
manner as to cause any individual in a restricted area to be exposed to airborne radioactive material possessed by the licensee in an average concentration in excess of the limits specified in Appendix B, Table I, of this part.
The limits given in Appendix B, Table I of this part, are based upon
exposure to the concentrations specified for forty hours in any period of
seven consecutive days. In any such period where the number of hours of
exposure is less than forty, the limits specified in the table may be increased
proportionately. In any such period, where the number of hours of exposure
is greater than forty, the limits specified in the table shall be decreased
proportionately.
(c) Exposure of minors. No licensee shall possess, use, or transfer
licensed material in such a manner as to cause any individual under IS years
of age within a restricted area to receive in any period of seven consecutive
days from radioactive material and other sources of radiation in the
licensee's possession a dose in excess of IO percent of the limits specified in
Appendix A of this part, or to be exposed to airborne radioactive material
possessed by the licensee in a concentration in excess of the limits specified
in Appendix B, Table II, of this part. For purposes of this paragraph, concentrations may be averaged over periods not greater than a week.
§ 20.I02 Permissible levels of radiation in unrestricted areas. (a) There
may be included in any application for a license or for amendment of a
license proposed limits upon levels of radiation in unrestricted areas resulting from the applicant's possession or use of radioactive material and other
sources of radiation. Such applications should include information as to
anticipated average radiation levels and anticipated occupancy times for
each unrestricted area involved. The Commission will approve the proposed
limits if the applicant demonstrates that the proposed limits are not likely
to cause any individual to receive a dose in any period of seven consecutive
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days in excess of 10 percent of the limits specified in Appendix A of this
part.
(b) Except as authorized by the Commission pursuant to paragraph (a)
of this section, no licensee shall possess, use, or transfer licensed material
in such a manner as to create in any unrestricted area from radioactive rna~
terial and other sources of radiation in his possession:
( 1) Radiation levels which, if an individual were continuously present
in the area, could result in his receiving a dose in excess of two millirems in
any one hour, or
(2) Radiation levels which, if an individual were continuously present in
the area, could result in his receiving a dose in excess of 100 millirems in
any seven consecutive days.
§ 20.103 Concentrations in effluents to unrestricted areas. (a) There may
be included in any application for a license or for amendment of a license
proposed limits upon concentrations of licensed and other radioactive material released into air or water in unrestricted areas as a result of the applicant's proposed activities. Such applications should include information
as to anticipated average concentrations and anticipated occupancy times
for each unrestricted area involved. The Commission will approve the proposed limits if the applicant demonstrates that it is not likely that any individual will be exposed to concentrations in excess of the limits specified in
Appendix B, Table II, of this part. For purposes of this paragraph, con.."
centration may be averaged over periods not greater than one year.
(b) Except as authorized by the Commission pursuant to § 20.302 or
paragraph (a) of this section, no licensee shall possess, use, or transfer
licensed material in such a manner as to release into air or water in any unrestricted area any concentration of radioactive material in excess of the limits
specified in Appendix B, Table II of this part. For purposes of this paragraph, concentrations may be averaged over periods not greater than one
year.
(c) For purposes of this section, determinations as to the concentration
of radioactive material shall be made with respect to the point where such
material leaves the restricted area. Where the radioactive material leaves
the restricted area in a stack, tube, pipe, or similar conduit, the determination may be made with respect to the point where the material leaves such
conduit.
(d) The provisions of this section do not apply to disposal of radioactive
material into sanitary sewerage systems (see § 20.303).
§ 20.104 Medical diagnosis, therapy, and research. Nothing in the regulations in this part shall be interpreted as limiting the intentional exposure
of patients to radiation for the purpose of medical diagnosis or medical
therapy.
§ 20.105 Measures to be taken after excessive exposures. In the event
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that any individual in a restricted area receives a dose or is exposed to concentrations of radioactive material in excess of the permissible limits established in § 20.IOI, the licensee shall limit the weekly dose or exposure of the
individual to 10 percent of such permissible limit until such time as the
average weekly dose or exposure to the individual for the period beginning
with the week in which the excessive dose or exposure occurred is less than
the permissible limit established in § 20.101.
PRECAUTIONARY PROCEDURES

§ 20.2(H Surveys. (a) As used in the regulations in this part, "survey"
means an evaluation of the radiation hazards incident to the production, use,
release, disposal, or presence of radioactive materials or other sources of
radiation under a specific set of conditions. When appropriate, such evaluation includes a physical survey of the location of materials and equipment,
and measurements of levels of radiation or concentrations of radioactive
material present.
(b) Each licensee shall make or cause to be made such surveys as may be
necessary for him to comply with the regulations in this part.
§ 20.202 Personnel monitoring. (a) Each licensee shall supply appropriate personnel monitoring equipment to, and shall require the use of such
equipment by :
(I ) Each individual who enters a restricted area under such circumstances that he receives, or is likely to receive, a dose in excess of 25 percent
of the limits specified in Appendix A of this part ;
( 2) Each individual who enters a high radiation area.
(b) As used in this part,
( 1) "Personnel monitoring equipment" means devices designed to be
worn or carried by an individual for the purpose of measuring the dose
received (e. g., film badges, pocket chambers, pocket dosimeters, film rings,
etc.);
(2) "Radiation area" means any area, accessible to personnel, in which
there exists radiation, originating in whole or in part within licensed material, at such levels that a major portion of the body could receive in any
one hour a dose in excess of 5 millirem, or in any 5 consecutive days a dose
in excess of I so millirem ;
(3) "High radiation area" means any area, accessible to personnel, in
which there exists radiation originating in whole or in part within licensed
material at such levels that a major portion of the body could receive in
any one hour a dose in excess of 100 millirem.
§ 20.203 Caution signs, labels, and signals-(a) General. (I) Except
as otherwise authorized by the Commission, symbols prescribed by this
section shall use the conventional radiation caution colors (magenta or
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purple on yellow background). The symbol prescribed by this section is the
conventional three-bladed design:
RADIATION SYMBOL

r. Cross-hatched area is to be magenta or purple.
2.

Background is to be yellow.

I
I
I

I
I

I
I

&.~I

A

A.f'-+ifl4~!/2
I

I

I

I
I

I+-5A -+f

(2) In addition to the contents of signs and labels prescribed in this section, licensees may provide on or near such signs and labels any additional
information which may be appropriate in aiding individuals to minimize
exposure to radiation or to radioactive material.
· (b) Radiation areas. Each radiation area shall be conspicuously posted
with a sign or signs bearing the radiation caution symbol and the words :

CAUTION 1
RADIATION AREA
(c) High radiation areas. (1) Each high radiation area shall be conspicuously posted with a sign or signs bearing the radiation caution symbol
and the words :
CAUTION 1
HIGH RADIATION AREA
( 2) Each high radiation area shall be equipped with a control device
which shall either cause the level of radiation to be reduced below that at
which an individual might receive a dose of 100 millirem in one hour upon
1

Or "Danger."
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entry into the area or shall energize a conspicuous visible or audible alarm
signal in such a manner that the individual entering and the licensee or a
supervisor of the activity are made aware of the entry. In the case of a
high radiation area established for a period of 30 days or less, such control
device is not required.
(d) Airborne radioactivity areas. (I) As used in the regulations in this
part, "airborne radioactivity area" means ( i) any room, enclosure, or operating area in which airborne radioactive materials, composed wholly or partly
of licensed material, exist in concentrations in excess of the amounts specified in Appendix B, Table I, Column I of this part; or (ii) any room, enclosure, or operating area in which airborne radioactive material composed
wholly or partly of licensed material exists in concentrations which, averaged
over the number of hours in any week during which individuals are in the
area, exceed 25 percent of the amounts specified in Appendix B, Table I,
Column I of this part.
(2) Each airborne radioactivity area shall be conspicuously posted with
a sign or signs bearing the radiation caution symbol and the words :
CAUTION 1
AIRBORNE RADIOACTIVITY AREA
(e) Additiona! requirements. (I) Each area or room in which licensed
material is used or stored and which contains any radioactive material (other
than natural uranium or thorium) in an amount exceeding IO times the
quantity of such material specified in Appendix C of this part shall be conspicuously posted with a sign or signs bearing the radiation caution symbol
·
and the words :
CAUTION 1
RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL(S)
(2) Each area or room in which natural uranium or thorium is used or
stored in an amount exceeding one-hundred times the quantity specified in
Appendix C of this part shall be conspicuously posted with a sign or signs
bearing the radiation caution symbol and the words :

CAUTION 1
RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL(S)
(f) Containers. (I) Each container in which is transported, stored, or
used a quantity of any licensed material (other than natural uranium or
thorium) greater than the quantity of such material specified in Appendix C
of this part shall bear a durable, clearly visible label bearing the radiation
caution symbol and the words :
CAUTION 1
RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
1

Or "Danger."
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( 2) Each container in which natural uranium or thorium is transported,
stored, or used in a quantity greater than ten times the quantity specified in
Appendix C of this part shall bear a durable, cleai:-ly visible label bearing the
radiation caution symbol and the words :
CAUTION

1

RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
(3) Notwithstanding the provisions of subparagraphs {I) and (2) a
label shall not be required :
(i) If the concentration ofthe material in the container does not exceed
that specified in Appendix B, Table I, Column 2 of this part, or
(ii) For laboratory containers, such as beakers, flasks, and test tubes,
used transiently in laboratory procedures, when the user is present.
(4) Where containers are used for storage, the labels required in this
paragraph shall state also the quantities and kinds of radioactive materials
in the containers and the date of measurement of the quantities.
§ 20.204 Exceptions from posting requirements. Notwithstanding the
provisions of § 20.203,
(a) A room or area is not required to be posted with a caution sign because of the presence of a sealed source provided the radiation level twelve
inches from the surface of the source container or housing does not exceed:
five millirem per hour.
(b) Rooms or. other areas in hospitals are not required to be posted with
caution signs because of the presence of patients containing byproduct material provided that there are personnel in attendance whoshall.take the precautions necessary to prevent the exposure of any individual to radiation or
radioactive material in excess of the limits established in the regulations in
this part.
(c) Caution signs are not required to be posted at areas or rooms containing radioactive materials for periods of less than eight hours provided
that ( I) the materials are constantly attended during such periods by an
individual who shall take the precautions necessary to prevent the exposure
of any individual to radiation or radioactive materials in excess of the limits
established in the regulations in this part and ; ( 2) such area or room is
subject to the licensee's control.
§ 20.205 Exemptions for radioactive materials packaged for shipment..
Radioactive materials packaged and labeled in accordance with regulations
of the Interstate Commerce Commission shall be exempt from the labeling
and posting requirements of § 20.203 during shipment, provided that the
inside containers are labeled in accordance with the provisions of § 20.203
(f).
1

Or "Danger."
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§ 20.206 Instruction of personnel. All individuals working in or frequenting any portion of a restricted area shall be informed of the occurrence of
radioactive materials or of radiation in such portion, and shall be instructed
in the hazards of excessive exposure to such materials or radiation and in
precautions or procedures to minimize exposure.
§ 20.207 Storage of licensed material. Licensed materials stored in an unrestricted area shall be secured against unauthorized removal from the place
of storage.

WASTE DISPOSAL
§ 20.301 General requirement. No licensee shall dispose of licensed material except :
(a) By transfer to an authorized recipient as provided in the regulations
in Part 30, 40, or 70 of this chapter, whichever may be applicable; or
(b) As authorized pursuant to § 20.302 ; or
(c) As provided in § 20.303 or § 20.304, applicable respectively to the
disposal of licensed material by release into sanitary sewerage systems or
burial in soil, or in § 20.103 (Concentrations in Effluents to Unrestricted
Areas).
§ 20.302 Method for obtaining approval of proposed disposal procedures.
Any licensee or applicant for a license may apply to the Commission for approval of proposed procedures to dispose of licensed material in a manner
not otherwise authorized in the regulations in this chapter. Each application
should include a description of the licensed material and any other radio-.
active material involved, including the quantities and kinds of such material and the levels of radioactivity involved, and the proposed manner and
conditions of disposal. The application should also include an analysis and
evaluation of pertinent information as to the nature of the environment,
including topographical, geological, meteorological, and hydrological characteristics ; usage of ground and surface waters in the general area ; the
nature and location of other potentially affected facilities ; and procedures to
be observed to minimize the risk of unexpected or hazardous exposures.
§ 20.303 Disposal by release into sanitary sewerage systems. No licensee
shall discharge licensed material into a sa,nitary sewerage system unless :
(a) It is readily soluble or dispersible in water ; and
(b) The quantity of any licensed or other radioactive material released
into the system by the licensee in any one day does not exceed the larger of
subparagraphs ( 1) or ( 2) of this paragraph:
(I) The quantity which, if diluted by the average daily quantity of
sewage released into the sewer by the licensee, will result in an average concentration equal to the limits specified in Appendix B, Table I, Column 2 of
this part ; or
(2) Ten times the quantity of such material specified in Appendix C of
this part ; and
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(c) The quantity of any licensed or other radioactive material released in
any one month, if diluted by the average monthly quantity of water released
by the licensee, will not result in an average concentration exceeding the
limits specified in Appendix B, Table I, Column 2 of this part; and
(d) The gross quantity of licensed and other radioactive material released into the sewerage system by the licensee does not exceed one curie
per year.
Excreta from individuals undergoing medical diagnosis or therapy with
radioactive material shall be exempt from any limitations contained in this
section.
§ 20.304 Disposal by burial in soil. No licensee shall dispose of licensed
material by burial in soil unless :
(a) The total quantity of licensed and other radioactive materials buried
at any one location and time does not exceed, at the time of burial, 1 ,ooo
times the amount specified in Appendix C of this part; and
(b) Burial is at a minimum depth of four feet; and
(c) Successive burials are separated by distances of at least six feet and
not more than 12 burials are made in any year.
RECORD, REPORTS, AND NOTIFICATION
§ 20.401 Records of surveys, radiation monitoring, and disposal. (a)
Each licensee shall maintain records showing the radiation exposures of all
individuals subject to per5onnel monitoring control under § 20.202 of the
regulations in this part.
(b) Each licensee shall maintain records showing the name of each individual exposed to radiation pursuant to § 20.101 (a) (2) and the weekly
dose of each such individual for the 13 consecutive weeks of highest cumulative weekly dose.
(c) Each licensee shall maintain records in the same units used in the
appendices to this part, showing the results of surveys required by § 20.201
(b), and disposals made under §§ 20.302, 20.303, and 20.304.
§ 20.402 Reports of theft or loss of licensed material. Each licensee shall
report by telephone and telegraph to the Manager of the nearest Atomic
Energy Commission Operations Office listed in Appendix D, immediately
after its occurrence becomes known to the licensee, any loss or theft of
licensed material in such quantities and under such circumstances that it
appears to the licensee that a substantial hazard may result to persons in
unrestricted areas.
[22 F. R. 3389, May 14, 1957]
§ 20-403 Notifications and reports of incidents-(a) Immediate notification. Each licensee shall immediately notify the Manager of the nearest
Atomic Energy Commission Operations Office listed in Appendix D by. tele-
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phone and telegraph of any incident involving licensed material possessed
by him and which may have caused or threatens to cause :
(I) Exposure of any individual to 25 rems or more of radiation, including any radioactive material taken into the body ; or
{2) The release of radioactive material in concentrations which, if
averaged over a period of 24 hours, would exceed 5000 times the limits specified for such materials in Appendix B, Table 2; or
(3) A loss of one working week or more of the operation of any facilities
affected ; or
(4) Damage to property in excess of $Ioo,ooo.
(b) Twenty-four hour notification. Each licensee shall within 24 hours
notify the Manager of the nearest Atomic Energy Commission Operations
Office listed in Appendix D by telephone and telegraph of any incident involving licensed material possessed by him and which may have caused or
threatens to cause :
(I) Exposure of any individual to 3 rems or more of radiation, including
any radioactive material taken into the body ; or
(2) The release of radioactive material in concentrations which, if
averaged over a period of 24 hours, would exceed 500 times the limits specified for such materials in Appendix B, Table 2 ; or
(3) A loss of one day or more of the operation of any facilities affected;
or
(4) Damage to property in excess of $I,OOO.
(c) Thirty-day reports. Each licensee shall make a report in writing
within 30 days to the Director, Division .of Civilian Application, United
States Atomic Energy Commission, Washington 25, D. C., of each incident
involving licensed material possessed by him which appears to have resulted
in the exposure of an individual to radiation or to concentrations of radioactive material, or to have resulted iti levels of radiation or concentrations
of radioactive material, in excess of any applicable limits set forth in these
regulations or in the licensee's license. Each report required under this
paragraph shall describe the nature of the incident, the extent of exposure of
persons to radiation or to radioactive material, the levels of radiation and
concentrations of radioactive material involved, the cause of the incident,
and corrective steps taken or planned to assure against a recurrence of the
incident. A copy of each report shall be transmitted to the Manager of the
nearest Atomic Energy Commission Operations Office listed in Appendix D.
[22 F. R. 3389, May I4, I957]
EXCEPTIONS AND ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENT

§ 20.501 Applications for exemptiOtJs. The Commission may, upon application by any licensee· or upon its own initiative grant such exemptions
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from the requirements of the regulations in this part as it determines are
authorized by law and will not result in undue hazard to life or property.
§ 20.502 Additional requirements. The Commission may, by rule, regulation, or order, impose upon any licensee such requirements, in addition to
those established in the regulations in this part, as it deems appropriate or
necessary to protect health or to minimize danger to life or property.
ENFORCEMENT

§ 20.6o1 Violations. An injunction or other court order may be obtained
prohibiting any violation of any provision of the act or any regulation or
order issued thereunder. Any person who willfully violates any provision
of the act or any regulation or order issued thereunder may be guilty of a
crime and, upon conviction, may be punished by fine or imprisonment or
both, as provided by law.

APPENDIX

A

PERMISSIBLE WEEKLY DOSE

Dose in critical organs (mrem)
Skin at
·Blood
Lens
basal
of
layer of forming
eye
Parts of body
Radiation
epidermis organs Gonads
1
1
1
1
Whole body . . . . . . . . Any radiation with half6oo
300
300
300
value-layer greater than
I mm of soft tissue ....
Whole body ........ Any radiation with half1,500
300
300
300
value-layer less than I
.
mm of soft tissue ..... .
Hands and forearms Any radiation . . . . . . . . . . . • I,500
or feet and ankles
or head and neck.
1
For exposures of the whole body to X or gamma rays up to 3 mev, this condition
may be assumed to be met if the "air dose" does not exceed 300 mr, provided the dose
to the gonads does not exceed 300 mrem. "Air dose" means that the dose is measured
by an appropriate instrument in air in the region of highest dosage rate to be occupied
by an individual, without the presence of the human body or other absorbing and
scattering material.
• Exposure of these limited portions of the body under these conditions does not alter
the total weekly dose of 300 mrem permitted to the bloodforming organs in the main
portion of the body, to the gonads, or to the lens of the eye.
Conditions of exposure
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B

PERMISSIBLE CONCEN'I1lATIONS IN AIR AND WATER ABOVE NATURAL BACKGROUND

Table II

Table I
Material
Au·······················
Ag'"' ·····················
Ag"' ·····················
Am111 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
As........................ .
AF .................... .
Au,. .................... .
Au,. .................... .
Ba""+ La'............... .

Be' ...................... .
C" ..................... ..

eaca ······················
Cd +Ag
1110

1110

+

••••••••••••••

Ce'" Pr'" ............. .
Cl"' .................... ..
Cm102 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Co111 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Cr"' .................... ..
Cs... Ba................ .
Cu" .....•................
Eu'"' .................... .

+

F"' ...................... .
Fe• ..................... .
Fe"" ..................... .
Ga" ..................... .
Ge" ..................... .
H" (HTO or T.O) ...... ..
Ho,. .................... .
J"'l ..................... ..

If'IO .................... ..
Ir'"" ••............•......•
Ku ·······················

La"" .................... .

Lu'"
Mn• ·····················
.................... .
Mo• •••....••.....•.•....•
Na...................... .
Nb111 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ni"" ..••....•••...........
pi" ..................... ..

Pb- .................... .
Pb,.. RhlD> ............ ..
Pm111 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Po010 (soluble) ........... .
Po""' (insoluble) ......... .

+

Pr',. .................... .
P!fD (soluble) ........... .
P!fD (insoluble) ........ ..
Ra-+!
dr ...•...........
Rb10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Re....................... .
Rh....................... .
Rh... +dr ............... .
Ru1110 +Rh1110 • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Column I
Air (2)

1

1.6 X IO...
3.6X IO..,
I X IO...
8X IO-n
7X IO-e

9X I0-10

3·4 X

10...
IO...
2X 10...
I.3 X IO...
1.4 X 10...
9X 10...
2X IO...
2X 10...
I X 10...

8X

5 X Io-10

34X
24X

10...
IO..,
6X 10...
:ZX IO""
2X 10""
3-5 X Io...
1.8 X 10...
5 X IO...
I X 10...
1
I X 10
7X 10...
I X 10...
9X 10...
2.2 X IO""
1.5 X 10...
6X 10...
4 X 10...
1.5 X IO""

8 X 1o•
5 X 10...
5 X 10°
1.3 X 10•
5 X IO""
4 X JO-T

2X IO""
2X 10""
6 X 10_,
6 X 10-m
2 X 10-m
2.3 X IO""
6X 10-'"
6 X 10-'"

24 X

X
24 X
1.1

s• ...................... .
Sc....................... .

See footnotes at end of table.

IO-n

10...,
6
10
3X 10...,
I X 10...
8X 10...
3 X IO""
2 X 10_,

Column:z•
Water (3)
14

X

10...

13

4XI01

6X 10-•
6X 10...
9X 10...
2X 10...
6X 10...

3

X 10...
X 10...
2 X Io-•
1
I X 10""
7X 10-a
2.7 X 10...
SX 10...
I

1.5

14

4-5 X to...
2.5 X I0-1
I

1.3

X

10-1

X

10...
10...

3-3 X
:z6
27

5X
70

10-J.

9X 1o...

4 X 1o-"

2.7 X
4

X

10-a
4
10

34
70

5 X Io-•

40

2.4

X 1o...

I.2X 10...

7 X 10-•

10...
4 X Io~•

6X

4

2X 10

3

9X 1o...
I

4-5 X

IO""

X
9X
24 X

10...
10-a
10-•
10_,

1.2

sx

6X10""

4X
I.S X
I

5 X IO""
X Io-•
4 X I0-1
I.J X 10...

1.6

5

2.6

Column2•
.Water (3}

10-•
4
10

4

2X 10
ZX IO""
3X 10...
7X IO_.
1
10
I X 10-1
J.6 X IO...

zx

5 X to...
7X 10...

J.6x
24 X
I X
1.8 X

10...
10...
10...
10...
5X 10...
1.5
10...
8X 10...
3 X 10...
9X 10...

x

4X 10...

X 10...
9X 10-a
9 X J0-1
1.6x 10...
1.1

2.J
3X 10...
1.3 X 10...
9X 10...
1.4 X 10-a
1.1 X I0-1

24

4

1.5 X 10
14
8X 10...
4X 10...
2.5 X 10....
2X 10...
4
14 X 10
I X 10...
I X 10-1
3X 10""
3.6X 10_.
1.5 X 10...

4X
3X

10...

w-•

8X 10...
1.6 X 10...
2X1o-"
1
1.3 X I0
X 10...
3.6 X 10_.

s
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PERMISSIBLE CONCENTRATIONS IN AlB AND WATER ABOVE NATURAL BACKGROUND
Table II

Table I
1

Material
Sm1111

•••••••••••••••••••••

snua .••.••••.•••.•••••.••

sr- ..................... .
Sr"" + Y"" •...•......•.•.•
Tc" ..................... .
Te....................... .
Te119 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Tha. ... ·.......•..........
Th-natural (soluble) •.....
Th-natural (insoluble) ....
Tm110 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
U-natural (soluble)" ..... .
U-natural (insoluble)" .... .
U'"" (soluble) .•.•.........
(insoluble) •..........

u-

V'"
····················'··
Xe..................
-..•..
111
Xe
•••••••••••••••••••••
Y"' ...................... .
Zn"" ................• ; •..•

Column I
Air (2)
4 X Io-e
1.7 X 10-e
6X 10-e
6 X I0-1D
8 X 10-e
3X Io-r
1.2 X Io...
2X IO'"'
5 X 10-11
5 X 10-11
1.5 X IO...
5 X 10-11
5 X 10-11
4 X 10-10
5 X 10-11
3 X Io-e
1.3 X 10-e
5 X 10-e
1.2 X Io-r
6 X IO""'

Column2•
Water (3)
6X I0-1

5X
2X

I0-1
JO""

2.4 X Io-e
. 8 X Io..
8X IO...
3·3 X w ..
IO
I.5 X IO""'

8 X Io"1
2X IO""

4.sx.ic>-I.5
I.3 X IO...

'4X IO'"'1
6 X 10.2X I0""1

Column J 1
Air (2)
I.3 X IO"'"
6 X 10-e
2 X IO"'"
2 X I0-11
3 X Io...
I X IO-e
4 X IO"'"
6 X 10-e
1.7 X IO""u
1.7 X IO-U
5 X Io...
1.7 X IO-U
1.7 X IO-U
I X 10-11
1.6 X IO-U
I X IO...
4X 10...
1.7 X Io-r
4X Io•
2X 10...

Column2 1
Water (3)
ZX IO""
I.6 X 10...
7 X xo-e
8 X Io-a
3 X Io-a
3 X Io-a
I.I X xo-a

3 X 10""1

5 X Io-a
2.5 X 10-a
7 X xo-a

X

10-a

5X

IO-•

1.5

4X 10"'
I4X

IO""

2X 10... ''
6 X 10-a

Unidentified beta or gamma
emitters or any undetermined mixtures of beta or
I X 10...
I X 10...
gamma emitters ........ .
Unidentified alpha emitters
or any undetermined mixI X IO-"
tures of alpha emitters ...
1
Air concentrations are given in microcuries per milliliter of air.
1
Water concentrations are given in microcuries per milliliter of water. These figures
also apply to foodstuffs in microcuries per gram (wet-weight) .
. • For enriched uranium the same radioactivities per unit volume as those for natural
uranium are applicable. It should be noted that the contribution of U-234 to the gross
activity of enriched uranium is 20-40 times that of the U-235.
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Af!!I"' ...................... .
Agm

..................... .

As••, As................... .
Au""' ...................... .
Au""' ...................... .
Ba140 +La"" ............... .
Be• ....................... .

c• ....................... .

Ca'" ...................... .
Cd100 +Ag""' .............. .

I

IO
IO
IO

IO
I

so
so
10

IO

Ce'"+ Pr'" ............... .
00

Cl • • • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Co"' ·······················
Cr"' ...................... .
Cs137 Ba137 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . •
Cu"'

C

Microcuries

Material

+

...................... .

Eu'"' ...................... .
P ........................ .
Fe"" ....................... .
Fe........................ .
Ga........................ .
11

Ge • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
H"(HTO or H".O) ......... .
Illll ....................... .

Inn• ...................... .
Ir""' ...................•....
K'"
La"" ························
...................... .
Mn........................ .
Mn........................ .
Mo"" ....•.............•....
Na........................ .
Na10 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Nb"' ...................... .

I

so
I

so
I

so
so
I

IO

so
2SO

IO
I
IO

IO
IO
I

so

+

Pd101
Pd100
Pm1..

Po210
Pr141

Material
Rh101 • • • • • • • •

• •

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• • • • •
• • • • • • • • • • • •• • • . . . • • • •

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• • • • •

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ... • • • •

IO
O.I

IO

o.I

Rb.. .......................

IO

Re'"" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . .
Rh""' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . .
Ru100 + Rh100 • • • • • • • • • .. • • • •
S85 • • • • • • • • • • • · · · · · · · · . . ••• •
Sb110 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• •• • • •
Sc'" ....................... .
Sm,.. .. ... . .. ...... .... ....
snua . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . .

IO

Sr"" ....................... .
Sr""
Y"" .. . . .. . . . . . .. . .. .

+

Ta182

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • .. • • • •

Tc""

...................... .

Tc"" ...................... .
TeU7 . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. .. .. . ...
Te120 ••• ••• . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Th (natural) . . . . .. . . . .. . . . .
Tl"" .......................
Tritium. See H". . . . . . . .. . . . .
U (natural) . :.. . . . . . .... .. .

U""" ... ............... .....

u--u-ao . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . .

V'" ························

w=
················· .....
yoo ...................... .

IO
IO

Y"' ....................... .
Zn"' . .. . . ... . . . . . . . . . .. . . . .
Unidentified radioactive materials or any of the above in
unknown mixtures . . . . . . . .

IO

Microcuries
so
Io

Pu................... .

Ra... ..... ..... .. ... ...... ..

10
IO

Ni......................... .
Ni"" .....•..................

p ......................... .

1127

Io
I

so
I

IO

IO

o.I
IO

IO
I

so
so
2SO

so
I

so
I

IO
IO

O.I

NoTE: For purposes of §§ 20.203 and 20.304, where there is involved a
combination of isotopes in known amounts the limit for the combination
should be derived as follows: Determine, for each isotope in the combination, the ratio between the quantity present in the combination and the limit
otherwise established for the specific isoptope when not in combination.
The sum of such ratios for all the isoptopes in the combination may not
exceed "1" (i.e., "unity").
ExAMPLE: For purposes of § 20.304, if a particular batch contains 2,000
p.e of Au128 and 25,000 p.e of C 14, it may also include not more than 3,000 p.e
of P 31 • This limit was determined as follows:
2

.. r Au
'ooo ,....
10,000 p.C

198

.. r C + 3 'ooo r.. r P
+ 25 'ooo ,....
14

50,000 p.C

81

=I

10,000 p.C

The denominator in each of the above ratios was obtained by multiplying the
figure in the table by 1000 as provided in § 20.304.
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UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION OPERATIONS OFFICES

Mail address
Telegraph address
Albuquerque Operations Office .................... P. 0. Box 5400, Albuquerque, N. Mex ............. Albuquerque, N. Mex.
Chicago Operations Office .. P. 0. Box 59, Lemont, III... Lemont, Ill.
Grand Junction Operations
Office .................. Grand Junction, Colo....... Grand Junction, Colo.
Hanford Operations Office .. P. 0. Box 550, Richland,
Wash ................... Richland, Wash.
Idaho Operations Office .•.• P. 0. Box I22I, Idaho Falls,
Idaho .................. (Telegram), 550 Second St.,
Idaho Falls, Idaho.
(Teletype), Idaho Falls,
New York Operations OfIdaho.
fice .................... 70 Columbus Ave., New
York 23, N. Y .......... (Telegram), 70 Columbus
Ave., New York 23, N.Y.
Oak Ridge Operations Of(Teletype), New York, N.Y.
fice .................... P. 0. Box E, Oak Ridge,
Tenn. . ................. Oak Ridge, Tenn.
San Francisco Operations
Office .................. sr8 17th St., Oakland 12,
Calif; ................... 518 17th St., Oakland 12,
Savannah River Operations
Calif.
Office .................. P. 0. Box A, Aiken, S. C. .. Augusta, Ga.
Schenectady Operations Office .................... P. 0. Box ro69, Schenectady, N. Y ............... (Telegram), Knolls Atomic
Power Laboratory, Schenectady, N. Y.
(Teletype), Schenectady,
N.Y.
[22 F. R. 3389, May 14, 1957]
NOTE: The record keeping and reporting requirements contained herein have been
approved by the Bureau of the Budget in accordance with the Federal Reports Act of
1942.

ITEM 2
CALIFORNIA GENERAL INDUSTRY SAFETY ORDERS

Title 8, Group 6
Article 53· Radioactivity and Ionizing Radiation
38oo. Purpose. Article 53 sets up minimum standards for the protection
of employees exposed to potentially injurious levels of ionizing radiation or
potentially injurious quantities of radioactive materials but does not include
such ionizing radiation or radioactive materials as cosmic radiation or normal
radon or thoron in the. atmosphere.
3801. Definitions. (a) "Roentgen" (r) is the international unit of quantity of x-rays or gaffillla rays.
(b) "Milliroentgen" (mr) is one thousandth of a roentgen.
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(c) "Rad" is the unit of absorbed dose, defined as 100 ergs per gram of
tissue.
(d) "Totally protective installation" is one where the radiating equipment or material is surrounded by barriers such that no person has access
to· any place where exposure can be more than seven milliroentgens in an
hour. If the radiation is not properly measurable in roentgens, then the
biological effect shall be no greater than that from seven mr ~!;~-rays in an
hour.
(e) "Sealed container" means one from which radioactive contents cannot escape whether the radiations from them do or not.
(£) "Shielded container" means one such that the radiations produced
by the equipment or materials within it will measure no more than 200 milliroentgens in an hour at any point on the outside surface of the container
and no more than 10 milliroentgens in an hour at a distance of one meter
from the container. In the case of radiations not properly measurable in
roentgens, the biological effect shall be no greater than that from x-rays in
the above named amounts.
(g) "Curie" is the international unit of radioactivity.
(h) "Integral absorbed dose" (total body dose) is the total energy absorbed throughout a given body or region of interest. The unit is the
gramrad (equal to 1/100,000 joule).
38o2. Supervision and Instruction. (a) All operations involving exposure
to potentially injurious levels of ionizing radiation or potentially injurious
quantities of radioactive materials shall be under the supervision of competent technical personnel. A competent technical person is one who is capable of evaluating the radiation exposure to employees and specifying such
protection as required by these orders.
(b) Every employee who may be regularly or frequently exposed to
ionizing radiation shall be instructed in the hazards he may encounter in the
course of his duties and in methods of protecting himself and others against
them.
38o3. Ma.rimJim Permissible Exposures. (a) No employee shall be
exposed to more than 0.3r of x-rays or gamma rays, or other ionizing radiation producing equivalent biologic effect, in a week. Measured or presumed
exposure of any employee of more than 0.3r in any week shall be reported
to the medical supervisor. See Section 38II.
N ole: The maximum allowable exposures set forth in 38o3
are derived from best available authorities on the subject. However, since it is probable that further experience may lead to revision of some of these figures, the Division of Industrial Safety
plans to hold hearings on revisions of 38o3 periodically. The following handbooks should be consulted for a more thorough and
detailed discussion of the subject of radiological health safety,
including more details on the maximum allowable exposures in
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the table in 38o3(b). Reference: National Bureau of Standards
Handbooks Nos. 23, 27, 41, 42, 47, 48, 49, so, sr, 52, and 55·

(b) For the purpose of these orders the followi~g table gives the biological effect of other ionizing radiations equivalent to unit x-ray exposure, and
the permissible limits for whole body exposed .and for hands only exposed.
(See table below.)
(c) Concentrations of radioactive substances in the air of workrooms or
other locations in which employees are regularly or frequently present shall
not be greater than :
(I) 5 X xo-12 microcuries per cubic centimeter for alpha
emitters.
(2) w-9 microcuries per cubic centimeter for beta and gamma
emitters.
Relative
Type of
Biological
Radiation
Effect
Exposure
X-rays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
O.Jr
I
O.Jr
Gamma rays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
I
Beta rays .. .. .. . .. . .. . .. . .. .
Proton rays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Alpha rays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Fast neutrons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Thermal neutrons . . . . . . . . . . .
5
._

Maximum Permissible
Absorbed Dose as Measured
in Basal Layer of Epidermis
Entire Body
0.5
rads
0.5
rads
0.5
rads
0.05
rads
0.025 rads
0.05 rads
o.I
rads

Hands Only
1.5
rads
1.5
rads
1.5
rads
O.I5 rads
0.075 rads
O.I5 rads
O.J
rads

For more detailed maximum permissible amounts of radioisotopes in the
human body and maximum permissible concentrations in air and water,
see National Bureau of Standards Handbook No. 52.
38o4. Monitoring. (a) Workrooms or other locations in which material
giving rise to ionizing radiation is used or handled shall be inspected for
hazardous amounts of radiation at scheduled intervals. The Division of
Industrial Safety may prescribe a monitoring schedule for a particular
operation but such a schedule is subject to an immediate change if it is indicafed by personnel monitors or other means that more frequent inspections
are necessary to maintain exposures below those set forth in 38o3. When
such materials are received, transferred, or used for different operations,
they shall be monitored to assure safe handling. Radioactive materials in
sealed containers shall be inspected for leaks at least yearly.

Note: National Bureau of Standards Handbook No. 51, Radiological Monitoring Methods and Instruments, should be consulted
for details of radiological monitoring.
(b) Equipment, machines or totally protective installations giving rise
to ionizing radiation shall be surveyed to determine the stray radiation level
when first installed and thereafter whenever any change is made in the
installation or its use which would affect its protective features, but in no
case shall monitoring be done less often than yearly. Where such equipment, machines or installations are in such locations or are so constructed
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that vibration or other physical conditions may cause changes in the protective features, inspection of protective devices and check for stray radiation shall be made at least every six months and also whenever it is indicated,
by personnel monitors or other means, that more frequent inspections are
necessary to maintain exposures below those set forth in 38o3.
(c) The monitoring and inspections required by (a) and (b) shall be
done by a competent person with instruments adequate to d~"-.:c·.-er hazardous amounts of whatever radiations the machines or materials are producing. Records of such inspection shall be reviewed by the competent technical
person and shall be filed as a permanent record available to representatives
of the division. These records shall show the dates and results of the
monitoring and the observations, recommendations or comments of the
competent technical personnel.
(d) Employees who may be subjected to ionizing radiation which could
potentially exceed the exposures referred to in 38o3 shall wear appropriate
indicating or monitoring devices to show the amount of ionizing radiation
to which such employees have been subjected. Persotinel monitoring devices
shall be worn on that part of the body expected to receive the greatest exposure. Records of exposure as recorded by these devices shall be reviewed
by the competent technical person and shall be filed as a permanent record
available to representatives of the division.
38o5. Maintenance of Protective Devices. (a) Whenever it is found,
by monitoring or otherwise, that any shielding or other protective device is
defective, insufficient or inoperative, such. shielding or device shall be
promptly repaired or augmented as may be needed, and operations in
volving productions of ionizing radiation shall not be resumed until adequate
repairs or changes are completed.
(b) Whenever it is found, by personnel monitoring or otherwise, that any
employee is exposed to a weekly dosage of ionizing radiation greater than
that specified in 38o3, immediate steps shall be taken to locate the condition
giving rise to such exposure, and the operation giving rise to the exposure
shall be discontinued until such condition is corrected. The employees who
have been exposed to excessive radiation shall be immediately referred to
the medical supervisor.
38o6. Handling of Radioactive Materials. Wherever radioactive materials are handled except in sealed containers :
(a) General or local exhaust ventilation shall be provided adequate to
prevent concentrations of radioactive substances in the air greater than
those set forth in 38o3 and National Bureau of Standards Handbook No. 52.
(b) Spillage or other contamination of floors, walls or workbenches
shall be removed promptly and monitored for adequate decontamination.
In the event of a spill of a significant quantity of long-lived material the
employer shall immediately notify the Division of Industrial Safety. Cloth-

1132

STATE REGULATION

ing contaminated by spillage shall be changed promptly and persons
monitored for adequate decontamination. Contaminated clothing shall be
decontaminated by special decontamination facilities equipped to safely cope
with the problem. See National Bureau of Standards Handbooks Nos. 42
and 48.
(c) Radioactive wastes shall not be allowed to accumulate in sufficient
amounts to cause hazardous exposures and shall be disposed of in such
manner as will not cause harmful concentrations of radioactive material in
either the atmosphere or other environment. See Bureau of Standards
Handbooks Nos. 42, 48, and 49·
(d) Surfaces shall be designed and used as to afford easy and safe
decontamination.- See National Bureau of Standards Handbook No. 48 for
details.
(e) Smoking or eating shall not be permitted in workrooms. Food,
tobacco, or personal effects such as purses, combs or cosmetics shall not
be set down in such rooms,
(f) At the close of each work period, workers' faces, hands, hair and
clothes shall be inspected for contamination by radioactive material. Such
inspeCtion shall be made by a competent person. Unsafe garments shall be
decontaminated or adequately disposed of. Skin surfaces shall be decontaminated. Protective clothing or other protective devices, which may include gowns, coats or overalls, shoes or overshoes, caps, hoods, or respiratory
protection, shall be provided by the employer and used by the employee.
Such personal safety devices or safeguards shall be suitable and adequate
to provide protection against exposure to the radioactive materials being
handled. If contamination of clothing or any part of the body is possible, both shall be monitored before leaving the work area, and suitable
action (disposal or decontamination) taken. When skin surfaces have become contaminated the medical supervisor shall be notified. See National
Bureau of Standards Handbooks Nos. 42, 48, and 52, and Sections 38o3 and
381 I in these orders for more details.
(g) Where monitoring indicates contamination, floors and benches shall
be cleaned by a process which will prevent the dispersion of radioactive
dust. Dry sweeping with broom or brush is prohibited.
(h) All working surfaces where radioactive materials are handled shall
be provided with illumination of not less than 50 foot-candles.
38o7. Storage of Radioactive Materials. (a) Radioactive materials stored
in a workroom or other location where employees are regularly or frequently
present shall be enclosed in containers of such thickness and construction
that employees will not be exposed to radiation in amounts greater than
those set forth in 3803.
(b) Vaults or rooms in which substances giving rise to ionizing radiation
are stored shall be so isolated by construction, location or a combination of
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the two that no employee shall in the course of his employment be exposed
to radiation in quantities greater than those set forth in 38o3. Such rooms
or vaults shall be ventilated as required by 38o6 (a) unless all radioactive
materials are stored in sealed containers.
·(c) Each container of radioactive materials in storage shall be labeled to
indicate:
That the material is radioactive.
(2) The chemical name of the material or the isotope.
(3) The amount or quantity of the radioactive material.
( 4) The date received and the person responsible for the
material.
( 1)

(d) Radioactive materials should be housed in fireproof containers and
preferably placed in a fireproof room or enlosure for storage purposes.·
38o8. Warning Signs or Signals. (a) All locations or installations where
ionizing radiation from radioactive materials may be encountered in injurious amounts shall be marked or posted with warning signs, signals
or lights. Purple shall be the basic color for the radioactive warning symbol,
and the background should be yellow.
(b) All locations where machines may produce injurious amounts of
ionizing radiation shall be provided with warning signals or lights activated
when the machine is producing such radiation.
3&>9. Totally Protective Installations. (a) No employee shall be permitted to remain within the confines of such an installation while ionizing
radiation is being produced or generated.
(b) Every entrance to such an installation shall be provided with an electrically contacted or interlocked door or gate so arranged that no person or
part of body can enter the enclosure while the source of ionizing radiation
is in operation. Visible or audible signals shall be provided in each such
enclosure and shall be so arranged as to be in continuous operation while
the source of ionizing radiation is producing radiation.
(c) At least one door shall be provided with knobs or handles on the inside of the door so that anyone who may have been locked in accidentally
can leave the enclosure without delay.
3810. Special Orders for Radium Dial Painting. (a) All pertinent provisions of 38oo to 38o9 inclusive shall apply to radium dial painting operations. See National Bureau of Standards Handbook No. 27 for additional
details.
(b) All radioactive luminous compounds shall be mixed with adhesive
before being applied; no dry method of application of powder shall be used.
Mixing and painting shall be done under a mechanically ventilated hood.
(c) When in use, radioactive luminous paint shall be kept in a porcelain
or other impervious container of proper size to avoid spillage and shall be
set in a lead block. Not more than one container shall be on any work bench
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at any time, and no container shall contain more than one gram of mixed
luminous compound. The container shall provide at least one inch of lead
protection and shall be covered when the paint is not in use.
(d) Brushes in use for radium dial painting shall be kept on racks in
the ventilated hood so that the bristle part does not touch the table top.
Solvents and small wiping papers shall be used to clean brushes. Wiping
papers shall be discarded after a single use and placed in covered containers,
and they shall be disposed of as radioactive waste material.
(e) Brushes shall never be pointed in the mouth.
(f) Removal of radioactive paints from dials shall be done under liquid.
Dry scraping or removal of luminous compounds by buffing is prohibited.
(g) Drying racks in the workroom shall be equipped with exhaust
ventilation which will remove radon and prevent its dispersal in the workroom. Finished work shall be placed in the drying racks promptly and
shall not be allowed to accumulate on work benches.
3811. Medical Supervision. (a) Each employee exposed to ionizing
radiation shall be under the supervision of or in consultation with a competent medical expert experienced in the diagnosis of the harmful effects of
ionizing radiation. Such supervision shall include an examination prior to
starting work with a source of ionizing radiation and again at intervals not
less than once yearly while so employed. Certification of such supervision
shall be kept current and shall be posted conspicuously in the place of employment. Such notice shall contain (I) the name of the competent medical
expert providing the medical supervision and ( 2) the number and names of
the employees under supervision and their occupation. The employer shall
be responsible for the provision of the necessary medical supervision.
(b) When in the opinion of the medical supervisor continued exposure
to ionizing radiation is likely to injure an employee's health, such employee
shall be removed from the exposure. See Section 3803(a) in these orders.
38I2. Devices Containing Radioactive Materials That Are Used as
Hand Tools or Worn on the Person. (a) The employer shall not require or
permit the use of such devices unless a complete set of instructions is supplied with the device. The instructions must contain at least the following
information:
(I ) A statement that the device has been tested and is free from
radioactive contamination on its external surfaces. The name of
the person who made the test and the date on which it was made
shall be included in the statement.
(2) Instructions for operation and use, with specific reference
to the nature of the danger if the device should become defective,
permitting the escape of sources of ionizing radiation.
(3) Detailed instructions giving proper methods of decontamination in the event of contamination.
(4) Instructions for safe disposal of damaged or wornout
devices.
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(b) Each device must be legibly tabled with words or phrases equivalent
to the following:
WARNING: Contains Radioactive Material
Handle With Care
DO NOT DISMANTLE

Note: The division may require additional warning words or precautionary statements on the label where the potential exposure justifies such additional precautions.
J8IJ.

Radioactive Luminous Compounds. The container of every radio-

activ~ lu~inous compound shall be labeled or tagged as follows:

DANGER ! Contains radioactive substance.
POISON
(Name substance)
Do not take internally.
A void contact with skin.
Do not breathe dust, vapors, or gas.

ITEM 3
NEw YoRK INDUSTRIAL CoDE RuLE No.

38

RADIATION PROTECTION

Finding of Fact
The Board finds that every industry, trade, occupation and process involving the use or presence of radioactive material or radiation-producing
equipment involves elements of danger to the lives, health and safety of
persons employed therein. The Board further finds that special regulations
are necessary for the protection of such persons, in that such material and
equipment may emit invisible and imperceptible rays or particles having the
property of producing deleterious or fatal effects, immediate or deferred,
upon and within the human body.
J8-I APPLiCATION

This rule applies to every place and every operation where any employee
in the course of his work may be exposed to radiation in excess of one
tenth the permissible weekly dose as set forth in this rule except the following places and installations which are subject to the provisions of the New
York State sanitary code relating to ionizing radiation, to wit:
I. Hospitals, institutions, medical clinics, medical offices, dental offices
and podiatry offices.
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2. Veterinary clinics and veterinary offices.
3· Educational institutions.
4· Commercial, private or research laboratories performing diagnostic
procedures or handling equipment or material for medical use.

38-2

ExEMPTIONS

Except as herein specifically provided, every operation involving only the
following devices, appliances and materials are hereby exempted from the
application of this rule :
1. Small lots of timepieces, instruments, novelties or devices containing
self-luminous elements during the course of retail sale, during industrial
use or during repair. The repair and refinishing of the self-luminous elements themselves, however, are not exempted.
2. Naturally radioactive materials of a degree of specific radioactivity
approximately equivalent to that of potassium as it occurs normally.
3· Electrical equipment having thermionic conduction current and
operated at voltages less than 16 kilovolts which is not primarily intended
·
to produce radiation.
4· Domestic television receivers except during production testing.
S· Potentially radiation-producing equipment which is not being used or
operated in such manner as to produce radiation, e.g., during storage or
shipping or during the course of .retail sale. Such equipment is not, however, exempted from the labeling requirements of this rule.
6. Any radioactive material being transported by common carrier and
subject to the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission or other
governmental agency having jurisdiction.·
7· Total quantities of the following radioactive material not exceeding
the amounts specified in Columns I and 2 below :
Column 1
Unsealed
(Microcuries)
Antimony 124 (Sb 124).....................
1
10
Arsenic 76 (As 76)..........................
Arsenic 77 (As 77)..........................
10
Barium 14o--Lanthanum 140 (Ba La 140).....
1
Beryllium (Be 7)............................
so
Cadmium 109-Silver 109 (Cd Ag 109).......
10
Calcium 4S (Ca 4S).........................
10
Carbon 14 (C 14)...........................
so
Cerium 144-Praseodymium 144 (Ce Pr 144)..
1
Cesium 137-Barium 137 (Cs Ba 137) ........ .
Chlorine 36 (Cl 36).........................
1
so
Chromium 51 (Ch 51).......................
Cobalt 6o (Co 6o) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1
so
Copper 64 (Cu 64)..........................
Europium 154 (Eu IS4).....................
1
Fluorine 18 (F 18)..........................
so
Gallium 72 (Ga 72)..........................
10
Germanium 71 (Ge 71)......................
so
Gold 198 (Au 198) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .
10

Column2
Sealed
(Microcuries)
10
10
10
10

so

10

10

so

10
10
10

so
so
10
so
10
so
10

10
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Column 1
Unsealed
(Microcuries)
IO
Gold 199 (Au 199)..........................
Hydrogen 3 (Tritium) (H 3)................
250
Indium 114 (In 114).........................
I
10
Iodine 131 (I 131)...........................
Iridium 192 (lr 192).........................
IO
Iron 55 (Fe 55).............................
so
Iron 59 (Fe 59).............................
I
10
Lanthanum (La 140)....... •. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Manganese 52 (Mn 52) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I
so
Manganese 56 (Mn 56) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Molybdenum 99 (Mo 99)....................
IO
Nickel 59 (Ni 59). . · ·. · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Nickel 63. (Ni 63) ............... · .. · · · · · · · · ·
Niobium 95 (Nb 95)........................
10
Palladium 109 (Pd 109).... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
to
Palladium 103-Rhodium 103 (Pd Rh 103)....
50
Phosphorus 32 (P 32).......................
10
Polonium 210 (Po 210)......................
0.1
Potassium 42 (K 42)........................
IO
Praseodymium 143 (Pr 143) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
IO
Promethium 147 (Pm 147)...................
IO
Radium 226 (Ra 226)........................
1
10
Rhenium 186 (Re 186)......... . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Rhodium 105 (Rh 105)......................
10
Rubidium 86 (Rd 86)........... . . . . . . . . . . . .
10
Ruthenium tOO-Rhodium 1o6 (Ru Rh 106)...
I
Samarium 153 (Sm 153).....................
IO
Scandium 46 (Sc 46).. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I
Silver 105 (Ag 105) ....................... .
Silver111 (Ag111).........................
10
Sodium 22 (Na 22).........................
10
Sodium 24 (Na 24)....... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
10
Strontium 8g (Sr Sg).......................
1
Strontium go-Yttrium 90 (Sr Y go).........
0.1
Sulfur 35 (S 3S)............................
so
Tantalum 182 (Ta 182).....................
10
Technetium g6 (Tc g6)...... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I
1
Technetium 99 (Tc 99).......... . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tellurium I27 (Te 127) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
10
Tellurium I29 (Te 129) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I
so
Thallium 204 (TI 204)......................
Tin 113 (Sn 113)...........................
IO
Tungsten 181 (W I8I)... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
IO
TWigsten t8S (W t8S)......................
10
Vanadium 48 (V 48) ....................... .
Yttrium go (Y go) .................•.......•
Yttrium 91 (Y 91) ......................... .
Zinc 6s (Zn 6s)..................... . . . . . . . .
10
Natural Uranium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,000
Natural Thorium . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,000

Column2
Sealed
( Microcuries)
10
2SO

10
10
10

so

10
10
10

so

10
10
10
10
10

so

10

10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
I

so

10
10
IU

10
10
50
10
100

10
10
10
10
10
. 10,000
10,000

Such materials however, are not exempted from the labeling requirements
of this rule.
8. Any other radiation-producing device or radiation appliance incorporating either radioactive materials or radiation-producing equipment which
the Board finds, either by variation or by approval, to be exempt from the
application of this rule. ·
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38-3 DEFINITIONS
As used herein and for the purposes of this rule, the following terms
mean:
38-3.I Airborne Radioactive Material. Airborne radioactive material in
any form such as dusts, fumes, mists or gases.
38-3.2 Approved. In compliance with a subsisting resolution of approval
adopted by the Board.
38-3.3 Board. The Board of Standards and Appeals of the New York
State Department of Labor.
38-3.4 Commissioner. The Industrial Commissioner of the State of
New York.
38-3.5 Controlled Area. Any area access to which is restricted by the
owner.
38-3.6 Dose. Radiation received by an individual during exposure thereto
expressed in "mrem." The dose for an individual includes all doses to the
region of interest from all types and energies of radiation.
38-3.7 Dose Rate. The dose per unit of time.
38-3.8 Employee. A person employed; one who works for wages or
salary in the service of another.
38-3.9 Exposure. The presence of an individual in a field of radiation.
38-3.10 High Airborne Concentration Area. Any room, enclosure or
area of operation accessible to employees in which airborne radioactive rna-·
terial exists in excess of the amounts specified in 38-6.I, Table I, at any one
time or in excess of 25 percent of the amounts specified in 38-6.1, Table I,
averaged over a period of one week.
38-3.1 I High Radiation Area. A radiation area accessible to employees
in which there exists a radiation level in excess of 100 millirem in any one
hour.
38-3.12 Installation. A location where for a period of more than 30
days one. or more sources of radiation are used, operated or stored. The
confines of an installation shall be as designated by the owner. A part of a
building, an entire building or a plant may be designated ·as an installation.
38-3.13 Mobile Source. A source of radiation used or operated outside
an installation.
38-3.14 Owner-of an Installation. The person or organization having
by law the administrative control of a source or radiation located within
the confines of the installation, whether as proprietor, lessee, or otherwise.
Of a Mobile Source. The person or organization having by law the administrative control thereof, whether as owner, lessee, contractor or otherwise.
38-3.15 Personnel Monitoring Equipment. Devices designed to be worn
or carried by an individual for the purpose of measuring radiation received
by him. Examples of personnel monitoring equipment include film badges,
pocket chambers, pocket dosimeters and film rings.
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38-3.I6 Radiation. Alpha and beta particles, electrons, protons, neutrons,
gamma and x-rays and all other radiations which produce ionizations directly or indirectly but not electromagnetic radiations other than gamma and
x-rays.
38-3.I7 Radiation Area. Any part of an installation accessible to employees in which there exists a radiation level over 5 millirem in any one
hour or over ISO millirem in any seven consecutive days.
38-3.I8 Radiation Worker. A person entrusted with or put in charge
of a source of radiation by the owner of such source for the purpose
of actually using the radiation thereof for a prescribed purpose.
38-3.I9 Radiation of Very Low Penetrating Power. Radiation whose
half value layer is less than one millimeter of soft tissue.
38-3.20 Radiation-Producing Equipment. Any equipment producing
radiation by the application of electrical energy. ·
38-3.2I Radiation Safety Physician. A duly licensed physician who has
had training or experience in the biological or physiological effects of radiation.
38-3.22 Radiation Safety Officer. A person qualified by training and
experience in radiological science and the control of the health hazards of
radiation to perform dependable radiation protection surveys and to assume
all responsibilities required of him under this rule.
38-3.23 Radiation Safety Supervisor. A person employed at supervisory
level who has been sufficiently instructed and trained to manage the application of all protective techniques applicable to the radiation areas within an
installation to the satisfaction of a radiation safety officer.
38-3.24 Radioactive Material. Any material either solid, liquid or gas,
which emits radiation spontaneously.
38-3.25 Sealed Source. Radioactive material that is encased in and is to
be used in a container in a manner intended to prevent leakage of the radioactive material.
38-3.26 Shall. The word "shall" is always mandatory.
38-3.27 Survey. An evaluation of the radiation hazards associated with
each source of radiation under normal use or storage conditions. Such an
evaluation may include a physical survey of the location of each source and
the measurement of the dose rate of radiation therefrom.
38-3.28 Weekly Dose. The total dose received by an individual in any
period of 7 consecutive days.
38-3.29 Weekly Intake. The total amount of radioactive material taken
into an individual's body in any period of seven consecutive days.
38-4 REGISTRATION
38-4.I Installations. The owner of every installation shall register the
same or cause it to be registered with the Industrial Commissioner. Such
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registration shall be in a form acceptable to the Commissioner, and shall
include the following:
(a) The name and address of the owner.
(b) A designation of the confines of the installation.
(c) A designation of the type or types of sources of radiation expected
to be in the installation. (For example, x-ray machines, particle accelerators,
sealed radioactive sources, unsealed radioactive material.)
(d) For each type of source designated in (c), an estim11ote of the maximum number of sources of radiation expected to be in the installation at any
one time, and an estimate of the maximum size or rating of such sources of
radiation. (For example, s x-ray machines, maximum rating 2SO kilovolts,
S milliamperes; 75 sealed gamma ray sources, IS millicuries each ; so millicuries of unsealed radioactive material.)
(e) The name, address, qualifications and signature of the radiation
safety officer or other person in charge of radiation protection for the
installation.
38-4.2 Mobile Sources. Every mobile source shall be registered by its
owner with the Commissioner.
Such registration shall be in a form acceptable to the Commissioner and
shall include the following :
(a) Name and address of owner.
(b) Type of source and its size or rating. (For example, 2 x-ray machines, 2so KV, S milliamps.)
(c) Name and address and the qualifications and signature of the radiation safety officer or other person in charge of radiation protection for the
source.
38-4.3 Time of Registration. Existing installations and mobile sources
shall be registered within ninety (go) days after the effective date of this
rule and every new installation and mobile source shall be registered before
it is placed in operation.
38-4.4 Changes in Installations. The owner of every registered installation or mobile source shall advise the Commissioner forthwith of all changes
which may substantially increase the potential hazard to any employee.
38-s CoNTRoL oF ExPosURE
38-s.I Control-General. The owner of every source shall shield, protect
or isolate the same or arrange and control exposure thereto so that no
employee in the course of his work receives a dose in excess of the permissible limits specified in 38-6.
38-s.2 Supervision Required-General. The owner of every installation
and every mobile source shall provide or cause to be provided the safety
measures required by this rule and shall designate a radiation safety supervisor who shall maintain such safety measures in accordance with this rule.
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38-5.3 Supervision Required-High Hazards. The owner of a source
creating a high radiation area or a high airborne concentration area shall
designate a radiation safety officer as herein defined. Such officer shall
cause to be provided the required safety measures with respect to such areas.
38-5-4 Control Outside an Installation. The owner of every source shall
shield, isolate, protect or otherwise arrange and control the same so that
radiation cannot penetrate walls, partitions, floors, ceilings c,. "'ther enclosing structural portions delimiting the source as a whole to an extent capable
of exposing employees of himself or another outside the installation to radiation in excess of 10% of the permissible weekly dose as specified in 38-6.
38-5.5 Maintenance. The owner of protection devices required by this
rule shall maintain them in good repair and proper operating condition.
38-5.6 Control of Airborne Radioactive Material. Airborne Radioactive
Material shall be controlled by means of local exhaust ventilation, isolation
of the process, approved respiratory equipment or other effective means as
may be necessary to maintain the average concentration of inhaled or ingested radioactive material within the limits specified in 38-6.1, paragraph 7,
Table I, of this rule.
38-5.7 Mobile Sources. The placing in storage, the transportation and
the use of every mobile source shall be _under the supervision of a radiation
safety supervisor.
38-5.8 Doors from Shielded Enclosures. Shielded enclosures of radiation
areas with access openings large enough for the entry of personnel shall have
at least one exit door easily and quickly openable manually from the inside.
38-5.9 Warning Signals-High Radiation Areas. Within and at the entrance to all high radiation areas conspicuous warning signs shall be posted
or signals shall be installed and arranged to operate whenever the dose rate
exceeds 100 mrem per hour except as provided in 38-10.5.
38-5.10 Instruction of Employees. No employer shall suffer or permit an
employee of himself or another to work in a radiation area unless such employer has first informed the employee of the presence of radiation, instructed him as to the safe means and methods of performing his work
during such exposure, and taken all necessary measures for his protection.
38-5.11 Training of Radiation Worker. No employer shall employ any
person as a radiation worker unless such person is sufficiently informed, instructed and trained by a radiation safety supervisor or radiation safety
officer to handle, use or operate the source of radiation with which he works
so that the exposure to radiation is maintained within the limits prescribed
by this rule.
38-5.12 Radiation Safety Supervisor-Qualifications. No employer shall
employ or designate any person as a radiation safety supervisor unless such
person has been instructed and trained by a radiation safety officer in the use
of all protective measures that may be necessary for all radiation sources
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that may be in his charge. The qualifications of the radiation safety supervisor shall be in writing and shall be signed by the qualifying radiation
safety officer.
·
38-5.I3 Minors Under I8. No employer shall suffer or permit an employee under I8 years of age to be exposed to radiation in excess of 10%
of the permissible weekly dose limits as specified in 38-6.1.
38-5.I4 Leakage. Every sealed source shall be so maintained that the
concentration in any area accessible to employees, as a result of leakage, will
not exceed the limits specified in 38-6.I, paragraph 7, Table I.
38-5.I5 Eating Places. No person shall use any part of a high airborne
concentration area for eating purposes.
38-6 DosE LIMITS
38-6. I Permissible Weekly Dose Limit. Except as below provided no
employer shall suffer or permit an employee to receive in the course of his
work a weekly dose greater than the following:
1. For employees whose entire body or major portion thereof is exposed
to radiation from external sources : 300 mrem in the blood-forming organs,
in the gonads and the lenses of the eyes ; 6oo mrem in the skin.
2. For employees whose entire body or major portion thereof is exposed
to radiation of very low penetrating power from external sources : 300
mrem in the lenses of the eyes; 1500 mrem in any other part of the body.
3· For employees whose hands and forearms only are exposed to radiation from external sources: 1500 mrem in the skin area receiving the highest
dose.
4· For employees whose feet and ankles only are exposed to radiation
from external sources: 1500 mrem in the skin area receiving the highest
dose.
5· For employees whose heads and necks only are exposed to radiation
from external sources: 1500 mrem in the skin area receiving the highest
dose ; 300 mrem in the lenses of the eyes.
6. For employees exposed to radiation from both external sources and
ingested or inhaled radioactive material simultaneously or successively ; an
aggregate weekly dose not exceeding any of the appropriate weekly doses
specified above.
7· For employees who are exposed to radiation from ingested or inhaled
radioactive material only: 300 mrem in any part of the body.
For the purpose of this rule continuous inhalation or ingestion during a
work week of 40 hours of concentrations of radioactive material set forth
in Table I below are deemed to produce a weekly dose equivalent to 300
mrem in some part of the body.

APPENDIX A

1143

TABLE I
MAXIMUM PERMISSIBLE AVERAGE CONCENTRATIONS OF INHALED OR INGESTED
RADIOACfiVE MATERIALS

Col. (I) Effective half life in body in days.
Col. (2) Inhaled concentrations in microcuries per milliliter of air.
Col. (3) Ingested concentrations in microcuries per milliliter of water.
Col. (I)
Material
A.,_ ..•••••..••.••••.•••.••.••...••
0.74
2.8
Af!!D" ..••.••...•.•...•...........•

Af![ll ............................ .
Amw •...........................
As"· ............................. .
AtD' ............................ .
Au,. ... ; ........................ .
Au,. ............................ .
Ba""+La"" ..................... .
Be~ ...•..........................
C" .............................. .
Ca'" ............................. .
Cd100 Ag""' ..................... .
Ce1" +PI"" ..................... .

+
c1• ............................. .

2.I

89o.

UJ9
0.3I

2.6

3-I
I2'

48

I8o
I5I

77

I8o
29

em- ............................ .

I20

Cr"' •............................

22

Co., ...•....•.....................

esm+Ba.., ..................... .
Cu"' ........•.................•...
Euw .......•...........•.........
Fu .............................. .

Fe"" .....••....•..•..•............
Fe"" ............................. .

Ga"' ..............•••.............
Gen ······························
H" or T(HTO or H.'O) .......... .

Ho............... ; .............. .
!'"' .............................. .
Ir"'" .....•........................

Ires ............................. .

K"* .............................. .
La""
·····························.
Lu'" ............................
Mn"' ............................ .
Mo• ............................ .
Na10 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

84
I7
0.53
820
-078
6I
27

0.59
3·9
I9
I.I

7-7
7·3
17
0.5I
1.6
3.2
O.Io6
2'.8

o.6I

Nb• •............................
Ni"" ••••.••.........•..•..........

2I

pat ...••••..........•............•

14

Pb.............................. .
Pd100 Rh103 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Pm1" • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Po""' (sol.) ...................... .
Po""' (insol.) .................... .

+

Pr'" ............................ .

8
2.I6

4-4

I40
40
3I
II

Pu• (sol.) ...•................... 43,000
Ptt- ( insol.) .................... .
300
Ra... +! dr...................... . I6,ooo
Rb"" .••...........................
7.8
Re281 •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
0.5
Rh""' ............................ .
1.4
Rn..,+dr....................... .
RuUIO RhUIO ••••••••••••••••••••••
I9

+

Continued

Col. (2)
I.6X Io..,
J.6X 10..,
I X I0-4
8 X to-n
7 X to..
9 X to-10
3·4 X to_,
8 X to_,
2 X Io_,
1.3

X

10...

t-4 X Io...
9X to..,
2 X to_,
2X to..,
I

X

IO"""

5 X 10-10
34 X to"""
24X to..
6X to""'
2X to"""
2X to..,
3·5 X to...
1.8 X IO"""

5X
I X
I X

7X
I

X

9X
2.2

X

10...
10...
10...
IO"""
10...
IO""'
IO"""

1.5 X Io_,
6X to..
4X to..,
1.5 X IO"""

8X

10...

5X IO..
5X IO..
1.3 X 10...
5X 10....

4 X Io_,
2X to...,
2X to..
6 X Io_,
6 X 10·10
2 X 10-10
2.3 X to...,

6X

6X
24X

6X

10-1

6X Io..
9X Io...

2X

IO-o

6X Io...
3
I

X

IO...

1.5 X Io..
2
I

X
X

10-1
10-1

7X 10...

2.7 X Io...

5X

IO...

I-4

4-5 X Io...

2.5 X
I

2.6
I.J

X

10-1
10-1

X

IO...

3-3 X 10...

2.6X IO
2.7 X Io
5 X 10-'

7X IO
9X to...,
4 X 10-•
2.7 X to...,
4

X

10-•

34
7X to

5 X I0-1
4X IO
2-4 X 10_,
1.2 X to...
7 X I0-1
6X 10...
4X 10·1
3X Io...
3

9 X Io...,
I

10-u
IO-u

4·5 X to..

IO-n
10...

1.2

J.I

X

2-4

X to...,

3X to..,

X to-"
8X 104

1

Col. (3)
14 X to..
5
I.J X 10
4X to-<

X Io-"
9X to...

2-4

X

10-1

5 X to-•
6X to..,
4

X

10·1
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TABLE

!-Continued

MAXIMUM PERMISSIBLE AVERAGE CONCENTRATIONS OF INHALED OR INGESTED
RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS .

Col. (I) Effective half life in body in days.
Col. (2) Inhaled concentrations in microcuries per milliliter of air.
Col. (3) Ingested concentrations in microcuries per milliliter of water.
Material

Col. (I)
IS
I3
Sc"' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . .

s.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Sm101 ••• ; • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 39,000
Snw ..... ......... .. .. .. . . . . ......
44
Sr"" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
52

Sr"" + Y"" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,7oo
Tc"" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.I
Te..., . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Te120 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• • • • • • • • • • • • •
Th... . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tm"" ...................... · ... · · ·
U-natural (sol.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
U-natural (insol.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
U 210 (sol.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
U 181 (insol.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
V"' ...............................

Xe""' .......•.•...•............. :.
Xe1111 •• • •• • •• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ••
Y"' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

zn• . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
All other beta or gamma emitters ..
All other alpha emitters .......... .

I3
Io
24-I

59
30
I20

300
I20
I2

5-27
0.38
5I
. .:ii

Col. (2)

3X

2X
4X
1.7

X

6X

6X

8X
3X
1.2 X

2X

1.5 X
5X
5X

4X

5X

3X
X
5X
I.2 X

I-3

6X

3X
I.5 X

Io...,
Io-"·
10...,
Io...,
10...,
I0-1o
IO....
10-"
10-1
IO....
10-1
IO-U
IO-U
I0-10
IO-U

Io...,
IO...
IO....

IO-"
IO....
IO....
IO-U

Col. (3)
I.5

X
I

6X

5X
2 X

IO-·
I0-1
1
I0-

Io...

2.4 X IO....

8X
8X

3-3 X
1

X

IO-o
IO...
IO-•

10

8X

2X

I0-1
IO...

4·5 X

IO...

I.5

1.3 X
4X
6X
:z X
3X
3X

IO....
IO....

10-1
I0-1

IO-"
IO-"

38-6.2 Quarter Year Dose Limits. Notwithstanding the provisions of
38-6.1, an employer may, during any quarter-year period, suffer and permit
an employee over 18 years of age to receive a weekly dose greater than a
permissible weekly dose subject to the following requirements:
I. Personnel monitoring equipment and a proper method of determining
the dose shall be provided and used.
2. During such quarter-year period the employer shall not suffer or per~
mit the employee to receive a weekly dose or intake exceeding three times the
weekly limits specified in 38-6.1.
3. The employer shall not suffer or permit an employee to receive a total
dose or intake throughout such quarter-year period exceeding ten times the
weekly limits specified in 37-6.1.
38-6.3 Repeated Excessive Dose. When.ever personnel monitoring, physical examination by a radiation safety physician or appropriate tests indicate
that any employee may have received an excessive amount c;>f radioactive
material or received during a period of 13 consecutive weeks more than IO
times the permissible weekly dose specified in 38-6.1, the employer shall
report the fact to the Commissioner within 7 days after such finding. Such
report shall describe the nature and extent of the exposure and the reason
therefor and a description of corrective measures instituted.
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38-7 SuRVEYs
38-7.1 General. Every employer shall cause such sur\reys to be made by a
radiation safety officer as may be necessary to determine whether the dose to
any employee is maintained within the limits prescribed by this rule.
38-7.2 Report. A report shall be made of each survey and shall be signed
by the person by or under whose direction it was made and shall show the
date when the survey was completed.
38-7.3 Radiation Instruments. Every owner of an installation wherein
radiation areas associated with radioactive .materials, other than sealed
sources, are present shall provide or have readily available instruments and
•
procedures suitable for detecting and measuring radiations or contamination
in accordance with the requirements of this rule and said instruments shall
be maintained in proper calibration.
38-8

RECORDS

38-8.1 Retention of Reeords. The owner of every installation shall keep
in his possession a copy of all reports of surveys, dosimeter readings and
physical examinations or tests.
38-8.2 Record of Use-Sources Outside Installations. The owner of
every source of radiation used outside an installation shall keep a written
record of each such use setting forth the following information:
I. The specific identification of each source.
2. The place or site of use.
3· The date and time of the removal of the radiation source from its
installation or place of storage.
4· The date and time of its return thereto.
5· The name of the radiation worker by whom each source was used and
the name of the radiation safety supervisor in charge.
38-8.3 Availability and Destruction of Records. No person shall damage
or destroy any required radiation records, or suffer or permit the same to be
destroyed without first having obtained the written consent of the Commissioner. All pertinent radiation records or copies thereof shall be readily
available to the attending physician of any person who may have undergone
exposure in connection with the installation to which such records relate and
they shall also be available to the Commissioner.
38-8-4 Commissioner to Receive Records. The Commissioner shall receive all radiation records of a discontinued radiation installation which are
voluntarily presented to him by the owner of such installation and acknowledge the receipt thereof in writing. The delivery of such records to the
Commissioner relieves the owner from all subsequent responsibility in respect thereto. The Commissioner may keep or destroy such records in his
discretion.
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38-9 PERSONNEL MoNITORING
38-9. I General. Any employee who in any week receives or is likely to
receive a radiation dose which is more than 25% of the limits set forth in
38-6. I shall be supplied with and shall use appropriate personnel monitoring
equipment.
38-9.2 High Radiation Areas. Every employee having any occasion to
enter a high radiation area shall be supplied with and shall use appropriate
personnel monitoring equipment when the dose rate may exceed Ioo mrem
in any one hour.
38-IO CAUTION LABELS AND SIGNS
38-IO.I General. Except as provided in 38-ro.s, the owner of every
installation or mobile source shall indicate the presence of each source of
radiation by conspicuous labels on the source or container thereof or by
conspicuous signs in their immediate vicinity, or both.
Each label or sign shall bear the standard radiation warning symbol specified in 38-I0.3 and appropriate explanatory wording, such as "radiation,"
"radioactive," "airborne radioactivity" or "X-ray." The printing of any
further matter upon such label shall not obliterate or obscure the symbol or
the said words.
38-Io.2 Special Provision. Where,. in the judgment of the radiation
safety officer, personnel monitoring or the use of respiratory equipment is
required for employees entering a high radiation area or high airborne concentration area, the posted signs shall conspicuously indicate such requirement.
38-I0.3 Standard Radiation Warning Symbol. The following described
standard radiation warning symbol is hereby adopted :
1. Upon a yellow background there shall be the design shown in purple.
2. The design in purple must be centered within a sufficient area of yellow
background to make it conspicuous.

***

(Reproduction of Symbol Deleted)
38-Io-4 Use of Symbol Restricted. No person shall affix, post or display
any sign or label bearing said standard radiation warning symbol or any
closely similar symbol to, upon or in any thing or location in any place to
which this rule applies except for the purpose of warning of the presence
of radiation.
38-10.5 Exception from Posting Requirements. Caution signs are not
required to be posted at areas or rooms containing sources of radiation for
periods of less than twenty-four hours provided such sources are attended
by a radiation worker during such periods.
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38-II STORAGE OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Radioactive material not in use shall be stored in properly shielded and
secured containers.
38-I2 SEVERABILITY
If any provisions of this rule or the application thereof tc :-"~} person or
circumstances is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect other provisions
or applications of this rule which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this rule are declared
to be severable.

ITEM 4
NEw YoRK STATE SANITARY CoDE

Chapter XVI
IONIZING RADIATION
REGULATION 1. DEFINITIONS (a) The term "radiation" or "ionizing
radiation" as used in this chapter shall refer to electromagnetic radiations
(x-rays and gamma rays, etc.) or particulate radiations (electrons or beta
particles, protons, neutrons, alpha particles, etc.) usually of high energy,
but in any case it includes all radiations capable of producing ions directly
or indirectly in their passage through matter.
(b) The term "roentgen" (r) shall mean the quantity of x-radiation or
gamma radiation such that the associated corpuscular emission per o.o01293
grams of a.ir produces, in air, ions carrying an electrostatic unit of quantity
of electricity of either sign. Milliroentgen (mr) equals I/Iooo of a
roentgen.
(c) The "rad" is the unit of absorbed dose and is equal to IOO ergs per
gram of matter irradiated. Millirad (mrad) is equal to xjxooo rad.
(d) The term "rem" is that quantity of any type of ionizing radiation
such that the energy imparted to a biological system (cell, tissue, organ or
organism) per gram of living matter by the ionizing particles present in the
region of interest has the same biological effectiveness as an absorbed dose
of 1 rad of lightly filtered x-radiation generated at potentials of 200 to 300
kilovolts. Millirem (mrem) is equal to I/IOOO rem.
(e) The term "Relative Biological Effectiveness" ( RBE) is the ratio of
the absorbed dose of lightly filtered x-radiation generated at potentials of
200 to 300 kilovolts, to the absorbed dose of any other type and/or energy of
radiation that is required to produce the same biological effect on a particular
biological system, when the conditions under which the radiation is received
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are the same. A dose in rems is equal to the dose in rads multiplied by the
appropriate RBE.
(f) The term "curie" as used in this chapter shall mean that quantity of
any radioactive material in which the number of disintegrations per second
is 3·7 x 1010 • Millicurie (me) equals I/Iooo of a curie. Microcurie (uc)
equals I/IOoo of a millicurie.
(g) The term "radiation installation" shall mean a location or facility
where radiation equipment is used or where radioactive material is produced,
transported, stored or used for any purpose. The limits of the radiation
installation area shall be as designated by the operator. (See regulation 4 (e)
and 5.) As used in this chapter, "radiation installation" shall refer only to
those installations located i~ a hospital ; institution ; medical clinic ; medical
office ; dental clinic ; dental office ; veterinarian clinic ; veterinary office ; podiatry office; educational institution; commercial, private or research laboratory performing diagnostic procedures or handling equipment or materials
for medical use ; shoe store; trucking, storage, messenger or delivery service
establishment; or any industrial or commercial establishment not subject to
supervision by the New York State Department of Labor in accordance with
the Laws of New York State. "Radiation installation," as used in this chapter, shall include, vyl}ether or not it is specifically stated above, any facility
where radiation is applied intentionally to a human. "Radiation installation,"
as used in this chapter, shall not include facilities subject to the regulations
adopted by the Interstate Commerce Commission, United States Coast
Guard, United States Post Office or Civil Aeronautics Board.
(h) The term "radiation equipment" as used in this chapter, unless otherwise specified, shall include any device which emits or may emit ionizing
radiation, except that radiation equipment shall not include equipment operated at less than 15 Kilovolts and which is not designed primarily to produce useful radiation; or, except for the repair and servicing thereof, equipment operating normally at higher voltages, but which, by nature of design,
does not produce radiation at the point of nearest normal approach at a
weekly rate higher than one-tenth the appropriate basic minimum permissible total weekly dose for any criticai organ exposed. It shall not include
equipment in storage, in transit or not being used, or equipment operated in
such a manner that it .cannot produce radiation.
(i) The term "radioactive material" as used in this chapter is any solid,
liquid or gaseous substance containing radioactive atoms which undergo
spontaneous disintegration resulting in the emission of one or more types of
radiation. As used in this chapter, radioactive material shall not include:
( 1) Natural radioactive materials having an equivalent specific radioactivity not exceeding that of natural potassium.
( 2) Small lots of time pieces, instruments, novelties or devices containing self-luminous elements, except during manufacture or repair of the self-
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luminous elements themselves. Such time pieces, instruments; novelties or
devices shall be included, however, if they are stored, used or handled in
such quantity or fashion that any person might receive within a week a
radiation dose exceeding I/10 the maximum permissible total weekly dose.
(3) Radioactive material of such quantity that if the total amount were
taken internally by a person, no serious harm would be likely to result.
(Column 3-Table 3-N ational Bureau of Standards Hanc~J.Jk 52 can be
used as a guide.)
(j) The term "radioactive waste" as used in this chapter shall include any
solid, liquid or gaseous substance containing radioactive material, regardless
of its source, which is discharged into the environment.
(k) The term "competent person" as used in this chapter shall mean an
individual who has received training or instruction in radiation hazards and
their control, sufficient to specify protection for himself and others in the
vicinity.
(1) The terms "hazard," "radiation hazard," or "hazardous amounts of
radiation" when used in relation to external radiation exposure, shall refer
to any exposure rate, which may result in a person receiving within a period
of one week a total radiation dose exceeding the maximum permissible total
weekly dose. When used in relation to internal exposur.e, they shall refer
to concentrations of radioactive material in air, food .or water, which e?'ceed
the maximum permissible concentrations in air, food or water for continuous
exposure.
(m) The term "sealed source" as used in this chapter shall mean any
device containing radioactive material to be used primarily as a source of
radiation which has been constructed in such a manner as to prevent the
escape, under normal conditions, of any radioactive material.
( n) The term "survey" as used in this chapter shall mean the evaluation
of the potential radiation hazard in the vicinity of a radiation source.
( o) The term "personnel monitoring equipment" as used in this chapter
shall mean devices or equipment which are capable of indicating or recording with reasonable accuracy the radiation dose a person has received during
a specific period.
(p) The term "operator" as used in this chapter shall mean an individual,
group of individuals, partnership, firm, corporation or association conducting the business or activities carried on within the radiation installation.
( q) The term "health officer" as used in this chapter shall mcim the
county or part-county health officer, the health officer of a city of so,ooo
population or over or the state district health officer.
REGULATION 2. REGISTRATION. Every operator of a radiation installation
as defined in this chapter shall register such installation with the health
officer having jurisdiction, prior to March I, 1956. All new installations as
defined in this chapter made on or after September I, 1955. shall be regis-
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tered with the health officer having jurisdiction, before the installation is
placed in operation. Such registration shaH be made on a form prescribed
by the state commissioner of health. The follo~ing information shaii be
provided by the operator at the time of registration: The name of the operator; a designation of the confines of the installation; a statement of the
type of sources of radiation expected to be used, operated or stored within
the installation and of the approximate total number of each type; a summary of the radiation safety program.
A central committee (such as an isotope committee) having supervision
for radiological safety over two or more radiation installations may register
such installations in lieu of registration by the individual operator.
Registration shall not imply approval of manufacture, storage, use, handling or operation, but shaH serve merely to notify the health officer having
jurisdiction, of the location and character of radiation sources.
Any change in the character of the radiation instaiiation which might increase the radiation exposure; such as addition to number of sources, increase in source strength, increase in output, increase in energy of radiation
produced, shall be considered a new installation and shall be registered with
the health officer having jurisdiction.
If the registration of each device or each change in the character of the
installation would be impractical, the state commissioner of health, upon
request of the operator or central committee, may approve blanket registration of the installation.
Radioactive materials in quantities not exceeding the amounts shown in
Table I shaH be exempt from registration.
REGULATION 3· CoNSTRUCTION MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION. Every
radiation instailation shall be constructed, maintained and operated in such
a manner as not to create a hazard.

Note: As a general guide to compliance with Regulation 3, the
recommendations of the National Committee on Radiation Protection, as published in Handbooks 4I, 42, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53,
54, 55, 56, 57, 58, and 59 of the National Bureau of Standards,
and such other recommendations as may be made by that Committee, may be foiiowed.
The applicable regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, United States Coast Guard and
United States Post Office may be used as a general guide to compliance with this regulation in relation to the proper storage and
intrastate shipment of radioactive materials. [See Chapter 28I: ·
TRANSPORTATION.)
REGULATION 4· MAXIMUM PERMISSIBLE DosEs. (a) The radiation exposure of a person or persons shaH always be kept at the lowest practical
level, in accordance with the current recommendations of the National Com-
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Upper Limit
Element
Microcurie
Pb110 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
I
Po110 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
At= ....................... .
Ra228 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
I
Acm . . . . . . . . • . • • . . . . . . . . • . . .
I
U""' ...•.....••......••.....
Pu130 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • Am..,_ ..........••...........
Cm"2 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Sc48 ••• •• • •• • ••• • •• • • •• ••• •• •
10
Co..,_ ••••••••••••••••••••••••
IO
Sr"" .. . .. .•. . .. . . . . .. . . . . . . . .

Io

Ru""' .... -....................

IO
IO
IO
IO
IO

AglllO........................

Te,.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
JUl • . . . • • • • • . . • • . . . . • • • . • . • •
Cs117 • • •• •• • •• • • • •• ••• • •• • •
Ce'" ........................
Eu15ol ••••••••••••••••••••••••

ww·················· ......
Re
183

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Ir"'" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

P"" . . . . . . . . • . . • • . . . . . . . . • . . .
Cl"'" ....•.•.•..•.......•....
Ca"' . . . . .. . . . .. . .. . . .. . . . . . .
Sc41 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Sc'". .. . . .......... .. .. .. . . . .
V 48 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Fe.. . . .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Zn"" . . . . .. • ... . . . . .. . . . . . . . .
Ga.. ... . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. .. . .. .
As•• . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Rb"" .•. •. .. ..•...... .. .. •. . .
Sr"" . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

yn ................ : ........

Nb'"' .. .• .•. .. . .••... .. ... ...
Tc"" . . . . . .•.• .. .. •.. . . . .....
Rh:tm... .. . . .. .. . . ... . . . . . . . .
Cd100

Io
IO
IO
IO
10
100
100
IOO
100
IOO
IOO
IOO
100
100
100
IOO
100
100
100
100

Ioo

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

IOO

Ag'll ........................

Ioo
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Upper Limit
Element
Microcurie
Snua . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . 100
Tem ... .. . . .. . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . 100
Ba"" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
La"" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100

Pr'" . . . .. . . . ... . . . . ... . . . . . .

Sm161

•••••••••••••••••

• ••

100
IOO
IOO
IOO
IOO
IOO
IOO

Ho""' . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .. .. .. .. .
Tm170 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Lu177 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Ta182 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Pt'"'- . . . . . . . . . • . . . . • . • • . . . . . .
Pt100 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • Ioo
Au 108 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • IOO
Au"'" . . . . . . . . .. . .. . .. . . . . .. . 100
Tl""' ........................ 100
Tl"" . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ioo
Pb.,. ...•.......•........•... 100
Th"" ........................ 100
H" ......................... Iooo
Be7 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • IOOO

C" .........................
Na"' ........................

IOOO
1000

Fe"" .........................

1000

s• .......................... Iooo
K'" ......................... 1000
Cr"l ........................ Iooo

Mn"" ....•..........•......• IOOO
Ni.......................... Iooo
Cu"' ........................

Ge" ........................
Mo• ........................
Pd101 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Pm'.........................

Ir""' ........................

Au100 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Tl"" ........................
Tl1111 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Natural U ..................
Natural Th .................

1000
IOOO
1000
IOOO
1000
1000
1000
1000
1000
1000
1000

mittee on Radiation Protection, as published in the handbooks of the
National Bureau of Standards.
(b) When the source of radiation is outside the body, the maximum
permissible total weekly dose under the conditions noted shall not exceed the
following: _
( 1) Entire body or major portion thereof exposed to penetrating radiation (half-value layer greater than I mm of soft tissue). The maximum
permissible total weekly dose shall be 6oo mrems in the skin ; and 300 mrems
in the blood-forming organs, gonads and lens of the eye. For exposure of
the whole body to x-rays or gamma rays with an energy up to 3 million
electron volts, this condition may be assumed to be met if the "air dose"
does not exceed 300 milliroentgens.
(2) Entire body or major portion thereof exposed to radiation of very
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penetrating power. (Half-value layer less than I mm of soft tissue.) The
maximum permissible total weekly dose shall be I 500 mrems in the skin and
300 mrems in the lens of the eye.
·
(3) Hands and forearms or feet and ankles or head and neck exposed
to any radiation. The maximum permissible total weekly dose shall be I 500
mrems in the skin.
· (4) Exposures Exceeding Basic Permissible Weekly Doses. In exceptional cases, it may be necessary for a person to receive in one week a radiation dose exceeding the basic permissible total weekly dose, outlined in Regulation 4 (b) : I, 2, & 3· This shall be allowable provided that the basic
permissible dose during any seven consecutive days is not exceeded by more
than a factor of three ; and provided further that the total dose in any organ
accumulated during a period of thirteen (I3) consecutive weeks does not
exceed ten ( IO) times the basic permissible weekly dose.
(5) Accidental or Emergency Exposure to Radiation. Accidental or
emergency exposure of the whole body or parts thereof to x-rays or gamma
rays with photon energy less than 3 million electron volts occurring only
once in a lifetime of a person shall be assumed to have no effect on the radiation tolerance status of that person provided that the total exposure of the
whole body or major portion thereof does not exceed 25 roentgens measured
in air and provided also that the exposure to the hands, forearms, feet and
ankles does not exceed 100 roentgens in addition to the whole body exposure.
Accidental or emergency exposure to radiation of other types and energies· occurring once in a life-time of a person shall be assumed to have no
effect on the radiation tolerance status of the person provided _that the total
tissue doses resulting therefrom in the different tissues and organs of the
body (expressed in rems) do not exceed numerically the respective tissue
doses in rads resulting from exposure to x-rays with photon energy less
tha~ .3 million electron volts.
Planned emergency exposure shall be carried out on the basis that a
person will not receive doses higl;ler than one-half the tolerable accidental
o.r emergency dose.
(c) When the source of radiation is radioactive materials within the
body, the dose rates to the tissues of the body shall be controlled by limiting
the average rates at which radioactive materials are taken into the body
either by inhalation or by ingestion. The maximum permissible concentrations of radioactive material in air and water shall be in accordance with
nationally recognized limits (Table 3 and Appendix 3-National Bureau of
Standards Handbook #52).
(d) The maximum permissible dose for any person shall include all doses
from all types and energies of radiation, whether delivered simultaneously
or successively, during the period of measurement, to the region of interest.
(e) The radiation dose delivered to any person outside the installation
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shall be limited to 1/10 the maximum permissible amounts stated in Regulation 4(b): (1), (2), & (3) and 4(c).
(f) Nothing in this regulation shall be construed to limit the kind and
amount of radiation that a physician, dentist, or other licensed practitioner
may intentionally apply to a person in diagnosis or treatment.
(g) The limitations expressed in this regulation shall not apply to exposure received by persons being fitted for shoes in a sho;: f.~tlng fluoroscope, provided such fluoroscope installation is constructed, operated and
maintained in compliance with Regulation 19 of this Chapter.
TABLE 2

MAXIMUM PERMISSIBLE TOTAL WEEKLY DOSES IN CRITICAL ORGANS UNDER VARIOUS
CONDITIONS OF EXPOSURE

Dose in Critieal Organs (mrem per week)
Skin,
at Basal
BloodLayer of ·Forming
Radiation
Epidermis Organs
Any Radiation with
6oo"
Half-value layer
greater than
1 mm. of soft tis-

Conditions of Exposure
Part of Body
Whole Body

Whole Body

Gonads

Lens of
Eye

JOO"

sue

Any Radiation with
Half-value layer
less than I mm
of soft tissue
Any Radiation

1500

300

300

300

Hands and Forearms or Feet and
Ankles or Head
and Neck
• For exposures of the whole body to x-rays or gamma rays up to 3 Mev, this condition may be assumed to be met if the "air dose" does not exceed 300 mr, provided the
dose to the gonads does not exceed 300 mrem. "Air dose" means that the dose is measured by an appropriate instrument in air in the region of highest dosage rate to which
an individual might be exposed without the presence of the human ·body or other
absorbing and scattering material.
b Exposure of these limited portions of the body under these conditions does not alter
the total weekly dose of 300 mrem permitted to the blood-forming organs, the main
portion of the body, to the gonads, or to the lens of the eye.

(h) In special cases, exposure in excess of the values outlined in this
regulation may be permitted for individuals over 45 years of age. This will
be allowable if such exposures are in accordance with nationally recognized
standards (National Bureau of Standards Handbook #59).
· (i) The radiation dose delivered to any person less than 18 years of age
shall be limited to a maximum of I/Io the maximum permissible total
weekly amounts specified in Regulation 4(b): 1, 2, & 3 and 4(c).
REGULATION S· SuPERVISION. All radiation installations shall be operated by or under the direction of a competent person who shall be responsible for all necessary safety precautions.
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The operator of a radiation installation shall be responsible for:
(a) Insuring beyond reasonable doubt that all persons working with radiation equipment or radioactive materials are properly and adequately instructed in the hazards associated with and the safe methods of handling or
operation and use of the radiation equipment or radioactive materials.
(b) Insuring beyond reasonable doubt that all persons working with radiation equipment or radioactive materials are properly and adequately instructed in the purpose and proper use of any protective and monitoring
equipment provided. This shall also apply to visitors to areas under his
control.
(c) Insuring beyond reasonable doubt, by means of radiation surveys,
that any space normally occupied by persons not primarily engaged in radiation or associated work is not subjected to radiation levels which would result in a person receiving a dose exceeding one-tenth the maximum permissible amounts indicated in Regulation 4(b) : I, 2, & 3 and 4-c of this chapter.
(d) Controlling the discharge of radioactive wastes so that any person
outside the installation is not subjected to radiation levels exceeding onetenth the maximum permissible levels specified in Regulation 4-c of this
chapter.
·
REGULATION 6. PERSONNEL PROTECTION. The operator of a radiation
installation shall provide personnel monitoring equipment, properly calibrated, for every individual who may possibly receive routinely, a weekly
radiation dose in excess of one-fourth the maximum permissible amounts
specified in Regulation 4(b) : I, 2, & 3 of this chapter. Summary records
shall be kept of all exposures indicated or recorded on personnel monitoring
equipment and shall be filed by the operator; (I) for the length of the employment of the exposed individual plus 5 years, or (2) until two years
following the death of the exposed individual, or (3) until, upon application,
specific instructions have been given by the state commissioner of health for
the-disposition of the records. These records shall be open to inspection by a
duly authorized representative of the health officer and/or the state commissioner of health. The operator shall on request furnish any person with
a summary statement of his radiation exposure record.
Personnel monitoring equipment shall be worn on the torso. If it is determined that the head and neck or extremities might receive exposures
greater than I/4 the maximum permissible amounts specified for these areas
of the body, personnel monitoring equipment shall be worn also on the body
area likely to be so exposed.
Protective equipment such as interlocked tube screen, leaded rubber
aprons and leaded rubber gloves, shall be available to and used by the operator of fluoroscopic equipment. Protective equipment shall be without
defects.
Radiation shields, including protective windows or other visualization de-
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vices or their equivalent, which will provide protection for the person operating the equipment, shall be supplied for all radiographic equipment.
When it is known or believed that the exposure of an individual during
any one week may have exceeded five times the maximum permissible total
weekly amounts specified in Regulation 4(b): I, 2, & 3 of this chapter, the
person shall be notified and all known facts relative to its occurrence shall
be reported to the health officer having jurisdiction, within ;"? burs of the
discovery thereof and a copy of the report shall be put into that person's
personnel file. Immediate corrective measures leading to the elimination of
the recurrence or continuance of the overexposure shall be undertaken by
the operator.
REGULATION 7· MEDICAL ExAMINATIONS. All persons who might regularly ingest or inhale radioactive materials in concentrations exceeding onequarter of the maximum permissible amounts specified in Regulation 4 (c)
shall be examined by a physician at least once each year to determine the
presence of radioactive material in the body. Such examinations shall include, according to the physician's judgment, pertinent laboratory examinations such as urinalysis, expired air analysis or other laboratory tests or aids
which will give data of value bearing on the person's state of health.
All persons who might be exposed accidentally or under emergency conditions to external radiation exceeding the maximum outlined in Regulation 4(b) (5) shall be examined by a physician for evidence of radiation
injury or for any physical condition which would tend to predispose to radiation injury. Such examination shall include, according to the physician's
judgment, pertinent laboratory examinations, such as blood counts.
Records shall be kept of physical examinations and shall be filed by the
operator; (I) for the length of the employment of the exposed individual
plus five years, or ( 2) until two years following the death of the exposed
individual, or (3) until, upon application, specific instructions in writing
have been given by the state commissioner of health for the disposition of
records.
REGULATION 8. PROTECTION OF PATIENT. Filtration equivalent to at least
a total of 2 millimeters of aluminum shall be used with all diagnostic x-ray
equipment.
Fluoroscopy equipment installed after September I, I955 shall not be
operated for the examination of a patient unless an automatic timer is installed, so set and functioning as to interrupt the x-ray exposure at the end
of four minutes' total exposure. The timer shall be so installed that the
equipment may not be reactivated without resetting the equipment controls.
Focal skin distance for all fluoroscopes shall be not less than twelve inches.
The dosage rate at table top shall not exceed ten roentgens per minute.
REGULATION 9· DISPOSAL OF RADIOACTIVE WASTES. Radioactive wastes
discharged to the environment shall not be released in such manner that they
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will accumulate in the environment in concentrations that may lead to any
person receiving a dose exceeding that specified in Regulation 4(e) of this
chapter. If several users are discharging wastes in such way that the radioactivities are additive~ they shall enter into a mutual agreement each to
limit his release, so that the total comes within the permissible limit specified
in Regulation 4(e). If no agreement is reached, then the amount of maximum discharge for each user shail be· set by the State Commissioner of
Health.
·
Radioactive wastes shall not be disposed of by dumping on the surface of
the ground or by burial in the soil, except in areas specifically approved by
the state commissioner of health. Controlled surface or subsurface storage
in such·a· fashion that radioactive material cannot mix with the soil or enter
the ground water shall not be considered disp(>sal by dumping or burial.

. Note: The contamination of soil resulting from the use of ra. dioactive materials in. plant, animal .and similar studies shall not
be considered as contamination by radioactive waste. It is recom. mended, however, that the health officer having jurisdiction be
consulted prior to the initiation of such studies.
·
REGULATION 10, RADIATION INSTRUMENTS. Every operator of a radiatil;)l1 installation. where radioactive materials, not in sealed sources, are present shall provide or have immediately available instruments suitable for
detecting and ..measuring radiation. and radioactive contamination. Such
instruments shall be maintained in proper calibration.
REGULATION 11. HANDLING OF CADAVERS CoNTAINING RADIOISOTOPES.
The identification of a particular patient as radioactive shall be the responsibility of the physician in charge of the case or his designated representative.
If such a patient dies in a hospital, the doctor who pronounces him dead
shall notify the physician in charge of the case or his designated representative at once.
An autopsy shall not be commenced on a body that contains more than
five·millicuries of radioactivity without the consultation and advice of the
radiation safety officer of the hospital or; if he is not available, of the
physician responsible for the administration of the radioactive material. If
neither is available, their designated representative may serve.

Note: An official radiation safety officeris required by the Isotopes Division of the Atomic Energy Commission in institutions
equipped for treatment with radioisotopes obtained from Atomic
Energy Commission or secondary suppliers.
A radioactivity report on every cadaver containing more than 5 millicuries
of radioactivity shall be completed by the radiation safety officer or the
physician responsible for the administration of-the radioactive material or
their designated representatives. This report shall accompany the body
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(whether autopsied or not) when it is surrendered to the funeral director.
This report shall contain the following information:
(a) Name of hospital
(b) Name of deceased
·{c) A statement, "This certifies that the remains of ................. .
. . . .' ........... has been examined this date by ....................... .
·
(person certifying)
Radioactivity close to the surface of the body, as determined by ........ .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . (is) (is not) below the rate of 30 mr /hr
(state instrument or method)
that is acceptable for embalmers during their work. This maximum permissible dose per hour will not be exceeded, if rubber gloves are worn, and
further precautions are observed as listed below."
(d) Statement of precautions to be taken
(e) Date
(f) Signature of Radiation Safety Officer or physician.

Note: As a general guide to compliance with Regulation I I, the
recommendations of the National Committee on Radiation Protection, as published in Handbook 56 of the National Bureau of
Standards, may be followed.
REGULATION I2. MONITORING OF RADIATION INSTALLATION. It shall be
the responsibility of the operator of a radiation installation to make certain
that surveys of the radiation installation are made by a· competent person
with appropriate, properly calibrated monitoring equipment.
Records shall be made of such surveys and shall be filed by the operator
for: (I) five years following the date of the survey, or, (2) until, upon
application, specific instructions have been given by the state commissioner
of health for the disposition of such records. Such records shall be open to
inspection by a duly authorized representative of the health officer and/or
the state commissioner of health. The operator shall keep the radiation intensity in any occupied space below that which would result in any person
receiVing more than the maximum permissible total weekly dose during the
time the space is occupied by that person during the week.
· Surveys of radiation installations shall be made at the intervals outlined
below:
(a) Installations where radioactive materials not contained in a sealed
source are handled shall be surveyed at least once a month. Such surveys
shall be made more often if it is indicated by personnel monitoring equipment or other means that more frequent surveys are necessary to limit radiation intensities or contamination below the permissible maximum. Regularly
scheduled radiation monitoring of the air shall be required where there is
any reasonable possibility that concentrations of radioactivity in inhaled air
may exceed the amounts ·specified in Regulation 4-c of this chapter.
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(b) Installations where radiation equipment is used or where radioactive
materials in a sealed source are handled or installed on or after September I,
1955 shall be surveyed when originally installed."
All radiation installations of this type, regardless of the date of installation, shall be surveyed whenever any change is made in the installation or
its use that might increase the radiation to which a person could be exposed.
When vibrations or other physical conditions exist which may cause
changes in the protective features, inspection of protection devices and surveys for radiation rates shall be made at least every six months or at more
frequent intervals if required by the health officer having jurisdiction.
REGULATION 13. THERAPY RooMs. No person other than the patient and
those who may be required to hold the patient, shall be allowed to remain
within a therapy room during irradiation. No person who is habitually near
radiation producing equipment or materials shall hold a patient during irradiation. The person holding the patient shall not be in the useful beam
and shall be protected as much as practicable from scattered radiation.
Every entrance to an x-ray therapy room in which equipment is operated
at a potential above 1 so KV and every entrance to a teletherapy room shall
be protected by interlocks so that no person can enter without turning off
the radiation equipment or adequately shielding the radiation source. It shall
be so arranged that irradiation equipment cannot be started again, or the
radiation source unshielded again, without resetting the controls.
In addition to the interlocking controls, signals shall be installed which are
visible or audible inside the therapy room. These signals shall be installed
so that they will be activated whenever irradiation is proceeding. It shall be
possible for a person to escape from a therapy room at all times.
REGULATION 14. WARNING SIGNS. (a) Standard Symbol. A standard
symbol for designating any radiation hazard has been adopted . . .
[Symbol Omitted]
(.b) Radiation Areas-The operator of a radiation installation shall post
conspicuous warning signs to indicate the area where a radiation hazard
exists. Such warning signs shall contain the standard symbol and the words
"Danger" and "Radiation Area."
(c) Radiation Sources-The operator of a radiation installation shall
label conspicuously all radioactive material as follows :
( 1) Containers for sealed sources of external hazard only: A label
containing the standard symbol and the words "Danger-Radiation." Where
a time limit is specified, it shall be posted.
(2) Containers for storage or shipment of loose bulk or unsealed
sources primarily of an internal hazard: A label containing the standard
symbol and the words, "Danger-Radioactive Material."
(3) Additional Precautions: The printing of further precautions and
instructions on the warning labels for radioactive materials shall not obscure
the standard symbol and required precautionary words.
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(d) Removal of signs and labels-All radiation labels or signs which may
have been posted at a time when a radiation hazard existed shall be removed
when there is no longer a need for such warning.
REGULATION 15. AccouNTING FOR RAmoACTIVE MATERIALS. The operator of a radiation installation shall maintain an accurate account of all
radioactive materials in a radiation installation. Such records shall show
amounts and form of the radioactive materials received, purpose for which
used, amounts of wastes and such other information as may be necessary to
account for the difference between the amount of radioactivity received and
the amount on hand. Such records shall be open to inspection on request by
the state. commissioner of health and/or the health officer having jurisdiction, or their authorized representatives.
The state commissioner of health, or his authorized representative, upon
application, may modify this accounting requirement under special circumstances.
REGULATION 16. RADIATION ILLNEss, INJURIES, EMERGENCIES, AcciDENTS. Accidents involving the serious overexposure of personnel ; the
discharge of radioactive wastes in a concentration above an acceptable limit;
the spillage, loss or theft of radium, or other radioactive materials ; fire ;
flood or other catastrophe affecting places using or storing radioactive materials ; or other incidents, which will or are likely to expose people to hazardous quantities of radiation ; whether it occurs at an installation as defined
in this chapter or in any other place, shall be reported immediately by the
person in charge by telephone or telegraph to the health officer having jurisdiction. Such reporting shall not relieve the operator of the responsibility
for instituting and performing such corrective and preventive measures as
are necessary to reduce the hazard. Following the receipt of notification, the
health officer having jurisdiction shall investigate the incident promptly and
determine that the operator has taken all necessary corrective and preventive
measures.
For the purpose of this regulation, "the serious overexposure of personnel" shall mean the exposure of a person to a quantity of external radiation
exceeding that specified in Regulation 4(h-5) of this chapter, or to a quantity of internal exposure which would result from the ingestion or inhalation
of radioactive material in such quantities as to exceed so times the maximum
permissible amount (Handbook 52, National Bureau of Standards).
For the purpose of this regulation, "acceptable limit" shall mean that concentration of radioactive material which will not constitute a hazardous
external or internal exposure to a person.
It shall be the duty of every physician to report in writing to the state
department of health the full name, address and age of every patient who .
is suffering from radiation illness or injury from exposure to ionizing
radiation.
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Radiation received by a patient for therapy under the supervision of a
physician or the effects of such radiation shall not come within the intent of
this regulation.
REGULATION I7. ELECTRICAL HAZARDS. All x-ray equipment installed in
a radiation installation after September I, I955, shall, where applicable, bear
the seal of approval of the Underwriters' Laboratories, Inc., or shall be required to meet an equivalent 5afety standard. All equipment installed prior
to September I, I955, if not bearing such seal, shall be altered to comply
with the pertinent requirements of the standard of the National Board of
Fire Underwriters' (The National Electrical Code) prior to September I,
I956.
Certification by a duly constituted local authority that the installation is
free of electrical hazards shall be acceptable.
REGULATION I8. VACATED PREMISES. Upon vacating any radiation installation handling radioactive materials, the operator shall decontaminate it,
if necessary. If decontamination is not possible, the operator shall inform
the owner and l?e health officer having jurisdiction. The owner shall inform
the future occupants of any residual potential hazard.

Note: As general guide to decontamination, the recommendations of the National Committee on Radiation Protection as published in Handbook 4B of the National Bureau of Standards may
be followed. .
REGULATION I9. SHOE-FITTING FLUOROSCOPES. (a) No fluoroscopic or
x-ray equipment for fitting shoes shall be operated unless it is equipped with
an automatic timer which will cut off each x-ray exposure at .the end of a
five-second interval.
(b) All establishments which use a shoe-fitting fluoroscope shall display
at all times, in a location where all users can see it, a warning sign furnished
by the state department of health.
(c) Exposure to the useful beam measured on the base of the foot opening in fluoroscopic shoe-fitting machines installed after September I, I955,
shall not exceed I .o roentgen per five-second exposure.
Exposure to the useful beam measured on the base of the foot opening
of fluoroscopic shoe-fitting machines installed prior to September I, I955,
shall not exceed two roentgens per five-second exposure. After January I,
I¢0, no shoe-fitting fluoroscope shall be operated if the exposure to the
useful beam measured on the base of the foot opening exceeds I .o roentgen
per five-second exposure.
(d) The base of the foot opening shall be covered with a sheet of aluminum at least 2 mm. thick and of dimensions equal to or greater than the
base. This aluminum filter shall be protected from wear by a covering layer
of other material and shall be installed in such a fashion that its thickness
can be conveniently determined.
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(e) Only salespersons shall be permitted to operate a shoe-fitting fluoroscope. The starting mechanism shall be so designed and located as to prevent operation by customers.
(f) The fluorescent viewing screen shall be covered with leaded glass
having a lead equivalent of at least 1 ·5 mm.
(g) Customers should be required to have shoes on both feet during a
fluoroscopic examination.
(h) Customers should be questioned regarding dates and numbers of
previous shoe-fitting fluoroscopic examinations and may not be allowed such
fittings in excess of 12 five-second viewings per year or in excess of three
per day..
(i) Salespersons shall operate the device for their own customers only.
(j) Salespersons shall not use their own feet or hands for demonstrating
x-ray fluoroscopy. Children's feet shall not be held in position by any person
while the machine is in operation.
(k) Salespersons shall report any defects in the machine to the person
in charge of the establishment wherein such machine is installed. Defective
machines shall not be operated until repairs are made.
(1) Machines shall be located as far as possible from frequently occupied areas. X-ray tubes shall be shielded and cabinets constructed so that
stray radiation is reduced to less than 10 milliroentgens per hour at all
positions six inches from the cabinet surface and at viewing ports at eye
level, except at the foot opening. Foot openings shall be so oriented and
shielded that scattered radiation from the openings is not directed toward
areas which are continuously or frequently occupied unless suitable protecting screens are interposed. Scatter radiation from the foot opening shall not
exceed a rate of 10 milliroentgens per hour at a distance of ten feet.
( m) All metal non-current carrying parts shall be properly grounded.
( n) An interlocking switch shall be provided on any door or panel giving
access to high voltage components. This switch shall operate to break the
electrical current whenever the door or panel is opened.
( o) Cabinet doors or panels shall be kept locked at all times except when
making necessary repairs.
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ITEM 5
MICHIGAN ADMINISTRATIVE CODE

Michigan Department of Health
Division of Occupational Health
REGULATIONS GovERNING THE UsE OF RADIOACTIVE IsoTOPES,
X-RADIATION AND ALL OTHER FoRMS oF IoNIZING RADIATION
PART I. ADMINISTRATIVE RuLES AND PRocEDURES

R 325.1301. Radiation protection advisory committee.
Sec. r. The state health commissioner shall appoint a radiation protection
advisory committee to be known as the commissioner's radiation committee
which will serve to advise him on all matters pertaining to radiation protection and the rules and regulations promulgated for this purpose.
R 325.1302. Same; qualification of members, chainnan.
Sec. 2. The state health commissioner shall appoint 9 members to serve
on the commissioner's radiation committee.
2.1 Members shall be appointed on the basis of their recognized knowledge in the field of radiation and the committee shall be so constituted as to be a fair representation of all interested groups of users
of ionizing radiation.
2.2 The state health commissioner or his representative shall act as
chairman of the committee.
2.3 Members shall be appointed for 3-year periods. Of the original appointees, 3 shall be appointed for r year, 3 for 2 years, and 3 for 3
years.
2-4 The committee shall meet for review of these regulations at least
once annually and at such other times, not to exceed 4 times a year,
as may seem necessary. Meetings may be called by the state health
commissioner on his own initiative or at the request of 5 or more of
the members.
R 325.1303. Technical committees or consultants, appointment.
Sec. 3· The state health commissioner may appoint such technical committees or consultants as may be indicated from time to time.
R 325.1304. Local health departments, enforcement of rules.
Sec. 4· The state health commissioner may delegate authority to the
county, city or district health departments to enforce these rules and regulations.
PART 2. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS AND DEFINITIONS

R 325.I305. Sec. 5· Scope of regulations.
5.I These regulations apply to all persons who receive, possess or use
materials or devices capable of emitting ionizing radiation as de-
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fined in these regulations except the sources or uses cited in section 7, exemptions.
5.2 Person includes any municipality, industry, public corporation, copartnership, firm or any other entity whatsoever.
S·3 Nothing in these regulations should be interpreted as limiting the intentional exposure of patients to radiation for the purpose of medical diagnosis, medical therapy, or medical research conducted by
duly licensed members of the healing professions.
R 325.1300. Sec. 6. Registration of users and sources of radiation.
6~1 Within 10 days after receipt or completion thereof all sources of
ionizing radiation shall be registered with the state health commissioner by the legal owner, user or authorized representative.
Registration information shall include the name and address of the
owner or user, the name of the individual and the training and/or
qualification of the individual who will be appointed by the owner
or user to see that the radiation source is safely used and stored,
location in which the radiation source shall be used or stored, type
of radiation source, and the quantity in curies or the energy and
capacity of the radiation source. Existing sources of ionizing radiation shall be registered within go days of the effective date of these
rules and regulations. The owner of every registered source of
ionizing radiation shall advise the state health commissioner and
receive prior approval for all changes which may materially increase
the potential health hazard.
6.2 A written exemption to the notification of changes, which may
materially increase the potential health hazard in an existing installation, or the registering of each individual source or use may be
granted by the state health commissioner, provided that the legal
owner, user or authorized representative of the registered source is
registered with the state health commissioner and the registrant
meets the health and safety requirements specified and prescribed in
these regulations for such registrant by the state health commissioner.
R 325.13<>7. Sec. 7· Exemptions.
7.1 The following materials, sources and uses are exempted from
registration :
7.1.1 Natural radioactive materials of an equivalent specific radioactivity not exceeding that of natural potassium.
7. 1.2 ( 1) Radioactive materials in such total quantity that if the
entire amount were taken internally, at any one time by a
single person, no harmful effects would be likely to result.
A listing of the upper quantities of radioactive material that
shall not require registration are given in appendix D. Up to
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quantities of material listed in this appendix may be possessed by any person provided that no 2 or more quantities
are combined in any way so as to increase the amount of
radioactive material in any one quantity.
(2) Radioactive materials in air, water, or food in concentrations not exceeding those listed in appendix B, table II,
columns I or 2 of these regulations, or radioactive materials
in non-edible liquids and solids in .such concentrations that
they would not result in contamination of air, water, or
edibles in excess of the limits in appendix B, table II,
columns I or 2 of these regulations.
7.1.3 Electrical equipment that is primarily not intended to produce
radiation and that, by nature of design, does not produce radiation at the point of nearest approach at a rate higher than
I/10 of the appropriate permissible limit for any critical
organ exposed. The production testing or production servicing of such equipment shall not be exempted only if the dose
to the gonads is 'less than I/IO of the appropriate maximum
permissible limit.
7.1.4 Timepieces, instruments, novelties, or devices containing selfluminous elements. However, all persons engaged in the
manufacture or repair of self-luminous elements and possessing amounts of radioactive materials in excess of the
limits prescribed in appendix B, table II, column 2, of these
regulations shall register such sources.
7.1.5 Radiation devices not being used in such manner as to
produce radiation.·
7.1.6 Radioactive material being transported in accordance with
specific ·radiation safety regulations of a state or federal
agency having jurisdiction over such transport.
7.1.7 Any other special research devices or nuclear devices so specified by the state health commissioner.
R 325.I3o8. Sec. 8. Definition of terms.
8.I For the purpose of these regulations, the following terms shall
mean:
8.I.I
Air-borne radioactive material means any radioactive material dispersed in the air in the form of dusts, fumes, mists,
vapors, or gases.
8.1.2 Air-borne radioactivity area means any· area in which airborne radioactive materials are accessible to persons in
concentrations of which
( 1) Values at any time are in excess of respective· values
stated in appendix B, table I, column 1; or
10
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8.1.4

8.1.5

8.1.6

8.1.7

8. I .8

8.1.9

· 8.1.10
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(2) Values averaged over a week of working time are in
excess of 251o of the respective values stated in appendix B, table I, column I.
Authorized recipient means any person licensed by the
Atomic Energy Commission to possess radioactive materials, and if resident in Michigan, registered under these
regulations.
Controlled area means any area in which the activities of occupants are subject to control or supervision by the registrant and which is designated by the registrant as a potential
radiation hazard area. (A controlled area shall not include
space in use as residential quarters, although a room or
rooms in a residential building may be set apart as a controlled area.)
Diagnostic-type housing. A type of x-ray tube housing that
reduces the leakage radiation to at most O.Io rjhr at a
distance of I meter from the tube target when the tube is
operating at its maximum continuous rated current for the
maximum rated voltage.
Dose is a quantity of radiation measured at a certain point
expressed in roentgens, rems or rads.
Absorbed dose of any ionizing radiation is the amount of
energy imparted to matter by· ionizing particles per unit
mass of irradiated material at the place of interest (expressed in rads).
Exposure dose is a quantity of radiation measured in
air in roentgens without back scatter at a given point.
Dose rate is dose J)er unit time.
Film badge is an appropriately packaged and calibrated
sensitive film for detecting and measuring ionizing radiation
received by persons. It is usually dental-film size and
worn/or carried on the person.
High radiation area means any area accessible to personnel,
in which there exists radiation at such levels, that a major
portion of the body could receive in any I hour a dose in
excess of IOO millirems.
Installation is a location where for a period of more than 30
days I or more sources of radiation are used, operated, or
sto·red. The confines of an installation shall be designated
by the owner. A part of a building, an entire building or a
plant may be designated as an installation.
Ionizing radiation means any or all of the following forms
of ionizing radiation: alpha rays, beta rays, gamma rays,
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8.1.11
8.1 .12

8.1.13

8.1.14

8.1.15
8.1.16
8.1.17

8.1.18
8.1.19
8. I .20

8.1.21

x-rays, neutrons, high-speed electrons, high-speed protons
and other atomic particles; but not sound or radio waves, or
visible, infra-red, or ultraviolet light.
Leakage radiation is all radiation coming from within the
tube housing except the useful beam.
Maximum permissible dose is that dose of ionizing radiation
which, in the light of present knowledge, is not expected
to cause bodily injury to a person during his lifetime.
Normal operating conditions for x-ray machines. Operating
conditions under which the x-ray apparatus is normally
used with respect to the following :
(a) Maximum tube voltage
(b) Maximum tube current
(c) Total weekly operational time
(d) Direction of the useful beam
(e) Minimum radiographically usable distance from the
tube to personnel barrier
(f) Occupancy of adjacent areas
Occupancy factor (T) is the factor by which the work load
should be multiplied to correct for the degree or type of
occupancy of the area in question.
Occupied area is an area that may be occupied by persons or
radiation sensitive materials.
Personnel barrier is a barrier which restricts the movements
of personnel in the vicinity of an x-ray apparatus.
Potential radiation area. That area surrounding a radiation
source such that the radiation source may produce a radiation field in the area, if it is operated under maximum conditions, which exceeds I/IO of the maximum permissible
dose based on 13 weeks of continuous occupancy.
Primary radiation is radiation coming directly from the
target of an x-ray tube or from other radiation sources.
Protective apron is an apron made of attenuating materials
used to reduce radiation hazards.
Protective barrier is attenuating material used as shield to
reduce radiation hazards.
Primary protective barrier is a barrier sufficient to attenuate
the useful beam to the required degree.
Secondary protective barrier is a barrier sufficient to attenuate the stray radiation to the required degree.
Protective glove is a glove made of attenuating materials
used to reduce radiation hazards.
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8.1.24
8.1.25

8.1.26

8. I .27

8.1.28

8. I .29

8. I .30
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Rad is that quantity of any radiation which produces an
absorbed dose of 100 ergs per gram.
Radiation area. Any part of an installation accessible to
employees in which there exists a radiation level of 7·5 millirem in any I hour or over I so millirem in any 7 consecutive
days.
Radiation field is the region in which ionizing radiation is
propagated.
Radiation hazard is any situation where persons might be
exposed to radiation in excess of the maximum permissible
dose.
Radiation monitoring is the periodic or continuous determination of the dose rate in an occupied area (area monitoring) or of the dose received by a person (personnel monitoring).
Radioactive material means any compound or element which
may emit any or all of the following : alpha and beta
particles, electrons, photons, neutrons and gamma and all
other emissions which produce ionization directly or indirectly.
Relative biological effectiveness (RBE) is the biological
effectiveness of I type and energy of radiation, relative to
that of lightly filtered x-rays, generated at potentials of 200
to 300 kv, for the particular biological system and biological
effect, and for the conditions under which the radiation is
received.
Rem is the quantity of any radiation such that the energy
imparted to a biological system (cell, tissue, organ, or organism) per gram of living matter by the ionizing particles
present in the region of interest, has the same biological
effectiveness as an absorbed dose of 1 rad from lightly
filtered x-rays generated at potentials of 200 to 300 kv. A
dose in rems is equal to the dose in rads multiplied by the
appropriate RBE.
Roentgen is the quantity of x or gamma radiation such
that the associated corpuscular emission per o.ooi293 grams
of air produces, in air, ions carrying I electrostatic unit of
quantity of electricity of either sign. The roentgen is applicable only to x- and gamma radiation of quantum energies
up to 3,000,000 electron volts.
Scattered radiation is radiation that has been deviated by
substances in its path.
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8. I .32

8.I.33

8. I ·34

8.1.35
8.1.36

8.1.37

8.1.38
8.I ·39

8.1.40
8.1.4I

8.1.42

PART

Sealed source means any radioactive material that is encased
in and is to be used in a container in a manner intended to
prevent leakage of the radioactive material.
Secondary radiation is radiation emitted by any matter being
irradiated with x-rays, gamma rays, etc. or with any high
energy rays or particles.
Source of ionizing radiation is any material that is emitting
ionizing radiation spontaneously or as a result of impingement of energy upon it.
Stray radiation is radiation not serving any useful purpose.
It includes leakage and secondary radiation.
Survey means an evaluation of the radiation hazards incident to the production, use, release, disposal, or presence
of radioactive materials or other sources of radiation under
a specific set of conditions.
Therapeutic-type housing. An x-ray tube housing that reduces the leakage radiation to at most 1.0 r/hr at a distance
of I meter from the tube target and 1.0 r/min. at any point
on the surface of the housing when the tube is operating
at its maximum continuous rated current for the maximum
rated voltage.
Uncontrolled area means any area not designated as a controlled area.
Use factor (U) is the fraction of the work load during
which ·the useful beam is pointed in the direction under
consideration.
Useful beam is that part of the primary radiation that passes
thru the aperture, cone or other collimator.
(1) Workload (W) is the working activity of an x-ray
machine measured in milliampere minutes per week.
(2) Workload (W) is the total exposure measured in
roentgens per week in the useful beam at I meter from a
teletherapy source.
X-ray apparatus shall mean any source of x-ray and its high
voltage supply, including high energy betatron.

3·

PERMISSIBLE DosE LEVELs AND CoNCENTRATIONs

R 325.I309· Sec. 9· Basic standards.
These basic standards are designed to be in general conformance with requirements. of recognized authorities, are based on current knowledge of
biological effects of radiation, and subject to change with the development
. of new information or with substantial increase in the average exposure of
the whole population to radiation.
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Exposure of individuals in controlled areas.
9.1.1 Exposure to radiation:
( 1) Except as provided in subparagraph ( 2) of this paragraph no registrant shall possess, use or transfer radioactive material in such a manner as to cause any individual in a controlled area to receive in any period of 7
consecutive days from radioactive material and other
sources of radiation in the registrant's possession a dose
in excess of the limits specified in appendix A.
( 2) A registrant may permit an individual in a controlled
area to receive a dose in excess of the liinits established
in sub-paragraph ( 1) of this paragraph provided (a)
this dose accumulated during any period of 7 consecutive
days does not exceed 3 times ·the limits specified in appendix A, and (b) that the dose accumulated during the
period of any 13 consecutive weeks does not exceed 10
times the limits specified in appendix A.
(3) It is further provided that the maximum permissible accumulated dose, in rems, at any age, shall not exceed 5
times the number of years ·beyond· the age 18, and that
no annual increment shall exceed 15 rems.
9.1.2 No registrant shall possess, use, or transfer registered material in such a manner as to cause any individual in a controlled area to be exposed to air-borne radioactive material as
specified by the registrant in an average concentration in
excess of the limits specified in appendix B, table I. The
limits given in appendix B, table I are based on exposure to
the concentrations specified for 40 hours in any period of 7
consecutive days. In any such period where the number of
hours of exposure is less than 40, the limits specified in the
table may be increased proportionately, provided the number
of hours of work in any period of 7 consecutive days is less
than 40. In any such period where the number of hours of
exposure is greater than· 40, the limits specified in the table
shall be decreased proportionately.
9.1.3 Exposure to minors: No registrant shall possess, use or
transfer registered material in such a manner as to cause any
individual under 18 years of age within a controlled area to
receive in any period of 7 consecutive days from radioactive
material and other sources of radiation in the registrant's
possession a dose in excess of the 10% of the limits specified
in appendix A or to be exposed to air-borne radioactive material possessed by the registrant in a concentration in excess
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of the limits specified in appendix B, table 2. Concentrations
may be averaged over a period of not greater than a week.
9.2 Permissible levels of radiation in uncontrolled areas.
9.2.I There may be included in any registration proposed limits on
levels of radiation in uncontrolled areas resulting from the
registrant's possession or use of radioactive material and
other sources of radiation. Such registration should include
such information as anticipated average radiation levels and
anticipated occupancy times for each uncontrolled area involved. The state health commissioner may approve the proposed limits if the registrant will demonstrate that the proposed limits are not likely to cause any individual to receive
a dose in any period of 7 consecutive days in excess of the
Io% of limits specified in appendix A.
9.2.2 Except as authorized by the state health commissioner pursuant to paragraph 9.2. I no registrant shall possess or use
registered material in such a manner as to create in any uncontrolled area from radioactive material and other sources
of radiation in his possession :
(I) Radiation levels which if an individual were continuously present in the area could result in his receiving an
exposure dose in excess of 2 mr in any I hour.
(2) Or radiation levels which if an individual were continuously present in an area could result in his receiving an
exposure dose in excess of IO mr in any 7 consecutive
days.
·
9.2.3 . Except for radioactive materials· being transported as contemplated by section 7.1.6 all radioactive materials which are
. transferred or moved through uncontrolled areas shall be
packaged in tightly sealed unbreakable containers. Absorbent
materials sufficient to absorb the liquid contents of any radio.active 'liquids
be wrapped around the .container inside
any shieiding present if the radioactivity is transferred in
liquid form. In addition the radioactive material must be
packaged so that:
(I) The radiation field on any acceptable surface of the con. tainer is less than 200 mr per hour.
(2) The radiation field I meter from the center of the container is less than 10 mr per hour.
(3) The outside dimensions of the container are equal to or
greater than 4 x 4".
In the process of transferring or moving radioactive materials in such containers they shall not be allowed to remain
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in any I uncontrolled area longer than 2 working days. All
containers shall in addition be labeled as specified in section
II.3.6.

An exemption may be granted by the state health commissioner if it can be shown that an unwarranted hardship is
caused by the requirements in section 9.2.2.
9·3 Concentrations of effluent to uncontrolled areas.
9·3· I There must be included in any registration, proposed limits
of concentrations of registered radioactive material released
into the air in uncontrolled areas as a result of the registrant's
proposed activity. Such registration should include information as to anticipated average concentrations and anticipated
occupancy time for each uncontrolled area involved. The
state health commissioner will approve the proposed limits if
the registrant demonstrates that it is not probable that any
individual will be exposed to concentrations in excess of the
limits specified in appendix B, table II, column 1. For purposes of this section concentrations may be averaged over
periods not greater than I year.
9.3.2 Except as authorized by the state health commissioner pursuant to paragraph 9·3· I no registrant shall possess, use or
transfer registered material in such a manner as to release
into air in any uncontrolled area any concentration of radioactive material in excess of the limits specified in appendix B, table II, column 1. For purposes of this section
concentrations may be averaged over a period not greater
than I year.
9.2.4

PART 4·

ExcESSIVE ExPOSURES

R 325.I3I0. Sec. IO. Excessive exposures.
IO.I Measures to be taken in event of excessive exposures.
IO.I.I
In the event that any individual in a controlled area receives
a dose or is exposed to concentrations of radioactive material in excess of the permissible limits established in
part 3, section 9.I, the registrant shall limit the weekly dose
or exposure of the individual to 10% of such permissible
limits until such time as the average weekly dose or exposure to the individual for the period beginning the week
the excessive dose or exposure occurred is less than the
permissible limit established in part 3, section 9.I.
I0.2 Emergency exposure for firemen, policemen and other emergency
personnel.
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I0.2.I

I0.2.2

10.2.3
I0.2-4

I0.2.5

I0.2.6

Emergency work involving high level exposure to radiation from external sources with photon energy less than
3,000,000 electron volts shall be carried out on the basis that
the person will not receive doses higher than the following:
(I) Exposure of the whole body-any adult-total dose
measured in air up to 25 r.
(2) Local exposure-any adult--dose measured in air and
additional to whole-body doses :
Hands and forearms, up to IOO roentgens
Feet and ankles, up to IOO roentgens
The responsibility for monitoring of the area or the personnel subjected to emergency exposure shall be assigned
to a person designated by the registrant to be responsible
for the radiological health phase of the operation and said
person shall not be assigned other duties during the emergency.
Women shall not be subjected to emergency exposure unless physically' incapable of reproduction.
The following incidents shall be reported to the state health
department within 6 hours by phone and telegram of any
incident involving registered material possessed by him
and which may have caused or threatens to cause:
(I) Exposure of any individual to 25 rems or more, including any radioactive material taken into the body ;
or
(2) The release of radioactive material in concentrations
which, if averaged over a period of 24 hours, would
exceed 5,000 times the limits specified for such materials in appendix B, table II.
The following incidents must be reported to the state health
department within 24 hours by phone and telegram of any
incident involving registered material possessed by him and
which may have caused or threatens to cause:
(I) Exposure of any individual to 3 rems or more, including any radioactive material taken into the body, or
(2) The release of radioactive materials in concentrations
which, if averaged over a period of 24 hours, would
exceed sao times the limits specified for such materials
in appendix B, table II.
Those incidents requiring 30 day reports
(I) Each registrant shall make a report in writing within
30 days to the state health department of each incident
involving a registered facility owned or leased by the
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registrant, which has caused an exposure of an individual to radiation or concentrations of radioactive
material or have resulted in levels of radiation or concentrations of radioactive material in excess of applicable limits set forth in these regulations.
PART

5·

PRECAUTIONARY PROCEDURES

R 325.I3I 1. Sec. I 1. Precautionary procedures.
I I. I Surveys.
I I. I. I Each registrant shall make or cause to be made such surveys as may be necessary for him to comply with the regulations.
I I .2
Personnel monitoring.
I 1.2. I Each registrant shall supply appropriate personnel monitoring equipment to, and shall require the use of such
equipment by :
(I) Each individual who enters a controlled area under
such circumstances that he receives, or is likely to receive, a dose"in excess of 25% of the limits specified
in appendix A of these regulations.
(2) Each individualwho enters a high radiation area.
I I ·3 Caution signs, labels, and signals.
I I ·3· I Except as otherwise authorized by the state health commissioner, symbols prescribed by this section shall use the
conventional radiation caution colors (magenta or purple
on yellow background). The symbol prescribed by this
section is the conventional 3-bladed design :
.Radiation Symbol
(I) Cross-hatched area is to be magenta or purple.
( 2) ·Background is to be yellow.
11.3.1.I In addition to the contents of signs and labels
prescribed in this section, registrants may provide on or near such signs and labels any additional information which may be appropriate in
aiding individuals to minimize exposure to radiation or to radioactive material.
I I .3.2 Radiation area. Each radiation area shall be conspicuously
posted with a sign or signs bearing the radiation caution
symbol and the words (medical installations may be exempted from this posting):
Caution-Radiation Area
I I ·3·3 High radiation areas.
I 1.3.3.I
Each high radiation area shall be conspicuously
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posted with a sign or signs bearing the radiation
caution symbol and the words :
Caution
High Radiation Area
I I ·3·3·2
Each high radiation area shall be equipped with
a control device which shall either cause the level
of radiation to be reduced below that at which an
individual might receive a dose of IOO millirem
in I hour upon entry into the area or shall energize a conspicuous visible or audible alarm signal
in such a manner that the individual entering and
the registrant or a supervisor of the activity are
made aware of the entry.
I I ·3-4 Air-borne radioactivity areas.
I 1.3·4-I Each air-borne radioactivity area shall be conspicuously posted with a sign or signs bearing
the radiation caution symbol and the words :
Caution
Air-borne Radioactivity Area
I I ·3· 5 Additional requirements.
u.j.5.t Each area or room in which registered material
is used or stored and which contains any radioactive material (other than natural uranium or
thorium) in an amount exceeding 10 times the
quantity of such material specified in appendix C
of this part shall be conspicuously posted with a
sign or signs bearing the radiation caution symbol and the words :
Caution
Radioactive Material ( s)
I 1.3.5·2
Each area or room in which natural uranium or
thorium is used or stored in an amount exceeding
100 times the quantity specified in appendix C
shall be conspicuously posted with a sign or signs
bearing the radiation caution symbol and the
words:
Caution
Radioactive Material ( s)
I I .3.6 Containers.
I 1.3.6. 1 Each container in which is transported, stored,
or used a quantity of any registered material
(other than natural uranium or thorium) greater
than the quantity of such material specified in
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appendix C shall bear a durable, clearly visible
label bearing the radiation caution symbol and
the words:
Caution
Radioactive Material
I I .3.6.2 Each container in which natural uranium or
thorium is transported, stored, or used in a quantity greater than 10 times the quantity specified
in appendix C shall bear a durable, clearly visible
label bearing the radiation caution symbol and
the words:
Caution
Radioactive Material
I 1.3.6.3
Notwithstanding the provisions of subparagraphs (I ) and ( 2) a label shall not be required :
(I) If the concentration of the material in the
container does not exceed that specified in
appendix B, table I, column 2 or
(2) For laboratory containers, such as breakers,
flasks, and test tubes, used transiently in
laboratory procedures, when the user is
present.
I 1.3.6.4 Where containers are used for storage, the labels
required in this paragraph shall state also the
quantities and kinds of radioactive materials in
the containers and the date of measurements of
the quantities.
Exceptions from posting requirements. (Notwithstanding the provisions of I I .3.) ·
11:4-I A room or area is not required to be posted With a caution
sign becaus~ of the presence of a sealed· source provided
the_ radiation lev~l I2 inches from the surface of the source
container or housing does not exceed 5 millirem per hour.
I 1.4.2 Rooms or other areas in hospitals are not required to be
posted with caution signs because of the presence of patients containing byproduct material provided that there
are persomid in attendance who shall take the precautions
necessary to prevent the exposure of any individual to
radiation or radioactive material in excess of the limits
established in the regulations.
I I ·4·3 Caution signs are not required to be posted at areas or
· rooms containing radioactive materials for periods of less
than 8 hours provided that (I) the materials are constantly
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11 ·5

I I

.6

I 1.7

attended during such periods by an individual who shall
take the precautions necessary to prevent the exposure of
any individual to radiation or radioactive materials in excess of the limits established in the regulations, and, ( 2)
such area or room is subject to the registrant's control.
Instruction of personnel.
I 1.5.I All individuals working in or frequenting any portion of
a controlled area shall be informed of the presence of radioactive materials or of radiation in such area, and shall
be instructed in the hazards of excessive exposure to such
materials or radiation and in precautions or procedures to
minimize exposure.
II.5.2 Each registrant shall have on file and available I or more
copies of these regulations and of the appropriate national
bureau of standards radiation protection handbooks.
Storage of registered material.
I r.6.I
Registered material stored in an uncontrolled area shall be
secured against unauthorized removal from the place of
storage.
No x-ray apparatus shall be left unattended without locking the
apparatus itself, or the room or building in some manner which will
prevent its use by unauthorized persons.
PART

R

6.

wASTE DISPOSAL

Sec. 12. Waste disposal.
General requirements--No registrant shall dispose of registered
waste material except :
I2.I.I
By transfer.to an authorized recipient, or
12.1.2 As authorized pursuant to I2.2, or
12.1.3 As provided in 12.3 or I2.4 applicable respectively to the
disposal of registered material by release into sanitary
sewerage systems or burial in soil, or in 9·3·
12.1.4 In accordance with Act 245, Public Acts of I929 (CL I948,
§ 323.I et seq.), as amended by Act 117, Public Acts of

325.I3I2.
I2.I

1949·
12.2

Method for obtaining approval of proposed disposal procedures.
I2.2.1 Any registrant may apply to the state health commissioner
for approval of proposed procedures to dispose of registered material in a manner not otherwise authorized in the
regulations except for disposal to surface waters. Each
application should include a description of the registered
material and any other radioactive material involved, including the quantities and kinds of such material, the levels
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of radioactivity involved, and the proposed manner and
conditions of disposal. The application should also include
an analysis and evaluation of pertinent information as to
the nature of the environment, including topographical,
geological, meteorological, and hydrological characteristics ;
usage of ground and surface waters in the general area; the
nature and location of other potentially affected facilities ;
and procedures to be observed to minimize the risk of unexpected or hazardous exposures.
Disposal by release into sanitary sewerage systems.
12.3.1
No registrant shall discharge registered material into a
sanitary sewerage system unless :
(I) It is readily soluble or dispersible in water ; and
(2) The quantity of any registered material released into
the system by the registrant in any I day does not
exceed the larger of subparagraphs (a) or (b) of this
paragraph.
(a) The quantity, which if diluted by the average
daily quantity of sewage released into the sewer
by the registrant, will result in an average concentration equal to the limits specified in appendix
B, table I, column 2, or
(b) Ten times the quantity of such material specified
·in appendix C, and
(3) The quantity of any registered material released in
any I month, if diluted by the average monthly quantity of water released from the premises of the registrant, will not result in an average concentration exceeding the limits specified in appendix B, table I,
column 2, and
(4) The gross quantity of registered material released into
the sewerage system by the registrant does not exceed
1 curie per year.
Disposal by burial in soil. No registrant shall dispose of registered
material by burial in soil unless :
12.4.1 The total quantity of registered materials buried at any I
location and time does not exceed, at the time of burial,
1,000 times the amount specified in appendix C of these
regulations, and
12.4.2 Burial is at a minimum depth of 4 feet, and
12-4.3 Successive burials are separated by distances of at least 6
feet and not more than 12 burials are made in any year.
I 2-4.4 Burial of registered materials in amounts exceeding 1,000
times the amounts specified in appendix C may be per-
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mitted in a controlled and posted area at the discretion of
and with the express permission of the state health commissioner. Applications for the establishment of controlled
burying grounds must be reviewed by the advisory committee.
Burial sites shall be approved and registered with the state
health commissioner. Burial shall be in a controlled area.

7·

INDUSTRIAL RADIOGRAPHIC INSTALLATIONS

R 325.1313. Sec. 13. Industrial radiographic installations; classification.
For the purpose of registering and approving industrial radiographic installations all industrial installations shall be classified as either class A,
class B, class C or class D. This section is to include isotopic sources in
which case appropriate requirements under each installation class shall be
applied.
13.1 Class A installation requirements for unlimited use at maximum
capacity.
13.1.1 The x-ray source and objects exposed thereto must be contained within a permanent enclosure.
13.1.2 The enclosure shall be constructed
(I) So that the primary and secondary x-rays are attenuated to a dose rate as measured in air at any accessible·
external point not to exceed 7 mr/hr when the x-ray
beam is adjusted to give maximum dose rate with the
x-ray generator running at maximum operating conditions and the x-ray tube placed in the shortest "tube
to wall" radiographically usable position. Mechanical
or electrical limiters may be placed on the x-ray apparatus to rest~ict the movement of the beam to an
area which will result in a dose rate not in excess of
7 mr/hr measured in air at any accessible point. Personnel working adjacent to the enclosure area shall
not be exposed to a dose greater than 100 mr/week.
( 2) With reliable interlocks which will either prevent anyone from entering the enclosure while the x-ray gener;ttor is in operation or will terminate the generation
of x-rays should anyone enter: the enclosure.
(3) So that persons may at all times be able to escape from
within the enclosure.
(4) With visible and/or audible signals within the enclosure which are actuated a minimum of 5 seconds
before the generation of x-rays.
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(S) When the ceiling barrier does not meet the dose rate
as indicated in the part above, a barrier such as a
fence may be used to restrict access to the area on the
roof.
I3.1.3 No person is to be permitted to remain within the enclosure
while the x-ray generator is in operation.
I3.1.4 All protective enclosures and equipment shall be kept in
good repair.
I 3.2 Class B installations for unlimited use under normal operating conditions as specified by the registrant at the time of registration .
. IJ.2.I The x-ray source and objects exposed thereto must be contained within a permanent enclosure.
I 3.2.2
The enclosure shall be constructed
(I) So that the primary and secondary x-rays are attenuated to a dose rate as measured in air at any accessible
external point not to exceed 7 mrfhr when the x-ray
beam is adjusted to give maximum dose rate with the
x-ray generator running at normal operating conditions and the x-ray tube placed in the shortest "tube to
wall" radiographically usable position. Mechanical or
electrical limiters may be placed on the x-ray apparatus to restrict the movement of the beam to an
area which will result in a dose rate not in excess of
7 mrfhr measured in air at any accessible point. Personnel working in the immediate enclosure area shall
not be exposed to a dose greater than IOO mr/week.
(2) With reliable interlocks which will either prevent anyone from entering the enclosure while the x-ray generator is in operation or will terminate the generation
of x-rays should anyone enter the enclosure.
(3) So that persons may at all times be able to escape
from within the enclosure.
(4) With visible and/or audible signals within the enclosure which are actuated a minimum of 5 seconds
before the generation of x-rays.
(S) When the ceiling barrier does not meet the dose rate
as indicated in the part above, a barrier such as a fence
may be used to restrict access to the area on the roof.
I3.2.3 The controls for the kilovoltage and milliamperage shall
be limited by mechanical or electrical means so as not to
exceed the normal operating conditions as specified by the
registrant at the time of registration.
I3.2-4 No person is to be permitted to remain within the enclosure
while the x-ray generator is in operation.
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All protective enclosures and equipment shall be kept in
good repair.
Class C installations for limited use under conditions specified by
the registrant at the time of registration.
I3.3.I The x-ray source and objects exposed thereto must be contained within a permanent enclosure.
I 3.3.2 The enclosure shall be constructed
(I) So that the primary and secondary x-rays are attenuated to a dose rate as measured in air at any accessible
external point not to exceed 50 mr /hr when the x-ray
beam is adjusted to give a maximum dose rate with
the x-ray generator running at its maximum rated capacity and the x-ray tube placed in the shortest "tube
to wall" radiographically usable and/or limited position.
(2) With reliable interlocks which will either prevent anyOile from. entering the enclosure while the x-ray generator is in operation or will terminate the generation
of x-rays should anyone enter the enclosure.
(3) So that persons may at all times be able to escape from
within the enclosure.
I3·3·3 The workload of the machine. shall be restricted so that the
dose at any accessible point outside the protective enclosure
does not exceed IOO mr /week with the x-ray generator
running at its maximum capacity.
I3·3·4 The number of hours per day or week for permissible operation shall be established for the x-ray generator by the
state health commissioner under the conditions established
by the registrant at the time of registration.
I3·3·5 Warning signs should be posted in those areas outside the
protective barriers in which the dose rate in air at any accessible external point exceeds 2 mr jhr with the generator
operating at its maximum rated capacity and the x-ray
beam adjusted to give its maximum dose rate and the x-ray
tube placed in the shortest "tube to· wall" usable and/or
limited radiographic position.
I3.3.6 Mechanical or electrical limiters shall be placed on the
x-ray apparatus to restrict its movement to an area which
will result in a dose rate not in excess of so mrjhr measured in air at any accessible point.
13·3·7 All protective enclosures and equipment shall be kept in
good repair.
I3.2.5

I3.3
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No person is to be permitted to remain within the enclosure
while the x-ray generator is in operation.
I 3·3·9 Film badges or other permanent recording instruments
shall be provided and required to be worn continuously by
persons in the area at all times.
Class D installations for limited use and for temporary operation
(to include portable or mobile industrial x-ray installations).
I3-4-I An x-ray installation not meeting the conditions and specifications as described as class A, class B, or class C may
be operated for a period not to exceed 30 days ·or when it
is impractical or when an undue and unnecessary hardship
is involved, it may be extended by the state health commissioner for a period longer than 30 days. In either case such
installation and operation of such installation shall have
the approval of the state health commissioner and shall be
classified as a class D installation.
I3.4.2 All such installations shall have the radiation area in excess
of 5 mrfhr barricated by a fence, a rope or other suitable
barriers erected along the 5 mr jhr contour line.
I343 The area described by the temporary barricade shall be
suitably posted with caution signs.
I344 Film badges or other permanent recording instruments
shall be provided and required to be properly used on a
continual basis for personnel in the area at all times.
Industrial radiographic installations utilizing high intensity sealed
sources of radioactive material shall meet all appropriate requirements for radiological safety specified for x-ray installations of
class A, B, C, or D, whichever may be applicable.
I3·5·I The source when not in use shall be enclosed within a protective housing such that the dose rate does not exceed an
average of 2 mrfhr or a maximum of IO mrfhr at I meter
from the source.
I3.5.2 If the source is permanently mounted in a housing with a
beam control device or extended from and retracted into
a housing, this device shall be of positive design capable of
acting in any position of the housing. It shall also be possible to move the source to a shielded position manually
with a minimum risk of exposure in the event of the failure
of the automatic mechanism. There shall be on the housing
and on the control panel, a warning device which plainly
indicates whether the apparatus is "on" or "off."
I3·5·3 If the apparatus is of a type in which the source is removed
from the shield when in use, transfer shall be accomplished
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by a remote control mechanism. Transfer mechanisms
shall be so designed as to minimize the possibility of damage to the source in transit.
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8.

MEDICAL INSTALLATIONS

(Not Reproduced)
PART

9·

DENTAL RADIOGRAPHIC INSTALLATIONS

(Not Reproduced)
PART IO. FLUOROSCOPIC SHOE X-RAY MACHINES

(Not Reproduced)
PART II. MISCELLANEOUS TYPES OF X-RAY INSTALLATIONS

(Not Reproduced)
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Organs Under Various Conditions of Exposure
APPENDIX B-Maximum Permissible Average Concentrations of Radioactive Materials in Air and Water
APPENDIX C-Permissible Levels for Burials and Labelling Requirements
·APPENDIX D-List of Maximum Quantities of Radioactive Material Exemptions
APPENDIX E-Protection Requirements for Fluorographic Installations
APPENDIX F-Protection Requirement for Fluoroscopic Installations
APPENDIX G-Protection Requirements for Radiographic Installations
APPENDIX H-Protection Requirements for Dental Installations
APPENDIX !-Protection Requirements· for Therapeutic Installations
APPENDIX ..A"
PERMISSIBLE TOTAL WEEKLY DOSES IN SIGNIFICANT VOLUMES OF CRITICAL ORGANS UNDER
VARIOUS CONDITIONS OF EXPOSURE

Dose in Critical Organs (mrem) per week

Skin,
at Basal
Layer of
Epidermis
Radiation
Any radiation with
6oo"
half-value-layer
greater than ·
I mm of soft tissue
Any radiation with
ISoo
half-value-layer
less than 1 mm
of soft tissue
Any radiation

Conditions of Exposure
Part of Body
Whole Body

Whole Body

Blood
Forming
Organs
300

Gonads
300

Lens of
Eye
300

300

300

300

Hands and Forearms or Feet and
Ankles or Head
and Neck
• For exposures of the whole body to X or gamma rays up to 3 Mev, this condition
may be assumed to be met if the exposure dose does not exceed 300 mr, provided the
dose to the gonads does not exceed 300 mrem.
b Exposure of these limited portions of the body under these conditions does not alter
the total weekly dose of 300 mrem permitted to the bloodforming organs in the main
portion of the body, to the gonads, or to the lens of the eye.
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APPENDIX "B"
MAXIMUM PERMISSIBLE AVERAGE O)NCENTRATIONS OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS IN
AlB AND WATER
Note: In applying table I, exposures in any week should be averaged over 40 hours.
In applying table II, concentrations of radioactive material should be averaged over
I year.
Uncontrolled
Controlled (40 hrs.-week)
Table II
Table I
HalfLife(I) Column I
Column2
Column2
Column I
(Days)
Air(2)
Air(2)
Water(3)
Material
Water(3)
5 X IO..,
1.4 X Io..
5 X Io..
A" ·················
0.074 1.6 X IO....
1.6 X 10-•
3.6 X Io..,
A~ .... ·............
2.8
I.2 X IO""
5
. 2.I
4 X 10-•
3 X Io...
I X IO...
Ag"' ................
I3
8 X IO-n
3 X Io-u 1.3 X Io...
4X IO...
Am782" ...............
890
2X ro-"
1.01)
7 X ro-e
2X IO""
6 X Io~·
As ................
9 X 10-m
6X ro...,
2X 10-"
3 X I0-11
0.3I
At= ················
3X 10...
I.I X IO""
Au- ................
2.6
34 X 10-"
9X IO""
4
7 X 10...
8X IO-"
Au190 • • • • • • • • • • • ·• • • • •
2X I0
2.5 X IO""
3.1
2X 10...
I2
2X IO-"
6X IO""
Ba"0 + La"0 • • • • • • • • •
6X 10""
I X 10-1
Be•
4X IO-"
1.3 X IO""
48
3 1
Io...,
3.6X
10...
1.4
X
I8o
I
X
IC1
5
X
IO""
C' ·················
9X Io...,
5X IO....
3 X IO""
I5I
1.5 X IO""
Ca'" ················
2 X 10-•
Cd... + AglDO .. ······
7 X Io-a
2X ro-"
7 X 10""
77
7 X 10-m 3.6 X IO-a
2X 10....
I X Io-•
I8o
Ce"' + Pr'" .........
4 X Io...,
2.4 X 10...
I X IO-e
7 X Io-a
Cl80 .................
29
I X 10...
1.8 X Io-11
Cm...
5 X 10-m · 2.7 X ro..
I20
···············
4
Co..,
I.2 X IO-"
r.8 X Io-a
3·4 X Io...,
8.4
5 X 10
8X IO-"
5 X 10-•
2.4 X Io...,
c~ ................
22
I4
2X ro""
1.5 X 10...
6X IO-"
4-5 X 10...,
Cs111 +Ba121 ·········
I7
6X IO-"
8 X 10-a
2.5 X 10-•
2X I0-6
Cu"' .................
o.53
6 X 10-m
EulM ··········•••(>••
I X 10-1
3 X ro-a
2 X Io-a
820
I.2 X ro..,
p
9 X IO-•
.Q78 3·5 X Io...
2.6
·················
4X 10...
1.8 X IO...,
1.3 X ro...
6X IO""
6I
Fe05 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
I.I X Io...,
1.5 X Io-e
5 X Io-a
Fe...................
3-3 X 10...
27
Ga.. ................
9 X 10-•
3·4 X 10-•
I X I0-6
z6
0.59
Ge... ................
9 X 10-•
I X IO...
J.6X IO""
27
3·9
5 X IO-•
2.5 X Io...
1.6 X Io-•
7X Io...,
H" (HTO or ToO) ...
I9
Houe ...............
3 X IO-"
I X IO...
I. I
2.3
70
3 X IO-m
1...
9X ro...,
9 X Io-e
3 X IO""
7-7
·················
2.2 X 10...,
4 X IO-•
1.3 X Io...
7X IO""
Ir'"" ................
7-3
9 X ro...,
2.7 X Io...
5 X IO""
lr182 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
I.5 X IO-"
17
6X IO...,
4 X 10-•
2X 10-"
14 X 10-a
0.51
K'" .................
1.1 X 10-•
1.4 X ro-•
4 X IO...,
1.6
La''"
34
················
1.5 X IO...,
5 X IO-"
2.4
Lu177 ················
70
3-2
5 X IO-•
1.5 X IO-•
8X 10....
3 X IO-"
0.100
Mn""
r.8 X ro...
5 X ro-a
2.8
1.4
Mo00 ................
40
8X 10...
1.6 X ro-"
5 X 10...,
24 X ro...
o.61
Na"' ................
4 X ro....
1.2 X IO-a
4X ro...
1.3 X 10....
2I
Nb"" ................
7 X IO-•
5 X ro...,
1.6 X ro""
2.5 X IO""
8
Ni"" .................
2X ro...,
6X ro...
14 X ro-a
4X IO-"
P""
14
4 X IO-•
6X w-"
14 X ro...
2X 10-6
2.16
Pb'"'" ················
I X IO-a
2X 10...
3X ro...
7X IO""
Pd100 + Rh101
44
1 X w-•
2X 10....
6X IO-"
Pm'"
140
3
2 X IO-n
3 X IO...,
9X ro...,
6 X I0-10
Po010 (sol.) ..........
40
7 X IO-U
2 X I0-10
Po010 (insol.) ........
31
0

••••••••••••••••

................

················

.................
········
···············

Continued
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APPENDIX "B"-Continued
MAXIMUM PERMISSIBLE AVERAGE CONCENTRATIONS OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS IN
AIR AND WATER

HalfLife(I)
(Days)

Pr""
Pu""'
Pu...
Ra...,
Rb88
Re188

Material
. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . .
II
(sol.) . . . . . . . . . . 43000
( insol.) . . . . . . . .
36o
! dr. . . . . . . . . 16ooo

+

• • • • • • • • • • • • • •• •

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Rh105 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Rn122 +dr.......... .
Ru108 Rh108 • • • • • • • •

7.8
0.5

1.4

+

19
IS
saa ·················· 13
Sc"' ................ .
sm= ··············· 39000
Sn118 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
44
Sr"" ···········•·····

Sr""+ Y"" ..•........
Tc"" .•..•...........
Te"" .............•..
Te"" ............... .
Th.................. .
Th-natural (sol.) ... .
Th-natural (insol.) ..
Tm110 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
U-natural (sol.)* ....
U-natural (insol.)* ..
U""" (sol.) ......... .
u- (insol.) ....... .
V"'
xeua ·················
............... .
xeua· ............... .
yn ................ .

zn• ............... .

52

2700
2.I

13
IO

24-I

59
30
I20

300
120
12
5.27

0.38
51
21

Controlled (40 hrs.-week)
Table I
Column I
Air(2)
2.3 X Io...

6 X IO-U
6 X IO-U
24 X I0-11
. I. I X Ici...
2.4 X IO"""
3X IO""
I X IO...
8X IO"""
3X IO...
zX 10-"
4X ro...
I.7 X IO"""

6X IO....
6 X w-10
8X IO""
3X IO...,
I.2 X ro...,
2X IO"""
5 X 10-u
5 X I0-11
I.5 X Io...,
5 X 10-u
5 X 10-u
4 X I0-10
5 X IO-n
3X IO""
I.3 X Io"""
5 X ro...
I.2 X IO...,
6X IO""

Column2
Water(3)
I

4-5 X ro...
1.2

x

ro....

Uncontrolled
Table II
Column I
Air(2)
7 X IO....

X
X
8X
4X
8X
I X
2
2

ro-"

IO-U

4X

ro-o

3 X 10...

8X IO"""

1.6 X Io-a
ro-"
1.3 X Io...

zx

5X 10...

3.6 X

IO_,

2
I.6

X
X
7X

ro-a
Io-•
ro-o

3X
3X
1.1 X

ro-<~

3X
5X

I0-1
ro-<~

X

ro-a

sx 10...

2.5

ro...
Io-a

7 X ro-a

10...

I

X

IO...

5 X ro-u

I

X

IO...

I

X

X

IO-U . I.5
IO-U

Io...,
9X 10""".
2.4 X 10-1
IO-"
5 X 10-•
IO-"
6X 10""" 3-3 X IO..
2.6X IO..
4 X ro-1
1.5 X 10-·
I X IO-"
7X Io...
I
6 X·I0-1 I.3 X IO..
6X Io...,
5 X I0-1
zx 10... 2X IO..11
2 X I024 X ro...
8X I0-1
3X IO-"
8 X w-•
4X Io...,
4X IO..
3·3 X ro-o
6X Io...,
IO
I-7 X IO-U
1.5 X IO""
I.7 X IO-U
5 X 10..,
I.7 X IO-U
I.7 X IO-U
I X 10-11
I.6 X IO-U
I X IO-"
1.5
4
4X IO-"
I.3 X 10
4 X ro-a
1.7 X Io...,
6 X I0-1
4 X Io...
2 X 10-1
2X IO...,

Unidentified beta or
gamma emitters or
any
undetermined
mixtures of beta or
gamma emitters . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Unidentified alpha
·
emitters or any undetermined mixtures
of alpha emitters. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Columnz
Water(3)
3·6 X IO...

(I) Effective half-life in body.
(2) Air concentrations are given in microcuries per milliliter of air.
(3) Water concentrations are given in microcuries per milliliter of water. Those
figures also apply to foodstuff in microcuries per gram (wet weight).
* For enriched uranium the same radioactivities per unit volume as those for natural
uranium are applicable. It should be noted that the contribution of U ... to the gross
activity of enriched uranium is 20-40 times that of the U ....
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PERMISSIBLE LEVELS FOR BURIALS AND LABELLING REQUIREMENTS

Microcuries
Agw. ... . . . . . . . . . .
I
Ag111 • • • • • • • • • • • • Io
18
11
As , As • • • • • • • • IO
Au108 • • • • • • • • • • • • IO
Au190 • •• • • • •••• •• IO
Ba"0 +La"" . . . . .
I
Be• .............. so
C" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . so
Ca'" . . .. . .. .. . . . . Io
Cd""+Ag""' ..... 10
Ce"'+Pr"' .....
Cl...... ·....... ..
I

Microcuries

Microcuries
Sm""' ........... . 10
Snu" ........... . IO

Ir192 • • • • • • • • • • • • • IO
K 42 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • IO
Lauo . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Sr"" ............ .
I
I
Mn52 • • • • • • • • • • • •
sr"" Y"" . . . . . .. O.I
Ta.............. . IO
Mn"" ........... . so
Tc"" ............ .
I
Mo"" ........... . IO
22
Na
• • • • • • • • • • ••
IO
Tc00 • • • • • • • • • • • • •
I
107
IO
Na.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . Io
Te
••••••••••••
I
Nb"" . .. . . . . . . .. .. IO
Te120 • • • • • • • • • • • •
Th (natural) ... . so
Ni"" ............ .
08
Tl.............. . so
Ni • • • • • • • • • • • • •
P"" ............. . IO
Tritium-See H" .. 2SO
108
108
Com . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I
Pd
Rh
•••••
U (natural) .... . so
so
1011
u- ............ . I
Cr"' . . . . . . . . . . . . . so
Pd
••••••••••••
IO
U""'-U.......... . so
Cs"" Ba"" . . . . .
I
Pm"' . . . . . . . . . . . . IO
Cu"' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . so
Po210 • • • • • • • • • • • •
o.I
V"' ·············· IOI
EulJW . . . . . . . . . . . .
I
Pr"" . . . . . . . . . . . . IO
W"" ........... .
yoo ......•.....•• I
F 18 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • so
Pu280 • • • • • • • • • • • •
I
Y"' ............ .
Fe"" ·............. so
Ra""" . . . . . . . . . . . . o.I
Zn.............. . IO
Fe"" . .. . .. . .. .. . .
I
Rb'"' . . . . . . . . . .. . . IO
72
Ga • • • • • • • • • • • • • IO
RelJIO ... ·......... IO
Unidentified radioactive materials
Ge71 • • • • • • • • • • • • • SO
Rh""' . . . . . . . . • . . . IO
1
or any of the
H (HTO or
Ru""' + Rh""' . . . . .
I
85
above in unH".O) . . . . . . . . . 2so
S • • • • • • • • • • • • • • so
O.I
known mixtures.
1'11116 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • IO
Sb'"' . . . . . . . . . . . .
I
ln • • • • • • • • • • • • •
I
Sc'" . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I
Note: For purposes of paragraphs IO.J and II-4 where there is involved a combination of isotopes in known amounts the limit for the combination should be derived as
follows:
Determine for each isotope in the combination, the ratio retween the quantity present
in the combination and the limit otherwise established for the specific isotope when not
in combination. The sum of each ratios for all the isotopes in the combination may not
exceed "I" (i.e. "unity").
.
Example: For purposes of paragraph II-4, if a particular batch contains 2,000 p. of
Auuo and 2S,OOO p. of C", it may also include not more than 3,000 p. of 1131• This limit
was determined as follows :
2,000 p. Auuo + 2S,OOO p. C" + 3,000 p. 1111
IO,OOO p.
so,ooo p.
IO,OOO p.
The denominator in each of the above ratios was obtained by multiplying the figure
in the table by I,OOO as provided in paragraph 114
Limits listed are for radiological health reasons only. Other considerations such as
chemical toxicity may require lower limits.

+

+

+

>

APPENDIX "D"
'UST OF MAXIMUM QUANTITIES OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL EXEMPTIONS

Column No. I
Not as a Sealed
Source
Byproduct Material
( Microcuries)
Antimony (Sb,..) . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I
Arsenic 76 (As"").... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
IO
Arsenic 77 (As")... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
IO
Barium I4o-Lanthanum I40 (BaLa140 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I
Beryllium (Be7 ) • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
so
Cadmium IQ9-Silver 109 ( CdAg""') . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . .
10
Calcium 4S ( Ca'") . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
IO
Carbon 14 (C").....................................
so
Cerium 144-Praseodymium (CePr"').................
I
Continued

Column No. II
As a Sealed
Source
( Microcuries)
IO
IO
IO
IO

so
IO
IO

so
IO
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APPENDIX "D"-Continued
LIST OF MAXIMUM QUANTITIES OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL EXEMPTIONS
Column No. I Column No. II
Not as a Sealed
As a Sealed
Byproduct Material
Source
Source
( Microcuries)
( Microcuries)
I
10
Cesium-Barium 137 (CaBaU7)........................
Chlorine -36 (018 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I
10
Chromium 51 (Cr"') .... ... .. .... .. .. .. . .. .... .......
so
so
Cobalt 6o (Co'"') ................... , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I
10
Copper 64 (Cu"')......... .... .... ... .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
so
50
Europium 154 (Euw)... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1
10
Fluorine 18 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . .
so
50
11
Gallium 72 (Ga ) • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ; • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
1010
Germanium 71 (Gen).-.... ....... ...................
so
so
Gold· 198 {Au""'). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
10
10
Gold 199 {Au""').....................................
10
10
Hydrogen 3 (Tritium) (H")........................
250
250
Indium 114 (Inw)... . . . .. . . . . .. . .. . . .. . .. . .. . . .. . . ..
I
10
Iodine -131 (P11 ) •••• - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
10
10
Iridium 192 {Ir""')..................................
10
10
Iron 55· (Fei!B)......................................
so
50
Iron 59 (Fe"")......................................
1
10
Lanthanum I40 {La14" ) . . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
10
IO
Manganese 52 {Mn.. ) ..•........ ; ............... :...
1
10
88
Manganese 56 (Mn ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . •
so
so
Molybdenum 99 (Mo"") ........... , .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . ..
Io
Io
Nickel· 59 (Ni"")........................ .............
1
10
01
Nickel 63 {Ni ) . . . . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
1
10
Niobium 9S (Nb"") ...................... ,...........
IO
10
Palladium I09 (Pd"'")...............................
10
10
Palladium 103-Rhodium 103 (PdRh...,)...............
so
so
Phosphorus 32 (P"")................................
to
10
Polonium 210 (Po.,.)...............................
0.1
I
Potassium 42 (K.. ) ...... ~.... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
10
IO
Praseodymium 143 ( Pr.. ) . . . . . .. . .. .. . .. . . .. . . . . . . . .
10
10
Promethium I47 (Pm14' ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
10
Io
Radium 226 (Ra-).................................
0.1
1
180
Rhenium 186 {Re ) • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
10
10
Rhodium 105 (Rh""')...............................
10
10
Rubidium 86 {Rb88 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • •
10
10
Ruthenium Io6-Rhodium 1o6 (RuRh""')...............
I
10
Samarium IS3 {Sm'"")...............................
10
10
40
Scandium 46 ( Sc ) • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
I
10
Silver I05 ( Ag""') . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I
IO
Silver III {Ag"') .... .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
IO
10
Sodium 22 (Na"")...................................
10
10
Sodium 24 (Na"')..................................
10
IO
Strontium 89 ( Sr"") . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I
IO
Strontium 90- Yttrium 90 (SrY"")....................
0.1
I
so
so
Sulfur 35 (S•).....................................
181
Tantalum I82 {Ta ) . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
IO
to
Technetium 96 {Tc"").... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I
to
00
Technetium 99 (Tc ) . . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
I
10
Tellurium I27 (Te"") . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
IO
10
Tellurium 129 {Teuo)...................... . . . . . . . . .
I
10
Thallium 204 (TI""'). .. .. . .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
so
so
Thorium (natural) . . .. . . . . .. .. . . . .. .. . .. .. . . . . . . . ..
so
so
Tin II3 ( Sn111 ) • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
10
10
Tungsten I85 (W""') . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
IO
10
Vanadium 48 (V.. )..................................
IO
Yttrium 90 (Y""} . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
10
Yttrium 91 (VV')...................................
10
Zinc 6s (Zn"").... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
10
10
Beta and/or Gamma emitting byproduct material not
listed above . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
10

-...

00

mm.
2.I
I.6
I.2
0.8
·4
2.5
2.0
1.4
I.O
o.6

3ft.

s ft.

.s

8ft. IO ft. I 5 ft. 20ft.

Lead thickness required for primary barrier at a target-tooccupied-area distance of3ft.

s ft.
in.
4.I
2.8
I.6
0.6
0
5·7
4·0
2.3
o.g
0
in.
2.8
I.6
o.6
0
0
4.0
2.3
0.9
0
0

ft.
IIO
6o
35
20
IO
I20
6s
35
20
IO

Distance
without
barrier'

s ft.

o.8
·3
0

o.s
0
0

0

0.2
0

0
0
0

mm.
O.I
0
0

8ft. 10ft.

mm. mm. mm.
0.6 0.4 0.2
.2 0
·3
0
0
0·

3ft.

Lead thickness re. quired for secondary
barrier" at a targetto-occupied-area
distance of-

I.8
0
0

0

in.
I. I
O.I
0

s ft.

2.4
I.O

in.
I.8
0.8
0

3ft.

0

0.3
0

in.
0.7
0
0

0

0
0

in.
O.I
0
0

8ft. IO ft.

Concrete thickness"
required for secondary barrier" at a
target-to-occupiedarea distance of-

Note: 1.5 hvl should be added for controlled areas and s hvl outside
the controlled area to each of the tabular barrier thicknesses.

• Distance from target at which the weekly useful beam dose will not
exceed 0.3r. These distances were computed from the outputs at zero
barrier thickness and the air absorption coefficient for double the minimum·wave length.
• Note that a target-to-skin distance of so em is assumed.
• Equivalent to 3,000 4o-ma-sec exposures per week.

in.
3·3
2.0
I.O
0.2
0
4·7
3.0
I.S
0.3
0

8ft. IO ft. I 5 ft. 20ft.

Concrete thickness• required for
primary barrier at a target-tooccupied-area distance of-

in.
mm. mm. mm. mm. mm.
in.
in.
6.3 5·4 4·5
1.7 1.4 I.3 I.O o.g
s.o 4·I 3.2
I.3 I.O 0.9 0.7
.s
o.g 0.6
.s
3·7 2.8 2.0
·4
·3
.2
.I 0
2.4 I.6 0.9
·S
·3
.2
.I 0
I.2 0.6
0
0
.I
2.1
I.8 I.6 I.3 I.I
8.7 7·4 6.2
1.6 I.3 I.I o.g 0.7
7·0 S·7 4·5
I.I 0.8 0.7
.s
5·2 3·9 2.8
·3
.2
0
0.7
3·4 2.3 1.3
·3
.I 0
0
0
2.0 I.O 0.2
·3
1
Constant potentials may require IS to 2S% larger thicknesses of
lead and S to ISo/o larger thicknesses of concrete than those given here
for pulsating potentials. These differences were estimated from the
data of Miller and Kennedy at 275 to 52$ kvcp and from the data of
Trout at so to 2SO kvp. As these expertmenters used very different
filtrations, the differences indicated here may be high, especially for
concrete.
1
W =workload, U =use factor, T =occupancy factor. Use factor
for secondary barrier is always 1.
• The concrete requirements are based on a concrete density of
2.35 g/cm•.

ma.-min.
kep per. wk.
IOO 82,000
soo
I25
30
7
I,OOO
ISO
250
6o
IS
4

Tube
potential' WUT'

Useful beam protection
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APPENDIX "F"
PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS 1 FOR FLUOROSCOPIC INSTALLATIONS
Workloadx
Tube occupo-

Lead thickness required for secondary barrie~ at a target-tooccupied~area distance of-

Concrete thickness required for
secondary barrie~ at a taletto-occupied-area_ distance -

ten- kct~
tial• (WT)
3ft. s ft. 8ft. 10ft. IS ft. 20ft. 3ft. s ft. 8ft. 10ft. IS ft. 20ft.
ma.min./
kvp
mm. mm. mm. mm. mm. mm. in.
in. in.
in.
in.
in.
wk.
IOO 4.000
0
2.6 1.9 I.J o.S 0.2
0
0.8 o.s O.J 0.2 O.I
I,OOO
I.6 0.8 0.2 0
0
0
0
.s .2 .I 0 0
.2 0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
o.s 0
2SO
0
0
I.I o.8 o.s 0.3 0.2
I2S 4.000
3.6 "24 I4 1.0 04
I,OOO
0
.2 0
0
2.0 I.O O.J 0
0
0
0.7
4
0
0
o.8 0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2SO
.J 0
0
ISO 4.000
1.3 I.O 0.7 o.s 0.2
4-3 3·3 24 1.7 04- 0
1,000
0
0
0
0
.2 0
2.9 I.7 04 0
0.9 o.s
0
0
0
0
I.2 0
0
0
0
0
0
250
4
• As the useful beam is always intercepted by the protective fluoroscopic screen cover,
only secondary barriers are required.
·
1
Constant potentials may require IS to.25% larger thicknesses of lead and S to ISo/o
larger thicknesses of concrete than those given here for pulsating potentials. These differences were estimated from the data of Miller and Kennedy at 27S to 525 kvc_p and
from the data of Trout at SO to 2SO kvp. As these experimenters used very different
filtrations, the differences indicated here may be high, especially for concrete.
• Note that a target-to-skin distance of so em is assumed.
Note: 1.5 hvl should be added for controlled areas and 5 hvl outside the controlled
areas to each of the tabular barrier thicknesses.

12
3
I

so

200

I~

WUT'
ma.-min.
perwk
1,000
250
6o
IS
4
400
IOO
2S
6

8ft. 10ft. IS ft. 20ft.

mm. mm. mm. mm. mm.
I.S 1.2 I. I 0.8 0.7
1.1 o.8 0.7 o.s 0.3
0.7 o.s 0.3 0.2 O.I
0
0.3 0.2 O.I 0
O.I 0
0
0
0
1.5 1.2 1.1 o.S 0.7
1,1 0.8 0.7 o.s 0.4
0.7 o.s 0.4 0.2 0
0
0.4 0.2 0
0
0
0
0
0
0
I.S I.2 I.I 0.8 0.7
1.1 o.S 0.7 o.s 0.3
0.7 o.s O.J 0.2 0
0
0
0
O.J 0
0
0
0
0
0

s ft.

0
s.6
3·7
2.1
0.8
0

o.g

in.
4·8
3-5
2.2
1.2
0.4
s.1
J.6
2.1
in.
3·9
2.6
1.4
o.s
0
4·0
2.6
1.2
0.2
0
4·2
2.6
1.1
0
0

in.
3·5
2.2
1.2
0.3
0
3·6
2.I
0.9
0
0
3·7
2.1
o.S
0
0

o.g

0
0
0
2.1
o.8
0
0
0

in.
2.2
I.2
0.3
o·
0
2.1

6o
30
I6
8
4

5

IO

20

40

70

25
IS
8

so

ft.
90

8ft. IO ft.

O.J
0
0

0
0
0

0
0
0

0.2
0
0

0
0
0

0
0
0

0
0
0

.. .. .... ....
.. ..

o.s
0.2
0

.. .. .... ....
.. ..

s ft.

mm. mm. mm. mm.
o.s 0.2 0.1 0
0.2 0
0
0
0
0
0
0

3ft.

Lead thickness required for secondary barrier" at a
target-to-occupiedarea distance of-

0
0

0
0

o.s
0
0

·0
0

0
0
0

in.
0.4
0
0

0
0
0

..
..

0
0

0

in.
0
0
0

8ft. 10ft.

.. .. . .
.. .. . .
o.g 0 0

1.5
0.3
0

in.
0.8
0
0

s ft.

.. .. .. . .
.. .. . . ..

in.
1.6
o.s
0

3ft.

Concrete thickness•
required for secondary barrier• at a
target-to-occupiedarea distance of-

1
The concrete requirements are based on a concrete density of
2.35 If/em•.
' D1stance from target at which the weekly useful beam dose will
not exceed 0.3r. These distances were computed from the outputs
at zero barrier thickness and the air absorption coefficient for
double the minimum wave length.
• Note that a target-to-skin distance of so em is assumed.
Note: 1.5 hvl should be added for controlled areas and 5 hvl outside the controlled areas to each of the tabular barl'ier thicknesses.

I.S
0.6
0
0
2.7
1.3
0.3
0
0
2.7
1.3
0.1
0
0

2.7

in.

Distance
without
s ft. 8ft. IO ft. IS ft. 20ft. barrier'

Concrete thickness• required for primary barrier at a target-to-occupied-area distance of-

1
Constant potentials may require 15 to 25o/o larger thicknesses of
lead and S to 15o/o larger thicknesses of concrete than those given
here for pulsating potentials. These differences were estimated from
the data of Miller and Kennedy at 275 to 525 kvcp and from the
data of Trout at so to 250 kvp. As these experimenters used very
different filtrations, the differences indicated here may be high, especially for concrete.
• W =workload, U =use factor, T =occupancy factor. Use
factor for secondary barrier is always 1.

ISO

I25

·kvp
IOO

Tube
potential'

Lead thickness required for
primary barrier at a target-to-occupied-area distanceof-·

Useful beam protection
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>

t:t
.....
X

z

tr1

""d

>
""d

\0
0

-

WUT" 3ft. 4ft.

s ft.

6ft. 8ft. 10ft. 20ft.'

Lead thickness required for primary
barrier at a target-to-occupied area
distance of-

DENTAL INSTITUTIONS

3ft. 4ft.
in.
2.4
x.s
o.8
·3
4-S
3-2
2.0
0.9

s ft.
in.
1.8
1.0
0.4
0
3.6
2.4
1.2
04

in.
x.s
0.8
·3
0
3.2
2.0
0.9
.2

in.
0.8
·3
0
0
2.0
0.9
.2
0
3S
20
IO
8o
40
2S
13

ft.

6s

Distance
without
barrier'

mm.
0.1
0
0
0.3
0
0

mm.
0.2
0
0
0.2
0
0
o.s
.I
0

s ft.

mm.
0.3
0
0

3ft. 4ft.

~

Lead thickness
required for secondary barrier"
at a target-tooccupied-area
distance of-

1.2
0.4
0

in.
0.7
0
0

0.7
0
0

in.
0.4
0
0

3ft. 4ft.

o.s
0
0

0.1
0
0

in.

s ft.

~

Concrete thickness,• required
for secondary
barrier" at a
target-to-occupied-area
distance of-

8
The concrete requirements are based on a concrete density of
2.3s g/cm•.
• Distance from target at which the weekly useful beam dose will not
exceed 0.3r. These distances were computed from the outputs at zero
barrier thickness and the air absorption coefficient for double the minimum wave length.
• Note that a target-to-skin distance of so em is assumed.
Note: x.s hvl should be added for controlled areas and 5 hvl outside
the controlled areas to each of the tabular barrier thicknesses.

in.
2.1
1.3
0.6
.2
4-2
2.9
1.7
0.7

6ft. 8ft. 10ft. 20ft.

Concrete thickness• required for primary barrier at a target-to-occupiedarea distance of-

ma.-min.
kvp per wk. mm. mm. mm. mm. mm. mm. mm.
in.
in.
8oo
o.8 o.8 0.7 0.6 o.s 0.4 0.3
70
3·0 2.7
2.1
200
.6
.I
1.8
.s
·4
·4
·3
·3
.2
.2
.I 0
1.3 1.0
so
·3
·3
·4
I2
.2
.2
.I
0.6 0.4
.I 0
0
0
IOO
8oo
1.8 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.1 1.0 o.6
s.s 4-9
200
1.3 1.1 I.O 0.9 0.7 0.6
.3
4-2 3·6
0.9 0.7 0.6
so
.s ·4 ·3 .I 2.9 2.4
I2
.2
.2
1.6 .J.2
.I 0
.s
·4
·3
1
Constant potentials may require IS to 2S% larger thicknesses of
lead and s to IS% larger thicknesses of concrete than those given here
for pulsating potentials. These differences were estimated from the
data of Miller and Kennedy at 27S to S2S kvcp and from the data of
Trout at so to 2SO kvp. As these experimenters used very different
filtrations, the differences indicated here may be high, especially for
concrete.
• W =workload, U =use factor, T =occupancy factor. Use factor
for secondary barrier is always 1.

Tube'
potential

FOR

Useful beam protection
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"'

--

2SO

ISO

6oo

ISO
40,000
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8.7 8.2 7.2 6.s
7.0 6.s s.6 s.o
s.s 5.0 4·2 J.6
4·0 J.6 2.9 2.4
2.7 2.4 I.8 1.4

8 ft. IO ft. IS ft. 20ft.
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I.2
o.8
.6
·3
0
7·0
s.7
4·4
3·0
I.8
I0.4
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7.0
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I6.9
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19.0
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14.6
I2.2
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0
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2.J
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·4
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0
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4·a
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0
0
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0
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0.3
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0
0
0
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2.2
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0
S·7
4·0
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8ft. IO ft. IS ft. 20ft.

Concrete thickness• required for
primary barrier at a target-tooccupied-area distance of-

Useful beam protection

Lead thickness required for
primary barrier at a target-tooccupied-area distance of-

3ft.
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0
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0
0
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Dis- Lead thickness required for
ta.nce secondary barrier' at a tarWlth- get-to-occupied-areadistance
out
ofbar~
.
rier" 3ft. s ft. 8ft. IO ft. IS ft.
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27.0
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I7.J
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soo. 12.0 10.0 8.0 7.0 s.s
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Dis- Lead thickness required for
tance secondary barrier' at a tarwith- get-to-occupied-area distance
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Concrete thickness• required for
primary barrier at a target-tooccupied-area distance of-'-

IJ.4 II.4
10.8 8.8
8.2 6.2

in.
in.
12.$ 10.8
IO.I 8.4
7.8 6.o

4·4

9.8

7.2

4·3
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in.
!).2
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6.2
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S·9
3·5

s.8
0

7·4

2.4

4·7

in.
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3ft. s ft. 8 ft. IO ft. 15 ft.

Concrete thickness• required
for secondary barrier' at a
target-to-occupied-area distance of-

1
W =workload, U =use .factor, T =occupancy factor. Use factor for ·these ·experimenters \!Sed ·very different filtrations, the ·differences ·indicated
secondary barrier is always I.
here may be high, especially for concrete.
1
The concrete requirements are based on a concrete density of 2,35 g/cm•.
• Pulsating; pot~ntials may require 10 to 20% smaller thicknesses of lead
1
Distance from target at which the weekly useful beam dose will not ex- and s to 1,;% smaller thicknesses of. concrete than those given here for conceed O.Jr.
stant potentials. These differences were estimated from the data of Miller and
· Kennedy at 27S to S2S kvcp and from the data of Trout at so to 250 kvp. As
' Note that a target-to-skin distance of so em is assumed.
1
Constant potentials may require IS to 2S~o larger thicknesses of le'ad and these experimenters used very different filtrations, the differences indicated
S to Is% larger thicknesses of concrete than those given here· for pulsating here may be high, especially for concrete.
.
potentials. These differences were estimated from the data of Miller and
Note: I.S hvl should be added for controlled areas and S hvl outside the
Kennedy at 27S to S2S kvcp and from the data of Trout at so to 2SO kvp, . .As controlled areas t<i each of the tabular barrier thicknesses.

-

Tube
potential WUT'
ma.-min.
kvcp• per wk.
40,000
300 10,000
2,SOO
6oo
I 50
~
400 12,000
J,OOO

Lead thickness. required for
primary barrier at a target-tooccupied-area distance of-

Useful beam protection

PROO'ECTION REQUIREMENTS FOR THERAPEUTIC INSTALJ.ATIONS

APPENDIX "!"-Continued

Appendix B
ITEM 1
REPORT OF THE NEw ENGLAND CoMMITTEE ON ATOMIC
ENERGY TO THE NEw ENGLAND GovERNORs' CoNFERENCE

Draft of an Act to Coordinate Development and Regulatory Activities
Relating to the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy
Be it enacted by, etc.
Section

I.

Declaration of Policy

a. The State of .............. , .... endorses the action of the Congress
of the United States in enacting the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to institute
a program to encourage the widespread participation in the development and
utilization of atomic energy for peaceful purposes to the maximum extent
consistent with the common defense and security and with the health and
safety of the public; and therefore declares the policy of the State to beTo cooperate actively in the program thus instituted; and
To the extent that the regulation of special nuclear materials
and by-product materials, of production facilities and utilization
facilities, and of persons operating such facilities may be within the
jurisdiction of the State, to provide for the exercise of the State's
regulatory authority so as to conform, as nearly as may be, to the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and regulations issued thereunder,
to the end that there may, in effect, be a single harmonious system
of regulation within the State.
l.
2.

b. The State of. .................. recognizes that the development of
industries producing or utilizing atomic energy may result in new conditions calling for changes in the laws of the State and in regulations issued
thereunder with respect to health and safety, working conditions, workmen's
compensation, transportation, public utilities, life, health, accident, fire, and
casualty insurance, the conservation of natural resources, including wildlife,
and the protection of streams, rivers, and airspace from pollution, and therefore declares the policy of the State to bel. To adapt its laws and regulations to meet the new conditions
in ways that will encourage the healthy development of industries
producing or utilizing atomic energy while at the same time protecting the public interest; and
2. To initiate continuing studies of the need for changes in the
relevant laws and regulations of the State by the respective departments and agencies of the State which are responsible for their
administration ; and .
J. To assure the coordination of the studies thus undertaken,

1193

1194

STATE REGULATION
particularly with other atomic industrial development activities of
the State and with the development and regulatory activities of
other States and of the Government of the United States.

Section

2.

United States Licenses or Permits Required

No person shall manufacture, construct, produce, transfer, acquire or
possess any special nuclear material, by-product material, production facility, or utilization facility, or act as an operator of a production or utilization facility, wholly within this State unless he shall have first obtained a
license or permit for the activity in which he proposes to engage from the
United States Atomic Energy Commission if, pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the Commission requires a license or permit to be obtained
by persons proposing to engage in activities of the same type over which it
has jurisdiction.

Section 3· Conduct of Studies Concerning Changes in Laws and Regulations with a View to Atomic Industrial Development
Each of the following departments and agencies of the State Government
is directed to initiate and to pursue continuing studies as to the need, if any,
for changes in the laws and regulations administered by it that would arise
from the presence within the State of special nuclear materials and byproduct" materials and from the operation herein of production or utilization facilities, and, on the basis of such studies, to make such recommendations for the enactment of laws or amendments to law administered by it,
and such proposals for amendments to the regulations issued by it, as may
appear necessary and appropriate.
a. The Department of Public Health, particularly as to hazards, if any,
to the public health and safety.
b .. The Department of Labor, particularly as to hazardous working conditions, if any.
c. The Workmen's Compensation Commission, particularly as to the
time and character of proof of claims of injuries and the extent of the
compensation allowable therefor.
d. The Department of Public Highways, particularly as to the transportation of special nuclear materials and by-product materials on highways of
the State.
e. The Public Utilities Commission, particularly as to the transportation
of special nuclear materials and by-product materials by common carriers
not in interstate commerce and as to the participation by public utilities subject to its jurisdiction in projects looking to the development of production
or utilization facilities for industrial or commercial use.
f. The Department of Insurance, particularly as to. the insurance of
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persons and property from hazards· to life and property resulting from
atomic development.
g. The Department of Conservation, particularly as to the hazards, if any,
to the natural resources of the State, including wildlife, and as to the protection, if necessary, of rivers, streams, and airspace from pollution.
h. Such other departments and agencies (including departments and
agencies of political subdivisions of the State) as the Governor may direct
and for the purposes specified by him.

Section 4· Coordination of Studies and Development Activities
a. The Governor and Council shall appoint a citizen of this State to serve
as adviser to the Governor with respect to atomic industrial development
within the State ; as coordinator of the development and regulatory activities
of the State relating to the industrial and commercial uses of atomic energy ;
and as deputy of the Governor in matters relating to atomic energy, including participation in the activities of any committee formed by the New
England States to represent their interest in such matters and also cooperation with other States and with the Government of the United States. The
person so appointed shall have the title of Coordinator of Atomic Development Activities.
b. The Coordinator of Atomic Development Activities shall have the
duty of coordinating the studies, recommendations, and proposals of the
several departments and agencies of the State (and its political subdivisions)
required by Section 3 of this Act with each other and also with the programs and activities of the Department of Industrial Development of the
State. So far as may be practicable, he shall coordinate the studies conducted, and the recommendations and proposals made, in this State with like
activities in the New England and other States and with the policies and
regulations of the United States Atomic Energy Commission. In carrying
out his duties, he shall proceed in close cooperation with the Department of
Industrial Development.
c. The several departments and agencies of the State (and its political
subdivisions) which are directed by Section 3 of this Act to initiate and
pursue continuing studies are further directed to keep the Coordinator of
Atomic Development Activities fully and currently informed as to their
activities relating to atomic energy. No regulation or amendment to a regulation applying specifically to an atomic energy matter which any such department or agency may propose to issue shall become effective until 30 days
after it has been submitted to the Coordinator, unless, upon a finding of
emergency need, the Governor by order waives all or any part of this 3o-day
period.
d. The Coordinator of Atomic Development Activities shall keep the
Governor and Council arid the several interested departments and agencies
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informed as to private and public activities affecting atomic industrial development and shall enlist their cooperation in taking action to further such
development as is consistent with the health, safety and general welfare of
this State.
e. The Coordinator of Atomic Development Activities shall be paid a
salary of $
per annum.

Section S· Injunction Proceedings
Whenever, in the opinion of the Attorney General, any person is violating
or is about to violate Section 2 of this Act, the Attorney General may apply
to the appropriate court for an order enjoining the person from engaging
or continuing to engage in the activity violative of this Act and upon a
showing that such person has engaged, or is about to engage in any such
activity, a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or the
other order may be granted.

Section 6. Funds Provided
There is hereby authorized to be appropriated the sum of $
for the
salary of the Coordinator of Atomic Development Activities and for secretarial, travel, printing, and other necessary expenses incurred by him in the
performance of his duties.

Section 7· Definitions
As used in this Act,
a. The term "atomic energy" means all forms of energy released in the
course of nuclear fission or nuclear transformation.
b. The term "by-product material" means any radioactive materials (except special nuclear materials) yielded in or made radioactive by exposure
to the radiation incident to the process of producing or utilizing special
nuclear materials.
c. The term "production facility" means (I) any equipment or device
capable of the production of special nuclear material in such quantity as to
be of significance to the common defense and security, or in such manner
as to affect the health and safety of the public; or (2) any important component part especially designed for such equipment or device.
d. The term "special nuclear material" means (I) plutonium and. uranium
enriched in the isotope 233 or in the isotope 235, and any other material
which the Governor declares by order to be special nuclear material after
the United States Atomic Energy Commission has determined the material to be such ; or ( 2) any material artificially enriched by any of the
foregoing.
e. The term "utilization facility" means (I) any equipment or device,
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except an atomic weapon, capable of making use of special nuclear materials in such quantity as to be of significance to the common defense and
security, or in such manner as to affect the health and safety of the public,
or peculiarly adapted for making use of atomic energy in such quantity as
to.be of significance to the common defense and security, or in such manner
as to affect the health and safety of the public; or (2) any important
component part especially designed for such equipment or device.
f. The term "operator" means any individual who manipulates the controls of a utilization or production facility.

ITEM 2
A

SuGGESTED STATE RADIATION PROTECTION AcT

From the National Bureau of Standards Handbook No. 61,
"Regulation of Radiation Exposure by Legislative Means."
(December 9, 1955)
"AN ACT for the Control of Radiations from Machines and Radioactive Materials, for the Purpose of Protecting Health."
Short Title. This Act may be referred to as the . . . . . . . . . . Radiation
(State)
Hygiene Act.
Section 1. Statement of Policy. Whereas, radiation can be instrumental
in the improvement of health, welfare, and productivity of the public if
properly utilized, and may impair the health of the people and the industrial
and agricultural potentials of the State if improperly utilized, it is hereby
declared to be the public policy of this State to encourage the constructive
uses of radiation and to control any associated harmful effects.
Section 2. Definitions. For the purposes of this Act, the following
words and phrases are defined :
(a) Radiation is gamma rays and X-rays, alpha and beta particles, highspeed electrons, neutrons, protons, and other nuclear particles ; but not
sound or radio waves, or visible, infrared, or ultraviolet light.
(b) Radiation machine is any device that produces radiations when the
associated control devices are operated.
(c) Radioactive material is any material, solid, liquid, or gas, that emits
radiation spontaneously.
Additional definitions may be included.
Section 3· Creation and Organization of Agency: Advisory Board,
Meetings, Employees.
(a) There is hereby created and established a State Radiation-Control
Agency hereinafter. referred to as the Agency. The Agency shall be an
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organizational component of the State Department of ......... (Alternate:
There is hereby created and established an independent State RadiationControl Agency, hereinafter referred to as the Agency.)
(b) The Governor shall appoint a Director of the Agency (hereinafter
called the Director) who shall perform and carry out all functions and
duties given to the Agency under this Act, and shall direct, carry out; and
enforce all radiation safety control activities and measures vested in the
Agency. The Director shall be a person having extensive training and experience in the field of health and of radiation protection.
(c) In accordance with the laws of the State, the Agency may employ,
compensate, and prescribe the powers and duties of such persons as may be
necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act. However, technical, legal,
and other services shall be performed, insofar as practicable, by personnel
of existing State departments, agencies, and offices.
(d) The Director may delegate to officers and employees of the Agency
such function, duties, and authority as are vested in the Agency by this
Act ; except the authority to adopt and promulgate standards, rules, and
regulations, and to issue or modify orders.
(e) There is hereby established within the Agency a State Radiation
Technical Advisory Board, hereinafter referred. to as the "Board," consisting of five members. The Director of the Agency shall be a member of
the Board. The other four members shall be persons with scientific training
in one or more of the following fields : health, agriculture, medicine, radiology, radiation physics, biology, industry, labor, atomic energy. The
Governor shall appoint these four members after seeking recommendations
of established authorities or organizations in the above-specified fields. The
members' term of office shall be four years, except that the terms of those
first appointed shall expire as follows:
I

I
I
I

at the end of I year after such date,
at the end of 2 years after such date,
at the end of 3 years after such date, and
at the end of 4 years after such date

as designated by the Governor at the time of appointment. If a vacancy
occurs, the Governor shall appoint a member for the remaining portion of
that term. The Director of the Agency shall be Chairman of the Board. The
Board shall hold four regular meetings each calendar year, and special meetings as deemed necessary by the Board or the Director. It shall be the duty
of the Board to review the policies and program of the Agency as developed
under authority of this Act; to make recommendations thereon to the
Agency ; to provide the Agency with such technical advice and assistance as
may be required relative to permissible exposure levels, standards of practice, radiation instrumentation, and other technical matters. Members of
the Board, other than the Director, shall be entitled to receive compensation
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at ........ dollars per diem and reimbursement for actual and necessary
traveling and subsistence expenses while engaged in the business of the
Board.
Section 4· Po·wers and Duties of the Agency. The Agency shall have the
following powers and duties :
(a) Shall develop comprehensive policies and programs for the evaluation
and determination of hazards associated with the use of radiation, and for
their amelioration ;
(b) Shall advise, consult, and cooperate with other agencies of the State,
the Federal Government, other States and interstate agencies, and with
affected groups, political subdivisions, and industries in furtherance of the
purposes of this Act ;
(c) May accept and administer loans, grants, or other funds or gifts from
the Federal Government and from other sources, public or private, for
carrying out any of its functions ;
(d) May encourage, participate in, or conduct studies, investigations,
training, research, and demonstrations relating to the control of radiation
hazard, the measurement of radiation, the effects on health of exposure to
radiation, and related problems as it may deem neCessary or advisable for
the dis~harge of its duties under this Act ;
(e) Shall collect and disseminate in formation relating to the determination and control of radiation exposure and hazard ;
(f) Shall adopt and promulgate such rules and regulations as may be
necessary to further the purposes of this Act; such rules and regulations
may incorpOrate by reference the recommended standards of nationally
recognized bodies in the field of radiation protection such as the National
Committee on Radiation Protection or the American Standards Association ;
(g) Shall devise, modify, repeal, promulgate, and enforce rules and
regulations as necessary to implement or effectuate the powers and duties of
the Agency under this Act;
(h) May issue, modify, or revoke orders prohibiting or abating the dis-:charge of radioactive material or waste into the ground, air, or waters of the
State in accordance with the provisions of this Act and rules and regulations adopted thereunder;
( i) Upon request, shall render opinion concerning such plans and specifications on the design and shielding for radiation sources as may be submitted before or after construction, for the purpose of determining the possible radiation hazard ;
(j) May make inspections of radiation sources shielding, and immediate
surroundings for the determination of any possible radiation hazard; and
shall provide the owner, user, or operator thereof with a report of any
kriown or suspected defiCiencies ;

1200

STATE REGULATION

(k) May exercise all incidental powers necessary to carry out the
purposes of this Act.
Section 5· Registration
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person to produce radiation, or to
produce, use, store, or dispose of radioactive materials, or to modify, extend, or alter such activities, unless he registers in writing with the Agency
in accordance with the procedures prescribed by such Agency, except that a
period of go calendar days shall be allowed for such registration after the
effective date of this Act.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person to produce radiation, or to produce, use, store,· or dispose of radioactive materials, except in accordance
with the provisions of this Act and rules and regulations promulgated thereunder.
Section 6. Classification of Sources and Hazards and Standards of Protection
(a) The Agency is authorized, w_ith the concurrence of the Board, to
classify radiation sources, exposures, and hazards for the purpose of
(1) making inspections, .(2) determining the competence of the radiation
users, (3) determining the adequacy of radiation-protective devices and
procedures, and (4) other purposes compatible with the present and future
utilization of all forms of radiation, taking. into account the protection of
the health of the people of this State.
(b) Prior to the establishment of a system of classification of sources or
uses, or setting standards of protection, or modifying such classifications or
standards, the Agency shall conduct public hearings in connection therewith.
Notice shall be given of time, date, and place of public hearing and shall
specify the technical area in which a classification is sought to be made or
for which standards are sought to be adopted. Such notice shall be published
at least twice in a newspaper of general circulation in the area affected, and
shall be mailed at least 20 days before such public hearing to the chief executive of each political subdivision of the geographical area affected, and may
be mailed to such other persons as the Agency has reason to believe may be
affected by such classification and the setting of such standards. The Agency
shall utilize the assistance of the Board in connection with such hearings.
(c) The adoption of standards · of protection and the classification of
radiation sources, or any modification or change thereof, shall, upon approval of the Board, be issued as an order of the Agency and shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the area affected. In classifying sources and setting radiation-protection standards, or making any
modification thereof, the Agency shall permit and announce a reasonable
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time for: the persons or users involved to comply with such classification
and standards;: if their operations create a: known hazard to health; except
that a user ma:y be directed to abate ·withOut delay a serious known hazard
to health.
· ·
Section 7. Examination for Complia_nce:

~tatement

of Non-compliance

(a) The Agency shall itself, or by its duly designated representatives;
inspect and examine such sources of radiation as it desires, in order to determine their compliance with the adopted classification and radiation-protection standards of the Agency.
(b)· If such inspection and examination indicates that the source of radiation is not in. compliance with the adopted classification and radiation-protection standard~, the owner, operator, or user shall be so notified in
writing, with full particulars regarding any deficiencies.
Section 8. Proceedings Before Board
(a) Whenev.er the Agency determines there are reasonable grounds to
~lie:ve that ther.e has been a viol~tion of any of the provisions of this Act
or of any order of the Agency, it may· give written notice to the alleged
violator or violators specifying the causes of complaint. Such notice shall
require that the alleged violations .be· corrected or that the alleged violator
appear before the Agency· at a time and place- specified in the notice, and
answer the charges .. The.notice shall be delivered to the alleged violator or
violators in accordance with the provisions of subsection (d) of this section
not less than ..... days before the time set for the hearing.
.(b) The Agency shall afford the alleged violator or violators an opportunity for a fair hearing in accordance with the provisions of section9 at the
time and place,specified in the. notice or any modification thereof.·On the
basis of the evidence produced at the hearing the Agency shall make findings of fact and conclusions· of law and enter such·order as in its opinion will
best further the purposes of this Act and shall ·give written notice of such·
order to the alleged violator and to such other persons as shall have appeared at the hearing and· made written request for notice of the order. 1f
the hearing is held before any person other than the Agency itself, such
person shall transmit the record qf the hearing together with· recommendatioO:s· for findings of fact and conclusions -of law to the Agency, which shall
thereupon enter its order on the basis of such record and recommendations.
The order of the Agency shall become final and binding on all parties.unless
appealed to the courts as provided in section 12 within .... days after notice
has been sent to the parties.
·
·
·
(c) Whenever the Agency finds that an emergency exists requiring
immediate action to protect the public health or welfare; it may, without
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notice or hearing, issue an order reciting the existence of such an emergency
and requiring that such action be taken as it deems necessary to meet the
emergency. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) of this section, such order shall be effective immediately. Any person to whom such
order is directed shall comply therewith immediately, but on application to
the Agency shall be afforded a hearing as soon as possible. On the basis of
such hearing the Agency shall continue such order in effect, revoke it, or
modify it.
(d) Except as otherwise expressly provided, any notice, order, or other
instrument issued by or under authority of the Agency may be served,
personally or by publication, on any person affected thereby, and proof of
such service may be made in like manner as in case of service of a summons
in a civil action, such proof to be filed in the office of the Agency; or such
service may be made by mailing a copy of the notice, order, or other instrument by registered mail, directed to the person affected at his last known
post office address as shown by the files or records of the Agency, and proof
of such service may be made by the affidavit of the person who did the
mailing, such proof to be filed in the office of the Agency.
(e) Every certificate or affidavit of service made and filed as herein provided shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated, and a certified
copy thereof shall have like force and effect.
Section 9· Hearings. The hearings herein provided may be conducted by
the Director, or the Director may designate hearing officers who shall have
the power and authority to conduct such hearings in the name of the Agency,
at any time and place. A record or summary of the proceedings of such
hearings shall be made and filed with the Agency, together with findings of
fact and conclusions of law made by the Agency. A member of the Agency
or a hearing officer, designated by the Agency, shall have the power to issue
in the name of the Agency notice of the hearings or subpoenas requiring
thetestimony of witnesses and the production of evidence relevant to any
matter involved in such hearing, and to administer oaths and examine
witnesses during such hearings. Witnesses who are subpoenaed shall receive the same fees and mileage as in civil actions. In case of contumacy or
refusal to obey a notice of hearing or subpoena issued under this section,
the . . . . . . . . . . . . Court shall have jurisdiction, upon application of the
Agency or its representative, to issue an order requiring such person to appear and testify or produce evidence as the case may require, and any failure
to obey such order of the court may be punished by such court as contempt
thereof.
Section

10.

Inspections and InvestigaJions: Maintenance of Records.

The Agency or its duly authorized representative shall have the power to
enter at reasonable times, and after prior notice of at least 2 days, upon any
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private or public property for the purpose of inspecting and investigating
conditions relative to the purposes of this Act ; except that such entry into
security areas under the direct or indirect jurisdiction of the Federal
Government shall he permitted only by and with the concurrence of the
Federal Government Agency or its duly designated representative.
Any authorized representative of the Agency may examine any records
or memoranda pertaining to the operation of radiation machines and radioactive materials. The Agency may require the maintenance of records relating to the operation of disposal systems. Copies of such records must
he submitted to the Agency on request.
Section

11.

Penalties: Injunctions

(a) Any person who violates any of the provisions of, or who fails to
perform any duty imposed by, this Act, or who violates any order of the
Agency promulgated pursuant to this Act, shall he guilty of a misdemeanor,
and in addition thereto may he enjoined from continuing such violation.
Each day upon which such violation occurs shall constitute a separate violation.
(b) It shall he the duty of the Attorney General on the request of the
Agency to bring any action for an injunction against any person violating
the provisions of this Act, or violating any order of the Agency. In any
action for an injunction brought pursuant to this section, any findings of the
Agency after hearing or due notice shall be prima facie evidence of the fact
or facts found therein.
Section

12.

Review

(a) An appeal may he taken from any final order, or other final determination of the Agency, by any person who believes himself adversely affected thereby, or by the Attorney General on behalf of the State of the
............... ·.... Court of ................... Within 30 days after
(Seat of Government)
receipt of a copy of the order, or other determination, or after service of
notice thereof by registered mail, the appellant or his attorney shall serve a
notice of appeal on the Agency through its (Director) provided that during
such 3o-day period the court may, for good cause shown, extend such time
for an additional period not to exceed 6o days. The notice of appeal shall
refer to the_ action of the Agency appealed from, shall specify the grounds
of appeal, including both points of law and fact which are asserted or
questioned by the appellant. A copy of the original notice of appeal with
proof of service shall he filed by the appellant or his attorney with the clerk
of the court within 10 days of the service of the notice and thereupon the
court shall have jurisdiction of the appeal.
(b) The appellant and the Agency shall in all cases he deemed the original
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parties to an appeal. The State, through the Attorney General or any other
person affected, may become a party by intervention, as in a civil action, upon
showing cause therefor. The Attorney General shall represent the Agency,
if requested, upon all such appeals unless he appeals or intervenes in behalf
of the State. If the Attorney General or a member of his staff is not available to represent the Agency in any particular proceeding, the Agency is empowered to appoint special counsel for such proceeding. No bond or deposit
for costs shall be required of the State or Agency upon any such appeal or
upon any subsequent appeal to the Supreme Court or other court proceed·
ings pertaining to the matter.
(c) The appeal shall be heard and determined by the court upon the
issues raised by the notice of appeal and the answer thereto according to the
rules relating to a trial in the nature of an appeal in equity of an administrative determination. All findings of fact by the Agency are to be deemed
final, unless it is shown that such findings were not supported by substantial evidence produced before the Agency at the hearing. In any appeal
or other proceeding involving any order, or other determination of the
Agency, the action of the Agency shall be prima facie evidence reasonable
and valid and it shall be presumed that all requirements of the law pertaining to the taking thereof have been complied with. A copy of the proceedings before the Agency shall be certified to the court in connection with
each appeal.
(d) A further appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court of the State in
the same manner as appeals in equity are taken.
Section 13. Conflicting Laws. This Act shall not be construed as repealing any laws of the State relating to radiation sources, exp<)sures, radiation
protection, and professional licensure, but shall be:: held and construed as
auxiliary and supplementary thereto, except to the extent that the same are
in direct conflict herewith.
Section 14. Existing Rights and Remedies Preserved. It is the purpose
of this Act to provide additional and cumulative remedies to evaluate, con-:
trol, and prevent impairment to health from radiation and to encourage the
constructive use of radioactive materials and radiation machines. Nothing
herein contained shall be construed to abridge or alter rights of action or
remedies in equity or under the common law or statutory law, criminal or
civil, nor shall any provision of this Act, or any act done by virtue thereof,
be construed as estopping the State, or any municipality or person; in the
exercise of their rights in equity or under the common law or statutory law
to protect the public health and encourage commerce and industry.
Section 15. Severability. If any section, subsection, sentence, clause,
phrase, or word of this Act is for any reason held to be unconstitutional,
such decree shall not affect the validity of any remaining portion of this Act.

PART IV
FEDERAL STATUTORY AND
ADMINISTRATIVE LIMITATIONS
UPON ATOMIC ACTIVITIES

Federal Statutory and Administrative Limitations
Upon Atomic Activities
CouRTs OuLAHAN

*

I. INTRODUCTION
Scientific and technological considerations heretofore have dominated
the interest and work of the United States government and private
American business in the field of atomic energy. This major preoccupation with research and engineering problems in the development of a
new source of energy for peacetime uses is understandable. The product
of the exigencies of World War II and the post-war arms race between
the Soviet bloc and the United States and its allies, the atomic bomb and
its proliferations as a hydrogen and cobalt weapon constitute an important factor in the present balance-or imbalance-of world power.
Adopting a new source of energy developed in the context of conflict
and of government monopoly to the peacetime needs of medicine, public
utilities, and industry may well comprise the beginning of a new industrial revolution of which the scientist and engineer are the principal
architects.
A. Scope and Policy of AEC Regulation
In their preoccupation with technology, private industry and the
American public have tended to overlook the problems of, and the
present justification for, government regulation which covers every facet
of the field of atomic energy. 1 The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 2 establishes the broadest control ever exercised by the federal government over
any one industry in the United States. 3 The statutory provisions en*B.S., Haverford College; LL.B., Yale University Law School; member, Ohio and
D.C. bars; formerly Lecturer in Law, Western Reserve University Law School. This
manuscript was completed at the end of September, 1958.
1 " . • • [T]he dictatorship of the technically competent" must not over-shadow "the
importance of developing procedural formalities as a means of assuring just administration." Plaine, "Atomic Energy-A New Body of Administrative Law,'' 24 D.C. Bar
A.J .. 71, 75 (1957).
2 68 Stat. -921 (1954), 42 U.S.C.A. §§2011 et seq.
a The Civil Aeronautics Board is "[n]ext to the AEC ... perhaps the administrative
agency with the widest and most complex range of responsibility," Joint Committee on
Energy, "A Study of AEC Procedures and Organization in the Licensing of Reactor
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acted by Congress are the framework of this control, which is, in turn,
implemented and effected by the administrative regulation and policy of
the Atomic Energy Commission.
The Atomic Energy Act of 1946, 4 otherwise known as the McMahon
Act, was enacted to substitute civilian for military control over the
application of atomic energy largely to the field of warfare. The "primary purpose" of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 was "to make our
Nation's legislative controls better conform with the scientific, technical,
economic, and political facts of atomic energy as they exist today," principally in the field of its peaceful uses. 5 Thus, the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954 states:
Atomic energy is capable of application for peaceful as well as
military purposes. It is therefore declared to be the policy of
the United States thata. the development, use, and control of atomic energy shall be
directed so as to make the maximum contribution to the general welfare, subject at all times to the paramount objective of
making the maximu~ contribution to the common defense and
security; and
b. the development, use, and control of atomic energy shall be
directed so as to promote world peace, impro'l.te the general
welfare, increase the standard of living, and strengthen free
competition in private enterprise. (Emphasis supplied.) 8
Of course, the 1954 statute was not enacted without wide differences
of opinion between both major political parties. The debate continues;
especially concerning the extent to which government should participate
in the process of industrial exploitation of atomic energy. 7 Indeed, techFacilities,'' Ssth Cong., Ist Sess. 4I (I9S7) (hereafter cited as Joint Committee Staff
Study). This document is perhaps the most useful and comprehensive ever published
by the Joint Committee with respect to administrative law problems of the atomic
energy field. Findings of the Staff Study are summarized in BNA, Atomic Industry
Reporter 3: us.
4 6o Stat. 755 ( I946), 42 U.S.C.A., §§I8oi et seq.
5 H.R. Rep. No. 2181, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. I (I954).
8 42 U.S.C.A. §201 I. See Cole, "The Power and the Prize-Development of Civilian
Nuclear Power in the United States," 25 Geo. Wash. L.. Rev. 471, 475, 478 (1957).
7 Spokesmen for opposing points of view with respect to the means whereby Ameri-·
can development of atomic energy for peaceful uses shall be fostered have disclaimed
any desire to plunge this field of regulation into the controversy between so-called "public" and "private" power policy adherents. See remarks of Rep. Holifield (Dem., Cal.),
Hearings before Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, "Development, Growth and State
of the Atomic Energy Industry,'' 85th Cong. 1st Sess. 65 (1957) (hereafter cited as
I957 Section 202 Hearings) ; and remarks of AEC Chairman Strauss, Nov. 9, I9SS.
claiming the Commission "bas no philosophy as regards the issue of Public versus
Private Power" (BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter I: 187). However, the issue clearly
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nological and scientific developments, with attendant economic effects,
may well require a reappraisal from time to time of the respective roles
of government and private business. However, the fact is that Congress
has enacted a statute, and the Commission is bound by a policy, which
stresses that
. . . the goal of atomic power at competitive prices will be
reached more quickly if private enterprise, using private funds,
is now encouraged to play a far larger role in the development
of atomic power than is permitted under existing legislation.
In particular, we do not believe that any developmental program carried out solely under governmental auspices, no matter how efficient it may be, can substitute for the cost-cutting
and other incentives of free and competitive enterprise. 8
Prior to 1956 only a limited recognition had been given to the effect
of the statutory and administrative restraints imposed under atomic
was raised in the 85th Congress with the introduction of S. 151 and H.R. 2154, introduced, respectively, by Sen. Gore (Dem., Tenn.) and Rep. Holifield, requiring the
Commission to launch an accelerated program of reactor building for the generation
of electrical energy, by means of government construction, ownership, and operation
of plants. See, e.g., Report of the Standing Committee on Commerce concerning "Federal v. Private and Local Atomic Power for Civilian Use," 82 A.B.A. Rep. 426 (1957);
Hearings before Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on "Atuhorizing Legislation,"
85th Cong., 1st Sess. 594-595 (1957) (hereafter cited as 1957 Authorizing Legislation
Hearings); Cole, suPra note 6 at 477-478; remarks of Rep. Holifield, Hearings before
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on "Congressional Review of Atomic Power Program," 85th Cong., 1st Sess. II (1957) (hereafter cited as 1957 Congressional Review
Hearings); Winsbrough, "A Partnership Plan for Atomic Power Development," 59
P.U. Fort. 217, 219 (1957). The principal attack upon the Atomic Energy Commission program to date was made by Rep. Cannon (Dem., Mo.), Chairman of the House
Appropriations Committee, April 16, 1957, charging that "[t]he Commission's atomic
electric power program is in some respects in contravention of the law," "[t]he program
from a factual viewpoint is practically nonexistent," "[t]he atomic giveaway under the
independent industrial program is not authorized by law," and "[t]he whole powerdemonstration program is nothing but paper hopes" (103 Cong. Rec. 5188, 5189, 5195,
and 5196 (1957)).
8 H.R. Rep. No. 2181, supra note 5 at 3· The majority report on H.R. 9757 to amend
the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 further stated (p. 9) : "It is our firmly held conviction that increased private participation in atomic power development, under the terms
stipulated in this proposed legislation, will measurably accelerate our progress toward
the day when economic atomic power will be a fact . . . . We do not believe that the
efforts of free enterprise, using its own resources and money, are by themselves adequate to achieve the speediest possible attack on the goal of peacetime power. Neither
do we believe that maximum progress toward this objective will be afforded by an
effort relying exclusively on governmental research and development, using the public's
moneys. We believe, rather, that teamwork between Government and industry-teamwork of the type encouraged by these amendments-is the key to optimum progress,
efficiency, and economy in this area of atomic endeavor. . . ."
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energy legislation upon the hopes and expectations of the American
public with respect to the benefits realizable from the peaceful uses of
this energy, as clearly intended by the Congress when it enacted the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954. 9 Early in 1956, in its important report
on the "Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy" to the Joint Congressional
Committee on Atomic Energy, the McKinney Panel on the Impact of
the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy pointed out that "the role of the
Federal Government in this field [atomic energy] could strongly influence, if not control, the rate of future development" of its peaceful
uses. 10 Indeed, with respect to the administrative controls exercised by
the Atomic Energy Commission through its licensing and rule-making
powers and its ownership of special nuclear material, the Panel found:
One of the consequences of regulatory systems is a tendency
toward overregulation. This is particularly true where all initiative for making determinations rests with the regulatory
body. 11
The Atomic Energy Commission has, to a certain extent, recognized
the dangers inherent in "overregulation" and claims that it "has sought,
within the limits required for the protection of the public, to impose no
unnecessary restrictions upon the developing industry." 12 In a major
statement of policy contained in its semiannual report to Congress for
the last six months of 1957, the agency said:
Development of the atomic energy industry necessarily has
depended primarily upon the initiative of private enterprise
organizations. The Commission has played a principal role also
because of the peculiar nature of the special nuclear material
on which the industry rests; its military importance, the Government activities and industry based on its processing and
9 See, e.g., Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc., "A Growth Survey of The Atomic Industry 1955-1965" (1955) (hereafter cited as AIF Growth Survey) (p. 10): "Further,
in using the data presented in this report, . . . it is suggested that the reader take into
account, as they may affect his own situation, such factors as ... [t]he possible effect
of future . . . federal regulatory actions. . • ."
1o "Report of the Panel on Impact of Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy to Joint Committee on Atomic Energy," 84th Cong., 2d Sess. xi (1956) (hereafter cited as McKinney Panel Report). The panel consisted of Robert McKinney,· Chairman, Ernest R.
Breech, George R. Brown, Sutherland C. Dows, John R. Dunning, Frank M. Folsom,
T. Keith Glennan, Samuel B. Morris, and Walter P. Reuther.
11 I d. at 129.
12 AEC, Twenty-third Semi-Annual Report 175 ( 1958). See also id. at 138: "It
has been the policy of the Commission to encourage industry to carry on the various
phases of industrial participation in atomic energy with a minimum of Governmental
financial assistance and controls."
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use, the secrecy that necessarily surrounded so much of the
technology and cost data, and the possible hazards to public
health and safety created by radioactivity. Much of the Commission's efforts . . . have been directed tO'l1Jar& helping private enterprise groups to overcome the obstacles created by
Federal dominance of the field and by the continuing paramount position of national defense considerations. 18 [Emphasis supplied.]

B. . Encouragement of Private Industrial Development
In carrying out what it conceives to be its mandate under the 1954
act, the Commission has established several programs for the development of civilian power reactors, utilizing the resources and experience
of private industry but assuring the cooperation of government in connection with certain important phases of research and development. The
Commission has summarized the general principles governing the reactor programs, as follows:
I. Developing economically competitive nuclear power for
civilian use will be aided by maximum practical utilization of
the financial incentive common to business ventures in order to
stimulate ingenuity and imagination and the assumption of
calculated technical and economic risks.
2. The Commission's role should be to develop advanced
technology at Government expense and to stimulate outside
groups to undertake developmental or demonstration power
projects primarily with non-Commission financing.
In general, the application of these principles has involved :
(a) Financing almost entirely by the Commission of experimental reactors and studies whose primary aim is to develop and prove out basic technology;
(b) Limited financial help by the Commission to industrial, cooperative, or public power groups in construction and
operation of reactor demonstration projects which build on the
technology developed in the experiments. and add ·operational
and economic data.
(c) Complete financing by industry of certain independent
projects which also contribute further to technology and add
operational and economic data.14

The first of these three branches of the power reactor program, which
is concerned with Commission-financed development of basic reactor
[d. at 161.
u AEC Statement Feb. I9S7 to Joint Committee, 1957 Section
note 7 at 113.
18

202

Hearings, supra
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types, has produced twelve reactor experiments, with four under construction and one planned. 13
Of more direct importance to private and public power groups has
been the power demonstration reactor program inaugurated in January,
1955, and involving three so-called "rounds" or invitations to negotiate
with the government. 16 This program has the principal aim of developing joint participation by "private, cooperative, and public power groups
and the Commission . . . to develop prototype power reactor plants to
·demonstrate technical and economic feasibility of various reactor
concepts." 17
8
Und~r the first round invitation, issued in January, 1955/ the Commission called for proposals from private industry without limitation
as to size of plant and has approved three proposals as bases for contracts.19 The second round invitation, issued in September, 1955, 20 proposed the development, design, and construction of smaller reactors
ranging from 5,000 to 40,000 kilowatts of electricity, which program
has been confined to date to proposed publicly and cooperatively owned
facilities. 21 It has produced seven proposals, four of which initially
were approved by the Commission as bases for contract negotiations.
1 ~ AEC, Twenty-third Semi-Annual Report IOI-123, 358 (1958); see AEC, Twentysecond Semi-Annual Report 49-54 (1957); 1957 Section 202 Hearings, supra. note 7
at 114-117.
16 AEC, Twenty-third Semi-Annual Report 16, 99-100 (1958); AEC, Twenty-second
Semi-Annual Report 54 (1957); 1957 Section 202 Hearings, supra note 7 at 117; Cole,
supra. note 6 at 479.
17 AEC Statement Feb. 1957 to Joint Committee, 1957 Section 202 Hearings, supra
note 7 at 117; AEC, Twenty-second Semi-Annual Report vii, 49 ( 1957) ; Cole, supra
note 6 at 472-48o; statement cif W. K. Davis, Director, AEC Division of Reactor Development, 1957 Authorizing Legislation Hearings, supra note 7 at 158: "... [W)e
have a rather unique situation where the Governnient, through AEC, is developing an
industry which in the end has to be supplied to the utilities by private industry. There
is no way the Government is going to supply the reactors themselves to the utilities
who are going to use them ..."; statement of K. E. Fields, AEC General Manager,
id. at 143-144, 146-148.
18 AEC Press Rei. No. 589 (Jan. 10, 1955); 1957 Authorizing Legislation Hearings,
supra note 7 at 512.
19 Yankee Atomic Electric Co., Rowe, Mass., contract signed June 6, 1956; Consumers Public Power District, Hallam, Nebraska, Sept. 20, 1957; and Power Reactor
Development Co., Monroe, Michigan, Mar. 26, 1957. See 1957 Section 202 Hearings,
supra. note 7 at 117.
2 0 AEC Press Rei. No. 695 (Sept. 21, 1955); 1957 Authorizing Legislation Hearings, supra. note 7 at 513-515; see Statement of K. E. Fields, AEC General Manager,
id. at 144-146, 148-152.
21 These projects are "almost entirely a Government program," since the Rural
Electrification Administration (REA) furnished loans for each such project; state-
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As the result of strong representations to the Joint Committee in
1957/2 Congress included special provisions in the appropriations act
for fiscal year 1958 with respect to contracting for such publicly and
cooperatively owned projects. 23 This legislation also contained provision, at an initial cost of $18,ooo,ooo, for the institution of a prototype power reactor facilities program by the AEC itself involving the
construction of a natural uranium, graphite-moderated, gas-cooled
power reactor facility and a plutonium recycle experimental reactor. 2•
ment of Sen. Gore, 1957 Authorizing Legislation Hearings, supra note 7 at 145. For
a list of the projects accepted and the three rejected, see 1957 Section 202 Hearings,
supra note 7 at II7-II8. In May 1958, the Commission announced that, "in and because of 'little or no early economic promise,' consultation with Wolverine's management" the agency had decided to discontinue consideration of the aqueous homogeneous
power reactor·project submitted by Wolverine Electric Cooperative, Big Rapids, Michigan (BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 4: 165).
22 Section 202 of the 1954 act, 42 U.S.CA. §2252, requires the Joint Committee during the first 6o days of each session of Congress to "conduct hearings in either open
or executive session for the purpose of receiving information concerning the development, growth, and state of the atomic energy industry."
23 This is the so-called "cooperative power reactor demonstration program," provided
in Section III of Pub. L. 85-162, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957). Under this program,
$129,915,000 initially was authorized for use in a program not to exceed $149,915,000 for,
among other purposes, "arrangements for projects sponsored under the second round
of the Commission's power reactor demonstration programs by cooperatives and publicly
owned agencies under which the reactor is financed in major part by the Government."
In connection with these projects, the Commission is required to contract directly with
the private manufacturers of facilities, rather than have the utility make the contract.
After operation for five years by the Commission under contract with the utility, the
latter has the option to purchase the plant ; if such a purchase is not made, the plant
must be dismantled. This special treatment for publicly or cooperatively owned utilities was held warranted by the policy consideration that "the need for advancing the
small or intermediate reactor art should be the AEC's primary interest and negotiations with cooperatives and publicly owned organizations should take into consideration
basic differences in their size, financial structures, and capacity for participation" without "jeopardizing the financial integrity of cooperatives and publicly owned organization" (Sen. Rep. No. 791, 85th Cong., Ist Sess. 16-17 (1957) ). In its authorization
legislation for fiscal year 1959, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy increased the
amounts authorized for the next 12 months from $129,915,000 to $155,113,000 and increased the over-all program totals from $129,915,000 to $155,113,000; H.R. Rep.
No. 21o8, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 20-21 (1958).
u Sections 101 (e) (14)-(15) and no, Pub. L. 85-162, 85th Cong., Ist Sess. (1957);
see Sen. Rep. No. 791, supra note 23 at 21-33. This program is based on the Joint Committee contention that the Commission has not "been making sufficient progress in the
development of prototype power reactors to test and demonstrate the practical problems
of achieving economic nuclear power," id. at 21. In a statement issued when he approved Pub. L. 85-162, Aug. 21, 1957, President Eisenhower stated that, while he was
"not opposed to such projects [for natural uranium and plutonium production reactors]
as studies by the Commissio11, ... I will oppose the expenditure of public money for
the construction and operation by the Government of any large-scale power reactor, or
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The third round announced by the Commission on January 7, 1957,
and requiring proposals by December 31, 1958 (later extended to
June 30, 1959), placed no limitation on the types or sizes of plants
which may be proposed, except that "they should make significant contributions toward the achievement of commercial utilization of nuclear
power and that construction will be completed by June 30, 1962," which
date apparently will be extended in the case of individual proposals. 25
The third round contemplates assistance in the form of:
any prototype thereof, unless private enterprise has first received reasonable opportunity
to bear or share the cost" (N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 1957). In a letter to Rep. Cole, Aug.
3, 1957, prior to enactment of the legislation, AEC Chainnan Strauss charged that the
provision for reactor prototypes in the appropriation legislation "would constitute a
substantial start toward a program for Government-owned atomic power facilities"
and that "a congressional direction to the Commission to proceed with particular reactor concepts would set an unwise precedent" (103 Cong. Rec. A63I9-2I (Aug. s,
19S7) ). Sections IOI (e) and no of Pub. L. 8s-162 represented considerably diluted
versions of continuous attempts in recent years to require the Commission to develop
a prototype reactor program with an initial expenditure of as high as $4oo,ooo; see I9S7
Section 202 Hearings, supra note 7 at 41, s8; s. lSI, 8sth Cong., Ist Sess. (Jan. 7.
19S7); Winsbrough, supra note 7 at 219; BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 2: I7I-I79
and 2 : 2II ; Cole, supra note 6 at 487-488.
n AEC Statement, I9S7 Section 202 Hearings, supra note 7 at n8-II9- See BNA,
Atomic Industry Reporter 3 : I I, 13 and IS; statement of AEC General Manager Fields,
I9S7 Authorization Legislation Hearings, supra note 7 at I4S-I46, IS2-IS3; Cole, supra
note 6 at 4Bo-482. As of Jan. I, I9S8, four utilities or groups of utilities had submitted
proposals under this round, one of which (Northern States Power Co., Sioux Falls,
Iowa) signed a contract with the AEC on Nov. I9, I9S7; AEC, Twenty-third SemiAnnual Report IOI (I9S8). Extension of the termination date of this round from Dec.
3I, I9S8, to June 30, I9S9, was agreed to by the Joint Committee in its proposed appropriation legislation for fiscal year I9S9, H.R. 13121, Section I09; see H.R. Rep.
No. 21o8, supra note 23 at 2I and 31. The Commission itself early recognized the diffi~
culty of meeting the completion deadline of June 30, Ig62 (BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 4 : I 9) and has sought extension of the deadline with respect to two particular
projects. These are (1) the proposal of East Central and Florida West Coast Nuclear
Groups for a gas-cooled reactor, to be completed by June 30, 1g63, the basis for the ar-.
rangement for which the Joint Committee approved in the I9S9 authorization legislation
(H.R. 13121, Section 109 Pub. L. 8S-S90, 8sth Cong., 2d Sess. (I9S8); see H.R. Rep.
No. 21o8, supra note 23 at 2I and 31, and BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 4: 7S and
4: 94) and (2) the proposal of Pennsylvania Power & Light Co. and Westinghouse
Electric Corp. for a homogeneous reactor project, with no firm construction date. The
latter proposal was the subject of critical concurrent resolutions introduced in April
I9S8, by Sen. Anderson (Dem., N.M.) and Rep. Holifield (Dem., Cal.), S. Con. Res.
78 and H. Con. Res. 307, Ssth Cong., 2d Sess., and an adverse decision by the Comptroller General, April 8, I9S8, Dec. B-I3S649. BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 4:123
and 221:827. The Commission thereupon made a specific submission of the proposed
contract, in restricted form, to the Joint Committee, which approved such submission
as the basis for an arrangement in the proposed appropriation legislation for fiscal
year I9S9 (Sec. I09, Pub. L. 8S-S90, supra; see H.R. Rep. No. 2Io8, svtra note 23 at
21-22 and 32).
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(I) Waiver of established Commission charges for use of
source and special nuclear materials over a specified period of
time; ( 2) performance either without cost or at less than full
cost in Commission laboratories of mutually agreed-upon research and development not reasonably available elsewhere;
and (3) support of research and development required to advance the technology of projects which promise to make a significant contribution toward achieving cheap, abundant, and
safe nuclear power. 26
Criticism of the Commission's program, which became particularly
acute in the 1957 session of Congress/ 7 resulted in the amendment of
the appropriations provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Under Section 26x 28 of that statute as then amended, any arrangement
between the Commission and a private party must be reviewed and
specifically authorized by the Joint Committee. 29 This provision conceivably <:Ould permit congressional review of all expenditures heretofore
made under the first and second rounds, 80 a development which has been
termed an attempt to effect ex post facto application of a statute. 81
AEC Statement, 1957 Section 202 Hearings, supra note 7 at I x8.
A principal criticism has been that the third round invitation would permit applicants under the other two roux1ds to "get more money even though it previously had
been limited to a fixed amount" (Rep. Cannon, 103 Cong. Rec. 5195-5196 (1957) ).
Sen. Gore characterized this invitation as a Commission attempt "to further feather
the bed of private concerns in order to entice them to submit proposals" and "to add
feathers to the bed of those with whom you [AEC] entered into contracts even as far
back as 1956" ( 1957 Section 202 Hearings, supra note 7 at 35-36). In its report authorizing appropriations for the AEC in accordance with Section 261, as amended in
1957, the Joint Committee stated (Sen. Rep. No. 791, suPra note 23 at 20): "During
the hearings it was also brought out that the language of the third round might make
availaqle third round funds to the first and second round participants and to other reactor projects already under construction. The committee does not approve the implications of this language. Such language would permit the transference of funds
authorized by Congress for specific future projects retroactively to past projects which
were proposed under different terms and conditions. . . . Provision is made in the third
round for postconstruction research and development assistance which, if attempted to
be applied as proposed in the second round . . . could result in outright subsidies to
the operators of private reactors."
28 42 U.S.C.A. §2017.
2 9 Pub. L. 85-162, 85th Cong., 1St Sess. (1957). In ·the AEC authorization legislation for fiscal year 1959, Congress provided that, "[b)efore the Commission enters into
any arrangement the basis of which has not been previously submitted to the Joint
Committee ..., it shall make public announcement of each partic:ular reactor project
it considers technically desirable for construction and shall set reasonable dates for
submission, approval of the proposal and negotiations of the basis of the arrangement,
and commencement of construction" (Section 109, Pub. L. 85-590, supra; see H.R. Rep.
No. 21o8, supra note 23 at 22 and 32).
.
80 See statement of Rep. Holifield, 1957 Congressional Review Hearings, supra note
7 at 6g.
8l See statement of AEC Chairman Strauss, supra note 7 at 6926
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C. Development of Private Industry

Although confronted with numerous technical and financial problems 82 which may presage "lean and trying years" in the foreseeable
future,S 8 the private industry regulated by the I9S4 statute is no mere
economic fledgling. Even prior to I9S4 approximately $so millions
were spent by private sources for nuclear research and development. 84
Between I9S4 and I9S8, it is reliably estimated that some $300 millions
of non-government funds will have been spent for such research and
development, sa of which approxima~ely $1 IS millions will g9 into capital
facilities. 88 ·
As the peaceful·l!ses of atomic energy are expanded, private industry
should assume anincr~asingly important role. In I9S2, for example, the
research institutions spent $1.2 millions, and industry $4.8 millions, for
facilities and equipment and operations in the field. During I9S6-I9S8,
however, such industrial expenditures are expected to reach $44.1 millions annually, compared with $3.7 millions for the institutions. 81 These
efforts are believed capable of producing ~uclear power on a nearly
commercial basis sometime between 1965 and 1970.88
82 1957 Section 202 Hearings, supra note 7 at 58-59; 1957 Authorizing Legislation
Hearings, supra note 7 at 203, 331-339; SelL Rep. No. 2¢, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 1
(1957). See AEC Twenty-third Semi-Annual Report 7 (1958): "Late in 1957, some
readjustment was going on in that part of the 'atomic energy industry concerned with
civilian power reactors. Some firms had dropped out, or reduced their undertakings.
Current economic trends undoubtedly were a partial factor in some cases. While this adjustment may temporarily deter new firms from entering the industry, the hard core of
the atomic energy business is already established and growth is steady. . . ." For a discussion of technological and economic factors affecting industry, including reduction in
capital, fuel, and maintenance costs, see id. at 94-98; for the point of view of industry
concerning retrenchment during 1957, see Hearings Before Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy on "Development, Growth and State of the Atomic Energy Industry," 85th
Cong., 2d Sess. 218, 270 (1958) {hereafter cited as 1958 Section 202 Hearings).
8a C. L. Wilson, President, Metals & Controls Corp., BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 3: 51.
u AIF Growth Survey, supra note 9 at 6.
&tJ /d. at u.
88 /d. at 26. According to former AEC Chairman Strauss, "industry's share ..•
represents about one-third of the total national effort to develop economic nuclear
power" (BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 4: 21).
aT AIF Growth Survey, supra note 9 at 14ss See id. at 35; Cole, supra note 6 at 475-476. The McKinney Panel Report, supra
note 10 at 2, states that ,;[b]y 1975 atomic power could amount to 20 to 40 per cent of
presently installed electric generating capability in the United States. If this occurs,
however, it will be in the context of a total generating capability of 3 to 4 times present
levels." The goal of the AEC itself is achieving "competitive nuclear power in the
United States during the next ten years,'' according to a statement by the Commission
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Progress in the atomic energy industry is, in the opinion of the
Atomic Energy Commission, "without precedent," due to the fact that
"[n]o other major scientific discovery has ever before been applied so
qu,ickly to so many practical uses." 39 The Commission has thus described the condition of this industry at the end of 1957:
Since 1953, an atomic energy industry has come into being,
though still on [a] relatively small scale for a major industry
in the United States, and a foundation has been laid for
healthy growth and expansion.
Basically, the industry has two main divisions-that which
purchases and uses atomic energy products, such as the companies processing radioisotopes, and the manufacturers of such
devices as thickness or density gauges that incorporate radioisotopes; and the section which designs, constructs, and operates or sells research and power reactors, plus the suppliers of
materials, components, and services for Federal or private reactors. The radioisotope part of the industry is older and
better developed, and still is rapidly expanding. The reactor
part, a composite of Federal and private activities, is mostly
new since 1953, but already has attracted considerable risk
capital.
Private companies have entered many phases of the reactor
part of the industry, particularly where there was a promising
market for products or services. Industry has assumed heavy
outlays in designing, building, and operating nuclear reactors
to produce electric power. A foreign market is developing for
United States built research and power reactors. Heavy expense has been incurred in nuclear research, development, and
engineering.
submitted June 4,-1958, to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 54: 39). This statement was made in connection with a program for
projecting the civilian power reactor development effort through fiscal year 1963 and
clearly was formulated in the light of continuous criticism of the AEC for its alleged
failure to prepare and announce a long-range program in the civilian power reactor
field. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 21o8, supra note 23 at 9-10; 1958 Section 202 Hearings,
supra note 32 at 209- As of January 1, 1958, actual or potential electrical capacity of
civilian nuclear power projects aggregated 1,3o6,5oo kilowatts, of which 65,000 kilowatts were being produced by plants then in operation, 689,000 kilowatts were planned
to be produced by plants then being built, and 552,500 kilowatts were proposed for
plants then being planned. AEC, Twenty-third Semi-Annual Report 77, 357 (1958).
The two plants in operation at the end of 1957 were the Vallecitos boiling water reactor at Pleasanton, Cal., operated by Pacific Gas & Electric Co., which achieved criticality in Oct. 1957 and has a capacity of 5,000 kilowatts, and the pressurized water reactor operated by the AEC and Duquesne Light Co. at Shippingport, Pa., which
achieved criticality Dec. 2, 1957, and has a capacity of 6o,ooo kilowatts.
so AEC, Twenty-third Semi-Annual Report 3 ( 1958).
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Private organizations and Government were constructing
89 reactors as of the end of I957· Including 7 critical assemblies, there were 43 research, training, and test reactors (I I of
them for the foreign market). The 46 power reactors, of
which 36 were military machines, included IO civilian powerplants, I for overseas sale.
Expenditures or obligations by the Federal Government for
research and development and construction of civilian and
military power and propulsion reactors are estimated at more
than $500 million for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1958.
Estimates were that private industry was spending about $64
million on civilian power reactors during the same period! 0

D. Role of Administrative Law
Federal administrative law includes those statutes and regulations
governing the departments, agencies, and regulatory commissions of the
Executive Branch of the Government, as well as those rules made by
such organizations to govern,private activity. This branch of the law
can and does have a widespread impact upon citizens and businesses in
every state of the Union.u The field is as broad as the field of national
government. By enacting the Atomic Energy Acts of I946 and 1954,
Congress brought the control of the peaceful uses of atomic energy into
an area where the established agencies and the courts have been guided
by fairly well-defined concepts of administrative due process consistent
with the needs and powers of government.
Except for unique scientific, technological, and economic problems
which will be solved by the passage of time, the atomic energy field is
no different from any other area of government regulation. The Atomic
Energy Commission uses traditional forms of administrative controls,
such· as rule-making and licensing, to carry out its powers. In addition,
that Commission has utilized conditions in contract awards as a means
of industry control to a very great extent, probably more than heretofore used by any other federal agency.
Although special problems concerning atomic energy must be given
due consideration in establishing a system of administrative regulation,
a moratorium should not be declared in that area on Congressionally
enacted and judicially developed concepts of due process and delegated
I d. at 6 ; for a detailed list of the reactors and projects involved, see I 958 Section
Hearings, supra note J2 at 36ff.
u Cooper, The Lawyer and Administrative Agencies 1-2 (1957); Cragun and de
Seife, "A Skeptic Views 25 Years of Administrative Process," 16 Fed. Bar }. 556
(1956); Oulahan, "A Challenge to the American Bar," 51 The Brief 101, IOJ-104
(1956).
40
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power otherwise applicable to an agency of the United States government. In passing the Atomic Energy Acts of 1946 and 1954, Congress,
instead of conferring a special status upon administrative procedures
of the Atomic Energy Commission, expressly made applicable thereto
the provisions of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act of 1946. 42
As Congress has recognized in passing atomic energy legislation, the
Administrative Procedure Act
. . . was enacted by the Congress in 1946 to regulate and
make uniform, where practicable, the administrative process,
particularly in the control of private and property rights by
agencies of the executive branch. That statute represented the
culmination of nearly two decades of effort on the part of the
Congress, the executive branch, members of the Judiciary, and
the organized bar to meet the numerous problems of procedure
and substantive rights which have arisen out of the multiplication of Federal administrative agencies and the expansion of
their functions. 48
However, Congress took cognizance of situations where so-called
Restricted Data or defense information was involved in connection with
atomic energy. As more fully discussed hereafter, special provision was
made in the 1954 statute for parallel non-public procedures in such
cases."
In this study, the procedures used by the Atomic Energy Commission will be considered with particular regard to the philosophy and provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act and to the special problems
of administrative law which have arisen under the atomic energy statutes
of 1946 and· 1954· Rule making (the procedure whereby the Commission largely effects and implements controlling legislation) and licensing
and contracting (the administrative means for enforcing the rules)
comprise the three major categories of administrative activity carried
on by the Atomic Energy Commission. Accordingly, these three subjects are treated separately.
42

6o Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C.A. §§IOc>I et seq.
Commission on Organization of Executive Branch of the Government, Task Force
Report on Legal Services and Procedure, 137 (1955) (hereafter cited as Hoover Commission Legal Task Force Report). See Statement of Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Sen. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 311 (1946): " ... I do not
believe a more important piece of legislation has been or will be presented to the Congress of the United States ... because it deals with something which touches the most
lowly as well as the most elevated and lofty citizen in the land. It touches every phase
and form of human activity. . . ."
44 Section 181, 42 U.S.C.A. §2231. For a summary of the legislative history of this
section, see Joint Committee. Staff Study, supra note 3 at 67-6g.
48
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II. RULE-MAKING PROCEDURES

A. Rule Making in Administrative Law

Rule making, sometimes called subordinate legislation, results from
a delegation of legislative power to an administrative agency to implement the basic law established by Congress. Although "a normal feature of Federal administration ever since the Government was estab:.
lished," n the rule-making process has assumed its present importance
only with the development of numerous federal regulatory agencies and
the increasingly common practice of Congress "to establish legislative
standards [for agency rule making] in broad, vague and general
terms." 46
The power of agencies to issue rules is in many respects more important than the legislative authority of the Congress in creating the
rule-making power. Rules, no less than statutes, establish standards of
conduct for all to whom their terms apply. 47 It was in recognition of
this important role of rule making in the federal administrative process 48 that Congress in 1946 included special provisions with respect
thereto in the Administrative Procedure Act. ' 9
This statute establishes two categories of rule making, formal and
informal. It specifies procedures applicable to rule making except where
"there is involved any military, naval, or foreign affairs function of the
United States or . . . any matter relating to agency management or
personnel or to public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts." 50
Informal rule making is required to be effected by publishing notice
thereof in the Federal Register 111 and by giving interested persons an
opportunity to submit written or oral views with respect to the subject
4D Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies-Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, Sen. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., Ist Sess.
78 (1941).
46 Cooper, Administrative Agencies and the Courts 259 (1951). For a discussion of
legislative delegations of authority, see Hoover Commission Legal Task Force Report,
supra note 43 at 133-136.
4 1 Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 418 (1942).
48 Sen. Doc. No. 248, supra note 43 at 18, 194-195, 251-252, 304-305, 353-354, and
358. See Cooper, supra note 46 at 253-302.
49 Sections 2(c), 4, and 7(c), 5 U.S.C.A. §§IOoi (c), 1003, and Ioo6(c).
50 Section 4(1) and (2), 5 U.S.C.A. §1003(I) and (2). These exceptions assume
importance in the light of the military and international aspects of the Atomic Energy
Commission's authority and of its powers with respect to leasing atomic materials, providing grants for research and development by contract or otherwise, and making contracts to implement the Government's atomic energy program.
51 Section 4(a), 5 U.S.C.A. §1oo3(a).
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matter under consideration. 52 Notice of proposed rule making may be
omitted, however, where "the agency for good cause finds . . . that
notice and public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or
contrary to the public interest." Except where the agency otherwise
provides "upon good cause found and published with the rule," proposed rules must be published at least thirty days before their effective
date. 5 3
In addition to informal rule making, the Atomic Energy Commission
is authorized, together with nine other federal agencies and departments/Hto engage in formal rule making. Such rule making is involved
wherever the statutes require that regulations be made on the record
after opportunity for agency hearing in an adjudicatory proceeding. 55
Under such procedure, an opportunity for a hearing must be afforded
before the agency, a member thereof, or a hearing examiner 56 appointed
in accordance with the requirements of the Administrative Procedure
Act. 57 The presiding officer is authorized to issue a recommended decision based on the evidence; or the agency may issue a tentative decision or order the record certified to it for immediate final decision
when it finds "upon the record that due and timely execution of its
functions imperatively or unavoidably so requires." 58 The parties to
n Section 4(b), S U.S.C.A. §I003(b).
Section 4(c), 5 U.S.C.A. §I003(c).
54 These agencies are the Department of Argiculture, 7 U.S.C.A. §§I8I et seq. (rate
making under Packers and Stockyards Act), 7 U.S.C.A. §§6oi et seq. (marketing
orders under Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act), and 7 U.S.C.A. §§IIIS(a) and
II3I (c) (sugar quotas and wage standards under Sugar Act of I948); Food and Drug
Administration, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 2I U.S.C.A. §§30I
et seq. (Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act); Department of Labor, 29 U.S.C.A.
§§20I et seq. (wage orders under Fair Labor Standards Act) and 4I U.S.C.A.
§3S (wage determinations under Walsh-Healey Act); Army Corps of Engineers, Department of Defense, 33 U.S.C.A. §§503 and so4 (reasonableness of bridge tolls) ;
Civil Aeronautics Board, 49 U.S.C.A. §486 (mail rate proceedings) and 49 U.S.C.A.
§642(d)-(h) (rates, fares, and charges); Federal Communications Commission, 47
U.S.C.A. §§204. 20S, and 222(e) (3) (charges, classifications, and practices) and
§303(£) (frequencies and authorized power); Federal Power Commission, I6 U.S.C.A.
§824a(b) and IS U.S.C.A. §7I7f(a) (interconnection of facilities), I6 U.S.C.A. §§8:z4d8:z4e and IS U.S.C.A. §§7I7C-7I7d (fixing rates), I6 U.S.C.A. §S:zs and IS U.S.C.A.
§7I7g (accounting entries), and I6 U.S.C.A. §8:zsa and IS U.S.C.A. §7I7h (depreciation and amortization); Interstate Commerce Commission, 49 U.S.C.A. §§IS(I),
3I6(e), 3I8(b), 907(b), 907(h), 9I5(b), and Ioo6(b) (rates and practices); Securities and Exchange Commission, IS U.S.C.A. §§77a, 78a, 79, 77aaa, 8oa-I, and &ob-I
et seq. (corporate and financial structures and practices).
55 Administrative Procedure Act, Section 4(b), 5 U.S.C.A. §Ioo3(b).
5 6/d., Section 7(a), S U.S.C.A. §Ioo6(a).
5 7 /d., Section 11, 5 U.S.C.A. §1010.
58 /d., Section 8(a)(I)-(z), s U.S.C.A. §I007(a)(I)-(2).
58
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the proceeding are afforded opportunity for the submission of evidence
and the taking of exceptions to the decisions of the hearing officer
equivalent to that afforded in formal adjudication.~
9

B. Rule Making under the Atomic Energy Act of 1946
The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 contained few statutory references
to the rule-making authority of the Atomic Energy Commission. 60 Indeed, provision for general rule-making authority was not made in that
statute until 1953. 61 However, a number of regulations of wide scope
and importance were developed under the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. 62
In order to assure continuity of regulation, the transition from the
1946 to the 1954 statute required special action by the Commission
when the President signed the present legislation on August 30, 1954.
This was effected the same day by a "note . . . promulgated as a rule"
in which the Atomic Energy Commission announced:
Until further order of the . . . Commission, all provisions
of rules, regulations and notices, published . . . under the
authority of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 and in effect immediately prior to the effective date of the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954, are continued in force and effect to the extent that
they are not inconsistent with the Atomic Energy Act of
1954·68

Thus, a possible inconsistency between the definition of "fissionable
material," the term used in the 1946 statute, 84 and "special nuclear
material," the equivalent term used in the 1954 statute, 65 as well as the
regulatory hiatus which might have otherwise resulted, were avoided.
The Commission resorted to provision in the Administrative Procedure
~ 9 I d., Sections 7(c) and 8(a) and (b), 5 U.S.C.A. §§mo6(c) and I007 (a) and (b).
eo Sections 5(a)(4), 5(c)(2), 7(c), and I2(a}(2), 42 U.S.C. §§I8o5(a)(4),
I8o5(c} (2}, I8o7(C), and I8I2(a) (2) (I946).
61 Section I2(a) (10), as added by Pub. L. I64, 83d Cong., Ist Sess. (I953).
62 E.g., "Control of Source Material," IO Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 40.
68 The Commission filed this "Note" on September 2, I954· It was published in the
Federal Register the following day, 19 Fed. Reg. 5628.
84 Section 5(a) (I), 42 U.S.C.A. §I8os(a) (I) (I946), which provided, in part, that
"... the term 'fissionable material' means plutonium, uranium enriched in the isotope
235, any other material which the Commission determines to be capable of releasing
substantial quantities of energy through nuclear chain reaction of the material, or any
material artificially enriched by any of the foregoing. . . ."
6
~ Section ny, 42 U.S.C.A. §20I4(y): "The term 'special nuclear material' means
(I) plutonium, uranium enriched in the isotope 233 or in the isotope 235, and any other
material which the Commission ... determines to be a special nuclear material ...
or (2) any material artificially enriched by any of the foregoing. . . ."
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Act authorizing adoption of a rule without resort to public rule-making
procedures on the ground that such procedures "would be contrary to
the public interest by reason of the fact that the public health and safety
and the national defense necessitate the uninterrupted continuation of
the effectiveness of all existing controls." 66 The Commission indicated
its intention in the future to secure wide public and industry participation in rule making when it stated that the provisions of the "Note"
were considered "interim" only and that "comments by all interested
parties are invited." 67

C. Rule Making under Atomic Energy Act of 1954
I.

General Authority

The rule-making authority of the Atomic Eriergy Commission under
the 1954 legislation is one of the keystones of the system of controls
contemplated by that statute. 68 Under Section 161q of that act, the Commission is given general authority to "make, promulgate, issue, rescind,
and amend such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out
the purposes of this Act." 69 Seven other sections of the 1954 statute
confer specific authority upon the Commission with respect to rule making in matters of safety, 70 issuance of licenses, 71 and definition of
materials. 72
Section 4(a), 5 U.S.C.A. §1003(a).
By additional rule announced September 3, 1956 (19 Fed. Reg. 5628) and made
effective Aug. 30, the Commission also amended its prior rules (10 Code Fed. Regs.
§50.2) to make the term "production facility" under Section np of the new act (now
Section I It, 42 U.S.C.A. §2014t) include all facilities for the production of "fissionable
material." Such rule making also was effected without notice and public procedure
"for good cause found by the Commission on the ground that such are impracticable by
reason of the fact that due and timely execution of the Commission's functions in giving effect to the Atomic Energy Act would be impeded by such notice and procedure."
As in the case of the "Note" published Aug. 30, 1954, this rule was stated to be
"interim" only, and comments by interested parties were invited.
68 See McKinney Panel Report, supra note 10 at 21: "This sweeping revision [the
1954 Act] replaced a relatively simple Government monopoly with a complex structure for regulation of private activities. At the same time, it gave wide discretionary
authority to the Commission to stimulate and aid private development. . . . Many new
provisions required Commission interpretation and action before industry could tell
what it could or could not do. . . ."
69 42 U.S.C.A. §2201(q), which section is identical with Section 12(a)(IO) of the
1946 act, added by Pub. L. 164, 83d Cong., Ist Sess. (1953).
7 0 Section 53e(7), 42 U.S.C.A. §2073(e) (7) (distribution of special nuclear material "only pursuant to such safety standards as may be established by rule . . . to
protect health and to minimi~e danger to life or property").
71 Sections 53b and 63b, 42 U.S.C.A. §§2073(b) and 2093(b) (establishing "by
66

67
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Although an improvement in degree of specificity over the 1946legislation, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 exemplifies a tendency of Congress at times to give administrative agencies unusually broad latitude
in effectuating Congressional policies, without providing clear and precise standards to channel and govern administrative implementation of
such policies. 78 With a few exceptions the formulation of Commission
rules is limited only by vague and general concepts of "common defense
and security" or "health and safety of the public." 14 The statute, however wise its administration has been to date, represents an extreme
example of so-called "skeleton legislation," which must be clothed by
· executive regulations. 75
2.

Informal Rule-Making Procedures

Section 181 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 applies the Federal
Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 "to all agency action taken under
this [Atomic Energy] Act," except where Restricted Data and defense
information are involved. 76 In the latter event, "parallel procedures" are
permitted, preserving administrative due process but at the same time
precluding unauthorized disclosure of secret information.
Although the Commission has, by regulation and in apparent good
faith, sought to implement these requirements with respect to rule mak-.
ing, the regulations governing rule making clearly emphasize informal
procedures and do not encourage an opportunity for oral hearing. Indeed, it is Commission policy that
Informal hearings will normally be held for the purposes of
obtaining necessary or useful information, and affording parrule, ·minimum criteria for the issuance of . . . licenses for the distribution of . . .
[special nuclear material and source material respectively] depending upon the degree
of importance to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the
public of ... [its] physical characteristics ... , the quantities . . . to be distributed
... , and ... [its] intended use ..."); and Section IOJa, 42 U.S.C.A. §2133(a)
(commercial licenses to be issued "subject to such conditions as the Commission may
by rule or regulation establish to effectuate the purpOses and provisions of this Act").
12 Sections IIx, 42 U.S.C.A. §2014(x) (formerly Section ns); Section ny, 42
U.S.C.A. §2014(y) (formerly Section nt); Section 51, 42 U.S.C.A. §2071; and Section 61, 42 U.S.C.A. §2091.
1s See Hoover Commission Legal Task Force Report, mpra note 43, at 133-136.
14 E.g., Sections 53b and 63b, supra note 71.
75 Sen. Doc. No. 8, sufWa note 45, at gS.
7il 42 U.S.C.A. §2231, comparable to Section 14 of the 1946 act, 42 U.S.C. §1814
(1946).
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ticipation by interested persons, in the formulation, amendment, or rescission of rules and regulations. 77
Thus, in the case of "informal hearings," the procedure to be followed
. . . shall be such as will best serve the purpose of the hearing.
For example, an informal hearing may consist of the submission of written data, views, or arguments with or without oral
argument, or may partake of the nature of a conference, or
may assume some of the aspects of a formal hearing in which
the subpoena of witnesses and the production of evidence may
be permitted or directed. 78
Informal public rule-making procedure is further covered in the Com-.
mission's Rules of Practice, 79 which relate to "the issuance, amendment,
or rescission of substantive rules in which participation by interested
persons is prescribed under Section 4 of the Administrative Procedure
Act." 80 This procedure for "substantive rules" conforms to the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act concerning hearing requirements for such rules. 81
Under the Commission procedure, rule making is commenced by an
"initiation petition" made upon the agency's own motion, the recommendation of another federal agency, or the request of "any other in7 7 IO Code Fed. Regs. §2.7o8. See Plaine, "Rules of Practice of Atomic Energy
Commission," 34 Tex. L. Rev. &n, 8I8 (I956): "Because hearings for rule-making
under the Atomic Energy Act are not 'on the record,' trial-type hearings, but are hearings in the legislative sense, the public rule-making procedure will normally be an informal hearing. Thus interested persons will be provided the opportunity, as the Commission determines and states in the notice, to submit written views or arguments, or
to participate in a conference, or in an oral hearing as the case may be. . . ." House
Committee on Government Operations, "Survey and Study of Administrative Organization, Procedure, and Practice in the Federal Agencies--Agency Response to Questionnaire," Part II A-Independent Agencies ( I957) (hereafter" cited as AEC Response to
Questionnaire), in which the AEC stated (p. ro8I): " . . . [E]ven if an oral hearing.
[for rule making] were held, it would be most likely to be informal, in the nature of
a conference so that formal procedures would not be necessary. . . ."
78 IO Code Fed. Regs. §2.720.
79 IO Code Fed. Regs. §§2.78o-2.787.
80 IO Code Fed. Regs. §2.78o.
81 Under the Administrative Procedure Act, an agency rule is considered "substantive" unless it relates to "any military, naval or foreign affairs function of the United
States," "any matter relating to agency management or personnel or to public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts," "interpretative rules," "general statements
· of policy,'' and "rules of agency organization, procedure or practice." See Section 4 (I),
(2), and (a), 5 U.S.C.A. §I003 (I), (2), and (a); Sen. Doc. No. 248, supra note 43
at I99·200. The Commission believes that "public participation in these matters [nonsubstantive rule making] to !he extent of commenting on proposed regulations is generally desirable" (AEC Response to Questionnaire, supra note 77, at 1o82).

1226

FEDERAL REGULA TORY AND

terested person." 82 Petitions by such persons for the issuance, amendment, or rescission of AEC rules are required ( 1) to state "the substance or text of any proposed rule or regulation, or amendment thereof"
or to "specify the rule or regulation the rescission of which is desired,"
and (2) to "state the basis for the request." Such petitions are to be
given "a docket or other identifying number" and to become a matter of
public record, 88 except where Restricted Data or defense information is
involved. 84 In the latter event the Commission presumably will resort to
"parallel procedures."
A hearing on a petition filed by an interested person is not held "unless
the Commission deems it advisable," in which event notice of public rule
making is given. Where "the Commission determines that the petition
does not disclose sufficient reasons to justify instituting the public rule
making procedure," the petitioner is so notified "with a simple statement of the grounds" for the agency's failure to act. 85
The notice provisions of the Commission's rules with respect to institution of public rule-making proceedings 86 conform to those of the Administrative Procedure Act. 81 The latter statute does not contain a
provision with respect to the minimum time required for the giving of
such notice. However, the Commission in its rules specifies a Is-day
8 2 10 Code Fed. Regs. §2.781. See Section 4 (d) of the Administrative Procedure
Act, 5 U.S.c.A: §tooJ(d), which provides: "Every agency shall accord any interested
person the right to petition for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule."
8 3 10 Code Fed. Regs. §2.782. See notice of petition requesting amendment of 10
Code Fed. Regs. §2.301 concerning the definition of a "patent owner," assigned Docket
No. PRM-1, 22 Fed. Reg. 524 (Jan. 26, 1957). The docket number indicates that this
petition either is the first ever to be formally filed with the Commission or is the first
document to be considered by the agency as falling within the meaning of "petition for
rule· making,'' as set forth in §2.782. However, the Commission ordered no hearing on
the petition but merely stated that it could be examined in the public document room.
Changes in the Commission's rules to date apparently have been made as the result of
conferences between the agency and interested parties, rather than by petition, see Statement of AEC to Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, 1957 Section 202
Hearings, supra note 7 at 148.
84 As defined in Sections uh, 42 U.S.C.A. §2014(h), and IIW, 42 U.S.C.A. §2014(w)
(formerly Section ur) of the 1954 act.
85 10 Code Fed. Regs. §2.783.
86 10 Code Fed. Regs. §2.784.
87 Section 4(a), 5 U.S.C.A. §tooJ(a), which states: "General notice of proposed
rule making shall be published in the Federal Register (unless all persons subject
thereto are named and either personally served or otherwise have actual notice thereof
in accordance with law) and shall include (1) a statement of the time, place, and nature of public rule making proceedings; (2) reference to the authority under which
the rule is proposed; and (3) either the terms or substances of the proposed rule or a
description of the subjects and issues involved."
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notice "provided that a lesser time may be prescribed upon good cause
found and incorporated with a brief statement of the reasons in the
notice." 88
As noted previously, the hearing itself may not necessarily include the
taking of testimony before a designated Commission officer but may be
limited merely to the submission of views in writing. 89 However, the
interests of participating parties appear to be adequately protected by
provisions in the rules that "opportunity to participate may include an
opportunity to comment upon or respond to the data, views, or arguments submitted by others" and that additional time therefor may be
granted at the discretion of the Commission. 90
Adoption of a rule under Commission procedure, as provided in the
Administrative Procedure Act, 91 requires consideration of relevant information by the Commission and publication of the rule with "a concise
general statement of its basis and purpose." 92 Such publication must
be made at least 30 days before the effective date of the rule "unless the
Commission may provide otherwise upon good cause found and published with the rule." 93
3· Formal Rule-Making Procedures
Under Section 189a of the 1954 act, the Commission must, "upon the
request of any person whose interest may be affected by the proceeding,"
grant a hearing "in any proceeding for the issuance or modification of
rules and regulations dealing with the activities of licensees." 9 * The
term "dealing with the activities of licensees" relates clearly to those
rules and regulations which prescribe the terms and conditions imposed
10 Code Fed. Regs. §2.78410 Code Fed. Regs. §§2.720 and 2.785.
90 10 Code Fed. Regs. §2.785. According to the Commission, its practice is "to publish all regulations, procedural or otherwise, as notices of proposed rulemaking with a
request for comments" ; however, in actual practice, the Commission has used in rule
making ''the professional knowledge of the AEC staff and the knowledge and experience which AEC has acquired since its establishment in 1946 ... supplemented by
comments of advisory groups and the public (and by studies of independent experts
when available)" (AEC Response to Questionnaire, supra note 77, at 108o).
9 1 Section 4(b) and (c), 5 U.S.C.A. §1oo3(b) and (c).
02 10 Code Fed. Regs. §2.786; see, to the same effect, Section 4(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. §1003(b).
93 10 Code Fed. Regs. §2.787.
94 42 U.S.C.A. §2239(a).
88

88
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upon licensees, 95 and also, it is believed, to those which set forth the
grounds for suspending, revoking, or amending any license. 96
Although Section 189a does not specifically prescribe either a
"formal" hearing or one "on the record" for rules affecting licensing,
the section undoubtedly applies to such rule-making procedures where
regulations involving licensing are concerned, particularly in view of
Section 189b which provides for judicial review of "any final order
entered in any proceeding" under Section 189a. 97 In order for court
review to be effected under Section 189b, there must be a record made
under Section 189a. For the Commission to take any other position
would be to open the door to possible use of rule making by informal
procedure without hearing to affect the substantive rights of existing
licensees, where a formal licensing proceeding would otherwise be. required by Section I 89a. 98
As provided under the Administrative Procedure Act 99 and the pro95 E.g., maintenance of records and making of reports by licensees of production and
utilization facilities, 10 Code Fed. Regs. §50.71.
96 E.g., grounds for revocation, suspension, or modification of a license, 10 Code Fed.
Regs. §70.6 1(b).
97 Although the issue has not yet arisen, the Commission may well take a position
restricting the application of formal hearing procedures to the second clause of Section
189a of the 1954 statute requiring a "hearing" upon request of any party "in any proceeding for the issuance or modification of rules and regulations dealing with the activities of licensees." See Plaine, supra note 77 at 811 : "Section 189a of the Atomic
Energy Act is the provision governing the grant of hearings by the Atomic Energy.
Commission, in particular affecting licensing. It provides opportunity for hearings in
both adjudicative cases (e.g., the granting or revoking of licenses) and sublegislative
matters (e.g., the issuance of rules dealing with the activities of licensees). It is silent
respecting an 'on the record' requirement for hearings. Nothing in the text or history of Section 189 indicates that Congress intended to depart from the dichotomy
under the Administrative Procedure Act between adjudication and sublegislation. The
AEC has therefore quite properly followed the accepted interpretation that an 'on the
record' requirement is implied in adjudicative proceedings, but not in sublegislative proceedings involving rule-making."
98 See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Federal Communications Commission, 2II F. 2d 629,
633-634 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (" ... Such an established statutory right [to a license]
requires adjudicatory disposition, and the procedure which is sufficient for the rule making is not sufficient for that purpose. . . .") The fact that Section 189a of the 1954 act
does not contain the words "on the record" should be immaterial in the context of the
provisions for adjudication and judicial review contained therein and the broad interpretation placed upon Section 5 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. §1004.
prescribing opportunity for a hearing in cases of adjudication "required by statute to be
determined on the record" and upon Section 4(b), 5 U.S.C.A. §1003(b), requiring a
formal hearing for rule making "required by statute to be made on the record after
opportunity for an agency hearing" (Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 48
(1950), as modified, 339 U.S. 908 (1950)).
9 9 Sections 7, 8, and 10, 5 U.S.C.A. §§wo6, 1007, and 1009.

ADMINISTRATIVE LIMITATIONS

1229

cedure of the Commission/ 00 a "formal" rule-making proceeding includes the use of a hearing officer or of the agency itself, the conduct
of the hearing along lines of judicial procedure where practicable, and
the rendering of a decision by such presiding officer, with appropriate
review by the agency and by a court. 101
The inclusion of the requirement for "formal'' rule making in areas
in which that process closely resembles adjudication 102 represents a
salutary legislative policy. This policy does much to protect the interests
of atomic energy licensees in administrative due process, as well as to
advance_ the interests of the Commission in orderly procedures which
inspire public confidence.
4· Public Rule-Making Hearings 103
On only one occasion has the Commission announced and held public
hearings in connection with rule making. Notice of this proceeding was
given February 26, 1955, for the purpose of obtaining the views of all
interested persons with respect to procedures and methods for awarding
leases for the mining of uranium on federal lands under the control of
the Atomic Energy Commission. 104 In commenting on this proceeding,
the Commission has stated :
·
No oral hearing has ever been requested on proposed rules
nor has the Commission ever felt it desirable to initiate such a
hearing. In one case, oral hearings were held to determine the
advisability of changing our source material purchasing
practices.105
5· Written Submissions
On numerous occasions the Commission has published a notice of
"contemplated" rule making without public hearing but requesting that
10 Code Fed. Regs. §§2.78o-2.787.
These procedures are described in detail in .Section C, "Licensing," infra.
1o2 "To assert that formal rule making is, unlike adjudication, not an adversary proceeding is to have regard only to the form of the proceeding and to ignore realities.
In many respects, where rules are promulgated on the basis of a record made at a
formal hearing involving sharply contested issues of fact, the agency is, in effect, prosecuting the proceeding against private parties to be affected in the future by the rules"
(Hoover Commission Legal Task Force Report, supra note 43, at 164).
1o3 The rule making described in subsections d-i generally covers the period through
June 30, 1957.
104 20 Fed. Reg. 1227 (Feb. 26, 1955). ·The hearings were to be held Mar. 29-31,
1955, at Grand Junction, Colorado, under the supervision of the AECs Manager, Grand
Junction Operations Office.
tos AEC Response to Questionnaire, supra note 77 at 108o-1081.
100
1o1
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"[i]nterested persons . . . submit their views or other relevant information" concerning proposed changes in rules within thirty days 106 or,
in one instance, within fifteen days. 107 With respect to the licensing of
by-product material 108 and also in connection with so-called "parallel
procedures" for licensing involving classified information, 109 the Commission has promulgated rules to be effective within thirty days but
requested written submittals thereon in the meanwhile. Such comments
and submittals usually are directed to be sent to the chief of the division,
branch, or field office of the Commission which will administer the rules
involved.
6. Promulgation of Rules
As a general, although not necessarily a uniform, policy, the Commission gives thirty days' notice of the promulgation of final rules as
required by the Administrative Procedure Act. 110 However, no such
notice has been given in a number of cases.
1os See, e.g., "Notice of Proposed Rule Making-General Rules of Procedure on
Applications for Determination of Reasonable Royalty Fee, Just Compensation, or
Grant of Award for Patents, Inventions, or Discoveries," 10 Code Fed. Regs. Pt. So,
20 Fed. Reg. 2I93 (April 7, I95S). Similar procedure has been utilized with respect
to "Standard Specifications for Granting of Patent Licenses," IO Code Fed. Regs.
Pt. 8I, 20 Fed. Reg. 2283 (April 8, I955) ; "Control of Facilities for the Production
of Fissionable Materials," IO Code Fed. Regs. Pt. so, 20 Fed. Reg. z4B6 (April IS,
1955); "Definition of Fissionable Material," IO Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 70, 20 Fed. Reg.
249I (April IS, 1955); "Safeguarding of Restricted Data," 10 Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 9S,
20 Fed. Reg. 249S (April IS, 1955); "Access to Restricted Data," IO Code Fed. Regs.
Pt. 2s, 20 Fed. Reg. 3634 (May 24, 1955); "Operators Licenses," IO Code Fed. Regs.
Pt. 55, 20 Fed. Reg. 4658 (June 30, 19SS); "Standards for Protection Against Radiation," 10 Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 20, 20 Fed. Reg. SIOI (July I6, 1955); "Rules of Practice,•• Io Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 2, 20 Fed. Reg. 5786 (Aug. Io, I955); "Priorities Regulations," 10 Code Fed. Regs. Pt. I30, 20 Fed. Reg. 86o8 (Nov. 22, I955); "Waiver
of Patent Rights," 10 Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 83, 2I Fed. Reg. 7007 (Sept. 18, I956);
"Rules of Practice," IO Code Fed. Regs. §2.I02, 22 Fed. Reg. 2433 (April II, I957);
and "Intervention in Proceedings on Application for Facility Export License," 10 Code
Fed. Regs. §2.705, 22 Fed. Reg. 4054 (June 8, 1957).
1o1 "Public Records," IO Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 9, 21 Fed. Reg. 8464 (Nov. 3, I956).
10s "Licensing of Byproduct Material," IO Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 30, 2I Fed. Reg. 213
(Jan. II, I956).
109 "Rules of Practice," 10 Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 2, Subpt. H, 2I Fed. Reg. 8594
(Nov. 8, I956).
no "Control of Facilities for Production of Fissionable Materials," IO Code Fed. Regs.
Pt. so, 20 Fed. Reg. 6676 (Sept. 10, I955), published in proposed form, 20 Fed. Reg.
2486 (April 15, 1955) ; "Operator's Licenses," 10 Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 55, 2I Fed.
Reg. 6 (Jan. 4, 1956), published in proposed form, 20 Fed. Reg. 4658 (June 30, I955);
"Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities," IO Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 50, 2I
Fed. Reg. 355 (Jan. I9, 1956), published in proposed form, 20 Fed. Reg. 2486 (April
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Promulgation of regulations on the date of the notice of final formulation or prior thereto has been justified by the Commission on the
grounds that such rules involved non-substantive or security matters not
required to be developed according to the Administrative Procedure
Act. 111 In such cases the Commission usually has found merely that
"good cause exists why the regulations . . . should be made effective
without the customary thirty-day period of notice." 112 "Good cause"
for dispensing with the thirty-days requirement of the Administrative
Procedure Act also has been found where rules are needed in pending
proceedings 113 or because of safety considerations.114 Also, the ComIS, I9SS); "Licensing of Byproduct Materials," IO Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 30, 2I Fed.
Reg. 2I3 (Jan. 11, I9S6); "Priorities Regulation," IO Code Fed. Regs. Pt. I30, 21
Fed. Reg. 100S (Feb. 14, I9S6), published in proposed form, 20 Fed. Reg. 86o8 (Nov.
22, I9SS); "Rules of Practice," IO Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 2, 2I Fed. Reg. 8o4 (Feb. 4.
I9S6), published in proposed form, 20 Fed. Reg. S786 (Aug. IO, I9SS); "Special
Nuclear Material," 10 Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 70, 2I Fed. Reg. 764 (Feb. 3, I9S6), published in proposed form, 20 Fed. Reg. 2491 (April IS, I9SS) ; and "Standard Specifications for Granting of Patent Licenses," IO Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 8I, 2I Fed. Reg. 6o6
(Jan. 27, I9S6), published in proposed form, 20 Fed. Reg. 2283 (April 8, I9SS); miscellaneous amendments to "Priorities Regulations," IO Code Fed. Regs. Pt. I30, 2I
Fed. Reg. I0267 (Dec. 2I, 1956) ; "Procedures on Declaring Patents Affected with
.the Public Interest and Licensing of Patents," IO Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 2, Subpt. C,
2I Fed. Reg. 9764 (Dec. 11, I956); and "Standards for Protection Against Radiation," IO Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 20, 22 Fed. Reg . .548 (Jan. 29. I957). Proposed rules
for Part 20 previously were published for comment July I6, I9SS, supra note 106.
111 E.g., "General Rules of Procedure on Applications for Determination of Reasonable Royalty Fee, Just Compensation, or Grant of Award for Patents, Inventions, or
Discoveries," IO Code Fed. Regs. Pt. So, 20 Fed. Reg. 393I (June 7, I95S), published
in proposed form, 20 Fed. Reg. 2I93 (April 7, I9SS); "Unclassified Activities in Foreign Atomic Energy Programs," IO Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 110, 2I Fed. Reg. 4I8 (Jan.
20, I956), not published in proposed form except as a "Determination and Authorization" under Section 57a(3) (B) of the I954 Act, 20 Fed. Reg. 7399 (Oct. 5, I95S);
"Safeguarding of Restricted Data," IO Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 95, 2I Fed. Reg. 7I8 (Feb.
2, I9S6), published in proposed form, 20 Fed. Reg. 2495 (April IS, I9SS) ; "Access to
Restricted Data," IO Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 25, 2I Fed. Reg. 8Io (Feb. 4, I9S6), published in proposed form, 20 Fed. Reg. 3634 (May 24, I9SS); amendment to "Access
to Restricted Data," IO Code Fed. Regs. §25.II(b)(7), 2I Fed. Reg. S733 (Aug. I,
I9S6); and "Criteria and Procedures for Determining Eligibility for Security Clearance," 10 Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 4. 2I Fed. Reg. 3IOJ (May Io, I9S6), as amended,
2I Fed. Reg. 7I47 (Sept. 20, I956).
112 E.g., IO Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 110, 2I Fed. Reg. 4I8 (Jan. 20, I9S6), supra note
III.
11a "Public Records," IO Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 9, 21 Fed. Reg. 9743 (Dec. 8, I9S6),
as corrected 22 Fed. Reg. 2005 (Mar. 27, 1957). Fifteen days' notice has been given
for the same reason where the Rules of Practice have been amended, 10 Code Fed.
Regs. Pt. 2, 2I Fed. Reg. 8594 (Nov. 8, I956) and 2I Fed. Reg. 974I (Dec. 8, I956).
114 Amendments to "Standl!.J"ds for Protection Against Radiation," IO Code Fed. Regs.
Pt. 20, 22 Fed. Reg. 3389 (May I4. 1957).
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mission has utilized the exceptions contained in the Administrative Procedure Act 115 permitting promulgation, without notice, of rules "recognizing exemption or relieving restriction" 116 and dealing with public
property and personne1. 117
Where the Commission publishes an advance statement of the proposed rules, which rules are later ·promulgated without thirty days'
notice, interested persons have some degree of prior notice. However,
this is not the case where the rules are not published in proposed form
but are nevertheless made immediately effective.

7- Special Non-Public Procedures
Under the 1954 statute, the Commission is authorized to promulgate
certain rules by special non-public procedures involving the President
and the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy. These procedures are used when the Commission desires to add "other material"
to the categories of "special nuclear material" 118 or "source material." 118
Pursuant to these procedures, the Commission is required to make
findings· (I), with. respect to "special nuclear material," that the material to be added to that category "is capable of releasing substantial
quantities of atomic energy"; and ( 2), with respect to "source material," that such additionai material "is essential to the production of
special nuclear material." In both cases, the Commission also must find
that its determination "is in the interest of the common .defense and
security.,., Express Presidential assent to each such determination then
is required, whereupon
The Commission's determination, together with the assent of
the President, shall be submitted to the Joint Committee and
1u Sections 4(2) and 4(c), 5 U:S.C.A. §§1003(2) and 1003(c).
116 Amendments to "Licensing of Byproduct Material," 10 Code Fed. Regs.
§§3o.22(c), J0.71-30.72, 21. Fed. Reg. 7265 (Sept. 25, 1956) and 21 Fed. Reg. 7503 (Oct.
J, 1956); amendments to "Operators' Licerises," 10 Code Fed. Regs. §5s.1o(d), 21
Fed. Reg. 7265 (Sept. 2s, 1956); and amendments to "Control of Source Materials,"
10 Code Fed. Regs. §40.12, 22 Fed. Reg. 1318 (March 2, 1957).
111 See,· e.g., "RadioisOtope Research Support Program," 10 Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 37,
20 Fed. Reg. 4712 (July 2, 1955) and 20 Fed. Reg. 66o4 (Sept. 9, 1955); "Uranium
Leases on Lands Controlled by the Commission," 10 Code Fed. Regs. §6o.8, 21 Fed.
Reg. 5259 (July 14, 1956) and 10 Code Fed. Regs. §6o.9, 22 Fed. Reg. 1326 (March 5,
1957); and "Advisory Boards," 10 Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 7, 20 Fed. Reg. 6515 (Sept. 3,
1955) and 21 Fed. Reg. 4271 (June 19, 1956).
us Section ny, 42 U.S.C.A. §2014(y) (formerly Section IIt) and Section 51, 42
U.S.C.A. §2071.
uu Section IIX, 42 U.S.C.A. §2014(x) (formerly Section IIs) and Section 61, 42
U.S.C.A. §2091.
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a period of thirty days shall elapse while Congress is in session
. . . before the determination of the Commission may become
effective : Provided, however, That the Joint Committee, after
receiving such determination, may by resolution in writing,
waive the conditions of all or any portion of such thirty-day
period. 120
These special procedures represent an innovation in the 1954 statute
as compared with the 1946 act. They were intended to permit the Commission "to enlarge the traditional scope of materials covered under
the [ 1954] Act, but only after appropriate safeguards are provided for
careful review." 121 The first such determination by the Commission
under Section 51 was announced on June 30, 1955/22 when, effective
that date, Uranium 233 was declared to be "special nuclear material." 128
The fact that these highly important definitions of "special nuclear material" and "source material" can be expanded by essentially secret rulemaking procedures, without notice to interested persons who might
comment thereon, has been criticized. 12•
8. Miscellaneous Rule-Making Procedures
a. Policy Determinations
The Commission has published, by notice effective immediately, important policy decisions affecting the civilian reactor program. Thus,
on March 3, 1956, the agency announced a classified schedule of guaranteed fair prices for special nuclear material lawfully produced under
Sections 51 and 61, 42 U.S.C.A. §§2071, 2091.
Statement of Mr. William Mitchell, former AEC General Counsel, Oct. 13, 1954,
1 CCH Atomic Energy Law Rep. 1!so8. See H.R. Rep. No. 2181, supra note 5 at 15:
"In view of the potentially great impact any future declaration of the addition of further materials to the category of special nuclear material [under Section 51 of the 1954
act] could have on the economy of the Nation, these statutory steps were deemed to
be necessary. . . . It is believed that this provision gives the Commission the statutory basis it needs for including new materials within this category, and stiii provides
adequate safeguards to assure that this power is not abused. . . ."
122 20 Fed. Reg. 4664- The notice stated that the Commission's determination, with
Presidential approval, was submitted to the Joint Committee on April 12, 1955. This
indicates considerable negotiation between the Commission and the Committee before
the latter gave its approval. The 3o-day limitation in the statute appears meaningless,
because the Committee could take adverse action prior to the expiration thereof, to.
forestall a promulgation of the determination by the Commission without the Committee's complete approval.
123 Section IIy(I), 42 U.S.C.A. §2014(y) (I) (formerly Section nt(I) ), merely
defin~s "special nuclear material" as including "uranium enriched in the isotope 233."
124 I CCH Atomic Energy Law Reporter 1[n7sa.
120

121
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license, such prices to take effect July I, I95S, and to be effective until
June 30, I¢2.m The basis for the determination was not disclosed and
the schedule was at that time classified. 126 On November I7, I956, 121
and June 6, I957/ 28 the Commission announced nonclassified guaranteed fair prices to be paid for plutonium and uranium 233 produced in
licensed reactors and delivered to the Commission for one year after
July I, I¢2. 129
Other policy decisions affecting the domestic reactor program also
have been announced by notice rather than by rule. 130 The Commission
has indicated that the practice of making such decisions by automatic
notice without opportunity for rule-making procedures might be
changed. 181
b. Interpretations
The Commission has recognized as rules certain interpretations of the
Atomic Energy Act. This has been effected by the creation of a special
Part 8 of its regulations "to contain interpretations of the . . . Act of
I954 . . . and of regulations . . . issued thereunder." 182 Only one
such interpretation, however, has been issued. 183
c. Special Determinations and Authorizations
Under the I954 act, before proposing or receiving written submittals
with respect to draft regulations, the Commission has adopted the prac21 Fed. Reg. 1421 (Mar. 3, 1956).
C, "Licensing,'' infra.
Rei. No. 930 (Nov. 17, 1956), BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter
223:16.
12s 22 Fed. Reg. 3985 (June 6, 1957).
129 See Section C, "Licensing," infra.
1 80 Extension of access permits for two years, 21 Fed. Reg. 2389 (April 12, 1956);
fuel reprocessing by Commission, 22 Fed. Reg: 1591 (March 12, 1957); and work experience program for civilian application, 22 Fed. Reg. 2139 (Mar. 30, 1957).
181 See Statement of former AEC General Counsel Mitchell, June 10, 1957, before
Joint Committee, 1957 Congressional Review Hearings, supra note 7 at 47: "Representative HOLIFIELD: ... [W]ould you consider publishing in the Federal Register such fair prices and such guaranteed fair prices, as a part of your criteria? There
has been some criticism ... that in the establishment of criteria you have established
it by notice rather than by rule published in the Federal Register. . . . Mr. MITCHELL: I think a more formal statement, by publishing in the Federal Register, would
be desirable, and we do propose to do that."
1s2 10 Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 8.
1 88 "Interpretation of Section 152 of the Atomic Energy Act," IO Code Fed. Regs.
§8.1, 2I Fed. Reg. 1414 (Mar. 3, 1956).
125

12& See Section
1 27 AEC Press
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tice in a few instances of announcing a policy determination preliminary
to public rule making.
This was first done by the Commission to meet the need for clarifying
and regularizing the status of American consultants who were called
upon to advise concerning atomic energy projects and plants abroad. 134
OnOctober 5, 1955,135 the Commission announced that "any activity
which . . . constitutes directly or indirectly engaging in the production
of special nuclear material in any [friendly] foreign country" and which
did. not "involve the communication of Restricted Data or other classified defense information" or the "violation of other provisions of law"
would not be considered a violation of Section 57a(3) (B) of the 1954
act_l 36 The agency also announced its intention to incorporate and implement the foregoing "determination and authorization" in regulations,
which were subsequently promulgated on January 20, 1956. 187
9. General Content and Form of Rules
Rules and regulations promulgated by the Atomic Energy Commission generally show careful and clear draftsmanship and are cast in a
form which makes their content readily ascertainable by the person consulting them. Thus, each part of the rules usually begins with paragraphs which set forth the purpose/ 58 basis/39 and scope 140 of the rules.
In some cases, policy "findings" upon which the rules are based, are
included. 141 "Definition" sections often are included where required or
appropriate. 142
The Commission apparently has sought to find a practical solution to
two problems which often face regulated persons or businesses. The
first of these problems arises from the fact that rules of procedure often
seem to conflict whenever two or more rules or sets of rules are appli134 See Section C, "Licensing," infra.
1 35 20 Fed. Reg. 7399 (Oct. 5, 1955).
1 3 6 42 U.S.C.A. §2077(a) (3) (B): "It shall be WIIawful for any person to ... directly or indirectly engage in the production of any special nuclear materials outside
of the United States except ... upon authorization by the Commission after a determination that such activity will not be inimical to the interest of the United States."
137 21 ·Fed. Reg. 418 (Jan. 20, 1956).
138 E.g., 10 Code Fed. Regs. §7.1 ("Advisory Boards").
139 E.g., 10 Code Fed. Regs. §40.1 ("Control of Source Material").
140 E.g., 10 Code Fed. Regs. §2.1 ("Rules of Practice").
141 E.g., 10 Code Fed. Regs. §6.10 ("Security Policies and Practices Relating to Labor Management Relations").
142 E.g., 10 Code Fed. Regs. §8o.2 ("General Rules of Procedure on Applications
for the Determination of Reasonable Royalty Fee, etc.").
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cable to a given situation. Under the C01;nmission's Rules of Practice,
where there is any conflict between a general procedural rule applicable
to every type of agency proceeding "and a special rule in another subpart applicable to a particular type of proceeding, the special rule will
govern." 148
More important, however, has been the Commission's attempt to deal
with the problem of reliance by private parties upon official interpretations of its rules. To provide some protection for the private party who
seeks an interpretation of the meaning and applicability of a rule and
desires to rely upon such interpretation, each of eleven parts of the
Atomic Energy Commission's regulations provide, with respect to the
subject matter of that part, that
·
Except as specifically authorized by the Commission in writing, no interpretation of the meaning of the regulations in this
part by any officer or employee of the Commission other than
a written interpretation by the general counsel will be recognized to be binding upon· the Commission. 1 u
It is to be hoped that the above type of provision will be extended to all
parts of the Commission's rules.
Only in a few cases throughout the entire federal government does
the private party have such a right to rely in good faith upon an interpretation of an administrative rule or its application to the facts of a
particular case.m In most cases, the party acts at his peril in so relying,
particularly where the application of a rule is controversial and subject
to the vicissitudes of changes in agency policy.
us ro COde Fed. Regs. §2.3.
1u 10 Code Fed. Regs. §20.6 ("Standards for Protection Against Radiation"); §2S4

("Access to Restricted Data"); §JO.s ("Licensing of Byproduct Material"); §4o.so·
("Control of Source Material"); §so.J ("Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities"); §ss.s (Operators' Licenses"); §70.6 ("Special Nuclear Material"); §81.4
("Standard Specifications for Granting of Patent Licenses") ; §95.7 ("Safeguarding of
Restricted Data"); §no.s ("Unclassified Activities in Foreign Atomic Energy Programs"); and §1404, ("Financial Protection Requirements and Indemnity Agreements"). For an example of a similar rule adopted under the 1946 act, see §so.6o
("Control of Facilities for the Production of Fissionable Material"), now obsolete.
u·D By statute, an advisory agency opinion may be relied upon from the Office. of
Alien Property, so U.S.C. App. §s(b), and the Department of Labor under the "Portalto-Portal" Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §259. These two statutes, as well as the Defense Production Act of I9SO, 64 Stat. 818, so U.S.C.App. §2IS7, and the six regulatory statutes
administered by the Securities and Exchange Commission, IS U.S.C.A. §§77s(a),
nsss(c), 78w(a,), 79t(d), 8oa-37(c), and 8ob-n(d), permit reliance in good faith
upon a rule or regulation of the agency concerned. See Hoover Commission Legal
Task Force Report, supra note 43 at 189: "By practice and precedent, letters of advice and staff opinions are given limited validity by the Bureau of Foreign Commerce,
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D. Conclusions
By the end of 1957 the Atomic Energy Commission had developed
the major framework of rules implementing the Atomic Energy Act of
1954. 146 Criticism of the agency's delay in developing and promulgating
these rules, particularly under the impetus of a pending administrative
proceeding, 141 has been countered by the claim that the Commission
"went about its job slowly and deliberately so that there would be an
opportunity for industry to comment on what the AEC proposed and
for the AEC to think carefully about its regulations before they were
issued."· 148 Consultation with advisory groups, rather than resort to public rule-making proceedings, seems to have been the primary reliance of
the Commission in developing its regulations. 149 This policy, while not
apparently abused to date, is vulnerable to imputations of ex parte influence in the eyes of the public and could be so abused in the future.
In general, the Atomic Energy Commission would appear to have
exercised its rule-making authority under the 1954 statute in accordance
with both the letter and the spirit of the Administrative Procedure Act
of 1946. 150 A desire to improve public policy and relations with the
Department of Commerce, by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, by the Interstate Commerce Commission, by the Post Office Department, and by the Office of Munitions Control, Department of State. This excellent practice . . . has been most effectively used by the Securities and Exchange Commission, which issues several thousand
such opinion letters annually."
14 6 See 1957 Section 202 Hearings, supra note 7 at 18, 147; Trowbridge, "Licensing
and Regulation of Private Atomic Energy Activities," 34 Tex. L. Rev. 842 (1956).
HT In the Matter of Power Reactor Development Company, AEC Dkt. F-16. This
proceeding was inaugurated on Aug. 31, 1956, by the filing of a petition of intervention to oppose the conditional granting of a construction permit to the applicant,
awarded to the applicant by the Commission on Aug. 4, 1956.
148 Trowbridge, supra note 146.
149 1957 Section 202 Hearings, supra note 7 at 149; AEC Response to Questionnaire,
supra note 77 at 1o81.
150 See McKinney Panel Report, supra note 10 at 130: "The Commission has selected a complex and time-consuming technique for developing its regulations. It has
conducted conferences with representatives of diverse organizations on each aspect of
regulations. . . . While some points of view may not be fully reflected by this technique, opportunity for comment is also afforded after publication of proposed regulations in the Federal Register. The logic of this course of Commission action appears
sound and is not being vigorously opposed by any interests or groups so far as can
be observed." The only substantial attack to date upon the Commission in the field
of rule making has come from intervenors United Automobile Workers and AFLCIO in AEC Dkt. No. F-16, in the matter of Power Reactor Development Company.
The intervenors did not specifically attack the licensing rules involved in that proceeding but argued that the Comt:nission, "in granting the conditional construction permit,"
violated 10 Code Fed. Regs. §§50.35, 50.40, and 50.45; see "Petition for Intervention
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industries and individuals subject to regulation might have dictated
uniform resort to public rule-making procedures and to notice of promulgation of rules, even where non-substantive matters traditionally
have been exempt therefrom under the Administrative Procedure Act.
Particularly commendable, so far as the practice goes, has been the
adoption of the regulation for interpretation of rules by the Commission's General Counsel, upon which good-faith reliance can be placed.
This procedure should be extended to all parts of the agency's rules,
which step could be effected by an appropriate amendment to Part 8 of
the Commission's rules.
Largely untested is the 1954 statute's provision for review of certain
rules by the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, which
rules relate to changes in the definitions of "special nuclear material"
and "source material." The Committee's authority thus conferred tends
to give the Committee "a very substantial role in the atomic energy
program." 151 This review procedure affords a relatively speedy means
for amending Sections I IX and I Iy of the I954 act by a quasi-legislative
process. However, the power exercised by the Joint Committee in this
connection conceivably could be used in the future to affect the administration of the ~tomic energy law by the Executive Department. 152
III. LICENSING

A. Licensing in Administrative Law
In its report published in I94I, the Attorney General's Committee on
Administrative Procedure referred to licensing by federal agencies as a
distinguishing characteristic of the "trend toward preventive legislation"
in the United States. Indeed, the report stated:
Licensing of any activity may be one of the most burdensome
forms of regulation, since all who engage in the activity must
and Request for Formal Hearing" 4-13 (Aug. 31, 1956); Notice of Hearing Order,
21 Fed. Reg. 78o9 (Oct. 12 1956).
In May 1958 the AEC informed the Joint Committee that "informal" public rulemaking procedures would be utilized in connection with consideration of that agency's
regulations on "Financial Protection Requirements and Indemnity Agreements," 10
Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 140, issued initially Sept. 11, 1957, with only 15 days' public
notice (22 Fed. Reg. 7223, BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 227: 625). Industry advisory conferences on the subject occurred in Dec. 1957, and Jan. 1958, but the Commission felt the need for further industry advice concerning, and public support for,
the regulations in this field; see BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 4: 100 and 4: 157.
1n 1 CCH Atomic Energy Law Reporter 1fs68.
u 2 See, e.g., Letter of AEC Chairman Strauss to Rep. Cole, Aug. 3, 1957, concerning the Commission authorization bill for fiscal year 1958, 103 Cong. Rec. A6319A6320 (Aug. 5, 1957).
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be licensed in order that the persons who would probably act
improperly may be controlled. But it is also one of the most
effective [means of control], and it is particularly likely to be
resorted to where the effort to effectuate policies is made with
conviction. 158
More than a decade later another governmental body, after a survey of
federal administrative functions, observed that the "power to license is
in effect the power to control the business and commercial life of the
community." 154
In no field of regulation affecting American private industry has the
Congress used licensing more extensively to assure governmental control than in that of atomic energy. The major areas of private industrial and research activity permitted under the Atomic Energy Act of
1946 were severely circumscribed by restrictions upon the licensing
process. One of these areas-the manufacture or production of any
device utilizing fissionable material or atomic energy, or the utilization
of such forms of energy-was never exploited. Under the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, expanded private use of atomic energy is governed
by licensing requirements which give the Presidel).t, the Atomic Energy
Commission, and even the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, greater
control over industry than is the case in any other area of federally regulated activity.
In enacting the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 155 and the statute which
superseded it in 1954, 156 Congress had the foresight to require that the
licensing authority of the Atomic Energy Commission be subject to
safeguards of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act. Provisions
of that legislation affecting the licensing process clearly were enacted by
Congress in 1946 "because of the very severe consequences of the conferring of licensing authority upon administrative agencies" and "to
remove the threat of disastrous, arbitrary, and irremediable administrative action." 157
Under the Administrative Procedure Act, licensing covers "any form
Sen. Doc. No. 8, supra note 45 at 14.
Commission on Organization of Executive Branch of the Government, Report on
Legal Services and Procedure 58 (March 1955) (hereafter cited as Hoover Commission Legal Ser-Vices Report); see Hoover Commission Legal Task Force Report,
supra note 43 at 172-174
1511 Section 14 42 U.S.C.A. §1814 (1946).
15& Section 181, 42 U.S.C.A. §2231.
ts7 Sen. Doc. No. 248, supra note 43 at 368.
153

154
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of required official permission." 158 Agencies are required to proceed
with reasonable dispatch to conclude and decide proceedings on applications for licenses. 159 No license may be withdrawn without the agency's
first giving the licensee notice thereof in writing and an opportunity to
demonstrate or achieve compliance with all lawful requirements. In
business of a continuing nature, no license can expire until timely application for a new license or for a renewal thereof is determined by the
agency, except in "cases of willfulness or those in which the public
health, interest, or safet;y requires." In the latter cases, an agency can
summarily suspend or revoke a litense. 160
B. Licensing Under Atomic Energy Act of 1946

Licensing under the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 was rigorously curtailed by Congressional policy, even though the Commission was required to carry out a program "directed toward improving the public
welfare, increasing the standard of living, [and] strengthening free
competition in private enterprise." 161 Particularly restrictive was the
direction of the statute for a "program for Government control of the
production, ownership, and use of fissionable material to assure the
common defense and security and to insure the broadest possible exploitation of the fields." 162 This policy was further effectuated in Section 4 (e) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946,163 which provided that
uBJd. at 3o6; see 197, 254. Under Section 2(d), 5 U.S.C.A. §Iooi(d), licensing
constitutes a form of agency "adjudication" and is always the subject of an "order."
Under Section 2(e), a license is defined as including "the whole or-part of any agency
permit, certificate, approval, registration, charter, membership, statutory exemption or
other form of permission" ; and "licensing" as including "agency process respecting the
grant, renewal, denial, revocation, suspension, annulment, withdrawal, limitation amendmerit, modification, or .conditioning of a license." Under Section 2(f), an agency "sanction" "includes the whole or any part of any agency ... requirement, revocation, or
suspension of a license" ; and agency "relief' includes "any agency . . . grant of . . . ·
license." Under Section 2 (g), an "agency proceeding" includes licensing, and "agency
action" includes an agency license.
u& See Section 6(a), 5 U.S.C.A. §1005(a): "... Every agency shall proceed with
reasonable dispatch to conclude any matter presented to it except that due regard shall
be had for the convenience and necessity of the parties or their representatives. . . ."
Although this provision was intended by Congress to assure a speedy decision with
respect to matters before any agency, consistent with the public interest in a full and
complete record, "The Administrative Procedure Act provides no remedy for failure
of agencies to proceed with reasonable dispatch" (Hoover Commission Legal Task
Force Report, supra note 43 at 183-186).
16o Section 9(b), 5 U.S.C.A. §1oo8(b).
161 Section 1 (a), 42 U.S.C. §1801 (a)(1946).
16 2 Section I (b) (4), 42 U.S.C. §1801 (b) (4) (1946).
16842 U.S.C. §18o4(e) (1946).
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licenses for the manufacture of production facilities for fissionable
material 104 were to be issued "in accordance with such standards and
upon such conditions as will restrict the production and distribution of
such facilities to effectuate the policies and purposes of this Act."
I.

Types of Licenses

Licensing activities of the Atomic Energy Commission under the
I946 act were limited to four major categories. These included licenses
(I) for facilities (including important component parts thereof) for
the production of fissionable material/ 65 ( 2) for the transfer of source
materials, 166 and (3) for the distribution and use of by-product materials (radioisotopes) .167 A fourth licensing activity, never implemented, covered the manufacture or production of any equipment or
device utilizing fissionable material or atomic energy. 168
In controlling facilities for the production of fissionable material, the
Commission under the I946 act issued both specific licenses for domestic
and foreign activities and also general licenses for domestic activities. 169
The general licensing device was especially convenient because of the
fact that the definition of facilities for the production of fissionable
material was broad enough to encompass an extensive list of articles in
common use. 170 These included Geiger counters and mass spectrometers
and spectrographs. The production and utilization of these articles, together with those of some twenty other devices, were controlled by
general licenses 171 subject only to reporting requirements. 172
The same division of licenses into general and special categories 173
was made with respect to the licensing of source material transfers.
This was effected by the use of a detailed list of exempted products 174
164 Defined in Section 5(a) (1) generally as "plutonium, [and] uranium enriched in
the isotope 235,'' 42 U.S.C. §18o5 (a) (I) ( 1946).
165 Section 4(e), 42 U.S.C. §18o4(e) (1946).
16& Section 5(b) (2), 42 U.S.C. §xSos(b) (2) (1946).
167 Section 5(C) (2), 42 u.s.c. §I8os(c) (2) (1946).
168 Section 7(a), 42 U.S.C. §18o7(a) (1946).
16 P1o Code Fed. Regs. §§50.1o-.I3 and 50.30 (repealed).
170 Section 5(a)(1), 42 u.s.c. §18o5(a)(I)(19¢).
1 7 1 Under Schedule B, 10 Code Fed. Regs. §50.71 (repealed).
17 2Io Code Fed. Regs. §§50.12(b) and so.4o-.41 (repealed).
11a 10 Code Fed. Regs. §40.23.
174 10 Code Fed. Regs. §4o.6o, listing "Schedule I" which covered incandescent mantles, ceramic products, refractories, glass products, photographic supplies, certain rare
earth metals, and vacuum tubes, and certain types of thoriated tungsten. Section 40.61,
containing "Schedule II" and §40.28 prohibit the use of source material, containing by
weight uranium in excess of o.oso/o, in the manufacture of ceramic, glass, and photographic products.
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and transactions protected by general license. m A similar program for
general and special licensing was in effect promulgated to regulate the
distribution of byproduct material by exempting from the AEC's rules
therefor certain categories of items and quantities thereof. 176
2.

Standards and Conditions

It is perhaps fortunate that licensing under the Atomic Energy Act
of 1946 did not assume the importance that this function has under
current legislation. The statutory standards under which the Atomic
Energy Commission exercised its authority under the 1946 legislation
were sketchy, if not entirely non-existent from a practical point of view,
with the "licensing power . . . left to the virtually uncontrolled discretion of the Commission." 177 Except in the case of authorizations for
radioisotope procurement, licensing regulations issued by the agency
failed to provide specific standards for licenses and the conduct of
licensees.
The tone of the regulations under the 1946 act was, of course, set by
the statute itself. Under that act, licenses for the manufacture, production, transfer, or acquisition of any facilities for the production of
fissionable material were to "be issued in accordance with such standards and upon such conditions as will restrict the production and distribution of such facilities to effectuate the policies and purposes of this
[ 1946] Act." 178 The standards and conditions with respect to transfers
of source materials were only slightly more specific and required that
licenses should not impair an adequate supply of source materials or permit "the use of such materials in a manner inconsistent with the national
welfare." 179 More exact and readily ascertainable standards and conditions were stated with respect to authorizations for the use of radioisotopes.180 Licensing of fissionable and source materials was prohibited
under the 1946 act "if, in the opinion of the Commission, the issuance
17G 10 Code Fed. Regs. §40.62,. containing "Schedule Ill."
176 10 Code Fed. Regs. §30.71 (repealed) containing "Schedule A" for exempt items,
and §30.72 (repealed), containing "Schedule B" for exempt quantities.
177 Report of the American Bar Association Special Committee on Atomic Energy
to Joint Committee on Atomic Energy 12 (Mimeo Nov. 20, 1953) (hereafter cited as
ABA Committee Report).
178 Section 4(e), 42 U.S.C. §18o4(e) (1946).
179 Section s(b) (3), 42 U.S.C. §18o5(b) (3) (1946).
180 Section s(c) (2), 42 U.S.C. §18o5(c) (2) (1946), set forth the authorized uses for
byproduct materials. Further, authorization was to be denied to "any applicant, who is
not equipped to observe or who fails to observe such safety standards to protect health
as may be established by the Commission." See 10 Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 30 (repealed).
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of a license to such person . . . would be inimical to the common defense and security." 181 A similar vaguely-worded condition was applied
to licenses for the manufacture, production, or export of any equipment utilizing fissionable material or atomic energy. 182
The regulations issued with respect to licenses for facilities for the
production of fissionable material 183 and for transfers of source material184 followed the statute and permitted the Commission to impose
"such conditions as it deems appropriate and in accordance with law."
Regulatory standards incorporated in the rules were as indefinite as those
of the statute itself. They included such terms, capable of varied interpretation, as "assurance of the common defense and security," 185 "assurance of adequate" supplies of the materials or facilities concerned, 186
"prevention of the use of source materials in a manner inconsistent with
the national welfare," 187 "preservation of health and safety," 188 "inimical to the common defense and security," 189 and "effectuating the policies
and purposes of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946." 190 Since compliance
with all regulations of the Commission was a condition of every license
and since the Commission reserved the right to change its regulations, 191
there existed no clearly ascertainable standards and conditions with
respect to licenses for facilities to produce fissionable materials and to
transfer source material.
Only in the case of regulations with respect to authorization for utilization of radioisotopes did the Commission set forth standards and
conditions which could be readily ascertained with reasonable cer181 Section 5(d), 42 U.S.C. §18o5(d) (1946). The phrase "common defense and security,'' nowhere explained in the Act, also appeared in Section l(a), 42 U.S.C.
§18o1 (a) (1946) ("Findings and Declaration") and Section 1 (b) (4), 42 U.S.C.
§18o1 (b) (4) (1946) ("Purpose of Act").
182 Section 7(c), 42 U.S.C. §18o7(c) (1946).
18a 10 Code Fed. Regs. §50.21 (repealed).
184 10 Code Fed. Regs. §40.21.
185 10 Code Fed. Regs. §§4o.22(a) and 50.22(a) (repealed).
1 8 6 10 Code Fed. Regs. §§4o.22(b) and 50.22(b) (repealed).
1 87 10 Code Fed. Regs. §§40.22(c) and 50.22(c) (repealed).
188 10 Code Fed. Regs. §40.22(d).
189 10 Code Fed. Regs. §40.22.
190 10 Code Fed. Regs. §50.22(d) (repealed).
191 10 Code Fed. Regs. §40.25: "Nothing in this section [on revocation, suspension,
and modification of licenses] shall limit the authority of the Commission to issue or
amend its regulations in accordance with law." See, to the same effect, §50.32 (repealed). The open-end nature of the licenses issuable under the 1946 Act also arises
under the 1954 act; see Section 187 of the latter statute, 42 U.S.C.A. §2237 and 10
Code Fed. Regs. §7o.J2(b), more fully discussed hereafter ..
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tainty. 192 Thus, requirements for approval of an authorization for the
use of radioisotopes required specified uses for the byproduct material,
suitable equipment for health and safety, and suitably trained personnel.
3· Licensing Procedures
Although subject to the requirements of the Federal Administrative
Procedure Act, procedures for licensing under the Atomic Energy Act
of 1946 193 were not otherwise defined or marked out by Congress. 194
However, except in the case of appeals from denials or revocations of
licenses, licensing procedures complied generally with those required
by the Administrative Procedure Act. 195
Appeals procedure was clearly deficient in the case of licenses for the
manufacture of facilities for the production of fissionable material and
transfer of byproduct materials. In each case, the only procedure provided was for an applicant to file a "petition" in letter form with the
Commission "stating the reasons why the petition should be granted." 198
Although the General Counsel of the Commission at one time held the
view that these regulations in effect authorized an intra-agency appeal
when desired by an applicant,19't such a construction depended more
upon the practice of the agency itself than upon the actual language of
the regulations involved.
10210 Code Fed. Regs. §Jo.:zi(a)(l)-(2) (repealed). Special requirements were
listed for human uses by institutions (§J0.24(a)) and by individual physicians
(§J0.24(b)), for human use of sealed sources (§J0.24(c)), for use in research andj
development (§30.24(d)), and for processing (§30.24(e) ).
1ua Section 14. 42 U.S.C. §1814 (1946).
194 Thus, Section 4(e), 42 U.S.C. §18o4(e) (1946), stated that licenses for the manufactUre of facilities for the production of fissionable material "shall be issued in accordance with such procedures as the Commission may by regulation establish." Section s(b) (3), 42 U.S.C. §18o5(b) (3) (1946), was to same effect with respect to licenses
for the transfer of source materials. Section 5(c) (2), 42 U.S.C. §18o5(c) (2) (1946),
covering authorizations for distribution of radioisotopes, contained no provision whatsaver for licensing procedures.
m See 10 Code Fed. Regs. §§JO.JO (repealed), 40.20, and 50.20 (repealed) dealing
with license applications ; §§30.34 (repealed), 40.25, and 50.32 (repealed) dealing with
license revocation, suspension, or modification ; and §4o.:z6 dealing with license renewals.
196 IO Code Fed. Regs. §§40-SI and so.6I (repealed).
101 Answers of Atomic Energy Commission to Questionnaire Submitted by Task
Force on Legal Services and Procedure, Commission on Organization of Executive
Branch of the Government (1954): "As indicated in §40.51 and 50.61 of the regulations, an appeal may be made by filing a letter with the Commission, stating the reasons for the appeal. If reason therefor appears, the action may be modified by the
Licensing Controls Branch. Otherwise the appeal and the related file data are referred to the General Manager for consideration and response to the applicant."
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C. Licensing Under Atomic Energy Act of 1954
Licensing under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 is the means whereby
the government not only regulates the atomic energy industry but also
effects the development of that industry in accordance with the aims
of that legislation. "[A] comparative newcomer among the Commission's many other functions," licensing constitutes a fairly "narrow but
highly significant area of the Commission's overall responsibilities for
atomic energy development" which is "closely linked with the AEC's
nortregulatory responsibilities." 198
The overriding national defense policy of the Congress in enacting
the 1946 Act set the tone of licensing thereunder. In enacting the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, however, Congress manifested a compelling
intention to take advantage of the potentialities of private industry in
the development of atomic energy for peaceful uses. Accordingly, "the
development, use, and control of atomic energy . . . to [among other
.things] strengthen free competition in private enterprise," 199 as provided in the 1954 act, should and must guide the Commission in enacting regulations to implement the legislation. Further, Congress intended
that Commission programs for assistance to research. and development
:!lnd the "dissemination of unclassified scientific and technical information" should "encourage scientific and industrial progress." 200 Indeed,
one of the specific purposes of the present statute, clearly designed to
set the administrative tone of the licensing function thereunder, is the
stated policy "to encourage widespread participation in the development
and utilization of atomic energy for peaceful purposes to the maximum
extent consistent with the common defense and security and with the
health and safety of the public." 201
Licensing under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 is subject to two
controlling factors that did not exist under the earlier legislation. First,
the Commission acts "in the dual capacity of encouraging as well as
regulating private activity," with the result that "considerations of
Government promotion and assistance were more closely interrelated
with those of regulation than is the case in most other regulatory
agencies." 202 Second, the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic
Energy acts, under a 1957 amendment to Section 261 of the 1954 statJoint Committee Staff Study, supra note 3 at 2-3.
Section xb, 42 U.S.C.A. §20II (b).
2oo Section Ja and b, 42 U.S.C.A. §2013(a) and (b).
2o1 Section 3d, 42 U.S.C.A. §2013(d).
2o2 Joint Committee Staff Study, supra note 3 at 4

198
199
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ute, 208 in a reviewing capacity with respect to all major licenses where
federal government assistance in any form is involved. These two factors vitally affect the development of private atomic enterprise under the
I954 act, as amended.
The Atomic Energy Act of I954 establishes a complex system of integrated licensing controls. Thus, where a public utility or research
institution desires to build and operate on atomic reactor, it must obtain
(I) a construction permit to build the reactor; ( 2) a facility license to
operate the reactor ; ( 3) depending on the reactor design, a license to
acquire, possess, and use source material; ( 4) a license to possess and
use special nuclear material; and ( 5) a license for each person operating
the reactor.
Several statutory features promote the integration of licensing functions. For example, the licensing provisions of the I954 act are, for
the most part, contained in a single chapter of the statute. 204 An applicant for a so-called "commercial" 205 or "non-commercial" 206 license for
a facility utilizing or producing special nuclear material is encouraged
to develop the information which will be required by the Commission by
prior consultation with the agency and to submit its application for each
type of license required in connection with the operating permit, insofar
as possible, at the same time. 207 Further, Section 16Ih of the present
statute authorizes the Commission to
. . . consider in a single application one or more of the activities for which a license is required by this Act, [and] combine
in a single license one or more of such activities. . . .208
The licensing system now administered by the Atomic Energy Commission requires the following types of authorizations before a private
person or business can act :
1. Special Nuclear M a.terial-License to receive, possess,
use, and transfer special nuclear material, as provided in Sections 53 and 57a(I)-(2): for the conduct of research and development activities under Section 3 I ; for use in conduct of
research and development activity or in medical therapy, under
2oa
204

Pub. L. 85-79, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
Chapter 10, "Atomic Energy Licenses," Sections 101-110, 42 U.S.C.A. §§2131-

2140.
Under section 103, 42 U.S.C.A. §2133.
Under section 104, 42 U.S.C.A. §2134.
2o1 Joint Committee Staff Study, supra note 3 at 11-15 and IOI-IOS; Upton, "Licensing and Services to Licensees and Others Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,'' 24
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 488, 489 (1956).
2o8 42 U.S.C.A. §2201 (h).
2os

206
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non-commercial licenses pursuant to Section 104; and for use
under commercial licenses pursuant to Section 103.
2. Source Material-License to transfer, deliver, receive,
possess, import, or export source materials after removal from
the place of deposit in nature, as provided in Sections 62 and
63 : for use in the conduct of research and development activities under Section 31 ; for use in research and development
activities or in medical therapy under non-commercial licenses
pursuant to Section 104; for use under commercial licenses
pursuant to Section 103; or for "any other use approved by
the Commission as an aid to science or industry."
3· Byproduct Material-License to transfer, manufacture,
produce, acquire, own, possess, import, or export byproduct
material, as provided in Sections 81 and 82, for use in research and development, medical therapy, industrial uses, agricultural uses, and "such other useful applications as may be
developed."
4· Activity Abroad-Authorization for activity involving
the production of special nuclear material outside the United
States, as provided in Section 57a(3) (B), where United
States has no agreement for cooperation with a foreign
country pursuant to Sections 54 and 123.
s. Commercial Utilization or Production Facility-License
for commercial utilization or production facility using special
nuclear material as provided in Section 103.
6. Non-Commercial Utilization or Production FacilityLicense for non-commercial utilization or production facility
using special nuclear material as provided in Section 104 for
medical therapy, research and development activities for industrial or commercial purposes, and research and development
activities for non-commercial purposes.
7· Construction Permit-Construction permit for construction prior to licensing, or alteration after licensing, of utilization or production facility licensed under Sections 103 and
104, as provided in Section 185.
8. Operator's License-License to operate, as provided in
Section 107, various classes of utilization or production activities otherwise licensed under Sections 103 and 104.
9. Access Permit-License authorizing access, subject to
personnel security clearances, to confidential or secret Restricted Data, as developed by Commission regulation under
Sections 3b, 141, 145, and 161i.
With respect to the domestic distribution of special nuclear material, 209 the transfer of source material in interstate or foreign com209

Section 53b, 42 U.S.C.A. §2073(b); see 10 Code Fed. Regs. §§70.11-.14.
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merce, 210 the domestic distribution of byproduct material, 211 and the
domestic production or use of component parts of utilization and production facilities, 212 the Commission is authorized to issue either a special or general license. The authority of the Commission in this respect
is considerably expanded under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
compared with the situation under the 1946 statute.
1.

Standards and Conditions

The statutory standards established by the Atomic Energy Act of
1954 for Commission licensing, and also the conditions and terms imposed on licensees under Commission regulations, constitute only a
minor improvement over those of the 1946 legislation and rules issued
thereunder. For example, the completely vague and meaningless standard of "national welfare," so commonly used in the Atomic Energy Act
of 1946, appears infrequently in the 1954 legislation 218 and survives in
the present regulations only ·as a licensing condition for source materials.214 However, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, particularly with
respect to licensing, provides "only the vaguest 'standards' to guide the
hand of the Commission." 215
The indefinite standard of "common defense and security" 218 appears
21o Sections 62 and 63b, 42 U.S.C.A. §§2092 and 2093(b); see 10 Code Fed. Regs.
§§40.11, 40.23, 40.6o, and 40.62.
211 Section 81, 42 U.S.C.A. §2111; see 10 Code Fed. Regs. §§30.71-.72.
212 Section 109(a}, 42 U.S.C.A. §2139(a).
2 1 8 Under Section 1a, 42 U.S.A. §zon (a) ("Declaration"), it is "the policy of the
United States that ... the development, use, and control of atomic energy shall be
directed so as to make the maximum contribution to the general welfare. . . ." Under
Section JC, 42 U.S.C.A. §2013(c), the Commission is directed to carry out, among
others, "a program for Government control of the possession, use; and production of
atomic energy and special nuclear material so directed as to make the maximum contribution to ... the national welfare." See also Section zg, 42 U.S.C.A. §2012(g),
concerning the use of funds "to promote general welfare," and Section 2i, 42 U.S.C.A.
§zo1zi, concerning government indemnity in the interest of the general welfare.
214 10 Code Fed. Regs. §§40.1 and 40.22(c).
215 Stason, Workshops on Legal Problems of Atomic Energy 4 (1956) (hereafter
cited as Atomic Energy Workshops); see "Report of Workshop III" at 58-59. See
also statement of Rep. Holifield concerning Section 53 of the 1954 act with respect to
licenses for special nuclear material, 1957 Congressional Review Hearing, Sttpra note 7
at 16: "Under Section 53 ... of the act, you [the AEC] have wide latitude to make
administrative judgments in the granting of a license. You can, in effect, include in
this granting of the license every kind of a term and condition that you want. . . ."
21a This is nowhere defined in the new act except in Section IIg, 42 U.S.C.A.
§2014(g), which merely states, "The term 'common defense and security' means the
common defense and security of the United States."
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frequently throughout the present statute m and the regulations issued
thereunder. 218 Further, under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, any
license may contain "such terms and conditions as the commission may,
by rule or regulation, prescribe to effectuate the provisions of this
Act." 219 This language confers on the Commission almost unlimited
discretionary authority over licenses in the atomic field. · This broad
authority also is written into the regulations by the provision that a
license shall be issued "in such form and upon such conditions as it
[the Commission] deems appropriate and in accordance with law." 220
Of even more doubtful regulatory justification is the statutory 221 and
regulatory 222 provision under the 1954 act that licenses may be, ipso
facto, modified or amended by subsequent changes in legislation or regulations.228 This is particularly true in view of the fact that a hearing on
21r Section 1a, 42 U.S.C.A. §20n (a) ("Declaration"); Section :za, b, d, e, g, and
i, 42 U.S.C.A. §2012(a), (b), (d), (e), (g), and (i) ("Findings"); Section 3c, d,
and e, 42 U.S.C.A. §2013(c), (d), and (e) ("Purpose"); Sections 53b and 57b(2),
42 U.S.C.A. §§2073(b) and 2077(b) (2) ("Domestic Distribution of Special Nuclear
Material" and "Prohibition"); Sections 63b and 69. 42 U.S.C.A. §§2093(b) and 2099
("Domestic Distribution of Source Material" and "Prohibition"); Section 81, 42
U.S.C.A. §2n1 ("Domestic Distribution of Byproduct Material"); Sections 103b and
d and 104a, c, and d, 42 U.S.C.A. §§2133(b) and (d) and 2134(a), (c), (d) ("Atomic
Energy Licenses"); and Section 182a, 42 U.S.C.A. §2232(a) (general licensing
standards).
21s 10 Code Fed. Regs. §§30.31b(1) and 30.33(c) ("Licensing of Byproduct Material"); §40.22(a) ("Control of Source Material"); §70. 32(b) (1) ("Special Nuclear
Material"); §§50.12 and 5040(c) ("Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities").
2 19 Section 183, 42 U.S.C.A. §2233 ;·see, to the same effect, Section 103<1, 42 U.S.C.A.
§2133(a), with respect to commercial licenses.
22o 10 Code Fed. Regs. §40.21 ; see, to the same effect, §§30.31 (b), 50.50, 55.30, and
70.31 (a).
22 1 Sections 183d and 187, 42 U.S.C.A. §§2233(d) and 2237. "Section 183d would
seem to imply that while licenses are subject to the hazard of a change in the act, they
are not subject to the hazard of a change in regulations without a change in the act";
but "section 187 indicates that license terms are subject to modification by subsequent
regulations". and to revocation for failure to observe such subsequent regulations,
Upton, supra note 207 at 496, 497·
222 10 Code Fed. Regs. §§30.32(a), 40.25, 50.54(h), 5540(a), and 70.61(a).
223 Section 1700 of the 1954 act, 42 U.S.C.A. §2210(a), added by Congress in 1957,
requires that, as a condition of their licenses, certain classes of licensees ''have and
maintain financial protection" in the form of liability insurance or otherwise, as determined by the Commission under Section 17ob, 42 U.S.C.A. §2210(b). It is a further
condition of such licenses that the licensee enter into an indemnity agreement with the
AEC, Section 17oc, 42 U.S.C.A. §2210(c). With respect to these conditions imposed
upon persons licensed by the Commission prior to enactment of the 1957 legislation,
the Joint Committee has stated, H.R. Rep. No. 435, 85th Cong., 1st Sess~ 21 (1957):
"In view of the provisions ~ section 187 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, making
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changes in the licensing regulations usually is held only upon the request
of any licensee affected thereby. 224
2.

Types of Licenses
a. Use and Production of Special Nuclear Material

Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the United States retains
title to all special nuclear materiaF 25 The Atomic Energy Commission
is authorized to distribute such material at a reasonable charge to persons licensed to possess it. The statute also requires that the Commis- .
sian purchase from licensees at a fair price special nuclear material produced by licensees in the course of their operations.
Section 31 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 226 authorizes assistance
by the Commission to private or public institutions or persons for research and development activities relating to nuclear processes, the
theory and production of atomic energy, utilization of special nuclear
material, and the protection of health and the promotion of safety.
Under Section 104, 227 licenses are authorized for medical therapy and
for research and development for industrial or commercial purposes.
Where special nuclear material is licensed by the Commission for activities authorized under Sections 3 1 and 104, the Commission may, but is
not required to, make a reasonable charge for the tJSe of such material,
the charge to be based upon established criteria, "considering, among
other things, whether the licensee is a nonprofit or eleemosynary institution and the purposes for which the special nuclear material will be
used." 228
On the other hand, the Commission is required to make a reasonable
charge for special nuclear material for use by commercial licensees 229
under Section 103 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. 23 ° Further, with
respect to charges for such material to be used by both Section 104 nonall licenses subject to later amendment of the act, there is no need to incorporate language here amending the licenses where this financial protection may be required. . . ."
For a discussion of the insurance and indemnity provisions of the 1954 act, see infra,
text at note 495.
224 Section 189b, 42 U.S.C.A. §2239(b).
2 25 Sections zb and 52, 42 U.S.C.A. §§zo12(b) and 2072.
226 42 U.S.C.A. §2051.
227 42 U.S.C.A. §2134.
22s Section 53b(1)-(2) and c, U.S.C.A. §zo73(b) (1)-(z) and (c).
2 2 9 Section 53b(3) and c, 42 U.S.C.A. §2073(b) (3) and (c).
23o 42 U.S.C.A. §2133.
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commercial licensees and Section 103 commercial licensees, the Commission must take into consideration
(I) the use to be made of the special nuclear material;
( 2) the extent to which the use of the special nuclear material will advance the development of the peaceful uses of
atomic energy; [and]
(3) the energy value of the special nuclear material in the
particular use for which the license is issued. . . .231
Where a Section 103 commercial license is involved, the Commission
must, ''insofar as practicable, make uniform, nondiscriminatory
charges" for special nuclear material used in connection with such a
license. 232 In addition,
. . . with respect to special nuclear material consumed in a
facility licensed pursuant to section 103, the Commission shall
make a further charge based on the cost to the Commission, as
estimated by the Commission, or the average fair price paid
for the production of such special nuclear material as determined by Section 56, whichever is lower. 238
Section 56 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 deals with the "fair
price" to be paid by the Commission for special nuclear material produced in licensed private facilities. 234 Such a price must be applicable to
all producers of the same type of material and must reflect the value of
the material for its intended use by the United States, and the Commission "may give such weight to the actual cost of producing that material as the Commission finds to be equitable." Further, Section 56
provides that
. . . the Commission may establish guaranteed fair prices for
all special nuclear material delivered to the Commission for
such period of time as it may deem necessary but not to exceed
seven years.
By the middle of 1957 the Commission had made available to private
industry for domestic use so,ooo kilograms of contained uranium 235. 235
Section 53d(1)-(3), 42 U.S.C.A. §2073(d) (1)-(3).
Section 53d(4), 42 U.S.C.A. §2073(d) (4).
Section 53d(5), 42 U.S.C.A. §2073(d) (5).
2u 42 U.S.C.A. §2076.
23 5 Twenty thousand kilograms were made available Feb. 22, 1956, and an additional
30,000 kilograms July 3, 1957. At the same time, equal amounts were released for use
by cooperating foreign nations. See AEC, Twenty-third Semi-Annual Report, 19,
23 (1958); AEC Twentieth Semi-Annual Report vii-ix (1956); Atomic Energy Facts
3 (GPO 1957).
.
281

28 2
283
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Subsequently, the Commission by regulation established guaranteed fair
prices for special nuclear material lawfully. produced under license
through June 30, 1963. 236 The agency also has sought to waive the use
charge for special nuclear material in connection with certain projects
under the civilian reactor program. 237 In addition, the Commission, at
a fixed unit charge to the licensee, recovers in Commission-owned facilities source and special nuclear materials from spent reactor fuel or
blanket materials of licensees under Sections I03 and I04 of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954. 238
Opponents of the 1954 legislation have attacked these sale and purchase provisions, as administered by the Commission, as a "built-in subsidy feature" to industry. 289 As a result of this criticism, a new Section
58 was added to the statute by Congress in July 1957, providing:
Before the Commission establishes any fair price or guaranteed fair price period in accordance with the provisions of
Section 56, or establishes any criteria for the waiver of any
charge for the use of special nuclear material licensed or distributed under section 53, the proposed fair price, guaranteed
fair price period or criteria for the waiver of such charge shall
be submitted to the Joint Committee. . . . 240
The Commission-proposed price must lie before the Joint Committee for
a period of forty-five days prior to its effective date. This provision
was aimed directly at curbing the future exercise of Commission discre21 Fed. Reg. 1421 (Mar. 3, 1956), AEC Press Rei. No. 930 (Nov. 18, 1956),
Fed. Reg. 3985 (June 6, I957), and 22 Fed. Reg. rog6s (Dec. 28, 1957).
237 Under the first, second, and third round invitations; see statement of AEC General Manager Fields, I957 Authorizing Legislation Hearings, Sti/Jra note 7 at IS3-I54In its request for authorization of funds for fiscal year 1958, the AEC asked authorization· for a total of $23,II5,000 for waiver of fuel-use charges under the three rounds,
but Congress authorized only $20,000,000 to be used under the third round invitation
(Sen. Rep. No. 791, supra note 23 at 39). Waiver of use charges aggregating $1,325,000
under the first round invitation and $1,790,000 under that of the second round, as requested by the Commission, were disallowed by Congress.
238 Section r6rm(1), 42 U.S.C.A. §2201(m) (I); 22 Fed. Reg. 1591 (Mar. 12, 1957).
239 H.R. Rep. No. 2181, Slipra note 5 at 13o-131; Adams, "Atomic Energy: the
Congressional Abandonment of Competition," 55 Col. L. Rev. ISS, 168-I6g (1955);
Rep. Holifield, 1957 Authorizing Legislation Hearings, supra note 7 at 183; Rep. Cannon, 103 Cong. Rec. 5192 (1957). In his report on a review of AEC contract
No. AT(30-3)-22 with Yankee Atomic Electric Co. executed in Nov. 1956, the Comptroller General charged that the Commission's announced policy of waiving fuel-use
charges up to an agreed-upon amount of money was not fully complied with in the
Yankee contract "since it provides that AEC will waive its use charge, without limitation, for all special nuclear material used during the contract period" ( 1957 Section
202 Hearings, supra note 7 at 758).
24 0 Pub. L. 85-79, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957), 42 U.S.C.A. §2078.
236

22
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tion with respect to prices for special nuclear material used in the
civilian reactor program. 241
As a matter of law, ownership of special nuclear material by the
U~ited States is not nece-ssary to adequate regulation of the atomic
energy industry. 242 As long as the Commission remains the major producer of special nuclear material and as long as the number of private
users of such material ·for energy producing purposes is limited, the
need for private ownership is not particularly pressing. However, as
the number of private reactm'.s increases, the availability of an assured
source of enriched reactor fuel at reasonably foreseeable prices will
become a requisite. to financial and operational stability of the industry.
The more the industry is subject to normal competitive mar}{et conditions, the healthier it will be, and the greater will be the benefit to the
public welfare ,from thriving private atomic energy production base.
The Commission appears conscious of these factors. As it has emphasized to the Joint Committee :

a

The AEC policy . on pricing materials and services which it
makes available, and on establishing fair prices which it will
pay for s~ial nuclear materials produced in licensed facilities is recognized as being of major importance to the growth
and development of the i,ndustry, both here and abroad.
The influence of these prices. on the industry depends not
only upon their actual level, but almost equally upon their stability, for without some assurance that these prices will remain
reasonably stable, industry will be unable to make the longrange plans essential to the procurement of the financing necessary to proceed with its projects. 248
A.t th~ pre~ent.tim~, ind~~try has no guarantee that it can obtain a reasonably assured quantity of special nuclear material at prices which will
: ..... .

241•H.R. Rep. No. 571, Sst!i Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1957): "It is intended tha.t the provisions of section 58 shall' apply ·to changes by the Commission to any presently established fair price, gtiaranteed fair price period, or criteria for the waiver of charge
period, as well as to the establishment of such matters in the future."
·242 Estep, "Federal Control of Health and Safety Standards in Peacetime Private
Atorruc Energy Activities," 52. Mich. L. Rev. 333 (1954); see "Report of Workshop
III,'' Atomic Energy Workshops, supra note 215 at 56-57: " ... [A]uthority for adequate regulation of such industry exists under the several clauses of the Constitution,
including, for example, the commerce power and the war power and established regulatory power's thereunder."
24S 1957 Section 202 Hearings, supra note 7 at 107. See 1958 Section 202 Hearings, supra note 32 at 62, 67, and 127 ("... the Government's price for fissionable
material and associated proc~ssing operations is potentially one of the most significant
factors that determine the course and speed of power reactor development.").
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be set by supply and demand rather than by administrative or congressional fiat, possibly based on political, not economic, considerations. zH
The McKinney Panel has urged that Congress re-examine the policy
of federal ownership of special nuclear material. In the meantime, problems created by such ownership confront the industry.
Federal ownership does create some problems which may tend
·to grow with the growth of a private atomic industry. The
most critical of these is the role of the Federal Government in
the pricing of special nuclear materials, hence its role in the
economics of private licensed operations. . . .
In most prospective near-term commercial atomic power reactors, the "buy back" price could make or break the economies
of the plant. By law, the Commission can only guarantee "buy
back" prices for 7 years, while plants able to produce such material must run for 25 to 40 years to amortize their costs.
Thus, private investors have no way of forecasting when they
may suddenly be thrown into a losing operation as a result of
changes in future Commission-guaranteed prices. It is true
that all licensees receive the same prices, but all licensees will
not have the same types of plants and may have differing
economic break-even points.
During the period when there are relatively few atomic
power-plants in operation, there are advantages to the principle of Federal ownership [i. e., assured buyer of byproduct
materials and stability of prices]. . . .
As the number of atomic power-plants increases, a market for
the byproduct plutonium or uranium 233 for use as reactor
244 10 Code Fed. Regs. §so.6o(a); see Upton, supra note 2fY7 at 493-94: "How binding is this [Commission] allocation? The difficulty is that Section 161m of the act,
which permits the Commission to make long-term agreements to sell source material,
expressly denies similar authority for the distribution of special nuclear material. Thus,
one could argue that the Commission's assurances would be meaningless and that the
licensee would not have any legal remedy if the Commission failed to honor its assurances." See also statement of AEC to Joint Committee, 1957 Section 202 Hearings,
supra note 7 at lfYl: "The Commission's prices [for enriched uranium] ... are not
guaranteed, but ... it is the intention of the Commission to maintain the price
schedule on as stable a basis as is possible. • . ." On the other hand, Section 56, 42
U.S.C.A. §2fY76, authorizes Commission-guaranteed fair prices for special nuclear material produced in private facilities for up to 7 years, which presumably have the binding force of a contract between the government and private parties acting in reliance
upon the guarantee, provided Joint Committee approval of such guarantee has been
given under Section 58, 42 U.S.C.A. §2fY78. Under Section 161m(2), 42 U.S.C.A.
§2201(m) (2), the Commission may sell or lease source or byproduct material to Section 103 or 104 licensees, subject to cancellation by the licensee; this section specifically excludes special nuclear material from the provisions thereof. Special nuclear
material may be recaptured by the AEC during a war or national emergency declared
by Congress (Section roB, 42 U.S.C. §2138).
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fuel will undoubtedly develop, thus a degree of inherent
market stabilization will come into existence. . . . When that
time does arrive, the policy of Federal ownership should be
re-examined. 245
b. Use of Source and Byproduct Materials
The transfer, receipt, delivery, or possession of source materials 246
and byproduct materials 247 are subject to Commission licensing. 248 Such
materials may be sold, leased, or otherwise made available by the Commission to its licensees 249 at reasonable charges and upon written criteria established by the Commission, 250 without, however, the necessity
of obtaining Joint Committee approval as in the case of special nuclear
material. 261
Licenses for the transfer, delivery, or possession of source and byproduct material are issued pursuant to regulations which establish general conditions with respect to the common defense and security, the
preservation of health and safety, the furnishing of reports, and the
keeping of records. 252 Prior to May 1957, the Atomic Energy Commission did not require immediate reporting of incidents involving
possible radiation hazat:ds from the use of byproduct materials. This
swpra note 10 at Vol. 1, p. 131; see also 13 and 134Defined as uranium, thorium, and their refined counterparts after removal from
the place of deposit in nature (Section ux, 42 U.S.C.A. §2014(x), formerly Section
us, 42 U.S.C.A. §2014(s)).
2 41 Defined as "any radioactive material (except special nuclear material) yielded
in or made radioactive by exposure to the radiation incident to the process of producing or utilizing special nuclear material" (Section ne, 42 U.S.C.A. §2014(e) ).
us Section 62 (source material) and Section 81 (byproduct material), 42 U.S.C.A.
§§2092, 21 II.
249 Section 161m(2), 42 U.S.C.A. §2201(m)(2).
250 Section 63c (source material) and Section 81 (byproduct material), 42 U.S.C.A.
§§2093(c), 2111.
25t Section s8. 42 U.S.C.A. §2078.
25 2 10 Code Fed. Regs. §§40.21-.22 and 40.30 (source material) and 30-ZJ-..24,
30.31 (b)--32, and J0-41-43 (byproduct material). As of the end of 1957, the AEC
had issued 1,200 licenses to use radioisotopes for industrial purposes to about I,f:J&!
industrial organizations, AEC, Twenty-third Semi-Annual Report 25 (1958). In addition, 7 commercial firms have received licenses to dispose of low-level radioactive
byproduct and source material wastes (id. at 151). On March 8, 1958, the AEC for
the first time gave notice of its intention to issue a byproduct and source material
license to provide radioactive waste disposal service, 23 Fed. Reg. 1663, BNA, Atomic
Industry Reporter 4: 88. As of March 1958, the AEC had denied 4 applications for
licenses for source materials and 46 applications for licenses for byproduct materials,
while 21 applications of the _latter type were withdrawn, 1958 Section 202 Hearings,
supra note 32 at 91.
2u McKinney Panel Report,

246
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serious omission in the agency's regulations was corrected by amendment to the rules 263 governing licensees of such materials as the result
of an accident reported to the Commission more than a month after its
occurrence. 2 H For both source and byproduct material, the Commission
has exempted certain types of uses from the requirements of a specific
license and provided instead a general license iri such situations. 255
c. Operators
Although its statutory authority with respect to operators' licenses is
practically unfettered, 256 the Commission has exercised restraint in restricting to the minimum . the classes of persons required to obtain
licenses. 257 Licenses for individual operators of utilization and production facilities have been generally controlled by reasonable conditions of
health and proficiency. 258
263 IO Code Fed. Regs. §20.403, 22 Fed. Reg. 3389 (May I4, I957). This regulation requires that (I) each byproduct material licensee "immediately" notify the nearest AEC Operations Office by telephone and telegraph "of any incident involving licensed material possessed by him and which may have caused or threatens to cause"
serious exposure to individuals and the suspension of work in the facility involved· Jor
one week or more; (2) each such licensee notify the AEC within 24 hours of any incident involving minor exposure to individuals and the suspension of work in the facility
involved for less than one week; and (3) each such licensee submit to the AEC a written report of any of the above types of incidents within 30 days thereafter. At the time
these additions to the regulations affecting byproduct material licenses were issued,
the Commission also added a regulation requiring such licensees to report "immediately" any theft or loss of licensed material, IO Code Fed. Regs. §20.402.
25 • This involved Byproduct Material License Nos. 3I-246-I and 3I-246-2 issued to
M. W. Kellogg Company, infra note 454. The incident involving byproduct material
occurred on March I3, I957, but was not reported to the Commission until April I9,
I957, acording to the AEC General Manager (BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter
265: 206).
zu 10 Code Fed. Regs. §§40.23, 40.6o, and 40.62 (source material) and 30.20-.2I and
30.7I-.72 (byproduct material). On June 27, I958, the AEC announced that depleted
uranium (containing less than .007 percent by weight of uranium 235) would be sold
by the Commission on an unclassified basis to domestic buyers for such goods as
ceramics, glass products, coloring agents, and photographic supplies ; such sales and
transfers of the material involved would continue to be subject to the Commission!s
licensing procedures; AEC Press Rei. No. A-I 58.
256 Section I07, 42 U.S.C.A. §2IJ7.
257 For example, licensing is not required of persons who may manipulate controls
but who do so in the presence and under the direction of a licensed operator. As. of
the end of I957, only I48 operators' licenses had been issued, AEC, Twenty-third SemiAnnual Report I95-I99 ( I958) ; see BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 227: 85I-857.
As of March I958, only one application for an operator's license had been denied by the
AEC ; I958 Section 202 Hearings, supra note 32 at 91.
268 ro Code Fed. Regs., Pt. 55, particularly §ss.r I.
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d. Foreign Activity, Imports, and Exports
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 established several categories of
regulated activity concerning the export, import, or use abroad of atomic
materials or of atomic information. These activities are controlled by
the requirement of a license.
Section 62 of the present legislation 259 requires a license for the
import into, or export from, the United States of any source material.
Section 82c contains a similar requirement with respect to byproduct
material. 260 The export or import of special nuclear material by private
individual is, of course, impossible under the 1954 act, since title to such
material is vested in the United States government. 261
Persons under the jurisdiction of the United States are prohibited
from directly or indirectly engaging "in the production of any special
nuclear material outside of the United States" except in two circumstances. 262 In the first circumstance, such activity is authorized where
carried on pursuant to an agreement for cooperation between the United
States and a foreign country, 263 which requires the approval of the
Atomic Energy Commission, the Department of Defense, the President,
and the Joint Committee. 264 In the second circumstance, the activity may
be authorized by the Commission if it determines that "such activity
will not be inimical to the interest of the United States." As an implementation of this authority, licenses are required by the Commission
for. private concerns and persons to engage in certain unclassified activities in foreign atomic energy programs, outside of the scope of agreements for cooperation. 265
42 U.S.C.A. §2092.
42 U.S.C.A. §2n2(c); see 10 Code Fed. Regs. §30.33.
2 61 Section 52, 42 U.S.C.A. §2072.
282 Section 57a(3), 42 U.S.C.A. §2077(a) (3).
263 Section 123, 42 U.S.C.A. §2153; see also Section 144 42 U.S.C.A. §2164.
26 4 Thirty-nine such agreements with 37 countries were in effect at the end of 1957.
AEC, Twenty-third Semi-Annual Report 195-199 (1958); ·see BNA, Atomic Industry
Reporter 287 : 203. Once such an agreement is reached, the Commission issues an
authorization letter to the private concern or individual to act under the agreement ;
see AEC authorization letter to Westinghouse Electric Corporation dated April 2,
1956, under an agreement with Belgium; BN A, Atomic Industry Reporter 287 : 401.
265 10 Code Fed. Regs., Pt. no. Section 110.7(a) of the regulations states the determination by the Commission that "any activity which . . . (I) Constitutes directly
or indirectly engaging in the production of special nuclear material in any foreign
country [other than countries or areas within the Soviet or Communist Chinese bloc]
. . . ; and (2) Does not involve the communication of Restricted Data or other classified defense information; and (3) Is not in violation of other provisions of law ...
will not be inimical to the interests of the United States and is authorized by the
2so

26o
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The principal difficulty which arises in the international field derives
from the fact that the Atomic Energy Commission is not the only
federal regulatory body concerned with exports and imports. The Commission is a member of the Advisory Committee on· Export Policy
created by the Secretary of Commerce in 1950 268 to administer the
Export Control Act of 1949. 267 This Committee advises the Secretary
of Commerce with respect to "export measures required from the standpoint of national security, foreign policy, and short supply," which
measures are administered under Department of Commerce regulations.
Under this system, import certificates are required from the Department for source materials or for facilities for the production or utilization of special nuclear material. 268 Export licenses issued by the Department of Commerce also are required for components of facilities for
the production or utilization of special nuclear material, 269 isotopes for
which procurement authorization previously has been obtained from the
Atomic Energy Commission, 270 unclassified technical data/ 11 and certain
types of unpublished technical data. 272 Validated licenses are required
for the export of certain metals such as beryllium and boron 278 to all
foreign countries except Canada. 274 Special licensing restrictions apply
to the exportation of certain materials to the Soviet and Chinese Communist bloc. 216
Although diffuse exercise of federal regulatory power by different
agencies of the government is ordinarily objectionable, over-all control
of exports and imports by the Department of Commerce appears justified in view of the aspects of foreign policy involved. The burden imposed on the private or business interest by having to deal with two
Atomic Energy Commission." Prior to the promulgation of Part 110 in 21 Fed. Reg.
418 (Jan. 20, I9S6); the Commission issued a notice of Commission policy identical
with Section no.7(a) of the regulations, 20 Fed. Reg. 7399 (Oct. S, I9SS).
266 Dep't of Commerce Order No. I2S (Oct. s, I9SO), as amended, 20 Fed. Reg.
s269 (July 2I, I9Ss).
287 so U.S.C.A. App. §§202I et seq.
268 IS Code Fed. Regs. §§368.I(a)(3), (b)(I), and (e).
269 IS Code Fed. Regs. §J70.4(d).
21o IS Code Fed. Regs. §373-SS(b).
211 Granted by general license, IS Code Fed. Regs. §38S.I-.2.
272 Granted by special license, IS Code Fed. Regs. §38S·3·
21a So-called "RO" commodities appearing on the Department of Commerce's "Positive List of Commodities," IS Code Fed. Regs. § 399.1, app. A.
2Hrs Code Fed. Regs. §§37I.3(a)(I) and 399-I(f).
27G So-called "R" commodities, such as naphthenates of metals, for which no license
is required for export to countries outside this bloc, IS Code Fed. Regs. §§371.3(a) (2)
and 399-I(f).
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different agencies-that department and the Atomic Energy Commission-is, to a certain extent, outweighed by the need for centralized
control of strategic exports and imports.
e. Access Permits
To make "available to private enterprise classified scientific and technical information relating to the civilian uses of atomic energy" under
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,276 the Atomic Energy Commission in
1955 instituted its information access permit program. No such program existed under the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, although that
statute stated the policy, never implemented, that
. . : the dissemination of scientific and technical information
relating to atomic energy should be permitted and encouraged
so as to provide that free interchange of ideas and criticism
which is essential to scientific progress. 277
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 sought to raise, consistent with national security, the paper curtain imposed by the earlier statute. Congress
therefore laid down the policy for the Commission that
The dissemination of scientific and technical information relating to atomic energy should be permitted and encouraged so
as to provide that free interchange of ideas and criticism
which is essential to scientific and industrial progress and
public understanding and to enlarge the fund of technical
information. 278
The dissemination of information under atomic energy legislation is
complicated by the existence of a special category of information created
under the 1946 statute, Restricted Data. 279 Such information is defined
in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as
. . . all data concerning ( 1) design, manufacture, or utilization of atomic weapons; ( 2) the production of special nuclear
276 AEC Statement to Joint Committee, 1957 Section 202 Hearings, supra note 7
at 92; see AEC, Twenty-third Semi-Annual Report 165-66 (1958).
277 Section 10a(2), 42 U.S.C.A. §I2IO(a) (2) (I946); see, to the same effect, Section I (b)(2), 42 U.S.C.A. §IBm (b)(2)(I946).
2 78 Section I4I b, 42 U.S.C.A. §2I6I (b); see, to the same effect, Section 3b, 42
U.S.C.A. §20I3(b), authorizing the Commission to engage in "a program for the dissemination of unclassified scientific and technical information and for the control, dissemination, and declassification of Restricted Data, subject to appropriate safeguards,
so as to encourage scientific and industrial progress." Section I42, 42 U.S.C.A. §2I62,
provides for classification and declassification procedures. Under Section 146b, 42
U.S.C.A. §2I66(b), "[t]he Commission shall have no power to control or restrict the
dissemination of information other than as granted by this or any other law."
279 Section 10(b) (I), 42 U.S.C.A. §1810(b) (1) (1946). This definition does not
substantially differ from that under the 1954 legislation.
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material; or ( 3) the use of special nuclear material in the production of energy. . . . 280

Persons employed by private concerns in connection with Commission
contracts or commercial or non-commercial licenses under Sections 103
and 104 of the 1954 act must receive permission from the Commission,
after investigati~n, to have access to Restri~ted Data. 281 Since adminis~
tration of an atomic energy license or operation of an atomic energy
reactor pursuant to license will in all cases require the use of such data,
the access permit is an absolute necessity for the private concern
involved. 282
Access permits are issued by the Commission for periods of two years
for three separate categories of Restricted Data. These are ( 1) an "L"
clearance for Confidential Restricted Data, ( 2) a "Q" clearance for
Secret or Top Secret Restricted Data in areas outside the controlled
thermonuclear field, and (3) a special "Q" clearance for access to information involving the controlled fusion process. For an "L" clearance,
the applicant must demonstrate to the Commission that he has "potential use" for the information desired. 288 For a "Q" clearance involving
access to Secret or Top Secret Restricted Data not related to the controlled thermonuclear field, the applicant must demonstrate to the agency
a specific need for the information desired. 284 A "Q" clearance for access
Section IIw, 42 U.S.C.A. §2014(w) (formerly Section ur).
Under Section 161i(1) of the 1954 Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §2201(i)(1), the Commission· is authorized to issue regulations necessary "to protect Restricted Data received by any person in conneetion with any activity authorized pursuant to this Act."
Section 145a, 42 U.S.C.A. §2165(a), further provides that "[n]o arrangement shall be
made under section 31, no contract shall be made or continued in effect under section
41, and no license shall be issued under section 103 or 104, unless the person with whom
such arrangement is made, the contractor or prospective contractor, or the prospective
licensee agrees in writing not to permit any individual to have access to Restricted Data
until the Civil Service Commission shall have made an investigation and report to the
Commission on the character, associations, and loyalty of such individual, and the
Commission shall have determined that permitting such person to have access to Restricted Data will .not endanger the common defense and security." Similar clearance
is required for Commission employees, Section 145b, 42 U.S.C.A. §z165(b). Investigation procedures are covered by Sections 142e-e, 143, and 145c, 42 U.S.C.A.
§§216z(c)-(e), 2163, and 2165(c), and criminal penalties concerning misuse of Restricted Data are prescribed in Sections 221 and 224-227, 42 U.S.C.A. §§2271 and
2274-2277. Effective July 1, 1958, issuance of access permits became the authority of
the AEC's field offices; AEC Press Rei. No. A-152 (June 23, 1958).
282 See Green, "The Atomic Energy Information Access Permit Program," 25 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 548, 553 (1957).
283 10 Code Fed. Regs. §§25.11(b)(7), 25.15(a), and 95.3(d).
284 10 Code Fed. Regs. §§25.11(b)(7), 25.15(b)(x), and 95.3(g).
28 0
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ADMINISTRATIVE LIMITATIONS

1261

to Secret or Top Secret Restricted Data related to controlled thermonuclear processes will not be granted unless the applicant is, among other
things, "directly engaged in a substantial effort to develop, design, build
or operate a fission power reactor that is planned for construction and
is making or proposes to make a comparative evaluation of fission and
controlled thermonuclear processes for production of power." 285
Although an. access permit is probably a license within the meaning
of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act, 286 the Atomic Energy
Commission has refused to recognize that such a permit is protected by
the licensing provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. However,
the Commission has followed a liberal, rather than a restrictive, policy
in issuing such permits, 287 and the denial of permits has not been up to
the present time, in any event, a serious factor adversely affecting the
atomic energy program. 288
The only major criticism of the access permit program has been made
in connection with the application by Power Reactor Development Company for a construction permit. 289 In that proceeding counsel for certain intervenors moved the Commission to grant access, "without imposition of any security requirements," to information relevant to the
proceeding. The motion alleged that the information required by
counsel had been "published" within the .meaning of Section 142a of
the 1954 Act by its being "made available or offered by the Commission
to many hundreds of persons· under the Commission's access permit
program, and to many thousands of the employees of such persons."
The motion concluded that (1), "[t]o the extent that the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954 requires Intervenor's attorneys to submit to the
security regulations of the Commission as a condition of access to any
information essential and pertinent to the preparation and trial of this
proceeding, the Act abr~dges freedom of speech and violates due process
of law contrary to the First and Fifth Amendments of the Constitution.
. . ." ; and ( 2) due process of law and the Fifth Amendment would be
28 5 10 Code Fed. Regs. §25.15(b} (2), as amended, 22 Fed. Reg. 6568 (Aug. 15,
1957).
2 8 6 Section 2(e), s U.S.C.A. §IOOI(e), made applicable to AEC functions by Section 181 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C.A. §2231.
287 At the end of 1957, 1.404 access permits were in force, involving 22,352 persons
cleared for access to classified documents in 26 major categories of American industry;
57 percent of the permits allowed access to secret and confidential Restricted Data,
and the remainder to confidential Restricted Data alone. AEC, Twenty-third SemiAnnual Report 138, 166 ( 1958).
288 Green, supra note 282 at sss-ss6.
2so AEC Dkt. No. F-16.
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violated as to the intervenors "for the Commission to condition Intervenors' ability effectively to pursue their rights and privileges under law
upon their attorneys' submission to the Commission's security requirements." The motion of intervenors was opposed by Commission counsel,
and the Commission denied the motion March 5, 1957. 290 The ir{tervenors claimed that Commission refusal to grant the motion constituted
·
"denial of a fair hearing." 291
f. Commercial and Non-Commercial Facilities
The most important category of atomic energy licenses are those P-rescribed in Chapter 10 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. This category covers licenses for the construction and operation of facilities
utilizing or producing special nuclear material either for medical therapy
and research and development {a Section 104 292 "non-commercial"
license) or for private industrial uses (a Section 103 298 "commercial"
license) .. Even though Section 103 or Section 104 licenses are used
for different purposes, both types of licenses were intended to be subject
. . . to the same general conditions . . ., namely, ownership
and control in United States citizens, and operation to be consonant with the common defense and security and with the
health and safety of the public.m
( 1)

Construction Permits

An integral part of the licensing system is the sa:-called construction
pel'tnit provided for under Section 185 285 of the 1954 statute. A construction permit is a form of intermediate licensing issued prior to the
21io BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 3: 12, 3: 85, and 246: 739-743· Considerations
of public policy probably favor the Commission's making access to Restricted Data as
easy as possible for intervenors' counsel within the requirements established by Congress. However, the extreme position on the motion would, if sustained, have weakened the entire Information security program ; see id. at 2 : 379.
291 Post-Hearing Brief of Intervenors with Proposed Findings and Conclusions
28-35. The intervenors conceded that -40 out of the 73 documents requested in the
motion were declassified by the Commission without any deletions. The applicant in
the proceeding argued to the Commission that the question raised by the intervenors
was "utterly without merit" and claimed that "[n]o classified evidence has been offered
by any party to this proceeding, and there has been no indication that any information still classified is directly relevant to any issue in the proceeding'' (Reply Memorandum for Applicant 2-3 (Nov. 19, 1957) ).
292 42 U.S.C.A. §2134
293 42 U.S.C.A. §2133.
294 H.R. Rep. No. 2181, supra note 5 at 20.
295 42 U.S.C.A. §2235·
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granting of a Section 103 or 104 license. 296 This two-step procedure for
licensing an atomic energy facility was based on that contained in the
Federal Communications Act of 1952. 297 The standards and conditions
attached to a construction permit are generally the same as those for
the license eventually desired by the permit applicant. 298
As of June 30, 1958, the Commission had issued construction permits
for five facilities 299 to conduct research and development activities for
industrial or commercial purposes under Section 104b of the 1954 act. 300
By that time the agency also had issued construction permits for thirtytwo facilities 801 to conduct research and development activities for nu296 10 Code Fed. Regs. §50.23.
297 47 U.S.C.A. §§153(dd) and 3o8; see Hollis, "Atpmic Energy and Lawyers,''
24 D.C. Bar Assn. J. 76, 79 (1957). An. excellent. description of the negotiations and
procedures whereby application is made to the Commission for a construction permit
and its conversion to a license is to be found in the Joint Committee Staff Study,
supra note 3 at 11-15 and App. 4 at Ioo-Io8; see also remarks of F. K. Pittman,
Deputy Chief, AEC Division of Civilian Application, Dec. 12, 1955, BN A Atomic
Industry Reporter 51: 105. In its Brief filed in the PRDC proceeding, AEC Dkt.
No. F-16, the so-called "separated staff" of the Commission claimed that the "legislative history [of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954] indicates that the concept of a construction permit was patterned in some measure on that contained in the Federal Communications Act'' (p. 16).
·
29810 Code Fed. Regs. §§50.45 and ·50.55(c).
299 Consolidated Edison Co., CPPR-1 (May 4. 1956); Commonwealth Edison Co.,
CPPR-2 (May 4, 1956); General Electric Co., CPPR-3 (May 14, 1956); Power
Reactor Development Co. (PRDC), CPPR-4 (Aug. 4, 1956); and Yankee· Atomic
Electric Company, CPPR-5 (Nov. 4, 1957). The PRDC permit has been the subject
of a formal AEC hearing.
·aoo Providing for facilities "involved in the conduct of research and development
activities leading to the demonstration of the practical value of such facilities for industrial or commerdal.purposes."
ao1 Research reactor construction permits: University of Michigan, CPRR-1 (Feb.
17, 1955); Armour Research Foundation, CPRR-2 (Mar. 28, 1955); U.S. Naval Research Laboratory, CPRR-3 (April 29. 1955) ; Battelle Memorial Institute, CPRR-4
(Aug. 5, 1955); Massachusetts Institute of Technology, CPRR-5 (May 7, 1956);
Aerojet-General Nucleonics, CPRR-6 (Aug. 16, 1956) ; AMF Atomics, Inc., CPRR-7
(Jan. 22, 1957); Westinghouse Electric Corp., CPRR-8 (July 3, 1957); AerojetGeneral Nucleonics, CPRR-g (Feb. 22, 1957); North Carolina State College, CPRR-10
(Mar. 7, 1957); Curtiss Wright Corp., CPRR-11 (June 20, 1957); Aerojet-General
Nucleonics, CPRR-12 (July 8, 1957); Aerojet-General Corp. and Aerojet-General
Nucleonics, CPRR-13 (July 8, 1957); North American Aviation Inc., CPRR-14 (Aug.
2; 1957); University of Virginia, CPRR-15 (Sept. 13, 1957) ; Ordnance Materials
Research Office, CPRR-16 (Oct. 2, 1957); Daystrom, Inc., CPRR-17 (Oct. n, 1957);
Utlion Carbide Corp., CPRR-i8 (Oct. 31, 1957); General Electric Co., CPRR 19 (Oct.
26, 1957); and American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp., CPRR-20 (Oct. 31,
1957).
Critical experiment constr~tion permits: Babcock and Wilcox, CPCX-1 (Dec. 9,
1955) and CPCX-9 (Oct. 2, 1957); Battelle Memorial Institute, CPCX-2 (Dec. 28,
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clear processes and for the theory and production of atomic energy
under Sections 31 802 and 104c 808 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. 804
Two problems are presented in connection with construction permits.
The first, which has not yet arisen but which nevertheless deserves consideration, concerns the conversion of a permit into a license upon construction of a facility, in the absence of "good cause." 805 The phrase
"good cause" as used in this context is not defined by the act or regulations 806 and creates considerable uncertainty as to the right of a permittee to receive a license. 307
The second problem presented with respect to a construction permit
arises under the regulation which authorizes the Commission to issue a
provisional permit in cases where
. . . an applicant is not in a position to supply initially all of
the technical information otherwise required to complete the
application. . . . If the Commission is satisfied that it has
information sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that a
facility of the general type proposed can be constructed and
operated at the proposed location without undue risk to the
19SS); Nuclear Development Corp. of America, CPGX-3 (June II, 19s6); General
Electric Co., CPCX-4 (July s. 19S6); Lockheed Aircraft Corp., CPCX-s (Mar. IS,
19S7); Martin Co., CPCX-6 (May IJ, I9S7); General Dynamics Corp., CPCX-7
(June 18, 19S7); General Electric Co., CPCX-8 (Sept. 20, 19S7); Westinghouse
Electric Corp., CPCX-10 (Oct. 17, 19S7) and CPCX-I2 (June 16, I9S8) ; and National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, CPCX-II (Jan. 22, I9S8).
80 2 42 U.S.C.A. §20SI, providing for AEC research assistance.
80 3 Providing for facilities "useful in the conduct of research and development activities of the types specified in Section 31 and which are not facilities of the type specified in subsection IQ4b.''
804 One application for a license for a research reactor was denied by the Commission prior to I9S8. On Dec. JI, I9S7, the Commission by notice advised that the application of The Prosperity Company, Syracuse, N.Y. had been denied "with the consent of the applicant and without prejudice to submittal of a new application." 22 Fed.
Reg. uo88 (Dec. JI, 19S7); see BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 4: I6.
805 Section ISS, 42 U.S.C.A. §223s; see 10 Code Fed. Regs. §so.s6.
8 06 "Good cause" for the purpose of extending the completion date of a permit is
defined in the regulations as including "developmental problems attributable to the
experimental nature of the facility or fire, flood, explosion, strike, sabotage, domestic
violence, enemy action, an act of the elements, and other acts beyond the control of
the permit holder." (Io Code Fed. Regs. §so.ss(b)).
80 7 See Upton, supra note 207 at 492: " ... [A] permit does not mean very much
under present circumstances. The unsolved technological problems are such that any
permit must be stated in terms so general to be of questionable value as assuring the
issuance of a subsequent facility license." It is the opinion of the Chairman of the AEC's
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards that "it is impossible to give a construction permit which can be guaranteed to be converted into an operating license in my
view" ( I9S8 Section 202 Hearings, supra note 32 at I20).
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health and safety of the public and that the omitted information will be supplied, it may process the application and issue a
construction permit on a provisional basis without the omitted
information subject to its later production and an evaluation
by the Commission that the final design [of the facility] provides reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the
public will not be endangered. 808
The regulations also provide for certain "common standards" for both
construction permits and licenses 309 and for the granting of a construction permit to an applicant for a license "if the application [for a construction permit] is in conformity with and acceptable under the criteria :· •. and standards" applicable to a license. 310
The issuance of a provisional construction permit to Power Reactor
Development Co: (PRDC) 311 to build a fast-neutron breeder reactor at
Monroe, Michigan, for the production of electrical energy developed the
opposing points in view c~ricernirig the Commission's authority to issue
such a· permit under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. 312 The view
IO Code. Fed. Regs. §50.35.
u> Code I:ed. Regs. §5040.
81o IO Code Fed. Regs. §50.45.
811 CPPR-4 (Aug: 4, i956), 2I Fed. R~g. 5974 (Aug. 9, I956). The conversion of
the construction permit into a license is subject to two general conditions, namely:
(I) "Unless, within twelve months from the date of this construction permit, PRDC
submits sufficient information relating to its financial resources to enable the Commission to make a finding that the Company has adequate financial resources to meet the
requirements of the law and the regulations, this permit shall expire; provided that
the Commission may for good cause shown extend the time for the submission of such
data:"; and (2) "The conve~sion of this permit to a license is subject to submittal by
PRDC to the Commission (by amendment of the application) of the complete, final
Hazards' Summary Report (portions of which may be submitted and evaluated from
time to time). The final Hazards· Summary Report must show that the final design
provides reasonable assurance to the satisfaction of the Commission that the health
and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation of the reactor in accordance with the specified prOcedures." (Ed. Note: On December IO, I958, the Commission issued its Opinio~ and Initial Decision in the PRDC case and continued the
proVisional construction permit in effect, subject to further conditions to establish complete safety and financial qualifications.)
812 See Petition for Intervention and Request for Formal Hearing, AEC Dkt. No.
F-I6, filed Aug. 3I, I956, by three unions and their officials; BNA, Atomic Industry
Reporter 2: 283 and 2: 294. The princiPal contentions were that (I) the Commission
failed to make the requisite findings of "Reasonable Assurance" of safety required
by Section I85 of the act and §50.35 of the regulations, particularly in View of a generally adverse report dated June 6, I956, by the Commission's Advisory Committee on
Reactor Safeguards (Petition, pp. 4-n); and (2) the Commission could not issue a
permit conditional upon the satisfaction of "financial qualifications" at a later date (id.
at II-I3). See a'tso statemt;nt of Rep. Cannon, I03 Cong. Rec. 5I¢-5I98 (I957);
statements of W. P. Reuther, President, United Automobile Workers, AFL-CIO,
308

809
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taken by the intervenors in that proceeding against the validity of the
provisional construction permit issued to PRDC was that no section of
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, including Section 185,
. . . provides for the issuance of conditional or provisional
construction permits. There is nothing in this section [ 185],
nor in any other section of the Act, which indicates that there
may be inconsistent criteria for the issuance of construction
permits.
It is true that Section 185 does enumerate, as one of the
conditions for the issuance of an operating license, that the applicant file "any additional information needed to bring the
original application up to date.". . . It was not contemplated
that the kind of construction permit to be issued would depend
on the amount of information filed with the application. In
other words, Congress did not contemplate that the filing of
additional information was one of the requirements that make
the application acceptable to the Commission. . . . [A]cceptability must be determined at the beginning, when the construction permit is granted. . . .
It seems quite clear that Sections 50.45 and 50.40 [ 10 Code
Fed. Regs.] were based on this interpretation of the Act ....
This means that there must be a present determination that the
information supplied to the Commission gives reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be
endangered by the construction and operation of the reactor. 818
The view supporting the validity of a provisional construction permit stresses the necessity for such a device under a broad interpretation
B. C. Sigal, counsel, UAW, and Leo Goodman, staff member, UAW, 1957 Authorizing Legislation Hearings, supra note 7 at 597-633; statement of A. J. Biemiller, Legislative Director, AFL-00, 1957 Section 202 Hearings, supra note 7 at 440; statements of Sen. Anderson and Rep. Holifield, Joint Committee Staff Study, st~Pra note 3,
App. 7.B and C, at 125-127. The standing of intervenors to intervene in the proceedings was questioned by PRDC, which stated, however, that it was willing to have the
issues involved in the granting of the construction permit heard in a proper hearing
( BN A, Atomic Industry Reporter 2: 307 (Sept. 26, 1956)). "Notice of Hearing,
Order and Memorandum" were .issued by the Commission Oct. 8, 1956, 21 Fed. Reg.
78o9 (Oct. 12, 1956) and Joint Committee Staff Study, supra note 3, App. 7.D. at
128-132. After prehearing conferences held Oct. 29 and Nov. 29, 1956, the hearing
commenced Jan. 8, 1957, with the introduction of testimony in narrative form by the
applicant, PRDC. Witnesses were examined May I3, June 10, Aug. I, and Aug. 7,
I957· Briefs were submitted by Nov. 29, I957, and the record was certified to the
Commission without decision by the hearing examiner appointed in the case. Procedural
and other issues presented in these proceedings are discussed where appropriate elsewhere in this chapter.
81 8 Reply Brief of Intervenors 9 (Nov. 19, I957). See, to the same effect and
arguing that the legislative history of Section ISS supported this position, Post-Hearing Brief of Intervenors, supra note 29I at 16-17.
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of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the Commission's regulations.
In the light of Section 185,
. . . the Commission was thus faced with the very practical
problem of determining what showing is to be required at the
construction permit stage, especially by applicants for licenses
for developmental projects. The construction of a large power
reactor and associated generating facilities necessarily takes
approximately four or five years. Yet the entire history to
date of the peaceful application of nuclear energy comprises a
span of only a little over a decade, and at least for the next
few years relatively brief periods undoubtedly will continue to
witness vast accretions of knowledge in this field. The Commission was therefore aware that if the basic policies of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 were to be effectuated, and if the
United States is not to fall far behind in this rapidly moving
field, the construction of developmental projects . . . must
not only be permitted but must be encouraged to be started
without waiting for all of the technological problems associated with them to be definitively solved.
Thus it was clear that if the Commission required applicants for licenses to submit at the outset all of the technical
information required ·to be included in the final Hazards Summary Report, it would effectively defeat the purposes of the
Act by seriously delaying if not utterly eliminating most developmental projects, and particularly those which will lead to
substantial technological advances. 814
Regardless of the issues involved in the PRDC proceeding, the provisional construction permit represents one of the means whereby private
industry can carry out its role in the atomic energy field in the present
fluid state of the technology involved. An alternative to legislation and
regulations which permit industry to construct reactors on the basis of
sH Brief for Applicant 34-35 (Oct. 29, 1957). In its Brief filed with the Hearing
Examiner in the PRDC proceeding, the so-called "separated staff" of the AEC, represonted by the Acting General Counsel of the Commission and two other AEC attorneys, argued (p. 21): "Thus, the legislative history of Section 185 reflects both the
desire of industry for maximum assurance that conversion of a construction permit to
a license will be semi-automatic, and the concern by at least some members of Congress that once a construction permit is granted and substantial funds are expended,
the pressures for conversion of the permit into a license may become overwhelming.
Both considerations serve to emphasize the importance of the determinations made
at the construction permit stage." PRDC took the position that "there is no legal,
moral or other commitment of any sort to convert this [construction] permit into an
operating license unless and until the full showing required by the law and the regulations to be made at that time has been completed to the satisfaction of the Commission. . . . The only risk involved in going forward with this project ... is a financial
om; and a financial one to PRDC alone. . . ." (Brief for Applicant 87).
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continually expanding knowledge of science and engineering is, of
course, a government monopoly of all such developmental work.
( 2)

Non-Commercial Licenses

Non-commercial licenses issuable under Section 104 of the 1954 act
are used for medical therapy, 815 research and development for industrial or commercial purposes, 316 and research ·and development of a
theoretical and purely scientifi~ nature. 817 Through the end of June 1958,
forty-two licenses had been issued, and one proposed, for reactors in
the last-named category. 318
Standards and conditions applicable to non-comm'ercial licenses relate
primarily to considerations of health and safetyand the value of the
research involved. 819 The principal adrtiinistrative problem with respect
to non~commercial licenses arises not so. much Ul).<f.e.r these r~gulations
815 Section 104a and d, 42 U.S.C.A. §2134(a) and (d); see 10 Code FCQ.. Regs.
§§50.21 (a) and 5041 (a) and (b) . .
816 Section 104b, 42 U.S.C.A. §2134(b); see 10 Code !'"~d. Regs. §§.So.zi(b) and
50.41 (c).
317 Section 104c, 42 U.S.C.A. §2134(c); see 10 Code Fed. Regs. §50.21 (c).
818 North Carolina State College of Agriculture, R-1 (Oct. i, 1955) ·; Pennsylvania
State University, R-2 (July 8, 1955); Armour Research Foundation, R-3 (June 12,
1956) ; Battelle Memorial Institute, R-4 (Aug. 10, 1956) ; Naval Research Laboratory, R-s (Sept. 14, 1956); Aeroiet-Ge11eral Nucleonics, R-6 (Oct. 19; 1956), R-7
(Feb. 23, 1957), R-9 (Mar. 14. 1957), R-10 CMar. 29. 1957), R-13 (July II,<1957),
R-14 (July 11, 1957), R-17 (Aug. I, 1957), R-20 (Aug. 23, 1957), R-21 (Aug. 23,
1957), R-29 (Sept. 20, 1957), R-32 (Oct. 28, 1957), R-34 (Jan, 22, 1958), R-35 (Feb.
12,1958), R-39 (May 16, 1958), and R-42 (June 3, 1958); Aerojet-General Corp., R~8
(Mar. 12, 1957), R-12 (June 19, 1957), R-15 (July 16, 1957), R-·16 (July 16, 1957),
R-18 (Aug. 6, 1957); U.S. Naval Post-graduate School, R-11 (April29, 1957); North
American Aviation, Inc., R-19 (Aug. 2, 1957), R-40 (May 17, 1958); Oklahoma ·State
University of Agriculture, R-22 (Aug. 26, 1957); Texas Agricultural and Mech;mical College System, R-23 (Aug. 26, 1957); University of Akron, R-24 (Sept. 5,
1957); University of Utah, R-25 (Sept. 12, 1957); Colorado State University, R-26
(Sept. 12, 1957); U.S. Naval Hospital, Bethesda, Md., R-27 (Sept. 13, 1957); University of Michigan, R-28 (Sept. 13, 1957) ; University of California, R-30 (Nov. 19;
1957) ; Catholic University, R-31 (Nov. 15, 1957) ; General Electric Co., R-33 (Oct.
21, 1957); Curtiss Wright Corp., R-36 (April 29, 1958); Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, R-37 (June 9, 1958); General Dynamics Corp., R-38 (May 3, 1958);
American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp., R-41 (May 21, 1958); and University of Delaware, proposed. As of June 30, 1958, the AEC also had issued 11 critical experiment licenses, as follows: Babcock & Wilcox Co., CX-1 (Mar 20, 1957)
and CX-10 (Jan. 22, 1958) : General Electric Co., CX-2 (July 29, 1957). CX-4 (Aug.
30, 1957), and CX-5 (Oct. 16, 1957); General Dynamics Corp., CX-3 (June 26, 1958);
Westinghouse Electric Co., CX-6 (Nov. 25, 1957) and CX-11 (June 17, 1958): Mar·
tin Co .. CX-7 !June 1.1. •QS8); Nuclear Development Corp.. CX-8 <Jan. 2'.1, 19581.
and Batte1lt> Memorial Lnstitute, CX-Q (Jan. 16, 1958)
aoo F..g ''' ( ·odt> Ft>d Regs §§50.34 and 50.41.
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as under another statutory requirement which must be met before a
reactor, developed under Section 104b and shown to have the necessary
safety and operational features, 320 can be licensed for commercial use
under Section 103.
Under Section 102 321 of the act, whenever the Commission has made
"a finding in writing that any type of utilization or production facility
has been sufficiently developed to be of practical value" under Section
104, a Section 103 license therefor may be issued upon appropriate application.322 "Practical value" appears to embrace both technical and economic considerations, and up to the end of 1958 the Commission never
had issued such a finding. This probably is due in part to the economic
uncertainties in private atomic enterprise at this beginning stage of
development and also to the failure of the statute and regulations to
permit a private citizen to request, and provide the evidentiary basis for,
a determination of "practical value" and to set forth the standards for
such a finding. 323 Indeed, until these deficiencies in Section 102 are
corrected, the section can be used as "a barrier of Commission discretionary authority" to the issuance of Section 103 licenses.m
Further, a problem arises in connection with the transition from a
"developmental" to a practically useful stage of reactor development.
The private operator has no statutory assurance that his Section 104b
license will be permitted to remain in effect for its prescribed term after
the Section 103 license is issued, thus protecting the investment and
research of the licensee. 325 It is true that the Commission has adopted a
. 32.o A Section 1041> license is essentially a "demonstration" license; Upton, supra
note 2CY7 at 490·
. 32142 U.S.C.A. §2132.
. 322 H.R. Rep. No. 2181, supra note 5 at 19: "This finding [under Section 102] sepa~ates the issuance of research and development licenses for any facility under Section
104b, and the issuance of conunercial licenses under Section 103. . . ."
823. The McKinney Panel has reconunended that the statute be amended to permit
private citizens to initiate a proceeding for a finding of "practical value" and to limit
the definition thereof to "technical considerations" (Report, supra note 10 at 13).
The Panel further stated (id. at 132-133) : "The Conunission's interpretation of section 102 ••• particularly strains our concepts of private enterprise. As yet undefined
tests of economic feasibility are to be applied by the Commission in arriving at such
findings. While the Federal Government does frequently require applicants for other
licensed activities to prove economic feasibility of proposed activities, this is the first
time, so flj.I" as can be determined, that the Federal Government has set itself up to
decide on its own initiative when private licensees can profitably embark on regulated
activities, denying private investors the right to proceed before that time. . . ."
824 Jd. at IJ2.
s25 See Upton, supra note 2rY; at 490.
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rule that seemingly covers the situation, 826 but a rule can always be
changed.
( 3)

Commercial Licenses

Although the Commission has sought to develop 827 some semblance of
regulatory order out of the hodgepodge of provisions contained in Section 103 and related sections, particularly Section 105,828 the result does
not inspire confidence that the regulatory authority can maintain a
proper balance between the public and private interests involved. 829
Under Section 7 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946,880 the licensing
of atomic power for commercial use was made practically impossible
by statutory strictures. Under the procedure therein provided, the Commission was required to report to the President and through him to
Congress that industrial, commercial, or non-military use of atomic
energy had been developed to a point where such use was practicable.
No license for such use could be issued by the Commission until the
report had been submitted to Congress while in session and ninety days
had elapsed after such submission. 881
Due to the strictures of Section 7 and the prevailing governmental
sentiment prior to 1954 towards the development of atomic energy for
peaceful uses, Section 7 was never utilized. Moreover, much of the
restrictive philosophy of the section has crept into Section 103 of the
present act. Indeed, it is the conflict between these restrictions and the
826 Effective November 30, 1956, 21 Fed. Reg. 9354, a new §50.24 was added to the
licensing regulations, which provided that "[t]he making of a finding of practical
value pursuant to section 102 of the act will not be regarded by the Commission as
grounds for requiring: (a) The conversion to a Oass 103 license of any Class 104
license prior to the date of expiration contained in the license; or (b) The conversi(;m to a Class 103 license of any construction permit, issued under section 104 of the
act, prior to the date designated in the permit for expiration of the license." Implementing a policy adopted more than a year previously by the Commission, the regulation "may serve to set at rest, at least for the time being, one possible uncertainty
facing those companies engaged in proving out power reactor concepts through construction of full-scale prototypes" ( BN A, Atomic Industry Reporter 2: 389).
827 10 Code Fed. Regs. Pt. so.
a2s 42 U.S.C.A. §2135 ("Antitrust Provisions").
329 McKinney Panel Report, supra note 10 at 13:
"Despite recognition of the fact
that there is no evidence of anyone now being injured by the licensing provisions of
sections 103 and 104, the principles involved in these sections ... conflict with the
principles of private enterprise which the 1954 act has been represented as advancing." See also 132-134.
sso 42 U.S.C. §1&>7 (1946).
S31 For a favorable view of Section 7, see H.R. Rep. No. 2181, supra note 5 at 107roS. For a criticism thereof, see ABA Committee Report, supra note 177, at 15-21.
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underlying philosophy of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to encourage
investment of private capital in atomic energy facilities which creates
the problem for industry. In this connection it is significant that Section 104 of the present act specifically states that licenses issued thereunder should be "subject to the minimum amount of regulation" consistent with the regulatory duties of the Commission. 832 No such policy
statement is contained in Section 103, although the inference to be
drawn from its absence is far from clear. 388
(a)

Section 182 Restrictions

Restrictions imposed upon Section 103 licensees concern notice requirements, priorities, the right of the Commission to require information, and antitrust provisions. Under Section 182c of the present statute, 834 notice prior to the issuance of such a license is required to be
given to "such regulatory agency as may have jurisdiction over the
rates and services of the proposed activity, to municipalities, private
utilities, public bodies, and cooperatives within transmission distance
and which are authorized to engage in the distribution of electric
energy." 833 The effective date of the license is further delayed by a
requirement of notice for four consecutive weeks in the Federal Register, followed by another period of four weeks before the license becomes effective.
33 2
333

Section 104a, b, and c, 42 U.S.C.A. §2134(a), (b), and (c).
The applicant PRDC in AEC Dkt. F-16 argued that "Section 104.b enjoins the
Commission not to impose in the way of developmental projects any administrative
road blocks that are not absolutely essential from the standpoint of security and safety,
and it requires that priority be given to those activities most likely to lead to 'major
advances' in the industrial application of nuclear energy" (Brief for Applicant, supra
note 314 at 34). The policy of the section was urged in support of the PRDC position that, .in order to qualify for a provisional construction permit, the applicant need
only establish "a reasonable probability under all the circumstances that ... the proposed [PRDC] reactor . . . can in due course be proved safe for operation at the proposed site" (id. at 36) and "is reasonably assured under all the circumstances of
obtaining the financial resources that it will probably need,'' taking into consideration
"the determination of its [PRDC's] member companies to see the project through"
(id. at 16 and 12). The contrary view, advanced by the intervenors in that proceeding,
was that, notwithstanding Section 104b, "nothing takes priority over the twin elements of. (1) common defense and security and (2) health and safety of the public.
The encouragement of private participation in the atomic energy industry is a means
to these ends, not a qualification of them" (Reply Brief of Intervenors, supra note 313
at 3).
a34 42 U.S.C.A. §2232(c).
885 See 10 Code Fed. Regs. §so.43(a). The Joint Committee Staff Study, supra
note 3 at 69-70, outlines bri~fly the legislative history of Section 182.
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Licensing of activities involving interstate as well as intrastate commerce by joint action of a federal and state regulatory body is not an
uncommon practice under administrative law. 336 The provisions of Section 182c go further, however, and can only be regarded as a means of
prolonging for a period of eight weeks the licensing of an otherwise
qualified private commercial facility. During that period application
can be made to a court to enjoin the license, or Congress, if in session,
can take action by legislation to reverse the performance of Executive
Department functions. 881 However, other than the delay involved, this
particular restriction raises no insuperable problems for private industry.
Section 182d of the present act also establishes a system of priorities
to be given to license applicants. That section provides :
The Commission, in issuing any license for a utilization or
production facility for the generation of commercial power
under section 103, shall give preferred consideration to applications for such facilities which will be located in high cost
power areas in the United States if there are conflicting applications for a limited opportunity for such license. Where such
conflicting applications resulting from limited opportunity for
. such license include those submitted by public or cooperative bodies such applications shall be given preferred
consideration. 888
As summarized by the Commission in its regulations, such priorities
among "conflicting applications for a limited opportunity for such
license" are as follows :
1. Applications submitted by public or cooperative bodies
for facilities to be located in high cost power areas in the
United States.
2. Applications submitted by others for facilities to be located within such high cost power areas in the United States.
3· Applications submitted by public or cooperative bodies
for facilities to be located in other high cost power areas.
4· All other applications. 339
8ils See, e.g., Interstate Commerce Commission use of "joint boards" composed of
representatives of the agency and state regulatory bodies, 49 U.S.C.A. §305.
837 Representatives Holifield and Price have charged that these notice requirements
lack "specific recognition of those interests whose rights may be affected by Commission action or whose participation may be in the public interest," H.R. Rep. No. 2r8r,
supra note 5 at 122.
33s 42 U.S.C.A. §2232(c).
339 ro Code Fed. Regs. § 50.43 (b).
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Section 182d raises several questions which are not satisfactorily
answered by its legislative history. 340 The term "limited opportunity"
is susceptible of varying interpretations, although a reasonable meaning would seem to be "limited availability of special nuclear material." 341
Moreover, what constitutes a "high cost power area" is an exceedingly
difficult question to answer because of very slight differences in the cost
of generating electricity from conventional sources among several areas
within the United States. 842
Both the Commission indirectly, and the Joint Committee directly,
have implemented the preference provisions of the 1954 statute with
respect to cooperatively and public-owned utilities. The Commission's
second round invitation in September 1955, under the civilian power
reactor program encouraged application by seven utilities of the preferred publicly or cooperatively owned type to develop, design, construct,
and operate nuclear power plants with generating capacities of between
5,000 and 40,000 kilowatts. 348
However, the limitations on funds available to such groups of utilities have tended to prevent their full-scale participation in the civilian
atomic energy program. 8 u Although recognizing that this preferred
840 See H.R. Rep. No. 2181, supra note 5 at 28: " . . . [W]here all other conditions are equal and there are conflicting applications for a limited opportunity for a
license, the Commission is required to give preferred consideration to facilities which
will be located in high-cost power areas." See Joint Committee Staff Study, n1Pra
note 3 at 69-70.
BU·Upton, supra note 2CYJ at 491.
842 See Atomic Energy Facts 78 (GPO 1957); Rep. Cole has characterized Section
185c as "this fear and apprehension [in private industry] which I call a roadblock"
(1957 Section 202 Hearings, n1pra note 7 at 6g). After agreeing with Sen. Pastore
(Dem., R.I.) that New England "certainly is a high cost area," Mr. E. L. Lindseth,
Vice Chairman, Committee on Atomic Power, Edison Electric Institute, told the Joint
Committee in the 1957 Section 202 Hearings, id. at 268-26g: "Our industry takes no
exception to that portion of the act which relates to preference in favor of high cost
fuel areas. . . ."
843 See AEC Twenty-fourth Semi-Annual Report 335 (1958); four of those have
been accepted as bases for negotiation of contracts, statement of AEC, 1957 Section
202 Hearings, supra note 7 at II7-II8. These four proposals "are all entitled to preference under the Atomic Energy Act" (Statement of AEC Division of Reactor Development Director, 1957 Authorizing Legislation Hearings, supra note 7 at 186).
One public body, Consumers Public Power District, of Columbus, Nebraska, has applied for a contract under the first round invitation, Sen. Rep. No. 791, supra note 23
at ro-n.
844 Cole, supra note 6 at 4&>: ".•. [A]ll three invitations for proposals under the
demonstration program have emphasized the specific types of available government
assistance and have stressed that the Conunission's obligations would be limited or
'closed end.' There is one dilemma which is posed by the Commission's desire to
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class of utilities showed no "particular competence or experience" with
respect to atomic reactors, the Joint Committee in 1957 recommended,
and Congress enacted, legislation which specifically directed the Commission to give such utilities a highly preferred position under the
civilian power reactor program, ~ with advantages not available to privately owned utilities. 846
84

(b)

Section 105 Restrictions

Another type of restriction imposed on Section 103 licenses is created
by Section 105 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 coqcerning antitrust
problems. 847 Previously, under Section 7(c) of the 1946 act:
Where activities under any license might serve to maintain
or to foster the growth of monopoly, restraint of trade, unlawful competition, or other trade position inimical to the entry
of new, freely competitive enterprises in the field, the Commission is authorized and directed to refuse to issue such
license or to establish such conditions to prevent these results
as the Commission, in consultation with the Attorney General,
may determine. The Commission shall report promptly to the
Attorney General any information it may have with respect to
any utilization of fissionable material or atomic energy which
appears to have these res~lts. . . .us
. Under the present legislation, the restrictions imposed under the 1946
legislation have been broadened by new statutory provisions which were
"in large part, the product of compromise." 849
The antitrust provisions of the 1954 act have three principal effects
upon the regulated atomic energy industry. Each of these is presumably
based on the intended policy of strengthening "free competition in private enterprise." 850
limit commitments and this is a result of a preference clause contained in the Atomic
Energy Act of I954· ·The very limited funds generally available to such 'preference'
groups . . . for assumption of technological risk make it difficult, in a practical sense,
for these groups to assume responsibility for excessive costs. Thus difficulty is encountered in making contractual arrangements containing strong incentives for costreduction except as these groups may be able to make favorable arrangements with
reactor manufacturers."
84~ Sen. Rep. No. 79I, supra note 23 at I6.
846 These preferred contractual arrangements were contained in Section II I (a) (I)
of Pub. L. 85- I62, 85th Cong., Ist Sess. (I 957), and are discussed in detail, infra.
847 42 U.S.C.A. §2I35.
.
348 42 U.S.C. §I8o7(c) (I946):
849 Attorney General Brownell, I957 Section 202 Hearings, supra note 7 at 63I-635.
sso Section Ib, 42 U.S.C.A. §2011 (b) ; see Jacobs and Melchoir, "Antitrust Aspects
of the Atomic Energy Industry," 25 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 508 (I957). The authors
were listed as members of the Antitrust Division, Department of Justice.
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The first, and most important, is the mandate that no provision of the
act "shall relieve any person from the operation" of the antitrust laws. 351
These laws may well be applied not only to actual violations thereof, but
also, and of more practical significance to the industry, to "incipient
practices which could ultimately lead to Sherman Act violations." 352
Moreover, in the event a license is found by a court of competent jurisdiction to have violated any provision of the federal antitrust laws, then
the Commission "may suspend, revoke or take such other action as it
may deem necessary with respect to any license issued by the Commission under the provisions of this Act." 858
As under the 1946 act, Section 105b of the 1954 act requires the
Commission to report to the Attorney General any information coming
to its attention with respect to license activity "which appears to violate
or to tend toward the violation of any of the [antitrust] . . . Acts, or
to restrict free competition in private enterprise." 854 Further, under
851 Further designated in the Atomic Energy Act as the Sherman Act of I89o, IS
U.S.C.A. §§I-7; the Wilson Tariff Act of IB94, IS U.S.C.A. §§8-11; the Clayton Act
of I9I4. IS U.S.C.A. §§I2-27; and the Federal Trade Commission Act of I9I4. IS
U.S.C.A. §§4I-46 and §§47-sB.
852 Jacobs and Melchoir, supra note 3SO at sog; see Brownell, I9S7 Section 202
Hearings, supra note 7 at 63I: " . . . In this evolving [atomic energy] industry, we
[the Federal Government] attempt preventive measures to foster competition, rather
than remedial litigation to undo the effect of anticompetitive action already taken."
Critics of the current AEC program have emphasized the alleged danger from incipient violations of the antitrust laws. Rep. Cannon, IOJ Cong. Rec. SI97-Sig8 (I957}
has referred to "serious antitrust implications" in the PRDC project because it was
being undertaken by "two separate combinations of companies." Some witnesses in
the Joint Committee I9S7 Section 202 Hearings charged that the I954 act was being
administered in such a fashion as to effect "monopolization of the atomic energy field"
by major power companies, which were accused of engaging in "a form of legalized collusion" to violate the antitrust laws, sr~pra note 7 at 452-4s6; see, to the same effect,
id. at 28s-28g and 46o-462.
858 Jacobs and Melchior, srtpra note 3SO at SII-I2: "Should the Federal Trade Commission find a violation of section s of its act and the respondent not seek court review, the [Atomic Energy] Commission could not under this section [105a of the
Atomic Energy Act] cite the finding as a basis for suspension, as this would not
constitute a finding by a court of competent jurisdiction. . . . Thus, considerable importance attaches to what might be an accident of procedure, i.e., whether an action
for violation of one of the antitrust laws is brought in the first instance by the Department of Justice or by the Federal Trade Commission." The opposite position would
be that Congress intended an atomic energy licensee to have its alleged violation of
the antitrust laws adjudicated in a federal court, either at the District Court level in
an original proceeding or at the Court of Appeals level on review of a Federal Trade
Commission order, rather than have the atomic energy license jeopardized by merely
an administrative determination.
85 4 Jacobs and Melchior, supra note 3SO at SI2: "The obligation will require the
application of a degree of antitrust expertise at an early stage, to make possible the
detection of anti-competitive practices in their incipience."
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Section IOSC, when the Commission proposes to issue a Section 103
license, the Attorney General must be notified, and he must give an
opinion within 90 days, to be published in the Federal Register, "whether
insofar as he can determine, the proposed license would tend to create
or maintain a situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws." This section empowers the Attorney General to request, and the Commission to
furnish or "cause to be furnished, such information as the Attorney
General determines to be appropriate or necessary to enable him to give
the advice called for by this section." It should be noted that Section IOSc has application only to proposed Section 103 commercial
licenses. It does not apply to construction permits for either Section 103
or 104 licenses, nor does it reach to Section 104 licenses, a fact which
has occasioned some controversy. 355
Indeed; Section 105 was one of the most controversial portions of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954. The theory underlying the section is derived from certain other adm~nistrative powers and duties delegated by
Congress with respect to government ownership, regulation, or disposal
of war industries and materials. 856 As originally proposed in Congress,
this section would have permitted a licensee to purge itself of any violation of the antitrust laws in connection with any atomic energy activity,
before the Atomic Energy Commission could take any action with respect to the license.m The legislation reported out by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy would have provided "for hearings [before
355 1957 Section 202 Hearings, supra note 7, at 285, 288-289, 292; Jacobs and Melchior, supra note 3SO at SI3-5I4; Rep. Cannon, I03 Cong. Rec. SI98 ( I9S7).
356 Section 20 of the Surplus Property Act of I944, reenacted as Section 207 of the
Federal Property and Administrative Service Act of I949, 40 U.S.C.A. §488 (whenever an executive agency begins negotiations for the disposition of plant or property
which cost the United States at least $I million or of patents, processes, and inventions, the Attorney General must advise within 6o days whether "the proposed disposition tend to create or maintain a situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws") ;
Section 708 of Defense Production Act of I950, so U.S.C.A. App. §2IS8 (requiring
submission of "voluntary agreements and programs" within an industry to the
Attorney General and Federal Trade Commission, publication thereof in the Federal
Register, and formal approval thereof by the Attorney General before the President
can put any such agreement or program into effect) ; Rubber Producing Facilities Disposal Act of I9S3, so U.S.C.A. App. §I94Ia (before submission of proposed disposal of
rubber plant to Congress, Rubber Producing Facilities Disposal Commission must
obtain, but need not follow, advice of Attorney General with respect to antitrust problems in connection with such disposal). See Austern, "Memorandum of Collateral
Antitrust Enforcement," Atomic Energy Workshops, supra note 2IS at I6S-I66; Jacobs
and Melchoir, supra note 3SO at SIS-SI6.
an Austern, "Legislative History of Sections IOS and ISS of the Atomic Energy Act
of I9S4," Atomic Energy Workshops, supra note 2IS at ISS·
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the Federal Trade Commission] and judicial review in case there is any
claim by the Attorney General or the Federal Trade Commission that a
proposed license of any production or utilization facility would violate
the antitrust laws." 358 A Senate amendment to the bill passed by the
House, which was rejected by the conference committee, would have
. . . required that the Commission follow the advice of the
Attorney General unless the President made a finding that the
issuance of such a license was essential to the common defense
and security and the finding was published in the Federal
Register. This amendment in effect made the advice of the
Attorney General a decision binding upon the Commission
and the applicant without hearing. . . .859
As finally enacted, Section 105 does not require the denial of a license
because of a possible antitrust violation as was the case under the 1946
statute. The Commission merely takes "due account" of the Attorney
General's opinion. 860 It would, however, take a foolhardy Commission
to disregard the Attorney General's opinion. 861
Thus, the atomic energy industry faces the possibility of adverse
decisions based upon administrative interpretation and the application
of the antitrust laws without an opportunity for administrative hearing
or judicial review. 862 However, it is to be hoped that the Commission,
8~8

H.R. Rep. No. 2181, supra note 5 at 20.
H.R. Rep. No. 2639, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1954). The amendment rejected was
proposed by Sen. Humphrey (Dem., Minn.), see Adams, supra note 222, 55 Col. L. Rev.
169-170.
880 10 Code Fed. Regs. §5042(b); see also §50.54(g); Austern, supra note 339 at
165. Concerning this provision, Attorney General Brownell has stated, 1957 Section
202 Hearings, supra note 7 at 633 : "This provision, patterned after earlier surplus of
property disposal laws, makes available to the [Atomic Energy] Commission analysis
of any special anticompetitive considerations presented. Antitrust advice, however,
need not be controlling. For the Commission must also weigh the necessities of defense and security and public health and safety. Nonetheless such a procedure provides
an effective means to insure that knowledge of possible antitrust difficulties required
to foster competition."
881 See Adams, supra note 239 at 170. It is possible that, where the Attorney General either gives adverse or favorable advice concerning a Section 103 license application to the Commission, he would not be precluded from. proceeding by ·appr~priate
antitrust proceedings against the licensee for future violations of these laws or for violations unknown and undisclosed to the government at the time the application was
processed. See Attorney General Brownell, 1957 Section 202 Hearings, supra note 7,
at 633; Jacobs and Melchior, supra note 350 at 517-518. Probably the Attorney General's position would not be binding upon a private party seeking treble damages or
other relief under the antitrust laws.
8 6 2 Under the Humphrey amendment, supra note 359. the Attorney General was both
"a judge and jury," "not an appropriate role for the prosecuting attorney to play"
(Sen. Hickenlooper (Rep., Iowa), 100 Cong. Rec. 14344 (Aug. 13, 1954)).
~

8 9
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if so requested by an applicant for a license which initially is denied as
a result of Section 105, would make the antitrust question an issue at
the formal hearing provided by statute and regulation. 363
Section 105, as enacted by Congress and implemented by Commission
regulation, represents a probable deterrent to private participation in
the atomic energy field. Section 105a providing that no official action
under the Atomic Energy Act shall prevent appropriate action by the
Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission under the antitrust laws merely states existing law for "normal application of antitrust
to the civilian atomic industry." 864 These provisions are unobjectionable,
even if unnecessary. The only basic objection to Section 105a lies in
the unlimited discretion granted the Atomic Energy Commission in the
event a licensee is found by a court to have violated an antitrust act,
clearly a matter which should be left exclusively in the jurisdiction of
the court, 865 without permitting extrapunitive action by an administrative body. 366
The language of Section 105b and c, especially with respect to the
grounds on which the Attorney General may render an adverse advisory
opinion or the Commission may refuse a license, go far beyond ordinary
concepts of antitrust law developed heretofore by statutes, the courts,
and administrative agencies. 367 A final source of possible administrative
overreaching under Section 105 lies in the requirement, under Section 161p of the act, that licensees furnish information and reports,
and permit inspections, "as may be necessary to effectuate the purposes
8 68
364

Section 18ga, 42 U.S.C.A. §2239(a); 10 Code Fed. Regs. §2.102(a).
Attorney General Brownell, 1957 Section 202 Hearings, supra note 7 at 632.
3 65 See Atomic Energy Workshops, supra note 215 at 61.
8 66 "Those who engage in activity in this [atomic energy] field in violation of the
antitrust laws should get no better and no worse treatment, be subjected to the same
sanctions, imposed by the same administrative and judicial tribunals, and prosecuted
by the same enforcement agencies, as are those who engage in any other business subject to the antitrust laws" ("Report of Workshop III," Atomic Energy Workshops,
supra note- 215 at 58).
36 7 See "Report of Workshop III," Atomic Energy Workshops, supra note 215 at
58; Austern, supra note 3S7, at ISS; Austern, supra note 356 at 167-168: "In Section
lOSe of the Atomic Energy Act, the Attorney General is to decide whether a proposed
license would tend to create or maintain 'a situation inconsistent with the antitrust
laws.' This language does not confine the Attorney General's interest in the matter to
any particular area of the company's business. On occasion the Attorney General is
bound to be influenced by the existence of litigation which he is conducting against a
proposed licensee, even if the litigation does not directly involve atomic energy at all.
" For a similar criticism of the standards in Section 7(c) of the 1946 Act, see
ABA Committee Report, supra note 177 at 20.
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of the Act, including Section IDS of the Act." 868 This statutory provision, as implemented by regulation, 869 in effect constitutes an unlimited
hunting license for the federal government to police the atomic energy
industry without any of the traditional safeguards afforded other
branches of industry subject to the antitrust laws.
The provisions of Section IDS as enacted have been characterized as
" 'passing the buck' on monopoly prevention" and as locking "the barn
after the horse is stolen." 370 The power given the Atomic Energy Commission under the 1946 act to decide antitrust questions has been supported and justified on the basis of the argument that eight Federal
agencies, 371 other than the Federal Trade Commission, have the same
authority in the fields regulated by them. 372 What has been termed the
"collateral enforcement" of the antitrust laws is, however, subject to
serious objection because of diffusion of responsibility 373 and possible
inefficient administration. 874
However, in enacting the Atomic Energy Act of 19S4, Congress has
avoided adding to the conflicting interpretation and sometimes overlapping jurisdiction in the antitrust field by excluding the Atomic
42 U.S.C.A. §2201 (p).
10 Code Fed. Regs. §§50.70 (inspections) and 50.71 (records and reports). These
requirements present real problems for the licensee who conceivably could withhold no
operating information from the Commission, and the Commission apparently is under
no affirmative obligation to refrain from publishing what might ordinarily be a business secret. Limited protection for business secrets is afforded by 10 Code Fed. Regs.
§2.790, which permits the Commission to "withhold any document or part thereof from
public inspection if disclosure of its contents is not required in the public interest and
would adversely affect the interest of a person concerned,'' subject, of course, to the
exercise of Commission discretion. As of March 6, 1957, the Commission had received
four requests for the withholding of certain information contained in license applications, two of which were granted. "Requests by License Applicants to Withhold
Matters from Public Inspection," Joint Committee Staff Study, supra note 3, App. 13,
at 183-186.
3 70 H.R. Rep. No. 2181, supra note 5 at 125-126. See Adams, supra note 239 at 178179: "If monopoly comes to atomic energy, it shall not have been inevitable. . . . It
shall have come about because of unwise, man-made, discriminatory, privilege-creating
legislation which throttles competition and restricts opportunity. . . ."
371 Interstate Commerce Commission, Federal Communications Commission, Civil
Aeronautics Board, Federal Reserve Board, U.S. Tariff Commission, Federal Power
Commission, Department of Interior, and Department of Agriculture.
37 2 H.R. Rep. No. 2181, supra note 5 at 125-126. For a criticism of this situation,
see Hoover Commission Legal Services Report, supra note 154 at 86 and Hoover Commission Legal Task Force Report, supra note 43, at 25o-255.
378 Austern, supra note 356 at 165; see Report of Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws 367-369 (1955).
874 See Transamerica Corp. v. Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System, 206
F. 2d 163 (3d Cir. 1953).
36s
369
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Energy Commission from issuing orders based upon antitrust considerations. There has been substituted the procedure for reports to and
from the Attorney General, with the possible withholding of the license
by the Commission based upon these reports. Because of the extrajudicial character of the Attorney General's participation in the atomic
energy licensing process, this procedure can hardly be regarded as an
improvement from the standpoint of the licensee.
More recently, still another extra-judicial forum to consider possible
antitrust problems affecting individual licensees has been established.
This results from the 1957 amendments by Congress to Section 261a
of the Atomic Energy Act. 375 In its review of the bases requested for
appropriations by the Commission for financial assistance to private
parties under the civilian power reactor programs, the Joint Committee
will have the opportunity "to review the antitrust and patent implications of each individual arrangement before it is consummated." 376
3· Hearing Procedures ·
The general licensing provisions of the 1954 statute, 377 as implemented by the Commission's regulations, 878 establish procedures for the
granting, denial, or revocation of licenses which substantially comply,
both in spirit and in letter, with the requirements of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act. Inasmuch as these hearing procedures in their
formal aspects are only now being gradually utilized by the Commission,
considerable question remains concerning their application and implementation. The hearing procedures of the Commission have, in fact,
undergone considerable statutory and policy change since enactment of
the 1954 legislation.
Initially, Section 189a of the statute 879 provided only that "in any
for the granting, suspending, revoking, or amending
proceedings .
of any license . . . and in any proceeding for the issuance or modificam 42 U.S.C.A. §2017(a).
876 Remarks of Rep. Holifield outlining scope of review of Joint Committee under
Section 261a, 1957 Congressional Review Hearings, supra note 7 at 38: "Antitrust
policy and patent policy: Under the Joint Committee bills ... the basis for each individual arrangement must be submitted to the Joint Committee . . . before becoming effective it it provides any financial assistance. Such basis shall include a description of 'the general features of the proposed arrangement or amendment' ... and it
is contemplated that the Joint Committee may therefore be able to review the antitrust
and patent implications of each individual arrangement before it is consummated."
877 Sections 181-189, 42 U.S.C.A. §§2231-2239.
878 10 Code Fed. Regs Pt. 2.
879 42 U.S.C.A. §2239(a).
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tion of rules and regulations dealing with the activities of licensees ...
the Commission shall grant a hearing upon the request of any person
whose interest may be affected by the proceeding. . . . " Section 181
provides that the "provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act shall
apply to all agency action taken under this act." 380 Licensing under the
Atomic Energy Act clearly constitutes adjudication under the Administrative Procedure Act. 881 The Commission has taken the praiseworthy
and correct 882 position that a "formal hearing" should be held on applications for the issuance, amendment, or transfer of a license or construction permit 883 or the modification, suspension, or revocation
·thereof. 38• However, "informal" proceedings are obviously preferred
by the Commission for the collection of necessary information and for
rule making. 885
Prior to 1957, a "formal" proceeding could be initiated under two
circumstances. Before the Commission acted on an application, such a
hearing could be ordered upon the request of the applicant, an intervenor, or the Commission itself. Request by the applicant or an intervenor for such a hearing also could be made, within thirty days after
notice of Commission action with respect to the license had been
published. 388
Further, "in such cases as it deems appropriate," the Commission
could serve notice of proposed action on an application upon the appli880 42 U.S.C.A. §2231.
881 Section :z(d), 5 U.S.C.A. §ux>I(a).
8 82 Under Section 5 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. §1004, formal
adjudication occurs where the applicable statute requires a determination "on the record
after opportunity for an agency hearing." Although Section 1B9;l of the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954 prior to the 1957 amendment did not use the words "on the record," the
context in which the hearing requirement was used and the liberal interpretation to be
accorded the Administrative Procedure Act warranted the Commission's position that
a hearing "on the record" was required where requested under Section 1B9;l. See Wong
Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33. so, 70 S. Ct. 445 (1950) as modified, 339 U.S.
goB, 70S. Ct. 564 (1950); Hoover Commission Legal Task Force Report, supra note
43 at 167-170. For a contrary point of view, see Davison, "Requirements of Hearings
in Administrative Adjudication," Joint Committee Staff Study, supra note 3, App. 15
at 195. In the case of the first such request in a licensing proceeding, the Commission correctly ordered a formal hearing. In the Matter of Power Reactor Development Company, AEC Dkt. F-16, "Notice of Hearing Order," 21 Fed. Reg. 78og (Oct.
12, 1956). Prior to 1957, it was recommended that the Commission, as a Inatter of
policy, order .a formal hearing in each Section 103 licensing proceeding, "Report of
Workshop III," Atomic Energy Workshops, supra note 215 at 59.
883 10 Code Fed. Regs. §2.102(a).
884 10 Code Fed. Regs. §2.202.
885 10 Code Fed. Regs. §2,7o8.
88810 Code Fed. Regs. §2.102(a).
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cant and interested parties and publish such notice, and a formal hearing
could be held upon request of such applicant or other parties if request
therefor was made within fifteen days after service of the notice. 387
Under this procedure, the Commission "uniformly" 888 took its action
first, subject to a request for hearing within thirty days.
However, after December 1956, the agency changed its practice and
issued notices of intention to grant a license affording fifteen days' time
in which to file requests for hearing. 889 In April 1957, the Commission
by rule formalized the latter procedure. 890 The Commission's action was
taken partly as the result of a Joint Committee Staff Study which set
forth in compelling terms the reasons for requiring a formal hearing in
every case prior to issuance of a construction permit or license under
Sections 103 or 104 of the statute. 391 The proposal had, in fact, been
opposed by the Commission. 392 Subsequently, Congress followed the
Staff recommendation, and in September 1957, it amended Section 1893to require that the "Commission . . . hold a hearing after thirty days
notice and publication once in the Federal Register on each application
under Sections 103 or 104b for a license for a facility, and on any application under Section 104c for a license for a testing facility." 898
10 Code Fed. Regs. §2.102(b).
Joint Committee Staff Study, supra note 3 at 19.
8 8 9 See "Notice of Proposed Issuance of Construction Permit to AMF Atomics, Inc.,"
Dec. 19, 1956, Dkt. No. F-17, as explained in AEC Press Rei. Dec. 28, 1956, Joint Committee Staff Study, supra note 3, App. 14A and B at 186-189.
8 90 This was done by amending 10 Code Fed. Regs. §2.102(b) and (c); see "Notice
of Proposed Rule Making," 22 Fed. Reg. 2433 (April 11, 1957).
891 Joint Committee Staff Study, supra note 3 at 23: "The advantages of this notice
of intent and hearing procedure are that it would provide the maximum amount of information concerning the proposed reactor to the public, and would also provide easy
opportunity for participation by interested parties and the public. This type of procedure would seem to provide maximum assurance of fair and open dealings on the
part of the agency." Sen. Anderson indicated support for such a recommendation during floor debate on Section 189 of the 1954 act, id., at 17, n.2 see recommendation that
the AEC, as a matter of policy, order a formal hearing in each Section 103 licensing
proceeding, "Report of Workshop III," Atomic Energy Workshops, supra note 215
at 59·
B92 Chiefly on the grounds that such procedure would destroy "administrative simplicity" and cause unnecessary delay in proceedings, particularly where uncontested,
Joint Committee Staff Study, supra note 3 at 22-24 and App. 5 at 109-110.
89 8 Pub. L. 85-256, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957); see H.R. Rep. No. 435, 85th Cong.,
1st Sess. 12, 25 (1957). As the result of the amendment to Section 189a, the Commission was required to vacate the notice of proposed issuance of a construction permit for
a Section 104b research reactor to Yankee Atomic Electric Co., Dkt. No. so-29, and
to set the matter for hearing, 22 Fed. Reg. 7188 (Sept. 7, 1957). After a hearing on
Oct. 8 and 24, 1957, the AEC on Nov. 19, 1957, published a notice of its findings and
887
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This congressional action represents an important step in bringing
administrative due process to atomic energy procedures, a development
which had been parallelled to a certain extent by Commission procedure
developed by regulation and precedent in the Power Reactor Development Company licensing proceeding, the first of its kind held by the
agency. 894 The requirement of an opportunity for a hearing before an
application for a construction permit or license is issued also resolves
the question concerning the suspension of such a permit or license which
is once issued but later becomes the subject of a hearing. 895
order and. of the issuance of a construction permit to Yankee, 22 Fed. Reg. 9237. The
"Memorandum of Opinion of the Commissioners" granting the permit was not published in the Federal Register, an omission which should be corrected in the interests
of complete public information in the field of atomic energy (see BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 227: 6w). The Yankee proceeding was the first completed under the
new Section 189a procedure.
89 4 The PRDC proceeding "has already begun the development of quasi-judicial attitudes and techniques on the part of the Commission" (Plaine, .supra note 1 at 75).
8 9 3 In its order for hearing dated Oct. 8, 1956, in the PRDC proceeding, the Commission denied the request of intervenors ·"for an immediate suspension of said construction permit pending the final determination of the matters raised by said petitions
•.• without prejudice to ultimate determination by the Commission as to whether the
permit should be continued, modified, or vacated" (Para. (4) ). The intervenors in
that proceeding argued that the "continuance of the construction permit to PRDC . . .
would be contrary to the Act and the regulations of the Commission" and that the
permit "should be suspended" during the hearing (Reply Brief of Intervenors, .supra
note 313 at 43). The dilemma in which the AEC had placed itself by issuing a provisional construction permit and then by passing upon the merits of the controversy after
a formal hearing thereon is stated by the intervenors in their Post-Hearing Brief, .supra
note 291 at 36: "If this were . . . a case of initial licensing in which the Commission
had not taken a position on the merits at the time of the hearing, there can be no question that it would have been entirely appropriate for AEC not to take a position with
respect to the issues. . . . But this is not in fact a case of initial licensing. The Commission had already issued the license when the instant proceeding was instituted, and
it has continued that license, in effect, over the strenuous objections of Intervenors. It
is utterly unrealistic for the Commission to act as if it had not already rendered a decision on the issues, and to ignore the fact that it was being called on, in effect, to defend or reverse its position." Refusal of the Commission to take a position during the
proceeding was claimed to be a denial of a fair hearing. In this connection, the following exchange occurred between AEC Chairman Strauss and Sen. Gore during the
1957 Section 202 Hearings, .supra note 7 at 43-44: "Senator Gore. Is not that [the
PRDC construction permit] in fact in a state of suspension? ... Mr. Strauss. There
is a hearing in progress, Senator. . . . [C]onstruction is going ahead with no suspension or delay as far as the Commission is aware. Senator Gore. You have given a
construction permit? Mr. Strauss. That is right. It is not in suspension in any way."
Under the Federal Communications Act of 1952, 47 U.S.C.A. §Jog(c), a construction permit automatically is suspended for the duration of a hearing initiated by a
protest. See Joint Committee Staff Study, .supra note 3 at 21.
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Subject, of course, to actual observance by the Commission of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the Adminis.trative Procedure Act in
spirit as well as letter, the agency appears to have provided very adequately by its rules for administrative due process on such matters as
service of papers, 896 representation, 897 intervention, 898 consolidation of
related proceedings, 899 and notice of hearing. 400 The burden of proof in
any proceeding has been placed properly upon the applicant for a construCtion permit or license; which must affirmatively "demonstrate at
the hearing that it is able to satisfy those requirements of law and the
Commission's regulations which are in controversy." 401
10 Cqde Fed. Regs. §2.703.
10 Code Fed. Regs. §2.704- In formal hearings, involving as they do the practice
of law, only attorneys at law will be permitted to represent others, 10 Code Fed. Regs.
§2.704(b); see Plaine, supra note 77 at 8o8-8og.
398 10 Code Fed. Regs. §§2.705-.7o6; see Plaine, supra note 77 at Sog. The PRDC
proceeding, AEC Dkt. No. F-16, raises an interesting question with regard to the right
of intervention. The three unions petitioning to intervene therein largely based their
right to do so on their representation of union members whose health and safety
allegedly would be adversely affected if the application were granted; see Post-Hearing Brief of Intervenors, supra note 291 at 1-2. The standing to intervene was questioned but not actually controverted by the applicant, and the Commission held that
"[p]rima facie these allegations provide a basis for the granting of leave to intervene
in the procedings before the Commission" ("Memorandum of the Commission" I
(Mimeo Oct. 8, 19•6); see BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 52: 41). The applicant,
in a subsequent filing with the Commission, asked to have one of the issues, i.e., the
issue of financial qualification, eliminated on the grounds, inter alia, that the intervening unions had no interest in the matter of financial qualification. On Mar. 4, 1957,
the State of Michigan filed a petition, and was permitted, to intervene in the PRDC
proceedings, to participate therein "as its interests may arise" (BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 3 : 77).
89·o 10 Code Fed. Regs. §2.707.
400 10 Code Fed. Regs. §2.735. This regulation provides for the specification of issues by the AEC in its order for hearing, to which specification in the PRDC proceeding intervenors strongly objected; Charging that the Commission had been "capricious~
in its limitation of issues in the order dated Oct. 8, 1956, counsel for the intervenors
charged before the Joint Committee that "we [the intervenors] had to consider it
[participation in the hearing] on their [the AECs] terms and only on their terms,"
without regard to "the question of whether the AEC itself had violated the law" (1957
Section 202 Hearings, supra note 7 at 467, 476-477). It was the position of the intervenors that, by its limitation of the issues of the proceeding "so as to preclude proof
of illegal conduct on the part of the Commission in the issuance of a conditional construction permit to PRDC," the AEC had denied them a fair hearing (Post-Hearing
Brief of Intervenors, supra note 291 at 19) ; see Reply Memorandum for Applicant,
st~Pra note 291 at 4.
401 Power Reactor Development Company, AEC Dkt. No. F-16. "Memorandum of
the Commission," supra note 398 at 1[6.
896
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a. Hearing Officers
In formal licensing proceedings, Atomic Energy Commission rules 402
require that the hearing officer be either a member of the Commission,
an officer or board to whom has been delegated final authority of the
agency to act, or a hearing examiner appointed under Section I I of the
Administrative Procedure Act. 403 The appointment of Section I I hearing examiners in the first formal proceedings under the Atomic Energy
Act of I954 404 indicates the Commission will use such examiners to the
greatest extent possible. The powers of a presiding officer 405 are essen. tially those provided for under the Administrative Procedure Act. 406
The use of prehearing conferences 407 and deposition procedure 408 also
is emphasized. Time-consuming interlocutory appeals to the Commission from rulings of presiding officers are prohibited "except in extraordinary circumstances." 409
Ordinarily, a presiding officer issues an intermediate decision which
becomes final unless it is excepted to by the parties to the proceeding or
402 to Code Fed. Regs. §2.732. This conforms to Section 7(a) of the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. §10o6(a).
4os 5 U.S.C.A. §toto.
4 0 4 Power Reactor Development Company, AEC Dkt. No. F-t6, "Notice of Hearing Order," BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 52: 40; Yankee Atomic Electric Co.,
AEC Dkt. No. 5o-29; National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, AEC Dkt. No.
5o-3o, "Hearings: Additions and Modifications," 22 Fed. Reg. 72t4 (Sept. to, 1957),
BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 53:67; General Electric Company, AEC Dkt. No.
5o-7o, BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 4:95; see Plaine, supra note 77 at 812-813.
On Aug. 5, 1958, the AEC .announced that an Office of Hearing Examiner has been
established, and Samuel W. Jensch appointed thereto, "to fill the Commission's requirement for hearings and to keep pace with the growth of the regulatory functions
of the Commission" (AEC Press Ret. No. A-201).
405 10 Code Fed. Regs. §§2.733, 2.744. 2.745, 2.746, and 2.747.
40& Section 7(b), 5 U.S.C.A. §10o6(b).
40 7 10 Code Fed. Regs. §2.740; such a conference was held in the PRDC proceeding.
408 10 Code Fed. Regs. §2.745.
4 0 9 10 Code Fed. Regs. §2.748. This regulation provides that the hearing officer shall
not permit interlocutory appeals to the Commission during a proceeding "except in extraordinary circumstances where in the judgment of the presiding officer prompt decision by the Commission is necessary to prevent detriment to the public interest or
unusual delay or expense." In the PRDC proceeding, AEC Dkt. No. F-16, the hearing examiner refused to permit an interlocutory appeal from his order overruling objections to the use of written narrative testimony by PRDC witnesses. This decision
was affirmed by the Commission Feb. 27, 1957, on the grounds that " ... to allow the
requested appeal would simply mean allowing one of the parties to circumvent a sound
rule aimed at expediting the course of hearings, and would encourage continuing interruptions of this hearing by recurring appeals to the Commission" (BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 3: 78).
.
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unless it is ordered by the Commission to be certified to it. 410 Prior to
December 1957, in neither its regulations nor its practice had the Commission permitted a hearing officer to issue an initial decision, which
would become final unless appealed. 411 Such decisions, if permitted,
would have afforded the agency the benefit of the views of the officer
who heard the testimony. 412 However, the Commission in orders issued
in December 1957, instructed its hearing examiner to render initial decisions in two proceedings, a development which, it is hoped, may
establish a new policy for the Commission in the future. 418
Hearing examiner orders, in cases where permitted by the Commission, and final orders of the agency itself are required to contain findings
of fact and conclusions of law.m Provision also is made in the AEC
regulations for briefs and oral argument before the Commission m and
for petitions for reconsideration of a final order of the agency.m
10 Code Fed. Regs. §§2.751-.752.
The Commission, in every proceeding prior to 1958, has directed that the record
be certified to it by the presiding officer without decision, Power Reactor Development
Company, AEC Dkt. No. F-16, "Notice of Hearing Order,'' 21 Fed. Reg. 7809 (Oct.
12, 1956), BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 52: 40; Yankee Atomic Electric Co., AEC
Dkt. No. 5o-29, and National Advisory Committee of Aeronautics, AEC Dkt. No.
5o-3o, "Hearing: Additions and Modifications,'' 22 Fed. Reg. 7214 (Sept. 10, 1957),
BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 53:67.
412 If hearing examiners are to perform the quasi-judicial role intended for them by
Congress, then agencies should permit them to tender initial decisions in every case,
unless the parties stipulate otherwise; Hoover Commission Legal Task. Force Report,
supra note 43 at 203-200. See Joint Committee Staff Study, S!~frra note 3 at 39, n. 7:
"The Commission's reluctance to permit the hearing examiner to make an initial decision
[in the PRDC proceeding] is understandable, since he had no previous background in
atomic energy· matters, but it points up the need for qualified hearing examiners who
are conversant with the Atomic Energy Act, AEC regulations and atomic energy technology." In questioning witnesses before the Joint Committee, Rep. Holifield claimed
that the hearing examiner in the PRDC proceeding was a "special examiner appointed
by the AEC" (1957 Section 202 Hearings, suPra note 7 at 441 and 467-468). For a
criticism of the AECs refusal to permit a decision at the examiner level, see id. at 478.
41 8 National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, AEC Dkt. No. 5o-3o, 22 Fed.
Reg. 9895 (Dec. 1i:, 1957), BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 3:422; General Electric
Co., AEC Dkt. No. 5o-7o, 22 Fed. Reg. 10126 (Dec. 18, 1957). On February 26, 1958,
the hearing examiner gave his decision that the order for a construction permit be
granted as of March 25, 1958, unless exceptions were filed to his decision or the Commission took the matter under advisement. On March 3, 1958 the applicant moved that
the construction permit be granted ·immediately, to which motion the Commission staff
consented, and the Commission ordered the construction permit issued on March 7,
1958. See BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 4: 95-¢.
414 10 Code Fed. Regs. §§2.749, 2.750, and 2.754.
41 5 10 Code Fed. Regs. §2.753. This rule does not contemplate oral argument before
an intermediate decision provided under 10 Code Fed. Regs. §2.751. However, in the
PRDC proceeding, the Commission announced that it would have oral argument before
410
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b. Evidence
By both rule and practice, the Commission has shown a realistic but
fair attitude towards the submission of evidence in formal proceedings
before that agency. In accordance with the Administrative Procedure
Act, 417 the AEC regulations provide for the submission of "such oral
or documentary evidence . . . as may be required for a full and true
disclosure of the facts," 418 with an admonition to the hearing officer to
"exclude all irrelevant, immaterial or unduly repetitious evidence." 419
The regulations also encourage the submission of evidence in written
form. 420 This practice has been used extensively, and it is believed
wisely, in the Power Reactor Development Company proceedings. 421
the agency itself issued an intermediate decision; BN A, Atomic Industry Reporter
4:22. Oral argument was held before Commissioners Floberg, Graham, and Vance
on May 29, 1958, at which Commissioner Floberg stated that consideration had been
given to remanding the case to the hearing examiner for an intermediate decision but
that the Commission had decided itself to issue such a decrsion, to which the parties
would have an opportunity to file exceptions and comments before a final decision was
rendered; see BN A, Atomic Industry Reporter 4: 179.
416 10 Code Fed. Regs. §2.756.
417 Section 7(c), 5 U.S.C.A. §10o6(c), which provides, in part:
"Any oral or
documentary evidence may be received, but every agency shall as a matter of policy
provide for the exclusion of irrelevant, immaterial or unduly repetitious evidence. . . .
Every party shall have the right to present his case or defense by oral or documentary evidence . . . as may be required for a full and true disclosure of the facts. . . ."
418 10 Code Fed. Regs. §2.747(a); see Plaine, supra note 77 at 816.
419 10 Code Fed. Regs. §2.747(b). In the PRDC proceeding the applicant charged
that, as the result of cross-exainination by the intervenors, "the proportion of the
testimony included in the transcript which is totally irrelevant to any issue presented
is extraordinarily high" (Brief for Applicant, supra note 314 at 5, n. 7).
420 10 Code Fed. Regs. §2.747(a) : "The parties shall be encouraged to present evidence in written form."
4 2 1 At a pre-hearing conference in the proceeding, AEC Dkt. No. F-16, on Nov. 29,
1956, the hearing examiner permitted the applicant to prepare the "substantial part"
of its case in the form of sworn statements by witnesses, subject to objection by the
intervenors and cross-examination of the witnesses. concerned; BNA, Atomic Industry
Reporter 2: 387. On Jan. 8, 1957, the applicant presented and rested its case with the
introduction of so-called "canned testimony" by six witnesses, whereupon the hearing
was adjourned to Jan. 28, 1957, for objection to the testimony by the other parties
concerned; id. at 3: II. After oral argument, the examiner on Jan. 29, 1957, overruled all but 5 of 62 objections to the PRDC evidence. The principal attack by intervenors on the evidence was that (1) under 10 Code Fed. Regs. §2.740(b), providing
for pre-trial orders, the consent of intervenors was required to the entry of the examiner's pre-trial order with respect to written evidence and (2) counsel was denied
the right to observe the demeanor of the witnesses. The intervenors filed an interlocutory appeal from the examiner's ruling (id. at 3: 45) which was denied by the
Commission Feb. 27, 1957 (id. at 3: 78). The issue was extensively argued by the
parties in their briefs, the intervenors taking the position that a fair hearing had been
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It is a matter of common practice in the older established agencies like
the Federal Communications Commission 422 and Federal Power
Commission. 423
c. Public Records
An important problem that arises in connection with licensing by any
agency is the manner in which the agency implements Section 3 (c) of
the Administrative Procedure Act which provides:
Save as otherwise required by statute, matters of official record
shall in accordance with published rule be made available to
persons properly and directly concerned except information
held confidential for good cause found. 424
Aside from problems which arise under the Atomic Energy Commission's access permit program, 425 that organization is one of the few
executive agencies and departments which has spelled out by regulation
the meaning of the term "public records." 426
denied them; Post-Hearing Brief of Intervenors, supra note 291 at 6-7 and 37-41;
Reply Memorandum for Applicant, supra note 291 at 2-4. In connection with the
National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics proceeding, AEC Dkt. No. 5o-3o, the
presiding examiner requested parties thereto to distribute written copies of testimony
to each other prior to the hearing; BN A, Atomic Industry Reporter 4: 13. The use
of sworn memoranda in proceedings, particularly where uncontested, was approved
by the Joint Committee Staff Study, supra note 3 at 21-22, 24· The AEC has indicated that proposed written testimony by Commission witnesses will be submitted in
advance of hearing to an applicant for a license where the application is not contested
and the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safety report is generally favorable, whereby
"the applicant and other parties will be in a position to cross-examine promptly, if
they desire to do so." (Statement of Robert Lowenstein, Office of General Counsel,
AEC, to Atomic Industrial Forum (mimeo, 1958) ).
422£.g., In the Matter of Carolina Gas Corp., eta!., FPC Dkt. No. G-1335 (1950).
42S E.g., In the Matter of Charges for and in Connection with Marine Telegraph
Services, FCC Dkt. Nos. 9915 'and 9822 (1951). In particular, see testimony introduced by South Porto Rico Sugar Company, operator of a small coastal radio station
which was saved considerable expense by the use of "canned testimony." Indeed, without such a device, such small companies would find participation in rate and other
proceedings almost prohibitively high in cost. Further, the device speeds the proceeding, a result which the intervenors in the PRDC case recognized but probably did not
favor.
424 5 U.S.C.A. §roo2(c). See Hoover Commission Legal Task Force Report, supra
note 43 at 155: "A weakness of the Administrative Procedure Act is that it contains
no definition of matters of official record. The majority of agencies have not defined
this term. Even where a definition has been provided, it has usually been too restrictive. . . ."
426 See text, s~tpra at note 289.
426 10 Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 9, adopted Dec. 8, 1956. For the more important provisions of these regulations, see Joint Committee Staff Study, mpra note 3, App. 3C, at
9Q-91; BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 2: 355·
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Adopted to meet the needs of the AEC's first adjudicatory proceeding, the rules are not without their shortcomings, a fact which Congress
has sought to remedy by amendment of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
The practice of the Commission prior to the PRDC licensing proceeding was to withhold from the public the report of the agency's Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). 427 A qualified
report by the ACRS with respect to the PRDC reactor 428 was leaked
through Congressional sources, whereupon the Commission in October
1956, published the Committee report together with the AEC's order
setting the PRDC case for hearing. 429 The Commission made clear that
this action was not to be considered a precedent, but modified its previous procedure in licensing cases to the extent that a summary of the
ACRS report was contained in the memorandum accompanying the
Commission issuance of a construction permit or license!80
This action did not, however, completely answer doubts raised as to
the wisdom of the Commission's policy of withholding ACRS reports,
particularly in view of the indemnity program then being considered by
the 85th Congress. 481 The result was that, in enacting legislation to provide for a federal indemnity for atomic accidents and a limitation on the
liability of persons participating in the atomic energy program:32 Congress gave the ACRS legislative status. 433 This legislation also required
that all applications for construction permits and licenses under Sections 103 and 104 be reviewed by ACRS, and that the report be "made
part of the record of the application and available to the public, except
to the extent that security classification prevents disclosure." 434
427 Joint Committee Staff Study, supra note 3 at 29; see AEC, Twenty-third SemiAnnual Report J20 (19s8).
t2s Joint Committee Staff Study, svpra note 3, App. 8 at 133.
429 See Para. (6), "Notice of Hearing," 21 Fed. Reg. 7&9 (Oct. 12, 1956), BNA,
Atomic Industry Reporter 52: 39; and Para. 9, "Memorandum of the Commission"
Oct. 9, 1956, ibid., which stated in part : "This action is being taken because a copy
of the Advisory Committee's report was sent to the Power Reactor Development Co.
on June 18, 1956.•.• The Commission has concluded that the public interest would
be served in this instance by making the document available to the interveners and the
public."
430 Letter of AEC General Manager Fields to Joint Committee Executive Director,
Oct. 17, 1956, Joint Committee Staff Study, supra note 3, App. 9 at 136.
431 H.R. 7383 and S. 2051, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., favorably reported by the Joint
Committee May 9, 1957, Sen. Rep. No. 296, supra note 32, and H.R. Rep. No. 435, supra
note 223.
432 Pub. L. 85-256, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
483 Section 29, 42 U.S.C.A. §2039.
434 Section 182b, 42 U.S.<:;.A. §2232(b). The requirement for publicity of ACRS
reports was closely tied in with that of Section 189a, as amended, requiring a formal
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The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 authorizes the Commission to provide by regulation
. . . in the case of agency proceedings or actions which involve Restricted Data or defense information . . . for such
parallel procedures as will effectively safeguard and prevent
disclosure of Restricted Data or defense information to unauthorized persons with minimum impairment of the procedural
rights which would be available if Restricted Data or defense
information were not involved. 485
This provision constitutes a landmark in administrative law and a
praiseworthy attempt to accommodate the national need for information security with administrative due process and fairness to persons
participating in the atomic energy program. 48 6"
The Commission delayed in implementing the statutory provision for
hearing in all Section 103, 104b, and 104c procedings. See H.R. Rep. No. 435, supra
note 223 at 12: "Having established the Committee [ACRS] under the bill, it was
thought that its functions would be best served if its reports should be made public,
and if the facilities of the type on which its report were required should be licensed
only after a public hearing. . . . [F]ull, free, and frank discussion in public of the
hazards involved in any particular reactor would seem to be the most certain way of
assuring that the reactors will indeed be safe and that the public will be fully apprised
of this fact." The policy of ACRS, according to its chairman, is to avoid "concerning
itself with problems of national policy other than the question of safety. The Committee believes that it is possible to conduct the operation of nuclear reactors without
unnecessarily exposing the public or workers to harmful amounts of radiation" ( 1958
Section 202 Hearings, supra note 32 at 118). The emphasis by members of the Joint
Committee on the role of ACRS is on its freedom of action "to exercise your judgment fully without restriction in this field" (id. at II]). With respect to the ACRS,
an official of the AEC has recently emphasized that the group is an advisory group
only and "not an 'independent agency,' " with the ultimate responsibility for the issuance or non-issuance of a license resting with the Commission ; meetings of the ACRS
probably will not be open, although representatives of the applicant may be asked to
answer questions of ACRS after preliminary study of the application by the latter;
in cases where the ACRS report is favorable, "the hearing is not likely to be protracted" before a hearing examiner (Lowenstein, supra note 421).
485 Section 181, 42 U.S.C.A. §2231.
486 As originally proposed, Section 181 required the AEC to "provide by regulation
for identical procedures except that they shall not be made public." The language of
the section as enacted was proposed by Sen. Hickenlooper (Rep., Iowa), with the
following comment (Joint Committee Staff Study, supra note 3 at 68-69): " ... [T]he
change in section 181 relating to the Administration Procedure Act is to provide the
Commission with a little more flexibility in dealing with procedures than was provided in this section in the bill. ... [T]he procedures are such as to protect against
the wrongful dissemination of restricted data and defense information while at the
same time preserving as many of the normal procedures as possible. . .."
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such "parallel procedures." Apparently as the result of some prodding
by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and "a need in pending proceedings" for such rules, the Commission finally in late 1956 provided
for "parallel procedures" for Restricted Data. 437
As the Commission stated in its notice of rule making:
Discharge of this responsibility [under Section 181 of the
Act] requires the framing of novel procedures; and a delicate
balancing of the need to provide adequate protection for Restricted Data in relation to the importance of providing access
for parties and the public to the records of administrative proceedings before the Commission and information relating
thereto. 638
An important step in the implementation of the statutory provision was
taken in placing these rules in effect.
The principal features of the new "parallel procedures" are ( 1) the
obligation of parties to a proceeding to avoid introduction of Restricted
Data, 489 (2) the requirement of a notice of intent to introduce Restricted Data/ 40 and (3) the authority of the presiding officer to rearrange or suspend the proceeding pending the satisfaction of security
requirements by interested parties and counsel.""1 Effective implementation of these rules will depend, in large part, upon the whole-hearted
cooperation of parties, their counsel, the hearing officer, and the Commission, a pattern which has been established in other types of administrative proceedings before federal agencies where the schedule of hearings, admission of evidence, and the examination of witnesses often is
adjusted to suit the convenience and needs of the parties by mutual
consent. 442 The present rules are not without possible defect, and im637 21 Fed. Reg. 8594 (Nov. 8, 1956) and 21 Fed. Reg. 9741 (Dec. 8, 1956), 10
Code Fed. Regs. §§2.8oo-.814- It is significant that on the same December date that
the AEC published notice of intention to promulgate the parallel procedure regulations, the agency announced promulgation of new rules with respect to public records;
21 Fed. Reg. 9743, 10 Code Fed. Regs. §§9.1-9-7.
48821 Fed. Reg. 8594 (Nov. 8, 1956).
•ae 10 Code Fed. Regs.· §2.8o6.
uo 10 Code Fed. Regs. §§2.8o7-.8o8.
441 10 Code Fed. Regs. §2.8o9.
442 See Section 5(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. §1004(a)
which provides, inter alia: "In fixing the times and places for hearings, due regard
shall be had for the convenience and necessity of the parties or their representatives."
In the PRDC proceedings, AEC Dkt. No. F-16, the agency has had a "classification
officer" available at the hearing to advise the hearing examiner on questions of security information; BN A, Atomic Industry Reporter 3: 87 and 3: 102.
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provements in the procedure certainly should result from experience
gained by the Commission and private parties thereunder. 448
4. Revocation, Suspension, and Modification of Licenses and
Construction Permits
Revocation of a license is specifically subject 444 to the safeguards of
Section 9(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act. 445 This requirement
is implemented by Atomic Energy Commission regulation providing for
opportunity for a formal hearing. 446 However, unlike applications for a
construction permit or license under Sections 103 and 104 of the statute,
the suspension, revocation, or modification of a license requires only
that the agency provide opportunity for hearing.
As under the Administrative Procedure Act, a license or construction
permit may be suspended or revoked, 447 or an order to show cause immediately issued, 448 where "in the opinion of AEC the public health,
interest, or safety requires, or the failure to be in compliance [with the
Act, regulations issued thereunder, or license conditions] is wilful."
Aside from failure to comply with the act, regulations issued thereunder,
or license conditions, other grounds for immediate or future suspension
or revocation of a license include a "material false statement" in an
443 See Report of the Special Committee on Atomic Energy Law, 82 ABA Rep.
J24-25 (1957): (1) "The ... rules seem to contemplate the interruption of public
hearings whenever restricted data may be requested from a witness . . . . This might
be completely disruptive, and, indeed, it might even be used for that purpose~ An
alternative procedure would postpone the introduction of restricted data until some
convenient occasion later in the hearing. . . . " (2) Provision of §2.8o5(d) for interlocutory appeals from rulings of a hearing examiner concerning safeguarding of restricted data "would seem to open the door to innumerable interlocutory appeals which
could delay and disrupt the proceeding. . . . [T]he presiding officer should be left
in control of the proceedings with authority to certify questions relating to access to
restricted data if in his judgment it should seem desirable to do so . . . ." (3) "No
provision is made in the ... rules relative to court review of Commission decisions
involving classified information. . . . It would seem desirable to take notice of the
possibility of review in cases involving classified information. Provision could be
made, for example, for certifying the non-classified record which could be amplified
to contain non-classified statements concerning the general nature and content of the
classified information. . . . The classified record could thereafter be made available
upon court order to the court itself for the purpose of determining its relevance and
importance to an adequate court review. . . ."
4 H Section 186a, 42 U.S.C.A. §2236(a).
445 5 U.S.C.A. §1oo8(b).
446 10 Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 2, Subpt. B.
447 10 Code Fed. Regs. §§2.20I(b), 70.6I(d), 40.25, J0.5I(c), 50.100, and 55-40(a)
and (b).
448 10 Code Fed. Regs. §2.202(a) (2).
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application or report, 449 conviction of the licensee for violation of the
antitrust laws "in the conduct of the licensed activity," 450 and, in the
case of an operator's license, for personal behavior on the job deemed
by the Commission to create a hazard in the operation of a facility. 451
In connection with the requirements of compliance with license conditions, failure to maintain the records, submit the reports, and permit
the tests and inspections imposed by the statute and regulations,m as
required by the license, would constitute grounds for immediate or proposed suspension or revocation of a license. When a license for a commercial or non-commercial production or utilization facility is revoked
or suspended, the facility can be seized and operated by the government
upon payment of "just compensation." 453
Prior to 1958, the Commission suspended only one license, and this
without hearing because of the danger to public health and safety. By
order dated May 2, 1957, a byproduct material license was temporarily
suspended because of "certain incidents . . . resulting in the contamination of major portions of the facility from by-product material," the
contamination of clothing or employees, and "a potential hazard to the
health and safety of employees of the Company and members of their
families." 454
This AEC aCtion represents a wise exercise of the extensive discretionary power which is conferred upon the agency with respect to licenses
once they have been issued. 455 However, in general, there is some reason
" 9 Section 186a, 42 U.S.C.A. §2236(a}; 10 Code Fed. Regs. §§70.61(b), 40.24, 40-40,
J0.51(b}, 50.100, and 55·40(a) and (b).
450 Section 105a, 42 U.S.C.A. §2135(a); 10 Code Fed. Regs. §50.54(g).
m 10 Code Fed. Regs. §55-40(c).
452 Sections 65 and 103b, 42 U.S.C.A. §§2095 and 2133(b); 10 Code Fed. Regs.
§§7o.p(b) (5), 70.51-.54, 40·24. 40·29--30, 30-41--44, IIO.Io-.n, 50.34--35, 50.7o-.71, and
55-41.
m Section 188, 42 U.S.C.A. §2238; 10 Code Fed. Regs. §50.102.
454 Byproduct Material License No. 31-246-1 and 31-2,¢-2, M. W. Kellogg Co.,
''Temporary Suspension Order," 22 Fed. Reg. 3263 (May 9, 1957). The order was
modified to permit, among other things, decontamination of the premises involved,
"Notice of Proposed Modification of Temporary Suspension Order,"- 22 Fed. Reg.
8965 (Nov. 7, 1957): For the complete text of the documents involved in this prOceeding, including the full text of the conditions imposed in the modification order dated
Nov. 7, 1957, and a statement by the General Manager with respect to the incident
dated Nov. 2, 1957, see BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 265: 203-208. On March 14,
1958, the Commission permanently cancelled Kellogg's license at the request of the
licensee; 23 Fed. Reg. 1938 (March 22, 1958).
455 By order dated Feb. · 12, 1958, the Commission temporarily suspended without
hearing Byproduct Material License No. 42-9000-2 of Radiation Products Company
and issued an order for the licensee to show cause why the license should not be sus-
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for apprehension over the Commission's wide authority to revoke
licenses. This is particularly important because the agency's regulations themselves "do not impose self-restraints upon the exercise of that
authority." 458

S· Internal Separation of Functions
Under Section s{c) of the Administrative Procedure Act, except in
cases, among others, of initial licensing, a separation of functions is
required in formal adjudication with respect to hearing officers and investigatory and prosecuting officers. 457 A hearing officer may not be
subject to the direction or jurisdiction of an investigatory or prosecuting officer, nor may such latter type of officer participate or advise in
the decision of a case which he has investigated dr prosecuted. The
principles involved in this salutary provision of the Administrative Procedure Act have been thus summarized:
By internal separation Of powers is meant an arrangement
within an agency designed to prevent the contamination of
judging by other inconsistent functions. The basic objective is
to maintain the integrity of, and public confidence in, case adjudication affecting private rights. The agency employee who
investigates should play no further role in such proceedings
than that of witness. The legal staff members who present
pended or revoked; "Temporary Order and Order to Show Cause," 23 Fed. Reg. 1100
(Feb. 19, 1958). The order alleges that "[u]pon the basis of preliminary investigation,
it apears that ... the company has willfully transferred quantities of Cobalt 6o, a
byproduct material . . . to one or more persons in violation" of the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954 and the applicable regulations issued thereunder. A hearing on the order
initially was set for Feb. 24. 1958, but the respondent waived the hearing. The AEC
was· reported to have notified the Texas State Commissioner of Health and the Dallas
City Health Officer of the action taken by the federal agency. " ... [T]he fact that
the AEC has taken this action in the Radiation Products case may stem from the reaction to last year's M. W. Kellogg Company radiation incident at Houston~· (BNA,
Atomic Industry Reporter 4: 6o-61). On April 18, 1958, the AEC served notice of
intent to revoke the Radiation Products Company license effective February 7, 1958,
unless contested by the licensee, for violation of .the original suspension order. The
Commission claimed failure by Radiation Products Company to request a transfer of
the original license from it to Radiation Products Company, incorporated by the
former principal, in Radiation Products Company, 23 Fed. Reg. 2817 (April 26, 1958).
By order dated June 13, 1958, as modified July 24. 1958, the AEC temporarily suspended part of the license of a user of byproduct material for non-destructive testing,
and a hearing before the AEC hearing examiner on claimed violations of the license
was held in July, 1958, In The Matter of Advance Industrial X-Ray Laboratories,
By-Product Material License No. 41695-2B59.
456 Trowbridge. supra note 146 at 859.
45 7 5 t:.S.C .A §1004(c); see Plaine, supra note 77 at 813-14.
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evidence on behalf of the agency should not participate in the
ultimate decision of the case. The officer who presides at the
hearing can exercise his independent judgment on the evidence only if he is insulated against agency and staff influence.
The agency members should exercise their judgment on the
written record without consultation with those who investigated, prosecuted and heard the case below. These are the
fundamental objectives of internal separation of functions
vital to the protection of private rights. 458
Problems of internal separation have been presented to the Atomic
Energy Commission in its first formal licensing proceeding, that involving PRDC. 459 One of these related to the role of agency counsel in
the proceeding, since the PRDC conditional construction permit had
been issued with the active support and encouragement of the Commission itself. The PRDC proceeding involved initial licensing, and the
separation of functions ordinarily required by the Administrative Procedure Act was not applicable! 60 The Commission complied, to a limited
extent, with the spirit of the latter statute by creating a separated legal
staff for AEC participation at the hearing level. 461 The Commission did
not, however, permit the hearing examiner to issue an intermediate or
•~s

Hoover Commission Legal Task Force Report, supra note 43 at 176-177.
Power Reactor Development Company, AEC Dkt. F-16. As the result of the
criticism of the Commission's role in this proceeding, the Chairman of the Joint Committee directed its staff to study the problem of insuring "sharper separation of the
licensing function within the AEC organization" and invited comments thereon from
the AEC itself, Joint Committee Staff Study, supra note 3 at v and L See also BNA,
Atomic Industry Reporter 2: 413.
480 Section 5(c), 5 U.S.C.A. §1004(c).
461 The separated staff was represented by the Acting General Counsel and two
other attorneys of the AEC. Briefs filed by these attorneys stated that they were "submitted by the separated staff established for the purpose of representing AEC as a
party to this proceeding" and reflected "only the views of the separated staff" and not
those of the Commission itself. See AEC Response to Questionnaire, supra note 77
at 1095; AEC General Manager Fields' letter to Joint Committee Chairman Anderson, Dec. 12, 1956, Joint Committee Staff Study, st~pra note 3, App. IIB at I78-179,
which read, in part: " ..• [T]he Commission has established a separated· staff for
the preparation and conduct of the proceeding on behalf of the AEC. . • . In the
preparation and conduct of the proceeding, the separated staff will not be subject to
supervision by persons not on the separated staff. This staff will not participate in
advising the Commission with respect to its decision. . . . To assure the impartiality
of these AEC staff members in advising the Commission, the Commission has directed
that such staff members may not discuss with members of the separated staff questions relating to the position to be taken by the separated staff at the proceeding..•.
The separated staff will attempt in the public interest to insure that all relevant facts
not brought out by the other· parties are fully developed at the hearing. . . ."
459
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initial decision in the case, thus reserving unto itself all of the judging
function. 462
The PRDC proceeding brought to public attention an equally important problem with respect to the application of separation of functions to the Atomic Energy Commission itsel£. 463 Prior to December
1957, the Division of Civilian Application of the AEC exercised regulatory functions with respect to licensing and non-regulatory functions
with respect to the stimulation of reactor development by private industry.464 That the promotional efforts of the Commission might conflict
462 Joint Committee Staff Study, supra note 3 at 39: "The separation of the 'judging' function in the PRDC case was of a limited nature, however, and only applied
to staff advisers, because the Commission did not delegate to the hearing examiner
any power to make an initial decision, but retained all 'judging' authority and responsibility itself." The Commission recognizes the importance of maintaining the independence of hearing examiners assigned to it. ( 1958 Section 202 Hearings, supra note
32 at 87 and 89); see ~tatement by Commissioner Floberg to the Joint Committee,
id. at Sg-go: "One of the things I am particularly sensitive to is the complete independence of the trial examiners. As long as I have anything to do with this Commission, our trial examiners will be the most independent of any agency in Washing-:
ton" ; see note 404, sufi1:a.
463 A less spectacular, but no less important, problem raised by the PRDC proceedings concerned the role to be played by AEC employees and consultants as expert witnesses during the course of the hearing. Since many such persons had played an
important part in developing the PRDC project, the evidence of these witnesses was
pertinent and important to the making of a complete factual record. During the proceedings, charges were made by the intervenors to the Joint Committee that the AEC
had sought to draw "a curtain between nuclear experts [of the AECJ and critics of
the Commission" (statement of B. C. Sigal, IUE, AFL-CIO, General Counsel, 1957
Section 202 Hearings, supra note 7 at 470). This situation was claimed to have arisen
because of instructions issued to AEC staff members by the Director, Division of
Civilian Application, generally cautioning against participation in such procedings as
witnesses unless ordered to appear by subpoena (id. at 471-475). In the Post-Hearing
Brie£ of Intervenors, it was argued that the "Commission denied Intervenors a fair
hearing in warning consultants of the Commission that they may be subject to criminal
prosecution under conflict of interest laws if they have testified for the parties in this
case, other than AEC" (supra note 291 at 22-25). See AEC Response to Questionnaire, supra note 77 at 1096: " ... [T]here has been direction to AEC personnel concerning their participation on behalf of parties other than the AEC in proceedings
before the agency. AEC employees are directed to provide information and services
to parties to a proceeding on the same basis as they would follow with regard to other
persons, but are prohibited from consulting on their own time or voluntarily serving
as witnesses for any party. AEC employees were for the purposes of the PRDC
matter permitted to appear on subpoena by any party to a proceeding. In the matter
of PRDC the General Manager did testify upon subpoena by the intervenors."
464 AEC Release No. 1238, Dec. 26, 1957, BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 209:21;
see AEC Announcement No. PSM0-3, "Organization of the Division of Civilian Application," Nov. 2, 1956, I oint Committee Staff Study ,-upra note 3, App. 1 r at 176178; statement of AE( 1 'ommissioner Graham, 1951:\ Section 202 Hearings, supra
note 32 at 84.
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with its responsibilities in adjudicating applications for construction
permits and commercial licenses always was inherent in that agency's
organization so long as promotional and adjudicatory functions were
grouped at the staff level in one division. 465
The most drastic proposal for reorganization of the Commission contemplated the creation of two entirely separate statutory agencies, the
one concerned with regulation of private industry and the other with
military matters and the promotion and development of atomic energy
technology. 466 The Commission, to date, has opposed this step. 467 A
middle course proposed by the staff of the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy, which would create separate regulatory and promotional divisions within the Commission, 468 was, in fact, adopted by the Commission in December 1957.469 Under this reorganization, a Division of
Licensing and Regulation, reporting to the General Manager ,' 70 handles
all licensing and regulatory functions theretofore assigned to the Divi465 The intervenors in the PRDC proceeding sought to take advantage of claimed
conflicts of interest within the AEC between that agency's promotional responsibilities
and those relating to licensing. They moved that the AEC Chairman disqualify himself from considering the case when it reached the Commission because of two public
statements made by him concerning the PRDC project. These statements, the intervenors argued, revleaded "bias and prejudice in favor of PRDC' (Post-Hearing Brief
of Interveners, supra note 291 at 25-28. In its Brief, supra note 314 at 8, the applicant
argued that the position of intervenors "if sustained, would frustrate the administration of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. It would mean that if, as here, the Chairman
or a member of the Commission fulfills his executive obligations to expound congressional and Commission policy and to make recommendations to Congress regarding
its effectuation, he ipso facto disqualifies himself from performing the adjudicatory
duties that the law places ui>on him. . . ."
466 ]oint Cominittee Staff Study, supra note 3 at 44: "The separated agency would
regulate the private atomic energy industry, while the AEC would continue to be
responsible for the main operating program, including procurement of raw materials,
production of special nuclear materials, manufacture of weapons, and the research and
development program. . . . This separation could be achieved by reducing the present
number of AEC Commissioners from 5 to 3, and by creating a second commission of
3 members to regulate the atomic industry. . . ."
467 AEC Chairman Strauss' letter to Joint Committee Chairman Anderson, Jan. 4,
1957, id., App. 5 at 109; see 46-47.
468 I d. at 44-45.
469 Plans for the reorganization were announced by the AEC at the time it published
Part 1 of its regulations dealing with the offices and divisions of the Commission; zz
Fed. Reg. 9972 (Dec. 12, 1957). However, these regulations still provided for a Division of Civilian Application, 10 Code Fed. Regs. §1.113. On Dec. z6, 1957, the Commission announced that the Division of Civilian Application had been replaced by the
Division of Licensing and Regulation and the Office of Industrial Development;
BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 4: 3·
470 Section 24a, 42 U.S.C.A. §zo34(a); 10 Code Fed. Regs. §I.H>7.
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sian of Civilian Application. 471 An Office of Industrial Development,
reporting to the Assistant General Manager for Research and Industrial
Development, 472 was assigned the responsibility for developing over-all
Commission policy to encourage and assist private activities in the
civilian application of atomic energy.
The greater the internal separation of functions achieved by the
agency itself within the spirit and the letter of the Administrative Procedure Act, the less need, and the less pressure, for legislative action
creating a separation at the level of the agency or the divisions thereof.
In view of the special problems which affect the Atomic Energy Commission and the industry regulated thereby, 473 greater adherence by the
AEC to the areas of internal separation marked out by the Congress in
the 1946 procedure statute would go far to meet the criticisms leveled
at the agency. Should these procedures fail to provide that degree of
insulation of the judging from the prosecuting, investigating, and developmental functions which will assure administrative due process and
encourage public and Congressional confidence in the atomic energy program, then more drastic action by the legislature may well be favorably
considered. Such drastic action, of course, will be invited by the Commission if it fails to meet the standards set by the spirit as well as the
letter of the Administrative Procedure Act. 474
6. Congressional Review of Licensing
Although the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy was given the
authority under the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 475 to sit as a reviewing
body in the case of facilities' licenses. proposed to be issued by the
4n 10 Code Fed. Regs. §I.IIJ.
472 Section 24c, 42 U.S.C.A. §2034(cY; 10 Code Fed. Regs. §I.IIO.
478 Joint Committee Staff Study, mpra note 3, at 42-43; see id. at 47: "At this
stage of the atomic-development program, the arguments against a separate agency
are perhaps more persuasive than they will be at a later stage when commercial production of atomic power is achieved .and the Government's developmental and pro-.
motional assignments are a less prominent part of the Government's overall role [in]
atomic-power development. . . . As a longer range view is taken of atomic energy
development, however, the strength of the arguments against a separate agency diminish, and tend at some point to be outweighed by the arguments favoring separation. . . ."
474 Such was the case when Congress in 1947 conferred final authority on the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board with respect to investigation of
unfair labor practices, issuance of complaints thereon, and prosecution of such complaints before the Board, -29 U.S.C.A. §153 (d), while the Board continued to exercise
the adjudicatory authority of the agency, 29 U.S.C.A. §160.
m Section 7, 42 U.S.C. §1807 (1946).
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Atomic Energy Commission, this authority never was exercised. As
originally enacted, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 did not provide for
such review, but, by amendment to the appropriations provisions of the
statute in 1957, this review has been provided for indirectly.
It is reported that the Chairman of the Joint Committee refused in
January 1957 to have a hearing devoted exclusively to the then pending
construction permit for Power Reactor Development Co. 476 However,
in the hearings which the Committee held thereafter with respect to the
development, growth, and state of the atomic energy industry 471 and
to authorizing legislation for the AEC budget for fiscal year 1958,478
the issues involved in the PRDC proceeding were a major source of discussion and controversy. Although the procedure whereby AEC funds
were authorized and then appropriated had been the subject of prior
adverse comment by some members of Congress/ 79 it is clear that the
controversy resulting from the proposed construction permit for PRDC
brought the matter to a head. The result was a drastic change in the
authorizing procedure 480 which may well result in Joint Committee
review of all construction permit and licensing proceedings involving
in any way financial help from the federal government.
476 By letter dated Jan. 16, 1957, Rep. Ashley (Dem., Ohio) requested Joint Committee Chairman Durham "to make it [the PRDC project] a proper subject of hear-·
ings by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy." The Chairman responded that the
question was "not appropriate" for a separate hearing. BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 3:46-47.
n1 See, e.g., exchange between between Rep. Holifield and counsel for some of the
intervenors, 1957 Section 202 Hearings, supra note 7 at 479: "Representative Holifield. So your contention essentially is this; That •.. you are now asking this committee to exercise its jurisdiction and go into this matter [the PRDC proceeding]
thoroughly? Mr. Sigal. Yes...•"
478 See, e.g., Statement of Walter P. Reuther, President, UAW, AFL-CIO, 1957
Authorizing Legislation Hearings, supra note 7 at 6o2: "The Atomic Energy Commission will probably wait until this session of the Congress had adjourned and reaffirm their decision taken last year. The only recourse the people of Detroit and
Toledo have lies in this Committee. We urge you not to permit the construction of
this hazardous fast-breeder reactor...• We urge you to disapprO'Ue and disallow the
authorization sought here until the AEC cancels the construction permit . . ." [Emphasis supplied.] The opposite point of view was expressed by Robert W. Hartwell, Assistant General Manager of PRDC, id. at 634: "Messrs. Reuther and Sigal have
asked the subcommittee to sit in judgment on the uncompleted record of the construction permit proceeding. • . . Messrs. Reuther and Sigal obviously want the subcommittee and the Congress to sit as· a court of appeal and to do so before a!J. the facts
are in. . . ."
479 H.R. Rep. No. 571, supra note 241 at 2; Rep. Cannon, 103 Cong. Rec. 518g
(1957); BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter I: 19.
480 Section 261, 42 U.S.C.A. §2017; see Green, "The Strange Case of Nuclear
Power," 17 Fed. Bar J. 100, 123-125 (1957).
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Prior to the 1957 amendment to Section 261 of the Atomic Energy
Act, the Commission was required to submit the construction portion of
its proposed program for the coming fiscal yea~ for review and authorization by the Joint Committee and Congress before appropriations were
requested from Congressional appropriations committees. The remainder of the Commission's program, that is, expenditures not involving so-called "bricks and mortar," was submitted directly to the House
Ways and Means Committee without prior authorizing legislation initiated by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and passed by
Congress. 481
The original appropriations procedure of the 1954 act was, in the
opinion of the Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee,
"inadequate as a framework within which appropriation requests can be
adequately considered for atomic electric power." He criticized the practice of the Commission in "arbitrarily" dividing its civilian power
reactor program under the first three rounds of invitation into two fiscal
categories, one covering physical structures subject to prior Congressional authorization by the Joint Committee and the other covering
operating expenses not so subject to such prior authorization. The
result, according to the Chairlllan,
. . . has been that for fiscal years 1956, 1957, and 1958 the
amount appropriated and requested for the civilian power reactor program totals $236.8 million, of which only $40 million
was authorized under authorizing legislation reported out by
the joint committee and approved by the Congress. . . .482
Section 261, as amended in 1957, now requires that appropriations
involving any non-military experimental reactor designed to produce
more than ro,ooo thermal kilowatts of heat or designed to be used in
the production of electric power must be authorized by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy before legislation appropriating the funds
481 This departure from the treatment accorded .most regulatory agencies by legislation aff~cting their appropriations was made possible by the former language of
Section 261, which automatically authorized to be appropriated "such sums as may
be ~ecessary and appropriated to carry out the provisions and purposes of this Act
except such as may be necessary for the acquisition or condemnation of any real property or any facility or for plant or facility acquisition, construction, or expansion."
Under Section 19 of the 1946 statute, 42 U.S.C. §1819 (1946), "there are hereby
authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary and appropriate to carry
out the provisions of this Act," without any requirement for authorizing legislation.
482 Rep. Cannon, 103 Cong. Rec. 5189 (1957); see H.R. Rep. No. 571, mpra note
241 at 2.
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therefor can be enacted. 483 Specific authorization also now is required
for funds
. . . necessary to carry out cooperative programs with persons
for the development and construction of reactors for the demonstration of their use, in whole or in part, in the production
of electric power or process heat, or for propulsion, or solely
or principally for the commercial provision of byproduct material, irradiation, or other special services, for civilian use, by
arrangements (including contracts, agreements, and loans) or
amendments thereto, providing for the payment of funds, the
rendering of services, and the undertaking of research and development without full reimbursement, . . . by the Commission of any other financial assistance pursuant to such
arrangement. . . .484
The effect of this legislation 485 is to bring the regulation and development of contractual arrangements between the Commission and private
industry and many non-profit research institutions under the additional
umbrella of JointCommittee supervision. Thereby, that committee will
be placed in a position to review all applications for construction permits or licenses involving financial benefits. m Although reform in the
procedure for authorizing the appropriation of funds for the Atomic
Energy Commission probably was long overdue, the atmosphere in
Section 26Ia(I), 42 U.S.C.A. §20I7(a) (I).
Section 26Ia(2), 42 U.S.C.A. §20I7(a) (2).
485 The administration of Section 26Ia(2), as implemented by Section III of each
authorization bill, is thus explained by the Joint Committee, H.R. Rep. No. 57I, supra
note 241 at 9: "Under Section 26Ia(2) and proposed section III of the authorization
bill, it is contemplated that ·the Commission will request each year authorization for
a certain amount of funds as a lump sum for use in a program not to exceed another
lump SUlii, larger in amount. The first amount would cover appropriations to be
authorized, while the second amount would provide a total limitation on the payments
and other cpnsiderations which could be made available under the program ... As
each individual agreement is negotiated under that lump sum, the basis of the proposed
individual arrangement . . . must be submitted to the Joint Committee, and a period
of 45 days must elapse while Congress is in session . . . before the Commission may
enter the individual arrangement" (emphasis supplied). The latter requirement is that
provided in a uniform Section III for authorization bills agreed upon by the Joint
Committee, id. at 8, and as enacted in the authorizing legislation for fiscal year I958,
Pub. L. 85-I62, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (I957).
486 This will affect all outstanding construction permits held by persons under the
first and second rounds of the civilian power reactor program. See H.R. Rep. No. 57I,
supra note 24I at g: "Thus [under Section 26I of the Atomic Energy Act and Section III of authorizing legislation] the basis for each arrangement by the AEC with
industry under the first, second, third, and all subsequent rounds, will be submitted
individually to the Joint Committee before the Commission may proceed to enter into
the arrangement. All arrangements heretofore entered into are subject to the authorization and appropriation of funds, unless obligated. . . ."
488

484
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which this legislative change has been effected was unfortunate. The
new Section 261 was designed in general to increase Congressional control over the atomic energy program. In particular, it was intended to
give the Joint Committee indirect control over the licensing of the
civilian atomic energy industry both in the production of electrical
energy and in research and development.
It is clear that Commission financial support for many developmental
projects will be required in the future. Under the civilian power reactor
program, this aid has taken the form of waiver of established Commission charges for use of source and special nuclear material, mutually
agreed-upon research and development work in federal laboratories
where such work is not reasonably available elsewhere, and support of
research and development required to advance the technology of the industry as a whole. To limit this help, or to subject all contracts and
other arrangements concerned therewith to Congressional scrutiny and
possible rejection, therefore constitutes a limitation upon the licensing
authority of the regulatory body involved.
7· Judicial Review
Under Section 14(a) of the McMahon Act of 1946 487 the provisions
of Section 10 of the Administration Procedure Act 488 were made applicable to decisions of the Atomic Energy Commission. Under the
Administrative Procedure Act, judicial review of agency action causing
legal wrong to any person is provided, except where " ( 1) statutes preclude judicial review or ( 2) agency action is by law committed to
agency discretion."
The 1946 provision never was implemented by either statutory review procedure or agency regulation. Only two judicial decisions have
been found dealing with Section 14, and they did not construe the
scope of review intended by Congress, except to emphasize the bar to
judicial reconsideration of agency discretion. 489
The 1954 statute established a more explicit set of provisions for
42 U.S.C. §1814(a) (1946).
5 U.S.C.A. §1009.
489 Fletcher v. Commission, 192 F. :zd 29, 33 (D.C. Cir. 1951), ceri. den. 342 U.S.
914 (1952) (Court of Appeals can review Commission denial of award for alleged use
of petitioners' inventions but not denial of "just compensation" for such alleged use,
the remedy therefor being suit in Court of Claims); United Electrical, Radio &
Machine Workers of America v. Lilienthal, 84 F. Supp. 64o (D.C.D.C. 1949) (Court
cannot review "executive action committed by law to the discretion of the Atomk
Energy Commission")
487

488
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judicial review. Under Section 189b,490 judicial review is expressly
permitted from final orders entered in proceedings for ( 1) the granting,
suspending, revoking, or amending of any license or construction permit
or. application to transfer control, ( 2) the issuance or modification of
rules and regulations dealing with the activities of licensees, and (3) the
payment of compensation, awards, or royalties.
The area of judicial review may be actually narrower under the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 than under the 1946 atomic energy legislation. It is not impossible that the government would claim that any
other final order of the Commission entered in a proceeding not specifically listed in Section 189b is impliedly excluded from judicial review.491 Such a position, however, would be contrary to the legislative
intent in enacting Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act. 492
The procedure for invoking review under the Atomic Energy Act of
1954 is provided under a statute enacted by Congress in 1950. 493 This
legislation, after 1954, gave the Federal Courts of Appeals "exclusive
jurisdiction to enjoin, set aside, suspend (in whole or in part), or to
determine the validity of, all final orders . . . of the Atomic Energy
Commission made reviewable" by Section 189 of the 1954 act. 494 The
restrictive language of this statute as to the reviewabie orders of the
Commission also creates a likelihood that judicial review of Commission
action will be sought to be closely restricted by the government.
8. Indemnity and Public Liability
By amendment in 1957 to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,405 Congress has sought to meet the problems of public liability and property
49o 42 U.S.C.A. §2239(b).

Thus, the Joint Committee report on the 1954 act stated that "Section 189 provides for judicial review of a final order of the Commission entered ill certain agency
actions" (H.R. Rep. No. 2181, supra note 5 at 29). [Emphasis supplied.] See Joint
Committee Staff Study, supra note 3 at 71-75; McGrath v. Zander, 177 F. 2d 649
(D.C. Cir. 1949) (orders of Alien Property Custodian).
49 2 Sen.. Doc. No. 248, supra note 43 at 275: . "To preclude judicial review under
this bill [Administrative Procedure Act] a statute, if not specific in withholding such
review, must upon.i~ face give cl~ and convincing evidence of an intent to withhold it.
The ~ere .failure to provide specially by statute for judicial review is certainly no
evidence of intent to withhold review."
498 5 U.S.C.A. §§WJI et seq.
494 5 U.S.C.A. §1032.
496 Pub. L. 85--256, 85th Cong., Ist Sess. (1957). See Butler, "Liability Insurance
for the Nuclear Energy HaZ<lrd," (io P. U. Fort. 9I3 (1957).
491

1304

FEDERAL REGULA TORY AND

damage which might arise from a nuclear accident. As stated by the
Joint Committee,
. . . [T]he problem of possible liability in connection with
the operation of reactors is a major deterrent to further industrial participation in the [civilian reactor] program. While
the [Section] 202 hearings held in 1957 indicate that it may
not be the most important deterrent-that appears to be the
current lack of economic incentive-the problem of liability
has become a major roadblock. 496
Although evidence available to date does not indicate that the ·chances
for, and damages resulting from, such an accident are considerable; 497
Congress has shown salutary foresight and ingenuity in developing a
system of private insurance and governmental indemnity which is made
an integral part of the contracting and licensing controls of the Atomic
Energy Commission. 498 The policy underlying the Congressional action, as added to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 itself, is that
In order to protect the public and to encourage the development
of the atomic energy industry, in the interest of the .general
496 H.R. Rep. No. 435, supra note 22J at I; AEC, Twenty-third Semi-Annual Report I77 (I9S8): "The remote possibility that privately owned nuclear reactors 'migh~
have a catastrophic accident created the problem that private organizations building or
operating the facilities might incur a public liability larger than could be met either
by the financial structure of their organization or by the resources of the insurance
industry. . . ." See Hearings on Governmental Indemnity and Reactor. Safety Before
the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 85th Cong., Ist Sess. I47 (1957) (hereafter
cited as I957 Indemnity Hearings) : " ... [I]n a recent poll conducted by the Atomic
Industrial Forum, the unresolved liability question was rated second only to the lack
of economic incentives as a roadblock to further progress" (testimony of Francis K.
McCune, Vice-President, General Electric Co.); Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc.~
Financial Protection Against Atomic Hazards (I957).
497 H.R. Rep. No. 435, supra note 223, at 3: "Assuming that there were IOO large.
power reactors operating in the United States, the [Atomic Energy] Commission has
found that the most pessimistic of the probabilities involved lead to the estimate that
there would be less than I chance in so million of any person getting killed in any
year in a reactor incident as compared to I chance in s,ooo for getting killed in an
automobile accident. It is also concluded that hypothetical property damages range
from a lower limit of about one-half a million dollars to an upper limit, in the worst
imaginable case, of $7 billion. This latter figure is largely due to a contamination of
land with fission products. . . . There was no disagreement that .the probability of
major reactor accidents was exceedingly low." See testimony of AEC Chairman
Strauss, I957 Indemnity Hearings, supra note 496 at II-I2; AEC, Twenty-third SemiAnnual Report 177-178 (1958).
498 The principal opposition to the enactment of governmental indemnity legislation
was voiced by Rep. Holifietd in a vigorous dissent to the Joint Committee report favoring the legislation, H.R. Rep. No. 435, supra 223 at 35-40. In his opinion, the legislation "would provide another Government subsidy to atomic power development with-
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welfare and of the common defense and security, the United
States may make funds available for a portion of the damages
suffered by the public from nuclear incidents, and may limit
the liability of those persons liable for such losses. 489
The system established by Congress, to be administered by the
Atomic Energy Commission in conjunction with the Joint Committee,
regulates both licensees and contractors of the Commission. Holders of
licenses for the distribution of special nuclear material previously were
required, as a condition of that license, to "hold the United States and
the Commission harmless from any damages resulting from the use or
possession" of such material. 500 This requirement has been modified to
the extent that indemnification by the United States and limitation of
liability are available to licensees and contractors 501 under new Section 170 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. 502
Section 1700 requires that a person holding a license or construction
permit pursuant to either Section 103 or Section 104 of the act 503 must
provide certain financial protection against losses arising from a "nuclear
out any commensurate benefits to taxpayers and power consumers" and "is just another
prop for industries too timid to move ahead without paternalistic Government help"
(id. at 35-36).
499 Section 2i, 42 U.S.C.A. §2012(i). See H.R. Rep. No. 435, supra note 223 at 15:
"The primary concern of the Federal Government is with the protection to the people
who might suffer damages from the new atomic energy industry. Since many of the
reactors which will be built will be producing special nuclear material which is vital
to the defense of the country, it is in the interest of the common defense and security
to see that these companies are protected in their operations by having moneys available to them for payment of public liability claims and having limitations of liability
proceedings available when those funds are insufficient. Since title to special nuclear
material is in the United States, Congress has special powers and duties with respect
to the use of that material. One of the other constitutional bases for the limitation
of liability program is the bankruptcy power of the United States for it is improbable
that any firm could survive claims against it of $soo million, over and above the insurance which might be available."
5oo Section 53e(8), 42 U.S.C.A. §2073(e) (8).
501 See H.R. Rep. No. 435, svpra note 223 at 15.
5o2 42 U.S.C.A. §2210.
50 3 In addition, the Commission has the option to require that a licensee for special
nuclear materials (Section 53 of the 1954 act), source materials (Section 63), and
byproduct materials (Section 81) furnish such financial protection, but it "is not expected that ordinarily the Commission will use the authority given to it with respect
to these latter three types of materials." H.R. Rep. No. 435, svpra note 223 at 19.
In its 1958 report to the Joint Committee required to be submitted under Section 17oi
of the statute, the AEC stated that it was studying the problem of extending insuranceindenmity requirements to licensees other than those licensed under Sections 103 or 104,
BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 4: 116.
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incident," 504 and also must enter into an indemnity agreement with the
Atomic Energy Commission. 605 Under Section 170b and temporary
Commission regulation, 506 financial protection, i.e., the ability to respond
in damages for public Iiability, 507 must be provided in the amount of
$150,000 per thousand kilowatts of thermal energy capacity authorized
by the applicable license, but in no cases shall the amount of coverage be
less than $250,000 for each nuclear reactor. 508
504 A "nuclear incident" is defined in Section uo, 42 U.S.C.A. §2014(o), as "any
occurrence within the United States causing bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death,
or loss of or damage to property, or for loss of use of property, arising out of or resulting from the radioactive, toxic, explosive, or other hazardous properties of source,
special nuclear, or byproduct material." See H.R. Rep. No. 435, supra note 223 at 16:
"The definition of 'nuclear incident' is designed to protect the public against any form
of damage arising from the special dangerous properties of the materials used in the
atomic energy program. ... [l]t was not thought that an incident would necessarily
have to occur within any relatively short period of time. For instance, the steady exposure to radiation ... could constitute an incident. . . . The indemnification agreements are intended to cover damages caused by nuclear incidents for which there may
be liability no matter when the damage is discovered, i.e., even after the end of the
license. . . ."
5011 Section 17oa also establishes a third type of licensing condition applicable to
persons which have immunity against suit, i.e., state-owned educational institutions.
Such an institution may be required by the Commission to "shed its immunity," H.R.
Rep. No. 435, supra note 223 at 19-20; see 10 Code Fed. Regs. §140.16. The provision of Section 17oa that the AEC "may require, as a furti:Ier condition of issuing
a license, that an applicant waive any immunity from public liability conferred by
Federal or State law" has created difficulties for the Commission which are not yet
satisfactorily resolved. In its April 1958 report to the Joint Committee, the AEC
stated that, with only one exception, federal and state agencies receiving facilities'
licenses from the Commission claimed they could not waive immunity from public
liability because of existing statutory or constitutional law. According to the AEC,
work was progressing on possible legislation to waive federal immunity from tort
liability with respect to claims arising out of nuclear incidents and on a model bill
for such waiver by the states up to the amount of insurance carried and the AEC indemnity. BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 4: II5-II6. (Ed. Note: By Pub. L. 85-744
( 72 Stat. 837), Congress added Section 170k to the Act to exempt nonprofit educational institutions from the requirements of Section 170 and provided for the federal
indemnity of $soo,ooo to apply to public liability in excess of $250,000 arising from a
nuclear incident.)
5os 10 Code Fed. Regs. §140.II. The temporary regulations were issued Sept. II,
1957, shortly after enactment of Section 170 of the statute; 22 Fed. Reg. 7223, BNA,
Atomic Industry Reporter 227:625. In its report to the Joint Committee in April
1958, the AEC submitted the draft of a proposed permanent regulation with respect
to amounts of insurance to be carried by reactors, 10 Code Fed. Regs. §140.II, and
stated that it was considering the amendment of other provisions of the temporary
regulation, BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 54: 31.
507 Section nj, 42 U.S.C.A. §2014(i).
11os AEC licensees under Sections 103 and 104 of the statute were required to submit proof of financial protection to the agency within 30 days after Sept. 26, 1957, 10
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Although Section 170b and the Commission's regulations permit
financial protection in the form of private contractual indemnities, self
insurance, other proof of financial responsibility, or a combination of
such measures, 509 it is clear that insurance coverage from private sources
is, and will be, the preferred method for complying with the Congressional mandate. Insurance pools established by stock and mutual companies prior to 1957 were believed capable of insuring losses up to
$65 million in connection with a single nuclear accident. 510
Provided a licensee has secured the necessary financial protection, he
then is .entitled to an agreement of indemnity 511 from the Atomic
Energy Commission. In providing for this protection, Section 170c of
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, provides:
The Commission shall, with respect to licenses issued between
August 30, 1954, and August 1, 1g67, for which it requires
financial protection, agree to indemnify and hold harmless the
licensee and other persons indemnified, as their interest may
appear, from public liability arising from nuclear incidents
which is in excess of the level of financial protection required
of the licensee. The aggregate indemnity for all persons inCode Fed. Regs. §140.13(a). Licensees are required to notify the Commission of any
material change in proof of financial protection or in other financial information filed
with the agency in connection therewith, id., §140.13(e). Where an insurance policy
is furnished by the licensee, notice of renewal thereof must be furnished the Commission at least 30 days prior to its expiration date, id., §140.14(b). Under 10 Code
Fed. Regs. §I40.15(b), failure to provide proof of financial protection is grounds for
suspension or revocation of a license. The proposed permanent amendment to 10 Code
Fed. Regs. §140.II would require a minimum of $3,000,000 in financial protection for
any nuclear reactor, with a. maximum required coverage of $6o millions, the amount
of the insurance to be determined by formula based, among other things, on maximum
power level, fuel cycle, and population possibly subject to a nuclear accident.
50 9 10 Code Fed. Regs. §140.12. Under this regulation, "the licensee shall not substitute one type of financial protection for another type without first obtaining the
written approval of the Commission." See H.R. Rep. No. 435, s11pra note 223 at 20-21.
The AEC reported to the Joint Committee, in April 1958, that 12 out of 22 licensees
required to submit proof of financial protection submitted insurance policies, and
one elected to show adequate resources for self-insurance (BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 4= II5).
5to H.R. Rep. No. 435, supra note 223· at 7 and to- II; AEC, Twenty-third SemiAnnual Report 177-178 (1958) ; 1957 Indemnity Hearings, supra note 496 at 81-144511 Although the Commission has not yet announced a form of indemnity agreement
to be used under Section I 70, "The Commission will, in due course, execute and issue
agreements of indemnity," such agreements to be effective on the date of the regulations issued under Section 170 170 (Sept. 26, 1957) or the "effective date of the
license authorizing the licensee to operate the nuclear reactor involved, whichever is
later" (Io Code Fed. Regs. §t40.17(a) ). Section 17of and 10 Code Fed. Regs.
§140.17(b) establish a fee o~ $30 per year per thousand kilowatts of thermal capacity
authorized for the licensee to be issued an agreement of indemnity.
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demnified in connection with each nuclear incident shall not
exceed $soo,ooo,ooo including the reasonable costs of investigating and settling claims and defending suits for damage.
Such a contract of indemnification shall cover public liability
arising out of or in connection with licensed activity.m

Under Section 17oe, the liability of persons indemnified by the Commission is limited to $500 millions, together with the amount of financial
protection required, with respect to any single nuclear incident. 518 Such
limitation may be enforced by a proceeding instituted by the Commission or any person indemnified in the appropriate United States District
Court having jurisdiction in bankruptcy over the applicant. 614
Under Section 170d of the 1957 amendment to the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954, the Commission is authorized
. . . to treat with its own contractors in the same way it can
treat with licensees under the provisions of this bill. . . . It
is hoped that the Commission will adopt a policy of extending
indemnity provisions to· contractors and subcontractors consistent with that extended to licensees and their suppliers and
subcontractors. . . .
In this subsection, 'however, the Commission is allotted discretion as to the amount of financial protection which may be
n 2 42 U.S.C.A. §2210(c). Section 170h further provides that the "agreement of
indemnity may contain such terms as the Commission deems appropriate to carry out
the purposes of this section," and shall require the person indemnified to cooperate
with the Commission and Attorney General of the United States in any proceedings
involving payment of the indemnity. With respect to the reasons for establishing a
system of governmental indemnity, rather than of insurance, the Joint Committee has
stated, H.R. Rep. No. 435, supra note 223 at 9: ."A system of indemnification is established rather than an insurance system, since there is no way to establish any
actuarial basis for the full protection required. The chance that a reactor will run
away is too small and the foreseeable possible damages of the reactor are too great
to allow the accumulation of a fund which would be adequate.•.. [I]f, as the Joint
Committee anticipates, there never will be any call on the fund for payments, the funds
will have been accumulated to no purpose. Hence, in this instance it seemed wisest to
the Joint Committee not to treat this as an insurance problem but to treat it as an indemnification problem...•"
na In its· report the Joint Committee recognized that it might be necessary for Congress to increase the amount of the indemnity, or the amount of limitation of liability,
"in the light of the particular incident" (H.R. Rep. No. 435, supra note 223 at 21-22).
GH I d. at 22-23. Under Section 17oi, the Commission is required to make a survey
of the incident and report the same to the Joint Committee, as "an aid tO the Congress
in establishing the causes of a nuclear incident. It is, in part, an aid to the parties in
any action where it is unlikely that the public would be able to obtain the full amount
of technical information which might be required . . . ." (H.R. Rep. No. 435, supra note
223 at 24). The AEC also must report to the Joint Committee on April 1 of each
year concerning operations under Section 170.
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required of its contractors before the $500 million guaranteed
indemnity attaches. This authority is to be available for any
type of contract which the Commission may enter into, as well
as to contracts and projects which the Commission may enter
into jointly with other agencies of the Government . . . . 515
Although the Commission has not issued regulations with respect to the
above provisions, persons contracting with a licensee will be afforded
protection under the indemnity agreement made by the Commission
with such a licensee. 1118
9· Transportation and Transmission
Areas of possible conflict between the Atomic Energy Commission
and other federal and state regulatory agencies arise in connection with
the transportation of atomic materials and the transmission of electricity
produced from nuclear energy. Although these two phases of government regulation are generaJiy unrelated, they have a common characteristic in that the jurisdiction of the AEC is either duplicated or supplemented, and they present possible problems of conflicting jurisdiction.
a. Transportation
Although possession of source, byproduct, and special nuclear materials must be licensed by the Atomic Energy Commission, in the case
6u /d. at 21-22.

As a "person indemnified" within the definition of that term in Section 11r of
the statute, 42 U.S.C.A. §2014(r); see H.R. Rep. No. 435, supra note 223 at 17. The
Joint Committee report also dealt with the problem facing carriers "transporting spent
fuel elements from a reactor to a processing plant. If such a company, whether through
negligence or otherwise, should have an accident which would spill the radioactive materials into a stream, this bill would afford protection to the public and to the carrier,
even though the carrier is not required to be a licensee under the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954. . . ." Where the carrier transports materials and assemblies, such as reactor
parts with fuel elements installed therein, it usually does so without any knowledge of
the contents of the shipment, which is made by a contractor of the Commission. In
such cases, the only recourse of the carrier, to assure protection in the event of a
nuclear accident, may be to obtain a contract of carriage directly from the Commission.
See 19.s8 Section 202 Hearings supra note 32 at 274-276.
On January 16, 1958, the AEC announced that it was offering statutory indemnity
to "[C]ommission prime contractors and their suppliers engaged in the operation of
nuclear reactors or in operation of facilities such as gaseous diffusion plants or chemical separation plants" and "to other contractors engaged in activities involving the risk
of occurrence of a substantial nuclear incident" (AEC Press Ret. No. A-9, see BNA,
Atomic Industry Reporter 227: 629). In May 1958 the AEC indicated to the Joint
Committee that the decision. not to require private insurance from Contractors was
being reconsidered; see BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 4: 159.
1116
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of persons transporting such materials, the ways and means for effecting
such transportation come within the jurisdiction of four other federal
agencies. After debate as to whether or not the Interstate Commerce
Act was superseded by provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946
with respect to transportation of atomic materials, 517 the Atomic Energy
Commission acceded to the claims of the Interstate Commerce Commission for overriding authority in that field. In fact, the Atomic
Energy Commission has temporarily relinquished its apparent authority
over transportation of atomic materials not only to the Interstate Commerce Commission, 618 but also to the United States Coast Guard/ 19 the
Civil Aeronautics Board, 520 and the U. S. Post Office Department. 521
This has been accomplished by exempting from Atomic Energy Commission licensing regulation the interstate transportation activity of
regulated carriers and the mails. 522 In effect, the AEC has granted a
general license to persons· subject to the jurisdiction of these four
agencies, without actually relinquishing jurisdiction of the subject
matter.
The continuing jurisdiction of the Atomic Energy Commission in the
field of transportation is demonstrated by that agency's announcement
on September 21, 1957, of proposed regulations
. . . to establish appropriate precautions in connection with
the transportation of special nuclear material to prevent accidental conditions of criticality. Requirements to ·protect
against other hazards in the shipment of such materials are
prescribed pursuant to other parts [of the AEC's regulations]
. . . and in regulations of other agencies having jurisdiction
over means of transportation. Accordingly, the requirements
of this part are in addition to, and not in substitution for,
such other requirements. 528
517 See Evans, Physical, Biological, and Administrative Problems Associated with
Transportation of Radioactive Substances (National Research Council 1951), BNA,
Atomic Industry Reporter 281: 1-2.
518 49 Code Fed. Regs. §§71.I-.I1, 72.1-.5, 73.1-430, 74-so6-.6oo, 75.65I-.659, 76.701·702, and 77.&>2-.870.
519 46 Code Fed. Regs. §§146.01-4, 146.25-400.
520 14 Code Fed. Regs. §§29.o-71.
521 Post Offices Services Circular 2, Pt. 121, 124, and 125 (Dec. I, 1954); 39 Code
Fed. Regs. §15.2(d), which was amended effective May 15, 1958, to limit the amount
of radioactivity a package may contain, in addition to the previous limit on the amount
of radiation from the surface of the package; 23 Fed. Reg. 2221 (Apr. 4, 1958), BNA,
Atomic Industry Reporter 4 : 126.
62210 Code Fed. Regs. §§30.7, 40.62(b), 50.11 I d), and 70.T2
523 Proposed IO Codt> Fed. Regs. §71 I, 22 Ferl Reg. 7541 !Sept. 21. 11;57)
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The Commission has summarized the proposed regulations as follows :
The following proposed rule distinguishes between transportation by licensees [for special nuclear material] and transportation by such unlicensed carriers. Where special nuclear
material is to be transported by a licensee, prior Commission
approval of proposed shipping procedures must be obtained for
all shipments in excess of the quantities of special nuclear
material specified. . . . In the case of unlicensed carriers,
there normally exists a possibility that a number of small
quantities of special nuclear material from different shippers
might come into hazardous proximity to each other. For this
reason the quantity of special nuclear material which may be
delivered to a carrier authorized to transport special nuclear
material without a Commission license is set considerably
lower . . . except for cases where the licensee who makes the
shipment is in a position to, and does, exercise such control
over transportation of the shipment as to assure that the total
quantity of special nuclear material in the shipment does not
exceed the limits specified. . . .624
Although the regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission,
Coast Guard, Civil Aeronautics Board, and the U.S. Post Office usually
do not require the issuance of a license as such, the packaging, marking,
and container limitations imposed by these agencies constitute a form
of indirect licensing control. Atomic material cannot be transported
unless in conformity with these regulations.
There apparently has been no effort to make these licensing requirements uniform even where practicable. More efficient and economical
administration of the transportation of atomic material, and consequently a less restrictive burden on the shippers and carriers involved,
would result if the Atomic Energy Commission were to work out a
uniform system of transportation requirements with the other four
agencies involved, even though administration of these requirements
were vested in the other agencies.
G24 Ibid. Appendix A to the proposed regulation lists the qualities of uranium 235
and 233 and plutonium which a licensee of special nuclear material may deliver to a
carrier, without prior specific AEC approval, provided the licensee exercises "such
supervision and control over the shipment as to assure that, if said special nuclear material is transported with any other quantity of special nuclear material, the total
quantity of special nuclear material does not exceed the limits specified in Appendix A"; proposed 10 Code Fed. Regs. §71.22(a) (2). Appendix B lists the maximum
quantity of types of special nuclear material which a licensee may deliver to a carrier
unless in accordance with §71.22(a) or with special procedures approved by the ComInission in connection with an application for a license for special nuclear material
under §71 .23.
.
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Whenever the holder of a commercial atomic energy license transmits
electric energy in interstate commerce or sells it at wholesale in such
commerce, the Federal Power Commission is obliged to exercise jurisdiction with respect thereto. Such authority is in fact required as a
condition of the Atomic Energy Commerce license. 525
The dual jurisdiction thus involved creates the possibility of conflicting regulatory standards. This is particularly true with respect to
accounting practices. The accounting standards required to establish
financial responsibility under the Atomic Energy Act 526 may well differ
from those of the Federal Power Commission for rate-making purposes.
Indeed, critics of the present Atomic Energy Act have attacked its Section 103 commercial licensing provisions as lacking the accounting and
other financial restrictions imposed by the Federal Power Commission
by statute and regulation. 527
Further, a possible conflict in accounting practices may arise in connection with the determination of a "fair price" to be paid by the AEC
for the production of special nuclear material in a licensed reactor. Section 56 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 528 provides that the agency,
in determining such fair price, "may give such weight to the actual
cost of producing that [special nuclear] material as the Commission
finds to be equitable." Any difference in the methods of computing
costs of such material under accounting regulations enforced by the
AEC, Federal Power Commission, or a state agency would, of course,
be undesirable and possibly result in inequity to the licensee.
535 Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Section 272, U.S.C.A. §2019; see 10 Code Fed. Regs.,
§50.43(c). Section 271 of the statute further provides that "[n]othing in this Act
shall be construed to affect the authority or regulations of any Federal, State, or local
agency with respect to the generation, sale, or transmission of electric power" (42
U.S.C.A. §2018).
526 Section 182a, 42 U.S.C.A. §2232(a); 10 Code Fed. Regs. §50.4o(b).
527 H.R. ·Rep. No. 2181, supra note 5, at 122-123; Adams, supra note 239 at 168-170.
In its report at the end of 1957, the Commission stated (Twenty-third Semi-Annual
Report 98-99 (1958)): "Ascertaining costs for nuclear electric plants has required
new applications of accounting principles. The items of capital costs of conventional
plants are specified by the Federal Power Commission, for example, but as yet there
is no agreement on the components of capital costs for nuclear reactors. During the
past year the [Atomic Energy] Commission has studied the accounting problems inherent in power reactor construction and operations, and has developed an accounting
basis for use in determining the operating economics of these new plants. . . . The
Commission has been working with the Federal Power Commission and the National
Association of Railroad and Utility Commissioners on revising classification of accounts
to cover production of power through the use of reactors."
s2s 42 U.S.C.A. §2076.
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D. Conclusions
As officials of the Atomic Energy Commission often have observed
since passage of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, a license issued thereunder is not, like a contract, a mere matter of negotiation. 529 Presumably, all requirements of the statute and regulations being satisfied,
the applicant for a license will be entitled as a matter of legal right to
engage in the activities covered by the 1954 act and his application.
. This approach, however, oversimplifies the problem confronting the
private organization or business seeking to risk its capital and resources
in the development of atomic energy for peacetime uses. 530 A license
could.be a "gun [without] . . . ammunition" if the Commission chose
not to make available to the licensee such services as supplying enriched
uranium, a matter of negotiation and not of right. 531 Moreover, although
an applicant may satisfy the requirements when the license is issued and
may negotiate successfully for necessary supplies and services from the
Commission, he can never be sure what changes in these requirements,
and consequently changes in the terms of the license itself, will be made
in the future. ·
· As the McKinney Panel has found, the over-all effect of the restrictions imposed upon Section 103 and 104 licensees "appears to be contrary to the stated objectives of the [ 1954] Act" and constitutes "an
interference by the Federal Government in the right of the private
investor to risk his own money, even to go broke, if he chooses to do
so." 532 Further,
The emphasis in the 1954 Act on licensing is sound as a means
of establishing equality of treatment of private participants,
only if it is recognized that licensing rather than Federal
· ownership is to be the future course. 588
So long as regulation of licensing is uniform and without serious
changes in policy, the infant atomic energy industry can be reasonably
certain of the requirements which must be met. In this respect, the
529 Speech by Charles G. Manly, AEC Division of Civilian Application, July 27,
1955, BNA, Atomic Industry Rep<>rter 277: I .
• 5so See Brief for Applicant in the PRDC proceeding, supra note 314 at 87.
531 Upton, supra note 207 at 496. The Commission occupies the dual function of
iic~sing regulator and ''bargaining agent for the services" needed under a license.
This means that the licensee is "dependent upon the Commission's good will alone and
therefore is sm~ll consolation to lawyers accustomed to ascertaining their clients' rights
and not merely negotiating their privileges" (id. at 498).
582 McKinney Panel Repo~ supra note 10 at IJ2.
5 3 3 !d. at IJ4.
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Commission and its staff, in general, have performed an outstanding
public service in establishing a unique system of federal regulation in
which the interests of the government and of private industry, not
always mutual, must be accommodated. The regulatory procedures
established have been in general conformity with both the spirit and
the letter of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act, as required by
the Atomic Energy Act itself and in the interest of administrative due
process.
The infirmities in the present licensing system are due not so much
to the officials who administer the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 but to
the statute itself, which these officials are bound to follow in promulgating the applicable regulations. The language of that act is so general
in many important particulars as to be capable of differing interpretations. 584 For example, "national welfare" as used in the act has been
interpreted with two entirely different emphases by proponents and
opponents of private enterprise in the atomic field. The one interpretation favors minimum regulation to the extent consistent with national
security and public health and safety. The other would require maximum
regulation which would place private industry under complete government domination in the licensed activity and thus tend to leave the field
for public agencies alone.
The result is that the 1954 act and the regulations issued thereunder
contain within their provisions the possibilities for destroying the private participation which the act purports to seek and encourage. Such
an event could result from a radical change in Commission membership,
with a consequent reversal of current policies. Therefore, in the interests of both the government and private enterprise, the 1954 statute
should be re-examined with a view to establishing more definite standards for licensing, particularly with respect to commercial production
and utilization facilities. If a reasonably favorable climate of regulation
is lacking and especially if a markedly unfavorable attitude is adopted
by the AEC and Congress, then it is clear that atomic development will
be retarded, and the public will not enjoy the full benefits of this new
source of energy.
Re-examination of the antitrust procedures and conflicting jurisdictional problems arising under provisions of the present act and its regu584 Stason, Atomic Energy Workshops, supra note 215 at 4: ". . .
[T]here are
only the vaguest 'standards' to guide the hand of the Commission. Whether or not
licenses shall be issued in the first instance and whether or not they shall be modified
or rev•lkerl subsequence to issuance, depends almost exclusively upon the uncontrolled
discretion of thP Commission "
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lations also is desirable in the public interest. If industry is to assume
the role intended and stated by Congress in developing the field of peacetime atomic energy without huge expenditures of federal funds, then
the means for harassment of industry which are potentially present in
the act must be modified, consistently with the public interest to encourage the development of a new and useful form of power.
The statutory deficiencies in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 have
assumed added importance in the light of amendments to that statute
enacted by Congress during 1957, the cumulative effect of which is to
add greatly to the powers of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.
Indeed, it is not an exaggeration to state
. . . that the Congress, and in particular the Joint Committee
on Atomic Energy, has seized control over the civilian atomic
power program and has stripped the AEC of a large measure
of the responsibility, authority, and discretion which it previously had possessed and which executive agencies normally
possess. 585
Under the 1946 statute, the Joint Committee came close to assuming
the authority of the Commission itself, with the agency relegated to the
role of general manager of the program. This unsatisfactory division
of authority was rectified in some degree by the provisions of the 1954
legislation. Yet, with the new powers exercised by the Joint Committee under the 1957 amendments, particularly with respect to detailed
control over expenditures by the Commission, the pre-1954 situation
may well have been re-established.
Until the respective relationships and authorities of the Congressional
Committee and the Commission are definitely established, uniform and
consistent administration of the licensing provisions of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954 is not assured, and a program of peaceful utilization of atomic energy may well be inhibited.
IV. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION CONTRACTING 536
Just as the issuance of licenses constitutes the most important aspect
of the regulatory functions of the Atomic Energy Commission, so the
5 85 Green, supra note 48o at 124. See letter from AEC Chairman Strauss to Rep.
Cole, Aug. 3, 1957, 103 Cong. Rec. A6319-A6321 (Aug. 5, 1957); Hartwell, supra
note 478 at 639: "To encourage the parties in a formal AEC proceeding to try their
case not only judicially but also at the same time before Congress is not only in derogation of the administrative and judicial processes provided by law but will in our judgment go far toward destroying efficient and speedy administration of the development
of civilian atomic power... ;"
ne For general background information on government contract problems and pro-
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making of contracts provides the major means whereby the Commission
administers and operates the atomic energy plant owned in a proprietary
capacity by the United States government. Indeed, that plant is the
largest single business of its kind in the United States, and probably in
the free world. Atomic energy installations and other facilities have an
estimated value before depreciation of approximately $7.06 billion. 587
More than I 17,000 persons, including over 6,700 government personnel,
are engaged in the operation of existing, and the construction of new,
production facilities 538 under government control. Over one billion
dollars was paid out by the Commission during fiscal year 1955 to costtype contractors and directly to subcontractors. 589
Commission contracting powers go further than the mere provision
for the construction and operation of the government's atomic energy
plant. Under the civilian power reactor program authorized by the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the Commission's willingness to supply
certain services and to contract for research has become an important
adjunct to the system of licensing control established under that statute.
The Manhattan Engineer District, predecessor of the Commission,
established the policy of operating its facilities through contracts with
private business units. This practice was continued by the. Commission
when it took over the operations of the District on January 1, 1947. 540
cedure, see Tybout, Government Contracting in Atomic Energy (1956); Risik, "Federal Government Contract Oauses and Forms," 23 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 125 (1954);
vom Baur, "Defense in the Atomic Age, the Law, and the Bar," 9 Wyo. L. J. 25
(1954); Cuneo, "Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals; Tyrant or Impartial
Tribunal?" 39 A.B.A.]. 373 (1953); Joy, "The Disputes Clause in Government Contracts: A Survey of Court and Administrative Decisions," 25 Ford. L. Rev. II ( 1956) ;
Shea, "Government Contracts; Standard Disputes Clause: Effect of Act of May II,
1954,'' 40 Corn. L. Q. 355 (1955); Moss, "Practice Before Government Agencies," 15
Fed. Bar J. 155 (1955); Schultz, "Proposed Changes in Government Contract Disputes Settlement," 67 Harv. L. Rev. 217 ( 1953) ; Anderson, "The Disputes· Article in
Government Contracts," 44 Mich. L. Rev. 211 (1945); Kennedy, "The Conclusiveness
of Administrative Findings in Disputes Arising under Government Contracts," 4 Baylor L. Rev. 160 (1952); Etheridge, "Appeals from Administrative Decisions in Government Contract Disputes," 31 Tex. L. Rev. 552 (1953). See also "Bibliography on
Government Procurement and Contractual Procedure and Related Material," published
by the Law Branch of the Army Library and revised at regular intervals, which can
be obtained by writing the Department of the Army, Washington 25, D.C. Numbers
::z and 3 of Volume 16, Fed. Bar ]., contain an excellent summary of numerous problems relating to subcontractors of. the Federal Government.
m AEC, Twenty-third Semi-Annual Report 302 ( 1958).
538 !d. at 307-3o8.
53 9 Minsch, "Subcontracting in the Atomic Energy Program," 16 Fed. Bar J. 190-191
( 1956).
5 40 AEC. Twenty-third Semi-Annual Report 10 ( 1958).
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Government operation of production facilities appears to have been
conclusively rejected by the Commission. This policy assumes additional
importance under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, whereby Congress
sought to encourage a privately owned and operated atomic energy
industry through contractual relationships and cooperation between
government and business. 541
Despite the increasing importance of the role of contracting between
the Commission and private business in the development and expansion
of atomic energy for both military and industrial uses, the procedural
and substantive problems created by this method of administrative control have tended to be overlooked by both government and private
interests. This failure is unfortunate, but not surprising, in view of the
current lack of development of procedures assuring administrative due
process in other fields of government contract endeavor.
A. Contracts in Administrative Law
The current attitude of the Executive Branch of the government and
of the courts towards contracts between the government and its citizens
stems in large part from the c~ncept that, when entering into a contract,
the government exercises a "proprietary" function. 542 This means that,
since the government claims to assume the role of a private person in
contractual dealings with private business, the government's actions are
not necessarily held to be controlled by, or reviewable with respect to,
accepted standards of administrative due process applicable to licensing
and other more orthodox regulatory procedures. Moreover, government
ownership of special nuclear material under the Atomic Energy Act of
su See BN A, Atomic Industry Reporter 221 : 1 : "Contractor operation of Commission-owned research and production facilities lays the foundation for eventual termination of Government monopoly in this field and for integration of atomic energy development into the private enterprise system which is characteristic of this nation.
Under the present atomic energy program as a whole, the Government draws upon the
managerial skill of private enterprise, in return for which private enterprise acquires
specialized technical knowledge in the field of atomic energy which, under present
neces.si~ies of information control, is obtainable in no other manner." See also AEC
Response to Questionnaire, supra note 77 at 1088: "The operations of AEC are
carried out largely by industrial concerns and by private and public institutions under
contract with the Commission. . . ." AEC, Twenty-third Semi-Annual Report 138,
161 (1958).
542 The closest statutory definition of what constitutes a "proprietary" function is
found in Section 4(2) of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, 5
U:S.C.A. §1003(2), which refers to "any matter relating to agency management or
personnel or to public prop~rty, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts" and which excludes these subjects from the requirements for public rule making.
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1954 543 gives the Commission, if it desires to exercise it, a powerful
means of controlling not only contracting but also licensing under claim
of exercise of the agency's "proprietary" rights.
A corollary of the doctrine of "proprietary" function is that the
private citizen or business dealing contractually with the government has
only a privilege, not a right. 544 Persons contracting with the government, as the Supreme Court has stated, are not "compelled or coerced
into making the contract" which is considered a "voluntary undertaking
on their part." 545 Should this exercise of the "privilege" be curtailed
or denied in any way, therefore, neither general nor constitutional law
provides an effective remedy for the injured party as a matter of right,
except insofar as the courts are empowered to consider cases involving
damages arising from breach of contracts.
This concept of the government's "proprietary" functions and, as a
corollary, the privilege status of private parties in the field of contracts
are reflected in the provisions-or lack of them-with respect to contracting in the Federal Administrative Procedure Act of 1946. Procedures under the Contract Settlement Act of 1944 546 are specifically
exempted from the Administrative Procedure Act. 547 In Section 4(2)
of the Administrative Procedure Act 548 the making of rules with respect
to contracts, public property, and similar "proprietary" matters is excepted from the salutary requirements of public notice and hearing procedures required of most types of federally issued rules and. regulations.
us Section 52, 42 U.S.C.A. §2072.
54 4 See Schwartz, "A Decade of Administrative Law," 51 Mich. L. Rev. 775, 843

{1953) : "The government contractor . . . is seen to have only the 'privilege' of
dealing with the government. He is placed in a different position from that of the
private citizen whose property or personal 'rights' are adversely affected by administrative action." For what a congressional committee has termed "All in all ... a
shameful story" of unrestrained administrative over-reaching in the field of government contracts, see Heyer Products Co., Inc. v. United States, 140 F. Supp. 409, 412
(Ct. Cls. 1956).
546 United States v. Wunderlich, 342 U.S. 98, 100, 72 S. Ct. 154 (1951). See Wells
Bros. Co. v. U.S., 254 U.S. 83, 87, 41 S. Ct. 34 (1920) ("Men who take million dollar
contracts for Government buildings are neither unsophisticated nor careless. . . .").
u6 41 U.S.C.A. §§101 et seq.
U 7 Section 2(a), 5 U.S.C.A. §IOOI (a); see Sen. Doc. No. 248, supra note 43 at
44, 196, 302, 313, where the congressional. emphasis is upon the temporary wartime
nature of the Contract Settlement Act as justification for the exception.
54 8 5 U.S.C.A. §1003 (2) ; see Sen. Doc. No. 248, s~tf>ra note 43 at 199, 257: "The
exception of proprietary matters is included because the principal considerations in
most such cases relate to mechanics and interpretations or policy, and it is deemed wise
to encourage and facilitate the issuance of rules by dispensing with all mandatory procedural requirements ...•"
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In this connection, the rules of the Atomic Energy Commission with
respect to procurement policy 549 and to the procedure of agency's Advisory Board of Contract Appeals 550 were promulgated apparently,
without public participation in the rule-making process.
Although the federal government and the courts consistently adhere
to the theory that the making and administration of public contracts is
not a phase of administrative procedure/ 51 it is clear that a "Government
contract . . . is but a convenient administrative device for the Government to get its procurement work done and . . . administrative decisions of the Government's officers should be treated no differently
from other administrative orders which affect private interests." 652 As
is the case in most other federal agencies and departments, however,
neither the statutory nor regulatory procedures of the Atomic Energy
Commission recognize this obvious and important fact of governmental
life.
B. Contracting Authority under Atomic Energy Act of 1946
Provisions of both the Atomic Energy Acts of 1946 and 1954 dealing
with the contracting authority of the Atomic Energy Commission were,
until 1957, substantially similar. The major difference arose from the
implementation of sections of the later statute with respect to the use of
electrical power produced by atomic energy, which authority was not
sought to be exercised by the Commission under the earlier legislation.
However, in 1957, Congress provided for certain special contractual
treatment for publicly and cooperatively owned utilities 553 and for Con54 9

10 Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 5, 16 Fed. Reg. 1759 (Feb. 22, 1951).
10 Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 3, IS Fed. Reg. 5834 (Aug. 30, 1950).
551 See Ramey and Erlewine, "Introduction to the Concept of the 'Administrative
Contract' in Government Sponsored Research and Development," 17 Fed. Bar ]. 354,
355 n. 3 (1957).
552 Schultz, supra note 536 at 246-47, who adds: "Be that as it may, contract notions are so deeply imbedded in the thinking of judges and businessmen that it would
be revolutionary for one to deny their expectation that an individual or corporation
contracting with the Government will be fully protected with traditional rights and
remedies. . . ." Proposed legislation drafted by the Task Force on Legal Services
and Procedure of the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the
Government specifically defines "the performance of all proprietary functions such as
... the execution [or performance] of public contracts in which private rights, claims,
or privileges are asserted or affected" as informal adjudication; Administrative Code,
Section 202(b), Hoover Commission Legal Task Force Report, supra note 43 at
55o

366.
5 GSSection nt(a)(l), Pub. L. Ss-162, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957); see discussion, infra.
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gressional review of contracts involving the expenditure· of public funds
in connection with private projects. 554
Authority to execute contracts was specifically granted the Atomic
Energy Commission under the 1946 statute with respect to four major
categories of activity. Three of these provisions were extensively used
by the agency. The fourth, relating to byproduct power re$ulting from
utilization of atomic energy, proved a deadletter.
Under Section 3 (a) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946/ 55 the Commission was "authorized and directed to make arrangements (including
contracts, agreements, and loans)" for the conduct of research and .development activities relating to nuclear processes, the theory and production of atomic energy, and similar matters of primarily scientific importance. Section 4 (c) ( 2) 556 con fer red the authority to contract with
private industry for the construction and operation of production facilities for fissionable materials. Section 5 (a) ( 5) 557 authorized contracts
for the purchase of fissionable materials outside the United States, or
of "any interest in facilities for the production of fissionable material
or in real property on which such facilities are located." Finally, under
Section 5(b) (5) and (6), 558 authority was granted the Commission .to
contract for supplies of source material or for any interest in real property containing source material, and for "exploratory operations, investi,.
gations, and inspections" with respect to such material.
In exercising its authority under the above sections, the Commission
was permitted to forego competitive bidding by advertising "upon certi~
fication . . . that such action is necessary in the interest of the common
defense and security, or upon a showing that advertising is not reasonably practicable." 559 The statutory conditions imposed upon contractors
under these sections related to health and safety measures, requirements
for reports and inspections, and subcontracting only :with Commission
approval. 560
554 Section I I 1 (b), Pub. L. 85-162, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. ( 1957) and Section 261a;
as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §2017(a), Pub. L. 85-79, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957); see
discussion, infra.
555 42 U.S.C. §18o3(a) (1946).
55642 U.S.C. §18o4(c) (2) (1946).
55742 U.S.C. §18o5(a) (S) (1946).
55s 42 u.s.c. §18o5(b)(5) and (6)( 1946).
559 Otherwise required by Section 3709 of the Revised Statutes, 41 U.S.C.A. §5.
Under Executive Orders 10216 (Feb. 23, 1951) and 10210 (Feb. 2, 1951), Commission
contracts ·made without competitive bidding had to contain a clause authorizing the
Comptroller General to have access to, and to examine, the contractor's books.
560 Section 3(a), 42 U.S.C. §18o3(a) (1946), also provided with respect to research
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Two sections of the 1946 act related to sales of electrical energy generated in connection with the production of fissionable material. The
first of these provisions under Section 7 (d) 561 was never utilized, since
no commercial licenses which might have resulted in power generation
ever were authorized. Under the second statutory provision enacted
July 17, 1953,562 the Commission was authorized, in connection with the
construction or operation of its Oak Ridge, Paducah, and Portsmouth
installations, to enter into contracts for electric-utility services for
periods not exceeding twenty-five years. This authority served as the
basis for a similar but expanded provision in the 1954 act. 563
The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 contained no provisions dealing with
the general contracting authority of the Atomic Energy Commission,
other than that the agency was empowered to· acquire materials, property, equipment, and facilities, and to acquire, purchase, lease and hold
real and personal property required to carry out its functions. ~ Procurement regulations, 665 and the statutory 588 authority of, and regulations affecting, 587 the Advisory Board of Contract Appeals under the
1946 act were continued in effect under the Atomic Energy Act of
1954,~ 88 and will be discussed in connection therewith.
84

C. Contracting Authority under Atomic Energy Act of 1954
1.

Research

Section 31 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 ~ is the counterpart
of Section 3(a) of the earlier statute. The principal difference in
language between the earlier and later provisions lies in the broadened
scope of research and development activities under the 1954 act, 570 this
being in accordance with the proposed aims of that statute. 511
69

that no contract "shall ... contain any provisions or conditions which prevent the
dissemination of scientific or technical information, except to the extent such dissemination is prohibited by law."
68142 U.S.C. §I8o7(d) (I!)46).
582 Section I2(d), 42 U.S.C. §I812(d)(1946).
s8s Section I64, 42 U.S.C.A. §2204.
~84 Section I2(a) (S) and (7), 42 U.S.C. §I8I2(a) (5) and (7) (I946).
585 Io Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 5, I6 Fed. Reg. I759 (Feb. 22, I9SI).
586 Section I2(a) (1) and (c), 42 U.S.C. §I8I2(a) (I) and (c) (I946).
561 10 Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 3, IS Fed. Reg. 5834 (Aug. 30, I9SO).
568 Note, 10 Fed. Regs. Ch. I, I9 Fed. Reg. 5628 (Sept. 3, I954).
569 42 U.S.C.A. §20SI.
510 Section 3(a) (4) of the Atomic Energy Act of I946 authorized AEC contracts
for, among other things, "ut~lization of fissionable and radioactive Jnaterials and processes entailed in the production of such Jnaterials for all other purposes, including in-
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Under Section 3I of the present statute, 572 the Commission is authorized and directed to make arrangements, including contracts, for the
conduct of research, development, and training activities relating to
(I) nuclear processes, ( 2) the theory and production of atomic energy,
(3) utilization of special nuclear material and radioactive material for
medical or other purposes, (4) utilization of special nuclear material,
atomic energy, and radioactive material and processes entailed in the
utilization or production of atomic energy or such material for all other
purposes, including industrial uses, the generation of usable energy, and
the demonstration of the practical value of utilization or production
facilities for industrial or commercial purposes, and (S) protection of
health and safety. Where the Commission "finds private facilities or
laboratories are inadequate to the purpose," it is authorized to conduct
research for private parties in its own facilities for the purposes stated
in Section 31. 573 Although Section I69 574 of the 1954 act prohibits the
making of any subsidy to the holder of a license or construction permit
under Sections 103 and I04, a payment made by the Commission to a
permittee or licensee, pursuant to a contract under Section 3 I, is specifically permitted by Section I69.
Section 3 I contains provisions with respect to contractual conditions
assuring health and safety, requiring reporting, and permitting inspection of work done thereunder. As was the case under the Atomic
Energy Act of I946, 575
No such arrangement [under Section 3 I] shall contain any
provisions or conditions which prevent the dissemination of
scientific or technical information, except to the extent such
dissemination is prohibited by law. 516
Contracts may be made without public advertising for bids upon Commission certification that such action is necessary in the public interest
or upon a showing that advertising is not reasonably practicable. m
dustrial uses." Under Section 31a(4) and the 1954 act, this class of contracts has been
greatly extended beyond mere "industrial uses."
571 Sections 1, 2a and g, and 3b and d, 42 U.S.C.A. §§20n, 2012(a) and (g), and
2013(b) and (d).
m Section 31a(1)-(5), 42 U.S.C.A. §2051 (a) (1)-(5).
578 Section 33, 42 U.S.C.A. §2053.
5'74 42 U.S.C.A. §2209.
575 Section 3(a), 42 U.S.C. §18o3(a) (1941)).
576 Section 31d, 42 U.S.C.A. §2051 (d). Control of information is covered in Sections 141-146, 42 U.S.C.A. §§2161-2166, of the 1954 act.
377 Section Jib, 42 U.S.C.A. §2051 (b); see note 559, supra.
Detailed regulations
concerning procurement without formal advertising are contained in 10 Code Fed. Regs.
§§5.81-5.93.
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Commission Production Facilities

Contracting authority of the Commission with respect to the production of special nuclear material under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 578
is broader than under the 1946 statute. 579 Under Section 41b of the
new act, substantially equivalent to Section 4 (c) ( 2) of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1946, the Commission may continue former contracts
or enter into new contracts for the construction and operation of facilities owned by the Commissiot) for the production of special nuclear
material. Such contracts must assure protection against health and safety
hazards; must permit inspection by and require reports to the Commission,580 must contain security restrictions,1581 and may be negotiated without competitive bidding under certain stated circumstances. 582 The Commission also is given authority to acquire production facilities or to
acquire real estate for the construction of production facilities for its
own needs, again in some cases without regard to public advertising. 583

3· Energy Generated in Production Facilities
An important provision of the 1954 act, as originally enacted, with
respect to the production of special nuclear material, ~ permitted the
Commission "to dispose of usable energy generated in the production
facilities or in the experimental utilization facilities owned by the Commission." 5815 Concerning this statutory provision, the Joint Committee
on Atomic Energy has stated :
58

If the energy is sold to publicly or privately owned utilities or
users, the price is to be subject to regulation by the appropriate
agency, State or Federal, having jurisdiction. This section
will permit the Commission to dispose of that utilizable energy
it produces in the course of its own operations, but does not
permit the Commission to enter the power-producing business
without further congressional authorization to construct or
operate such commercial facilities. 586
m Sections 41-44, 42 U.S.C.A. §§2061-2064.
579 Section 4(c), 42 U.S.C. §18o4(c) (1!)46).
58o Section 41b(1)-(2), 42 U.S.C.A. §2161 (b) (1)-(2).
GSt Section 1453. 42 U.S.C.A. §2165(a).
582 Section 41b provides that "[a]ny contract ... may be made [without competitive
bidding] ... upon certification of the Commission that such action is necessary in
the interest of the common defense and security or upon a showing by the Commission
that advertising is not reasonably practical." See notes 559 and 577, supra.
1583 Section 43, 42 U.S.C.A. §2063.
584 Section 44, 42 U.S.C.A. §2064585 H.R. Rep. No. 2181, supra note 5 at 14-15.
586fbid.
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By a 1957 amendment to .the statute, the agency was authorized to sell,
or contract for the sale of, certain utilities, including electric power and
steam, to purchasers within the Commission-owned communities or in
the immediate vicinity thereof, where the Commission determined that
such utilities "are not available from another local source and that the
sale is in the interest of the national defense or in the public interest." 587
Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, preference and priority in the
use of Commission-produced power must be given "to public bodies and
cooperatives or to privately owned utilities providing electric utility
services to high cost areas not being served by public bodies or cooperatives." 588 This provision· applies to contracts for the sale of energy
derived from government plants the same priorities imposed upon
holders of commercial licenses for a utilization or production facility for
the generation of commercial power.ns 9
4· Purchase of Special Nuclear and Source Materials
Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the Commission is authorized
to contract for the purchase of special nuclear material outside the
United States. 590 This constitutes a little-known but highly important
activity of the Commission in the field of contract authority. 591
The purchase of source materials by the Atomic Energy Commission
is covered in some detail in the 1954 statute. Under Section 66 592
thereof, the agency is authorized to acquire supplies of source material,
interests in real property containing such material, or rights of entry
into property believed to contain such material. Section 67 598 authorizes
the Commission to lease lands belonging to the United States for mining
or prospecting for source materials in special situations requiring Commission inducement of private efforts in this field. 59 •
587 Section 161s, 42 U.S.C.A. §2201 (s), as added by Pqb. L. 85-162, Bsth Cong., 1st
Sess. (1957).
588 Section 44. 42 U.S.C.A. §2064589 Sections 103 and 182e, 42 U.S.C.A. §§2133 and 2232(c).
590 Section 55, 42 U.S.C.A. §2075.
591 This is done largely through the Combined Development Agency (CDA), established in 1944 for joint foreign ·procurement by tile United States and the United
Kingdom. Formerly a member of CDA, Canada sells uranium to the United States
under AEC contracts. Belgium, South Africa, Australia, and Portugal have contracts
with CDA. See AEC, twentieth Semi-Annual Report 3-5 (1956); AEC, Twentysecond Semi-Annual Report 4-7 (1957).
m 42 U.S.C.A. §2096.
59s 42 U.S.C.A. §2097.
594 See H.R. Rep No. 2181, supra note 5 at 17-18: "The Commission has exercised
this right in the past based on reservation to the United States of all rights to source
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5· Electric Utility Contracts
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 contains the most controversial
section dealing with the contracting authority of the Commission since
the agency's inception in 1947. In 1953 Congress added a subsection to
the 1946 statute permitting the Commission to make 25-year contracts
for the purchase of electrical power to operate the Oak Ridge, Paducah,
and Portsmouth installations, without advertising for bids therefor and
with authority to terminate the contracts upon payment of cancellation
costs. 595 What had been enacted in 1953 as Section 12(d) of the 1946
act was proposed in the same form in the first bill which the Joint Committee reported to Congress as the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. 596
In an attack upon the Commission's interpretation of Section 12(d),
which was proposed Section 164 of the new act, two members of the
Joint Committee claimed that the agency proposed
. . . to maintain its present firm contract for TVA power to
run the Paducah Plant while contracting for some 6oo,ooo
kilowatts of additional power to be delivered by the private
utility group to the TV A for service in the Memphis area,
several hundred miles away from any atomic-energy installation. In other words, the AEC would become a "power
broker," purchasing power it does not need for an area far
removed from its activities. The TVA would be forced into
buying the power from the private group through AEC instead
of building its own plant to serve the Memphis area. 591
materials in the public lands. This re~ervation is contained in the Act. The Commission believes that it needs to have the power to lease expressly granted to it, now that
this reservation is no longer carried in the bill. . . . It is the intent of Congress that
this leasing power should be invoked only where it is the only means of achieving
private development of deposits of source materials in lands belonging to the United
States. It is not intended to supplant the mining laws in any normal situation."
m Section 12(d), 42 U.S.C.A. §2204 Pub. L. 137, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1953).
See H.R. Rep. No. 676, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1953): "By the arrangements that
have been negotiated with the three utility companies [Ohio Valley Electric Co., Electric Energy, Inc., and Tennessee Valley Authority], the Commission is kept out of
the utility business, the Congress is relieved of the necessity of appropriating an additional sum of $1 billion this year for power-generating stations for the new gaseous
diffusion plants, and in the event of a shutdown in the future, the Government will not
be faced with the problem of disposing of a super Muscle Shoals." In its opinion in
Mississippi Valley Generating Company, Holding Company Act Rei. No. 12, 794 (Feb.
9, 1955), the Securities and Exchange Commission indicated that it considered Congress to have passed upon the validity of the MVG contract in enacting Section 164
of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. CCH Fed. Sec. Law Rep., 1'f76,JJO, p. 79,403.
5 96 Section 164, H.R. 9757, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954).
GDT H.R. Rep. No. 2181, supra note 5 at 115. See also dissenting opinion of SEC
Commissioner Rowen in Mississippi Valley Generating Company, supra note 595 at
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The dissenters further argued that the legislative history of the 1946
act did not substantiate the intrepretation placed by a majority of the
Commission upon Section I 2 (d). 598
As finally enacted, 599 Section 164 contained the questionable device
of a Congressional interpretation of authority, rather than an outright
grant thereo£. 60° Further, the authority retained by the Joint Committee
to consider a proposed contract for thirty days created serious problems
with respect to the proper division of powers between the Executive and
the Legislative Departments and was bound to be the subject of con79,411 : "The MVG plant will not make available to the AEC facilities additional electrical energy not otherwise available. . . . The power to be generated by MVG will
be supplied to TV A and will be consumed in the Memphis area . . . ."
598 H.R. Rep. No. 2181, supra note 5 at us: "When the Atomic Energy Commission sought and received this authority from the Congress to make long-term contracts, and to pay cancellation charges to the utility groups involved in the event the
contracts were terminated, the authority was specifically limited to utility services for
the Oak Ridge, Paducah, and Portsmouth installations of the Commission. As the
former General Manager, Marion W. Boyer, testified in answer to a question from
Congressman Holifield at the time the authorizing legislation was being considered
by the committee: 'In othe·r words, it is limited to the power requirements for those
three installations. It is not a wide-open authority.'"
599 "The Commission is authorized in connection with the construction of the Oak
Ridge, Paducah, and Portsmouth installations of the Commission, without regard to
section 3679 of the Revised Statutes, as amended, to enter into new contracts, or
modify or confirm existing contracts to provide for electric utility services for periods
not exceeding. twenty-five years, and such contracts shall be subject to .termination by
the Commission upon payment of cancellation costs as provided in such contracts, and
any appropriation .presentiy or hereafter made available to the Commission shall be
available for the payment of such ~ncellation costs. Any such cancellation payments
shall be taken into consideration in determination of the rate to be charged in the
event the Commission or any other agency of the Federal Government shall purchase
electric utility services from the contractor subsequent to the cancellation and during
the life of the original contract. The authority of the Commission under this section
to enter into new contracts or modify or confirm existing contracts to provide for electric utility services includes, in case 'such electric utility services are to be furnished
to the Commission by the Tennessee Valley Authority, authority to contract with any
person to furnish electric utility ser-vices to the Tennessee Valley Authority in replacement thereof. Any contract hereafter entered into by the Commission pursuant
to this section shall be submitted to the Joint Committee and a period of thirty days
shall elapse while Congress is in session (in computing such thirty days, there shall be
excluded the days on which either House is not in session because of adjournment
for more than three days) before the contract of the Commission shall become effective: Provided, however, That the Joint Committee, after having received the· proposed contract, may by resolution in writing, waive the conditions of or all or any
portion of such thirty-day period.''
6 0° Similar problems are created by Sections 51 and 61, 42 U.S.C.A. §§2071 and 2091,
requiring submission of expanded definitions of special nuclear material and source
material, respectively, for a period of 30 days to the Joint Committee.
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flicting interpretation. The procedure provided in Section I64 set the
pattern for Congressional review and control of Commission contracts
under the Atomic Energy Act of I954 as amended in I957. 601
The controversy over the sale of energy by private facilities to TV A
in alleged replacement of Commission power needs from TVA, has
ended in the Court of Claims. 602 Incidental to the controversy has been
the conflicting interpretation of the Joint Committee's authority under
Section I64. Two days after the contract between the Commission and
Mississippi Valley Generating Company was executed November I I,
I954, the Joint Committee decided to waive the thirty-day waiting
period under that section. On December I7, I954, the Comptroller
General approved the contract, whereupon a minority of the Joint Committee maintained that the waiting period could not be waived until a
contract, approved by that official and otherwise immediately effective,
was presented to Congress. On January 28, I955, the Joint Committee
Section 26Ia, 42 U.S.C.A. §20I7(a).
The early history of the MVG contract is summarized by the SEC in Mississippi Valley Generating Co., supra note 595, at 79, 372-79, 395. On July 11, I955
the President ordered the AEC's contract with the Mississippi Valley Generating
Company to be terminated. At that time the Attorney General stated that a "negotiated settlement" would be effected "and added that he had no idea how much the ter~
mination might cost the U.S." (BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter I: 38). On July
29, I955 the Comptroller General ruled that the Commission had authority to use its
funds to pay costs for cancellation of a contract which did not contain any provision
therefor and despite the language of Section I64 of the Atomic Energy Act of I954
(Dec. B-I20I88). On October 7, I955 the Commission informed the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy that "negotiations for settlement of cancellation costs are being
held in. abeyance to determine whether the contract actually exists, because of circumstances surrounding the contract's making. The AEC mentions 'possible conflict of
interest and public policy'" (BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 1: 146). Five days
later the General Accounting Office stated that it had "recommended a go-slow policy
to the Commission in reaching a settlement of the contract ... that might circumvent the government's right to a court test on the validity of the contract" (id. at
I: I59). Finally, in November I955, the Commission through its General Counsel
repudiated the contract for the reason that "there is a substantial question as to
whether there were material violations of law and public policy in the inception of
the contract which would result in its being held invalid by the courts" (id. at I: 203).
The result was the filing on December 13, I955, of suit by Mississippi Valley Generating Company in the Court of Claims to recover $3,543,778 in cancellation costs from
the federal government (id. at I: 2I9). In its answer filed with the court, the Department of Justice prayed that the action be dismissed because the contract was "in violation of the statutes and laws of the United States and ... unlawful, null, and void,
and contrary to public policy" for the reasons that, among others, the activities of one
government adviser "involved a conflict of interest so contrary to public policy as to
render the alleged agreement null and void," the agreement violated Section I64 of
the Atomic Energy Act of I954. and the contract had not been before the Joint Committee for 30 days ( id. at 2 : 229-230).
6ot
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sought to justify rescission of its original waiver of the thirty-day
period in these words :
In our view the conditions of section 164 were satisfied regardless of the effect of the resolution of rescission. We do not
believe that section 164 requires that contracts submitted to
the Joint Committee thereunder be immediately effective upon
the granting of waiver or the lapse of the thirty-day waiting
period. The purpose of the requirement of section I64 for a
waiting period' or a waiver was· to accord the Congress an
opportunity to review the power to make such contracts and to
take appropriate legislative action if it so desired . . . . [T]he
section does not require the submission to the committee of a
contract which is immediately effective in all respects upon
the expiration of the waiting period or the granting of a
waiver. The con.tract has been on f.ile with the Joint Committee from November II, 1954, to the present time. Thus, even
if the waiver action of November· 13, 1954, should be considered invalid, the prescribed waiting. period of thirty days
expired on February 4, · 1955, the Congress having been in
session since January 5, 1955. The effective date of the contract . . . is then either February 4, 1955, or December. 17,
1954, depending on the effectiveness of the waiver, but this
difference is not material. . . . (emphasis supplied.) ooa·
By this statement, the Joint Committee itself has demonstrated the
ineptness of. the language of Section 164 and the questionable nature
of the requirement that contracts be referred to that body for a period
of thirty days. The Committee claims that it merely reviews the "power
to make such contracts." The fact is that the Committee reviews the
contract itself before its execution and implementation, a power which
may well affect what would appear to be essentially an executive functiori..
6. Congressional Review of AEC Contracts
Atomic Energy Commission discretion in the making of certain types
of contracts under the civilian power reactor program has been severely
curtailed by action of Congress in 1957. These contracts are those under
the first, second, and third rounds of the program in which the agency
contributes financial support directly or indirectly to reactor demon~
strati on. projects. 604
Congressional action was due, in part, to a decision of the Comptroller
eos
604

BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter
See text, supra, at note 16.

221:821.
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General with respect to the initial contract made by the Commission
under the first round invitations of that program, that with yankee
Atomic Electric Company. Under that contract, dated June 4, 1956, the
co~pany was to bear ·construction costs of a pressurized water type
reactor with an initially estimated cost of $34·5 millions, while the
Commission was to undertake research and development work of up to
$1 million in agency facilities and to underwrite up to $4 million of such
work by the company itself. The Commission also agreed to waive its
normal charge for the use of special nuclear material to fuel the reactor
for a five-year. period after the issuance of an agency license, at an
estimated ·loss of revenue to the Commission of $3.3 million. Research
and development work under the Yankee contract commenced in June
1956 and will continue through at least :ig6o. 606
In his report to the Joint Committee February 19, 1957, on review
of the Yankee Atomic contract 606 the Comptroller General criticized,
among other· things, the agreement by the Commission to waive its
material use charge for five years, 607 as permitted under the second
round invitation for small reactor plants, 608 instead of for 2,0 years as
provided under the first round· invitatiOJ1. 609 Further, according to the
Comptroller General, ·
·
. . . AEC announcements provide that material use ·charges
may be waived up to an agreed-upon amount of money. The·
[Yankee] contract does not comply with this policy to the
extent that it does not specify any limitation on the amount of
money of the material use charge waiver but, instead, provides
that AEC will waive its use charge for· all special nuclear material used during the contract period. 610
As a result of this criticism by the Co.mp~roller General and Joint
Committee sen.timent "to shape the development of nuclear power along
the lines of its own ·preference," 611 legislation was enacted by Congress
in 1957 which gives, in effect, almost complete legislative control over
60 ~ For the text of the contract, see 1957 Section 202 Hearings, supra note 7 at 741752; see statement of AEC General Manager Fields, id. at 727-728; AEC, Twentythird Semi-Annual Report 105 .(1958); BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 2: 187.
606 1~57 Section 2o2 Hearirigs, supra note 7 at 757-768.
·

Id. at 764
AEC Press .Re~. No. 953 (Jan. 7, 1957); 1957 Section 202 Hearings, supra note 7
at 76o.
609 Sept. 21, 1955, 2 CCH Atomic Energy Law Reporter, 1[6539; 1957 Section 202
Hearings, supra note 7 at 76o-1.
6 1 0 1957 Section 202 Hearings, supra note 7 at 766.
611 Green, supra note 48o at 124
607

608
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Commission contracts involving the expenditure of federal funds for
the direct .or indirect benefit of the private .contracting party. This
change in the operation and administration of the United States atomic
energy program was effected by amendments to Section 261 of the 1954
statute 612 and by provisions of the appropriation act for fiscal year
1958. 613
As amended, Section 261 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 permits
only the appropriation of funds, without authorizing legislation approved by the J ojnt Committee and enacted by Congress, for contracts
involving non-military reactors designed to produce less than IO,ooo
thermal kilowatts of heat. Otherwise, the basis for each individual
arrangement, including contracts, agreements, or loans, which involves
the expenditure of public funds for other than pure research unrelated
to a specific project proposed under the civilian power reactor program,
must be presented to the Joint Committee for appropriate authorization.
This requires specific approval of "each of the seven arrangements
contemplated under the first' and second rounds of its [the AEC's]
program." oa
Section 26r was implemented by Congress in the authorization act for
fiscal year 1958 615 to effect the following procedures, thus described by
the Joint Committee :
. . . [B]efore the Commission enters into any arrangement
(including contract, agreement or loan) or amendment thereto,
the basis of which has not been included in the program justification data previously submitted to the Joint Committee and
which involves appropriations . . . , the basis for the arrangement or amendment thereto shall be submitted to the Joint
Committee, and a period of 45 days shall elapse while Congress is in session. . . .
. . . [ S] uch arrangements or amendment must be entered
into in accordance with 'program justification data' submitted
in connection with the hearings [before the Joint Committee]
and with the 'basis' of the arrangement. ... The phrase 'program justification data' was intended to include the scope, policies, and criteria of the various 'rounds' of the Commission's
power demonstration program, as explained by the Commission and interpreted by the [Joint] committee at the time of
the hearings and outlined in committee reports.
The effect of the requirement with respect to conformance
612
61a
614

615

Pub.
Pub.
H.R.
Pub.

L. 85-79, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
L. 85-162, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
Rep. No. 571, supra note 241 at 9.
L. 85-162, supra note 613, §III(a)-(b).
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of arrangements with program justification data .
would
be to prevent the Commission from changing its rules and criteria after congressional review during the authorization process. The scope, rules, and criteria of the various rounds of the
program could be changed only in connection with resubmission in a subsequent authorization hearing by the Joint
Committee.
The contract or arrangement shall also be in accordance
with the basis for the arrangement which has been previously
submitted to the Joint Committee either during the hearings
on the authorizing legislation, or else by the 45-day procedure
set forth in the subsection. The Commission must specifically
advise the committee when it is submitting a proposal to the
Joint Committee as a basis for the proposed contract or arrangement. For example, during the hearings on this bill ... ,
the Commission advised the Joint Committee that of the various proposals which it had under consideration, it was submitting only one (Power Reactor Development Co.) for review by the Joint Committee as a basis for a proposed contract
or arrangement. 616
That the Joint Committee will have the final word with respect to
Commission contracts involving research and development for particular
projects is demonstrated by the Committee's handling of the Commission's request for funds in connection with the Power Reactor Development Co. ( PRDC) project. Under its contract with PRDC, the Commission was to provide pre-construction research and development
assistance in AEC facilities up to a maximum of $4,450,000. PRDC
and its affiliate, Atomic Power Development Associates (A·PDA) were
to pay the remaining cost estimated to be $9 million. The Commission
further agreed to waive charges for the use of special nuclear material
for five years in an amount aggregating $3,702,600. 617 Two hundred
and forty-four thousand dollars having been obligated by the Commission in fiscal year 1957 under the PRDC contract, the agency requested
an additional $4,2o6,ooo for authorization in fiscal year 1958, with
$1,500,000 of this amount to be obligated in that year and the remainder
in fiscal years 1959 and 1g6o.
The Joint Committee rejected both the request for authorization of
funds for pre-construction research and for waiver of fuel charges,
"since legal proceedings before the AEC to determine the probable
safety of the proposed reactor are still pending." 618 The Committee only
61 6

Sen. Rep. No. 791, supra note 23 at 33-35·
at 10; AEC Twenty-third Semi-Annual Report 117 (1958).
61BJd. at 19.
817Jd.
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approved for authorization "the amount of $I,500,ooo ... [to] be
expended for research and development in Commission laboratories to
advance the technology of the fast breeder reactor concept," 619 and not
for pre-construction research and development in connection specifically
with the PRDC project.
Coincident with its establishment of de facto control over AEC contracting involving the expenditure of federal funds, Congress also has
spelled out the manner in which the agency is to make contracts with
publicly and cooperatively owned utilities. This Congressional action
was designed to expand the Commission's second round invitation under
the civilian power reactor program.
The so-called "Cooperative Power Reactor Demonstration Program"
inaugurated by Congress was legislatively launched in the authorization
act for appropriations for fiscal year 1958. 620 This program requires
that, in connection with power reactors proposed to be constructed by
publicly and cooperatively owned utilities :
1. Arrangements for such projects must be effected by direct negotiations between the Commission and the equipment
manufacturer or engineering organization developing, constructing, and designing the nuclear reactor and related
facilities.
2. The Commission must contract with such utilities for
"the provision of a site and conventional turbogenerating
facilities, operation of the entire plant including training of
personnel, sale by the Commission of steam [from the reactor
complex to the cooperative or publicly owned organization],
and other relevant matters."
·
3· Sale of steam by the Commission under its contract with
the utility "shall be at the rate based upon cost or value of
comparable steam from present or projected plants at the site
area," regardless of the actual cost of producing such steam
which probably would exceed that of, and be unable to compete with, fossil fuel~ in the foreseeable future.
4. Contracts for research and development in connection
with these facilities shall be for periO<ls of not more than 10
years.
5· The reactor installation must be dismantled at the end of
the contract period in the event the utility is unwilling to purchase it "at a price to reflect appropriate depreciation but not
to include construction costs assignable to research and
development." 621
619

Section 111(a)(2), Pub. L. 85-162, Ssth Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).

620/d., Section III(a)(I).
621

Sen. Rep. No. 791, sJ'pra note 23 at 33· The Comptroller General has approved
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The special treatment to be accorded contracts with publicly and
cooperatively owned utilities by the Commission, by Congressional direction, stemmed from the feeling of the Joint Committee that
Negotiations by the AEC which would result in jeopardizing the financial integrity of cooperatives and publicly owned
organizations would not be warranted on the basis of advancement of the atomic technology. Neither would it be wise to set
a contractual pattern on the part of the Government with these
small groups and thereby create a precedent for widespread
subsidy to large profitmaking private utilities later. 622
The requirements established by Congress create a double standard of
contractual relations which places the major financial and operating
responsibility for reactor facilities to be operated by publicly or cooperatively owned utilities squarely upon a federal governmental agency. 628
D. Contracting with the AEC
Although the Atomic Energy Act of.1954 did not deal comprehensively with the contracting authority of the Commission, that legislation
represented a distinct improvement over the 1946 act. As under the
prior statute, the 1954 legislation authorized the Commission to acquire
material, property, equipment, and facilities and to purchase, lease, and
hold real and personal property, as required In the exercise of its func-·
tions. 624 The President is authorized to exempt any action of the Comtwo .proposed contracts of the AEC with the Rural Cooperative Power Association,
Elk River, Minn., and with the City of Piqua, Ohio, which provided for a flexible
price for sale of interruptible reactor steam by the AEC to the utility concerned ;
Dec. B-136015, May 7, 1958, BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 221:830.
622.Sen. Rep. No. 791, supra note 23 at 17.
623 For an initial difficulty experienced by the· Commission in negotiating a contract
for construction of a reactor under the cooperative program, see AEC, Twenty-third
·Seini-Annual Report 109 (1958). This involved the proposed construction by Rural
Cooperative Power Association of Elk River, Minn., of a 22,ooo-electric-kilowatt boiling water reactor plant, accepted as a basis for contract negotiations under the second
round invitation in April 1956. W~th the enactment of Pub. L. 85-162, the AEC bebecame responsible for direct negotiations with the selected reactor manufacturer.
These negotiations were terminated when the manufacturer notified the Commission
that its price for building the reactor, and for accompanying research and development
work, would be $10.75 million rather than the $7.93 million ceiling previously agreed
upon. Also, on Sept. 20, 1957, the AEC signed a contract with Consumers Public
Power District of Columbus, Nebraska, covering construction and operation of a
large-scale nuciear power plant at Hallam, Nebraska. This contract, entered as the
result of a proposal made under the first round invitation, was signed after the Joint
Committee waived the 45-day waiting period established by Pub. Law 85-162.
62* Section 161e and g, 42 y.S.C.A. §2201 (e) and (g) ; see Section 174. 42 U.S.C.A.
§2224-
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mission "from the provisions of law relating to contracts whenever he
determines that such action is essential in the_ interest of the common
defense and security." 825
The statute deals with several matters which directly govern provisions of a Commission contract with a prime contractor. First, the
cost-plus-percentage-of-cost contract is outlawed. 626 Second, the contract may not provide "for direct payment or direct reimbusement by
the Commission of any Federal income taxes on behalf of any contractor performing such contract for profit." 627 Third, where a contract is negotiated with a domestic concern without advertising, it must
contain a provision permitting the Comptroller General to have access
to the contractor's books for three years' after the final payment is made
under the contract by the United States. 628 Finally, subcontracts under
a prime contract are forbidden unless authorized by the Commission. 629
Section 162, 42 U.S.C.A. §2202.
Section 165a, 42 U.S.C.A. §2205(a); see, to the same effect, 10 Code Fed. Regs.
§5.103. This type of contract also is outlawed by the Armed Services Procurement Act
of 1947, 41 U.S.C.A. §153(b), and the Federal Property and Administrative Services
Act of 1949, 41 U.S.C.A. §254(b). See Risik, supra note 536 at 130; Minsch, supra
note 539 at 195.
627 Section 165b, 42 U.S.C.A. §2205 (b).
628 Section 166, 42 U.S.C.A. §2206; see AEC Manual, Section 9II1-03II. This requirement applied to Conunission contracts prior to 1947 by virtue of Executive orders
10210, 16 Fed. Reg. 1049 (Feb. 6, 1951), and 10216, 16 Fed. Reg. 1815 (Feb. 27, 1951),
issued pursuant to the First War Powers Act of 1941, as amended. In contracting
with Yankee Atomic Electric Company under the power demonstration reactor program, the Commission agreed, subject to review by the Comptroller General, to amend
the examination-of-records' provision to limit its applicability to that portion of the
work performed by Yankee which was paid for by .the Commission. The Comptroller General ruled that, under the Yankee contract, records ·relating to all work
performed thereunder, and not necessarily reimbursable work, were subject to examination by the General Accounting Office (Dec. B-129II4, Oct. 10, 1956). In connection with the AEC's contract with Power Reactor Development Co. (PRDC) the
Comptroller General has ruled that, where research and development work by the
Commission with appropriated funds would be made under separate contract subject
to audit by the General Accounting Office, the prime contract between the agency
and PRDC does not violate Section 166 when it fails to include a provision requiring
such government audit of accounts in connection with the prime contract (Dec.
B-131013, Mar. 22, I957).
6 2 0 Section 4Ib(1), 42 U.S.C.A. §206I(b) (I). See Minsch, supra note 539 at 194I95:. "This somewhat unique statutory restriction on subcontracting is actually but
a logical concomitant of the general scheme of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (and
its predecessor statute) for ensuring, in the interests of the common defense and security and the health and safety of the public, that the AEC will have adequate control over the production and use of special nuclear material." Approximately onethird of the. over $I billion paid by the Commission directly under contracts during
fiscal year I955 went to subcontractors, id. at I90-19I.
m
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Contracting in General

The negotiation, execution, and administration of a contract with the
Atomic Energy Commission does not have the same procedural and
substantive safeguards which are afforded the businessman or firm
seeking a license from that agency. Absent the assimilation of contract
procedures to the requirements of administrative due process, the principal safeguard that the prospective government contractor has is his
own sense of caution and care in negotiating the terms of the agreement
with the agency or department involved. In spite of the general success
of the Atomic Energy Commission's program in satisfactorily administering a contract program involving billions of dollars with little public
criticism and litigation, healthy self-interest should never be forgotten
by the private businessman or concern in negotiating with the
Commission.
Like every other agency and department of the federal government,
the interests of the Atomic Energy Commission are paramount in
negotiating and administering a contract with a private party. Indeed,
the basic procurement policy of the Commission, in its own words, is
"that supplies and services be procured by" the methods most advantageous to the government." 630 In one of the two reported decisions
in which he has reversed a recommendation of the Commission's Advisory Board of Contract Appeals, the AEC General Manager has stated
that he was "not convinced the rights of the Government should be
relinquished by any action of mine which would not have adequate
support in the record." 681
Otherwise stated, "the Government has no paternalistic attitude
towards its contractors," and the "contracting officer is going to make
the best 'deal' he can for the Government and takes his obligation to
protect the Government's interest with seriousness." 632 The General
Counsel of the Navy Department has issued this advice in that regard:
I believe there has been a great deal of misunderstanding
about the very character of a Government contract. There are
some people who apparently have felt that getting a Government contract means "getting in on the gravy"-that you just
10 Code Fed. Regs. §5.21; see, to the same effect, §§5.101 and 5.501.
Raecolith Flooring Company, AEC ABCA Dkt. No. 3 (Board's recommendations rejected Sept. I, 1950), BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 221:311.
63 2 Moss, .supra note 536 at 159. He adds: "Many contractors seem to be laboring
under the impression that the Government will 'take care of them' regardless of contractual provisions. . .. Nothing is further from the truth. The Government is, in
fact, a sharp trader, and its· officers are trained in that regard. . . ."
6ao
631
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sign up with the Government, and the money ·begins to roll in.
But nothing could be farther from the truth. The Government has a carefully-worked out, meticulous and responsible
system of purchasing, designed to provide quality, as well as
quantity, which meets the complex and precise requirements of
defense and at the very best price. As a result, the so-called ·
'Government contract' that we hear about has become, not a
simple document that can be disposed of with a casual glance;
on the contrary, just as the legal requirements and many of the
goods which are called for by a Government contract are
highly complex, the Government contract ·has also become
·complex. . . . ·
. . . [T]he Government does not sit in a paternalistic capacity with its. contractors. It does not undertake to "take
care" of anybody or to "guarantee" them against loss or
against anything else. Its only position is that of a contractor dealing at arms length. 633
The misconception that the government contracts in other than an
attitude of hard bargaining may even be encouraged by the agency or
d~partment concerned. T)le emphasis in attracting would-be bidders for
government contracts often is that the entire .matter is solely one .pf
"public relations." 634 This approach is used to some extent by .the
Atomic Energy Commission. 685
. In this connection, it always should be remembered that the government is represented by legal counsel in preparing and negotiating. contracts with private persons. 686 This follows logically from the govern638 Vom Bauer, supra note 536 at 29 and 31.
es' Moss, mpra note 536 at 166.
685 "Counselor, advisers, or agents are not necessary to obtain business from the
AEC, its contractors or _subcontractors. Such persons cannot obtain AEC business
which the reader of 'Selling to AEC' cannot obtain for himself." ( AEC, Selling to
AEC (1956), reproduced in BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 221: x2I). This statement goes beyond· the salutary warning needed against use of "five percenters" and
"influence peddlers" and encourages the businessman not only to seek business from
the Commission but to eXecute a contract therefor without adequate expert engineering or legal advice.
sse Vom .Baur, supra note 536 at J2: "However, there are some Government contractors who appear to feel that they do not need legal advice. They sometimes enter
into contracts with the Government without benefit of counsel, and sometimes after-· ·
wards complain bitterly when they find out the exact nature of the rights and obligations which .they have u~wittingly assumed. True, the Government cannot insist that
a contractor be represented by counsel. That is his own personal business. But I
may say frankly, speaking personally at least, that in my opinion it is very greatly
to the advantage of the Government, as well as to that of the contractor, to have him
represented by a lawyer. He should be so represented not only at the outset of the
negotiations so that the contractor may understand clearly what he is getting into, but
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ment's understandable desire to make the best contract possible from
its point of view. 637 The need for adequately protecting his business and
legal interests is required of the contractor dealing with the Atomic
• Energy Commission, particularly with respect to cost contracts for large
research and development projects. These so-called "administrative
contracts" 638 deal only in the broadest terms with the rights and obligations of the parties. 639
A contract negotiated by a private contractor with any government
department or agency is not one negotiated between, or to be administered by, equals. The traditional concept of the Executive Department
also in the course of the performance of the contract, and in cases before the Armed
Services Board of Contract Appeals." See Ramey and Erlewine, supra note 551 at
36o, n. 8 : "In AEC contract negotiations are normally carried on in the field by a
'team' under the leadership of the field manager of operations . . . and with the advice and assistance of the Assistant General Counsel, or other attorney, the Director
of Finance and other appropriate staff. . . ."
6 37 See Beryllium Corp., AEC ABCA Dkt. No. 6 (Recommendations adopted by
General Manager Dec. 19, 1949), BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 221: 312;. "Contractor committed to construction of complete buildings for lump-sum consideration
cannot recover from Government amount paid sub-contractor in reimbursement for
expenses which, because of Government's need for speed, had been overlooked in
computation of price."
63 8 The term first was used by the AEC in 1951; AEC, Ninth Semi-Annual Re-port 52 (1951): "The type of cost contract used to a large extent by the Commission for development work may perhaps best be described as an 'administrative contract.' A main emphasis here, as in many other contracts, is upon cooperation between the Government and the contractor to accomplish the particular task. . . ."
639 Set: BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 221: 4-5. For a discussion of the "steady.
trend away from a fixed and definite contract," see Moss, supra note 536 at I6o161. The most comprehensive discussion of the "administrative contract" is contained
in Ramey and Erlewine, supra note 551 at 354 et seq. According to the authors, an
"administrative contract" is merely a "memorandum of understanding," with a " ' charter-like' nature," using "a minimum of legal or technical jargon" (id. at 363, 364,
365). In such an agreement, "[t]he parties are not overly concerned with the legal
consequences of their relationships in terms of enforcement through litigation, but are
careful that the agreement will pass muster with the court of first instance in Government contracts, the General Accounting Office" (id. at 355). Although cooperation
between the Commission and its contractors is certainly to be sought, and ordinarily
assured, this theory of cooperation to the exclusion of spelling out the legal relationship between the government agency and the private party hardly converts the "administrative contract". into a partnership between the parties. Nor does the "growing
use of the regulatory approach [to government contracts, emphasizing a detailed contract between the parties] seriously endanger . . . the cooperative, mutual agreement
approach to the administrative contract" or defeat "the ·very purposes" of goverriment
contracting (id. at 371). If any misunderstanding requiring administrative or judicial
relief arises under the contra<;!, it is the private party, not the government, which will
find the loose_ language of _the administrative contract the doorway to an adverse decision. Unfortunately for the private contractor, the government is not ordinarily forced
to use that doorway.
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and the courts that no real difference exists between government and
private contracts 640 is unrealistic. The doctrine of sovereign immunity
gives the government the choice of determining the forum in which disputes and suits with respect to a contract may be determined. Indeed,
"the Government, as a contractor, has insisted on and received favorable
treatment in its contracting capacity which it would not receive under
ordinary principles of private contract law." 641 The contracting officer,
who administers the contract and initially determines disputes thereunder, is hardly an unbiased or disinterested party to the proceedings.
Finally, the government has the ultimate authority, on behalf of the
Atomic Energy Commission, to seize facilities of a manufacturer who
refuses or fails to honor a mandatory order "to ·obtain prompt delivery
of any articles or materials the procurement of which has been authorized by the Congress exclusively for the use of . . . the Atomic Energy
Commission." 642
2.

Types of AEC Contracts 648

The Atomic Energy Commission uses three general types of con-:
tracts. The first, the unit-price contract, is used in purchases of supplies, materials, equipment, and other items on which a definite price can
be fixed by unit of sale. Purchases of uranium concentrate from
uranium processors fall into this category. 644
Construction programs are largely effected through the use of lumpsum contracts. This is also the type of contract used by the Commission
in ~ontracting for research by educational and other types of institutions, the latter being required to put up a certain percentage of the cost
of the project.
640 E.g., United States v. Wunderlich, 342 U.S. 98, 100, 72 S. Ct. 154 (1951);
Martinsburg & P.R. Co. v. March, II4 U.S. 549. 553-554, 5 S. Ct. 1035 (1884); see
Schultz, supra note 536 at 218-219, 222-223.
an Schultz, supra note 536 at 220.
842 Selective Service Act of 1948, so U.S.C.A. App. §468(a). The anned services
are the only other branch of the federal government with this authority.
848 For excellent discussions of this subject, see BN A, Atomic Industry Reporter
221: 1-7 and I CCH Atomic Energy Law Reporter, 1f57I ff.
644 See IO Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 6o, providing for purchases by the Commission of
uranium at guaranteed minimum prices pursuant to contract ( §6o. I (d) ) . In connection with a contract by the Commission for the purchase of four to seven million
pounds of high purity magnesium annually over a period of 5 years, the Comptroller
General has ruled that the Commission lacks authority to contract beyond one year
in the absence of special provision therefor, and that, while " ... no question will be
raised about earlier contracts (by the AECI. the principles
I in the decision] will
apply in the future" (Dec. B-I3o8I5. April 2. 1957); see BNA, Atomic lndustry
Reporter 3 : 133
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Finally, there is the cost type contract, in which the government pays
for the contractor's costs plus a negotiated fixed fee. This category of
contract has been used for the construction and operation by private
business of agency-owned facilities and represents the so-called "administrative contract." Under this type of agreement, its terms are stated
in broad and general terms, the particulars to be developed and agreed
upon as the work progresses.
3· AEC Contract Clauses
Like other federal government agencies, 645 the Atomic Energy Commission seeks to standardize clauses contained in the various types of
contracts which it makes. 646 This is effected by establishing one series
of clauses, the inclusion of which in every contract for over $500 is
required, 647 and another series of clauses the inclusion of which is recommended in each type of contract to which applicable. 648
a. Mandatory Clauses
Mandatory clauses or articles contained in Atomic Energy Commission contracts cover a multitude of public sins which the Congress, by
legislation, has seen fit to proscribe. 649 The settlement of disputes also
is prescribed in a mandatory contract clause.
In the public policy category of mandatory clauses are the prohibitions against
I.
2.

Convict labor; 650
Contingent fees; 651

See Risik, supra note 536 at IJ2-I33·
See AEC Manual, Section 911 I -<>22: "It is the policy of AEC to use standard
contract articles and fonns wherever practicable. Unifonnity in fonn and substance
of contract articles and fonns tend to assure impartial treatment of all contractors,
expedites negotiation and contract review, and facilitates contract administration." Yet
the Joint Committee has found that AEC "contract negotiations have developed a set
of unrelated and complicated proposed contracts [under the civilian power demon··
stration reactor program]. Apparently the tenns of each proposal have depended
upon the request of the proposer, and the AEC. has established no across-the-board
standards. Accordingly, there is considerable variation between the types of assistance
to be provided under the contracts [negotiated or being negotiated under the first,
second, and third-round invitations] . . ." (Sen. Rep. No. 79I, supra note 23 at I5-I6).
641 AEC Manual, Section !)III-03I.
64BJd., Section 9III-Q41.
649 See Gantt, "Labor Provisions of Government Contracts and Subcontractors,"
16 Fed. Bar ]. 331 ( 1956).
65 0 AEC Manual, Sections 9III-D32 and 9116-073·
See I8 U.S.C.A. §436, 4I
U.S.C.A. §35(d); Gantt, supra note 649 at 352-354.
651 AEC Manual, Section 9I I I -033.
645

646
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3· Non-discrimination in emplo-yment; 852
4. Benefits to members of Congress ; 853
5· Assignment of claims; u•
·
6. Work in excess of eight. hours; 655
7· Payment of less than minimum wages established by Secretary of Labor; 858 and
8. Purchases of foreign goods contrary to the Buy American Act. 857

These clauses, together with the Commission's statements of policy with
respect to aiding "small business," 858 represent the government's attempt to implement, at the behest of Congress, prevailing social and
economic policies. 659
652 I d., Sections 9111-035, 9116-o83, and 4228-ox et seq.
See Executive Order
10557, 19 Fed. Reg. 5655 (Sept. 3, 1954) ; Gantt, supra note 649 at 366-370.
&ss AEC Manual, Section 91II-036. See 18 U.S.C.A. §874, 40 U.S.C.A. §276c, 41
U.S.C.A. §51 (the so-called "anti-kickback" acts); Ga~tt, supra note 649 at 348-352.
85 ' AEC Manual, Section 9111-o37· See 31 U.S.C.A. §203, 41 U.S.C.A. §15.
6 55 AEC Manual, Section 9111-0314. See 40 U.S.C.A. §§324-326; Gantt, supra note
649 at 342-348.
6 56 AEC Manual, Section 91II-0315. See 40 U.S.C.A. §§276a et. seq. (Davis-Bacon
Act); Gantt, supra note 649 at 333-342. The Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act, 41
U.S.C.A. §§35-45, extends to workers employed under Government supply contracts
the protections afforded by the Davis-Bacon Act and the Eight-Hour Laws; see Gantt,
id. at 354-366.
657 AEC Manual, Sections 911I-o317-o318 and gno-o1ga-o1gb.
See 41 U.S.C.A.
§§1oa-1od (Buy American Act); Gantt, supra note 649 at 364658 10 Code Fed. Regs. §§5.24. 5.6g(a) (2)-(4), 5.5o6. For a discussion of AEC
policies with respect to "small business," see BNA Atomic Industry Reporter 2: 110;
AEC, Twenty-third Semi-Annual Report 303 (1958); Minsch, supra note 539 at ~91,
n.3 (nearly of the AEC direct payments to subcontractors "went to small business
firms") ; and Risik, supra note 536 ·at 134 : "This clause is generated by a statement
of government policy contained in several pieces of legislation to the effect that small
business concerns must receive a fair share of government contracts. The purpose
of this clause is laudable; it is not conceivable that our economy could function properly without small business concerns. But, it is difficult to see how a pious prayer such
as the utilization-of-small-business-concerns helps the situation. The enforceability of
such a covenant is doubtful to say the least, and at worst, a contractor might seek
to escape responsibility for the acts of his small business concern subcontractors."
659 Risik, supra note 536 at 133-134, 136: "Several clauses find their way into government contracts which actually have only a remote connection with the basic purpose of a contract. . . . There has been an increasing tendency to use government
procurement to implement social and economic policies. . . . The effect of these philosophies is a severe headache to the draftsman of a government contract. Not only
does the contract become cluttered with impediment which are not encountered in
commercial contracting, but the net result is frequently poor and meaningless draftsmanship.
If government contracts could be shorn of these extraneous matters in
some way. without necessarily freeing the contract from being subject tn such na
tional polic-ies as an• deemffi by tht' l.ongress or an administration to be w1se. these
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Other mandatory clauses deal with disputes, to be discussed hereafter; assignments of contracts without the permission of the Commission; 680 safety, health, and fire protection; 681 permits and licenses required to be obtained by the contractor from local authorities; 882
security; 663 litigation and claims; 664 required bonds and insurance; 665
and renegotiation of profits. 668 Aside from the disputes clause, particularly important to the contractor are the mandatory clauses which
( 1) permit the Comptroller General to have aecess to the contractor's
books for three years after a final payment under the contract in question, 667 and ( 2) require the contractor immediately to notify the Commission whenever "an actual or potential labor dispute is delaying or
threatens to delay the performance of the work." 668
b. Non-Mandatory Clauses
Suggested articles to be contained in Commission contracts cover
every type of situation which may be involved in the agency's procurement work. 669 Even though primarily or entirely drafted by the governcontracts would compare favorably with good commercial documents with respect to
simplicity of content, length, and quality of draftsmanship."
880 AEC Manual, Section 9111-o;38.
6 6 1/d., Section 9111-o39- ·
662/d., Section 9111-o3IO.
663Jd., Section 9JII-o312.
664 I d., Section 9111-0JI!).
665 Id., Section 9111-oJ2(>.
666/d., Section 9III-QJ2I; see Renegotiation Act of 1951, so U.S.C.A. App. §§12II
et seq. Under Sections 102(a) and 103(a), so U.S.C.A. App. §§1212(a) and 1212(c),
all contracts with the Atomic Energy Commission "to the extent of the amounts received or accrued by a contractor or subcontractor" on or after January 1, 1951, are
made subject to the renegotiation procedure.
68 7 AEC Manual, Section 9III-Q3II. This clause also requires the prime contractor
to insert a similar provision in subcontracts. See Comp. Gen. Dec. No. B-129114
(Oct. 10, 1956).
668 AEC Manual, Section 9II1-o313. See Mid West Contracting Co., AEC ABCA
Dkt. No. 35 (Board's recommendation adopted· by General Manager April 29. 1953),
BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 221: 328: "Contract specification's requirement that
contractor satisfy himself as to general and local labor conditions which can affect
cost under contract bars his recovery of ·additional costs incurred when he was required to use plumbers instead of pipelayers to install iron water pipes; contractor
was obligated by local custom and local union rules to use plumbers, instead of pipelayers, and he could and should have discovered this by reasonable inquiry required
of him under contract specification; less than total observance of union jurisdictional
boundaries in installing subdivision water lines does· not relieve contractor of obligation to use plumbers since he was engaged in overall large federal construction where
many other trades and uniof!S were employed."
6 89 AEC Manual, Sections 9111-04 through 096.

1342

FEDERAL REGULATORY AND

ment, such clauses tend to be strictly construed against the contractor
and in favor of the government. 670
E. Settlement of Contract Disputes at Administrative Level
Controversies arising under government contracts traditionally have
been sought to be settled by the use of a disputes clause inserted in the
contract itself at the insistence of the public agency. In addition, many
agencies like the Atomic Energy Commission have appointed a semiindependent body generally known as a Board of Contract Appeals to
review decisions of the contracting officer, with or without that decision
being binding on the head of the agency. A third method of contract
dispute settlement at the administrative level relates to the authority of
the Comptroller General.
1.

The Disputes Clause 671

The government has used 'two types of disputes clauses which empower the contracting officer, as the government's representative, to
settle all controversies arising. under the contract, such decision to be
final and conclusive, subject only to administrative review. The first,
the "all disputes" clause, permits the contracting officer to decide all
questions of law and fact. 672 The second, and more common, 878 type is
the "facts disputes" clause, which leaves to the contracting officer's final
determination only questions of fact.
The Atomic Energy Commission has adopted the "facts dispute"
clause. m This clause provides :
Except as otherwise provided in this contract, any dispute
concerning a question of fact arising under this contract which
is not disposed of by agreement shall be decided by the Con8 7 0 See Frank Belluscio & Sons, Inc., AEC ABCA Dkt. No. 4 (Board's recommendations adopted by General Manager Nov. 16, 1950), BNA, Atomic Industry
Reporter 221 : 3II-3I2, strictly construing a "changes" article.
8 71 For a general discussion of this type of contract provision, used in some form or
another in government contracts since after the Civil War, see Joy, supra note 536 at
13-17; Schultz, iuPra note 536 at 219-220.
612 See, e.g., Graham Mfg. Co. v. U.S., 91 F. Supp. 715, 716 (D. Cal. 1950).
67 3 Generally, Article 15 of the contract, see Shea, supra note 536 at 356; Joy, supra
note 536 at II.
6 14 AEC Manual, Section 9111-034. 10 Code Fed. Regs. §3.1 specifically provides
that such a clause may be included in subcontracts, a practice which is. not commonly
found in the contract appeals procedure of other agencies, see Cuneo, "Disputes Between Subcontractors and Prime Contractors Under Government Contracts, 16 Fed.
Bar J. 246, 253 (1956).
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tracting Officer, who shall reduce his decision to writing and
mail or otherwise furnish a copy thereof to the contractor.
Within 30 days from the date of receipt of such copy, the contractor may appeal by mailing or otherwise furnishing to the
Contracting Officer a written appeal addressed to the Commission, and the decision of the Commission shall, unless determined by a court of competent jurisdiction to have been
fraudulent, arbitrary, capricious, or so grossly erroneous as
necessarily to imply bad faith, or is not supported by substantial evidence, be final and conclusive: Provided, That if
no such appeal to the Commission is taken, the decision of the
Contracting Officer shall be final and conclusive. In connection with any appeal proceeding under this clause, the contractor shall be afforded an opportunity to be heard and to
offer evidence in support of its appeal. Pending final decision of a dispute hereunder, the contractor shall proceed
diligently with the performance of the contract and in accordance with the Contracting Officer's decision.
This clause contains five component parts with respect to procedure
at the administrative level. First, the contracting officer has sole authority to decide "a question of fact arising under this contract" on
which mutual agreement is not reached with the private contractor.
This provision is detailed in the Commission's rules to require the contracting officer to issue, and to serve upon the contractor, a "decision"
consisting of a statement of his decision, specific findings of fact
thereon, and a copy of the rules governing appeals to the agency's
Advisory Board of Contract Appeals. 615
Second, ·the clause gives the contractor thirty days from the date of
receipt «?f a "decision" by the contracting officer to file his appeal with
the Commission, that is, the Advisory Board of Contract Appeals. 676
67 5 10 Code Fed. Regs. §3.10. In the Board's view, specific findings of fact are "...
important. . . . Not only do such Findings formulate the issues for appeal ... but
they evidence a vital part of the mental processes essential to any decision. Until the
formal Findings of Fact have been completed, any purported decision (no matter how
designated) is tentative by the very nature of human thinking. The ultimate decision
must rest on, and be supported by, the Findings of Fact, and absent such Findings,
there is no decision ..." (Frontier Drilling Co., AEC ABCA Dkt. No. 74 (Board's
recommendations adopted by General Manager July I, 1955), BNA, Atomic Industry
Reporter 221: 374).
67 6 10 Code Fed. Regs. §§J.II-12. The 3o-day requirement has been liberally construed by the Board in favor of the contractor, J. F. Byrd, AEC ABCA Dkt. No. 22
(Board's recommendations adopted by General Manager June 6, 1951), BNA, Atomic
Industry Reporter 221: 325; Sound Construction and Engineering Co., Dkt. No. 63
(Board's recommendations adopted Dec. 23, 1954), BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter
221: 355; Frontier Drilling Co., suPra note 6{5.
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Third, if no appeal is taken, the decision of the contracting officer is
"final and conclusive." Fourth, the Commission must afford procedure
for the contractor to be given a hearing before it, which has been done
throt,igh the Advisory Board of Contract Appeals. Fifth, the contractor
must proceed "diligently" with the work during the pendency of the
dispute.
The government often has taken the position that the procedure
established by the disputes clause represents a true form of arbitration
consistent with principles of arbitration ·applicable to private contracts. 677
The .facts, however, do not support this claim. The contracting officer
is hardly an impartial third party, completely disinterested in the result
of the settlement of the dispute, 678 in spite of the AEC Board's praiseworthy efforts to improve the status of the contracting officer in contract
appeals procedure. 679 The contracting officer's job is to keep the contract
moving, with maximum benefit to the government, and the disputes
clause procedure provides a "relatively inexpensive and rapid method
bf settling controversies." 680 The disputes clause may afford some
measure of due process in th~ settlement of controversies arising under
a 'contract whil'e it is being carried out, but it is not a true agreement to
arbitrate
. . . because the deCision is made by a representative of the
Government. The bargaining power of the Government is
Joy, supra note 536 at II, 13; Anderson, supra note 536 at 220.
See, e.g., Review of Finality Clauses in Gwernment Contracts, Beatings before
House Judiciary Committee on H.R. I839 et al., 83d Cong., ISt and 2d Sess. 24 (1954),
in which the representative of the American Bar Association stated, in part: "Such
a contracting officer may not intend to ~o any wrong; unwittingly, he is just not impartial. ..." Other commentators are less charitable, see, e.g., Schultz, supra note
536.at 224·
679 See Otis Williams & Co., AEC ABCA Dkt. No. 88 (Board's recommendations
adopted by General Counsel Nov. 8, 1956), BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 221:388:
"Contracting officers have many duties in connection with the execution of, and performance unde~, both prime and subcontracts. In most of these, they act purely as
agencies of the· Co~mission as a party to a contractual arrangement. But when a contracting officer proceeds ·under the 'disputes articles' of a prime or a subcontract, to
decide a dispute, he. then acts in a quasi-judicial capacity, obligated to proceed impartially, ·and without favoritism either. to the subcontractor, to the contractor or to
the Commission. Once he has rendered his decision, his judicial connection with the
dispute ceases. . . ·. If the dispute was under a prime contract, he reverts to his status
as an agent of the Commission and appears, in that capacity, as appellee. . . • [W]hen
the dispute reaches this Board, appearances by counsel are on behalf of the proper
parties, and a purported appearance for the contracting officer in his j~icial capacity is as impossible and as improper as would be the appearance in an appellate·
court by counsel for the trial judge.
"
e8o Joy; supra note 536 at 20.
· 677

678
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very great since many contractors depend upon Government
contracts for their very existence, and are thus in no position
to force their demands upon the Government. As a result, the
disputes clause is heavily in favor of the Government. 681
2.

Advisory Board of Contract Appeals

Chartered in April, 1948, the Advisory Board of Contract Appeals
of the Atomic Energy Commission represents a salutary, although incomplete, attempt by that agency to assure a measure of due process in
the consideration of disputes appealed to the Commission from the
contracting officer. Authority for the creation of the Board stems from
Section 12(a) of the 1946 Act and Section 161a of the 1954 Act authorizing the Commission to "establish advisory boards to advise with and
make recommendations to the Commission . . . administration." 682
This type of intra-agency review procedure also has been used effecti~ely in other agencies of the government. Some of these boa~d~ follow
the pattern of the Atomic Energy Commission Advisory Board, the
decisions of which are merely recommendations. 683 Others 68• follow the
pattern of the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, the decisions
of which are binding on the agency involved. 685
Shea, supra note 536 at 356.
42 U.S.C. §I8I2(a) (I946); 42 U.S.C.A. §220I (a). The general administration
of advisory boards to the Commission, including the Advisory Board of Contract Appeals, is provided for in IO Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 7, adopted Sept. I, I955, in "the
midst of a growing controversy over what has been termed in press reports as 'big
business domination' of the drive to develop industrial uses of atomic energy" (BNA.,
Atomic Industry Reporter I: I07). For a discussion of the antitrust problems aris·ing with respect to AEC advisory boards, see Jacobs and Melchior, supra note 350
.at 53I-533. (Ed. Note: On February 3, I959, IO C.F.R., Part 3 of the AEC's Rule
was amended to place the hearing of contract appeals under the agency's hearing ex·aminer, 22 Fed. Reg. 726.)
6 83 General Services Administration Board of Review, established March 7, I950;
Veterans' Administration Construction Appeals Board and Supply Contract Appeals
Board, established April 8, I949, and March I2, I954. respectively.
- 6 8• Department of Interior Board of Contract Appeals, established December 29,
I9S4; Contract Disputes Board for Commodity Credit Corp., established April 4.
~946; and Army Corps of Engineers Claims and Appeals Board, established August 9,
I946. Army overseas commands also have Boards of Contract Appeal with jurisdiction of claims up to $50,000, see Joy, supra note 536 at I7.
. 6 B5 Established May I, I949, and merging the former War Department and Navy
Department Boards of Contract Appeals created August 24, I942, and December I,
I944, respectively. See· Cuneo, supra note 536 at 376: "The charter of the Board
also states that 'when an appeal is taken pursuant to a disputes clause in a contract
which limits appeals to disputes concerning questions of fact, the Board may nevertheless in its discretion hear, consider, and decide all questions of law necessary for
the complete adjudication of the issue,' and unless the contract provides otherwise,
681

. 6 82
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a. Jurisdiction

Although obviously exercising considerable· influence on the Atomic
Energy Commission with respect to contract disputes, the Commission
Advisory Board of Contract Appeals is exactly what its title signifiesan advisory body. Its decisions are merely recommendations to the
General Manager, who, in every reported case but two through 1957,
has approved such recommendations. 686 As the Board itself has stated,
it is only "the creature of the Commission, and it has only such power
as the Commissi9n has chosen to confer." 687
The Boards' jurisdiction primarily is established by the scope of the
disputes clause itself and by Commission regulation. Thus, the Board
is limited by that clause to settling controversies which arise "under the
contract." It does not have jurisdiction over questions of general law
connected with, but not directly arising under, the contract, nor can it
deal with controversies after the contract is completed. 688 Further, the
Commission's regulations ~tipulate that
The General Manager of the Commission is the designated
representative to decide finally all appeals arising under the
"disputes articles" of commission contracts and subcontracts.
The Commission has established an Advisory Board of Contract Appeals to assist the General Manager in his discharge
of this responsibility by hearing the appeal and recommending
to the General Manager appropriate disposition of the
appeal. . . . sse
if it appears that a claim for unliquidated damages is involved in the appeal, 'the Board
shall, insofar as the evidence permits, make findings_ of fact with respect to such claim
without expressing an opinion on the questions of liability.' ... The wisdom of the
Secretaries in giving the Armed Services Board administrative authority not set forth
in the contract was recognized by the Court of Claims in McWilliams Dredging Company, 118 Ct. Cl. I, 16 (1950). The court likened the Board as the representative of
the Secretary, to an owner who would reverse his representative if he were wrong,
not because the contract gave him the authority to make a final decision, but because
it would be the natural and fair way for an owner to act. The courts have said that
mistakes should be corrected within the agency whenever possible. Edmund J. Rappoli Company, Inc., g8 Ct. Cl. 499 (1943)."
686 Raecolith Flooring Company, supra note 631; F. H. McGraw & Co., AEC
ABCA Dkt. No. 6o (Board's recommendations rejected by General Manager Aug. 20,
1957), BN.A, Atomic Industry Reporter 221: 396 (cost-plus-fixed-fee contractor not
entitled to reimbursement for expenses incurr:ed in unsuccessfully contesting unfair
labor praclice charge before National Labor Relations Board).
687 Frontier Drilling Co., supra note 675 ; see; to the same effect, C. H. Leavall &
Co., AEc;::: ABCA Dkt. No. 112 (Board's recommendations adopted by Deputy General Manager Oct. 24, 1957), BNA, Atomic. Industry Reporter 221:397.
&88 Ibid.
ese 10 Code Fed. ·Regs. §J.I.
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In construing the above grants of power, the Board has severely limited
its authority. Thus it has held that
. . . [T]he rules do not establish the Board as an advisor at
large to the General Manager. Its advice can be sought, and
given, only where the appeal falls within the first sentence of
Section 3· I, namely a dispute arising under a contract or
subcontract. . . .
. . . Finally, the Board's jurisdiction is limited by the language of the particular disputes clause involved. Section 3.2
of the Rules provides for an appeal only where it arises "under
the disputes article" of the contract involved. Absent a disputes
article, the Board has no power to pass on any issue. . . .890
In exercising its limited jurisdiction, the Board also is governed by
the provisions of Public Law 356 enacted by Congress May 1 I, 1954.
This statute, which is fundamental law in the field of Government contracts, provides :
No provision of any contract entered into by the United
States, relating to the finality or conclusiveness of any decision of the head of any department or agency or his duly
authorized representative or board in a dispute involving a
question arising under such contract, shall be pleaded in any
suit now filed or to be filed as limiting judicial review of any
such decision to cases where fraud by such official or his said
representative or board is alleged: Provided, however, That
any such decision shall be final and conclusive unless the same
is fraudulent or capricious or arbitrary or so grossly erroneous
as necessarily to imply bad faith, or is not supported by substantial evidence.
No Government contract shall contain a provision making
final on a question of law the decision of any administrative
official, representative, or board. 691

ln construing the operation of the above provisions upon contract
appeals within the Atomic Energy Commission, the Advisory Board has
stated:
It will be noted that this statute does not operate to deprive
"any administrative official, representative or board" of jurisdiction over questions of law. It says, and means, only that
whereas (under Section I of the same statute) decisions on
questions of fact are final (absent the qualifications set out in
the proviso to that section), decisions on questions of law are
subject to judicial redetermination. But it is impossible for
690

Frontier Drilling Co., supra note 675.

691

41 U.S.C.A. §§321-322..
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Contracting Officers or their superiors to pass on claims without reaching decisions on matters of law. Nor can this Board
fulfill its advisory function without similar ·action, if a dispute
involving such issues is otherwise properly before it. (Emphasis supplied.) 692
The "proper" presentation of legal issues to the Advisory Board,
however, poses the problem, heretofore unsatisfactorily resolved, of
how to differentiate between questions of fact and questions of law.
This ·problem arises most acutely in judicial review of administrative
decisions. 698 It also has arisen in the field of contract law because of the
understandable desire of procurement agencies to insulate themselves
from judicial intervention in the exercise of a so-called "proprietary"
function. 694 .
The problem is not academic for contractors with the Atomic Energy
Commission. It is almost impossible for the contractor to decide when
the contracting officer, under the "disputes" clause, has decided a question of fact which, unless appealed to the Advisory Board within thirty
days, will .be binding upon him in any administrative or judicial proceeding involving the contract. The safest course for the contractor to
take is to appeal within the prescribed time. 695
Frontier Drilling Co., supra note 675.
See Schwartz, supra note 544 at 854-857; Hoover Commission Legal Task Force
Report, supra note 43 at 216-217: " ... [I]t is seldom that any issue on judicial review of administrative action is purely a question of law, see Dobson v. Commissioner,
320 U.S. 489, 5oo-501 (1943). In almost every case the question of law depends in
part upon the facts." As the foregoing report points out, the ultimate point in this
judicial and legislative fetish of trying to distinguish facts from the law was reached
in National Labor -Relations Board v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111 (1941). In
this decision the Supreme Court, in sustaining a decision of the Board that newsboys
were ''employees" of a newspaper under the Wagner Act (question of law) based upon
the facts of the situation, "applied a restrictive review of fact issues rather than a
broad review of legal questions." The judiciary's attitude in this chronic problem of
court revic;w is pJ:aiseworthy, because it is based on a healthy desire to. prevent encroachment by the courts upon the authority of the Executive Branch. However, the
insistence of the latter ui>on this restrictive scope of review is a part of the policy of
administrative agencies to limit any judicial review of their decisions. One solution
is to require courts, by legislation, to apply the law to the facts in all cases, see Section 207(g) of proposed Administrative Code, Hoover Commission Legal Task Force
Report, supra note ·43 at 374: "The reviewing court shall determine all relevant questions of law and interpret any constitutional and statutory provisions involved, and it
shall apply such determination to the facts duly found or established, whether or not
such court is the trier of the facts. . . ."
6 9 4 Etheridge, supra note 536 at 556; Moss, supra note 536, at 163; Joy, supra note
536 at 20-21 ; Schultz, supra note 536 at 246.
695 Etheridge, supra note 536 at 556-557; Cuneo, supra note 536 at 377: "Another
difficulty is to determine whether the dispute is factual or legal. The uncertainty of
692

693

ADMINISTRATIVE LIMITATIONS

1349

The problem again arises at the Advisory Board level. Under its
charter, the latter considers the "appeal ... de novo, and independent
findings of fact will be made, although the findings of fact of the contr~cting officer may be adopted by the Board in whole or in part." 696
This type of review, of course, is not a true trial de novo in which the
findings of fact of an administrative body would not be entitled to any
legislative or judicial conclusiveness. 697
The Advisory Board has endeavored to clarify the distinction between reviewable questions of fact, to which may be allied issues ·of
law, and non-reviewable issues of law standing alone. It has held itself
without jurisdiction to interpret a contract lacking a disputes clause. 698
However, the Board will make "some preliminary rulings" on legal
issues where necessary to determine its own jurisdiction or "to put a
factual dispute in its proper setting." 699 As a practical matter, like other
intra-agency contract review boards, the Advisory Board of the Atomic
Energy Commission probably will hear and decide an appeal from an
initial determination of a contracting officer as an issue of fact to
which issues of law are incidental.
b. Nature of Proceeding
On paper, the conduct of hearings by the Advisory Board appears to
be highly informal and possesses none of the attributes of formal
arriving at any clear-cut definition of what constitutes a question of 'law' or 'fact' has
generally been recognized by lawyers. . . . Whenever there is any doubt as to what
should be done, the wise course to follow is to appeal. In most cases the effort and cost
involved are negligible."
896 10 Code Fed. Regs. §3.22.
697 For a statutory equivalent of this quasi-de novo administrative review, see 49
U.S.C.A. §16(2) and 7 U.S.C.A. §210, providing for review of reparations' orders of
the Interstate Commerce Commission and Department of Agriculture. "Such restriction on the scope of review is inconsistent with a complete retrial of the facts under a
trial de novo" (Hoover Commission Legal Task Force Report, supra note 43 at 219).
698 Frontier Drilling Co., supra note 675.
699 The Board held, in part, ibid.: "While, under such an ['facts disputes'] article,
the Board can-and frequently must-make some preliminary rulings on legal issues
where necessary either to determine (as here) jurisdictional questions, or to put a
factual dispute in its proper setting, it is clear that the Board cannot pass on an appeal which raises only legal issues. . .. . The present dispute raises only a question
as to the interpretation of the contract. By long settled rule, the interpretation of
contract clauses, although a dispute under a contract, is a dispute over issues of law.
It follows that the Board has no jurisdiction. . . ." But see Retenbach Engineering
Co., AEC ABCA Dkt. No. I I (Board's recommendations adopted by General Manager
May 29, 1951), BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 221: 313: "Dispute over whether
contract gave Government or contractor responsibility for rerouting traffic around
construction site is question of fact determinable by Board under contract's disputes
clause."
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adjudication 700 or of an adversary proceeding. Such hearings, by rule,
are required to "be informal, with no fixed form of procedure." 701
These are no formal rules of evidence, 702 and parties may be represented
"by any authorized person." 703
Although neither the Atomic Energy Commission nor its Advisory
Board of Contract Appeals ever has publicly taken the position with
respect to contract review proceedings, there exists some sentiment that
such proceedings are in the nature of an airing of grievances or of a
friendly discussion. 704 The substance of contract appeals procedure and
the issues at stake repudiate this characterization. So does the government's own position in the proceedings by always being represented by
legal counsel. In fact as well as in theory, a proceeding before the
Advisory Board of Contract Appeals of the Atomic Energy Commission is litigation in the substantial sense and clearly quasi-judicial. 705
Indeed, a prominent and long-time member of contract review boards
in the Department of Defense has stated :
Hearings before the Board have been described as being informal. This does not mean that they are of a roundtable
discussion or conference variety. The procedure and atmosphere more closely resemble a court trial without a jury. 106
1oo Under Section 2(d) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. §wen (d),
made applicable to Commission proceedings by Section 181 of the 1954 Atomic Energy
Act, adjudication is the formulation of any agency order which finally disposes of
any matter other than by rule making. "Formal" adjudication is that which is "required by statute to be determined on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing'' (Section 5, 5 U.S.C.A. §1004),
101 xo Code Fed. Regs. §3.23.
702Jd., §3.23(d): "Testimony and evidence may be submitted without regard to the
formal rules of evidence. • . ."
11)3[d., §3.23(g).
70 4 See, e.g., Moss, stlf'ra note 536 at 166, n. 26: "For example, one member of the
ASBCA [Armed Service Board of Contract Appeals] argues openly that the Board's
primary function is to provide contractors with a place to air their grievances, regardless of the validity thereof : a sort of wailing wall so to speak." This view coincides
with the misconception that Government contracting is largely a matter of public relations.
70 5 Vom Baur, mpra note 536 at 32-33; Moss, supra note 536, at 163-164; see
Plaine, mpra note 1 at 78: "... [-P]ossibly the relationship between the AEC and
the contractors [under so-called reimbursement-type 'administrative contracts'] could
be considered, on analysis, as a branch of 'administrative law.'"· It also can be argued
that Pub. L. 356 requires a hearing on the record within the meaning of Section 5
of the Administrative Procedure Act and that such a right to a formal hearing is
· required by the Constitution, even without the provisions of Pub. L. 356; see United
States v. Blair, 321 U.S. 730, 734-737, 64 S. Ct. 820 (1944); United States v. ]os. A.
Holpuch Co., 328 U.S. 234. 238-241, 66 S. Ct. rooo (1946); Morgan v. U.S., 2()8 U.S.
468, 477-482, s6 s. Ct. 906 c1936).
1oe Cuneo, mfJra note 536 at 435·
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3· Comptroller General
In addition to an appeal from the initial determination of a contracting officer to the Advisory Board of Contract Appeals, an Atomic
Energy Commission contractor has another means of administrative
review in the General Accounting Office, headed by the Comptroller
GeneraP 07
This procedure has been well summarized, as follows:
The GAO, while not a party to the contract, may enter the
picture whenever vouchers are presented to it by an administrative agency for "direct settlement" with a contractor, or
whenever a disbursing officer or head of an administrative
agency requests an advance decision. The GAO also enters the
picture when a contractor makes a claim against the United
States where payment has been denied. It can deny payment or
demand payment back; if the latter is refused, it can collect
directly from any other governmental funds that may be due
a contractor, and failing that method, it may request that the
Attorney General sue on behalf of the United States in the appropriate court. It can also pay claims denied by the contracting agency, and a contractor dissatisfied with a decision of a
contracting officer or board of contract appeals has a second
opportunity for administrative review. Unlike the departmental review, however, this GAO review is optional and is not a
prerequisite to filing a court action. . . .
From the point of view of the contractor the administrative
review procedure of the GAO is not too dissimilar from departmental review. If anything, it is more informal. The
statutes under which the GAO is authorized to settle and adjust claims by and against the United States prescribe no
definite form of procedure for the presentation and settlement of claims, leaving it entirely to the Comptroller General.
Moreover, as an arm of Congress the GAO would appear to
be excluded from the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act, under Section 2 (a). On the other hand, there
may be some advantage to arguing a case to accountants,
rather than lawyers, where the issue is cost accounting; there
may also be psychological satisfaction in dealing with an office
closer to the source of payment. And, of course, if the amount
is worth fighting about, it is nice to have a second chance before resort to the courts. 708
This administrative forum offers the advantage to the contractor of
securing a determination of both his legal rights and the factual ques1o1

Pursuant to Section 305 of the Budget and Accounting Act of

1921, 31

§74708

Schultz, supra note 536 at 23o-232. See Joy, supra note 536 at 41.
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tions under the contract, without being limited on further judicial review to the restrictions of Public Law 356. Where both the contractor
and agency submit a dispute to the Comptroller General, it may not later
be redetermined by a board of contract appeals. Should the agency
unilaterally submit the dispute to the Comptroller General, the contractor does not lose his rights to administrative and judicial review
under the disputes clause and, indeed, may immediately bring suit in the
courts on the grounds that the agency, by its actions, has waived the
procedure provided under that clause. 709
F. Judicial Review of Contract Disputes
r. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Except where the Atomic Energy Commission voluntarily might
waive the requirements of the disputes clause, the contractor is required
to exhaust his administrative-or, more properly, contractual-remedies
before he may proceed in court. 110 This means that a dispute arising
under the contract must be disposed of, first, at the contracting officer
level; second, at the Advisory Board level; and, third, at the General Manager level, all in accordance· with the regulations of the
Commission.
This exhaustion of remedies at the various administrative levels does
not mean that the agency can delay its decision indefinitely, thus keeping the contractor out of the courts. Two years between the time of
filing of a notice of an appeal of a contracting officer's decision and the
date of a final decision by the agency has been held by the courts to be
reasona,ble, but it appears that any further delay would be treated as a
breach of the contract by the government which immediately would be
actionable. 711
2.

Judicial Forums Available

Two judicial forums are available to the contractor once the administrative proceeding stage has been passed. These are the Court of Claims
and the Federal District Courts.
Both of these tribunals have jurisdiction over suits involving "any
claim against the United States . . . founded upon any express or im7os Brooks~Callaway Co. v. U.S., 97 Ct. Cl. 689, 704 (1!).42); H.P. Andrews Paper
Co., ASBCA Dkt. No. 2486 (1955).
no Cuneo, supra note 536 at 377; Joy, supra note 536 at 21-22; Etheridge, supra
note 536 at 558-559; see Schwartz, supra note 544 at 831.
111 Southeastern Oil Florida v. U.S., 115 F. Supp. 198, 201 (Ct. Cl. 1953) ; Wessel,
Duval & Co. v. U.S., 126 F. Supp. 79, 81 (D.N.Y. 1954); see Joy, supra note 536 at 26.
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plied contract with the United States; or . . . for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort." 712 However, the
amount in suit is limited in the District Courts to $10,000. No such
limitation is imposed by Congress on the jurisdiction of the Court of
Claims.
The practical efficacy of submitting contract appeals to the courts is
subject to some question, in view of the cost and time involved and the
possibility that the government will fight the case to the Supreme Court
if necessary. 118 Indeed, one such contractor, who travelled the road to
the Supreme Court via the Court of Claims and lost, thereafter told a
Congressional committee :
Contractors are reluctant to go into the Court of Oaims unless they are grossly wronged. It is a costly and time-consuming process to litigate a dispute under a Government contract. It is usually in their best interest to accept a decision
and go about their established business. . . .m
As a result of the Supreme Court's decision in that case, United States
v. Wunderlich, 115 the burden on the contractor to overturn an adverse
decision by a contracting officer became almost impossible to meet.
3· Scope of Judicial Review
Prior to the ~Vunderlich decision in 1951, the courts clearly had established the rule that the decision of the contracting officer would not be
disturbed unless it involved "fraud or such gross mistake as would
necessarily imply bad faith, or a failure to exercise an honest judgment." 116 In Wunderlich, which involved a "facts dispute" clause similar to that used by the Atomic Energy Commission, a majority of the
Supreme Court narrowed the scope of review to allegations and proof
of actual fraud, that is
. . . conscious wrongdoing, an intention to cheat or be dishonest. . . . If the standard of fraud that we adhere to is too
limited, that is a matter for Congress. 711
m Court of Claims-28 U.S.C.A. §1491; district courts-28 U.S.C.A. §1346(a) (2).

Schultz, supra note 536 at 249-250, who recommends that the $10,000 limitation
imposed in the district courts by the Tucker Act of 1887 is now unrealistic and should
be raised to at least $100,000.
11 4 G. P. Leonard, Vice-President of Wunderlich Contracting Co., petitioner in
United States v. Wunderlich, supra note 640, in a statement to the House Judiciary
Committee on July 30, 1953, Hearings on H.R. I839 et al., supra note 678 at 10.
115 Supra note 640.
116 Kihlberg v. U.S., 97 U.S. 398, 402 (1878); see United States v. Moorman, 338
U.S. 457, 461, 70 S. Ct. 288· (1950).
717 342 U.S. !)8, 100. 72 S.Ct. 154 (1951). Three justices (Douglas, Reed, and Jack113
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Matter for Congress that decision did become. The standard imposed
thereby was recognized as "a departure from the previously settled
law" and "a clear invitation to injustice." 118 After prolonged hearings,719 Congress in May 1954 enacted Public Law 356.
The latter statute overrules the decision in Wunderlich. As noted
previously, the legislation reinstates the pre-1951 scope of contract review by providing that the final decision by the contracting agency, in
cases where there is a disputes clause, "shall, unless determined by a
court of competent jurisdiction to have been fraudulent, arbitrary,
capricious, or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith, or
is not supported by substantial evidence, be final and conclusive." This
language is incorporated in the disputes clause used by the Atomic
Energy Commission. 120 The Commission clause also conforms to the
statutory requirement that the decision of any administrative officer
cannot be final with respect to questions of law.
Not only did Public Law 356 restore a rule of law which gave the
contractor some semblance of contractual due process, it also added the
requirement of substantial evidence to underlie the agency decision. This
means that, for such a decision to be sustained, it must be supported in
the record on review by "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." 721 The new evidentiary standard represents a definite reform in contract review procedure, since theretofore the decision of the contracting officer or agency
could be sustained by a court on a mere preponderance of the evidence.
The provision clearly was designed to bring into this field of judicial
review at least one of the salutary standards required by the Administrative Procedure Act. 722 Further, Public Law 356 has been construed
son) vigorously dissented, stating in part, 342 U.S. 101: "But the rule we announce has
wide application and a devastating effect. It makes a tyrant out of every contracting
officer. He is granted the power of a tyrant even though he is stubborn, perverse or
captious. He is allowed the power of a tyrant though he is incompetent or negligent.
He has the power of life and death over a private business even though his decision
is grossly erroneous. Power granted is seldom neglected." See Palace Corp. v. U.S., 110
F. Supp. 476, 478 (Ct. Cl. 1953), literally interpreting the Wunderlich rule.
ns Etheridge, supra note 536 I# 567; see Cuneo, supra note 536 at 374; Joy, supra
note 536 at 18; Schultz, supra note 536 at 221-224.
ns Hearings on H.R. 1839 et al., supra note 678; see H.R. Rep. No. 138o, 83d Cong.,
2d Sess: (1954) and Sen. Rep. No. 32, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953).
120 AEC Manual,. Section 9111-034·
· 7 21 Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B.; 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S. Ct. 2o6 (1938); see Shea,
supra note 536 at 358-359; Schwartz, supra note 544 at 852-853.
122 Section Io(e) (B) (5), 5 U.S.C.A. §wog(e) (B) (5) ("... the reviewing court
... shall ... hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions
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to permit consideration by a reviewing court of evidence outside the
so-called "administrative record" considered by the deciding officer of
the contracting agency. 123
G. Conclusions
Except with respect to the controversy involving Mississippi Valley
Generating Company, the contract policies and procedures of the Atomic
Energy Commission have not of themselves evoked substantial adverse
comment or criticism. Indeed, the agency appears to have done an outstanding job in establishing and operating a multi-billion dollar atomic
energy plant in the United States.
This does not mean, however, that the contract procedures of the
Commission cannot be improved. Such improvement only can be effected when the Commission and contractors alike recognize procurement as a form of administrative procedure and dispel the present theory
found to be ... unsupported by substantial evidence. . . ."); H.R. Rep. No. 138o,
supra note 719 at 4-5. For decisions construing the provisions of Public Law 356, see
Allied Contractors, Inc. v. U.S., 124 F. Supp. 366 (Ct. Cl. 1954) (contractor need
not take appeal from contracting officer's decision on question of law); Atlantic Carriers v. U.S., 131 F. Supp. I, 5 (D.N.Y. 1955) (dismissing libel in admiralty for government breach of charter party by returning ship in damaged condition, the court
holding: "A question of 'law' is not a 'claim' of which the court acquires immediate
jurisdiction before the administrative fact-finding process is completed. Questions of
law usually arise only after the disputed questions of fact relegated to administrative
determination have been resolved. If a claim arising under a disputes clause involves
solely questions of law, then immediate jurisdiction may properly be held to be present") ; United States v. Lennox Metal Mfg. Co., 131 F. Supp. 717, 732-733 (D.N.Y.
1954), affirmed 225 F. 2d 302, 318-319 (2<1 Cir. 1955) (holding substantial evidence
rule of Administrative Procedure Act and dissents iri Wunderlich case enacted into
contract law by Public Law 356); Wagner Whirler and Derrick Corp. v. U.S., 121
F. Supp. 664 (Ct. Cl. 1954) (overruling decision of contracting officer for lack of
substantial evidence therefor in record).
723 Volentine and Littleton v. U.S., 145 F. Supp. 952, 954 (Ct. Cl. 1956) : "There
is logic in the Government's position. But we do not adopt it. It would require two
trials in many cases involving this question. The first trial would include the
presentation of the 'administrative record' and its study to determine whether, on the
basis of what was in it, the administrative decision was tolerable. But the so-called
'administrative record' is in many cases a mythical entity. There is no statutory provision for these administrative decisions or for any procedure in making them. The
head of the department may make the decision on appeal personally or may entrust
anyone else to make it for him. Whoever makes it has no power to put witnesses
under oath or to compel the attendance of witnesses or the production of documents. There may or may not be a transcript of the oral testimony. The deciding
officer may, and even in the departments maintaining the most formal procedures,
does, search out and consult other documents which, it occurs to him, would be enlightening, and without regard to the presence of the claimant."
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that the contracting function of the government is exactly analogous to
that of a private party. Congressional authority to, in effect, review
certain types of Commission contracts presents a new and complicating
factor in the relations between private industry and the federal agency.
Within the Commission itself, the Advisory Board of Contract Appeals should be reconstituted as a true intra-agency review body, with
final-not advisory-authority to pass upon the initial determinations
of contracting officers. The success of, and general public confidence in,
the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals which has authority to
bind the Secretary of Defense, points the way towards a similar development within the Atomic Energy Commission.
The fiction that the Board only makes findings of fact, and reaches
conclusions of law incidental thereto, also should be laid to rest. This
can be done by amending the Rules of Procedure of the Board. There
exists no sound reason why the Board cannot consider mere questions
of law, which consideration, of course, would be reviewable in the
courts as at present. Such a' step would benefit both the agency and
contractors. The latter would be encouraged to confine the settlement
of all disputes arising under or in relation to a contract within the
intra-agency review framework, without any resort to the courts..
Any Commission or industry misconception that a proceeding before
the Board is merely a forum to air grievances also should be dispelled.
Form and theory to the contrary, such a proceeding is a quasi-judicial
hearing in which adverse interests litigate. The present emphasis of the
Commission's regulations on informality and lack of evidentiary rules
is misleading and detrimental to the interests of both the government
and the contractor.
Time and effort are expended by both sides in a proceeding which
could be shortened by greater formality and regard for the rules of
evidence. The often repeated argument that informality simplifies administrative proceedings is not borne out by the facts. Informality
lengthens the record and permits the introduction of arguments completely unrelated to the subject matter of the proceeding. More important, however, the contractor choosing to take his case to the courts
must do so with a recor~ which is difficult for the latter to review in
many cases because of disregard for the rules of evidence at the agency
level. In this, the contractor probably is the chief sufferer since he is
seeking to reverse an agency decision. 724 Indeed, the substantial evidence
724 Even those who favor the "administrative contract" admit that "judicial enforcement of total performance by either party would be difficult" (Ramey and Erlewine,
supm note 551 at 354; see Moss. supra note 536 at I6o-I6I)
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rule used by the courts since 1954 to review contract decisions would
seem to require that the record be made by practical and reasonable use
of the rules of evidence.
Finally, and most important, the contractor must realize the nature of
the transaction in which he engages when he contracts with the government. The fine print on the back of a government contract form is just
as binding as the clauses of a contract prepared on typing paper. Despite
the government's insistence at times on speed in negotiating and executing the contract, the private party should approach the transaction with
the same care and caution which he would use in other legal matters
affecting his business.

PART V
INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF
ATOMIC ENERGY

Chapter I
ATOMS FOR PEACE:
THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY
AGENCYt
BERNHARD

G.

BECHHOEFER

* AND

ERIC STEIN

**

On October 26, I956, seventy states signed an international agreement described as the Statute of an International Atomic Energy
Agency. This signing followed a conference of over a month in which
eighty-two states participated. 1 All of the participating states supported the text which resulted from this conference-a truly remarkable result considering that the subject of the conference was atomic
energy with its far-reaching international security implications. The
Agency came into existence on July 29, I957, as a result of the ratification of the statute by the requisite number of states. On October I
when its first General Conference convened in Vienna, the Agency had
fifty-four members.
The International Atomic Energy Agency in several respects is

t The authors gratefully acknowledge the support of the Stanford Research Institute, Menlo Park, California, in the preparation of this article. The authors are indebted also to The University of .Michigan Law School for providing able research
assistance by Mr. Frederick Juenger, graduate student at the Law School.
Any views expressed in this article are the personal views of the authors and not
necessarily the views of any agency of the United States Government. This article
appeared originally in the April I957 issue of the Michigan Law Review; it has been
revised to bring the developments concerning the International Atomic Energy Agency
up to October I, I957.
*Member, District of Columbia Bar; formerly Foreign Service Officer detailed
to U.S. Atomic Energy Commission as Chief of International Atomic Energy Agency
Branch, Division of International Affairs; A.B. 1925, Harvard College; LL.B. Ig28,
Harvard Law School ; member, Minnesota Bar ; from N' ovember I 954 to December
I955, Special Assistant to the United States Representative for International Atomic
Energy Agency Negotiations.
·
**Professor of Law, University of Michigan; J.U.D. I937, Charles University of
Prague, Faculty of Law; J.D. I942, University of Michigan; formerly of the Department of State, Adviser to the United States Delegation to the International Conference
on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy in Geneva and to the United States Representative for International Atomic Energy Agency Negotiations.
1 See Official Records of the I956 Conference on the Statute of the International
Atomic Energy Agency (hereinafter referred to as the statute), IAEA/CS/OR.J9, p. 2,
for the unanimous adoption of the statute. The text of the statute (reproduced as
Appendix A, Item IO) is contained in booklet form in IAEA/CS/IJ. For the list of
the states which signed the statute see IAEA/CS/OR 40, pp. II-IS.
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unique among international organizations. In the first place, it combines two functions. It has the positive function of seeking "to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health
and prosperity throughout the world." 2 Also, it has the negative
function of insuring, "so far as it is able, that assistance provided by
it or at its request or under its supervision or control, is not used in
such a way as to further any military purpose." 3
When President Eisenhower first launched the idea of the Agency
in the United Nations on December 8, 1953, he indicated that one of
its prime objectives should be to "begin to diminish the potential destructive power of the world's atomic stockpiles." 4 This envisioned
utilizing the Agency to siphon off fissionable materials from wartime
uses to peacetime uses. 5 Thus one function aims at raising standards
of living; the other theoretically relates to the over-all problem of
disarmament. 6
Another unusual feature of the Agency is that there will in fact be
three different types of relationships between the Agency and its members. This is reflected in the statute, particularly in the provisions on
the selection of the Board of Governors. 7 The first type of relationship will apply to those members which now produce substantial
quantities of fissionable materials; 8 those states probably will not apply
2 Statute, art. II, first sentence.
s Statute, art. II, second sentence.
4 U.N. General Assembly Off. Rec., 8th Session
(1953), Plenary Meetings,
A/PV.470, p. 443 at 452, par. 122.
G The same thought was repeated by Mr. Lewis Strauss, Chairman of the United
States Atomic Energy Commission, in the International Conference on the Statute.
He expressed the hope that the creation of an International Atomic Energy Agency
" ... will divert important amounts of fissionable material from atomic bomb arsenals
to the uses of benefit to mankind, and those amounts will steadily grow with the
maintenance of peace. More tons of these materials will be devoted to welfare, fewer
tons to weapons and warfare." IAEA/CO/OR.I, p. 11. However, see the United
States note of May 1, 1954 handed by Secretary of State Dulles to Soviet Foreign
Minister Molotov [in Atoms for Peace Manual, S. Doc. No. 55, 84th Cong., 1st sess.
274 (1954)] to the effect that " ... this proposal [for an international atomic energy
agency] was not intended as a measure for the control of atomic weapons. . . ."
e For the position of the Soviet Union on the relation between negotiations for the
Agency and disarmament negotiations, see Appendix A, Items 1 and 7, and footnotes 74
and 129 infra.
T Statute, art. VI, par. A.
s The statute defines fissionable materials in art. XX as follows :
"1. The. term 'special fissionable material' means plutonium-239; uranium-233;
uranium enriched in the isotopes 235 or 233; any material containing one or more of
the foregoing; and such other fissionable material as the Board of Governors shall
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in the foreseeable future for any assistance whatsoever from the
Agency. 9 The second type of relationship will involve the states that
have substantial quantities of "source material" (uranium and thorium) 10 and therefore will be in a position to make contributions to
the Agency as well as to receive benefits from the Agency. 11 This same
category would include countries such as Norway, Sweden, and the
Netherlands, which have developed considerable technical skills in the
field of atomic energy but lack, at the present time, source materials.
The third type of relationship will involve those members that have
neither technical skills nor source materials. These states constituting
most of the membership will derive benefits from the Agency but
their contributions, if any, are likely to be much smaller than the
benefits which they will derive.
While the states in this third category received texts of the draft
statute as early as August 1955 and made suggestions both in the
U. N. General Assembly and to the negotiating states, they did not
participate directly in the negotiations until the convening of the
International Conference. 12 Many of the changes in the statute made
at the conference resulted from their suggestions. 18
from time to time determine; but the term 'special fissionable material' does not
include source material.
"2. The term 'uranium enriched in the isotopes 235 or 233' means uranium containing the isotopes 235 or 233 or both in an amount such that the abundance ratio of
the sum of these isotopes to the isotope 238 is greater than the ratio of the isotope 235
to the isotope 238 occurring in nature." Cf. the definition of "special nuclear material"
in §ny of the United States Atomic Energy Act of 1954. 68 Stat. 921, 42 U.S.C.A.
§§20n et seq. (P.L. No. 703, 83d Cong., 2d sess., August 1954).
o This group includes the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and the
U.S.S.R. and perhaps France. The Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission
estimated that France would seek Agency assistance. (Hearings before the Committee
on Foreign Relations, U.S. Sen., 85th Cong., 1st sess., on Exec. I, May 14-20, 1957,
p. 117.)
1o Art. XX of the statute defines "source material" in the following manner :
"3. The term 'source material' means uranium containing the mixture of isotopes
occurring in nature ; uranium depleted in the isotope 235 ; thorium ; any of the foregoing
in the form of metal, alloy, chemical compound, or concentrate; any other material
containing one or more of the foregoing in such concentration as the Board of Governors shall from time to time determine; and such other material as the Board of
Governors shall from time to time determine." Cf. the definition of "source material"
in the U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C.A. §2014(x).
11 E.g., France, the Union of South Africa, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Portugal,
Australia.
12 Ambassador Morehead Patterson, U.S. representative in the initial negotiating
group, states in his Report to the President : "Many comments have been received
either through communications to the State Department or through statements made
in the recent debate on this subject in the Tenth General Assembly. These com-
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Three drafts emerged successively during the negotiations :
I. The text of August 22, 1955, prepared by the initial negotiating
group of eight states, referred to below as the eight-power draft; 14
2. The text of April 18, 1956, prepared by the enlarged negotiating
group of twelve states, referred to as the twelve-power draft; 15 and
3· The final text approved by the International Conference. 16

Separate and parallel negotiations were carried on between the
United States and the Soviet Union until the Soviet Union joined
in the negotiating group of twelve in November 1955. 17
A. Membership
The initial membership of the Agency is limited to states which are
members of the United Nations or of any of the specialized agencies
which sign the statute within the specified period and ratify it_l 8 As
a practical matter, all states are eligible for initial membership excepting the Chinese Communist regime, North Korea, East Germany,
Outer Mongolia, and Viet Minh. These regimes are neither members
of the United Nations nor of any of the specialized agencies. States
other than the initial members may become members "after their
membership has been approved by the General Conference upon the
recommendation of the Board of Governors." 19
ments indicate that differences in viewpoints as disclosed to date are mainly concentrated on a few points such as: a) composition and manner of selection of the Board
of Governors of the Agency; b) relationship of the Agency to the United Nations;
c) procedures for approval of the budget and prorating ainong States of operating
expenses. The United States and the other negotiating States have sought to give
full consideration to the viewpoints expressed by all of the States." 34 Dept. of State
Bul. 5 at 6 (1956).
1 3 The vast majority of the amendments to the statute offered at the International
Conference were proposed by these states. Approximately half of the amendments
brought to vote at the Conference were adopted. For a list of amendments and
their authors see IAEA/CS/INF-4/Rev. 1, dated October 3, 1956.
14 Published in 33 Dept. of State Bul. 666-672 (1955).
15 Annex III of the Report of the Working Level Meeting on the Draft Statute
of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Doc. 31, Washington, D.C., July 2, 1956;
also IAEA/CS/3, September 10, 1956, as corrected by IAEA/CS/3/Corr. 1 and
IAEA/CS/3/Corr. 2.
10 See note I supra.
11 See Appendix A, Item I.
1s Statute, art. IV, par. A. The statute was opened for signature on October 26,
1956. Statute, art. XXI, par. A. Fifty-seven states deposited their ratification in time to
become "initial members."
19 Statute, art. IV, par. B. This provision also applies to members of the United
Nations or one of the specialized agencies which have not signed the statute within
ninety days after it was opened for signature. See Appendix A, Item 2.
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B. Organs of the Agency

The Agency has three organs: the General Conference composed
of all members, 20 the Board of Governors, 21 and the staff headed by
a director general. 22 The negotiators at an early stage concluded that
in distributing responsibility among these three organs, the Board of
Governors would be given preponderant authority. 23 This conclusion
was due to the fact that the great bulk of contributions to the Agency
would come from the very few states that had fissionable materials or
large resources of uranium. These states, which were the only negotiators of the earlier drafts, were sure to play a large role on the Board
of Governors. As the group of negotiating states broadened, the
powers of the General Conference vis-a-vis· the Board of Governors
have increased. This was in response to the strong views expressed
by many states, particularly in the General Assembly and the International Conference. 2•
20

Statute, art. V.
Statute, art. VI.
22 Statute, art. VII.
23 See the remarks of Mr. Morehead Patterson in his Report, 34 Dept. of State
Bul. S at 6 ·(1956): "It was clear that the membership as a whole could not deal
with the day-to-day technical problems which would confront the Agency. Therefore, we provided in the Statute for a Board of Governors with broad authority to
make most of the necessary decisions for the Agency. The membership as a wholedescribed in the Statute as the General Conference-maintains its control over the
Board of Governors through election of a number of its members and through complete control over the purse."
See also the eight-power draft, which already·provided (in art. VII, par. H), "The
Board of. Governors shall be charged with complete authority to carry out the functions of and determine the policies of the Agency in accordance with the present
Statute subject to its responsibilities to the General Conference. . ••"
u Already in the debates in the Ninth General Assembly (in 1954) some delegations called for increased participation by underdeveloped countries in the drafting
of the statute. E.g., Mr. Barrington (Burma) said that "it was to be regretted that
Asia and Latin America had not been called upon to take part in the organization
of the international agency. . . ." U.N. General Assembly Off. Rec., 9th Session
(1954), First Committee, A/C.t/SR.723, p. 371 at 372. Similar views were expressed
by Mr. Menon (India). /d., A/C.t/SR.725, p. 381. Increased representation of the
"have-nots" on the proposed board as well as in the negotiations was advocated by
a number of countries in the Tenth General Assembly (1955). See particularly Syria,
U.N. General Assembly Off. Rec., 1oth Session (1955), First Committee, A/C.I/
SR.764. p. 39 at 43; Indonesia, id., A/C.t/SR.76S, p. 45 at 47; Israel, id., A/C. I/
SR.765, p. 45 at 48; Liberia., id., A/C.t/SR.766, p. 53 at SS; Indio, id., A/C.t/SR.768,
p. 63 at 65. The Indonesian representative said: "I have already cautioned against
repeating the inequalities of the earlier industrial revolution, with its sharp division
between the 'haves' and the 'have-nots,' between the producers of manufactured goods
and the suppliers of raw materials. . . . It is our sincere hope that the governing
21
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From the very outset of the negotiations, the General Conference
was given control over the purse strings. 25 The budget of the Agency
required the approval of the General Conference. 26
Among the additional powers granted to the General Conference at
the International Conference is the authority to make "decisions" (as
distinguished from recommendations) on matters referred to it by
the Board. 27 If this amounts to a delegation of decision-making authority it may be of practical importance particularly in the event of
the inability of the Board to decide upon a course of action. The General Conference was also given the authority to "discuss any questions
or any matters within the scope of this Statute or relating to the
powers and functions of any organs provided for in this Statute,
and may make recommendations to the membership of the Agency
body of the agency will, in the first place, be founded on the principle of equitable
geographic distribution. This means, naturally, that the Asian, African and Latin
American Continents must be adequately represented on this body." /d., A/C.1/PV.765,
pp. 22-23. In regard to the position of the underdeveloped countries see also William R.
Frye, "Atoms for Peace: 'Haves' Vs. 'Have-Nots'" in 35 Foreign Policy Bul. 41
( 1955).
25 See art. VI, par. D, subpar. 5, and art. XVI of the eight-power draft; art. V,
par. D, subpar. 5, and art. XIV of the twelve-power draft.
26 The General Conference under Article V (E) 6 will approve reports to be
submitted to the United Nations as required by the Relationship Agreement between
the Agency and the United Nations, except reports referred to in par. (C) of art.
XII, or return them to the Board with its recommendations. (The reports provided
in par. (C), art. XII, concern non-compliance by a state with orders of the Board
of Governors to remedy violations of "safeguards" agreements.) Under art. III of
the Draft Relationship Agreement (General Assembly Document A/3620, July 23,
1957), the Agency must submit (a) reports covering Agency activities at each regular
session of the General Assembly; (b) reports when appropriate to the Security CounCil "whenever, in connexion with the activities of the Agency, questions within the
competence of the Council arise"; and (c) reports to the Economic and Social
Council and to other organs of the United Nations on matters within their special
competence.
2 7 Statute, art. V, par. F, subpar. 1. This provision was part of the Indonesian-Pakistanian amendment (IAEA/CS/ Art. V /Amend. 8). Mr. Ahmad (Pakistan) stated:
"This amendment has been submitted with the idea of giving greater authority to
the General Conference within the scope of the present statute. . . . If ... there is
any matter on which the Board of Governors is unable to arrive at a decision or on
which it may definitely and explicitly want the opinion or the decision of the General Conference, then we think that instead of the present phraseology, the General
Conference should be authorized to take decisions on those matters which are specifically referred to it by the Board." IAEA/CS/0R.I8, p. 46. Mr. Surjotjondro
(Indonesia) remarked that " ... the insertion ... will add a very useful constitutional provision fur a matter which we are justified in anticipating will come up in
the course of the operation of the ag~nc~" rAEA/CS/0R.I9, p. 9. This amendment was adopted bv ilJ votes t•· '· wtth 14 abstentions. IAI:.<\ 1<'S/OR.22, p 46.
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or to the Board of Governors or to both on any such questions or
matters." 28 This language follows closely article 10 of the United
Nations Charter concerning the powers of the United Nations General Assembly. 'V"hile the Board of Governors still makes final decisions on most matters and while the powers of the General Conference are confined to those expressly granted to it in the statute,
nevertheless, this authority of the General Conference to make recommendations is significant. The Board of Governors is certain to give
the greatest weight to the recommendations of the General Conference. The legislative history raises some doubt whether the authority to make "recommendations to the membership" means only
general recommendations applicable to all members or whether it
includes also specific recommendations directed to an individual member. The authority to make recommendations of the latter type would
provide a rather powerful means of pressure on individual members. 29
28 Statute, art. V, par. D. This· addition also originated in the amendment proposed
at the Conference by Indonesia and Pakistan. IAEA/CS/Art. VI Amend. 8. In regard
to this amendment Mr. Michaels (United Kingdom) said: ". . . [W]e recognize that
perhaps the arrangements in the Agency should be brought a little more closely into
line with those which now apply to the United Nations as a whole." IAEA/CS/0R.I8,
p. 38. The Pakistanian representative remarked : "This paragraph . . . is taken from
the Charter of the United Nations where the powers of the General Assembly vis-avis the special organs of the United Nations are defined. . . . By the introduction of
this new paragraph, the powers of the General Conference • . . would be widened."
IAEA/CS/0R.I8, pp. 44-45. The Czechoslovak representative remarked: "Views that
the General Conference should be an organ with decisive authority in matters concerning the Agency's activities have been expressed by many Governments in their
comments on the original draft, as well as in the opening statements of many delegations at our Conference." IAEA/CS/0R.I8, p. 41. The amendment was adopted
by 76 votes to none, with 4 abstentions. IAEA/CS/OR.22, p. 42·
29 The importance of this new wording seems to lie in the power to make recommendations to the membership of the Agency, because the former art. V, par. E,
subpar. 1, of the twelve-power draft had already provided for the power "to make
recommendations to the BoaTd of GO'Vernors on any matter relating to the functions
of the Agency." (Emphasis added.) (The phrasing "within the scope of this Statute
or relating to the powers and functions of any organs" does not seem to differ substantially from "relating to the functions of the Agency.")
The amendment in its original form used the words "to the members." (Emphasis
added.) Mr. Michaels (United Kingdom) argued against this on the ground that
a situation should be avoided in which the General Conference would make recommendations to individual member states which were in conflict with arrangements made
by the Board, and that therefore the term "membership" rather than "members"
should be used. See IAEA/CS/OR.x8, p. 38. The Mexican representative said: "As
we understand it, the United Kingdom representative proposes that the General
Conference should be given authority to address recommendations to the members
of the Agency as a whole, and not to an individual member or group of members.
If that understanding is correct, the result, in our opinion, would be to restrict the
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This increase in the powers of the General Conference 80 as the
negotiations progressed 81 is reminiscent of the United Nations where
the authority of the General Assembly was considerably increased at
the San Francisco conference in contrast to the original Dumbarton
Oaks proposals worked out by the great powers with emphasis upon
the functions of the Security Council. 82
The most difficult and controversial question which arose in the
negotiations prior to the International Conference was the composition and manner of selection of the Board of Governors. 88
A number of formulae for the composition of the Board were considered and rejected. At one time, a system of weighted voting based
powers and functions of the General Conference. The provision would lose any practical value." IAEA/CS/OR.Ig, p. 17. The Chairman of the Conference stated before the amendment was brought to vote: "I understand that the sponsors of this
amendment will accept the proposed substitution of the words 'to the membership' for
the words 'to the members.' " IAEA/CS/OR.22, p. 41.
8o See Appendix A, Item 3·
81 This progress is described by Mr. Michaels (United Kingdom) in the following
manner: "I would point out to the Committee that the original draft of this statute,
which was circulated in August 1955, gave the Board of Governors a very large
degree of direct responsibility, not only in carrying out, but in initiating and approving the policies to be followed by the Agency. A number of countries criticized this
arrangement because they felt that on certain broad matters of policy affecting the
actions of the Board they should be more closely subordinated to the over-all direction of the General Conference. The twelve-power negotiating group, at its meeting
in March of this year, took these criticisms very seriously, and although I will not
enumerate them here, a number of very substantial changes were made to meet the
views expressed. . . . [T]the article as it now stands describes reasonably satisfactorily
the relative field of responsibility of the Board and the General Conference. To try
to give the General Conference the attributes of the executive organ of the Agency,
for which by its very nature it is not fitted, would, in view of my delegation, lead
only to inefficiency and misunderstanding. It would leave the Board without effective
influence or authority. As was pointed out by the representative of Portugal, the
operation of the Agency undoubtedly would require decisions which cannot wait a
year between meetings of the General Conference." IAEA/CS/0R.I8, pp. 36-37.
32 Compare chapter V, sec. B, of the proposal for the Establishment of a General
International Organization [Dumbarton Oaks, Washington, October 7, 1944, II Dept.
of State Bul. 368 (1944)] with arts. 10, II and 14 of the Charter of the United Nations. For the history of this development see Bentwich and Martin, A Commentary
on the Charter of the United Nations 35 (1950), and Gilchrist, "The United Nations
Charter with Explanatory Notes of Its Development at San Francisco ... ," 413
International Conciliation 452-454 (I 945).
38 Concerning the Board, the original outline of the statute transmitted to the
Soviet Union on March 19, 1954 (see Appendix A, Item .1) provided in art. II, par. C,
subpar. 1, for a "limited membership" representing governments in which it "might
be desirable to take account of geographic distribution and membership by prospective beneficiaries," and that "the principal contributors would be on the Board of
Governors."
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on contributions was suggested but was discarded largely because of
the technical difficulties of evaluating the contributions in different
types of materials. The advisability of granting permanent seats to
the most advanced atomic powers was also studied and rejected because of the impossibility of developing long-term criteria for permanent membership. 34 As the number of negotiating powers increased,
the proposed number of the Board members increased. The additional
seats would be filled mainly by "atomic have-nots," thus diluting the
influence of the "atomic powers" in the Board. The debate in the
United Nations General Assembly created pressures in this direction. 85
The twelve-power draft and the final text provide for a Board of
twenty-three of which ten are elected by the General Conference. 36
The remaining thirteen are chosen by the outgoing Board on the basi~
of (a) their potential for contributions in materials and skills, and (b)
a pattern of geographic representation for the major regions of the
world. The top five "atomic powers" 87 may claim what amounts in
fact to continuing membership as long as they retain their leading
position in the_atomic energy field-regardless of whether they actually
contribute to the Agency and regardless of any geographic criteria. 38
Despite widespread criticism in the International Conference of the
composition of the Board and despite a number of amendments suggested particularly by the Afro-Asian states to increase their representation on the Board, the provisions of the twelve-power draft were
adopted without change by the conference. 89 All the negotiating
84 See Report by Ambassador Morehead Patterson, 34 Dept. of State Bul. 5 at 6
(1956). Art. II, par. C, subpar. 2 of the first American outline [Atoms for Peace
Manual, note 5 · svpra at 2671 stated that "arrangements could be worked out to
give the principal contributing countries special voting privileges on certain matters,
such as allocations of fissionable material."
85 See note 24 supra.
86 Art. VI, par. A, subpar. 3 of the twelve-power draft and identical article in the
statute. The membership of the Board will be twenty-three, on the assumption that
"the five members most advanced in the technology of atomic energy" continue to be
the United States, United Kingdom, U.S.S.R., Canada, France, or continue to represent three geographic areas. If the five represented more or fewer than three areas,
it would change the size of the Board. The eight-power draft in art. VII, par. A
provided for a Board of 16. Five of the members would be the most important contributors of technical assistance and fissionable material, five others selected from
the principal producers and contributors of source materials, and only six were to be
elected by the General Conference.
37 At present the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France,
and Canada.
38 See Appendix A, Item 4·
89 Seven amendments to art. VI were proposed, five of them dealing with the com-
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powers including the Soviet representative urged strongly that no
change be made in the formula on the ground that no better formula
could be contrived in view of the political realities. 40
However, two concessions were made to the critics of this formula.
First, it was provided that the question of a general review of the
provisions of the statute should be placed on the agenda of the fifth
annual session of the General Conference. 41 In the debate, it was made
clear that the composition of the Board would be included in such review. In particular, the special representation of the producers of
source materials would be reconsidered since many additional states
during the next five-year period were likely to become large-scale producers of either uranium or thorium.
The second concession related to the composition of the Preparaposition and selection of the members of the Board. These five amendments were
sponsored respectively by: Denmark and Iran, IAEA/CS/ Art. VI/ Amend. 2; Philippines, IAEA/CS/ Art. VI/ Amend. 4; Liberia, IAEA/CS/ Art. VI/ Amend. 5; Egypt,
Ethiopia, Indonesia and Syria, IAEA/CS/ Art. VI/ Amend. 6; and Italy, IAEA/CS/
Art. VI/Amend. 7. None of these amendments was adopted. Amendments z and 7
were withdrawn. Amendment 4, though not formally withdrawn, was not pressed
to a vote. Amendment 5 was rejected by 31 to IS votes, 20 abstaining. Amendment 6
was rejected by z6 to z6 votes with I8 abstaining. (Amendments 5 and 6 attempted
to increase the participation of Africa and the Middle East.) Art. VI as a whole
was adopted by 7I votes to I, with 3 abstentions.
40 The Soviet representative, Mr. Zarubin, said:
"The draft article before the
Committee seems to be the reasonable compromise. . . . [I]n a spirit of co-operation
the delegation of the Soviet Union has decided not to move any amendments to
draft article VI. . . . [T]he delegation of the Soviet Union hopes that the same
spirit of co-operation will prevail among other delegations, and it appeals to all to
accept article VI of the draft statute as it stands." IAEA/CS/OR.zo, p. J.
Mr. Wadsworth, U.S. representative, agreed. "As the representative of the Soviet
Union has just said, since the outset of the negotiations on the statute over two
years ago, the question of the Board has presented arduous and complicated problems.
It was only with considerable difficulty that agreement was reached among the
original eight Negotiating States on the formula which was contained in the draft
statute of 22 A~gust 1955. . . . [S]ince this formula represents a finely balanced
compromise, even one small part cannot be changed without affecting the whole!'
IAEA/CS/OR:zo, pp. 4-6.
Mr. Bhabha, representative from India, remarked: "... [W]e recognize that
the composition as set up in the present draft has been arrived at by give and take
on all sides, and we cannot, therefore, expect to have those particular articles changed
that we do not agree with without, naturally, others also asking for a change in
articles w.ith which they do not agree. We are, therefore, prepared to accept this
article as it now stands and to support it." IAEA/CS/OR.2o, p. 12.
u Statute, art. XVIII, par. B. Interesting to recall is the analogy to the United
Nations Charter : The critics of the Great Power veto at the San Francisco conference
were placated in part by the inclusion in the Charter of a provision for a review and
revision of this instrument (art. 109 of the Charter). See Goodrich and Hambro,
Charter of the United Nations. Commentary and Documents 539-540 ( 2d ed .. 1949).
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tory Commission set up under the statute with the task of completing
the arrangements necessary for the actual establishment of the Agency.
All six elected representatives on the Preparatory Commission were
chosen from among the Afro-Asian and Latin American group! 2
Similarly, the first Board of Governors includes four Latin American
states and seven states from the Middle East and Far East. 43

C. Functions of the Agency
1.

Peaceful vs. Military Purposes

All Agency functions relate solely to the utilization of atomic energy
for peaceful purposes. The Agency is directed to ensure, "so far as it
is able," that its assistance is not used in such a way as to further any
"military purpose." 44
During the International Conference, France introduced an amendment defining "military purpose" as follows : "The only uses of atomic
energy which shall be regarded as uses for non-peaceful purposes are
military applications of the atomic explosion and of the toxicity of
radioactive products." 46 This amendment seems to be based on the
conclusion that the greatest menace to the world from the military use
of the atom arises as a result of nuclear explosions and from the
toxicity of radioactive materials. The concept of "military purpose"
thus would be limited to these uses only and would not include, for
instance, the use of nuclear fuel in the propulsion of a submarine, an
aeroplane, or a missile; the menace from these latter uses is not much
greater than that arising from the use of conventional fuels for
similar objectives. Under the French amendment the use of power
derived from atomic fuel in a munitions plant, for instance, would
not constitute a military use.
In urging the adoption· of a restrictive definition of "military purposes" the Indian representative suggested that any state having a
military program should be ineligible for any Agency assistance, since,
for instance, material made available to such state, under Agency
See Appendix A, Item s.
The first Board of Governors is composed of the United States, Canada, United
Kingdom, U.S.S.R., France, Portugal, Czechoslovakia, Australia, Brazil, India, South
Africa, Sweden, Japan, Italy, Rumania, Egypt, Pakistan, Indonesia, Korea, Guatemala,
Peru, Turkey, and Argentina. The 10 states listed last were elected by the first General Conference.
44 Statute, art. II, second sentence.
45 IAEA/CS/Art. XX/ Amend. 1.
42

48
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safeguards, for its non-military program would release corresponding
materials for its military program. 46
During the conference, it became apparent that any attempt to define "military purpose" in the statute would raise more problems than
it would solve. France never brought its amendment to a vote. 47 It
would not have been desirable for the Agency to adopt a definition
that by implication would sanction, for example, the use of Agency
assistance for an atomic submarine. The present text sets up a broad
standard under which the Board of Governors will have to develop
criteria applicable to specific situations as they may arise.
2.

Atomic Power

From the beginning of the negotiations, recognition has been given
to the principle that the Agency shall have a broad responsibility for
all phases of development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy. However, the portion of President Eisenhower's address to the General
Assembly of December 8, 1953, that had the greatest effect on public
opinion throughout the world was his statement that " . . . peaceful
power from atomic energy is no dream of the future. That capability,
already proved, is here-now-today." 48 Thus, the function of the
Agency which has received the greatest public attention is to furnish
atomic fuel for the production of electric power. 49 The functions of
the Agency, however, extend to many other matters such as research,
training, exchange of information, and development of standards of
health and safety. 50 The Report of the Preparatory Commission to
the General Conference recognizes that on the basis of current ecoIAEA/CS/OR.z8, pp. 66-67.
France withdrew its amendment with the understanding that its substance should
be considered by the Preparatory Commission. IAEA/CS/OR.36, p. 33. There also
was a proposed revision of the French amendment submitted by India. See Conference Room Paper No. 17. This revision read: "Any military purpose shall mean
the production, testing or use of nuclear, thermonuclear and radiological weapons."
This revision also was withdrawn, the Indian delegate commenting: "We agree that
this matter should be noted in the future and we do not wish at this stage to press
this particular amendment to a vote." IAEA/CS/OR.36, p. 34·
48 Atoms for Peace Manual, note 5 supra at 5.
49 It is widely expected that, in the long run, the development of reactors and, in
particular of power reactors, will be the most important peaceful application of
atomic energy, and that the Agency's assistance to its members in this field may in
time become the most extensive of its activities. Report of Preparatory Commission
of the International Atomic Energy Agency (PRECO), G.C.11I, GOV/1 (New York
1957) par. 43·
50 See Statute, art. III.
46
47
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nomics, the initial Agency programs are likely to stress these other
functions. 51
3· Training and Research
The final text of the statute reflects the importance of the function
of training-a recognition that the absence of trained technicians and
engineers may be a serious obstacle to early development of worldwide
electric power derived from atomic fuels. 52 There is every indication
that the Agency will place great emphasis in its early years on the
subject of training. 58
It should be noted that the Agency is authorized to encourage and
assist research and "to perform any operation or service useful in research." 5 ' While there is no express provision authorizing Agency
research, 55 it is doubtful whether the Agency could successfully carry
out its safeguard and health and safety functions or attract qualified
personnel without some research program. The Preparatory Commission suggested that the Agency undertake research programs in connection with "its statutory functions, such as waste disposal, health
and safety, and methodology of safeguards and should also encourage
such work in Member States." 58 However, the Commission did not
specifically recommend the immediate establishment of Agency laboratory facilities, but merely that "The Agency should examine at an
51

PRECO Report, note 49 supra, par. 43.
Note, e.g., the inclusion of the words "and training" in art. III, par. A, subpar. 4
of the statute, which originated in a Polish amendment. IAEA/CS/ Art. III/ Amend.
2/ Rev. I. This addition was adopted by 78 votes. IAEA/CS/OR.22, p. II.
58 PRECO Report, note 49 supra, par. 70. A number of amendments were proposed
during the International Conference which would provide for specific activities of the
Agency, such as the amendments submitted by Bolivia and Ecuador to establish a
world university of the atom (IAEA/CS/Art. Ill/Amend. 9), the Haitian amendment to provide for granting scholarships by the Agency (IAEA/CS/ Art. III/ Amend.
I), and the Polish amendment to publish an international periodical devoted to the
peaceful uses of atomic energy (IAEA/CS/Art. III/Amend. 2/Rev. I). These
amendments were all defeated on the ground that the functions of the Agency should
be general and the decision on specific activities should be left to the Board of
Governors. (E.g., the argument of Mr. Wadsworth, representative of the United
States in IAEA/CS/0R.I6, p. 17).
5f Statute, art. III, par. A, subpar. I.
55 The first United States outline (see Appendix A, Item I) mentioned "data
developed as a result of its own activities" (art. III, par. C, subpar. 2), which would
imply independent research by the Agency. In the later drafts no such clause can be
found. However, there is nothing in the statute to prohibit research by the Agency
as long as it is for peaceful .uses and furthers the purposes of the statute.
ss PRECO Report, note 49 supra, par. 30, and generally pars. 20-4I.
52
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early date the need for the establishment of laboratory facilities at its
headquarters." ~
7

4· Health and Safety Standards
The Agency has broad functions in the field of health and safety.
It is authorized "to establish or adopt . . . standards of safety for
protection of health and minimization of danger to life and property
(including such standards for labour conditions). . . ." It may "provide for the application of these standards to its own operations as well
as to the operations making use of materials, services, equipment, facilities, and information made available by the Agency or at its request
or under its control or supervision . . . ." 58 As in the case of safeguards against diversion of materials, it may also "provide for the
application of these standards, at the request of the parties, to operations under any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request
of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomiC energy. . . . " 59 States receivi~g Agency assistance must agree to meet
Agency health and safety standards. 60
The authority of the Agency to prescribe such standards is not confined to the type of hazards peculiar to operations utilizing nuclear
materials. Likewise there is nothing to prevent the Agency from applying to operations coming under its jurisdiction far more stringent
standards than the country where the operation takes place applies to
its operations. In such an event, as a practical matter, ·the Agency
would probably have to rely for enforcement of these higher standards
on its own inspectors. It could not readily utilize the local authorities
even in policing non-radiological hazards if those authorities applied
different and less stringent standards.
It would seem advisable for the Agency in setting up the standards
in this field to cooperate as fully as possible with the state where the
facility is located; in general, the Agency should insist on more rigorous standards than those prescribed by local laws only in the interest
of preventing hazards affecting more than one state (for example,
reactor incidents which would contaminate a considerable area or
waste disposal affecting international waterways) .61
PRECO Report, note 49 supra, par. 104.
Statute, art. III, par. A, subpar. 6.
59 Thiel.
so Statute, art. XI. par F subpar. 4(b); and art. XII, par. A, subpars. 1 and 2.
s1 For a discussion of analogous problems arising from federal v. state regulations
in this field. see State Regulation of Atomic Energy, Part III of this volume.
57
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Health and safety standards and practically every function of the
Agency, excepting the procurement and disposal of materials and the ·
operation of the safeguard system against diversion, are of some concern to various specialized agencies of the United Nations. This makes
it essential that there should be a clear-cut division of functions.
The Draft Relationship Agreement between the United Nations and
the Agency 62 takes note of this situation and suggests as one of the
principles of that relationship that the United Nations recognize "the
International Atomic Energy Agency . . . as the agency, under the
aegis of the United Nations as specified in this Agreement, responsible
for international activities concerned with the peaceful uses of atomic
energy in accordance with its Statute, without prejudice to the rights
and responsibilities of the United Nations in this field under the
Charter." 63 If this principle is carried out, the present and prospective
programs of some of the specialized agencies in the atomic energy field
may be considerably curtailed. 64

S· Exchange of Information
The Agency is to disseminate the information obtained from the
members and encourage the exchange of information among them.
The statute differentiates between information arising from assistance
extended by the Agency and other information. With respect to the
former, "Each member shall make available to the Agency" all such
information. 65 The obligation in connection with information from
other sources is much less sweeping : each member "should make
available such information as would in the judgment of the member
be helpful to the Agency." 66 This latter loose undertaking and the
obligation to share in the administrative budget seem to be the duties
which a member assumes through signing and ratifying the statute.
Other obligations arise only in connection with specific agreements between the member and the Agency concerning the receipt of benefits,
contributions to the Agency, or the application of safeguards on reGeneral Assembly Document A/3620 of July 23, 1957.
I d. at art. I. This provision follows closely the suggestions of the Secretary
General of the United Nations in a study of the question of the relation of the
Agency to the United Nations. Par. 4, General Assembly Document A/3122 of April
20, 1956, reproduced in IAEA/CS/5, Sept. 24, 1956.
64 See Appendix A, Item 6.
65 Statute, art. VIII, par. B (emphasis added).
66 Statute, art. VIII, par. A. (emphasis added).
62
63
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quest. The Preparatory Commission recommended a fairly extensive
initial Agency program for exchange of unclassified information. 67 •
Under article III, paragraph A, subparagraph 5 of the statute, it
would be possible to extend the Agency safeguards system into the
field of information. Theoretically, therefore, the United States and
other governments could turn over classified data to the Agency. 68
As a practical matter, this is unlikely to happen since data available to
the Agency will generally become available to all of its members. 69
The Director General and the staff of the Agency are required not
to "disclose any industrial secret or other confidential information
coming to their knowledge by reason of their official duties for the
Agency." This provision was included by the Conference on the
initiative of Switzerland. 70
D. Agency Facilities
The Agency is authorized "to acquire or establish any facilities,
plant and equipment useful in carrying out its authorized functions,
whenever the facilities, plant a,nd equipment otherwise available to it
in the are~ concerned are inadequate or available only on terms it deems
unsatisfactory." 11 This emphasizes a more gradual acquisition of
facilities than another provision that "the Agency shall as soon as
practicable establish or acquire" storage facilities and certain types of
other facilities. 72 These provisions are the end product of discussions
which commenced on the day of President Eisenhower's address as .
to whether the Agency should be "a bank"-should have actual possession of fissionable materials-or a "clearing house" merely arranging as an intermediary for the international distribution of fissionable
materials from one country to the other. The statute clearly authorizes
the Agency to be a "bank" and contemplates such a result. The Agency
may, however, operate also as a "clearing hquse."
PRECO Report, note 49 supra, pars. 58-65.
For the provisions of U.S. law, see 42 U.S.C.A. §§2164, 2153, 2154 (Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, note 8 supra, §§144, 123, 124).
69 The Department of State interprets the statute as imposing "no obligation for
us to furnish any information. In no case is it contemplated that we furnish .the
Agency or Members of the Agency classified information." Hearings before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, note 9 supra, at 55.
1o Statute, art. VII, par. F. IAEA/CS/ Art. VII/ Amend. 5/Rev. 1, adopted in
revised form (Conference Room Paper No.4) by 76 votes to none. IAEA/CS/OR.26,
p. 12.
11 Statute; art. III, par. A, subpar. 7·
12 Statute, art. IX, par. I.
67

68
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The Preparatory Commission concluded that "it would be premature
at this stage to make definite proposals regarding the timing of the
steps the Agency will have to take" to acquire storage facilities. 73
E. Agency Safeguards
There were three possible ways of dealing with the problems of safeguards against diversion of fissionable materials into military uses.
First, international transfer of fissionable materials for peaceful uses
might have taken place without any safeguards. The result of this
course would have been that in a short time a number of states would
have been in a position to develop atomic weapons. 74 It certainly would
not be in the interest of world peace if a large number of states were in
a position to use or threaten to use atomic weapons. There is less
danger when three states have atomic weapons than when more than
eighty states have them. In this respect, it is possible that the interests
of the United States and of the Soviet Union might coincide.
A second possible course would have been to delay the development
of the peaceful uses of atomic energy because of the danger to world
peace through diversion to military purposes. In view of the rapid
worldwide increase in power requirements and imminent shortages
of conventional fuels any such course would have inevitably handicapped efforts to improve world standards of living.
The statute follows a third and middle course which permits the
development of peaceful uses with safeguards designed to deter the
development of new weapons programs. The success of the system of
safeguards will depend on a wide variety of factors including technological and political developments.
The statute establishes the basic principle that safeguards will be
imposed only in connection with agreements between the Agency and .
states which are beneficiaries of Agency projects. 75 States do not sub73 PRECO Report, note 49 supra, par. 102. The only other technical facilities with
which the Commission deals in its Report are laboratory facilities, PRECO Report,
pars. 103 and 10474 The possible increase of the production of atomic weapons resulting from peaceful uses was used by the Soviet Union as an argument against international co-operation in the field of peaceful uses of atomic energy. See, e.g., the Aide-Memoire of
September 22, 1954 in the Atoms for Peace Manual, note 5 supra, 278 at 281.
75 Art. XI, par. F of the statute reads (in part) : "Upon approving a project, the
Agency shall enter into an agreement with the member or group of members submitting the project, which agreement shall: ... 4· Include undertakings by the
member or group of member:s submitting the project (a) that the assistance provided
shall not be used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and (b) that the
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mit to the system of safeguards merely by ratifying the statute. A
further step is essential.
The Soviet Union during the. negotiations has on the surface at
least made a complete about-face in its attitude toward safeguards.
Pointing to the fact that weapons grade plutonium is a neccessary byproduct of the operation of every power reactor, the Soviet Union
initially opposed all safeguards (and for that matter any agency dealing with quantities of fissionable materials) in the absence of a prohibition of atomic weapons. Gradually the Soviet Union altered its
position until it accepted the present provisions of the statute with
some vague warnings about infringement of sovereignty through
operation of the inspection system. 76
It is possible that the changed attitude was influenced by the discussions on the subject of safeguards which took place in Geneva in
August 1955 immediately following the United Nations Scientific
Conference. The exchange of notes between the United States and
the Soviet Union on this subject indicates the probability of further
bilateral discussions with the Soviet Union on the problem of safeguards.77
project shall be subject to the safeguards provided for in art. XII, the relevant safeguards being specified in the agreement . . . ." The Agency could not waive the
inclusion of the safeguard provision in the project agreement. See art. XI, par. F,
subpar. 4, and art. III, par. D referring to "agreements ... which shall be in accordance with the provisions of the statute." [Emphasis added.] What would be the
situation if the safeguards specified in the agreement are for some reason less stringent
than the "relevant" safeguards specified in article XII? Could the Agency under
article XII nevertheless enforce the "statutory" safeguards? There may be some support for an affirmative answer in the language of the statute and particularly in the
fairly detailed enumeration of the safeguards therein. However, such detailed enumeration may well have been due solely to the desire to avoid complaints on the part of
beneficiary states that the proposed project agreements worked out by the Board bore
no relation to the obligations which they thought they assumed when they signed
the statute. It was agreed among the eight negotiating states that some provisions
specifying the nature of the safeguards should be included in the statute. These provisions were vastly expanded and improved in subsequent drafts.
76 See Appendix A, Item 7.
77 The Soviet Union in its Aide-Memoire of July 3, 1956 (United States Department of State Press Release No. 527, Oct. 6, 1956, p. 28) stated that "the consideration of this problem [of the extension of the Agency safeguards to bilateral agreements] could be resumed after the statute is adopted by the Conference and after it
is ratified by the countries involved." In its answer of August 1 S, 1956 ( icl. at 30, 31),
the United States pointed to the fact that it will take some time until the Agency safeguards will be operative and that the United States Government is therefo·re interested
in standardizing the already existing safeguards. Mentioning the statement of the
Soviet Union that it had already initiated a program -for rendering assistance to a
number of states and that the same was true with respect to the United IGngdom and
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The statute elaborates in considerable detail the Agency safeguards, 78
which include the right of the Agency
1. To approve the design of specialized equipment and facilities, including nuclear reactors;
2. To require the observance of Agency prescribed health and
safety measures;
3· To require the maintenance and production of operating
records;
4· To call for and receive progress reports;
S· To exercise stringent controls over the operations connected with production of power where diversion of fissionable materials to weapons can most readily take place, and
to approve means to be used for chemical processing of spent
fuel elements ;
6. To establish a system of inspection through a staff of
international inspectors. 79

The statute deals in some detail with remedies in the event of noncompliance with the safeguard requirements. 80 Inspectors shall report
any non-compliance to the Director General, who shall transmit the
report to the Board of Governors. The Board shall call upon the
recipient state to remedy forthwith any non-compliance which it finds
to have occurred. The Board shall report the non-compliance to all
members and to the Security Council and General Assembly of the
United Nations. If the non-compliance constitutes a potential or actual
threat to international peace, the Security Council could exercise its
considerable powers under the United Nations Charter, assuming, of
course, that the five permanent members agree. The General Assembly o
might also exercise its recommendatory authority on the basis of the
report of the Board. 81
Canada (France having similar plans), the Department of State, in the interest of
assuring the effectiveness of the Agency proposed an early commencement of staff
level talks to explore the possibility of reaching uniform safeguards for bilateral
agreements not less comprehensive than the present ones of the Agency. The United
States Aide-Memoire also mentioned that Canada, France and the United Kingdom
indicated their interest in participating in such talks.
78 Statute, art. XII, par. A, subpars. 1-6.
79 For the functions of the inspectors see art. XII, par. A, subpar. 6, par. B and
par. C of the statute. The inspectors supervise the compliance with health and safety
standards and safeguards against diversion both _in the Agency facilities and in the
facilities of its members under project and other agreements.
80 Statute, art. XII, par. C, and par. A, subpar. 7. The purpose of art. XII, par. A,
subpar. 7 is not at all clear in view of the almost identical provision in art. XII, par. C.
81 For full discussion of the powers of the Security Council and the General Assembly
in this respect see Goodrich and Simons, the U.N. and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security. (1955).
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In the event of non-compliance, the Board may direct curtailment
or suspension of assistance provided by the Agency and call for return
of materials and equipment made available to the recipient member.
Obviously, the "recapture" of misused material would depend ultimately on the cooperation of the recipient state. The Agency may
also suspend the non-complying member from exercise of the rights
and privileges of membership. 82
It would seem that the finding of non-compliance by the Board may
serve as a basis for immediate withdrawal of any Agency assistance
and for other remedial measures. 83 The state affected will no doubt
be given full opportunity to present its defense. However, it would
appear that under the statute such a state does not have the right to
avoid or delay the remedial measures by invoking the procedure for
settlement of disputes discussed below. 84
The provisions for sending inspectors designated by the Agency
"after consultation" with the state involved into territories of recipient
states permit access of these 'inspectors "at all times to all places and
data and to any person who by reason of his occupation deals with
materials, equipment, or facilities . . . to be safeguarded, as necessary to account" for the materials, to check on compliance with health
and safety measures and other conditions of the Agency project agreements. 85 These are truly unprecedented inspection powers which apply
regardless of the type or extent of Agency assistance. Yet, these provisions resulted in relatively little controversy during the International
Conference. 86 They may, however, cause considerable difficulty when
8 2 Statute, art. XII, par. C, and art. XIX, par. B. Since the suspension can only
take place in accordance with art. XIX, it seems that all the requirements of par. B
of art. XIX must be present, namely, persistent violation of the statute or agreements,
unless art. XII, par. C can be read as providing for an independent basis for suspension in accordance with the procedure laid down in art. XIX.
as As to anticipated effect of remedial measures see Hearings before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, note 9 supra at 6o, 121.
84 Pp. 776 and 777.
85 Statute, art. XII, par. A, subpar. 6.
86 Switzerland proposed 2 changes in subpar. 6 of art. XII, par. A of the statute.
The first of them was to clarify that the persons subject to control by Agency inspectors are only those who because of their occupations deal with materials, equipment, and facilities supplied by the Agency. The second envisaged that the inspectors
be accompanied by representatives of the state concerned, if the state requested it and
the inspectors are not impeded thereby. See IAEA/CS/ Art. XII/ Amend. I/Corr. I
and Corr. I/Rev. 1. See also Conference Room Papers Nos. 6 and 13 and the Swiss
statement in IAEA!CS!OR.37, p. 102, for changes from the original wording of the
amendments. Both amendments were accepted by 77 votes to none with no abstentions.
For rather unenlightening statements on the scope of inspection, see IAEA/CS/
OR.29, pp. 17, 62, 87.
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the time comes to apply them. Substantially the same powers of access, however, are given to the United States audit inspectors under
the bilateral agreements concluded by the United States. 87 Some countries which are parties to these agreements might prefer to have the
inspection performed by an international agency rather than by nationals
of the United States. 88
The principal opposition to the safeguards provisions in the twelvepower draft came from India. Practically the entire debate on safeguards in the conference centered on the three reservations entered by
India. 89 The main thrust of the Indian objection was directed against
the inclusion of source materials 90 in the accountability system and
against the almost unrestricted right of the Agency to dispose of the
by-product weapon grade material produced in operation of the power
reactors. This latter right was considered essential to the safeguards
system for a number of reasons, one of which was to prevent states
8 7 See, e.g., art. X of the agreeme11.t for cooperation between the United States
and France, 102 Cong. Rec. 10398 (June 29, 1956). For detailed comparison of
Agency and U.S. bilateral safeguards provisions, see Hearings before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, note 9 supra, at 72-77.
88 One of the problems that might confront the Agency in working out its system
of inspection, namely the composition of inspection teams, was brought to the attention of the Conference in the proposed Philippines addition to article XII (IAEA/CS/
Art. XII/ Amend. 4) reading as follows : "Any mission of inspection to determine
any diversion to military end contrary to this statute shall consist of at least three
members: one from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and two others from
the five members most advanced in the technology of atomic energy referred to in
sub-paragraph A-I of Article VI of this statute." (U.K., U.S., U.S.S.R., Canada,
France.) This amendment received no substantial support. For an explanation of
the motivation of this amendment, see the statement of the Philippine representative
in IAEA/CS/OR-27, p. 36.
Mr. Virgin, Swedish representative, remarked: "The recruitment of the staff of
inspectors and the selection of members of a mission will obviously give rise to many
problems. . . . My delegation feels that on those questions one should not go into
further detail in the statute itself than has been done, but that it should be left to the
Agency to find an appropriate course of action and to arrange in each particular case
for the inspection under the general rules of the statute and, of course, of any agreement between the Agency and the recipient member country. The consultation envisaged in paragraph A 6 to which I just referred will give ample opportunity to the
recipient country to give its views for the consideration and guidance of the Agency .
. . . It would mean introducing an entirely new principle if staff members from particular countries or group of countries were to be given the right of being represented
in a given function of an international organization." IAEA/CS/OR.27, pp. 67-68.
For further statements in opposition to the Philippine amendment, see IAEA/CS/
OR.24, p. 67 (Australia); IAEA/CS/OR.Jo, pp. 26 (U.S.S.R.). The Philippine
delegation did not press the amendment to a vote. IAEA/CS/OR.JO, p. 47·
89 See Appendix A, Item 8.
90 See note 10 supra for the definition of this term.
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from stockpiling greater quantities of weapons grade by-product than
they could presently use for peaceful purposes. 91 India contended that
the statute would give the Agency perpetual and far-reaching power to'
affect the economic life of states. The ingenious compromise solution reached in the conference retains the accountability of source
materials but restricts the right of the Agency with respect to the
"special fissionable materials recovered or produced as a by-product" ;
the states will have the right to retain (under continuing Agency safeguards) such quantities of the by-product materials as they can use
"for research or in reactors, existing or under construction." 92
The discussion on the safeguards occupied about half of the conference debates. The compromise solution removed the last obstacle
to the unanimous approval of the statute.
While the provisions of the statute concerning safeguards are fairly
detailed, the agreements between the Agency and its members will
very likely have to go into considerably greater detail. The only restriction on the terms of the agreements is that all their provisions
"shall be in accordance with the provisions of the statute. . . ." 93
The elaboration and establishment of a detailed system of safe-.
guards will pose a great challenge to the Board of Governors; outstanding scientific skill coupled with wise political counsel will be
required to meet this challenge. 94 If th~ Agency grows into an active
91 For the United States view see the statement by Mr. Wadsworth, United
States representative, in IAEA/CS/OR.29, pp. 59-61.
9 2 Statute, art. XII, par. A, subpar. s. See Conference Papers Nos. 19 and 21, containing the amendments adopted in the statute. As a practical matter under existing
technology very little plutonium or U-233 would come under this exception at the
present time, and the states will thus be required to dispose of the bulk of these
materials as instructed by the Agency. In addition, states would have the right to
require that special fissionable materials produced as a result of such operations and
deposited with the Agency, "be returned promptly to the member or members concerned for use under the same provisions as stated above." Thus economic and
political factors could not deprive states of the plutonium and other fissionable byproducts produced from their reactors. At the same time, states would not be permitted· to accumulate idle stockpiles of plutonium readily usable for atomic weapons.
· 98 Statute, art. III, par. D.
94 As the representative of Pakistan, Mr. Ahmad, put it, "It will be up t() the
Board of Governors, as it considers different specific situations and as it attempts to
implement agreements which the statute provides for, to consider most carefully
where there is a necessity for applying rigidly the rules contained in the statute in this
specific case, and I take it that it will, in a realistic way, seek ·for each project technical solutions which, ·while upholding the main ideas of control, will burden the
recipient country with the minimum of difficulties." JAEA/CS/OR.28, pp. 24-25. The
Report of. the Preparatory- Commission contains the following recommendations for
implementatio11 of safeguard programs:
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body. its standards of safeguards for security as well as of health and
safety will have direct influence on national standards developed by
member states. The Agency may contribute to worldwide uniformity
of these vital standards. 95 Unprecedented questions will arise in coordinating the inspection and enforcement functions between the
Agency and the member states or groups of states such as EURATOM.
F. Supplying of Materials
The statute makes a differentiation between fissionable materials and
other materials which may be useful to the Agency. 96
Theoretically, the Agency is to accept any amounts of special fissionable materials offered to it subject only to reaching agreement on
a proper price and matters incidental to the transfer. 97 This would
carry out the underlying concept advanced by President Eisenhower in
the General Assembly in 1953 that the Agency should siphon off the
supplies of fissionable materials from military to peacetime uses. 98
"(a) The safeguard procedures should keep pace with the development of the
Agency's activities, starting with problems related to the transport and storage of
source and special fissionable materials and extending to the use of these materials
in Agency-sponsored projects and to their subsequent treatment;
"(b) The safeguard procedures should be adapted to the specific character of each
individual project and the degree of potential risk of material diversion. The safeguards should ensure adequate accountability in accordance with the statutory provisions, including both physical security and material accountability measures to the
extent required; ..." PRECO Report, note 49 supra, par. 84(a) and (b).
95 Secretary of State Dulles pointed out to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee:
" ... if there is no such organization with a standard system of controls, then you
may get into a situation where nations will shop around and buy their materials from
the nation which imposes the least controls ... and in the end the whole control system would break down." Hearings before the Senate Foreign Relatio1~s Committee,
note 9, supra at 8.
9 6 The definitions of the various types of materials as defined in art. XX (notes 8
to 10 supra) bear resemblance to those of the United States Atomic Energy Act of 1954,
42 U.S.C.A. §2014(x) and §2014(y). The definitions in the statute are, however, more
specific than those of the Act. Definitions similar to those of the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954 are contained in the bilateral agreements between the United States and other
countries. See, e.g., art. I, pars. H and I, of the Agreement for Co-operation Between
the United States and France, 102 Cong. Rec. 10398 (June 29, 1956). The Indian
amendment (IAEA/CS/Art. XX/Amend. 2), which had proposed that irradiated
source material should be excluded from the definition of special fissionable material
(art. XX, par. 1), was not adopted by the International Conference.
97 Statute, art. IX, par. A. This provision does not have the restriction contained
in par. B for source materials, namely, the power of the Board of Governors to "determine the quantities of such materials which the Agency will accept . . . ."
98 See text at note 4, supra. For the proposition that such was the purpose of the
language in par. A of art. IX, see Mr. duPlessis (representative of the Union of
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In contrast, the Agency would accept only such quantities of source
materials and other materials as determined by the Board of Governors.99 Without such a provision, the Agency might be overwhelmed
with materials useful in connection with atomic energy programs but
in surplus supply.
The statute does not specify whether the contributed material win
be sold or leased to the Agency; nor does it fix the legal form of the
transaction through which the material will be made available by the
Agency to the recipient state. 100 This commendable omission will allow
the Board to work out agreements tailored to different types of projects and fitting the requirements of national legislation. 101 As long as
the safeguards obligations are effectively imposed, the question of the
legal form of the transaction is relatively unimportant. 102
One of the most difficult problems in connection with the supplying
of materials will be the determination of the amount the Agency will
pay for the contributed materials. This is intertwined with the problems of financing of the Agency and will be dealt with later in that
connection.
No member may require that the materials it makes available to the
Agency be kept separately by the Agency or designate the specific
project in which they must be used. 103 It seems to be the purpose of
South Africa), who said: "Article IX . . . does not give the Agency the right to
refuse these materials since such a right would be incompatible with the disarmament
purposes of the Agency." IAEA/CS/OR.2o, p. 28.
99 Statute, art. IX, par. B.
100 The statute uses the inconclusive term "reimbursement" in art. XIII to describe the payment made to contributing members. The terms "withdraw" used in
art. XII, par. A, subpar. 7, and "return" in art. XII, par. C of the statute are also
inconclusive.
101 For problems arising under the United States Atomic Energy Act of 1954 in
regard to the title to fissionable material and the forms of transaction used, see text
at note 171, infra.
102 For the solution adopted by EURATOM see Treaty establishing the European
Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), and connected documents, Secretariat of
the Interim Committee for the Common Market and EURATOM, Brussels, 1957,
Chap. VI.
1oa See art. IX, par. J of the statute. This provision refers both to material stored
with the Agency and those stored by the member in accordance with art. IX, par; A,
second sentence, for in either case the materials are "made available." While a member has not the right to demand that its contribution be used for a specific project,
the article does not seem to preclude the Agency from agreeing to such a use. To
what extent would such agreement bind the Agency? Does the express exclusion of
the right to demand the use of a contribution in a specific project exclude any and
all conditions, e.g., the condition that the contribution be not used in a specified area
or for a certain type of project? Ambassador Wadsworth suggested that such a
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this provision to ensure that all contributed materials are available for
all approved projects.
Once a member has notified the Agency of its intention to make a
contribution, the member must be in a position to make delivery immediately to the recipient state as instructed by the Agency or to the
Agency itself to the extent that such materials are "really necessary for
operations and scientific research in the facilities of the Agency." 10*
However, the member in its discretion may decide whether it will retain
possession of the material pending instructions to deliver or make an
agreement with the Agency for storage in the Agency's depots. 105 The
latter alternative will be feasible, of course, only when the Agency has
established its storage facilities.
One great problem that will confront the Agency is the location of
storage facilities when they are established. The headquarters of the
Agency in Vienna would not be a particularly suitable location for
storage facilities. In storing special fissionable materials in its possession, the Agency is under obligation to insure the geographical distribution of these materials in such a way as not to allow concentration
of large amounts of such materials in any one country or region of the
world. 106 It will be difficult to find locations where the fissionable materials could be disposed of on short notice in the event of an attempt
to seize them. A possible location would be on an island where in an
emergency they could be dumped into the sea.
According to the statute, unless the Board decides otherwise, the
materials shall initially be made available for the period of one year. 101
A provision of this nature was probably necessary since the chief
contributors would not wish to bind themselves for any longer period
until they could determine how well the Agency was functioning.
condition "would be contrary to the spirit of paragraph ] of Article IX" and would
result in "chaos fairly soon." For extensive discussion of this problem see Hearings
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, note 9 supra at 154-156.
104 Statute, art. IX, par. D. This means that a state is obliged to deliver materials
to the Agency only for the Agency's own immediate needs. Therefore, the Agency
acts as a "bank" only for the materials stored at the request of the supplying member.
All other material is transferred directly from the contributing to the recipient country.
The word "really," which is bad English, was designed to emphasize the immediate
character of the Agency's own requirements for operations and research. It was
introduced in the twelve-power draft on Soviet insistence.
1os Statute, art. IX, par. A, second sentence.
·1os Statute, art. IX, par. H, third sentence.
10 7 Statute, art. IX, par. F, second sentence. The statute does not say specifically
whether the period covered py the contribution must be determined in the agreement
with the contributor and whether the Board has discretion to modify such period.
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However, it is somewhat unrealistic. The Agency projects will require
a continuous supply of fissionable materials .. It will be necessary for
the Agency, before it approves a project, to have some assurance of a
continuing supply of fissionable materials for the life of the project.
The bilateral agreements of the United States generally provide for
the supply of materials for at least five years. 108 In comparison, an
Agency project would not be particularly attractive if it could guarantee
materials only for one year. The United States has already indicated
its intention to make materials available to the Agency for a longer
period. On the final day of the conference, Chairman Lewis Strauss of
the United States Atomic Energy Commission delivered a message of
the President of the United States:
To enable the International Atomic Energy Agency, upon
its establishment by appropriate governmental actions, to
start atomic research and power programs without delay, the
United States will make.available to the Agency, on terms to
be agreed with that body, 5,000 kilograms of a nuclear fuel
uranium 235 from the 20,000 kilograms of such material
allocated last February by the United States for peaceful uses
by friendly nations. . . . In addition to the above mentioned
initial 5,000 kilograms of uranium 235, the United States will
continue to make available to the International Atomic Energy
Agency nuclear materials that will match in amount the sum
of all quantities of such materials made similarly available
by all members of the International Agency, and cin comparable terms, for the period between the establishment of the
Agency and July 1, 1960. The United States will deliver
these nuclear materials to the International Agency as they are
required for Agency approved projects. 109
During the General Conference in Vienna, Portugal offered to make
available to the Agency Ioo,ooo kilograms of "black oxide of uranium
in concentrated form," and the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom
reaffirmed their intention to contribute respectively so and 20 kilo1os E.g., in art. XI of the Agreement for Co-operation between the United States
and Cuba, 102 Cong. Rec. 10396 (June 29, 1956), and between the United States and
the Dominican Republic (also art. XI), id., 10401 at 10402.
The Atomic Energy Commission on November 18, 1956, announced that it is prepared to furnish fuel requirements beyond the term of ten years. Statement by the
Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, AEC Press Release, Nov. 18, 1956, p. 3·
1oo IAEA/CS/OR.4o, p. 7. The announcement of the Atomic Energy Commission,
referred to in the preceding footnote, leaves the door open for arrangements between
the United States and the Agency on terms similar to those of the bilateral agreements.
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grams of zo% enriched uranium. 110 The Chairman of the United
States Delegation stated that the United States would match these
contributions referring to the terms of the President's message.m It
should be pointed out that the President's offer to match contributions
of other states was generally interpreted to refer only to fissionable
materials and not to source materials. 112
G. Project Agreements
The principal obligations of members of the Agency including the
obligation to submit to safeguards and to health and safety regulations will arise only when the member signs a project agreement with
the Agency. The statute specifies the principal elements which must
be included in such agreement. 118
A majority of members of the Agency will have at the O).ltset little
technological skill in the field of atomic energy. For such a state to
secure a power reactor through the Agency, it must obtain fissionable
materials, technical advice, reactor components, and financing.
The applicant state will receive its fissionable materials from the
Agency as a result of an agreement with the Agency. On the other
hand, reactor components and much of the technical advice are likely
to be obtained from sources outside of the Agency.m The terms and
conditions under which the services and components are obtained must
110 See the statement of Mr. Nutting in the 718th meeting of the First Committee
of the gth General Assembly on November 16, 1954, that the United Kingdom was
prepared to hold available 20 kilograms of fissionable material as initial contribution
to the Agency. U.N. General Assembly Off. Rec., 9th Session (1954), First Committee, A/C.1/CR.718, p. 347 at 348. The Soviet Union on July 18, 1955, stated that
it is ready "to deposit into an international fund for atomic materials under an international agency for atomic energy so kilograms of fissionable materials, as soon
as agreement has been reached on the creation of such an agency." Note of the
Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the American Embassy, in United States Department of State Press Release No. 527, Oct. 6, 1956, p. II.
111 U.S. Press Releases, Vienna General .Conference, Nos. 4. 7 and 8.
11 2 Mr. Strauss during the Senate Hearings stated that the figure of 5,000 kilograms
referred to 20 percent enriched uranium. At the same time it was contemplated that
the bulk of uranium to be utilized would be enriched only to the extent of 2 or 3
percent. "If this [the uranium made available] had been stated, for example, in
terms of 2 or 3 percent, the figure of 5,oo0 kilograms would have been multiplied.
If one were mentioning it in terms of 100 percent enrichment, it would be yet another
figure." Hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, note 9 supra at III.
11a See art. XI, par. F of the statute.
114 The Preparatory Commission recommended that the Agency be in a position
to provide technical advice to its members. PRECO Report, note 49 supra, par. 49·
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be set forth in the project agreement with the Agency. 115 The Agency
has no responsibilities in connection with financing the project but
"upon request the Agency may also assist any member or group of
members to make arrangements to secure necessary financing from
outside sources to carry out such projects. In extending this assistance;
the Agency will not be required to provide any guarantees or to assume
any financial responsibility for the project." 116
H. Relation to Bilateral, Multilateral, and National Programs
An important aspect of the functions of the Agency revolves around
its relation to the bilateral agreements for developing peaceful uses of
atomic energy (such as some forty bilateral agreements for cooperation between the United States and other states) and multilateral
arrangements (such as the EURATOM plan negotiated by the six
members of the European Coal and Steel Community 117 and the proposed scheme of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation).118 To what extent will the Agency replace bilateral and multilateral arrangements for international cooperation in the atomic energy
field? 119 To what extent will the parties to these arrangements utilize
the Agency system of safeguards against diversion for military uses?
115
Statute, art. XI, par. F, subpar. 3. It is interesting to note that no specific
provision is made in this subparagraph with reference to supply of information, unless
the term "services" is meant to include supplying of information. Furthermore, subpar.
3 seems to be limited to situations where a project is assisted by the Agency or by the
Agency and a "member." What if assistance is given by a non-member?
116 Statute, art. XI, par. B. This wording originated in amendment IAEA/CS/ Art.
XI/Amend. 1, contained in revised form in Conference Room Paper No. 5, sponsored
by all 20 Latin American countries, which was adopted by 57 votes to none. IAEA/
csioR.2B, pp. 2-s.
117 Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, Secretariat of the
Interim Committee for the Common Market and EURATOM, Brussels, 1957. For
an earlier description of the EURATOM plan see "Report of the Intergovernmental
Committee on European Integration" (Brussels, 1956), reprinted in Univ. of Mich.
Law School Summer Institute, Workshops on Legal Problems of Atomic Energy
201-215 (1956). See also Knorr, EURATOM and American Policy (1956).
11s For a description of this scheme see "Report of the Special Committee for Nuclear Energy to the Council," with annexes and decisions adopted by the Council on
July 18, 1956, in Joint Action by O.E.E.C. Countries in the Field of Nuclear Energy
(1956). For an earlier report, see Possibilities of Action in the Field of Nuclear
Energy (O.E.E.C.) (1956). On both EURATOM and O.E.E.C. plans, see Knorr,
Nuclear Energy in Western Europe and United States Policy (1956).
119 The Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission discussed these
problems before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and concluded that there
would not be a duplication of activities. "The task is so great and the opportunities
so broad that, for a number of years, the combined activities of the United States-
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During the United Nations General Assembly discussions of the
Agency in the fall of 1954, in response to a question by Mr. Vyshinsky,
Ambassador· Lodge indicated that the United States did not contemplate that the Agency would have exclusive authority for international
transfers of fissionable materials for peaceful uses of atomic energy. 120
During the negotiations on the Agency statute it became apparent that
one of the prime objectives of the Agency-prevention of the diversion of fissionable materials to military uses-could be totally defeated
if the United States, the United Kingdom, or the Soviet Union in their
bilateral agreements should make fissionable materials available to
other countries under less onerous safeguards than thos·e provided in
the Agency statute. 121 Obviously, if safeguards are to be effective, the
systems of safeguards under bilateral and multilateral agreements must
in general conform to the Agency safeguard system.
A step in this direction was made by the United States in providing
in its more recent bilateral agreements for safeguards substantially
identical to those in the statute. 122 Furthermore, states which are
parties to these agreements undertook upon the establishment of the
Agency to consult with a view to transferring the administration of
together with countries with which we already have or will negotiate direct agreements-and of the world Agency should all serve a constructive, harmonious purpose."
Hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, note 9 supra at 85 and 86.
120 In the 715th meeting of the First Committee Mr. Vyshinsky said that the meaning
of the term "clearing-house" used for the activities of the Agency was not clear to him.
He interpreted it to mean that if projects for the use of fissionable material transferred through the International Agency from one state to another were made contingent upon approval by the International Agency, the Agency would have the right
to approve or reject the plans established by states for the use of fissionable materials
for peaceful ends. This would constitute a violation of international law, if the decisions of the Agency should be unacceptable to the states concerned. U.N. General
Assembly Off. Rec., 9th Session (1954), First Committee, A/C.t/SR. 715, p. 329 at
JJJ.
In the 717th meeting Mr. Lodge answered that in practice the Agency would have
no control over the use of fissionable material except when such material was specifically earmarked for Agency projects. Thus any state would be free to transfer fissionable materials to another state without having to secure the consent of the Agency.
A/C.1/SR.717, p. J4I at J43.
1 21 A meeting of experts was held in Geneva immediately following the scientific
conference in August I955 to discuss the question of uniform safeguards. See generally
United States Department of State Press Release No. 527, Oct. 6, 1956, and Appendix
A, Item I. See also note 95 supra.
122 In regard to the standardization of safeguards, see the United States AideMemoire of August IS, I956, United States Department of State Press Release No. 527,
Oct. 6, 1956, pp. 29-30, and the model article, id. at 31. For actual safeguards provisions
in a "power-bilateral," see arts. XIII and XIV of the agreement between the United
States and Australia, 102 Cong. Rec. 10412 at 10414 (June 29, 1956).

1390

INTERNATIONAL CONTROL

the safeguards to the Agency; either party was given the right to
terminate a bilateral agreement if such consultations do not lead to an.
understanding. 123 It remains to be seen whether the Soviet Union
would be willing to take a similar step with respect to the arrangements
to which it is a party. 124 The scheme proposed by the Organization for
European Economic Cooperation for the control of its activities in the
nuclear field calls for arrangements with the Agency "with regard to
the exercise of the control on the territory of countries participating
both in the Organization and in the Agency." 125 The Agency statute
now specifically provides that the Agency safeguards system ( including inspection by Agency inspectors) may be extended "at the request
of the parties, to operations under any bilateral or multilateral arrange12s On December I, I957, 39 bilateral agreements for cooperation were in force
between the United States and other states. Of this total 29 were agreements for
cooperation in the research reactor field and 10 were "power bilaterals." A number of
other agreements are in the process of completion. On U.S. bilateral agreements, see
Fisher, L'Energie Atomique et les :e.tats-Unis 24I -2g6 ( 1957).
Before the middle of 1956 the agreements did not refer to the International Agency.
Agreements concluded after that time took into consideration the future establishment
of the Agency in the following manner :
"The Government of
and the Government of the United
States of America affirm their common interest in the establishment of an international
atomic energy agency to foster the peaceful uses of atomic energy. In the event such
an international agency is created:
"1. The parties will consult with each other to determine in what respects, if any,
they desire to modify the provisions of this agreement for cooperation. In particular,
the parties will consult with each other to determine in what respects and to what
extent they desire to arrange for the administration by the international agency of those
conditions, controls, and safeguards, including those relating to health and safety
standards, required by the international agency in connection with similar assistance
rendered to a cooperating nation under the aegis of the international agency.
"2. In the event the parties do not reach a mutually satisfactory agreement following
the consultation provided in paragraph A [sic] of this article, either party may by
notification terminate this agreement. In the event this agreement is so terminated,
the Government of
shall return to the United States Commission all source and special nuclear materials received pursuant to this agreement and in
its possession or in the possession of persons under its jurisdiction." See United States
Department of State Press Release No. 527, Oct. 6, 1956, p. 33, and, for a practical
example, art. XII, par. A, of the Agreement for Cooperation with France, I02 Cong.
Rec. 10400 (June 29, I956).
124 See note 77 supra.
125 Sec. III, par. I2, subpar. a of the decisions adopted by the Council of the European
Organization for Economic Cooperation on I8th July, 1956, Joint Action by O.E.E.C.
Countries in the Field of Nuclear Energy I32-133 (I956). For the type of security
controls and safeguards contemplated, see id. at 57-73. For the controls and safeguards
contemplated by EURATOM, see Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy
Community, note I 17 supra, arts. 77-85.

ATOMS FOR PEACE

1391

ment." 126 During the International Conference, at the suggestion of
Thailand, this provision was further broadened to permit the safeguards system and the health and safety system to be extended "at the
request of a state to any of that state's activities in the field of atomic
energy." 127 This obviously is a further step in the direction of making
possible a uniform international system of safeguards.
The remaining steps necessary to transfer the concept of uniform
safeguards from the realm of ideas have not yet been taken: first, an
agreement among states disposing of fissionable materials outside the
Agency that they will require in each instance the acceptance of the
Agency system of safeguards as a condition of turning over the
materials; and second, the ultimate establishment of a system of safeguarded disarmament which would apply the system of safeguards
universally to the entire atomic establishment of all states including
those possessing atomic weapons. In view of the present Soviet attitudes, the outlook for the attainment of this last goal in the foreseeable
future is most unpromising. Nevertheless, the Agency could create a
working model of an inspection system which on a vastly broadened
scale would be useful in a disarmament program. 128
The United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union
supported the Thai suggestion but gave no indication that their own
programs would be subjected to Agency safeguards. The Soviet Union
has on a number of occasions stated that it will supply fissionable materials to other countries without any safeguards excepting an agreement by those countries to devote the materials only to peaceful purposes.129 However, to date the Soviet Union has apparently not offered
1 2 6 Art. III, par. A, subpar. 5 of the statute. This provision was first included in the
twelve-power draft.
127 Statute, art. III, par. A, subpar. s. Mr. Khoman, representative from Thailand,
remarked in the Conference: " ... [l]f for no other reasons than those of equality
and equity, as well as the reason that the roe7ztual establishment of world-'lf.'ide security
from atomic danger is possible, these safeguards shall not be restricted to the present
boundaries but extended to all the countries of the world." [Emphasis added.]
IAEA/CS/OR.IS, p. 65.
12s "The Agency will not, of course, achieve atomic disarmament, nor was it conceived to attempt that. However, it can promote United States objectives in the field
of disarmament by creating a practical working model of an inspection system, and a
climate of international opinion in support of our objectives. This, we may hope, will
facilitate establishment of the broader controls needed for a successful disarmament
agreement" (statement of Mr. Lewis Strauss, Hearings before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, note 9 supra at 87).
12 9 Mr. Zarubin, representative of the Soviet Union, stated at the Conference: "The
Agency should impose upon no country control that might infringe upon its sovereign rights . . . . It is ... necessary to note that the agreement on the peaceful
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significant quantities of fissionable materials to countries other than
those which it fully controls.
Most of the inter-governmental discussions of the relationship of
the Agency to bilateral or multilateral programs of cooperation have
concentrated on the systems of safeguards. However, the success or
failure of the Agency will depend equally upon working out a proper
relationship on other phases of the program. It is apparent that the
United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union can through
bilateral or multilateral agreements make available all types of assistance which the Agency might provide. If the terms offered by one of
these states are more favorable than those offered by the Agency or
if the procedures are less cumbersome, then there would be little incentive for a state to request assistance from the Agency.
If the Agency is to play a meaningful role in the development of the
peaceful uses of the atom, it will be necessary to work out some form
of relationship between the Agency program and bilateral and multilateral programs. Three possible types of relationship immediately suggest themselves.
I. The United States (and also the United Kingdom and the Soviet
Union) might gradually arrange for the Agency to take over the bilateral and multilateral programs in their entirety. Some of the recent
bilateral agreements of the United States provide for consultations
between the parties after the establishment of the Agency with a view
to possible modifications of the agreements. 130 Any change in the
agreements would require the consent of both parties. The present
policy of the United States, however, contemplates . continuance and
expansion of bilateral programs of cooperation. 181
utilization of atomic energy concluded between the Soviet Union and other countries
does not contain any conditions which might infringe upon the sovereign rights of
countries participating therein. The Soviet Union considers that a sufficient guarantee
is to provide in the draft statute that countries must be obligated not to make use of the
assistance which they receive from the Agency for the production of atomic weapons,
and must submit reports with respect to the assistance received. The system of
guarantees contemplated under the draft statute would have meaning if it had been
connected with the prohibition of the atomic weapon and if it had been made applicable
to both the recipient countries and the countries giving assistance." IAEA/CS/OR.3,
pp. 31-35. For the position taken by the Soviet Union in regard to safeguards, see also
Appendix A, Item 7.
180 See note 123 supra.
181 As to relationship of the International Atomic Energy Agency to bilateral and
multilateral arrangements see Hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
(statements of Mr. Lewis Strauss and of Mr. Gerard C. Smith), note 9 supra at 86 and
165.
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2. The bilateral and multilateral arrangements might continue with
the parties requesting the Agency to assume the responsibility for the
administration of safeguards. The statute contemplates this possibility,
w}:lich was discussed above. 182
3· The bilateral and multilateral arrangements might continue to
cover the same broad fields where the Agency furnishes assistance. In
this event, in order to avoid unnecessary duplication of activities, it
might be advisable for the three Great Powers to agree that certain
specific types or sizes of reactors would be furnished with the assistance
of the Agency while countries in their separate programs would concentrate on other types or sizes. 133 EURATOM and the Organization
for European Economic Cooperation have under study the establishment of "common installations" (or "joint undertakings"), such as
·isotope separation and chemical processing plants. 134 Coordination of
Agency activities with these multilateral arrangements will also be
necessary.
In the absence of some arrangement to correlate the various pro·grams, the Agency might find that practically all feasible projects were
·being undertaken outside the Agency.

I. Privileges and Immunities
The statute grants the Agency such legal capacity and privileges and
immunities in the territory of each member "as are necessary for the
exercise of its functions." 185 The delegates of the members and
Governors (members of the Board) with their staff as well as the Director General and the staff of the Agency are accorded privileges and
·immunities "necessary in the independent exercise of their func"'
tions. . . ." 186 Separate agreements to be negotiated between the
Agency and the members are to define the legal capacity, privileges,
and immunities so conferred. 181 These limited "functional" privileges
follow generally the provisions in the Charter of the United Nations
and the statutes of some specialized agencies of the United Nations. 188
Statute, art. III, par. A, subpars. 5 and 6.
See statements in note 131 supra.
184 On EURATOM "joint enterprises," see Treaty establishing the European
Atomic Energy Community, note II7 supra, arts. 45-51. On O.E.E.C. "joint undertakings," see Joint Action by O.E.E.C. Countries in the Field of Nuclear Energy 23-52
(1956).
185 Statute, art. XV, par. A.
13 6 I d., par. B.
187 ld., par. C.
1as See, e.g., art. 105 of the United Nations Charter, which, contrary to the Covenant
1a2

1sa
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The question arises whether or not the grant of the legal capacity,
privileges, and immunities was intended to become effective from the
date of the ratification of the statute in the absence of separate agreements. It is pertinent to note that the final draft omits the eightpower draft provision to the effect that the requirement of separate
agreements is "without prejudice to the immediate effectiveness" 189 of
the grant of the legal capacity, privileges, and immunities. 140
J. Settlement. of Disputes
"Any question or dispute concerning the interpretation or application" of the statute, not settled by negotiation, "shall be referred to the
International Court of Justice in conformity with the Statute of the
Court unless the parties concerned agree on another mode of settlement." 141 In order to bring a matter before the Court under this
provision, it will apparently be necessary for the parties to conclude
a special agreement unless both parties had previously accepted the
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. The provision in the eight-power
draft which would have conferred unequivocally upon the Court compulsory jurisdiction in this matter has been abandoned. 142 This is
clearly a concession to the opposition on the part of the Soviet Union
to the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court in any form
or shape.
The statute provides that both the General Conference and the Board
of Governors "are separately empowered, subject to authorization from
the General Assembly of the United Nations to request the International Court to give .an advisory opinion on any legal question arisof the League of Nations, does not provide for diplomatic immunities but only (as
in the case of the Agency) for limited privileges. The provisions in the constitutions
of other specialized agencies are similar. See, e.g., art. 67 of the Constitution of the
World Health Organization; art. 40 of the Constitution of the International Labor
Organization.
1s9 Art. XVII, par. C of the eight-power draft.
Ho For a view that limited privileges are available even in absence of separate
agreements, see the excellent statement of Mr. Leonard C. Meeker, Assistant Legal
Advisor, Department of State, in Hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, note 9 supra at 161.
141 Statute, art. XVII, par. A.
142 Art. XIX, par. E, the relevant provision of the eight-power draft, read: "The
Parties to the present Statute accept the jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice with respect to any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the
Statute. Any such dispute may be referred by any Party concerned to the International Court of Justice for decision unless the Parties concerned agree on some other
mode of settlement. . " [Emphasis added.)
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ing within the scope of the Agency's activities." 143 The General Assembly was to grant such authorization on all questions "other than
a question concerning the mutual relationships of the Agency and the
United Nations or the specialized agencies." 144
The above-quoted provision of the statute referring to advisory
opinion is broad enough to cover not only disputes among member
states but also disputes between the Agency on one hand and a member
on the other. The latter type of dispute would include differences arising between the Agency and a recipient state over the interpretation of
a project agreement. Under the statute, any such project agreement
is to "make appropriate provision regarding settlement of disputes." 140
It is hoped that the Board will develop a formula to be included in all
project agreements-for a speedy and binding solution of such disputes
in the event the efforts at a settlement by the Director General and the
Board should fail. A possible formula would be to refer the dispute
to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion which
the parties would undertake to accept in advance. 146 Another possible
143 Statute, art. XVII, par. B. This provision is based on art. g6, par. 2 of the
United Nations Charter which provides that "other organs of the United Nations
and specialized agencies, which may at any time be so authorized by the General
Assembly, may also request advisory opinions of the Court on legal questions arising
within the scope of their activities." It is of somewhat academic interest to speculate
whether under this article, the Agency would be considered a "specialized agency."
The Agency cannot be a party to a contentious proceeding before the International
Court since the Statute of the International Court of Justice provides in art. 34. par. I,
that only states can be parties in cases before it. It is interesting to note that the
Draft Relationship Agreement between the United Nations and the International
Atomic Energy Agency (General Assembly Document A/362o, July 23, 1957, arts.
I and XX) apparently does not consider the International Atomic Energy Agency a
specialized agency. Article I of the Agreement refers to the Agency as "autonomous."
Article XX refers to the relationships of "The Agency with any specialized agency."
144 See art. X, Draft Relationship Agreement between the United Nations and the
International Atomic Energy Agency, General Assembly Document A/3620, July 23,
1957145 Statute, art. XI, par. F, subpar. 6. This provision originated in an amendment
submitted by the Netherlands. IAEA/CS/Art. XI/Amend. 3. In view of its adoption,
a Swiss amendment (IAEA/CS/Art. XVII/Amend. 1/Corr.1) designed to provide for
the settlement of disputes of any kind and including disputes with the Agency was withdrawn.
146 Although this formula by itself would of course not establish compulsory jurisdiction of the Court over the Soviet Union, the Russians nevertheless may be expected
to oppose it. They may oppose it perhaps somewhat less vigorously and-it is hopedless successfully than the original text of the disputes article in the eight-power draft.
For a possible procedure utilizing the advisory opinion of the International Court of
Justice in an arbitration procedure see sec. 21 of the Headquarters Agreement between
the United States and the. United Nations, signed June 26, 1947. U.N. General
Assembly Off. Doc., Second Session (1947), Resolutions, 169 (II), p. 91.
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formula would be to provide for arbitration by a special commission
which could develop into an expert judicial body on matters relating
to atomic energy. 147
K. Financing of the Agency
One of the most difficult problems confronting the Agency will be
that of financing its operations. The reason, of course, is that most
activities in the field of atomic energy involve vast expenditures.
It is clear that the International Agency, at the outset, will have
the financial resources to carry on only a small fraction of the total
activities associated with the peaceful development of atomic energy.
The statute recognizes four methods of financing Agency activities.
First, administrative expenses 148 will be included in a separate budget
and apportioned among the members in accordance with a scale to be
fixed by the General Conference. The General Conference, in fixing
this scale, shall be guided by the principles adopted by the United Nations in assessing contributions of member states to the regular budget
of the United Nations. 149 In the early years of the Agency, only a
small fraction of the eighty-seven states eligible for initial membership will be the beneficiaries of power projects. Most of the remaining
members will be unwilling to accept large assessments which would be
utilized for the general administration of the Agency without any direct
benefit to them, thus limiting the funds assessed in this manner. 150
uT As pointed out above, a beneficiary state cannot avoid or delay the measures imposed by the Board for noncompliance with the safeguards provisions by invoking
the dispute settlement provisions contained in art. XVII or in the project agreement.
Any effort to provide for such avoidance or delay in the project agreement would
seem to be contrary to the safeguards provisions of the statute, and particularly to art.
XII, par. C.
148 Administrative expenses are d~fined in art. XIV, par. B, subpar. I of the statute to
include (a) costs of the staff of the Agency (other than the staff employed in connection with materials, services, equipment and facilities required in carrying out the
Agency's functions or necessary for Agency projects) ; cost of meetings, expenditures required for the preparation of Agency projects and for the distribution of information, as well as (b) costs of implementing safeguards and expenses incurred in the
"syphoning ·off" of special fissionable material not used for any project. The expenses
under (a) are apportioned to the full extent. According to par. C of art. XIV, the
expenses under (b) are apportioned only to the extent that they are not recoverable
under agreements regarding the application of safeguards between the Agency and
parties to bilateral and multilateral arrangements.
uo Statute, art. XIV, par. D.
1Do During the Preparatory Commission discussions some question arose as to the
scope of expenditures which could properly be included within the administrative
budget. For example, it was contended that the cost of a fellowship program could
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A second method of financing the Agency would be through borrowing. Under rules and limitations to be approved by the General Conference, the Board of Governors has the authority to exercise borrowing powers on behalf of the Agency without, however, imposing on
the individual members of the Agency any liability in respect of the
loans. 151 While the language of the statute is most -ambiguous, presumably loans would be utilized chiefly for the construction of Agency
facilities and not for the day-to-day operations of the Agency. 152
' A third method of financing is through voluntary contributions. The
Board of Governors is authorized to accept voluntary monetary contributions made to the Agency. 153 There are a number of parallels for
financing international bodies in this manner, for example, the United
Nations agency supporting the Palestine refugees. However, the
amount of voluntary contributions which states might be willing to
make is likely to be limited.
The fourth method of financing the Agency is through charges
imposed in project agreements between the Agency and states recipient of materials and services. Such charges will include costs of special
fissionable materials and of their handling and storage and probably a
large proportion of the cost of administering the system of safenot be deemed an administrative expense. The Commission ultimately recommended the
inclus'ion within the administrative budget of $2so,ooo "for a limited fellowship program which from the administrative point of view could be undertaken by the Agency
during the course of 1958 if funds were to be made available." This was justified on
the grounds that such expenses might be deemed as "other expenses, such as may
for example be contemplated under Article XIV F of the Statute." PRECO Report,
note 49 supra, pars. 170 and 171. This narrow definition of administrative expenses
was emphasized during the Hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
note 9 supra, at 57 and 136.
_
151 Statute, art. XIV, par. G. The provisioti that the members shall not be liable for
loans was included on British initiative following a suggestion made by Yugoslavia.
IAEAICS/OR31, p. 42· See also IAEAICSIOR32, p. 17 and pp. 6o-61 for the
British and U.S.S.R positions in this matter._ The amendment is contained in Conference Room Paper No. 12IRev. 1. The Soviet Union opposed any borrowing power
for the Agency. The amendment proposed by the Soviet Union to delete par. G
(IAEAICSI Art. XIV I Amend. 4) was rejected by 49 votes to 9, with 14 abstentions.
IAEA/CSIORJ6, p. 22.
1 52 See Appendix I.
153 Statute, art. XIV, par. G, last clause. This provision was included in the statute
as a result of an amendment submitted by Egypt, Indonesia, and Syria. IAEAICSI Art.
XIV1Amend. 2, as revised by Conference Room Paper No. 10. The Soviet Union proposed an amendment to add a new par. E to art. XIV providing for financing of expenseS under par. B, subpar. 2, to the extent that they concern the acquisition of
Agency-owned materials, facilities, and equipment, by voluntary contributions.
IAEAICSI Art. XIV I Amend. 4· This amendment was rejected by 52 votes to 10,
with 10 abstentions. IAEAICSI0RJ6, pp. 24-25.
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guards. m Here again there are practical limitations upon the funds
that can be raised through such charges. The greater the charges the
greater the cost of production of electric power utilizing atomic fuel.
If the charges imposed under Agency agreements are onerous, the
result will be to delay substantially the time when atomic power will be
competitive with conventional power. Furthermore, if the charges are
greater under the Agency program than under bilateral programs, states
will be discouraged in utilizing the Agency. On the other hand, there
may be no other practical way to finance the safeguards system. One
possible solution for this dilemma would be for states contributing
fissionable and other materials to contribute those materials to the
Agency at less than cost. There is nothing in. the statute which would
prevent such an indirect subsidy of the Agency.155
The Preparatory Commission recommended a first year budget of
slightly in excess of four ~illion dollars (excluding working capital
fund of two million dollars). 158
L. Amendment Procedures
Amendments to the statute come into effect when approved by the
General Conference by a two-thirds majority and "by two-thirds of
all the Members in accordance with their respective constitutional processes." 157
to• Statute, art. XIV, par. B, su6pars. I (b) and 2.
156 As stated previously, contributions of fissionable and other materials to the
Agency will be made on terms agreed upon between the Agency and each individual
state making the contribution. Statute, art. IX, pars. A and B. The agreement
between the contributing state and the Agency might provide for furnishing the
material at cost, at less than cost or at more than cost. There is nothing in the statute
to require the Agency to pay uniform sums to the states making the contributions. For
U.S. policy and legislation see note 16g infra, and text at that note. Chairman Strauss
of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, in his statement to the International Conference on October 26, 1956 (IAEA/CS/OR-40, p. 2 et seq.), indicated that the
United States contributions would be "on comparable terms" to the contributions made
by other members. Id. at 7· It thus would be possible for the United States and other
contributors to adjust the amount they charge to the Agency in such a manner that
the cost of fissionable materials to recipient states including surcharges for operation
of the safeguards system would be comparable to the cost of fissionable materials
furnished under the bilateral programs. It should be noted that under the bilateral
programs of the United States the net cost of fissionable materials to cooperating
states is reduced through the amounts which the United States pays to such states
for the plutonium by-product recovered when the fuel elements are chemically reprocessed in the United States. The Agency would not be in a position to make similar
payments until the technology of utilizing plutonium for peaceful purposes is further
advanced so as to allow the Agency to make profitable use of it.
t56 PRECO Report, note 49 supra at 39, pars. 174-187.
t5T Statute, art XVIII, par C
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A member unwilling to accept an amendment to the statute may
withdraw from the Agency at any time but must fulfill its contractual
obligations to the Agency. 158 In theory, at least, this right to withdraw
from the Agency protects a member against unacceptable amendments
which would make basic changes in the rights and obligations of membership. In practice, however, if the Agency becomes a truly important source of assistance it might not be feasible for a state to withdraw.
In all· probability, agreements between the Agency and its members
for the supply of special fissionable materials will result in obligations
extending over a number of years. 159 It might be wise for a state
furnishing fissionable materials to provide specifically in its agreement
with the Agency for the termination of its obligation to furnish the
materials in the event of its withdrawal from the Agency because of an
amendment to which it was unwilling to agree. Likewise, the obligations of a state receiving assistance from the Agency will presumably
extend for the life of the project and would make a withdrawal difficult. This raises the problem of the status of a power reactor constructed with assistance of the Agency if the state where the reactor
is located withdraws from the Agency. Presumably the agreement
between the Agency and the recipient state would cover this contingency. The statute provides that withdrawal by a member from the
Agency shall not affect its contractual obligations entered into pursuant
to the provisions governing Agency projects.
The United States Senate subjected its advice and consent to the
"interpretation and understanding" that ( I ) any amendment to the
statute shall be submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent, and
( 2) the United States will not remain a member of the Agency in the
event of an amendment being adopted to which the Senate by a formal
vote should refuse its advice and consent. 180 The act of Congress providing for the participation of the United States in the Agency made
provision for "the prompt and orderly settlement of obligations and
commitments to the Agency" and "orderly termination of United States
participation in the Agency'' if such a contingency should arise. 181
pars. D and E.
For considerations concerning the duration of obligations of member states contributing materials, see text at note 1<>7ff. supra.
18o The "interpretation and understanding" originated in The Committee on Foreign
Relations (Ex. Rep. 3 on Exec. I, 85th Cong., 1st. sess., at 17, June 14, 1957) and was
adopted by the Senate, 103 Cong. Rec. 8463 et seq., June 18, 1957.
181 International Atomic Energy Agency Participation Act of 1957, P.L. 85-177,
85th Cong., 71 Stat. 455·
158/d.,
159
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M. United States Cooperation with the Agency
The statute appears to conform to the concept of "an international
arrangement" for an "international atomic pool" into which the President was "authorized" by the Congress to enter by the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954. 162 The adherence of the United States to such an "arrangement" under the Act could have become effective either upon approval
by the Congress or upon advice and consent of the Senate (as a
treaty) .163 The Agency statute was submitted by the President to the
Senate as a treaty, and, after approval by the Senate, was ratified on
July 29, 1957.
The Executive Branch of the United States Government had concluded that under the conditions of the Act of 1954 United States
cooperation with the Agency could and should be provided through the
Atomic Energy Commission negotiating with the Agency periodic
"agreements for cooperation" specifying amounts and terms of the contributions of fissionable materials for a given period.m
162

Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2154 (P.L. 703, § 124).
/d.; §§ 2145 and 2014 (I) (P.L. 703, § 124, §II k). The statute provides for
"ratification or acceptance" in accordance with "respective constitutional processes."
Art. XXI, par. D. For discussion of § 2154 (P.L. 703, § 124) and generally of subchapter X (P.L. 702, c. II) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 on International Activities, see Cole, "The Meaning of the New Atomic Law," Nucleonics, p. 12 (March
1955); Wit, "Some International Aspects of Atomic Power Development," 21 Law
and Contem. Prob. 167-169 (1956). For a discussion of the provisions of the act
concerning international activities generally see Ruebhausen, "New Atomic Problems,"
9 N.Y. City Bar Assn. Rec. 368 (1954). See also University of Michigan Law School,
Summer Institute, Workshops on Legal Problems of Atomic Energy 63-84 (1956).
164 This general position was set forth to the Senate by the Secretary of State.
Hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, note 9 supra at 6 and 7.
Section 124 (P.L. 703, § 124) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2154.
contemplates that the United States' cooperation with the "pool" will be "pursuant to
an agreement for cooperation entered into in accordance with section 123." Section 123
(P.L. 703, § 123) provides for such an agreement with "any nation or regional defense organization." Since the Agency is not a "regional defense organization," the
question may be asked whether under § 123 (P.L. 703, § 123) an agreement with the
Agency is possible. This question clearly must be answered in the affirmative since in
the absence of new legislation any other arrangement in the general context of the act
and the Agency's statute would seem to be impracticable. It could perhaps be said
that the giving of advice and consent by the Senate to the statute (or the approval by
Congress of the Statute), since the statute provides for agreement between individual
contributors (such as the United States) and the Agency, supersedes §§ 123 and 124
(P.L. 703, §§ 123, 124) to the extent that they are interpreted as precluding a bialteral
agreement between the United States and the "international atomic pool." Cf. H.R.
Rep. No. 2181, 83rd Cong. 2d Sess., "Separate Views on International Activities" and
"Separate Views of Representative Holifield and Representative Price on H.R. 9757,"
reprinted in Atoms for Peace Manual, note 5 supra at 156-160, 161, 190-193.
163

ATOMS FOR PEACE

1401

The safeguards provisions of the Agency statute might be considered
sufficient to enable the Agency to undertake in the agreement for cooperation the guarantees against diversion of materials to military purposes required in the Act. Upon completion of negotiations under
this procedure the Commission would have to recommend approval
of the agreement to the President. Before approving, the President
would have to make "a determination in writing" that the agreement
"will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security." If it can be assumed that the participation
of the Soviet Union and its satellites in the "international atomic pool"
was contemplated by the Congress, such determination would be possible. Finally, before it came into effect, the proposed agreementafter approval by the President-would have to lie before the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy of the Congress for thirty days while
Congress is in session.
The provisions of the Agency statute seemed compatible with the
procedure required by the Atomic Energy Act interpreted in the above
fashion. In fact, as pointed out earlier, the Agency statute itself envisaged notification by members of contributions made available "in
conformity with its laws" and periodic agreements with contributors
determining the terms of the contributions. 165
These procedures required by the Atomic Energy Act proved to be
rather cumbersome in connection with bilateral agreements. Unfortunately the Congress in the 1957 Act providing for the United States
participation in the Agency appears to have complicated rather than
simplified the procedures. 166
Under Section 7 of the Participation Act, the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954 was amended to provide that with the exception of the 5,000
kilograms containing uranium 235 already earmarked for the
Agency,167 "The Commission may distribute to the International Atomic
Energy Agency or to any group of nations such amounts of special
nuclear materials and for such periods of time as are authorized by
Congress." 168 This means that special legislation will be necessary
for any further contribution to the Agency or for any contribution
to other multilateral groups such as EURATOM. This requirement is
far more burdensome than the procedures of the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954.
Statute, art. IX, par. C.
P.L. 85-177, 85th Cong., 71 Stat. 453.
161 Note 112 supra.
1 6 8 Emphasis added. Sec. 7, P.L. 85-177, 85th Cong., 71 Stat. 455.
165

166
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The same section of the Participation Act provided "unless hereafter
otherwise authorized by law the Commission shall be compensated for
special nuclear materials so distributed at no less than the Commission's
published charges applicable to the domestic distribution of such material," with the exception of certain relatively small quantities of
materials which might be made available for research purposes. This
provision was included in the Act despite the unqualified assurances by
the Executive Branch that full payment would be required for any
materials made available to the Agency. 169
It would seem desirable that the entire problem of United States
cooperation not only with the Agency but also with certain regional
arrangements such as EURATOM should be reviewed with a view to
further amending the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the Participation
Act of 1957 to permit greater flexibility in the relationships between the
United States and these international groups, under general policy
directives determined by the Congress.
Neither the Atomic Energy Act nor the Participation Act specify the
form of the legal transaction (sale, lease, etc.) through which the
United States fissionable material may be made available abroad. 170
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 does provide that the title to all such
materials ((within or under the jurisdiction of the United States" shall
be vested in the United States Government. 111 The United States
bilateral agreements provide for either a lease or a sale of such materials
to the cooperating government with the further provision in the case
of sale that the title must remain vested in that government (and not
passed to a private party under its jurisdiction) as long as private
ownership of fissionable materials is not recognized in the United
Sta:tes. 172 The cooperating government is also required to agree that
any material supplied by the United States will not be transferred
169 During the hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee the Secretary of State, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and Ambassador
Wadsworth, all stressed that the United States intended to receive full payment for the
fissionable materials which it proposed to make available to the Agency and that the
furnishing of these materials would not be on terms constituting in effect an indirect
subsidy. For example, at the end of his testimony, Mr. Lewis Strauss, in response to
a question, made the following statement : "They [countries receiving help from the
Agency] will not get the donation out of the 5,000 kilograms we have been talking
about because that is going to be cash on the barrelhead until Congress should determine differently." Hearings before the Senate Fnreign Relations Committee, note
9 supra at 125.
11o Section 54 of the Atomk Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2074.
111/d., §52 and § 2h, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2072 and § 2012(h)
112 The sale arrangement is used in "power bilaterals," e.g .. art. VII of the Agreement
with Australia 102 Cong. Rec. 10412 at 10413 (june 29, 1956) The lease arrange-
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"beyond the jurisdiction" of that government except as specified in the
agreement itsel£. 113
It s~ems unlikely that the legislation authorizing distribution of
United States materials to the Agency will specify the form of the
legal transaction. It is hoped that within the framework of the Atomic
Energy Act and the Agency statute the Board of Governors will be
able to work out with the Atomic Energy Commission a formula which
would allow the Agency to make use of the United States contribution
in the form most suitable to a given transaction keeping in mind, of
course, that under the statute no member "shall have the right to require"
that its contribution be "kept separately" or used for a designated purpose.174 Neither the concept of a lease nor that of a sale may necessarily
fit the actual arrangements desired.
N. Conclusions
The Agency as originally conceived had the twofold objective of
making available the benefits of the peaceful uses of atomic energy on a
worldwide basis and at the same time making a beginning in the direction of worldwide limitation of armaments through siphoning off to
peaceful uses a portion of the materials available for nuclear weapons.
For long periods of time during the negotiations the outlook for any
tangible achievement toward either of these objectives was clouded.
During the year immediately following the President's address to the
United Nations, it appeared that the Soviet Union might not be a
member and that the Agency might have limited membership largely
confined to Western Europe and Latin America. Despite these fears it
now appears that the Agency will have practically a worldwide membership.
The statute in its present form looks forward to a substantial contribution by the Agency to the peaceful development of atomic energy on
a worldwide basis. However, largely because of the vast cost of the
necessary facilities, for some years, its role is likely to be less significant
~ent is used in "research bilaterals," e.g., art. IV of the Agreement with New Zealand.
Id. at 10403.
The EURATOM plan contemplates that with certain qualifications EURATOM
will have the option to purchase uncommitted quantities of source and fissionable
material of the member states and will be the exclusive source of supply of such
material for the members. Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, note II7 supra, arts. 52-76.
11a Par. a(4) of § 123 (P.L. 703, § 123) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. 42
U.S.C.A. § 2153.
174 Statute, art. IX, par. }.

1404

INTERNA-TIONAL CONTROL

than the role of national, bilateral, and multilateral regional programs. 115
The safeguards system developed by the Agency should as a minimum
reduce the possibility of diversion of fissionable materials from peaceful
to military uses and should assist in establishing uniform worldwide
standards of health and safety. It could serve as a model for a control
system if agreement were reached among the Great Powers that all
future production of fissionable materials be utilized for peaceful purposes under adequate international control. 176
In the eyes of the world, the success of the Agency is likely to be
gauged by its progress toward establishment of power plants utilizing
atomic fuel in the various areas of the world. The provisions in the
statute regarding the powers, composition, and manner of selection of
the Board of Governors can be justified to the world only if the Agency
in the near future disposes of substantial quantities of fissionable
materials for this purpose.
There are many hurdles in the path of rapid progress toward atomic
power on a worldwide basis. ·Assuming as we may on the basis of the
assurances given by the United States that the Agency will have a
sufficient amount of fissionable materials to start operating, progress
toward the goals of the Agency will, nevertheless, be slowed down by
a shortage of trained technical personnel and a shortage of finances.
The lack of available capital and personnel will affect not only the budget
of the Agency but also national programs. Much skillful planning and
action lie ahead to surmount these obstacles. The success of the undertaking depends also in large measure on securing for both the Agency
staff and the Board of Governors individuals with the highest technical
competence and the creative imagination necessary to visualize the
Agency program and carry it out successfully. Finally, the Agency will
play a significant role only if the participating states show sufficient
imagination to see its potentialities and give it the necessary support.m
E.g., an Agency gaseous diffusion plant is an unlikely development for many years.
See proposal of Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States,
United Nations Disarmament Commission Document DC/113, Sept. II, 1957, Annex 5·
111 The experience in negotiating the statute of the Agency has created a useful
precedent for preparing drafting international legislation under U.N. auspices. Rather
than trying to draft a treaty in a cotpmittee of the General Assembly, it is preferable to
organize a small but representative group such as the twelve-power group including
those most vitally interested in the project. This group would then prepare the draft
treaty and submit it to an international conference of all members with the understanding that it should not be changed except as a result of a demand by two-thirds
of the members. During the negotiations, intermediate reports could well be made to
the General Assembly which might discuss the progress and the chief issues without
entering, however, into the drafting process.
175
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Chapter II
·SOVIET RUSSIA'S ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION FOR PEACEFUL USE.
OF ATOMIC ENERGY
HORACE

w.

DEWEY*

A. .Introduction

The U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers announced on June 30, 1954,
that the world's first industrial power station using atomic energy had
begun producing electrical current for industry and agriculture in the
Soviet Union. 1 Development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes
was emphasized in the Soviet Union Communist Party's directives on
the Sixth Five-Year Plan 11 and soon after the publication of these important directives the Council of Ministers issued a decree establishing
a new body, the Chief Administration for Use of Atomic Energy, to
direct atomic research, develop atomic reactors for electric power installations, and "further cooperation in the peaceful utilization of atomic
energy between the U.S.S.R. and other nations." 8 By mid-1957 a
report prepared for the United States Congress by staff experts of a
subcommittee of the Joint Economic Committee predicted a possible
Soviet victory over the United States in the "first round" of the atomicenergy "kilowatt race." 4 While kilowatts provide only one measure of
progress, the consistency and magnitude of the Soviet effort in the whole
area of peaceful utilization of atomic energy cannot be denied.
• LL.B., Ph.D. ; Assistant Professor of Russian, Department of Slavic Languages
and Literatures, University of Michigan.
1 Pravda, July 1, 1954, p. I.
11 Pravda, Feb. 26, 1956, pp. 2-7. These directives specified five areas in which the
use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes was to be "considerably expanded" : electric
power, transportation, agriculture and industry, medicine, and scientific research. Since
then the Soviet press has been full of reports on new atomic power plants (one with
a capacity of 420,000 kw.), an atomic-powered icebreaker (the Lenin), new nuclear research institutes, etc.
8 Pravda, April 19. 1956, p. 3·
4 N.Y. Times, July JJ, 1957, p. 2. The Soviets feel that the victory is already tlleirs.
A. N. Nesmeyanov, President of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, declared in late
1955 that the Soviet Union had attained full supremacy in the field of atomic energy.
Pravda, Dec. 31, 1955, p. 2. In his report to the Jubilee Session of the U.S.S.R.
Supreme Soviet on Nov. 6, 1957, Khrushchev said, "I shall limit myself to reminding
you that our country leads the world in the peaceful uses of atomic energy ..•" (New
Times, No. 46 (Nov. 14), Supplement, p. 12 (1957).)
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The Soviet Union undoubtedly is facing a host of legal problems
relating to the peaceful uses of atomic energy:. problems in administrative law, torts, patents, and insurance law. Other areas, such as labor
law and trade union legislation, may likewise be affected by atomic
energy developments in the U.S.S.R. Although discussions of such
problems have been published by the dozen in American periodicals,
the Soviet Union has not yet seen fit to publish any legal materials on
these subjects. The paucity of information on Soviet domestic legal
problems connected with peaceful uses of atomic energy would lead one
to believe that such information is considered secret because it affects
state security. If this is the case, the reason may perhaps be found in
the oft-repeated Soviet view that atomic energy's peaceful uses are
inextricably interwoven with its military uses and that complete exchange of information and data on atomic energy cannot be expected
between nations until nuclear weapons have been outlawed.
Liability for radiation injuries is one example of the kinds of legal
problems which have not received attention in available Soviet materials.5 Presumably, the imposition of liability is governed by Article
404 of the Soviet. Civil Code which reads :
Individuals and enterprises whose activities involve increased
hazard for persons coming into contact with them, such as
railways, tramways, industrial establishments, dealers in
inflammable materials, keepers of wild animals, persons
erecting buildings, and other structures, and the like, shall .
be liable for the injury caused by the source of increased
hazard, if they do not prove that the injury was the result of
an irresistible force or occurred through the intent or gross
negligence of the person injured.
Note: The period within which actions based on this section
may be filed against governmental agencies shall be limited to
two years and shall be computed from the day of the injury.
The period shall be suspended, aside from the general grounds
for the suspension and extension of periods of limitations
(Sections 48 and 49) from the day that the injured person or,
in the event of his death, persons theretofore supported by
him, apply to the proper agency of social insurance, until the
s Several such incidents have been reported in Great Britain, Canada, and the United
States in the last year. That Soviet scientists and doctors, if not lawyers, have been
concerned with such cases is seen from such titles as Two Cases of Acute Radiation
Sickness in Man and Labor Hygiene in Conditions of Ionizing Radiations-titles of
Soviet papers delivered at Geneva in 1955. Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc., World
Development of Atomic Energy 156-16o (1955).
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day when the pension is either awarded or refused (as
amended December 27, 1926, R.S.F.S.R. Laws 1927, text 3). 6
Is an atomic installation "an enterprise whose activity involves
increased hazard" in the terms of the code? It seems likely to be so
considered, in view of Soviet judicial practice, which has been to extend
the increased hazard concept to automobiles, sea and river vessels with
motors, various types of production in which mechanical motors are
used, loading operations, chemical factories, and the like. 7 A commentator on Soviet civil law has explained that the term "sources of increased hazard" refers to properties of things or of natural forces which,
at the present level of technological development, are not completely
subject to human control and, as a result, create a likelihood of harm to
human life and health, as well as to property. 8
Assuming the doctrine of increased hazard is involved, when is a
radiation injury the result of an "irresistible force," relieving the defendant of liability? The most common examples of "irresistible force"
are such external forces as floods or earthquakes which act on the source
of increased hazard and. cause it to manifest its dangerous properties.
But Soviet law also recognizes as an ."irresistible force" one "which
cannot be prevented by a given person but by a given society in
general." 9 Another question is: What is the effect of the plaintiff's
status ? Soviet materials indicate that a defendant enterprise might
not be held "responsible without fault" for injuries to an employee
despite ·the seemingly unequivocal language of the code. 10 Still other
questions are: What type of conduct manifests the necessary "intent"
or "gross negligence," i.e., contributory negligence, to relieve from
liability? Are there any exceptions to the two year period within which
tort suits must be brought? In view of the delayed effect of some
radiation injuries, the two year period is not realistic. What will be
the nature of the damages? The customary damages in cases of injuries
caus.ed by a "source of increased hazard" amount to the difference between the injured plaintiff's social insurance benefits and his wages at
the time of injury. 11 But would such a scale of damages be considered
adequate in the case of radiation injuries? What damages are awarded
6 Grazhdanskii Kodeks R.S.F.S.R. 71 (1954). The English text may be found in
II Gsovski, Soviet Civil Law 2o8-209 ( 1948).
7 II Bratus ( ed), Sovetskoe Grazhdanskoe Pravo 309 ( 195 I).
8 Ibid.
e I Gsovski, supra note 6 at 5o8 and sources therein cited.
to See case cited .in Hazard, Law and Social Change in the U.S.S.R. 237 (1953).
11 I d. at 236.
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if the plaintiff is uninsured-for example, a minor? This problem has
arisen in other cases involving injuries from "sources of increased hazard," and Soviet courts have handled it in various ways. 12 Who must
bear the economic loss if the "source of increased hazard" was being
operated by some one other than the "holder" or "owner" (Russian
vladelets) at the time of injury, as, for example, under a contract?
Soviet law would presumably hold both the "holder" and the contracting party responsible to the injured person. 13 The "holder," however,
apparently has rights of recovery against his own agent, if the latter is
proved to have been negligent, to the extent permitted by labor legislation. The agent may, in addition, be held criminally liable if his actions
displayed "signs of socially-dangerous activity." 16
These are only a few of the legal questions that may demand solution
in connection with the peaceful uses of atomic energy in the Soviet
Union. Any answers can only be conjectural until such time as Soviet
"atomic law" is made available to legal scholars throughout the world.
In contrast to the area of domestic Soviet "atomic law," in the area
of international cooperation for peaceful uses of atomic energy the
Soviets have published several documents and commentaries. 15 Therefore this paper will be limited to a survey of three forms which Soviet
activity has taken in the international sphere that have been discussed in
Soviet sources: the Soviet-sponsored Joint Nuclear Research Institute,
the U.S.S.R.'s relations to the International Atomic Energy Agency,
and bilateral agreements which the Soviet Union has conciuded with a
number of states both inside and outside the Communist bloc.

B. The Joint Nuclear Research Institute
Soviet jurists contend that there are two basic types of organization
for possible cooperation between European states in the peaceful use of
atomic energy. One of these types-bitterly assailed by the U.S.S.R.is the "closed grouping of several states on the basis of existing military
blocs in Europe," as primarily exemplified by EURATOM. The other
-Soviet-approved-type is the "intergovernmental regional organiza12 ld. at 24o-41.
1a Bratus, supra note 7 at 310.
Hfbid.
15 This paper is based primarily on Soviet sources. Considerations of time and
space have not permitted extensive use of East European materials. The English
titles of dozens of articles dealing with international cooperation in peaceful uses of
atomic energy which have been published in East European countries may be found in
the Library of Congress' East European Accession List, published monthly.
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tion open to participation by all interested European states .. , The latter
method of international cooperation, according to Soviet legal writers,
has been outlined in the Soviet government's proposals for all-European
cooperation in peaceful utilization of atomic energy. They add, in this
context, that a "model multilateral agreement for peaceful utilization of
atomic energy ·by means of an organized international scientific research
center for study in the field of nuclear p~ysics and peaceful uses of
atomic energy may be seen in the Charter of the Joint Nuclear Research Institute, fo.unded on March 26, 1956, on the Soviet Union's
initiative." 16
On that date delegates from eleven Communist states signed an
agreement making their respective countries "equal members" of an
organization called the Joint Nuclear Research Institute (ob'edinennyi
institut iadernykh issledovanii) .11 The Soviet press at the time paraphrased certain passages of the agreement, emphasizing that the new
institute was to be devoted exclusively to the peaceful utilization of
atomic energy.
The full text of the Agreement to establish the Joint Nuclear Research Institute, published on July II, 1956, specified that the Institute's activities would be conducted in accordance with a separate
Charter, which was to be prepared by the Institute's management and
approved by the governments of the member states. This Charter was
officially adopted, along with a Personnel Statute, at a conference of
member states held on September 23, 1956, at Dubna, near Moscow.
The Institute itself is located at Dubna.
16 Malinin, "Pravovye formy mezhdunarodnogo sotrudnichestva v oblasti mimogo
ispol'zovaniya atomnoi energii," Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo I Pravo, No. 7 (July) 122-z;
(1957). For texts of the Soviet government's proposals, see Appendix B, Item J.
Malinin's mention of. the Joint Nuclear Research Institute in connection with the Soviet
proposals for an intergovernmental regional organization open to participation by all
European states, as opposed to "closed military groupings,'' is misleading. For one
thing, the Joint Nuclear Research Institute itself resembles one of the "closed groupings of several states on the basis of existing military blocs" so vigorously condemned by Soviet writers, inasmuch as its membership thus far consists exclusively
of Communist states which have concluded military alliances with the U.S.S.R. Another
Soviet writer also mentions the Joint Nuclear Research Institute as a model of "regional atomic c~ation," whose equipment is much more modem and complete than
that of the European Organization for Nuclear Research (C.E.R.N.), organized in
1953 and "just getting started" (Larin, Mezhdunarodnoe Agenstvo Po Atomnoi Energii
10-12 (1957) ). Like Malinin, Larin cites the two Soviet proposals for all-European
cooperation in peaceful use of atomic energy.
1 7 Pravda, Mar. 15, 1956, p. J. The document signed at that time will be called the
Agreement in this paper, as distinguished from the Charter.
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The texts of the Agreement 18 and the Charter, 19 which is doubtless
regarded as subordinate to the Agreement and an implementation of it,
and a considerable body of secondary sources dealing with the Joint Nuclear Research Institute are now available, and problems relating to
membership in the organization, its functions, facilities, structure, basic
operational procedures, and its relation to other international atomic research organizations have become quite clear.
According to the Agreement, the Joint Nuclear Research Institute is
to be "an international scientific-research organization" with the "rights
of a juridical person." 20 The Charter also defines the Institute as a
legal entity and adds that it shall possess the capacity and status necessary to achieve its aims and functions "according to the laws of the
country wherein it is situated" 21-in other words, the laws of the
Soviet Union.
These generally-worded provisions, restated in more specific terms,
would appear to mean that the Institute, in addition to managing and
disposing of its property according to the terms of its Charter, may, in
its own name, make contracts and enter into other formal negotiations
and relationships with such Soviet organizations as the Chief Administration for Use of Atomic Energy 22 or the All-Union Ministry of
Medium Machine Building (to which the Chief Administration for Use
of Atomic Energy is supposedly subordinated)/3 as well as with other
Soviet organizations engaged in supplying the Institute with materials
or designing and constructing new equipment for it. 24 The provisions
18

The text of the Agreement is reproduced as Appendix B, Item I.
The text of the Charter is reproduced as Appendix B, Item 2.
2o Article 2.
21. Article J.
22 The Soviet Council of Ministers' decree setting up this body was published in
Pravda, Apr. 19, 1956, p. 3· Its functions include "furthering cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy between the U.S.S.R. and other nations." V. S. Emelianov
was appointed its Director in September, 1957; Izvestiya, Sept. 8, 1957, p. 6.
2 3 E. P. Slavskii, the former Director of the Chief Administration for Use of Atomic
Energy, succeeded Mikhail Pervukhin as Minister of Medium-Machine Building. The
All-Union Ministry of Medium-Machine Building is believed to be in charge of
over-all atomic energy development. For the report of Slavskii's promotion and
Western hypotheses regarding the role of the Ministry of Medium-Machine Building,
see the N.Y. Times, July 25, 1957, p. 1.
2 • See the Soviet legal provisions pertaining to "legal entities" in Article 13 of the
Soviet Civil Code. A detailed study of Soviet legal entities may be found in Bratus,
Yudidicheskie Litsa v Sovetskom Grazhdanskom Prave 124 and 140-152 (1947). A
scholar of Soviet law in this country has declared that Soviet legal entities are in
fact "sham entities and their mutual contracts are sham contracts." (I Gsovski, Soviet
Civil Law 392 (1948).)
19
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would also appear to give the Institute the capacity, in case of disputes
with these organizations, to sue or be sued in Soviet courts and tribunals-for example in the Gosarbitrazh (State Arbitration System)
which handles hundreds of disputes between Soviet enterprises yearly. 25
Both the Agreement 26 and the Charter 27 further stipulate that the
Institute may deal with other national and international scientificresearch organizations and other organizations in the development of
nuclear physics and the exploration of new possibilities for peaceful
uses of atomic energy. The Institute's relations to organizations of this
type will be examined in another context, later in this chapter.
A comparison of the Institute's Charter with the basic documents
of certain other international organizations devoted to peaceful utilization of atomic energy reveals some similarities, but there are also fundamental differences.
The Charter of the Joint Nuclear Research Institute specifies that
the "Institute will concern itself exclusively with the development of
peaceful uses of atomic energy to benefit all mankind" and authorizes
five closely-related functions : ( I ) coordination of atomic research
among member-states; ( 2) exchange of experience and research results
among member-states; (3) communication with national and international organizations devoted to the peaceful use of atomic energy; ( 4)
training (on all levels) of member-state personnel; and ( 5) announcement of results of the Institute's work in publications, reports to members, or in conferences. 28
Such aims and functions, as far as they go, coincide largely with those
of the International Atomic Energy Agency and EURATOM (both
frequently contrasted with the Joint Nuclear Research Institute by
Soviet writers) and, most of all, the European Organization for
Nuclear Research (about which the Soviets have had much less to
say). 29 However, the basic documents of these organizations (especially
25 A study in the English language on the Soviet arbitration system has been made by
Yaresh, Arbitration in the Soviet Union (1954). This work discusses the types of
conflicts handled by Gosarbitrazh and the scope of its activities. The role of Gosarbitrazh in handling disputes between the Institute and other organizations, at least those
within the Soviet Union, is made the more likely by the absence in the Charter of any
specific machinery to handle such litigation.
26 Article 2.
27 Article 4·
28 Ibid.
29 Compare the aims and functions of the Joint Nuclear Research Institute with those
of the European Organization for Nuclear Research (C.E.R.N.) as stated in Atoms for
Peace Manual, 549 ff. One. notes other similarities between the Joint Nuclear Research Institute and C.E.R.N.: both originally had eleven members, then added a
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of the International Atomic Energy Agency and of EURATOM) are
far more detailed than the Joint Nuclear Research Institute's Agreement and Charter, and contain considerably more implementing provisions. The Institute's Charter, for example, fails to prescribe any
machinery for handling disputes among member-states 80 and is silent
on the subject of formal contracts or "project agreements" between the
Institute and organizations in member-states, although as a "legal
entity" it theoretically has the capacity to conclude such agreements.
There is no mention in the Charter of guaranteeing the "sovereignty"
of member-states or of making Institute assistance independent of
"political, economic and military considerations"-conditions which the
Soviet delegates insisted on including in the Statute of the International
Atomic Energy Agency. Nowhere in the Joint Nuclear Research Institute's Charter will one find any clauses giving the Institute powers of
inspection and control-functions so strongly opposed by the U.S.S.R.
in the final draft of the International Atomic Energy Agency Statute.
Moreover, no health and safe.ty standards are prescribed.
The Joint Nuclear Research Institute is, as its name would indicate,
primarily a research organization and an educational or training center,
encouraging the "comprehensive development of creative capacities of
the member-states' scientific-research cadres." 81 As such, it has a far
.more limited range of functions than those which the International
Atomic Energy Agency and EURATOM are expected to perform. 32
Its functions do not include supplying fissionable materials or designing
and equipping atomic installations. Because it is a collective research
body, rather than an atomic "bank" or distributor of fissionable materials, there was doubtless less need to include in its Charter any clauses
setting up safeguards against diversion of fissionable materials from
twelfth; the Institute has four laboratories, and C.E.R.N. has four basic "study groups"
(but only one laboratory) ; the documents of both organizations carefully define the
scale of payments each member-state must make to meet the costs of organizational
activities (in the case of C.E.R.N., the scale of payments from Yugoslavia and Greece
were eventually reduced to .Js%) ; both organizations have "open" membership, at
least in theory.
80 The statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, on the other hand, provides for such machinery in its Article XVII, and EURATOM has its own "court of
justice"; see Section IV in Secretariat of the Interim Committee for the Common
Market and EURATOM. Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) (Brussels, 1957) (hereinafter called the "EURATOM treaty").
81 Lebedenko, "Ustav ob'edinnogo instituta yademykh issledovanii," Sovetskoe
Gosudarstvo I Pravo, No. 2 (Feb.), 117 (1957).
82 For a description and analysis of International Atomic Energy Agency functions,
see Bechhoefer and Stein, supra.
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peaceful to military uses, although the Soviet Union has always insisted that atomic energy's peaceful and military uses are inseparably
interrelated.
Could the danger of diversion-of materials or techniques--even
arise in connection with the activities of the Joint Nuclear Research
Institute? Would it be possible, for example, for a member-state such
as China to use Institute materials, or techniques developed at the Institute, for military projects without the knowledge and approval of the
U.S.S.R. and other Institute members? Such a development seems
highly unlikely, at least in the case of materials. One might speak of
two types of protection against diversion of this type. One of them
could be called "external security" -the fact that the Institute and all
its installations are physically located in the Soviet Union, eliminating
such difficulties and problems as "infringement of sovereignty" which
arise in connection with the enforcement of the inspection and control
clauses contained in the International Atomic Energy Agency statute
or the EURATOM treaty. The second type of protection might be
termed "internal security," being afforded by the structure and operational procedures (which we shall presently examine) of the Institute
itself. The requirement that all the Institute's undertakings be planned
(or known to and approved) by the management, the Scientific Council,
and the Finance Committee, as well as the collective character of these
undertakings, would seem to rule out the possibility of serious diversions of materials by individual member-states for unauthorized military purposes. It would, of course, be virtually impossible to limit the
application of techniques to the physical confines of the Institute.
The Soviet Union has provided impressive facilities for the Institute.
These include four laboratories : a laboratory of nuclear physics, which
has a synchrocyclotron with proton energy of 68o megelectron volts
(formerly the Nuclear Problems Institute of the U.S.S.R. Academy of
Sciences) ; a high-energy physics laboratory which has a proton synchrotron with proton energy of 10,000 megelectron volts (formerly
the Electrophysics Laboratory of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences);
a theoretical physics laboratory, and an electron physics laboratory.
Both the Agreement and the Charter provide for other experimental
installations and laboratories. 83 Some of the world's top nuclear physicists-men like Topchiyev and Veksler of the U.S.S.R.-work for the
Institute.
There were eleven original signatories of the Agreement to establish
33

Article 4 of the Agreement; Article 28 of the Charter.
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a Joint Nuclear Research Institute: Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, East
Germany, China, North Korea,· Mongolia, Poland, Rumania, the
U.S.S.R., and Czechoslovakia. a. The original Agreement .specified, in
its third article, that any other states wishing to take full part in the
Institute's work should declare their concurrence with the provisions of
the Agreement and that they could become members of the Institute by
the decision of a majority of the member-states .. A somewhat different
procedure, however, was followed in the case of the only new member
to date, Viet Nam, which joined the Institute on September 20, 1956,
upon the "invitation" ofthe member-states. 8 D
Membership qualifications as set forth by the Charter 86 remain substantially the same as those in the Agreement.- An additional clause declares that the amount of participation in the Institute's maintenance and
construction costs allotted to newly-joined member-states shall be de,.
cided by the Institute's Finance Committee and approved by the governments of the member-states. The Charter's sixth article states that
all members of the Institute shall participate equally iri its scientific
.work and management.
Soviet writers on the Joint Nuclear Research Institute have made a
great deal of this "open-doors-to-all" membership policy, while criticizing EURATOM as a "closed grouping" and condemning the "discriminatory" policy of the United States and others who have insisted
that only ·members of the United Nations or its specialized agencies
should be members of the Internatiomil Atomic Energy Agency. Such
a policy is held to be "illegal" and "in contradiction to the principle of
universality and of truly extensive international cooperation in the
.peaceful use of atomic energy." 87
A condition of membership in the Institute is the payment of a specified percentage of the Institute's expenditures for construction and
maintenance. The share 'borne by Albania, Mongolia, and North Korea,
on the one hand, is only o.os percent apiece; the Soviet Union, on the
86 The order of listing is according to the Russian alphabet, as followed in all documents.
85 Izvestiya, Sept. 21, 1956, p. I.
86 Article 5.
· 81 Trud, Sept. 14, 1956, p. 3· The article goes on to denounce the exclusion of the
German Democratic Republic, the Mongolian People's Republic, the .Korean People's
Democratic Republic and China from membership in the Agency. These states, it will
be noted, were among those signing the original agreement to set up the Joint Nuclear
Research Institute. See also New Times, No.8 ·(Feb. 21), II 12 (1957) and numerous
sources cited in our chapter on the Soviet Union and the International Atomic Energy
Agency.
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other hand, pays 47.25 percent_& 8 The Agreement declares that the
share of a member-state's contribution cannot be a factor bearing on
the degree of its participation in the Institute's scientific work or administration. "Unless this principle were observed," writes a Soviet jurist,
"membership in the Institute would be impossible for many states, and
'open doors for all' would remain an empty declaration of policy." 39
The Agreement's seventh article, and article 8 of the Charter, state
that any member-state may withdraw from the Institute by having its
plenipotentiary give the Institute's Director written notice of its intention to withdraw not later than three months before the end of the current fiscal year. This would necessitate a revision of the percentage
shares of the remaining member-states in meeting Institute expensesa procedure outlined in Article VI of the Agreement.
The Charter's seventh article creates a type of guest membership for
scientists from non-member states, enabling them to work in the Institute. Scientists from non-member states are encouraged to visit the
Institute and to participate in Its activities, and we frequently read of
such visits and participation in Institute activities by foreign scientists,
including scientists from the United States.~ 0
The present charter membership in the Joint Nuclear Research Institute is exclusively Communist. This membership fails, however, to
include one important Communist state, Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia- was
not among the original signatories of the Agreement to organize a
Joint Nuclear Research Institute, nor is there any record of its being
"invited" to join the Institute, as in the case of Viet Nam. Detailed
speculation on the reasons for Yugoslavia's non-membership could
hardly be justified in this paper, although a number of possible explanations come to mind. First, Yugoslavia may have been deterred from
joining by considerations of its relations with the West. Second,
Marshal Tito may have been reluctant to rush into joining a potential
atomic Cominform in view of Yugoslavia's banishment from the political Cominform in 1948. Third, Yugoslavia's membership as the only
Communist state in the twelve-member European Organization for
ss Article VI of the Agreement.
39 Lebedenko, supra note 31 at 117. For a similar description of the "open doors"
policy, see Kapryin, "V Dubne, pod Moskvoi," Pravda, Jan. 4, 1957, p. 4·
4 0 Iordansky, "Atomgrad," New Times, No._ 4 (Jan. 24) 25-27 (1957) and Pravda,
July 6, 1957, p. 4· One British scientist who has apparently become a regular staff
member of the Institute is Bruno Pontecorvo, who fled England and obtained Soviet
citizenship seve-ral years ago. His picture appears with a group of Institute scientists
in Pravda, Jan. 4, 1957, p. 4·
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Nuclear Research (CERN) may have been held against it by some of
the states in the twelve-member Joint Nuclear Research Institute. Until
the spring of 1958, Yugoslavia's absence from the Institute membership rolls did not seem to make much difference. A bilateral agreement
had been concluded with the Soviet Union, on what appeared to be
highly advantageous terms, for "cooperation in the use of atomic energy
for peaceful purposes." 41 A Yugoslav scientist who visited the Joint
Nuclear Research Institute was most impressed by its facilities and
regretted that, so far, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia had not exchanged scientific personnel-professors and research students. The
scientist stressed, however, that the Soviet-Yugoslav bilateral agreement
was especially satisfactory because "both from a political and a scientific
viewpoint" it constituted "an arrangement between equal parties." 42
The Communist-bloc attacks on Tito in 1958 would appear to lessen the
likelihood of Yugoslavia's joining the Institute and may result in serious curtailment of over-all Soviet atomic aid to Yugoslavia. 43
The Joint Nuclear Research Institute is headed administratively by a
Director and two Deputy Directors, elected by a majority of the member-states (through their plenipotentiaries) from among scientists of
those states. The Director is elected for a term of three years. A Soviet
professor, D. I. Blokhintsev (corresponding member of the Ukrainian
Academy of Sciences) is the present Director. Deputy Directors serve
n The general terms of this agreement were outlined in a Tass communique from
Belgrade, dated Jan. 28, 1956. The actual text of the agreement has not yet been
published.
42 }uric, "Nuclear Research in Yugoslavia," New Times, No. 23 (May 31), 20-21
(1956). Yugoslav spokesmen have criticized the Soviet Union as well as Great
Britain and the United States for keeping atomic data secret: "The Russians .•.
kept silent about their work and only revealed their final results : the explosion of
atomic and hydrogen bombs and the setting in operation of a nuclear power plant . . •
In spite of all attempts of the big powers to keep [atomic information] to themselves,
humanity will not be checked from progressing along its road." Popovic, "International
Cooperation and Nuclear Energy," 6 Review of International Affiairs, No. 126-128
(July-Aug.) 28 (1955). Yugoslav scientists and statesmen have called for the banning
of atomic tests and have accused the U.S.S.R. (as well as Britain and the U.S.) of
endangering world health by conducting nuclear tests. See statement by Academician
Pavle Savic to Borba, "Extremely Harmful Consequences of Nuclear Explosions for
the Whole World," Information Service Yugoslavia (n.d.) and statement by Tito on
May 15, 1957, Information Service Yugoslavia (n.d.).
43 During the crisis of mid-1958, Poland appeared to be the most reluctant of the
Communist-bloc states to c_riticize Yugoslavia, and some Poles were inclined to hold
China (rather than the U.S.S.R.) primarily responsible for the attack on Tito.
Interestingly enough, a Polish-Yugoslav agreement for cooperation in peaceful uses
of atomic energy through 1959 was reported by the Polish press on May 31, 1958;
N.Y. Times, June 2, 1958, p. 10.
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two-year terms. The current Deputy Directors are Professor Vaclav
Votruba (of Czechoslovakia) and Marian Danysz (of Poland). The
three together form the "management" or "Board of Directors"
( direktsiia) of the Institute. They formulate the all-important plans
for Institute activities and present the budget. The Agreement and
Charter make this Board responsible to the governments of the memberstates and oblige it to submit regular reports to those governments. 44
The Board's role in amending the Charter will be discussed later.
The Director acts as the Institute's plenipotentiary in relations with
appropriate institutions in the member-states on all questions pertaining
to the Institute's work. 45 Professor Blokhintsev, for example, would
represent the Institute in its dealings with the Polish Academy of Sciences on research projects of mutual interest. He also serves as chairman of the Scientific Council ( uche1zyi soviet), which considers and
approves the Institute's scientific research programs, examines the results of completed programs (and also the results of individual studies),
and considers "other questions concerning the scientific. work of the
Institute." 46 The Charter requires this body to meet not less than twice
a year.
Acting in his dual capacity of management head and chairman of the
Scientific Council, the Director obviously wields great power; both
executive and administrative. The Charter also confers on him the right
to hire and discharge employees according to the Personnel Statute
(the text of which has not yet been made public), to establish or alter
the wages of all employees within the official wage limits approved by
the Financial Committee, and to initiate individual pay raises of up to.
fifty percent for highly-skilled workers! 7 The· Director is the formal
manager-in-chief of all the Institute's assets! 8 He also appoints the
deputy, or "Administrative Director," who is in charge of construction
and business affairs of the Institute. 49
The policy-making importance and supervisory powers of the Scientific Council are clear from the above-outlined provisions of the
Article V of the Agreement; Articles 20, 23, and 25 of the Charter. ·
Article V of the Agreement; Article 21 of the Charter.
46 Article 18 of the Charter. Member-states' representation in this body is more
"equal" (three scientists from each state) than in the corresponding organs of the International Atomic Energy Agency or EURATOM; see Article 118 of the EURATOM treaty and Article VI of the Agency statute. Each member-state of C.E.R.N.
has one vote in the Council ; Atoms for Peace Manual 550.
tT Article 27 of the Charter.
ts Article 26 of the Chart~;r.
4 9 Articles 33-35 of the Charter.
u
u

1418

INTERNATIONAL CONTROL

Charter. The relative brevity of this Charter and its paucity of detail
means that most of the Institute's activities are determined by the Scientific Council. Minutes of the Scientific Council's first session give
some additional information on the Institute's program and· provide
insight into procedures within the Council itself. These procedures display unmistakably Soviet characteristics. We learn, for example, that
a .five-year plan for further Institute development was approved in the
first session of the Council. Elections for laboratory directors' posts
were also held. First, the list of candidates was presented by the Board
of Directors, and after this list was "discussed," three Soviet scientists
were "chosen by secret ballot." Two of these laboratory directors
(Veksler and Dzhelepov) immediately delivered addresses, apparently
well-prepared, which furnished thorough and detailed "explanations"
of the tasks to be undertaken by their respective laboratories. The Institute. Director "suggested" a number of basic plans for constructing or
acquiring new installations and equipment and for training specialists
from member-states, after which a "lively discussion" took place. During this discussion "many questions were clarified, remarks studied, and
certain legislative enactments were adjusted." There were "some differences of opinion," but the session closed with the "unanimous conclusions" which one has come to expect in Soviet organizational procedures.&o
To what degree is the Institute's Board dependent upon the Finance
Committee? The Charter's twenty-first article declares that the Board
of Directors shall be guided exclusively by the decisions of the Scientific
Council and the Finance Committee. While the Director presides over
the former, he would appear to have no formal influence over the activities of the latter. The Finance Committee is made up of representatives of all member-states (one representative from each state), appointed directly by the governments of these states. The chairmanship
of this body rotates among its members. It meets at least once a year,
and its decisions are made by a majority of not less than two-thirds of
the votes cast by its members. Its approval is formally required for
a wide range of expenditures,&1 and the Charter states that the Finance
60 Votruba, "The First Session of the Joint Nuclear Research Institute's Scientific
Council,'' 2 Atomnaya Energiya, No. 1, 72-74 (1957) (each issue of this periodical is
translated into English by Consultants Bureau, New York). Another reference to the
single plan governing all Institute research may be found in Karnaukh, "Foreign Scientists in Dubna-International Center of Nuclear Research,'' 2 Atomnaya Energiya,
No. 4, 482 (1957).
61 Article 10 of the Charter.
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Committee shall "generally control all financial affairs of the Institute."
Thus the budget which the Board of Directors prepares must be submitted to it, 52 and the Committee determines the amount of money (in
Soviet currency) to be expended by the Institute for "equipment, instruments and technical scientific literature or periodicals from states not
belonging to the Institute." 53 It is the Finance Committee's function to
establish "the manner of computing the value of equipment, materials
and instruments supplied by the member-states, as well as the value of
individual work accomplished according to Institute laws." 54
Yet it probably would be erroneous to regard the Finance Committee
as holding the purse strings and seeking to curtail, or otherwise actively
interfere with, the plans of the executive. Since the members of the
Joint Nuclear Research Institute are all states firmly committed to
"planned economy," it seems likely that the Finance Committee's chief
function is to work out practical financial arrangements in order that
the plans of the Director and the Scientific Council may be carried out
as effectively as possible. Its role is probably not to challenge any plans
on their merits, beyond deciding on their economic feasibility. That the
Committee operates largely in a "rubber stamp" manner seems clear
from the aforementioned report on the Scientific Council's first session.
The minutes note simply that "after the Scientific Council had finished
its work, the first meeting of the Finance Committee took place; the
Committee confirmed the tentative budget presented by the Institute's
Directors for 1956-57 and thus guaranteed the completion of plans for
the development of the Institute and of scientific-research problems approved by the Scientific Council." 55 Nevertheless, the Institute appears
to follow strict accounting procedures. Each state's percentage share in
the Institute's expenditures is credited with the value of equipment and
materials which it delivers in accordance with orders placed by the
Institute. Credit is also given for the value of research done by individual scientists working on Institute assignments and for sums which
are withheld or deducted from members' salaries in· form of taxes by
the states of which they are citizens. 56
We have already described the four laboratories which are attached to
the Institute. Each laboratory has its own director, whose appointment
by the Board (from among scientists of member-states) must, accordArticle 12 of the Charter.
Article 13 of the Charter.
Ibid.
55 Votruba, supra note so a.t 72.
56 Lebedenko, supra note 31 at n7.
52

53
54
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ing to the Charter's twenty-ninth article, be approved by the Scientific
Council. Apparently the "secret ballot" procedure described earlier
applies to the selection of four directors from a larger list of candidates,
or represents a failure to observe the exact procedure provided for by
the Charter. In this writer's opinion it makes little difference which
method is followed ; the laboratory directors appear in any event to be
selected by the Board. Each laboratory, under its director, is charged
with preparing programs for the scientific research work assigned to it
and with examining the results of this work as well as of studies made
by individual scientists in the laboratory. The laboratories each have
their own Scientific Council, which must be approved by the Institute's
Scientific Council, and each laboratory contains a number of departments and "sections" (sektory) which may be altered by·the Institute
Board. The laboratories have the right to confer learned degrees, including the degree of "doctor" of physico-mathematical sciences, upon
students at the Institute. Each laboratory may also consider "other
questions concerning the scientific work of the laboratory." 57
The Charter declares that all members of the Institute staff are
employees or associates ( sotrudniki) of the international scientific
organization and are obliged to carry out its purposes and tasks. 58 A
Soviet jurist speaks of some members being "dispatched" or "ordered"
( komandirovannye) by their governments to work at the Institute for
periods of not less than a year, while others have a considerably shorter
tour of duty. 59 The rights and obligations of staff members are regulated in detail by a Personnel Statute (polozhenie o personale) which
is appended to the Charter. (This statute is mentioned in the thirtyeighth article of the Charter, but its text has not yet been made public.)
Its norms are said to correspond to the "basic principles of labor legislation" of the various member-states. 60 The Charter specifies that Institute personnel shall be "subject to the laws of the country in which the
Institute is located"-i.e., the laws of the U.S.S.R. 61
Are the member-states all equal participants in the Institute's scientific research activities? Legally, yes. At least, the Charter's sixth
article says that they are. Do member-states enjoy equality in determining and· administering Institute policy? Here the legal answer is
less clear. A Soviet jurist has hailed the "democratic nature" (demoArticles 28 and 42 of the Charter.
Article 36. Compare with Article VII of the International Atomic Energy Agency
statute.
59 Lebedenko, supra note 31 at I 18.
60 Ibid.
6t Article 38.
57

58
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kratichnost') of the Charter provisions. 62 These provisions make the
Institute's Board of Directors responsible for Institute activities to the
collective governments of the member-states and require the Board to
submit periodic reports to these governments. 63 In its twenty-second
article the Charter also makes clear that the Institute's Board shall not
undertake to carry out the instructions of any individual member-state,
but shall be guided exclusively by decisions of the Scientific Council and
the Financial Committee, in which all member-states enjoy equal representation. We have already noted that a member-state's percentage
share in the Institute's expenditures and maintenance is supposed to
have no bearing on that state's degree of participation in Institute research or activities. Thus, on the surface at least, member-states are
equals when it comes to administering the Institute and shaping its
policies, as well as participating in its research activities.
Yet the Charter contains other passages whose legal effect would
appear to increase the Soviet Union's influence over the Institute to the
point of giving the Institute a Soviet character rather than an international one. We have already noted that the Joint Nuclear Research
Institute is a Soviet "legal entity" whose rights-and obligations-are
determined by Soviet law. This is in contrast to EURATOM whose
legal personality is subject to separate definition under the respective
municipal laws of the member-states.s. We have likewise noted that,
while the Personnel Statute's regulations allegedly conform to the
"basic principles" of labor legislation in member-states, the Institute's
staff is specifically made subject to Soviet law. There is no passage in
the Institute's Charter dealing with privileges or immunities of personnel, as is to be found in the fifteenth article of the International
Atomic Energy Agency statute. Problems of conflicts of laws, in which
jurisdiction and disposal of cases involving Institute personnel would be
at issue, could hardly arise under the Institute Charter's provisions.
The member-states' property rights in Institute installations have never
been defined, but the Charter acknowledges the Soviet Union's reversionary rights in these installations in the event of the Institute's dissolution, with the other member-states to receive monetary reimbursement proportionate to the amount of their participation and monetary
contributions. The installations include . "all Institute equipment and
all . . . buildings." 811
Lebedenko, supra note JI at 117.
Article 22.
6 4 Cf. Articles 184 and 185 of the EURATOM treaty.
&5 Article 40.
62

88
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Although the Charter makes no mention of it, we must assume that
the ultimate source of authority over matters affecting the Joint Nuclear
Research Institute is the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. 66 \Vhatever
the Joint Nuclear Research Institute may have in common with other
international organizations devoted to peaceful uses of atomic energy,
this political feature of subordination to a single national political
party-the Soviet Union's Communist Party-sets the Joint Nuclear
Research Institute apart.
There are other considerations which lead one to doubt that the
U.S.S.R. has only one vote in twelve in shaping Institute policy and controlling its administration. Without the guiding impetus and tremendous material contributions of the Soviet Union, the Institute could
never have become the impressive organization that it is today. It might
well continue to function effectively if one or more of the other memberstates withdrew, but what would become of the Institute if the U.S.S.R.
chose to exercise its right of withdrawal? It is difficult to imagine the
success of any Institute project if that project met the opposition of
the Soviet Union. Questions of formal status aside, the U.S.S.R. remains the scientific and economic "big brother" to the other members..
Representatives of the smaller states are the first to recognize this fact.
Professor Andrzej Soltan, Director of the Polish Academy of Sciences'
Nuclear Research Institute, has ha.iled the creation of the Joint Nucle~r
Research Institute as "above all a manifestation of international scientific cooperation . . . a great step forwards in the development of
atomic nuclear physics research, which permits scientists of small
countries to achieve work which they could not carry out by themselves.
We will use not only the experience of the Soviet scientists, but also
their equipment." 67 Lajos Janosi, a member of the Hungarian Academy
of Sciences, concedes that "such' a small state as Hungary would not be
in a position to construct and equip such an institution by its own means.
And it would not be expedient, anyway. The problem has been resolved
66 The Soviet Communist Party's complete power over all national organizations
within the U.S.S.R. is unquestioned. Does the Joint Nuclear Research Institute's
status as· an "international organization" make a difference here? We believe not. It
is an international organization of Communist states run by Communist parties, among
whom the Soviet Communist Party continues to play the directing role. The Soviet
Union's dominant position in international affairs between Co!l¥Dunist states (with the
much-publicized exception of Yugoslavia) appears unaltered at this date. Even without
considering the Charter provisions which favor the Soviet Union, we see no reason to
expect any of the other Institute member-states to object to, or in any way challenge,
the factual domination of that body by the U.S.S.R. and the Soviet Communist Party.
e1 Izvestiya, Apri14 1956, p. J.·
.
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correctly : the Institute was set up in a large country which has the
necessary equipment at its disposal, while other lands are given the
opportunity to participate in its work and to benefit by common experience." 68
The Institute's Charter sets up a simple procedure for amendment of
its provisions. Proposals for amending the Charter may be submitted
by Institute members to the Board of Directors. The Board, in turn,
has the right to introduce amendment proposals on its own initiative.
In either case, the amendments take force when adopted by a majority
of the member-states. 69
The Charter provides for the liquidation of the Joint Nuclear Research Institute, but tells us only that this may be done "by agreement
of the member-state's governments." 70
The Institute's relations to other organizations and programs for
peaceful utilization of atomic energy were highlighted by a visit which
Sterling Cole, Director-General of the International Atomic Energy
Agency, paid to the Joint Nuclear Research Institute in the spring of.
1958. 71 The Institute Charter's fourth article provides that one of its
purposes shall be to maintain communication between national and international scientific research organizations for the peaceful use of atomic
energy, and in the future some cooperation between the International
Atomic Energy Agency and the Joint Nuclear Research Institute may
be realized. For example, the Institute would appear to be the logical
institution to which students and specialists from Agency memberstates would come for training under the Soviet program outlined in
letters to Sterling Cole just before his trip to the U.S.S.R. 72
The record shows a fundamental difference, however, in the Joint
Nuclear Research Institute's relations with the various organizations
devoted to the peaceful use of atomic energy. It is hardly surprising
that the Institute cooperates most closely with organizations in the
Soviet bloc. Its Charter specifies that it shall coordinate the theoretical
and experimental research of member-state scientists, 73 and the Agreement's second a~ticle states that it shall cooperate in its work with the
Pravda, Jan. 4. 1957, p. 4-"
Section XII of the Charter. We are not told whether the majority in question
refers to a meeting of the Scientific Council or to some sort of general vote of members.
10 Article 40.
11 Pravda, April 11, 1958, p. 6; Izvestiya, April II, 1958, p. 4; Izvestiya, April 12,
1958, p. 3; Pravda, April 15, 1958, p. 6.
72 Pravda, April 4. 1958, p~ 5·
73 Article 4·
68

· eo
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appropriate institutes and laboratories in the territories of memberstates. The member-states, as we have seen, are placing great hopes in
this arrangement. The director of the Polish Academy of Sdiences'
Nuclear Research Institute, for example, has declared that he is counting
on the closest cooperation between the Institute and his organization. 74
The Institute's relations with the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences are
intimate. The Academy's Nuclear Problems Institute and Electrophysics Laboratory have become laboratories of the Joint Nuclear Resea.rch Institute, and the Academy's greatest scientists are working for
the Institute. We have no information on the Institute's ties with the
U.S.S.R. Ministry of Medium Machine Building or the Chief Administration for Use of Atomic Energy, but there can be little doubt that
such ties are fully exploited. The lavish expressions of gratitude for
Soviet assistance on the part of scientists of smaller states should not
obscure the fact that th~ U.S.S.R. itself stands to benefit considerably
from the results of the joint scientific research conducted by the Institute. According to a West German scholar, the Soviets expect valuable
contributions from scientists of Poland, China, and Czechoslovakia in
particular. 75 Further evidence of the advantages which the U.S.S.R.
will enjoy by virtue of its Institute membership is seen, curiously
enough, in a letter from a Rumanian scientist expressing thanks for
Soviet assistance to his country. Commenting on the atomic energy
program in the Soviet Union's own five-year plan, this Rumanian scientist adds that "in carrying out the scientific part of this program, a .
part will be played by the Joint Nuclear Research Institute, and Rumanian physicists are proud that they will be able to work at this
Institute." 78
With reference to non-Communist atomic organizations and agencies,
however, the Institute's attitude assumes a political and diplomatic
significance of a special type. The Institute's historical and political
background reveal a pattern which must be considered quite apart from
problems of research on peaceful uses of atomic energy. On the day following the announcement of the Agreement to organize the Joint Nu74 Izvestiya, April 4, 1956, p. J. See also Wspolpraca ze wszystkimi narodami, I
Polska, No. 41, 6-7 (1958), which mentions bilateral agreements between Poland and
Yugoslavia, and Poland and East Germany, in addition to Polish participation in the
Joint Nuclear Research Institute.
75 Huber, Internationale Ordnung Der Friedlichen Verwendung Der Atomenergie
51 (1956).
76 Sanielevich, "Aid Accorded to Atomic Scientists Coming from People's Democracies," 2 Atomnaya Energiya, No. I, 98-99 (1957).
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clear Research Institute, the Soviet government came out with a bitter
attack against EURATOM, a "narrow and closed group of West European states" whose American and VI/ est European sponsors "intend to
bypass the Paris Agreement clauses which prohibit West Germany from
producing and stockpiling atomic and hydrogen weapons." 77 Shortly
after the full text of the Agreement to organize the Joint Nuclear Research Institute was published (on July I I, I 956), EURATOM was
again denounced-this time in a statement by the Soviet government
on general European cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. 78
Once again, the twin facts that EURATOM was a ''closed grouping"
and that West Germany was to be one of its members drew Soviet
criticism. It was pointed out that several states within this "closed
grouping" were also members of closed military blocs, and the fear was
expressed that EURATOM's creation· would in effect lead to the removal of any restrictions on the production of atomic energy in West
Germany. "This," in the words of the statement, "would permit revenge-seeking West German circles to organize in their country production of atomic weapons, which would create a serious threat to the
cause of peace in Europe." The statement went on to describe, by way
of contrast, the "open" character of the Joint Nuclear Research Institute and the purely peaceful purposes for which it was being organized.
Any doubt that the Joint Nuclear Research Institute had been organized as the Communist bloc's answer to atomic research organizations sponsored by the West must have been dispelled when a Soviet
jurist wrote early in 1957 -that "C.E.R.N. is a closed organization
which does not admit states of the Socialist camp into its membership.
This has compelled a number of states to create their own international
research organization. With this purpose in mind, a conference was
held in Moscow, in March, 1956. . . . " 79
On March 17, 1957, in a declaration concerning the plans to create
EURATOM and a Common Market, the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Foreign
Affairs warned:
The entire activity of EURATOM and the "common market"
will be subordinated to the aims of NATO, whose aggressive
character is widely known. Under such conditions the fulfillment of plans to create EURATOM and the "common
market" will inevitably lead to a further deepening of the
division which splits Europe, to the increase of tensions in
TTizvestiya, March 28, 1956, p. 3·
78 See Appendix B, Item 4·
79 Lebedenko, supra note 31 at n6.
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Europe. It will greatly complicate the establishment of economic and political cooperation on an all-European basis; it
will bring into being new difficulties in solving the problems
of European security. 80

The declaration cautioned those who believed that the creation of
.EURATOM would lessen their countries' economic dependence on
the United States:
On the contrary, their dependence on the U.S.A. will only increase, to the detriment of the national sovereignty of the
countries participating in this grouping, since the United
States-and nobody attempts to conceal this fact-will in
reality control EURATOM, acting in the capacity of chief
supplier of fissionable materials and of equipment for atomic
production in the EURATOM countries. 81
In place of EURATOM, the Soviet government proposed an allEuropean organization for peaceful utilization of atomic energy,
"bearing in mind that this organization would be a regional division
or department of the International Atomic Energy Agency." Just
what advantages such a "regional division" of the International Atomic
Energy Agency would offer over the Agency itself was not disclosed.
The International Atomic Energy Agency has suffered greatly by
comparison with the Joint Nuclear Research Institute in the Soviet
press. During the New York conference which began on September 20,
1956, for examination and confirmation of the International Atomic
Energy Agency's statute, Soviet publications were filled with articles
drawing distinctions between the Agency and the Communist-sponsored Joint .Nuclear Research Institute. 82 These articles emphasized
that membership in the Joint Nuclear Research Institute was open to
all, even to non-Socialist states, but that membership in the Interna-:
tional Atomic Energy Agency was denied, quite illegally, to such states
as the German Democratic People's Republic, the Korean People's
Democratic Republic, the Mongolian People's Republic, and China.
All member-states in the Joint Nuclear Research Institute were said
to enjoy full legal equality. The draft statute of the International
Atomic Energy Agency was condemned for its failure .to include any
clearly-formulated provision that the sovereign rights of its memberSee note 16, supra.
Ibid.
82 Some examples may be found in Trud, Sept. 14. 1956, p. 3; lzvestiya, Sept 21,
1956, p. 1 ; Pravda, Sept. 27, 1956, p. 4 and Sept. 28, 1956, p. 6; lzvestiya, Sept. 29, 1956,
80

8t

p. 4·
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states must be observed in all activities of the Agency. With respect
to the Joint Nuclear Re5earch Institute, the articles claimed that
member-states have equal participation rights and equal use of the
Institute's facilities, regardless of their financial share in meeting its.
expenses. The statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency was
denounced as financially discriminatory, providing in essence that
countries which obtain aid from the Agency should not only pay for this
aid, but should also ensure that the Agency have the income which it
needs to construct or acquire its own plants, laboratories, and other
installations. The argument was advanced that the financial arrangements naturally discriminated against the smaller, or economicallyundeveloped, countries. In addition, the articles charged that the capitalist countries producing atomic raw materials and fissionable materials
in quantity were intent upon using the International Atomic Energy
Agency as a marketing channel. Finally, the equipment and facilities of
the Agency and of EURATOM were described as lagging far behind
those donated by the Soviet Union to the Joint Nuclear .Research
Institute, the finest in the world, and a .number of which were already
in operation.
From comparisons of this sort, one must conclude that the Joint
Nuclear Research Institute serves not only as an international research organization; but alsp as an instrument of Soviet diplomacy·
and propaganda.

C. The Soviet Union and the International Atomic Energy Agency
The Soviet position with regard to the International. Atomic Ene~gy
Agency, since Moscow's. first published reaction to President Eisenhower's proposal of December 8, 1953, deserves serious study. If we.
are to understand the Soviet approach to international cooperation in
the peaceful uses of atomic energy, the Soviet role in the history of
the International Atomic Energy Agency ~.nnot be ignored.
· Two closely-related propositions form the ostensible basis of Soviet
policy in international cooperation for the use of atomic energy. With-:
out a consideration of these two tenets .any discussion of the subject
is viewed by the U.S.S.R. as fruitless. Repeatedly raised and emphasized in all the channels of . communication available within the
S~viet Union, the propositions amount simply to this.: (I) at present
the peaceful ·uses of atoniic energy are inextricably interwoven with
its military uses; and ( 2) effective cooperation in peaceful .use of ·
atomic energy cannot be fully achieved untif an international agree-
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ment to prohibit the manufacture, storage, and use of nuclear weapons is reached. The author of a recent Soviet volume on the International Atomic Energy Agency warns that the basic efforts of all states
will inevitably be concentrated on the military, rather than the peaceful,
uses of atomtc energy until atomic weapons have been outlawed. 83
Although American scientists and officials have repeatedly praised the
personal goodwill and cooperative spirit of Soviet scientists at international congresses and other gatherings, Igor V. Kurchatov, director
of the Soviet Academy of Sciences' Atomic Energy Institute has admitted that "full candor" in relations between Soviet and Western
scientists cannot be expected until atomic and hydrogen weapons have
become a thing of the past. 84
In the following pages the Soviet position with regard to the International Atomic Energy Agency, as presented to the reader of Soviet
materials on the subject, is surveyed. It should be emphasized that
the Soviet views reach an enormous public, both inside and outside
the U.S.S.R.
A Soviet legal scholar has enumerated four basic juridical forms of
organization for international cooperation in the peaceful uses of
atomic energy. One of these forms is the bilateral agreement concluded
directly between interested nations. Another is created through so-called
intergovernmental "regional organizations." A third is the organization of international scientific-research centers based on multilateral
agreements between states situated in various parts of the globe. The
fourth form is the international organ created within the framework of
the United Nations and (the Soviets insist on this) based upon the
"principle of universality." 85
What is the place of the International Atomic Energy Agency in this
juridical scheme? In answering this question, the Soviet scholar has
offered the following description of the Agency's relationship with the
United Nations. First, the Agency was created within the framework
of the United Nations, which ensures the proper observation and control of the Agency's work. Secondly, the United Nations Security
Council and General Assembly have the right to demand reports from
the Agency. They may criticize these reports, give the Agency in8s Larin, supra note 16 at 46. Larin's book is especially important because it is the
only Soviet monograph on the International Atomic Energy Agency to appear thus far.
The book was edited by S. B. Krylov, the prominent Soviet specialist in international
law.
84 Pravda, Feb. 28, 1958, p. J.
8D Malinin, supra note 16 at 122.
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structions resulting from their discussion of the reports, and may
demand an accounting of the Agency's fulfillment of these instructions.
Third, the Agency may not decide on questions falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Security ~ouncil. Therefore, any instructions of the Security Council which concern the ensuring of states'
security are binding upon the Agency and its organs. These three
characteristics of the Agency, taken together, show that the International Atomic Energy Agency's statute provides for a closer relation
between the Agency and the United Nations than that which exists
beween the United Nations and its specialized agencies. The specialized
agencies, having been created by intergovernmental agreements, are in
matter of fact outside the United Nations. Their activity is merely
related to, or coordinated with, the activity of the United Nations. 86
In contrast to the specialized agencies, the author reminds us, the
Agency was placed in a definite relationship to the United Nations from
the outset. This relationship was based, not on Article 63 of the United
Nations Charter (which pertains to special agreements of the type used
by the specialized agencies and the United Nations), but on the provisions of the Agency's own statute. The statute's sixteenth article,
to be sure, requires an agreement between the Agency and the United
Nations concerning Agency reports to the United Nations, and concerning the Agency's consideration of resolutions adopted by various
United Nations organs on the subject of the Agency. But such agreements, as seen from the sixteenth article itself, merely pursue the practical aim of making more precise certain general provisions contained
in the Agency statute.
Further distinctions between the International Atomic Energy
Agency and United Nations specialized agencies can be found in the
Agency's statute which define its relation to the United Nations and
which emphasize that it was created within the framework of the
United Nations.
At the same time, the author points out, the Agency cannot be regarded as an auxiliary organ of the Security Council (such as the
United Nations Disarmament Commission), created in accordance
with Article 29 of the United Nations Charter. Such organs are set
up to ensure the performance by the Security Council of its immediate
functions, which clearly cannot be turned over to a body like the International Atomic Energy Agency. Furthermore, such organs are
created by the Security Council itself, whereas the Agency was created
sa /d. at

126.
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on an intergovernmental basis. Again, the organs created in accordance
with Article 29 of the United Nations Charter are completely subordinated to and exclusively controlled by the Secuity Council, while
the Security Council's control over the Agency is limited to guarding
the security of states and maintaining international peace.
Thus the Soviet scholar concludes that the Agency, in its juridical
position, differs both from a specialized agency and from an organ
created in accordance with Article 29 of the United Nations Charter.
In the author's opinion, the Agency is "a new internatio11al mechanism,
created by intergovernmental agreement, albeit within the framework
of the United Nations, and placed in direct relation to its chief organsthe Security Council and the General Assembly." 87
Turning to the historical background of the International Atomic
Energy Agency, the first step taken by the Soviet Union was to discount the United States' role in creating the Agency. President Eisenhower's proposal of December 8, 1953, to create an international agency
for peaceful uses of atomic energy was ·(and still is) dismissed as a
"face-saving measure," one designed to cover up the Americans' refusal
to outlaw nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the Communists state that
the President's proposal was much more limited in scope than claimed
by the "bourgeois press" which had hailed it as an unprecedented step
in the development of peaceful use of atomic energy. Actually (say
Soviet spokesmen), Eisenhower's plan completely ignored the problem
of removing the threat of atomic' warfare. Providing nierely that a
small portion of atomic materials be set aside for peaceful purposes, the
proposal tacitly assumed that the main mass of these materials would,
as before, be directed toward the production of newer and more destructive nuclear weapons. 88 · This, according to the Russians, was confirmed by American sources themselves; the United States' memorandum of January 11, 1954, and Secretary Dulles' informal paper to
Molotov at Geneva on May I, 1954, explained that the American proposal was merely a "first effort" oil a "modest basis," naturally not
conceived as a ·measure for bringing atomic weapons under control.
Furthermore, it is argued that the United States was in no sense the
initiator of international cooperation in peaceful uses of atomic energy.
The claim is advanced that the Soviet Union had stood for such cooperation long before Eisenhower's proposaJ.89
Ibid.
See Larin, sufwa note 16 at 17.
89 I d. at 18-19. See also the Soviet Aide-Memoire of April 27, 1954; Atoms for
Peace Manual 269-274. The reader of such passages might well conclude that ·the
87

88
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Before completion of the first draft of the International Atomic
Energy Statute in July, 1955, the Soviet government presented anumber of points which it declared should be basic principles of the new
Agency. These points were contained in a pair of memoranda, the
first issued on September 22, 1954 and the second on July 18, 1955. 90
The second (and more important) of these documents, in addition to
certain broad and general suggestions (that the Agency should be
created within the framework of the United Nations, and that it
should encourage the exchange of scientific and technical information,
establish research establishments, and maintain a number of specialists
to assist states receiving help from the agency, etc.) contained some
demands which proved to be sources of great discord in the subsequent
history of the International Atomic Energy Agency. These demands
included the principle that membership in the Agency should be open to
all states, that there should be no privileged status for any state or
group of states in the Agency, and that the Agency should never be
used "for security purposes of any states."
These principles became issues almost immediately. The U.S.S.R.
was not represented among the powers responsible for preparing the
first draft of the International Atomic Energy Agency statute, and
when it received this draft at the end of ]uly, 1955, it criticized the
document for three major reasons. First, no close ties were established
between the Agency and the United Nations. Secondly, it was "undemocratic," in that it gave all power to the Board of Governors, leaving the
Soviet Union stood for an international agreement to prohibit nuclear weapons, but
that the United States would hear of no such thing. The Soviet account fails to
mention other highly pertinent passages in the American documents. Point 4 of the
January II note, for example, states that "The United States is prepared to consider
any proposal that the Soviet Union sees fit to make with reference to atomic, hydrogen
and other weapons of destruction.;' Poi~t 5 goes on: "However, the United States
believes that the first effort should be to proceed on a modest basis which might
engender the trust and confidence necessary for planning of larger scope." Atoms
for Peace Manual 262. In the informal paper of May I, I954, Dulles declared (in
point 3) that "the US cannot concur in the view of the Soviet Union that creation of
an international agency to foster the use of atomic materials for peaceful purposes
would not be useful in itself." In point 5 of the same paper, the American statesman
repeated that "The US proposal of March I9 was, of course, not intended as a substitute for an effective system of control of atomic energy for military purposes. The
US will continue, as heretofore, to seek means of achieving such control under reliable
and adequate safeguards." Atoms for Peace Manual at 274. In contrast to the Soviets,
Yugoslav spokesmen have fre.ely recognized Eisenhower's initiative in international
cooperation for peaceful uses of atomic energy; Damjanovic, "Toward an International
Atomic Agency," VII Review of International Affairs, No. I56 (Oct. I), II (I956).
9o Atoms for Peace Manual 278-28I and Larin, supra note I6 at 2I-22.
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General Conference with merely consultative functions, and it limited
membership in the Agency to states which were members of the United
Nations or its specialized agencies. Thirdly, by failing to define the
dimensions of the budget, the draft statute would impose uncertain
financial obligations on Agency members.
In a memorandum devoted to the draft statute, dated October I, 1955,
the Soviet Union raised the following seven points. The first stressed
the necessity for control provisions ; since the Agency would be dealing with dangerous fissionable materials, and because the production
of atomic energy for military and peaceful purposes was closely connected, it would be necessary to observe and control the 'activity of
the Agency through some representative international organ such as
the United Nations. Secondly, there must be no "privileged groups"
in Agency membership. The statute must be based on recognition of
the principle that no single country or group of countries be accorded
a privileged position. In addition, the Agency's assistance was never
to be made conditional on political, economic, or military considerations,
or on any other considerations which were incompatible with the
"sovereign rights" of states. Third, the statute's provisions dealing
with the Agency's inspection and control powers must be in keeping
with the "sovereign rights" of states receiving assistance from the
Agency. Fourth, any state, regardless of whether or not it was a
member of the United Nations or its specialized agencies, must have
the right to be included among the founders of the International Atomic
Energy Agency. Fifth, the first Board of Governors must include India,
Indonesia, Egypt, and Rumania. Sixth, the statute must provide for
a three-fourths majority vote in both the General Conference and the
Board of Governors for approval of the budget and for establishing
the scale of payments made by individual member-states. Seventh, the
International Court of Justice was to have jurisdiction of cases involving the interpretation or application of the statute's provisions if the
interested parties consented to its jurisdiction. 91
·
By the time of the negotiations for creating the International Atomic
Energy Agency in the fall of 1955, the Soviet position was clear to
everyone. At the tenth session of the United Nations General Assem-:bly, the Soviet delegate ( Kuznetsov) repeated the demand that mem'"
bership in the Agency be open to all. It was "unfair and unjust" that
01 Larin, supra note 16 at 22-23. We shall presently see, in discussing Soviet bilateral
agreements with states outside the Communist bloc, that the Soviet Union was soon
to conclude agreements with Egypt and Indonesia, and was offering aid to India.
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Communist China and the German Democratic Republic had been
excluded from the Geneva conference that summer ; no state should
be barred from international cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic
energy. The inevitable appeal was made for an agreement prohibiting
nuclear weapons. The Soviet delegation submitted a resolution that
the General Assembly : ( 1) call upon all states to continue their efforts
to reach such an agreement; ( 2) call for the creation of an international
agency for peaceful uses of atomic energy within the framework of the
United Nations; (3) call a conference of experts from various governments for joint consideration of problems relating to the drafting of
a statute for the Agency; ( 4) recognize as desirable the periodic
convocation of conferences on exchange of experience in the peaceful
use of atomic energy in various fields (science, industry, agriculture,
health, etc.), and authorizing the General Assembly to take steps for
calling such a conference not later than 1957; and ( 5) decide on an
international publication of works by scientists on problems of peaceful uses of atomic energy by 1956. The Soviet account would lead
orie to believe that all these suggestions originated with the Soviet
delegation and adds that most of them were included in the final text
of the resolution unanimously adopted by the General Assembly on
December 3, 1955. 92
According to the Soviet version, the Washington conference on
drafting the International Atomic Energy Agency statute was subjected, from the outset, to tremendous pressure by the United States.
The Americans gave all to understand that the U. S. policy toward
the Agency would depend on the extent to which American wishes were
followed. 93 The U.S.S.R., supported by Czechoslovakia, India, and
others, posed as a defender of the United Nations against the American
machinations. Upon the insistence of these powers, a provision was
included in the statute requiring the Agency to present reports to the
General Assembly and, in necessary cases, to the Security Council and
other United Nations organs. The Agency was to examine the resolutions of these organs with respect to Agency activities, and was to
submit reports on measures taken by it after consideration of these
resolutions; "thus closer ties were set up between the Agency and the
Larin, supra note 16 at 21·
Larin, supra note 16 at 28-29. Once again, it is interesting to contrast the Soviet
point of view with that of Yugoslav spokesmen who praised the "flexibility shown by
the United States representatives towards the criticism of the attitude formulated in the
original draft statute," which "made it possible· to broaden the platform on which the
Agency would be created." Damjanovic, supra note 89 at 12.
92

93

1434

INTERNATIONAL CONTROL

United Nations." 94 But these powers condemned the limitation of
membership in the Agency to states which are members of the United
Nations or its specialized agencies as "discrimination" contradicting
the very concept of international cooperation in peaceful utilization of
atomic energy. The U.S.S.R. and Czech delegates also attacked a provision in the draft statute which would have enabled the Agency's
organs (the Board of Governors and the General Conference) to determine whether a given state would be capable of carrying out its
obligations according to the United Nations Charter. They also argued
that such powers belong to the United Nations' General Assembly and
that the provision in question would lead to the "absurd result" that
the Agency could pass on whether a particular state, already a member
of the United Nations, could fulfill obligations contained in the United
Nations Charter. According to Soviet reports, although the United
States and othernations "stubbornly defended this provision," a new,
changed formula was finally adopted.
The most controversial problem to arise at the conference concerned
the composition of the Agency's Board of Governors. Here again, the
Soviet delegation came out as a defender of "democracy" and "fair
representation" against the alleged attempts of the Anglo-American
bloc to subvert these principles. First, the Soviets proposed that the
number of members on the Board be increased from sixteen to twentyfour. Secondly, procedures for election to the Board of Governors
should be changed: nine member-states (including the five constant
members of the United Nations Security Council) would be Board
members by virtue of their advanced atomic technology andjor abundance of atomic resources. Fifteen other Board members would be
selected by the General Conference according to geographical dis_.
tribution (three members of American states, three from West Europe,
two from East Europe, three from the Near East and Africa, and
four from Southeast Asia and the Far East). These selections were
to be made on the basis of two principles : (I) the guarantee of representation of members receiving benefits from the Agency, not contributing to it; and ( 2) "the offer of services, equipment, and information enabling the Agency to achieve its aims and fulfill its functions."
The Soviet Union also demanded that Communist China be represented on the Board of Governors. Throughout the conference the
U.S.S.R. maintained that the supreme organ of the International
u• Larin, supra note 16 at JO.
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Atomic Energy Agency should be its General Conference, with decisions binding upon the Board of Governors. 05
The Soviet delegation recognized the danger that fissionable materials obtained from the Agency might be used for military purposes
rather than peaceful ones, but insisted that there should only be as
much control as was "really necessary," and that the "sovereignty" of
member-states should always be "strictly observed." The statute should
therefore provide that the Agency's activities never be made subject·
to conditions of economic, political, or military character-or in any
way "incompatible with the sovereignty" of the recipient state. The
United States-British insistence on strong inspection and control provisions, and their failure to accept the Soviet proposals for weakening
these provisions, were denounced as "a refusal to accept the Soviet
proposals to safeguard the sovereign rights of states making use of
Agency assistance." 96
In budgetary matters the U.S.S.R. sought to guarantee the fulfillment of the Agency's "true function"-assistance of underdeveloped
countries in practical application of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. The U.S.S.R. suggested that all decisions on financial questions
be made by a three-fourths majority vote, rather than two-thirds as
provided in the original draft of the statute. It also proposed that the
maximum contribution of any single state not exceed fifteen percent.
It recommended that the Agency provide nuclear materials to underdeveloped countries at especially low prices, and in some cases entirely
free. The Western powers were censured for rejecting this proposal,
and for insisting that the Agency be given the right to acquire or construct atomic plants, laboratories, and other equipment. According to
Soviet spokesmen, this would require enormous expenses, which would
of necessity fall upon Agency members, even when they considered such
construction and acquisition unnecessary. 97
Representatives of states attending the New York conference which
opened on September 20, 1956, to draft a statute for the International
Atomic Energy Agency were strongly reminded of the Soviet stand
on most of the points raised earlier. Bulganin dispatched a telegram
to the conference, repeating that only with prohibition of atomic and
95Jd. at 31-32. In this instance the Soviet view (on the relation of the Board of
Governors to the General Conference) is supported by Yugoslavia. Arnejc, "Conference
for the International Atomic Agency," 7 Review of International Affairs, No. 155
(Sept.), 9 (1956).
96 Larin, supra note 16 at 33·
97 ld. at 37·
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hydrogen weapons could the most favorable conditions exist for peaceful use of atomic energy. Other familiar problems emerged in the
course of discussions: the participation of the Chinese People's Republic and other Communist states in the Agency, the Agency's general
tasks and aims, membership policy, composition and powers of the
Board of Governors, and the Agency's inspection and control functions.
There was little new in what the Soviet delegates said, but some fresh
arguments were presented in support of their position.
On the question of Communist China's participation the Soviets
have pointed out that such "states" as Monaco and the Vatican were
invited to attend the conference, but the "great Asiatic power, the·
Chinese People's Republic"; yet China's contribution could be a valuable one. Outstanding Chinese scientists were said to be devoting themselves to problems of peaceful utilization of atomic energy. The Soviets
also claimed that considerable deposits of fissionable materials have
been discovered in China and that the Chinese government is giving
a high priority to atomic research. China has a twelve-year plan in
science and technology which envisages the achievement by 1967 of a
level in atomic energy research equal to that of the most advanced
countries. The Soviet Union's position is that the Chinese People's
Republic must sooner or later be admitted into the Agency and that the
present "short-sighted and discriminatory policy" can only harm the
Agency, undermining its influence and authority.
At the conference G. N. Zarubin, the Soviet delegate, declared that
the tasks and aims of the Agency must not be confined to serving the
interests of a narrow group of highly-developed industrial powers;
cooperation in peaceful uses of atomic energy can only be effective under
conditions of equality of all participating states, with strict observance
of their sovereignty and the principles of the United Nations. "In
its foreign policy, the U.S.S.R. always adheres strictly to the principles
of equality and observance of the sovereign rights of all people, great
and small, highly-developed or backward," declared Zarubin (hardly a
mouth before the tragic events which were to take place in Hungary
that year), and he again emphasized that international cooperation in
the peaceful uses of atomic energy could not be truly effective or complete until an international agreement was reached outlawing atomic
and hydrogen weapons and until these weapons were removed from the
arsenals of all states. 88
The American-British insistence on strong inspection and control
88

/d. at 45-47.
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provlSlons was interpreted by the Russian representative as an effort
to acquire control of the atomic industry in other lands. Paragraph D
of the statute's third article was seen as "making sovereignty dependent
upon carrying out the provisions of the Agency statute," 99 constituting
a violation of the United Nations Charter itsel£. 100 The Soviets insisted that a danger lies in the fact that whether or not the statute and
agreements made in accordance with its provisions have been observed
is a question of interpretation. The interpretation may differ widely,
according to who is doing the interpreting, and what considerations
guide the interpretation. One delegate from the Soviet Union claimed
that "there will always be those who are ready to accuse a state of failing to comply with the provisions of the statute or the agreements in
order to use this as a pretext to interfere in the internal affairs of that
state." According to the Soviet view, there are other means which are
quite adequate for bringing pressures to bear on states guilty of violating statute provisions or otherwise failing to carry out their obligations. It was pointed out in this connection that the Agency statute
provides sanctions, including withdrawal of Agency assistance from
offending states, and expulsion of these states from the Agency.
Raising the question of Agency membership anew, the U.S.S.R.
protested the exclusion of "certain states whose sociopolitical structure does not please the \Vestern powers : the German Democratic
Republic, the Mongolian People's Republic, the Korean Popular Democratic Republic and the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam." Claiming
that the United States could offer no justification for its discriminatory
policy, the U.S.S.R. advanced two arguments against the American
position. One was that the wording of the statute's fourth article dealing with membership contradicted the second and third articles. The
second article spoke of the Agency's efforts to attain a broader and
more rapid use of atomic energy for peace, health and welfare throughout the whole world; the third article envisaged the Agency's contributions to scientific research in atomic energy, and practical application
of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, over the entire earth. Such
provisions made the Agency's aims and tasks clear to the Soviets: the
Agency must be a body open to all states desiring to make a contribution
to, or to benefit from international atomic cooperation. In other words,
the Agency must possess. a truly universal character, embracing all
states without exception; In the opinion of the U.S.S.R. the dis99

I d. at 47·

100

The Charter provision in question is point 7 of Article

2.
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criminatory membership terms contained in the fourth article clearly.
contradicted such a universal character. The second Soviet argument
was based on alleged inconsistencies in the American position. The
Soviet representatives stated that originally the United States had no
discriminatory policy. It was pointed out that the United States
memorandum of March 19, 1954, in which basic principles for a treaty
establishing the International Atomic Energy Agency were proposed,
declared that "all states signing the treaty" would be Agency members.101 Furthermore, they alluded to the statement of Secretary Dulles,
at the plenary session of the United Nations General Assembly on
September 23, 1954, emphasizing the fact that the United States had
no intention of excluding any states whatever from participation. 102
It was claimed that it was only in the spring of 1956, at the Washington conference, that the United States "came out against its own idea."
In discussions concerning the composition and powers of the Board
of Governors, the U.S.S.R. upheld the view that the General Conference should be the general policy-making body. The Western insistence that the Board of Governors have sufficient powers to make
frequent decisions on important matters, without constantly being
compelled to turn to the General Conference, was attacked ·on two
grounds. First, it abrogated the principle of the "sovereign equality of
all the Agency's members"-the principle that all interested countries
should participate in deciding fundamental problems of Agency
activity. Secondly, the Western position was not based on considerations of expediency in the sense of making rapid, effectual decisions.
This, to be sure, was the argument of certain Western powers, but in
the Soviet view the real objective was to occupy a dominant position
on the Board of Governors and to make the Board independent of the
General Conference, where "the distribution of forces might sometimes
be unfavorable to the Western powers." 108
The text of this memorandum may be found in Atoms for Peace Manual 266-269.
/d. at 283-285. Secretary Dulles' words were that "I would like to make perfectly
dear that our planning excludes no nation from participation in this great venture. As
our proposals take shape all nations interested in participation and willing to take on the
responsibilities of membership will be welcome to join with us in the planning and execution of this program." The Secretary of State apparently had the U.S.S.R. itself
specifically in mind when he made these remarks, for he points out earlier in the
address that ''to date the Soviet government has shown no willingness to participate
in the implementation of President Eisenhower's plan except on this completely unacceptable condition [a prior agreement outlawing nuclear weapons]. Yesterday when
it was made known that I would speak on this topic today, the Soviet Union broke
a five months' silence by affirming its readiness to talk further. But the note still
gave no indication that the USSR had receded from its negative position."
1oa Larin, supra note 16 at SS-57·
101
1 02
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The Soviet arguments proved somewhat successful on the point because the U.S.S.R. and other opponents of the Western (particularly
American) position were able to secure a number of amendments at
the New York conference which broadened the powers of the General
Conference to a limited extent. 104
The Agency's inspection and control functions were the most severely
criticized by representatives of the Soviet Union who raised a series
of objections and consistently used these provisions for attacking the
United States. The inspection and control provisions contained in
Article XII, first of all, conformed to the terms in the bilateral agreements which the United States had concluded with other countries for
assistance in peaceful uses of atomic energy. The terms of inspection
and control in these bilateral agreements were not merely denounced as
harsh by the Soviets, but they were described as "violations of sovereignty." 105 The United States, however, insisted upon retention of
these provisions in the International Atomic Energy Statute. In essence, the American position at conferences for drafting the statute was
characterized by the Soviets as follows : "If you wish the United
States to make its contribution, do not change these provisions." 106
What were the motives underlying the American insistence on rigid
inspection and control provisions ? According to the Soviet view, the
United States and "certain other Western powers" hope to occupy a
dominant position in the Agency, and once the Agency has acquired
broad powers of inspection and control, the Western bloc will be able
to use these powers for its own ends: to control the development of
atomic industry in lands obtaining assistance from the Agency. The
Soviets charged that the Western bloc further was seeking to place
under Agency control all bilateral agreements for cooperation in peaceful use of atomic energy without exception, and thus to extend its
influence and control to the atomic industries of all lands of the
earth. The United States was alleged to be desirous of using the
Agency's control powers to hinder free development of atomic energy
in other lands, because such development would mean the undermining
of American influence there. Furthermore, Soviet representatives stated
that the United States was attempting to transform the Agency into an
"international policeman," thereby contradicting the entire concept of
/d. at 57·
The correspondence between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. on the question of
inspectors and other controls was published in a special supplement to the Soviet
periodical New Times, No. 42 (Oct. II) (1956).
1o6 Larin, supra note 16 at 6o.
104
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international cooperation in atomic energy development on the basis of
equality and respect of the sovereign rights of states. 107
Soviet spokesmen did not deny the necessity of certain specific security measures in the handling of fissionable materials. They claimed,
however, that the control mechanism which the United States suggested
was worthless. American claims that strict measures were necessary in
the interests of peace and security were denoted as "false and hypocritical." The Soviet delegates stated that if the Western powers were
sincerely interested in such aims, they would support the Soviet proposal for prohibiting the production, storage, and testing of nuclear
weapons and rid humanity of the threat of atomic war. The Soviet
view was that only when such prohibition has been effected will strict
international control be fully justified; thereafter international control
could be extended to all states and could be successfully directed toward
the use of nuclear energy for exclusively peaceful purposes if all existing supplies of nuclear weap~:ms were destroyed.
The Soviets argued that the Agency statute provided no controls
over the United States, Britain, the U.S.S.R., or other states whose
atomic energy development is highly developed because these powers
will not be seeking help from the Agency; on the contrary, they will
be rendering assistance, through the Agency, to other states. Furthermore, they stated that the Agency can have no control, regardless of
strict provisions in its statute, over states possessing adequate technical and material resources for carrying on their own program in
peaceful utilization of atomic energy without help from the Agency.
If such states were to undertake the costs involved, they would be able
to produce nuclear weapons on their own. According to the Soviet
view, those nations which are sufficiently developed technologically to
carry out their own atomic programs could make use of the Agency's
assistance and still manage to evade control by the Agency. 108
The Soviets concluded with the following line of argument. Those
states to whom the control provisions would apply are precisely the
states least likely to produce atomic weapons in the first place; namely,
the weakly-developed backward states whose need for Agency assistance
is the greatest. We are thus confronted with a paradox : those states
having no atomic installations ·or dangerous fissionable materials, and
who need help from the Agency, are expected to submit to inspection
and control at any time and any place. They can literally take no step
101

I d. at 61.
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/d. at 63; the author does not elucidate.
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in the development of their atomic industry without the Agency's knowledge and permission. On the other hand, such states as the United
States, which possess huge supplies of dangerous fissionable materials
and are constantly manufacturing atomic and hydrogen bombs, remain
completely outside the sphere of Agency control.' 09
In view of their conclusion regarding this paradoxical situation, and
because no general agreement has been reached outlawing nuclear
weapons, the Soviet Union felt that the promise of recipient states not
to use Agency-furnished fissionable materials for military purposes,
along with the statute's requirements for accounting and reports, should
prove sufficient safeguards. At the New York conference, however,
the "unnecessary" inspection and control clauses were adopted. The
Soviet proposals, made to "protect the sovereignty of states," found
some reflection, however, in the Agency statute to the extent that
the Agency cannot make its aid contingent upon political, economic,
military, or other conditions which are incompatible with the Agency's
rules, and that the Agency's activities with respect of fulfillment of
control functions must be agreed upon between the Agency and the
recipient states. 110
Despite its dissatisfaction with many provisions of the International
Atomic Energy statute, the Soviet Union was the first great power to
r~tify the statute, "thereby demonstrating once again its desire for
broad international cooperation in promoting peaceful uses of atomic
energy." 111 However, the same familiar issues were immediately raised
by the Soviet Union at the general conference of the International
Atomic Energy Agency in October, 1957. In a telegram to the chairman of the first session, K. Voroshilov (Chairman of the U.S.S.R.
Supreme Soviet Presidium) declared that the Soviet Union attached
great significance to the new international organization and had taken
an· active part in its creation, seeking to "ensure for it the mo~t democratic character possible, and to ensure the broad participation and equal
treatment of all countries participating in its work." He reminded the
conference delegates that the U.S.S.R. had been the first great power
to ratify the Agency's statute. He repeated the plea for an international agreement prohibiting atomic and hydrogen weapons and stressed
that the Soviet Union was ready to conclude such an agreement. "HowId. at 64.
Article III.
111 Larin, "Atoms for Peace and Progress," New Times, No.8 (Feb. 21) 11 (1957).
For decree of U.S.S.R. SuP.reme Soviet Presidium, ratifying the statute, and dated
Feb. 9, 1957, see Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, Mar. 8, 1957, at 163.
109
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ever, the Soviet Union's proposals to prohibit atomic and hydrogen
weapons have unfortunately not met with support from the Western
powers." 112 The U.S.S.R. and Czechoslovakia renewed their efforts
to admit Communist China into the Agency, 113 and the Soviet embassy
in Washington dispatched a note to the U. S. State Department insisting that the "Kuomintang (Nationalist China) has no right to represent China in the International Atomic Energy Agency. The Soviet
Union again reaffirms its position and declares that it does not recognize the legality either of the Kuomintang's signature on the statute
nor the Kuomintang's ratification of this Statute, since it does not
represent China." 114
So far, according to Soviet sources, the tone of the general conference had been "normal" and "business-like." But suddenly an
attempt was made to "poison the atmosphere and bring back the cold
war spirit," when the United States delegation, "for no apparent reason," introduced a resolution questioning the authority of the delegation representing the Hungarian People's Republic. "Of course, the
American delegate was unable to provide any reasonable explanation of
this provocatory resolution." The Soviets also expressed strong disapproval of the American insistence on procedures "which have become standard for the United _Nations and other international organs"
because these procedures blocked a proposal to exclude Nationalist
China and prevent the admission of Communist China intothe Agency.
In general, the United States opposed Soviet proposals, which flowed
from "the principle of the Agency's universality" (the apparent exception from this "universality" was Nationalist China), and the Soviet
"efforts to create a healthy setting for the Agency's practical activity."
The Soviet Union's spirit of cooperation and good will was claimed
to have been shown· in the appointment of the Agency's General Director. Although the U.S.S.R. would have preferred a representative of
a "neutral state" for this post, the U. S. A. "stubbornly insisted" that
Sterling Cole be named director, and the Soviet delegation "refrained
from objecting" to Cole's candidacy. 115
The "bourgeois press" made a great deal of the American offer "to
supply Uranium 235 on a commercial basis." Some Western newspapers went so far as to proclaim the Agency an "enterprise subsidized
11 2
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by America," but all these "fantasies died a quick death" on October 10,
1957, when V. S. Emelianov, the Soviet representative, gave a speech
outlining the U.S.S.R.'s aid program. This program included placing
fifty kilograms of enriched uranium at the disposal of the Agency. 116
While recognizing the importance of supplying the Agency with an
adequate amount of fissionable material, the U.S.S.R. claimed that the
more urgent problem was how to utilize the material. The heart of the
problem lay in training national cadres of scientists and specialists in
underdeveloped countries. Thus a particularly strong impression was
created when the Soviet delegate spoke of the Soviet Union's readiness
to offer Agency member-states assistance in training scientific cadres
in the technology necessary for manufacturing heat-generating elements for reactors. The U.S.S.R. was ready to take fifty or one hundred students from member-states to study in Soviet institutes of higher
learning and to grant fifty scholarships to students from underdeveloped countries. It was moreover prepared to train specialists from
member-states in the use of radioactive isotopes in science, industry,
medicine, and agriculture. It would also be willing to design the atomic
power and experimental projects and installations which were to be
built by the Agency in prospecting for uranium and in mining uranium
deposits. The Soviet account also stated that the American, British
and French delegates made a "general statement that they were prepared to share their own atomic knowledge and experience with the
Agency. Unfortunately, they did not specify any concrete form in
which this aid might be rendered." 117
The specter of American domination was raised again at this time. ·
Far from having any desire to help underdeveloped countries in the
peaceful use of atomic energy, ·the United States (according to the
Soviet account) is interested only in using the Agency to control the
work which scientists of other states are doing in the field. "These
118 Izvestiya, Oct. 18, 1957, p. 4- This report fails to mention Sterling Cole's expressed
hope that the Soviet Union would increase its contribution to the Agency's stocks of
fissionable material. The Soviet contribution was only a hundredth of the pledge made
by President Eisenhower; N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1957, p. II. Here again the Yugoslav
position is worth noting. With reference to Eisenhower's promise of 5,000 kilograms
of urairlum· 235, a Yugoslav writer notes· that this offer "has enabled the Agency to
take -steps for· atomic research and for the realization of energy programs without
. delay." Amejc, "Positive Prospects," 7 Review of International Affairs, No. 158
(Nov.) 9 (1956).
11 7 Izvestiya, Oct. 18, 1957, p. 4· Another statement that the U.S.S.R. regards the
Agency's chief aim to be in creating "national cadres of ·specialists and lOcal production bases in underdeveloped .lands" may be found in a short article by Podkliuchnikov,
Pravda, Oct, 1957, p. 4-
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motives, in particular, explain why the American delegation spent its
whole effort in getting Sterling Cole, former chairman of the U. S.
Congress' joint committee for atomic energy, appointed as the DirectorGeneral of the Agency." It was no accident that the United States had
~<no concrete proposals for rendering aid to underdeveloped countries
through the International Atomic Energy Agency." The "ruling
circles of the United States" want the Agency to be their subservient
organ so that the United States may control every step of the Agency's
members. 118
In April, 1958 Sterling Cole received three letters from L. M. Zamyatin, U.S.S.R. Deputy Permanent Representative to the International
Atomic Energy Agency. The first of the letters contained the information that the Soviet Union would appoint twenty to thirty advisers
and consultants for temporary aid to Agency member-states and that
the Soviet government would bear all expenses connected with the assignments of these specialists, who were to be sent by the Agency to
various countries to assist in setting up national scientific and technical
programs for the peaceful use of atomic energy. The other letters
stated that the U.S.S.R. was prepared to accept forty to forty-five
students in the academic year of 1958-59 for a period of from five to
six years of instruction in basic atomic specialties. The Soviet government would assume the maintenance and tuition oosts for twenty-five of
these students. In addition, the Soviet Union would be willing to
accept fifty scientists and specialists from Agency member-states for
three-to-six-months "refresher courses" with the Soviet government
bearing the expenses of twenty of these specialists. 119
Such have been the views, as presented to the reader of Soviet publications, of the International Atomic Energy Agency, some of the
provisions of its statute, and the role played by various states in the
Agency. These published views appear to bear out a remark made by
John Foster Dulles (in the early stages of negotiations for creating the
Agency) that "negotiations publicly conducted with the Soviet Union
tend to become propaganda contests." 120 American readers will quickly
recognize the extent to which the United States' role in the Agency has
been distorted and may be puzzled by certain inconsistencies in the
Communists' own position. The active Soviet role in international
cooperation for peaceful uses of atomic energy is stressed, and one is
us Podkliuchnikov, supra note II7.
119 Pravda, April 4. 1958, p. S·
120
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repeatedly reminded that the U.S.S.R. was the first major power to
ratify the Agency statute, despite the Soviet Union's originally negative
attitude toward the project of such an Agency. 121 Voroshilov's telegram
in1957 described the U.S.S.R. as a "disinterested member" and claimed
that the Soviet Union was striving for the greatest degree of international cooperation, employing a completely objective and harmonious
approach to the Agency and its operations, yet almost in the next breath
he expressed satisfaction that the Agency's headquarters were in a
"neutral state" (Austria). 122 In bemoaning the election of an American rather than some "representative of a neutral state" to the post of
Director-General, the Soviet press makes it clear that, come what may,
America remains in the "enemy camp." 128
There is more political expediency than logical consistency in the
Soviet view on the Agency's relations to the United Nations. On one
hand, the U.S.S.R. has always insisted that the Agency be within the
framework of the United Nations and strictly accountable to it, and
Soviet jurists have defined the Agency's ties to the United Nations as
considerably closer than those of the specialized agencies to the United
Nations. 124 On the other hand, the Soviets have denounced American
insistence on following United Nations procedures 125 and have insisted
that the statute's membership provisions are discriminatory and unacceptable because they exclude states not members of the United Nations. Whereas the U.S.S.R. at one time called for a strong control
mechanism, with inspectors investigating atomic installations of recipient states, 128 it became satisfied with minimum safeguards, ( excluding inspection or control within the recipient state), ostensibly because
inspection and control provisions make no sense in the absence of an
over-all prohibition of nuclear weapons and because such provisions
would result in violations of the recipient states' sovereignty by the
United States (not the U.S.S.R.).
Early in 1958 the United States proposed international inspection
teams to implement a general agreement to outlaw nuclear weaponsthe very type of agreement which the Soviets have constantly advocated. The American position was that no agreement to outlaw nuSupra notes 89 and 102.
Supra note 112.
12s Izvestiya, Oct. 10, 1957, p. 4·
12• Supra notes 86 and 87.
125 Supra note 115.
120 Dept. of State Press Release No. 527, Oct. 6, 1956, p. 23; see Bechhoefer and
Stein, supra at note 77·
121
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clear weapons could have meaning without concrete implementation
of this type. 127 The initial Soviet response was disappointing, 128 but
U. S. officials later saw hopes that an accord might be reached. 129 It
remains to be seen whether the U.S.S.R. will agree to effective measures implementing a general agreement to ban nuclear weapons, 130 and
how such an agreement will affect the Soviet attitude towards the
International Atomic Energy Agency and other forms of international
cooperation for peaceful use of atomic energy.
D. Bilateral Agreements on the Peaceful Use of Atomic Energy in the
Communist Bloc
Primary sources for studying bilateral agreements pertaining to the
peaceful use of atomic energy within the Communist bloc are meager.
The Soviet press periodically reports such agreements between the
U.S.S.R. and other states, and the Soviet government has published
a number of "joint declarations" concerning its negotiations with other
states for cooperation in peaceful utilization of atomic energy. Passing
references are made to bilateral agreements between other Communist states/ 81 but so far the actual texts of bilateral agreements in
the Communist bloc have not been made public. The testimony of
former citizens of the Communist states who have defected to the West
has provided some additional information not found in Communistbloc publications, but it is apt to be heavily biased and must be read
with caution.
According to some reports, the U.S.S.R. has been furnishing radioactive isotopes to Communist-bloc states since 1951 and was approached
by China with a request for assistance in constructing atomic laboratories in March, 1954. 182 It was not until January, 1955, however,
127 The text of Eisenhower's arms inspection proposal was published in the N.Y.
Times, April 8, I958, p. IO. For concrete data on the proposed inspection teams, see
N.Y. Times, April I6, 1958, p. 9·
12s The text of Khrushchev's reply was published in Pravda and lzvestiya, April
24, I9s8, p. 2.
129 N.Y. Times, May 12, I958, p. I; June 3, 1958, p. I and June 10, I958, p. I.
130 It has been suggested that the Soviet Union would enjoy important strategic
advantages if all nations stopped testing nuclear weapons without guarantees of real
world-wide disarmament; Kissinger, "Missiles and the Western Alliance," 36 Foreign
Affairs, No. 3 (April) 383-401 (I958) and Sulzberger, "Nuclear Tests and Soviet
Strategy,'' N.Y. Times, April 9, 1958, p. 32.
131 See, for example, Wspolpraca ze wszystskimi narodami, I Polska, No. 41, 6-7
(1958) and N.Y. Times, June 2, 1958, p. 10, for references to bilateral agreements
between Poland and Yugoslavia and Poland and East Germany.
182 Huber, supra note 75 at 4I.
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that the Soviet Union embarked on a vast program of extending scientific, technical, and industrial aid to other states for the establishment
of "experimental scientific centers to develop atomic energy for peaceful purposes." In the original announcement of this program, 183 the
Soviet government promised five states-China, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and East Germany-that it would aid them in designing and supplying equipment for the construction of "experimental
atomic piles," with a capacity of up to five thousand kilowatts, and for
the. construction of accelerators of elementary particles.m The U.S.S.R.
was to furnish these five countries with necessary quantities of fissionable materials for their atomic piles and scientific research work. Means
of extending the number of countries to be aided were considered.
Recipient states were to supply "appropriate raw materials" to the
U.S.S.R. in return for Soviet aid.
This program was inaugurated very rapidly. At the beginning of
March, 1955 a Czech government committee for research and use of
atomic energy for peaceful purposes met to discuss problems of carrying out the Soviet proposals. 185 By early June bilateral agreements had
been drafted and signed with the five states named in the original
Council of Ministers announcement, and similar aid was promised to
Hungary and Bulgaria in the near future. 136 Agreements to aid
·Hungary and Bulgaria were reported a week later. 187
·
Although the texts of these bilateral agreements have not been
published, their main features have been summarized in the Soviet
press. 188 The Soviet Union was to supply the other states with experimental reactors and accelerators designed in the U.S.S.R. and to provide free scientific and technical documentation concerning them, as
well as assigning Soviet specialists to aid in assembling and placing
tsa This announcement appeared on the front page of both Pravda and lzvestiya on
Jan. 18, 1955, the day after its issuance by the Council of Ministers.
134 Some revision in these figures was supplied in a report in Pravda, Aug. 29, 1955,
which stated that Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Hungary and the German Democratic Republic would have reactors with a capacity of 2000 kilowatts and cyclotrons
with up to 25 million electron volts of energy. China, on the other hand, was to acquire a
similar ·cyclotron, but a reactor of 6500 kilowatts thermal capacity. A United Press
dispatch from Tokyo on Mar. 7, 1958, announced the completiton of a 7000 kilowatt
reactor "with Soviet assistance."
·
ts5 Pravda, Mar. 12, 1955, p. 2.
tso Pravda, April 30, 1955, p. 2.
taT Pravda, June 15, 1955, p. 2.
t3s Pavda, April 30, 1955, p. 2. This issue summarized the· agreements with China,
Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rutpania, and East Germany, stating that similar agreements
would be concluded with Hungary and Bulgaria.
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them in operation. The Soviet Union was to make available to these
states the necessary amount of fissionable and other materials, and the
U.S.S.R. was to deliver necessary amounts of radioactive isotopes until
the experimental reactors went into operation. The agreements further
declared that scientists and engineers from these states would receive
training in the Soviet Union in nuclear physics, radiochemistry, use
of isotopes, and reactor technology.
·
By mid-July of 1955, top-ranking scientists of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany were referring gratefully to the atomic
"assistance agreements" between their states and the U.S.S.R., and
it was reported that Poland and Czechoslovakia were reorganizing
their over-all atomic energy programs (combining existing laboratories
into single research institutes and establishing national committees to
coordinate their research efforts) in order to take full advantage of
Soviet aid. 189
A Soviet-Yugoslav protocol on economic and scientific-technical cooperation was signed in Moscow on September I, 1955. On January 28,
1956, a Soviet-Yugoslav Agreement on Cooperation in the Use of
Atomic Energy for Peaceful Purposes was signed in Belgrade. 140 This
agreement provided for "general cooperation and experimental exchange in the field of atomic energy" and for Soviet scientific and
technical aid in constructing a reactor for Yugoslavia. The type of
reactor was to be based on the Yugoslav program and specifications. The
Soviet Union promised to supply the equipment and nuclear fuel necessary to ensure the uninterrupted operation of the reactor. Prices for
materials and nuclear fuel were to be set according to "prices in the
world market." In addition to the agreement itself, supplementary protocols setting forth "technical and commercial details" were to be
signed. 141
1ao See New Times, No. 30 (July 21) 13-14 (1955).
140 Pravda, Jan. 29, 1956, p. 6. According to Huber, this agreement would have been
concluded in 1955, but Yugoslavia was bound under an agreement with the World Bank
not to accept new credits until the end of 1955; Huber, supra note 75 at 53.
141 Talks were held in Belgrade during practically the entire month of May, 1956, to
"implement" the January agreement; Izvestiya, May 27, 1956, p. 3. The Soviet press
reported early in 1957, in a very brief communique, that a new protocol to the agreement
of Jan. 28, 1956, had been signed, providing for further cooperation between Soviet and
Yugoslav organizations and scientific institutes in the field of nuclear physics research
and use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. In the words of the communique,
"the negotiations took place in a spirit of mutual understanding and desire to cooperate
further in this field" ; lzvestiya, Feb. 13, 1957, p. 12. A United Press dispatch of April
30, 1958, quoted Tanjug, the official Yugoslav news agency, to the effect that Yugoslav
scientists had successfully tested a nuclear reactor and that the reactor would go into
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In 1956 the Joint Nuclear Research Institute was also organized.
The Institute has figured prominently in some of the later "joint declarations" between the Soviet Union and individual Communist states.
Four states which are members of the Institute (Albania, 142 North
Korea, Viet Nam, and Mongolia) have not yet concluded bilateral
agreements with the U.S.S.R. A possible explanation is that these
states lack the necessary technical personnel.
An agreement between the Soviet Union and Egypt for cooperation
in the peaceful use of atomic energy was signed in Cairo on July 12,
1956. Its terms appear to be very similar to those of the bilaterals concluded between the U.S.S.R. and states in the Communist bloc. 143
Later in July a "statement of the results of negotiations between
government delegations of the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic" reported a new· bilateral agreement. The statement
limited itself to a description of the benefits which East Germany was
to enjoy under the agreement; no terms favorable to the U.S.S.R. (for
example, shipment of East German uranium ore to the Soviet Union)
were listed. The U.S.S.R. was to assist in designing an East German
atomic power plant with a capacity of up to 100,000 kilowatts, and
the Soviet government undertook to supply the German Democratic
Republic with the necessary equipment and materials. 1" .
In a general agreement between the U.S.S.R. and Indonesia, signed
on September 15, 1956, the parties agreed, inter alia, to cooperate in
operation in early May, 1958. It remains to be seen what effect the ideological conflict
between Yugoslavia and the U.S.S.R. which was resumed in 1958, will have on Soviet
atomic assistance to Yugoslavia.
14 2 The Joint Soviet-Albanian Declaration of April 17, I9S7, contains a single sentence on the subject: "The parties have discussed cooperation in peaceful uses of
atomic energy"; New Tintes No. 17 (April 2S) 38 (I9S7).
143 Pravda, July IS, 19S6, p. s.
144 Pravda, July 18, I9S6, p. 4· A joint statement over the signatures of Bulganin
and Grotewohl in January, 1957, restricted itself to remarks on the desirability of a
"general European organization for the peaceful application of atomic energy, which
both parties ardently support," and concluding that "utilization of .atomic energy for
peaceful purposes would bring the European working people higher living standards."
New Tintes, No. 3 (Jan. 17) 36 (I9S7). For a description of the administration of
East Germany's atomic energy program, see Huber, supra note 7S at 44-46. Pravda
for Mar. IS, I9S7, p. 6, reported negotiations between Soviet and East German delegations on payments for the products of the Wismuth Aktiengesellschaft (a Soviet-controlled corporation which administers uranium mining in East Germany), but the
report was couched in such general terms that it adds nothing to our knowledge of
Soviet-East German relations in the atomic energy field. Construction on East Germany's first atomic power station started on October 8, I9S7- New Times, No. 42 (Oct.
17) 32 (19S7).
.
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peaceful uses of atomic energy, particularly in the use of radioactive
isotopes in medicine, science, and technology, and in the training of
Indonesian specialists in the use of atomic energy. 145
Shortly after the Polish unrest and th"e Hungarian uprising of late
1956, a series of "joint declarations" between the U.S.S.R. and other
Communist states were published. Some analysts believe that the Soviet
Union was induced by the events in Poland and Hungary to make
concessions (including concessions in the field of atomic energy) which
were reflected in these declarations. 148 The declarations were extremely broad in scope, and several of them touched upon the question
of cooperation in peaceful uses of atomic energy. Those involving
Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Hungary deserve particular attention.
In the Joint Soviet-Czechoslovak Declaration of January 29, 1957,
the two governments agreed that the Czechoslovak Republic would continue to supply uranium ore to the Soviet Union. The declaration -emphasized that Czech uranium, ore was being sold to the U.S.S.R. at a
"fair and mutually-advantageous price which makes possible the continued development of mining and refining of this raw material." The
Soviet. Union undertook to provide Czechoslovakia with the necessary
assistance for the construction of an atomic power plant and a nuclear
physics institute. It promised close cooperation with Czechoslovakia in
problems of peaceful application of atomic energy. The declaration
concluded with references to the two countries' active partin the work
of the Joint Nuclear Research Institute. 147 It contained one other important statement which will be discussed later in a different context.
ua Izvestiya, Sept. 18, 1956, p. 1. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1958, p. 53, for Indonesian
plans to earmark special funds to finance the Soviet aid program.
148 According to Soviet sources themselves, these bilateral talks were based on a
Soviet government declaration issued on Oi:tober 30, 1956, "On the Principles of Development and Further Strengthening of Friendship and Cooperation between the
Soviet Union and Other Socialist States"; Pravda, July 14, 1957, p. s.
147 New Times, No. 6 (Feb. 7) 42 (1957). The Czech government committee for
research and use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes met early in March, 1955, to
discuss problems concerning the Soviet government's proposal to grant Czechoslovakia
scientific, technical and production assistance in setting up scientific bases for developing research in nuclear physics and the peaceful use of atomic energy; Pravda,
Mar. 12, 1955, p. J. A national committee for the study of peaceful uses of atomic
energy was established shortly afterwards, to "coordinate research effort," and it was
hoped that the Soviet-built reactor and cyclotron would be in operation before the end
of 1956; New Times, No. JO (July 21) 14 ( 1955). (According to later reports, the
first Czech atomic reactor started operations on Sept. 25, 1957; Pravda, Sept. 26. 1957,
p. J). According to a former member of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Prague, a
Czech-Soviet treaty was concluded in 1945 (but kept secret until late in 1947) in
which Czechoslovakia agreed to deliver its entire stock •11 uranium ore, and its
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In respect to the declaration on negotiations between the governments of the U.S.S.R. and Bulgaria, it was announced that "together
with the other Socialist countries, Bulgaria will take an active part in
the work of the Joint Nuclear Research Institute, both in theoretical
research and experimentation." It was further agreed that the Bulgarian People's Republic would continue to supply the Soviet Union
with uranium ore "at a fair and mutually advantageous price that will
enable the further development of the mining of uranium ore." 148
Bulganin and Kadar signed a "Declaration of the Governments of
the Soviet Union and Hungarian People's Republic" on March 28, 1957.
This declaration listed four points of cooperation between the U.S.S.R.
and Hungary in the peaceful utilization of atomic energy. First, both
states would continue to participate in the work of the Joint Nuclear
Research Institute. Second, the Soviet Union would continue to render
Hungary economic and technical assistance in the geological survey of
uranium deposits and to supply equipment and instruments. · Third,
the U.S.S.R. would aid Hungary in constructing atomic power plants
and in obtaining fissionable material necessary for their operation.
Fourth, after "reorganization of the mining of uranium ore," Hungary
would sell the Soviet Union surplus ore "not required by her own economy" at a "fair and mutually advantageous price." us
entire production thueof, to the Soviet Union. Mining and shipping of uranium were
to be under Soviet direction. The terms of payment were left undefined, the treaty
stating simply that Soviet payments would be based on "expenses incurred in mining
the ore." Since vast quantities of ore were already on the surface, in pit heaps, these
"expenses" amounted to very little. It would have been far more to Czechoslovakia's
advantage to sell the ore at world market prices. The Czechs were obliged to supply
eapital for new investments, which were made on an enormous scale. The Soviet demands became so "cynical and ruthless," however, that finally the Czech Communist
premier (Gottwald) had to dispatch an envoy to Moscow to try to negotiate more
favorable terms. The Russians finally consented to appraise the pit heaps on the basis
of the market price of uranium and to refund investments financed by Czechoslovakia.
Kasparek, "Soviet Russia and Czechoslovakia's Uranium," 10 Russian Review, No. 4
(Oct.) 97-105 (1951).
148 New Times, No. 9 (Feb. 28) 37 (1957). Bulgaria's copper, mica and important
uranium mines are operated by Gorubso, a joint Soviet-Bulgarian corporation; Levitsky,
"The Soviet Union and Satellite Uranium," IV Bulletin of the Institute for the Study
of the U.S.S.R., No. 2 (Feb.) 39 (1957).
149 New Times, No. 14 (Apr. 14) Supplement, p. 8 (1957). The formation of an
"All-Hungarian Atomic Energy Committee" was reported in early 1956; Pravda,
Jan. 22, 1956, p. 5· But all was apparently not well. The Hungarian scientist Lajos
Janosi (the same Lajos Janosi whose enthusiastic approval of locating the Joint
Nuclear Research Institute was cited earlier in this paper) reportedly complained in
November, 1956, that the ~oviet authorities had zealously guarded everything connected with uranium and had kept the Hungarian experts-including himself (he was
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The Soviet Union's joint declarations with Poland and Rumania
contained no clauses on cooperation in peaceful utilization of atomic
energy although both those countries are known to possess uranium
deposits. It has been reported that Gomulka brought up the question of
Polish uranium mines when in Moscow in late 1956, and Poland may
have ~eceived Soviet agreement on a similar arrangement to that which
the U.S.S.R. has worked out with Czechoslovakia and East Germany. 150
But the Joint Statement on Soviet-Polish Talks, signed by Khrushchev,
Bulganin, Gomulka, and Cyrankiewicz in Moscow on November 18,
1956, made no mention of atomic energy. 151 The Soviet press reported
that a reactor was commissioned in Rumania in early August of 1957,152
but little else is known about Rumanian-Soviet relations in this area. According to one source, Soviet geologists discovered important uranium
deposits in Rumania several years ago and established a corporation
(Sovromquartz) in charge of uranium mining and export. This same
source cites a Soviet-Rumanian agreement of October 22, 1956, under
which the Rumanians acquired the right to buy up the Soviet share in
this corporation "under advantageous conditions." 158 G. Ionescu, an
anti-communist Rumanian economist, claims that Sovromquartz was
working exclusively on Soviet army requirements and not on peaceful
uses of atomic energy.m Nothing pertaining to peaceful uses of
atomic energy was to be found in the Statement on Soviet-Rumanian
Negotiations signed by Bulganin and Stoica on December 3, 1956.185
Vice-Chairman of the "All-Hungarian Atomic Energy Committee")---<:ompletely in
the dark; See Stolte, "Moscow's Current Hungarian Policy," IV Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the U.S.S.R., No.7 (July) 27 (1957) and sources therein cited.
A former Soviet economist has summarized the role which the issue of Hungarian
uraruum-mine control played in that country's tragic uprising in 1956. He reports
that the uranium mines had been controlled by the Soviet Union since the end of the
second World War, in accordance with a secret treaty which gave the U.S.S.R. the
exclusive rights to Hungarian uranium for twenty-five years without compensation.
When the Hungarian revolt broke out, the revolutionaries demanded that the terms
of the secret agreement be made public and that the mines be returned to Hungary
Failing this, they threatened to seize the mines by force, and as the revolution progressed the mines were so badly damaged that Hungarian uranium production came
to a standstill. In early 1957, Kadar announced that the Soviet-Hungarian uranium
agreement would be 'reexamined"; Levitsky, supra oote 148 at 4o-41, and sources
therein cited. The declaration we have quoted followed soon thereafter.
uo Levitsky, supra note 148 at 40.
151 New Times, No. 48 (Nov. :zz) 37-40 (1956).
m New Times. No. 32 (Aug. 8) 5 (1957)
t5s Levitsky, supra note 148 at 40·
1 s• See C retzianu ( ed.) Captive Rumania 93 ( 1956).
'"' Nt·w Times, No. 50 (Oec. 6) Documents, pp. 1-4 (1956).
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An agreement for Soviet assistance to Poland in the peaceful uses
of atomic energy was signed on January 22, 1958. The account of
negotiations preceding the agreement discloses that both sides "discussed" a number of problems of technical assistance, including: the
construction and equipping of a second experimental reactor in Poland;
the design and construction of Poland's first atomic-powered electric
plant; problems of uranium prospecting, mining and processing; the
organization of Polish production of equipment and apparatus necessary for experimental work and equipment of nuclear physics and
chemistry laboratories; further development of research and preparation
of specialist cadres for peaceful utilization of atomic energy; and the
organization of work in radiology. Technical assistance was to be carried out by: transmission of specialized literature and technical documents; delivery of special materials and equipment for nuclear physics
and chemistry laboratories and also of equipment and apparatus which
could not be produced by Polish industry; the assignment of Soviet
specialists to Poland for advising and consulting; the training of Polish
specialists in technology and production methods in the Soviet Union;
education of Polish students in Soviet institutions of higher learning;
and the assignment of teachers from Soviet institutions of higher learning to Poland for lecturing and consultation. The Soviet technical assistance to Poland was to be paid for according to the terms of a trade
agreement which had been concluded earlier between the two countries. 158
The Polish delegation visited the Joint Nuclear Research Institute after
the signing of the agreement, and V. Billig (the head of the Polish
delegation) declared there that this new agreement, along with Polish
participation in the Institute "in which the number of Polish associates
is increasing," gave Poland a "firm basis for further successful solu..:
tion of our problems in the field of peaceful utilization of atomic
energy." 157
As in other areas of international cooperation in the peaceful uses
of atomic energy, Soviet writers have contrasted the activities of the
U.S.S.R. and the Western powers in the field of atomic bilateral agreements. The American and British agreements with other lands have
been denounced as "incompatible with the principles of sovereignty and
15 6 Pravda, Jan. 23, 1958, p. 4. Poland's first nuclear reactor went into operation on
June 14, 19s8. It will be used in research work in medicine, physics, chemistry and
biology and will produce isotopes of iodine, gold, coal and cobalt. Most of the equipment
was purchased from the U.S.S.R., but Poles did most of the assembly work. The
Poles report plans for another, larger nuclear plant which they hope to build themselves. N.Y. Times, June 16·, 1958, p. 9·
15 7 Pravda, Jan. 28, 1958, p. 6.
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equality of states' rights"; the "ruling circles of imperialist states,"
writes one Soviet jurist, "seek to use such bilateral agreements to dictate
their will to the other contracting parties, to seize sources of atomic
raw-material and to interfere in the internal affairs of those states. The
aid which the Soviet Union, on the other hand, is rendering through
its bilateral agreements is in full harmony with the principles of the
United Nations Charter, being based on complete equality of rights
between states. It is not accompanied by any political, economic or military conditions whatsoever which would in any degree affect the independence of states." tss The jurist also emphasized that although it
had cost the U.S.S.R. vast sums to develop and construct atomic reactors and accelerators, the necessary scientific and technical documentation and experience was furnished other lands free of charge. The
aided countries pay only the actual costs of making the equipment which
is to be delivered to them. m
We are handicapped through our lack of the texts of the bilateral
agreements. Although they are said to be "in full harmony with the
principles of the United Nations," they have not yet been registered
with the United Nations. It appears beyond question, however, that the
agreements serve important political and diplomatic purposes. The timing of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers' first announcement on the
atomic aid program, for example, is highly significant. This announcement, described earlier, was published on January 18, 1955, at the very
moment when a United Nations consultative committee was meeting in
New York to prepare for the International Conference on Peaceful
Uses of Atomic Energy. On the day following the Council of Ministers'
announcement, Pravda carried a front-page editorial contrasting the
"two policies and two paths" followed by the Soviet Union and the West
in using atomic energy. The editorial repeated some of the Soviet
views on Eisenhower's proposal of December, 1953, which were discussed in connection with the International Atomic Energy Agency,
and then added :
It must be clear to everyone that two policies and two paths
arose long ago concerning the use of atomic energy. The
us See Malinin, supra note 16 at 122-123, referring to U.S. treaties (with Turkey,
South Korea and Latin American states) and the British treaty with Germany. A
particularly violent attack on U.S. bilateral agreements with other states was made in
connection with the U.S.-Swiss agreement of June 21, 1956. In an article appearing in
Izvestiya. Sept. 4, 1956, p. 4, it was claimed that the terms of this treaty gave the
United States the right to control the activity of all Swiss scientific institutes and enterprises which were to receive American. supplies and information.
tse Larin, s11pra note 16 at 8.
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Soviet Union is struggling consistently to free mankind forever from the danger of war and to pave the way for the
most extensive peaceful use of atomic energy. In contrast to
the American government, which prefers to make verbal statements on the peaceful use of atomic energy and in practice to
prepare for atomic war, the Soviet government is furthering
by concrete practical measures the use of atomic energy for
peaceful purposes.
Subsequent events have made it difficult to agree with this important
editorial. It seems more likely that the Soviet Union, far from feeling
genuine contempt for America's ''verbal statements" on the peaceful
uses of atomic energy, had become alarmed at the progress of the
American aid program and negotiations for creating the International
Atomic Energy Agency. It may have felt impelled to· launch its atomic
aid program and to include as many states in this program as possible
before the American aid program had progressed further and the International Atomic Energy Agency could start operations. Bilateral
agreements with Communist states were quickly concluded. The Joint
Nuclear Research Institute was created. Atomic aid treaties were made
with the important "uncommitted" countries of Egypt and Indonesia.
Libya and Sweden received Soviet offers of assistance. An offer was
made to India, but that state concluded a treaty with Great Britain three
weeks after the Soviet offer. 160 According to E. P. Slavskii, then Director of the Chief Atomic Administration of the U.S.S.R., an agreement
could have been reached between the Soviet Union and Switzerland
"had the latter referred this question to us." 181
The political and diplomatic aspects of atomic energy negotiations and
agreements were likewise apparent in the various "joint declarations"
made in late 1956 and early 1957. Cooperation in peaceful use of atomic
energy was merely one of many points covered in these declarations.
All of them stressed the solidarity and "everlasting friendship" of states
in the "socialist camp"; they uniformly condemned the United States
and Western "warmongers" and went to great lengths to justify Soviet
actions during the revolt in Hungary.
The U.S.S.R. has constantly emphasized the peaceful purposes of its
atomic aid program. Some observers, however, might wonder whether
the Soviet aid program has exclusively peaceful uses of atomic energy
in mind. Two days after announcing the atomic aid program, the
180
1e1

Huber, supra note 75 at 55-56.
Pravda, Sept. 7, 1956, p. 2.
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Soviet press explained why the U.S.S.R. had been engaged in producing
atomic and hydrogen bombs :
Although the Soviet Union has had to produce atomic and
hydrogen weapons in order to defend the peaceful life and
labor of its peoples, Soviet scientists and engineers have been
working persistently and purposefully to utilize atomic energy
for peaceful purposes. 162
Some of the raw materials for these bombs doubtless comes to the
U.S.S.R. from states with which it has concluded pacts for cooperation
in the "peaceful" uses of atomic energy. In the words of the Joint
Soviet-Czechoslovak declaration of January 29, 1957:
The parties declare that the Czechoslovak uranium ore is being
sold to the Soviet Union at a fair and mutually-advantageous
price which makes possible the continued development of mining and refining of this raw material. But it is not only a
matter of economic adva.ntage. The Czechoslovak people fully
realize that in the hands of the Soviet Union nuclear energy
is a powerful instrument of the peace and security of nations
against the atomic threats and frrovocations of the international forces of aggression. 168
Such a declaration as this adds new significance to the Soviet program of atomic. assistance to other countries, at least those countries
which are loyal "satellites" within the Communist bloc. From the
"joint declarations" on this program, and from the little that has been
published concerning the bilateral agreements which implement it, one
can say that it embraces frankly political and diplomatic aims, as well as
economic and technological ones. The Joint Soviet-Czech declaration
appears quite clearly to show that the Soviet aid program for "peaceful"
use of atomic energy has important military objectives as well.
102

Pravda, Jan. 19, 1955, p.

I.

1ea See supra note 147. Emphasis added.

Appendix A
ITEM 1
BRIEF SUMMARY OF NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL
ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
1.

First Phase of Diplomatic Correspondence Between the
United States and the Soviet Union

The first outline of a statute for an agency of the kind envisaged in
President Eisenhower's proposal of December 8, 1953, was contained in
a United States Department of State memorandum handed to Soviet
Ambassador Zarubin on March 19, 1954. This memorandum is the first
in a series of six documents representing the first phase of the correspondence between the United States and the Soviet Union, covering the period
from March 19 to September 23, 1954. For the text of these documents
see Atoms for Peace Manual, note 5 supra at 266-283; also U. N. General
Assembly Off. Rec., 9th Session (1954), Annexes, Agenda Item 67, p. 4
(Doc. A/2738). The outline already contained many features of the
Agency in its present form. In its reply the Soviet Union claimed that the
United States memorandum evaded the problem of nuclear weapons and
would tend to intensify the atomic armament race. Soviet Union AideMemoire of April 27, 1954, in Atoms for Peace Manual, note 5 supra,
26g at 271-272. Later on, however, the Soviet Union indicated its willingness to separate the issues of disarmament and peaceful uses of atomic
energy. Soviet Union Aide-Memoire of September 22, 1954, id. at 278
et seq.
2.

Negotiations of Eight States

Ambassador Morehead Patterson, U. S. representative in the original
negotiating group consisting of Australia, Belgium, Canada, France,
Portugal, the Union of South Africa, the United States, and the United
Kingdom, describes the development that followed the discussion in the
9th General Assembly in the fall of 1954: "The United States prepared
a first draft of the Statute taking into consideration suggestions received
from other negotiating States and also from the United Nations General
Assembly debates. This draft was then submitted to the negotiating States
on March 29, 195'5. During April and May the United States discussed
this draft with all the negotiating States and also received further comments from interested agencies of the United States Government which
had not participated in the original drafting.
"After a thorough discussion, it developed that there was sufficient
1457
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unanimity among all negotiating states so that substantially all of the suggested changes could be reconciled and incorporated into a new draft of
the Statute. This new draft was transmitted to the Soviet Union on a
confidential basis on July 29, 1955, and its comments were requested. It
was distributed by the United States on behalf of the negotiating States,
also on a confidential basis, to all eighty-four States Members of the United
Nations or of the specialized .agencies on August 22, 1955. Comments on
the Statute were requested from all States." Report of Ambassador Morehead Patterson, 34 Dept. of. State Bul. 5 at 6 ( 1956).

J; Discussion in the Ninth General Assembly
The question of th~ Agency came up for the first time for general international discussion in the 9th General Assembly. (See U. N. General Assembly Off. Rec., 9th Session (1954), Plenary Meetings, A/PV. 475, p. 17
at 25, A/PV. 478, p. 63 at 66, A/PV. 503, p. 339 at 339-349; First Com,.
mittee, A./C. 1jSR. 707-725, pp. 289-387, Annexes, Agenda Item 67.) The
debates there led to the unanimous adoption of a draft resolution which
referred to " . . . negotiations . . . in progress . . . for the· establishment
of an International Atomic Energy Agency . . .," expressed the hope that
" . . . the International Agency will. be established without delay .. .,"
and suggested .that ". . .. once the Agency is established, .it negotiate an
appropriate form of agreement with the United Nations .. .," and that
t• • • • Members of the United Nations be informed as progress is achieved
in the establishment of the Agency and that the views of members
which have manifested their interest be fully considered. . . ." Resolution
81o(IX), Document AjResolution/230, in U. N. General Assembly Off.
Rec., 9th Session (1954). Annexes, Agenda Item 67, pp. 24-25. For the
report of the First Committee, see id. at 22-23...

4· Second Phase of Dipiomatic Correspondence Between the
United States and the Soviet Union
In the second series of notes (Department o! State Press Release
No. 527, Oct. 6, 1956, containing fifteen notes exchanged between Nov. 3,
1954 and Jan. 27, 1956) the Soviet Union demanded that the Agency be
closely connected with the United Nations (in particular the Security
Council) and that no member should have a "privileged position" within
the Agency.
The United States, in a note of April 14, 1955 (id. at 8, 9), expressed
its willingness to consider these comments and made clear that it kept the
door open for the Soviet Union to join the negotiating group. It stated,
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however, its intention in the meantime to carry on the negotiations regardless of Soviet participation. The United States furthermore submitted an
agenda for a joint discussion by experts of both countries on safeguards
against diversion of fissionable materials.
The U.S. S. R., on July 18, 1955 (id. at II-13), declared its readiness
to participate in the negotiations and agreed to deposit so kilograms of
fissionable materials with the Agency as soon as agreement on the creation
of the Agency has been reached. Again it referred to principles which it
considered basic, among them the participation of all nations (obviously
designed to bring in Red China) in the Agency with no privileged position
for any s~te. The joint study of safeguards should take place after the
completion of the scientific conference in Geneva scheduled for the summer
of 1955.
In its answer of July 29, 1955 (id. at 14-15), the United States transmitted the draft statute worked out by the eight-power negotiating group
(note 14 supra), which was identical with the draft distributed on August
22, 1955 to all members of the United Nations and of the specialized
agencies, except for two minor changes. Later on the United States and
U. S. S. R. agreed on the conference of experts on the safeguards to
'include experts from Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, and the United
Kingdom. On Oct. 1, 1955 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet
Union wrote to the American Embassy (id. at 22-24) that the eight-power
draft could, with certain amendments, serve as a basis for drawing up
the charter of an atomic energy agency. The permanent members of the
'Security Council should become permanent members of the Agency's Board
of Governors. There should be a strong control mechanism, with inspectors
investigating atomic installations of countries receiving aid under provisions
which should give "due regard to the sovereign rights of the states.'' India,
I11donesia, Egypt, and Rumania should be added to an increased first Board
of Governors. A -! majority in the Board and the General Conference
should be necessary for financial decisions. In conformity with the eightpower draft, these Soviet proposals now envisaged the Agency acting not
only as a clearing house but also as a "bank" for fissionable materials. The
International Court of Justice should not have compulsory jurisdiction over
disputes arising from the application of the statute. After the discussion
of the Agency in the 10th General Assembly (see infra), the exchange was
continued in a United States note of Jan. 27, 1956 (id. at 25) suggesting
further discussions at a twelve nation working group meeting scheduled
for Feb. 27, 1956.
The remaining portion of the exchange between the United States and
the U.S. S. R. is concerned with the problem of safeguards, in particular
the possible extension of safeguards to existing international arrangements
(see note 77 supra).
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5. Discussion in the Tenth General Assembly
The main points of discussion in the 1oth General Assembly of the
United Nations were the relationship between the Agency on one hand
and the United Nations and its specialized agencies on the other; fair
representation of states, both in regard to the negotiations on the statute
and in the mode of selection and voting of the Board of Governors; universality of membership; and the relationship of the Agency to regional
or bilateral programs outside the Agency. See U. N. General Assembly
Off. Rec., 10th Session (1955), First Committee, A/C. I/SR. 757-772,
pp. 5-93· A resolution was adopted unanimously [Resolution 912 (X)
Document A/JII6, in U. N. General Assembly Off. Rec., 10th Session,
Supp. 19 (A/3116), pp. 4-5,] welcoming the intention of the nations sponsoring the draft statute of the Agency to invite all members of the United
Nations and its specialized agencies to a conference on the final text of
the statute ; welcoming the invitations extended to Brazil, Czechoslovakia,
India, and the U. S. S. R. to join the sponsors; recommending that the
sponsors take into account the views expressed by the Agency during the
debates in the United Nations and the comments made directly to the sponsors ; recommending that measures be taken to establish the Agency without
delay ; and requesting that the Secretary General in consultation with his
Advisory Committee study the question of the Agency's relationship to the
United Nations and transmit the results of this study to the sponsors before
the conference.

6. Negotiations of the Twelve States
A working group consisting of representatives of the original eight
negotiating powers and of the representatives of Brazil, Czechoslovakia;
India, and the U. S. S. R. met in Washington from Feb. 27 to April 18,
1956, for further discussion of the draft statute. The report of the working
level meeting dated July 2, 1956, reads (in part) : " . . . [T]he Group
reviewed each article of the Statute, together with the proposed amendments, taking into account the comments advanced during the proceedings
of the tenth regular session of the United Nations General Assembly as
well as those of the thirty-nine States which submitted observations on the
Statute in response to a request made by the initial Negotiating Group in
August 1955 to all States Members of the United Nations and its Specialized Agencies . . . . At the final plenary session on April 18, 1956, the
Negotiating Group approved, ad referendum, the revised text of the draft
Statute. . . . While the Australian, Czechoslovak, Indian and Soviet Delegations reserved their positions on certain provisions of the Statute, . . .
all delegations voted in favor of the Statute as a whole. . . . At the same
session, the Group agreed that a conference should be convened at the
United Nations Headquarters in New York in the latter part of September
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1956 to discuss, approve and open for signature the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. . . . The Group also unanimously approved the Agenda and Rules of Procedure for the Conference." Report
of the Working Level Meeting on the Draft Statute of the International
Atomic Energ,y Agency, Doc. 31, Washington, D. C., July 2, 1956, pp. 1, 2.

ITEM 2
(Footnote 19)
Article V, par. D, subpar. 2 of the twelve-power draft mentioned as one
of the functions of the General Conference "to admit new Members in
accordance with Article IV." This was changed in art. V, par. E, subpar. 2
of the final text to read "to approve states for membership in accordance
with Article IV." (Emphasis added.) The change was perhaps motivated
by the desire to make it clear beyond any doubt that a favorable recommendation by the Board is necessary for the admission of a new member.
The drafters may have had in mind the advisory proceedings before the
International Court of Justice on the question whether a favorable recommendation from the Security Council is required for admission of a state
to the United Nations by the General Assembly. The Court answered this
question in the affirmative. Advisory Opinion of the International Court
of Justice of March 3, 1950, in I. C. J. Reports of Judgments, Advisory
Opinions and Orders, 1950, p. 4 at 10.
In approving states for membership under this paragraph the Board of
Governors and the General Conference make the determination "that the
State is able and willing to carry out the obligations of membership in the
agency." Statute, art. IV, par. B. In making this determination "due
consideration" is to be given to the state's ability and willingness to act in
accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United
Nations. The eight-power draft would have had the Board of Governors
and the General Conference each make two determinations: first, that the
state was in a position to carry out the obligations of the Agency, and
second, that the state was able and willing to carry out the obligations
contained in the Charter of the United Nations. This would have excluded
Switzerland which considers that it is not in a position to undertake the
obligations required by the Charter of the United Nations. ·

ITEM 3
(Footnote 30)
The powers of the General Conference were a much debated item in the
International Conference on the statute of the Agency. Apart from the
additional powers already mentioned, the International Conference provided

1462

INTERNATIONAL CONTROL

for the authority of the General Conference to approve the appointment
by the Board of the Agency's chief executive, the Director General. See
art. V, par. E., subpar. IO and art. VII, par. A: This originated in an
Indonesian-Pakistanian amendment. IAEA/CS/Art. V /Amend. 8. The
amendment was adopted by 77 votes to I, with I abstention. IAEA/CS/OR.
22, p. 43·
Already before the discussions in the International Conference, the
powers of the General Conference had been controversial matter. The
smaller nations, not being represented on the Board of Governors, wanted
to accord more authority to the General Conference. In response to the
suggestions made to the negotiating parties, the twelve-power draft added
a provision in art. V, par. E, subpar. 3 giving the General Conference the
power to "propose matters for consideration by the Board and request
fro~ the Board reports on any matter relating to the functions of the
Agency" (now art. V, par. F, subpar. 2 of the statute). Furthermore, the
reference to the policy making power of the Board in art. VII, par. H of
the eight-power draft no longer appears in the twelve-power draft and the
statute. The powers of the General Conference other than those mentioned
earlier are :
To elect the ten members of the Board mentioned in art. VI, par. A,
subpar. 3 of the statute (art. V, par. E, subpar. I) ;
To determine the place of its sessions (art. V, par. A);
To elect a President and other officers (art. V, par. C);
To adopt its rules of procedure (art. V, par. C) ;
To request the Director General to convene special sessions (art. V,
par. A);
'ro approve states for membership upon recommendation by the Board
(art. IV, par. B);
To suspend members (art. XIX);
To consider the Board's·annual report (art. V, par. E, subpar. 4);
To approve or return to the ·Board reports .to the United Nations (art. V,
par. E, su!;.par. 6; art. III, par. B, subpars. 4 and 5);
To approve or return to the Board agreements between the Agency and
the United Nations or other international agencies (art. V, par. E, subpar.
7; art. XVI, par. A) ;
To approve rules regarding (a) the exercise of borrowing powers by
the Board (art. V, par. E, subpar. 8; art. XIV, par. G); (b) the acceptance of voluntary contributions to the Agency (art. V, par. E, subpar. 8;
art. XIV, par. E); (c) the use of the general fund (art. V, par. E,
8; art. XIV, par. F) ;
To approve amendments of the statute (art. V, par. E, subpar. 9; art.
XVIII, par. C(i) ).
It seems that the enumeration in art. Vis exclusive, i.e., the Conference
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has no other powers besides the ones specifically mentioned. A Polish
amendment ( IAEAjCS/Art. V /Amend. I) to art. V proposed to insert
at the beginning of the functions of the Conference a sentence reading "to
determine the general policy of the Agency." This amendment, in effect
a general clause granting additional powers to the Conference was rejected
by 37 votes to 24, with I8 abstentions. IAEAjCSjOR. 22, p. 42·
The voting procedures of the Conference are laid down in art. V, par. C.
Every member of the Agency has one vote. Except for decisions on
financial questions (art. XIV, par. H), approval of amendments (art.
XVIII, par. C ( i)), and the suspension of privileges (art. XIX, par. B),
which requires a -J majority, decisions are made by the majority of members present and voting, the majority of members constituting a quorum.
Simple majority suffices for the determination of what additional questions
are to be decided by a -J majority.

ITEM 4
(Footnote 38)
The eight-power draft, art. VII, par. A, subpars. I and 2, as well as the
first outline of the statute, art. II, par. C, subpar. I, third sentence [Atoms
for Peace Manual, note 5 su,pra, 266 et seq.], envisaged actual contributions
as a prerequisite for selection to the non-elective seats on the Board. This
prerequisite was dropped in the twelve-power draft. In the International
Conference on the statute, Denmark and Iran jointly submitted an amendment to art. VI, par. A, subpar. I, which provided that in designating
members of the Board under this sub-paragraph the contributions to the
Agency should be taken into consideration. IAEA/CS/Art. Vlj Amend. 2.
In explaining this· amendment the Danish representative said: "The main
idea behind the Agency is that countries which are advanced and which
are producing source material should give to other countries . . . their aid
and their help. . . . [S]tress should be laid also on the contributions . . .
because that is really the main point in the building up of this idea. . . .
[N]o one in this room will suggest that any member elected on the basis
of advanced technology and of production of source materials should be
allowed to sit if that member were not willing to make contributions and
was not actually making contributions." IAEA/CSjOR. 19, p. 27. The
Philippine representative remarked: "[T]hat paragraph [i. e., art. VI,
par. A, subpar. 2] mentions 'producers. . . .' However, what good would
that do as far as the Agency is concerned unless they make a contribution?" IAEA/CSjOR. Ig, pp. 29-30. In arguing against the amendment, ·
Mr. duPlessis (Union of South Africa) pointed to the difficulty of evaluating contributions and deciding what transactions were to be regarded as
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contributions. IAEA/CSjOR. 20, p. 26 et seq. Subsequently, this amendment was withdrawn. See IAEAjCSjOR. 23, p. 3·
The composition of the Board in its present form is somewhat comparable to that of the Council of the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative
Organization. Art. 17, Convention of the IMCO. For the text of this
convention, which is not yet in force, see 18 Dept. of State Bul. 499 et seq.
(1948). There six members with the largest interest in the international
seaborne trade and six with the largest interest in providing international
shipping services are represented in this Council, together with 4 members
eleCted by the Assembly of the IMCO. Other international organizations
such as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and
the International Monetary Fund have a system of weighted voting, based
on actual contributions. See art. V, sec. 3 of the Articles of Agreement
of the IBRD, and art. XII, sec. 5, of the Articles of Agreement of the
IMF. Certain other organizations have all-elected executive bodies with
one vote for each member, e.g., the United Nations Food and Agricultural
Organization, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the World Health Organization, and the World Meteorological
Organization.

ITEM 5
(Footnote 42)
See IAEAjCSjOR. 39, p. 61. The six states elected were Egypt, Indonesia, Pakistan, Japan, Argentina, and Peru. Apart from these six elected
members, the Preparatory Commission was composed of representatives of
Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Portugal, Union of South Africa, the U. S. S. R., the United Kingdom, and the
United States. The Commission came into existence with the opening of'
the statute for signature and continued till the first General Conference
was convened and the first Board of Governors was selected. Statute,
Annex I, par. A. The functions of this Commission were of a provisional
nature. Apart from organizing itself and appointing its staff it was to
make arrangements for the first session of the General Conference. This
included the preparation of a provisional agenda and draft rules of procedure. The Commission was to designate members of the first Board in
accordance with art. VI, pars. A and B; to make studies, reports and
recommendations on various important problems for the first meetings of
the Board and the Conference; and, finally, to enter into negotiations with
the United Nations for a draft agreement on the relationship of the Agency
to the United Nations and to make recommendations to the first sessions
of the Conference and of the Board in regard to the relationship to other
international organizations. Annex I, par. C, subpars. 1-7. The Report of
the Preparatory Commission included detailed recommendations for an
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initial Agency program. (G. C. 1j1, GOV ji, Report of the Preparatory
Commission of the International Atomic Energy Agency (PRECO), New
York, 1957).

ITEM 6
(Footnote 64)
The specific question of the Agency's relation to the specialized agencies
for which the statute provides in art. XVI, par. A is dealt with in a memorandum by the executive heads of the specialized agencies presented to
the International Conference (IAEA/CSj6, Sept. 24, 1956). In this memorandum attention was called to par. 9 of the United Nations, Doc. A/3122
(reproduced in IAEA/CS/5, Sept. 24, 1956), which calls for effective
coordination between the activities of the Agency and those of the specialized agencies, with the aim of avoiding overlapping and duplication of
activities. The annex to the memorandum contains comments by the International Labor Organization ( ILO) and the World Health Organization
(WHO), which seem to indicate a tendency not to relinquish much of the
jurisdiction of these bodies to the Agency. Thus it was the opinion of the
ILO that the protection of the health and safety of the workers cannot be
the responsibility of an agency dealing solely with atomic energy. ILO
felt that the present position, whereby the draft statute fails to make any
explicit provision for cooperation with the ILO, but specifically authorizes
the Agency "to establish or adopt standards of safety for protection of
health and minimization of danger to life and property (including standards
for labor conditions)," called for further consideration at the Conference.
IAEA/CSj6/Annex. See also the statements of the representatives of
various specialized agencies in the International Conference on October 4,
I956. IAEA/CS/OR. I6, p. 3I et seq.
Under art. III, par. A, subpar. I, the Agency is given responsibilities in
connection with "research on, and development and practical application of,
atomic energy for peaceful uses throughout the world . . . ." The Food
and Agricultural Organization includes among its functions "to stimulate
and coordinate the use of radiation and radioisotopes in agricultural research and development, and to promote necessary investigations of the
possible effects of radioactive materials on agriculture and food production." FAO is organizing an information service on the applications of
atomic energy in agriculture and related fields. United Nations, Economic
and Social Council, Doc. E/293I, Annex II, October 18, 1956, p. 7·
UNESCO authorized its Director General "to study and, if necessary,
to propose measures of an international scope to facilitate the use of
radioisotopes in research and industry." ld. at 9.
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development states:
"In carrying out its responsibilities, both to itself and to its members, in
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respect of the foregoing the IBRD will, from time to time, undertake
studies. of general and specific power needs, and the relationship of atomic
fuels to conventional energy resources." I d. at 19.
Under art. III, par. A, subpar. 3 the Agency is authorized "to foster the
exchange of scientific and technical information on peaceful uses of atomic
energy." Under par. A, subpar. 4 of this article the Agency is authorized
"to encourage the exchange and training of scientists and experts in the
fields of peaceful uses .of atomic energy." UNESCO's program of work
includes an item entitled "Training of Specialists." UNESCO proposes to
convene an international conference "to organize a far-reaching exchange
of information on the methods at present in use in various countries for
training engineers, technicians, laboratory research workers and, in general,
all the different scientific specialists who are concerned with the peaceful
uses of atomic energy." !d. at II. The conference will also recommend to
UNESCO "action at the .international level to secure the most efficient
cooperation possible among the various countries; in particular, problems
relating to exchange of teachers and students will have to be considered."
Id. at 12.
Urider art. III, par. A, subpar. 6 the Agency is given certain functions
in developing standards of sa'fety for protection of health and minimization
of danger to life and property (including such standards for labor conditions), and to provide fot the application of these standards to its own
operations as well as to other operations coming under the jurisdiction of
the Agency. The International Labor Organization states "the most immediate problems of concern to ILO is the protection of workers against
ionizing radiations." Id. at 3· It is also planned to issue codes of practice
d~ling with the technical protective measures required in industrial and
other undertakings. In addition, ILO will be able to provide advice and
assistance. to governments and industry in the training of specialized safety
personnel and inspectors. !d. at 5· The World Health Organization has
adopted a provisional program of work which includes training of specialists for health protection in atomic energy laboratories or plants, public
health administrators and medical users of radioisotopes. The WHO also
includes in its program the entire subject of the "health problems involved
in the control of the location of reactors and in radioactive waste disposal
from factories, laboratories and hospitals." I d. at 16 (emphasis omitted) .
. The World Meteorological Organization has an extensive program concerning collection and analysis of atmospheric radioactivity and its relation
to health and safety. Id. at 22.
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ITEM 7
(Footnote 76)
The history of the Soviet attitude toward the safeguards provisions is
of considerable interest. The first outline of an International Atomic
Energy Agency (see Appendix A above) in art. III, par. B, subpar. 3
included provisions for both health and safety standards and safeguards
against diversion of fissionable materials. Mr. Molotov, in his reply of
April 27, I954 (in Atoms for Peace Manual, note 5 supra, 2&} at 271)
described very vividly the situation which makes safeguards a necessity in
connection with any program for the peaceful uses of atomic ener!JY. He
said: "[T]he level of science and technique which has been reached at the
present time makes it possible for the very application of atomic energy
for peaceful purposes to be utilized for increasing the production of atomic
weapons." Mr. Molotov's solution to that problem was the restatement of
the Soviet line calling for the prohibition of atomic weapons without safeguards. In a memorandum handed to Ambassador Zarubin by Assistant
Secretary of State Merchant on July 9, I954, (id., 274 at 276) the United
States pointed out: "In reality,however, ways can be devised to safeguard
against diversion of materials from power producing reactors. And there
are forms of peaceful utilization in which no question of weapon grade material arises." On Sept. 22, I954, the day before the opening of the General
Assembly, Mr. Gromyko handed an Aide-M~oire to Ambassador Bohlen
in Moscow ( id., 278 at 28I) stating: "The Soviet Government is ready
to examine in course of further negotiations the United States Government's views on this question (safeguards)."
In the 716th Session of the 9th General Assembly's First Committee on
Nov. IS, I954, Mr. Vyshinsky emphasized the necessity of control provisions by referring to President Eisenhower's plan contained in his speech
before the General Assembly of Dec. 8, I953: " . . . [A]lthough the plan
had contained no safeguards to ensure that atomic energy would be used
only for peaceful purposes . . . that did not mean that the Soviet Union
considered it a bad one." [Emphasis added.] A/C. I/SR. 716, p. 335 at 339·
The note of the Soviet Union of Oct. I, 1955, to the American Embassy
in Moscow called for an appropriate staff of inspectors to investigate atomic
installations of the beneficiary states and to verify the use of materials and
equipment received from the Agency, such observations and control to be
accomplished "with due observation of sovereign rights of the above-mentioned states and within the framework of an agreement between a given
state and the Agency." United States Dept. of State Press Release No. 527,
Oct. 6, 1956, p. 23. See statement of the Soviet representative in the First
Committee of the roth General Assembly, Oct. II, 1955, U. N. General
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Assembly Off. Rec., roth Session (1955), First Committee, A/C. I/SR.
759, p. 13 at 14.
In its opening statement at the International Conference the Soviet Union
representative, Mr. Zarubin, stated that " . . . the conditions for control
and inspection, which are contemplated in the agreements between the
United States and other countries and in the draft statute, do, in our
opinion, infringe upon the sovereign rights of the recipient countries, and
do therefore give rise to justified criticism on their part." IAEA/CS/OR.
3, p. 31. In the following discussion on Agency safeguards, Mr. Zarubin
said: "The delegation of the Soviet Union had already declared that it
considered that a sufficient safeguard would be to abide by the provision
of the..statute which makes recipient states assume their obligation not to
use the assistance received for the production of nuclear weapons and to
submit reports on the use to which the assistance given by the Agency has
been put. The safeguards and controls which the draft statute provides
would be significant only if these provisions found their place within the
framework of a general prohibition of nuclear weapons and if these guarantees and safeguards extended to all States, both the States receiving the
assistance of the Agency and those supplying it. The application of safeguards to recipient countries alone-that is, in the first place, to underdeveloped countries-falls short of the mark and imposes upon the recipient countries such conditions of control and inspection as violate their
sovereignty and which would no doubt slow down the utilization of atomic
energy for peaceful purposes in these countries." IAEA/CS/OR. 36,
pp. 6, 7·

ITEM 8
(Footnote

89)

India made three reservations to art. XII of the twelve-power draft.
Report of the Working Level Meetings, Annex IV, p. 3· First, the provisions of the twelve-power draft and also of the final statute require the
agreement between the Agency and states receiving fissionable materials
from the Agency to provide for certain Agency rights and responsibilities
"to the extent relevant to the project or arrangement." The Indians would
have added to this that the safeguards should be required only as specifically
provided for in individual agreements between the Agency and the members
thereof, thus permitting agreements with less safeguards than those prescribed in the statute. While there was considerable discussion on this
subject India never submitted a specific amendment to the International
Conference.
The second reservation concerned art. XII, par. A, subpar. 3 requiring
the maintenance and production of operating records to assist in ensuring
accountability for source and special fissionable materials used or produced
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in the project or arrangement. The Indians would have amended the article
to restrict accountability to fissionable materials supplied. This would have
eliminated from accountability all of the source materials as well as plutonium or U-233, produced as by-products of the operation of the reactor.
IAEAJCSJOR. 7, p. 48 et seq. France joined India in advocating the
removal of source materials from accountability. IAEA/CS/OR. 24, p. 46
et seq. The third reservation (both the second and the third reservations
are contained in amendment IAEA/CS/Art. XII/Amend. 5 sponsored by
Ceylon, Egypt, India, and Indonesia) related to art. XII, par. A, subpar. 5,
dealing with the chemical processing of fissionable materials and the disposition of plutonium and U-233 produced as a result of the reactor operations. The statute provided for complete Agency control over both the
chemical processing of fuel elements and of the disposition of the fissionable materials produced in the reactor. This is one of the crucial points in
reactor operations where. diversion to war uses can most readily take place.
India called for considerably less stringent control in connection with the
by-product materials that would be produced from a reactor. Under this
suggestion, states would be able to stockpile the plutonium and U-233
produced in reactors for use within the state for peaceful purposes and
under Agency safeguards. Under present technology there are few peaceful
uses for plutonium and for U-233. The result of the Indian suggestions
would be that substantial stockpiles of materials unusable for peacetime
purposes would accumulate in many parts of the world. The United States
regarded this as a serious potential threat to the peace. India insisted that
under the original wording of the statute, the Agency would be in a position
to dictate in perpetuity what fissionable materials would be allotted to all
states; it was entirely possible that the Board of Governors of the Agency
on the basis of political or economic considerations unrelated to international safety would prevent states from acquiring the fissionable materials
necessary for development of their economic welfare. IAEAjCSjOR. 28,
p. 55 et seq.

ITEM 9
(Footnote I 52)
Art. XIV in pars. B and E in effect reduces to a minimum the occasions
when the Agency would be justified in utilizing its borrowing powers under
art. XIV, par. G. Theoretically, all of the expenditures coming under the
administrative budget (par. B, subpar. I) will be apportioned among the
members pursuant to par. D of art. XIV. All other expenditures will be
met through a combination of revenue from a scale of charges (art. XIV,
par. E) and voluntary contributions (donations). The Board of Governors
is required to fix a scale of charges at least adequate (together with donations) to cover the operational expenditures described in par. B, subpar. 2.
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Indeed, it is contemplated that there might be an excess of revenue which
would go into the general fund (see par. F of art. XIV) and thus be
available, for example, to meet a part of the cost of the safeguards system.
On the other hand, the administrative expenses are likely to exceed the
amounts that could be raised through apportionment among the members,
especially if the administrative budget includes substantial sums for items
such as the construction of safeguards facilities and storage costs for the
"syphoned off" fissionable material not used for Agency projects. Statute,
art. XIV, par. B, subpar. I(b), last clause. Could the words "the costs of
handling and storage of special fissionable material" in that clause be
interpreted to include also the costs of building storage facilities for this
material? Similarly, Agency facilities to be included in the operational
budget under par. B, subpar. 2 may prove too expensive to be charged to
the beneficiary members in accordance with art. XIV, par. E. It is these
deficits which might be covered through borrowing. It seems probable that
Agency borrowing would be directed primarily to that objective. Repayment of loans would come from the General Fund of the Agency resulting
from an excess of revenues arising from the scale of charges and from
donations. If loans are used for administrative expenses they could presumably be repaid by apportionment among members. Presumably, loans
to construct facilities would be repaid over a period of years bearing some
relationship to the life of the facilities.
The financing provisions were the subject of a lively discussion in the
International Conference. The main point raised was the question as to
who should be burdened with the financing of Agency facilities. See
Mr. Zarubin (U. S. S. R.), IAEA/CS/OR. 3I, p. 11; Mr. Wershof
(Canada), id. at I6; Mr. Wadsworth (United States), id. at 26, and other
statements in IAEA/CS/OR. 3I and 32.

ITEM 10
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC
ENERGY AGENCY
ARTICLE

I

Establishment of the Agency
The Parties hereto establish an International Atomic Energy Agency
(hereinafter referred to as "the Agency") upon the terms and conditions
hereinafter set forth.
ARTICLE

II

Objectives
The Agency shall seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of
atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world. It
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shall ensure, so far as it is able, that assistance provided by it or at its
request or under its supervision or control is not used in such a way as to
further any military purpose.
ARTICLE

III

Functions
A. The Agency is authorized :
I. To encourage and assist research on, and development and practical
application of, atomic energy for peaceful uses throughout the world; and,
if requested to do so, to act as an intermediary for the purposes of securing
the performance of services or the supplying of materials, equipment, or
facilities by one member of the Agency for another; and to perform any
operation or service useful in research on, or development or practical
application of, atomic energy for peaceful purposes;
2. To make provision, in accordance with this Statute, for materials,
services, equipment, and facilities to meet the needs of research on, and
development and practical application of, atomic energy for peaceful purposes, including the production of electric power, with due. consideration
for the needs of the under-developed areas of the world;
3· To foster the exchange of scientific and technical information on
peaceful uses of atomic energy;
4· To encourage the exchange and training of scientists and experts in
the field of peaceful uses of atomic energy;
5· To establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special
fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities, and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision
or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose;
and to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or
multilateral arrangement, or, at the request of a State, to any of that State's
activities in the field of atomic energy ;
6. To establish or adopt, in consultation and, where appropriate, in collaboration with the competent organs of the United Nations and with the
specialized agencies concerned, standards of safety for protection of health
and minimization of danger to life and property (including such standards
for labour conditions), and to provide for the application of these standards to its own operations as well as to the operations making use of ma:terials, services, equipment, facilities, and information made available by
the Agency or at its request or under its control or supervision ; and to
provide for the application of these standards, at the request of the parties,
to operations under any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or, at the
request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic
energy;
7· To acquire or establish any facilities, plant and equipment useful in
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carrying out its authorized functions, whenever the facilities, plant, and
equipment otherwise available to it in the area concerned are inadequate or
available only on terms it deems unsatisfactory. ·
B. In carrying out its function, the Agency shall:
1. Conduct its activities in accordance with the purposes and principles
of the United Nations to promote peace and international cooperation, and
in conformity with policies of the United Nations furthering the establishment of safe-guarded world-wide disarmament and in conformity with
any international agreements entered into pursuant to such policies ;
2. Establish control over the use of special fissionable materials received
by the Agency, in order to ensure that these materials are used only for
peaceful purposes ;
3· Allocate its resources in such a manner as to secure efficient utilization
and the greatest possible general benefit in all areas of the world, bearing
in mind the special needs of the under-developed areas of the world;
4· Submit reports on its activities annually to the General Assembly of
the United Nations and, when appropriate, to the Security Council: if in
connexion with the activities of the Agency there should arise questions
that are within the competence of the Security Council, the Agency shall
notify the Security Council, as the organ bearing the main responsibility
for the maintenance of international peace and security, and may also take
the measures open to it under this Statute, including those provided in
paragraph C of article XII ;
5· Submit reports to the Economic and Social Council and other organs
of the United Nations on matters within the competence of these organs.
C. In carrying out its functions, the Agency shall not make assistance to
members subject to any political, economic, military, or other conditions
incompatible with the provisions of this Statute.
D. Subject to the provisions of this Statute and to the terms of agreements concluded between a State or a group of States and the Agency
which shall be in accordance with the provisions of the Statute, the activities
of the Agency shall be carried out with due observance of the sovereign
rights of States.
ARTICLE

IV

Membership

A. The initial members of the Agency shall be those States Members
of the United Nations or of any of the specialized agencies which shall
have signed this Statute within ninety days after it is opened for signature
and shall have deposited an instrument of ratification.
B. Other members of the Agency shall be those States whether or not
Members of the United Nations or of any of the specialized agencies, which
deposit an instrument of acceptance of this Statute after their membership
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has been approved by the General Conference upon the recommendation of
the Board of Governors. In recommending and approving a State for
membership, the Board of Governors and the General Conference shall
determine that the State is able and willing to carry out the obligations of
membership in the Agency, giving due consideration to its ability and willingness to act in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter
of the United Nations.
C. The Agency is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all
its members, and all members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights
and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with this Statute.
ARTICLE

v

General Conference
A. A General Conference consisting of representatives of all members
shall meet in regular annual session and in such special sessions as shall
be convened by the Director General at the request of the Board of Governors or of a majority of members. The sessions shall take place at the
headquarters of the Agency unless otherwise determined by the General
Conference.
B. At such sessions, each member shall be represented by one delegate
who may be accompanied by alternates and by advisers. The cost of attendance of any delegation shall be borne by the member concerned.
C. The General Conference shall elect a President and such other officers
as may be required at the beginning of each session. They shall hold office
for the duration of the session. The General Conference, subject to the
provisions of this Statute, shall adopt its own rules of procedure. Each
member shall have one vote. Decisions pursuant to paragraph H of article
XIV, paragraph C of article XVIII and paragraph B of article XIX shall
be made by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting.
Decisions on other questions, including the determination of additional
questions or categories of questions to be decided by a two-thirds majority,
shall be made by a majority of the members present and voting. A majority
of members shall constitute a quorum.
D. The General Conference may discuss any questions or any matters
within the scope of this Statute or relating to the powers and functions of
any organs provided for in this Statute, and may make recommendations to
the membership of the Agency or to the Board of Governors or to both on
any such questions or matters.
E. The General Conference shall:
1. Elect members of the Board of Governors in accordance with article
VI;
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2. Approve States for membership in accordance with article. IV;
3· Suspend a member from the privileges and rights of membership in
·
accordance with article XIX ;
4· Consider the annual report of the Board ;
S· In accordance with article XIV, approve the budget of the Agency
recommended by the Board or return it with recommendations as to its
entirety or parts to the Board, for resubmission to the General Conference;
6. Approve reports to be submitted to the United Nations as required
by the relationship agreement between the Agency and the United Nations,
except reports referred to in paragraph C of article XII, or return them
to the Board with its recommendations ;
7· Approve any agreement or agreements between the Agency and the
United Nations and other organizations as provided in article XVI or
return such agreements with its recommendations to the Board, for resubmission to the General Conference;
8. Approve rules and limitations regarding the exercise of borrowing
powers by the Board, in accordance with paragraph G of article XIV ;
approve rules regarding the acceptance of voluntary contributions to the
Agency; and approve, in accordance with paragraph F of article XIV, the
manner in which the general fund referred to in that paragraph may be
used;
9· Approve amendments to this Statute in accordance with paragraph C
of article XVIII ;
IO. Approve the appointment of the Director General in accordance with
paragraph A of Article VII.
F. The General Conference shall have the authority:
1. To take decisions on any matter specifically referred to the General
Conference for this purpose by the Board;
2. To propose matters for consideration by the Board and request from
the· Board reports on any matter relating to the functions of the Agency.

ARTICLE

VI

Board of Governors
A. The Board of Governors shall be composed as follows:
I. The outgoing Board of Governors (or in the case of the first Board,
the Preparatory Commission referred to in Annex I) shall designate for
membership on the Board the five members most advanced in the technology
of atomic energy including the production of source materials and the
member most advanced in the technology of atomic energy including the
production of source materials in each of the following areas not represented by the aforesaid five:
(I) North America
( 2) Latin America
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(3) Western Europe
(4) Eastern Europe
(S) Africa and the Middle East
( 6) South Asia
·( 7) South East Asia ~nd the Pacific.
(8) Far East.
2. The outgoing Board of Governors (or in the case of the first Board,
the Preparatory Commission referred to in Annex I) shall designate for
membership on the Board two members from among the .following other
producers of source materials: Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and
Portugal ; and shall also designate for membership on the Board one other
member as a supplier of technical assistance. No member in .this category
in any one year will be eligible for redesignation in the same category for
the following year.
3· The General Conference shall elect ten members to membership on
the Board of Governors, with due regard to equitable representatioQ on
the Board as a whole of the members in the areas listed in sub-paragraph
A-I of this article, so that the Board shall at all times include in this
category a representative of each of those areas except North America.
Except for the five members chosen for a term of one year in accordance
with paragraph D of this article, no member in this category ·in any one
term of office will be eligible for re-election in the same category for. the
following term of office.
·
B. The designations provided for in subparagraphs A-I and A-2 of this
article shall take place not less than sixty days before each regular annual_
session of the General Conference. The elections provided for in subparagraph A-3 of this article shall take. place at regular annual sessions of
the General Conference.
C. Members represented on the Board of ~overnors in accordance with
sub-paragraphs A-I and A-2 of this article shall hold office from the end
of the next regular annual session of the General Conference after their
designation until the end of the following regular annual session of the
General Conference.
· D. Members represented on the Board of Governors in accordance with
sub-paragraph A-3 of this article shall hold office .from the end· of the
regular annual session of the General Conference at which they are elected
until the end of the second regular annual session of the General Conference thereafter. In the election of these members for the first Boru:d, however, five shall be chosen for a term of one year.
E. Each member of the Board of Governors shall have one vote. Decisions on the amount of the Agency's budget shall be made by a two-thirds
majority of those present and voting, as provided in paragraph H of article
XIV. Decisions on other questions, including the determination of addi-
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tiona! questions or categories of questions to be decided by a two-thirds
majority, shall be made by a majority of those present and voting. Twothirds of all members of the Board shall constitute a quorum.
F. The Board of Governors shall have authority to carry out the functions of the Agency in accordance with this Statute, subject to its responsibilities to the General Conference as provided in this Statute.
G. The Board of Governors shall meet at such times as it may determine.
The meetings shall take place at the headquarters of the Agency unless
otherwise determined by the Board.
H. The Board of Governors shall elect a Chairman and other officers
from among its members and, subject to the provisions of this Statute, shall
adopt its own rules of procedure.
I. The Board of Governors may establish such committees as it deems
advisable. The Board may appoint persons to represent it in its relations
with other organizations.
J. The Board of Governors shall prepare an annual report to the General Conference concerning the affairs of the Agency and any projects
approved by the Agency. The· Board shall also prepare for submission to
the General Conference such reports as the Agency is or may be required
to make to the United Nations or to any other organization the work of
which is related to that of the Agency. These reports, along with the annual
reports, shall be submitted to members of the Agency at least one month
before the regular annual session of the General Conference.
ARTICLE

VII

Staff

A. The staff of the Agency shall be headed by a Director General. The
Director General shall be appointed by the Board of Governors with the
approval of the General Conference for a term of four years. He shall be
the chief administrative officer of the Agency.
B. The Director General shall be responsible for the appointment, organization, and functioning of the staff and shall be under the authority of and
subject to the control of the Board of Governors. He shall perform his
duties in accordance with regulations adopted by the Board.
C. The staff shall include such qualified scientific and technical and other
personnel as may be required to fulfil the objectives and functions of the
Agency. The Agency shall be guided by the principle that its permanent
staff shall be kept to a minimum.
D. The paramount consideration in the recruitment and employment of
the staff and in the determination of the conditions of service shall be to
secure employees of the highest standards of efficiency, technical competence, and integrity Suhject to this consideration, due regard shall be paid
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to the contributions of members to the Agency and to the importance of
recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible.
E. The terms and conditions on which the staff shall be appointed,
remunerated, and dismissed shall be in accordance with regulations made
by· the Board of Governors, subject to the provisions of this Statute and
to general rules approved by the General Conference on the recommendation of the Board.
F. In the performance of their duties, the Director General and the staff
shall not seek or receive instructions from any source external to the
Agency. They shall refrain from any action which might reflect on their
position as officials of the Agency; subject to their responsibilities to the
Agency, they shall not disclose any industrial secret or other confidential
information coming to their knowledge by reason of their official duties for
the Agency. Each member.undertakes to respect the international character
of the responsibilities of the Director General and the staff and shall not
seek to influence them in the discharge of their duties.
G. In this article the term "staff" includes guards.
ARTICLE

VIII

Exchange of information

A. Each member should make available such information as would, in
the judgment of the member, be helpful to the Agency.
B. Each member shall make available to the Agency all scientific information developed as a result of assistance extended by the Agency pursuant
to article XI.
C. The Agency shall assemble and make available in an accessible form
the information made available to it under paragraphs A and B of this
article. It shall take positive steps to encourage the exchange among its
members of infom:tation relating to the nature and peaceful uses of atomic
energy and shall serve as an intermediary among its members for this
purpose.
ARTICLE

IX

Supplying of materials
A. Members may make available to the Agency such quantities of special
fissionable materials as they deem advisable and on such terms as shall be
agreed with the Agency. The materials made available to the Agency may,
at the discretion of the member making them available, be stored either by
the member concerned or, with the agreement of the Agency, in the
Agency's depots.
B. Members may also make available to the Agency source materials
as defined in article XX and other materials. The Board of Governors
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shall determine the quantities of such materials which the Agency will
accept under agreements provided for in article XIII.
C. Each member shall notify the Agency of· the quantities, form, and
composition of speCial fissionable materials, source materials, and other
materials which that member is prepared, in conformity with its laws, to
make available immediately or during a period specified by the Board of
Governors.
D. On· request o£ the Agency a member shall, from the materials which
it has made available, without delay deliver to another member or group
of members such quantities of such materials as the Agency may specify,
and shall without delay deliver to the Agency itself such quantities of such
materials as are really necessary £or operations and scientific research in
the facilities· of the Agency.
E. The quantities, forin and composition of materials made available by
any member may be changed at any time by the member with the approval
of the Board of Governors:
·
F. An initial notification iri accordance with paragraph C of this article
shall be made within three months of the entry into force of this Statute
with respect to the member concerned. In the absence of a contrary decision
of the Board of Governors, the materials initially made available shall be
for the period of the calendar year succeeding the year when this Statute
takes effect with respect to the member concerned. Subsequent notifications
shall likewise, in the absence of a contrary action by the Board, relate to
the period of the calendar year following the notification and shall be made
no later than the first day of November of each year.
G. The Agency shall specify the place and method of delivery and,
where appropriate, the form and composition, of materials which it has
requested a member to deliver from the amounts which that member has
notified the Agency it is prepared to make available. The Agency shall also
verify the quantities of materials delivered and shall report those quantities
periodically to the members.
H. The Agency shall be responsible for storing and protecting materials
in its possession. The Agency shall ensure that these materials shall be
safeguarded against (I) hazards of the weather, ( 2) unauthorized removal or diversion, (3) damage or destruction, including sabotage, and
( 4) forcible seizure. In storing special fissionable materials in its possession, the Agency shall ensure the geographical distribution of these
materials in such a way as not to allow concentration of large amounts of
such materials in any one country or region of the world.
I. The Agency shall as soon as practicable establish or acquire such of
the following as may be necessary:
I. Plant, equipment, and facilities for the receipt, storage, and issue of
materials;
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Physical safeguards;
3· Adequate health and safety measures;
4· Control laboratories for the analysis and verification of materials
received;
5. Housing and administrative facilities for any staff required for the
foregoing.
J. The materials made available pursuant to this article shall be used
as determined by the Board of Governors in accordance with the provisions
of this Statute. No member shall have the right to require that the materials it makes available to the Agency be kept separately by the Agency
or to designate the specific project in which they must be used.
2.

ARTICLE

X

Services, equipment, and facilities
Members may make available to the Agency services, equipment, and
facilities which may be of assistance in fulfilling the Agency's objectives
and functions.
ARTICLE

XI

Agency projects
A. Any member or group of members of the Agency desiring to set up
any project for research on, or development or practical application of,
atomic energy for peaceful purposes may request the assistance of the
Agency in securing special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, and facilities necessary for this purpose. Any such request shall be
accompanied by an explanation of the purpose and extent of the project
and shall be considered by the Board of Governors.
B. Upon request, the Agency may also assist any member or group of
members to make arrangements to secure necessary financing from outside
sources to carry out such projects. In extending this assistance, the Agency
will not be required to provide any guarantees or to assume any financial
responsibility for the project.
C. The Agency may arrange for the supplying of any materials, services,
equipment, and facilities necessary for the project by one or more members
or may itself undertake to provide any or all of these directly, taking into
consideration the wishes of the member or members making the request.
D. For the purpose of considering the request, the Agency may send
into the territory of the member or group of members making the request
a person or persons qualified to examine the project. For this purpose the
Agency may, with the approval of the member or group of members making the request, use members of its own staff or employ suitably qualified
nationals of any member.
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E. Before approving a project under this article, the Board of Governors
shall give due consideration to :
1. The usefulness of the project, including its scientific and technical
feasibility;
2. The adequacy of plans, funds, and technical personnel to assure the
effective execution of the project;
3· The adequacy of proposed health and safety standards for handling
and storing materials and for operating facilities ;
4· The inability of the member or group of members making the request to secure the necessary finances, materials, facilities, equipment, and
services;
5· The equitable distribution of materials and other resources available
to the Agency ;
6. The special needs of the under-developed areas of the world ; and
7· Such other matters as may be relevant.
F. Upon approving a project, the Agency shall enter into an agreement
with the member or group of members submitting the project, which agreement shall:
·
·
1. Provide for allocation to the project of any required special fissionable
or other materials;
2. Provide for transfer of special fissionable materials from their then
place of custody, whether the materials be in the custody of the Agency
or of the member making them available for use in Agency projects, to the
member or ·group of members submitting the project, under conditions
which ensure the safety of any shipment required and meet applicable
health and safety standards;
3· Set forth the terms and conditions, including charges, on which any
materials, services, equipment, and facilities are to be provided by the
Agency itself, and, if any such materials, services, equipment, and facilities
are· to be provided by a member, the terms and conditions as arranged for
by the member or group of members submitting the project and the supplying member;
4· Include undertakings by the member or group of members submitting
the project: (a) that the assistance provided shall not be used in such a
way as to further any military purpose; and (b) that the project shall be
subject to the safeguards provided for in article XII, the relevant safeguards being specified in the agreement;
5· Make appropriate provision regarding the rights and interests of the
Agency and the member or members concerned in any inventions or discoveries or any patents therein, arising from the .project;
6. Make appropriate provision regarding settlement of disputes ;
7· Include such other provisions as may be appropriate.
G. The provisions of this article shall also apply where appropriate to a
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request for materials, services, facilities, or equipment in connection with
an existing project.
·
ARTICLE

XII

.4gency safeguards
A. With respect to any Agency project, or other arrangement where the
Agency is requested by the parties concerned to apply safeguards, the
Agency shall have the following rights and responsibilities to the exterit
relevant to the project or arrangement:
i. To examine the design of specialized equipment and facilities, including nuclear reactors, and to approve it only from the viewpoint of assuring
that it will not further any military purpose, that it complies with applicable
health and safety standards, and that it will permit effective application of
the safeguards provided for in this article;
. 2. To require the observance of any health and safety measures prescn"bed by the Agency ;
3· To require the maintenance and production of operating records to
assist in ensuring accountability for source and special fissionable materials
used or produced in the project or arrangement;
4· To call for and receive progress reports;
S· To approve the means to be used for the chemical processing of
irradiated materials solely to ensure that this chemical processing will· not
lend itself to diversion of materials for military purposes and will comply
with applicable health and safety standards; to require that special fissionable materials recovered or produced as a by-product be used for peaceful
purposes under continuing Agency safeguards for research or in reactors,
existing or under construction, specified by the member or members concerned; and to require deposit with the Agency of any excess of any special
fissionable materials recovered or produced as a by-product over what is
needed for the above-stated uses in order to prevent stockpiling of these
materials, provided that thereafter at the request of the member or members concerned special fissionable materials so deposited with the Agency
shall be returned promptly to the member or members concerned for use
under the same provisions as stated above;
6. To send into the territory of the recipient State or States inspectors,
designated by the Agency after consultation with the State or States concerned, who shall have access at all times to all places and data and to any
person who by reason of his occupation deals with materials, equipment,
or facilities which are required by this Statute to be safeguarded, as necessary to account for source and special fissionable materials supplied and
fissionable products and to determine whether there is compliance with the
undertaking against use in furtherance of any military purpose referred to
in sub-paragraph F -4 of article XI, with the health and safety measures
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referred to in subparagraph A-2 of this article., and with any other conditions prescribed in the agreement between the Agency and the State or
States concerned. Inspectors designated by the Agency shall be accompanied by representatives of the authorities of the State concerned, if that
State so requests, provided that the inspectors shall not thereby be delayed
or otherwise impeded in the exercise of their functions;
7· In the event of non-compliance and failure by the recipient State or
States to take requested corrective steps within a reasonable time, to suspend or terminate assistance and withdraw any materials and equipment
made available by the Agency or a member in furtherance of the project.
B. The Agency shall,. as necessary, establish a staf(of inspectors, The
staff of inspectors shall haye,the responsibility of examining all operations
conducted by the Agency itself to determine whether the Agency is complying with the health and safety measures prescribed by it for application
to projects subject to its approval, supervision or control, and whether the
Agency is taking adequate measures to prevent the source. and special
fissionable materials if} its c~stody or used or produced in its own operations
from being useq in· furthera,nce of any military purpose. The Agency shall
take remedial action forthwith to· correct any non-compliance or failure to
take adequate measures. · ·· ·
C. The staff of inspectors shall also have the responsibility of obtaining
and verifying the· ~ccoun~ng referred to in sub-paragraph A-6 of this
article and of determining whether there is compliance with the undertaking
referred to in sub-paragraph F-4 of article XI, with the measures referred
to in sub-paragraph A-2 of this article, and with all other conditions of the
project prescribed in the agreement between the Agency and the State or
States concerned. The inspectors shall report; any non-compliance to the
Director General who shall thereupon transmit the report to the Board of
Governors. The Board shall .call upon the recipient .State or States to
remedy forthwith any non-compliance which it finds to have occurred. The
Board shall report the non-compliance to all members and to· the Security
Council and General Assembly of the United Nations. In the event of
failure of the recipient· State or States to take fully corrective action within
a reasonable time, the 'Board may take one or both of th~ following measures : direct curtailment or suspension of assistance being provided by the
Agency or by a member, and call for the return of materials and equipment
made available to the recipient member or group of members. The Agency
may also, in accordance with article XIX, suspend any non-complying
member from the exercise of the privileges and rights of membership.
ARTICLE

XIII

Reimbursement of members
Unless otherwise agreed upon between the Board of Governors and the
member furnishing to the Agency materials, services, equipment, or facili-
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ties, the Board shall enter into an agreement with such member providing
for reimbursement for the items furnished.
ARTICLE

XIV

Finance

A. The Board of Governors shall submit to the General Conference the
annual budget estimates for the expenses of the Agency. To facilitate the
work of the Board in this regard, the Director General shall initially
prepare the budget estimates. If the General Conference does not approve
the estimates, it shall return them together with its recommendations to the
Board. The Board shall then submit further estimates to the General Conference for its approval.
B. Expenditures of the Agency shall be classified under the following
categories:
I. Administrative expenses: these shall include:
(a) Costs of the staff of the Agency other than the staff employed in
connection with materials, services, equipment, and facilities referred to in
sub-paragraph B-2 below; costs of meetings; and expenditures required for
the preparation of Agency projects and for the distribution of information;
(b) Costs of implementing the safeguards referred to in article XII in
relation to Agency projects or, under sub-paragraph A-5 of article III, in
relation to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, together with the costs
of handling and storage of special fissionable material by the Agency other
than the storage and handling charges referred to in paragraph E below;
2. Expenses, other than those included in sub-paragraph I of this paragraph, in connexion with any materials, facilities, plant, and equipment
acquired or established by the Agency in carrying out its authorized functions, and the costs of materials, services, equipment, and facilities provided
by it under agreements with one or more members.
C. In fixing the expenditures under sub-paragraph B- I (b) above, the
Board of Governors shall deduct such amounts as are recoverable under
agreements regarding the application of safeguards between the Agency
and parties to bilateral or multilateral arrangements.
D. The Board of Governors shall apportion the expenses referred to in
sub-paragraph B-1 above, among members in accordance with a scale to be
fixed by the General Conference. In fixing the scale the General Conference shall be guided by the principles adopted by the United Nations in
assessing contribution! of Member States to the regular budget of the
United Nations.
-E. The Board of Governors shall establish periodically a scale of charges,
including reasonable uniform storage and handling charges, for materials,
services, equipment, and facilities furnished to members by the Agency.
The scale shall be desigried to produce revenues for the Agency adequate
to meet the expenses and costs referred to in sub-paragraph B-2 above, less
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any voluntary contributions which the Board of Governors may, in accordance with paragraph F, apply for this purpose. The proceeds of such
charges shall be placed in a separate fund which shall be used to pay members for any materials, services, equipment, or facilities furnished by them
and to meet other expenses referred to in sub-paragraph B-2 above which
may be incurred by the Agency itself.
F. Any excess of revenues referred to in paragraph E over the expenses
and costs there referred to, and any voluntary contributions to the Agency,
shall be placed in a general fund which may be used as the Board of Governors, with the approval of the General Conference, may determine.
G. Subject to rules and limitations approved by the General Conference,
the Board of Governors shall have the authority to exercise borrowing
powers on behalf of the Agency without, however, imposing on members
of the Agency any liability in respect of loans entered into pursuant to this
authority, and to accept voluntary contributions made to the Agency.
H. Decisions of the General Conference on financial questions and of
the Board of Governors on the amount of the Agency's budget shall require
a two-thirds majority of those present and voting.
ARTICLE

XV

Privileges and immunities
A. The Agency shall enjoy in the territory of each member such legal
capacity and such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the exercise of its functions.
B. Delegates of members together with their alternates and advisers,
Governors appointed to the Board together with their alternates and advisers, and the Director General and the staff of the Agency, shall enjoy
such privileges and immunities as are necessary in the independent exercise
of their functions in connexion with the Agency.
C. The legal capacity, privileges, and immunities referred to in this
article shall be defined in a separate agreement or agreements between the
Agency, represented for this purpose by the Director General acting under
instructions of the Board of Governors, and the members.
.
ARTICLE

XVI

Relationship 'With other organizations
A. The Board of Governors, with the approval of the General Conference, is authorized to enter into an agreement or agreements establishing
an appropriate relationship between the Agency and the United Nations
and any other organizations the work of which is related to that of the
Agency.
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B. The agreement or agreements establishing the relationship of the
Agency and the United Nations shall provide for:
1. Submission by the Agency of reports as provided for in subparagraphs B-4 and B-s of article III;
2. Consideration by the Agency of resolutions relating to it adopted by
the General Assembly or any of the Councils of the United Nations and
the submission of reports, when requested, to the appropriate organ of the
United Nations on the action taken by the Agency or by its members in
accordance with this Statute as a result of such consideration.
ARTICLE

XVII

Settlement of disputes
A. Any question or dispute concerning the interpretation or application
of this Statute which is not settled by negotiation shall be referred to the
International Court of Justice in conformity with the Statute of the Court,
unless the parties concerned agree on another mode of settlement.
B. The General Conference and the Board of Governors are separately
empowered, subject to authorization from the General Assembly of the
United Nations, to request the International Court of Justice to give an
advisory opinion on any legal question arising within the scope of the
Agency's activities.
ARTICLE

XVIII

Amendments and withdrawals
A. Amendments to this Statute may be proposed by any member. Certified copies of the text of any amendment proposed shall be prepared by
the Director General and communicated by him to all members at least
ninety days in advance of its consideration by the General Conference.
B. At the fifth annual session of the General Conference following the
coming into force of this Statute, the question of a general review of the
provisions of this Statute shall be placed on the agenda of that session.
On approval by a majority of the members present and voting, the review
will take place at the following General Conference. Thereafter, proposals
on the question of a general review of this Statute may be submitted for
decision by the General Conference under the same procedure.
C. Amendments shall come into force for all members when:
(i) Approved by the General Conference by a two-thirds majority of
those present and voting after consideration of observations submitted by
the Board of Governors on each proposed amendment, and
( ii) Accepted by two-thirds of all the members in accordance with their
respective constitutional· processes. Acceptance by a member shall be
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effected by the deposit 'of an instrument of acceptance with the depositary
Government referred to in paragraph C of article XXI.
D. At any time after five years from the date. when this Statute shall
take effect in accordance with paragraph E of article XXI or whenever a
member is unwilling to accept an amendment to this Statute, it may withdraw from the Agency by notice in writing to that effect given to the
depositary Government referred to in paragraph C of article XXI, which
shall promptly inform the Board of Governors and all members.
E. Withdrawal by a member from the Agency shall not affect its contractual obligations entered into pursuant to article XI or its budgetary
obligations for the year in which it withdraws.
ARTICLE XIX

Suspension of privileges
A. A member of the Agency which is in arrears in the payment of its
financial contributions to the Agency shall have no vote in the Agency if
the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contributions
due from it for the preceding two years. The General Conference may,
nevertheless, permit such a member to vote if it is satisfied that the failure
to pay is due to conditions beyond the control of the member.
B. A member which has persistently violated the provisions of this
Statute or of any agreement entered into by it pursuant to this Statute may
be suspended from the exercise of the privileges and rights of membership
by the General Conference acting by a two-thirds majority of the members
present and voting upon recommendation by the Board of Governors.

ARTICLE XX

Definitions
A~ used in this Statute :
1. The term "special fissionable material" means plutonium-239; uranium-233; uranium enriched in the isotopes 235 or 233; any material containing one or more of the foregoing; and such other fissionable material
as the Board of Governors shall from time to time determine; but the term
"special fissionable material" does not include source material.
2. The term "uranium enriched in the isotopes 235 or 233" means
uranium containing the isotopes 235 or 233 or both in an amount such that
the abundance ratio of the sum of these isotopes to the isotope 238 is
greater than the ratio of the isotope 235 to the isotope 238 occurring in
nature.
3· The term "source material" means uranium containing the mixture
of isotopes occurring in nature; uranium depleted in the isotope 235·;
thoriuni; any of the foregoing in the form of metal, atloy, chemical com-
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pound, or concentrate ;· any other material containing one or more of the
foregoing in such concentration as the Board of Governors shall from time
to time determine; and such other material as the Board of Governors shall
from time to time determine.
ARTICLE

XXI

Signature, acceptance, and entry into force
A. This Statute shall be open for signature on 26 October 1956 by all
.States Members of the United Nations or of any of the specialized
agencies and shall remain open for signature by those States for a period
of ninety days ..
B. The signatory States shall become parties to this Statute by deposit
of an instrument of ratification ..
C. Instruments of ratification by signatory States and instruments of
ac~;;eptance by States whose membership has been approved under paragraph B of article IV of this Statute shall be deposited with the Government of the United States of America, hereby designated as depositary
Government.
D. Ratification or acceptance of this Statute shall be effected by States
in accordance with their respective constitutional process.
E. This Statute, apart from the Annex, shall come into force when
eighteen States· have deposited instruments of ·ratification in accordance
with paragraph B of this article, provided that such· eighteen States shall
include at least three of the following States: Canada, France, The Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, and the United States of America. Instruments of ratification and instruments of acceptance deposited thereafter shall take effect
on the date of their receipt.
F. The depositary Government shall promptly inform all States signatory to this Statute of the date of each deposit of ratification and the date
of entry into force of the Statute. The depositary Government shall
promptly inform all signatories and members of the dates on which States
subsequently become parties thereto.
G. The Annex to this Statute shall come into force on the first day this
Statute is open for signature.
ARTICLE

XXII

Registratio~ with the United Nations

A. This Statute shall be registered by .the depositary Government pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
B. Agreements between the Agency and any member or members, agreements between the Agency and any other organization or organizations, and
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agreements between members subject to approval of the Agency, shall be
registered with the Agency. Such agreements shall be registered by the
Agency with the United Nations if registration· is required under Article
102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
ARTICLE

XXIII

Authentic texts and certified copies
This Statute, done in the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish
languages, each being equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives
of the depositary Government. Duly certified copies of this Statute shall
be transmitted by the depositary Government to the Governments of the
other signatory States and to the Governments of States admitted to
membership under paragraph B of article IV.
In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this
Statute.
DoNE at the Headquarters of the United Nations, this twenty-sixth day
of October, one thousand nine, hundred and fifty-six.
ANNEX I

Preparatory Commission
A. A Preparatory Commission shall come into existence on the first day
this Statute is open for signature. It shall be composed of one representative each of Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France,
India, Portugal, Union of South Africa, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and United
States of America, and one representative each of six other States to be
chosen by the International Conference on the Statute of the International
Atomic Energy Agency. The Preparatory Commission shall remain in
existence until this Statute comes into force and thereafter until the General
Conference has convened and a Board of Governors has been selected in
accordance with article VI.
B. The expenses of the Preparatory Commission may be met by a loan
provided by the United Nations and for this purpose the Preparatory
Commision shall make the necessary arrangements with the appropriate
authorities of the United Nations, including arrangements for repayment
of the loan by the Agency. Should these funds be insufficient, the Preparatory Commission may accept advances from Governments. Such advances
may be set off against the contributions of the Governments concerned to
the Agency.
C. The Preparatory Commission shall :
I. Elect its own officers, adopt its own rules of procedure, meet as often
as necessary, determine its own place of meeting and establish such committees as it deems necessary ;
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2. Appoint an executive secretary and staff as shall be necessary, who
shall exercise such powers and perform such duties as the Commission
may determine ;
3· Make arrangements for the first session of the General Conference,
inCluding the preparation of a provisional agenda and draft rules of procedure, such session to be held as soon as possible after the entry into force
of this Statute;
4· Make designations for membership on the first Board of Governors
in accordance with sub-paragraphs A-1 and A-2 and paragraph B of
article VI;
S· Make studies, reports, and recommendations for the first session of
the General Conference and for the first meeting of the Board of Governors on subjects of concern to the Agency requiring immediate attention,
including (a) the financing of the Agency; (b) the programmes and
budget for the first year of the Agency; (c) technical problems relevant to
advance planning of Agency operations ; (d) the ~stablishment of a permanent Agency staff; and (e) the location of the permanent headquarters
of the Agency;
6. Make recommendations for the first meeting of the Board of Governors concerning the provisions of a headquarters agreement defining the
status of the Agency and the rights and obligations which will exist in the
relationship between the Agency and the host Government ;
7· (a) Enter into negotiations with the United Nations with a view to
the preparation of a draft agreement in accordance with article XVI of
this Statute, such draft agreement to be submitted to the first session of
the General Conference and to the first meetings of the Board of Governors; and (b) make recommendations to the first session of the General
Conference and to the first meeting of the Board of Governors concerning
the relationship of the Agency to other international organizations as contemplated in article XVI of this Statute.

Appendix B
ITEM 1 *
AGREEMENT ON THE EsTABLISHMENT OF A JOINT NucLEAR
RESEARCH INSTITUTE
ARTICLE I

To insure joint theoretical and experimental research into nuclear physics
by scientists of the states signatories of the present agreement, an international scientific. research orgcLnization known as the Joint Institute. of
Nuclear Research is· hereby established.
ARTICLE 2

The Joint Institute of Nuclear Research shall conduct all its activities
in accordance with a charter, ihe draft of which shall be prepared by the
Institute's management and approved by the governments· of the states
members of .the Institute. The Join,t In~titute of Nuclear Research shall
ha~e the. rights of
juridical person. It may cooperate in its work with
appropriate institutes and l~boratories in the territories of the states members of the Institute. _The Institute ~hall .be located in Kalinin region, the
USSR.
.

a

ARTiCLE

3

The membership of the Jo~nt Institute of Nuclear Research consists of
the signatory states _of the present agreement. Other states, wishing to take
part in the work of the Joint Institute of ;Nuclear Research, shall declare
their concurrence with. the provisions of the present agreement and shall
become members of the Institute by dt;cision, ofthe majority of the states
members of the Institute.
.
ARTICLE 4
The Joint Institute of Nuclear Research shall comprise the following
research organizations :
I-A laboratory of nuclear problems with a synchrocyclotron with proton
energy of 68o megelectron volts (former Nuclear Problems Institute of
the USSR Academy of Sciences).
2-A high energy physics laboratory with a proton synchrotron of a
planned proton energy of IO,OOO megelectron volts (former Electrophysics
Laboratory of the USSR Academy of Sciences).
The aforementioned Nuclear Problems Institute and the Electrophysics

* The basic English text of this Agreement was published in a TASS press release
dated July I I, I956.
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Laboratory of the USSR Academy of Sciences shall be delivered by the
Government of the USSR to the Joint Institute of Nuclear Research with
all equipment, principal, auxiliary and administrative installations and
buildings, on the date the present agreement comes into force.
With a view to the further development of nuclear research the following installation shall be built at the Joint Institute:
I-A laboratory of theoretical physics with a calculating department and
electronic computing machinery;
2-A laboratory of neutron physics with an experimental nuclear reactor
with a high density of the neutron current;
3-A cyclotron for accelerating multicharged ions of various elements
and for experiments with them as part of the nuclear problems laboratory;
4-0ther experimental installations and laboratories.
ARTICLE

5

The Joint Institute of Nuclear Research shall be managed by a director
and two deputies, elected by the majority of states members of the Institute
from among scientists of these states. The director shall be elected for a
term of three years, and deputy directors for two-year terms. The Institute
director and his two deputies shall be elected in due manner by the plenipotentiaries of the states members of the Institute.
The Institute's director is a plenipotentiary person effecting relations with
appropriate institutions in the states members of the Institute on all questions bearing on the latter's work. The management of the Joint Institute
of Nuclear Research is responsible to the governments of the states members of the Institute for the Institute's work and shall report regularly to
them.
A scientific council shall be established at· the Institute to discuss and
approve research plans, the results of their fulfillment, and othei: questions
bearing on the Institute's scientific activities. The members of the scientific council shall be appointed by the states members of the Institute from
among their scientists, each state appointing ·three persons. The director
of the Joint Institute shall appoint a deputy in charge of construction and
the business affairs of the Institute.
ARTICLE

6

Each state member of the Joint Institute of Nuclear Research shall make
annual contributions for the maintenance of the Institute and the building
of new research facilities, and shall participate in the material maintenance
of the Institute.
The shares of the founder states in expenditures on the building and
maintenance of the Institute are determined by the following scale:
Albania-o.os percent; Bulgaria-3.6 percent; Hungary-4 percent; Ger-

1492

INTERNATIONAL CONTROL

man Democratic Republic 6.75 percent; Poland-6.75 percent; Rumania5-75 percent; USSR-47.25 percent; Czechoslovakia-5.75 percent.
In the case of new members joining the Institute or the withdrawal of
any state from the Institute, the shares of the states in the expenditures
on the building and maintenance of the Institute are subject to revision,
and the new scale shall be submitted for the approval of the governments
of the states members of the Institute. The share of the states members
of the Institute shall have no bearing on the degree of participation of a
member state in the Institute's scientific work and administration.
ARTICLE

7

A financial committee composed of representatives of all states members
of the Institute shall be formed to prepare the budget and control the
Institute's financial affairs. Each member state shall have one representa-tive on the financial committee. The committee members shall be appointed
by the governments of the states concerned. The chairmanship of the
financial committee meetings shall rotate among the representatives of
every state.
ARTICLE

8

Any state member of the Joint Institute of Nuclear Research has the
right to withdraw from the Institute. Written notification of the withdrawal from the Institute shall be sent by the plenipotentiary of the government of the member state desiring to leave the Institute to the Institute's
director not later than three months before the end of the current year.1
ARTICLE

9

The Joint Institute of Nuclear Research may be liquidated by agreement
among the governments of all the states members of the Institute. In case
of liquidation, all equipment, principal, auxiliary and administrative installations shall become the property of the USSR on whose territory the
Institute is located. The other member states shall be compensated in
accordance with their share in the capital expenditures of the Institute.
In case of the Institute's liquidation, the cash resources, with the exception of the part to be used to meet the Institute's obligations, shall be
divided among the states members of the Institute at the time of the
Insitute's disbandment proportionally to the actual cash contributions made
by these states during their membership in the Institute.
ARTICLE 10

This agreement shall become effective on the date of its signature by
all member states. For each country joining the Institute thereafter the
t The eighth article of the Institute's Charter states that "resignation from the Institute shall become official upon termination of that fiscal year in which the state
declared its withdrawal from the Institute."
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agreement shall become effective on the date of its admission to membership
according to the procedure provided for in Article 3·
The present agreement was signed in Moscow on March 26, I956. It
was done in one copy, in Russian. Certified copies of the agreement shall
be communicated by the Government of the USSR to all other signatories.

ITEM 2*
CHARTER OF THE }OINT NucLEAR RESEARCH INSTITUTE

SECTION I

Creation and Location of the Institute
ARTICLE I

The Joint Nuclear Research Institute, hereinafter referred to as the
"Institute," shall be an international scientific-research organization, created
by the Agreement for the organization of such an institute which was concluded among the following governments on the 26th of March, I956:
The People's Republic of Albania, the People's Republic of Bulgaria,
the Hungarian People's Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the
Chinese People's Republic, the Korean Popular-Democratic Republic, the
Mongolian People's Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Rumanian
People's Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Czechoslovakian Republic.
ARTICLE 2

The Institute shall be located in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
in the town of Dubna, Moscow district.
Mailing address: P.O. Box 79, Central Post Office, Moscow
ARTICLE

3

The Institute shall be a legal entity and, according to the laws of the
country wherein it is situated, shall possess the capacity and status necessary to achieve its aims and functions.
The Institute shall have the right of free access to foreign publications.
The Institute shall have its own seal, an impression of which is affixed to
this Charter.
• The Russian text of this Charter is to be found in 2 Atomnaya Energiya, No. 1,
76-82 (Russia 1957). An English text may be found in the English translation of
this periodical (published by Consultant's Bureau, New York).
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SECTION II

Aims and Functions of the Joint Nuclear Research Institute
4
The purpose of the Joint Nuclear Research Institute is:
(I ) to guarantee the coordination of theoretical and experimental re-'
search done by scientists of member-states in nuclear physics ;
( 2) to further the development of nuclear physics in the member-states
by the exchange of experience and of theoretical and experimental research
results;
(3) to maintain communication between the national and international
scientific-research organizations and other organizations interested in the
development of nuclear physiCs and in the exploration of new possibilities
for the peaceful utilization of atomic energy;
(4) to help develop specialized skills of every description in the scientific-:
research personnel of the member-states.
The Institute . will concern itself exclusively with the development of
peaceful uses of atomic energy to benefit all mankind.
Results of scientific research done at the Institute shall be announced
either by publication or at scientific conferences and meetings.
Reports on the work accomplished shall be sent to all member-states.
ARTICLE

SECTION III

Membership.in the Joint Nuclear Research Institute
5
The members of the Joint Nuclear Research Institute are those states
which signed the agreement concerning the organization of this Institute.
Other states, wishing to participate in .the work of the Institute and
concurring with the conditions of the Agreement concerning the organization of the Institute, shall become Institute members upon the decision of
a majority of the member-states.
The amount of participation in the Institute's maintenance and construction expenses allotted newly-joined member-states shall be decided by the
Finance Committee and approved by the governments of the member-states.
ARTICLE

ARTICLE

6

All members of the Institute shall participate equally in the scientific
work and management of the Institute.

7
The Institute's Board of Directors, with regarding to the principle of
cooperation, shall decide individually all questions regard the use of the
Institute for work by non-member state scientists.
ARTICLE
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The Institute Board shall determine the size and form of compensation
required for the use of Institute equipment and materials according to
the agreement reached with the interested state, scientists, or scientific
institution.
ARTICLE 8
Any Institute member-state can resign from membership.
Written notice of withdrawal from the Institute shall be submitted by
the government of the state wishing to withdraw from the Institute to the
Institute's Board no later than three months before the termination of the
current fiscal year.
Resignation from the Institute shall become official upon termination of
that fiscal year in which the state declared its withdrawal from the Institute.
After reviewing the budget for the fiscal year in which the state announced
its withdrawal from the Institute, the Finance Committee shall determine
the amount of monetary reimbursement due the resigning state, according
to the share of capital outlay for the Institute apportioned that state.

SECTION IV
Finance Committee and·Budget
ARTICLE

9

A Finance

Committee consisting of representatives from all memberstates shall be set up to control the financiat affairs of the Institute and to
approve the budget.
.
Each member-state shall have one representative on the Finance Committee. Members of the Committee shall be appointed by the governments
of the respective states.
The Finance Committee shall convene at least once a year. Representatives of each state in turn shall preside over the sessions.
The Finance Committee's resolutions shall require a two-thirds majority
vote for adoption.
ARTICLE 10

The Finance Committee shall examine ~nd approve :
·a) the estimated costs of financing Institute scientific and .economic
works; .
. ·
·.b) the departmental structure, personnel, and official pay rates for all
~tegories of Institute workers;
· .
c) amounts and terms of monetary payments toward Institute construction and maintenance from member~states, ·according to the proportionary
scale provided in the Agreement of the member-states;
. d) ~e plan ~or financing capital constr;uction.
The Finance Committee shall generally control all financial affairs of the
Institute.
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"ARTICLE II

A budget for the Institute covering the period from January xst to
December 31st inclusive shall be drawn up each year.
ARTICLE I2

_In the budget presented by the Board to the Finance Committee, provision shall be made for all Institute expenses, itemized as follows:
_a) financing of scientific research and payment of Institute workers;
b) cost of developing scientific research and other Institute objectives;
. c) money to reward and encourage Institute workers, for length of
service, etc., and to give financial help to workers when and if needed;
· d) other expenses incurred in the course of the Institute's activities.
ARTICLE

13

Each member-state shall produce on the dates specified monetary payments, according to the budget approved by the Finance Committee, toward
the maintenance and development of the Institute and its objectives.
These payments shall be payable in the currency of the country wherein
the Institute is situated.
In those cases where the Joint Nuclear Research Institute requires currency to purchase equipment, instruments, materials, technical scientific
literature or periodicals from states not belonging to the Institute, memberstates shall pay a portion of the sum allotted them by the Agreement in the
currency of those states. The amount of the sum in this currency will be
established by the Finance Committee.
The value of equipment, materials, and instruments supplied by memberstates, as well as the value of individual work accomplished according to
Institute laws may be computed as part of the allotted participation.
_The manner of computation shall be established by the Finance Committee.
ARTICLE I4

:The scale of allotted participation in the Institute development and maintenance costs shall be revised both upon the admittance of new memberstates and upon the withdrawal of any state from membership, and a new
stale · shall be presented to the governments of the member-states for
approval.
ARTICLE IS

During the fiscal year, the Institute may partially redistribute the monies
itemized in the budget under the divisions of capital construction and
exploratory work.
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ARTICLE I6

At the end of each fiscal year, the Institute Board shall report to the
Finance Committee on the budget balance according to its status at that
ti11_1e.
The Finance Committee shall specify the date on which the report is to
be presented.
SECTION

v·

The Scientific Council of the Joint Nuclear Research Institute
ARTICLE I7

The Scientific Council of the Institute shall consist of three scientists
from each member-state, to be appointed by their states.
The. staff of the Scientific Council shall include the Director and ViceDirectors of the Institute (who are chosen according to article 20 of this
statute), who shall have the right to vote.
Laboratory Directors, who have not been appointed members of the
Scientific Council by their various governments, shall be included in the
staff of the Scientific Council with the right of participating in the debates.
ARTICLE 18

The Scientific Council of the Institute shall :
a) consider and approve the Institute's scientific research programs;
b) examine the results of completed scientific research programs and
also the results of individual studies;
c) consider other questions concerning the scientific work of the
Institute.
The Scientific Council shall convene at least twice a year.
ARTICLE 19

The Institute Director shall be president of the Scientific Council.
The Scientific Council shall announce its own rules of procedure.
SECTION VI

Board of Directors of the Joint Nuclear Research Institute
ARTICLE 20

The Institute shall be headed by a Board of Directors consisting of an
Institute Director and two Vice-Directors, to be elected from the scientists
of the member-states by a majority of these states. The Director shall be
elected for a three-year term, the Vice-Directors for a two-year term.
The Board of Directors shall be elected by the plenipotentiary representatives of the member-states.
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ARTICLE 2I.

The Institute Director shall be a plenipotentiary officer, who shall maintain relations with the appropriate institutions of the member-states in all
questions regarding the Institute's work.
The Institute may establish direct communication with scientists and
scientific organizations of other countries.
The Institute Vice-Directors !!hall assist the Director in the management
of the Institute, substitute for him in his absence, and shall have a responsibility equal to his for all activity of the Institute.
ARTICLE 22

The Institute Board is responsible to the Governments of the membersUi-tes for the activity of the Institute and shall report to them periodically.
Only decisions of the Finance Committee and the Scientific Councii may
direct the Institute Board in the management of the Institute; the Institute
Board shall not obey any orders from individual merilber_.states.
ARTICLE

23

On the appointed dates, the Institute Board shall present a yearly budget
estimate and a report of the budget balance to the Finance Committee.
ARTICLE

24

The Institute Board shall direct the scientific work of the Institute
according to the prOgr-am for scientific research procedure approved by the
Institute's Scie11tific Council, and shall direct the financial affairs according
to the decisions of the Finance Committee.
The Institute Board shall have.the right of partially altering the scientific
research programs as~igned. to the various. institute Laboratories.
The 'Board
niust · infqrm
the .Institute's
'Scientific
Council of all such
'I.·
,.
.
1 I
'
.
;I
I
.. ,
changes. or mooifi'caticins.
,j

.•.•

ARTlCLE 25: ..

Each year,. tile Jnstitu.te Boarq shall present to the Institute's Scientific
Council for ~~~iew a~d approval draftsqf.s.ummary programs fo~ scientific
research works, drafts of programs for the future development of the
Institute, and a rep<)rt oi'the Institute's' scientific work.
ARTICLE 26

The Institute Director shall be manager in chief of Institute assets. He
shall be in charge of all the Institute resources and property.

APPENDIX B
ARTICLE

1499

27

The Institute Director shall have the right :
a) to hire and discharge employees according to the Institute's personnel
s~tute;_

b) to establish or alter within the official wage limits approved by the
Finance Committee the wages of all employees, and to initiate individual
pay raises for highly-skilled workers of up to so% of the original wage
within the limits of the sums estimated for this.
SECTION VII

Laboratories of the Joint Nuclear Research Institute
ARTICLE 28

The Institute staff shall include: a Nuclear Problems Laboratory, a
High Energy Laboratory, a Neutron Physics Laboratory, and a Theoretical
Physics Laboratory, each of which shall coordinate the research in their
respective fields of nuclear physics.
· The Institute Laboratories shall consist of scientific departments and
sections.
Decision of the Institute's Scientific Council can change the number of
Laboratories to fit the requirements of the work at hand, and decision of
the Institute Board can change the number of departments and sections.
ARTICLE

29

Scientists from member-states will be chosen by the Institute Board to
serve as Laboratory Directors and subsequently approved by the Scientific
Council; their function shall be the management of the Laboratories.
The Laboratory Directors shall be responsible to the Institute Board for
their actions and for the work of their Laboratories.
ARTICLE 30

The Laboratory Directors shall direct all scientific research work in their
Laboratories according to the program approved by the Institute Scientific
Council; their function shall be the management of the Laboratories.
The Laboratory Directors shall be responsible to the Institute Board for
their adions and for the work of their Laboratories.
Through the Institute Board, Laboratory Directors may select personnel,
h~re and discharge Laboratory employees, determine and alter, within the
approved pay-rate limits, wages paid Laboratory employees according to
the extent and quality of each employee's work, and may declare bonuses
or fines.
·
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ARTICLE 3I

A Scientific Council shall be set up in each Laboratory, the staff of which
shall be approved by the Institute Scientific Council.
The Laboratory Director shall be the president of the Laboratory Scientific Council.
The· Laboratory Scientific Council :
a) shall prepare programs for the scientific research work assigned the
Laboratory ;
b) shall examine results obtained by such scientific research work and
by individual studies;
c) shall confer doctorates and bachelors degrees in the mathematicophysical and technical sciences ;
d) shall consider other questions concerning the scientific work of the
Laboratory.
ARTICLE 32

On specified dates, the Laboratory Directors shall present a draft program of the Laboratory's scientific research work, a report on the Laboratory's work, and requests for needed materials and equipment to the Institute Board.
SECTION VIII

Administrative-Economic Management of the Joint Nuclear
Research Institute
ARTICLE 33

The Institute Director shall appoint one of his assistants as Administrative Director to manage the administrative-economic work and construction
of the Institute.
ARTICLE 34

The Administrative Director shall direct the work of the departments
within his jurisdiction, which departments provide the framework of the
Institute. He shall have the right of hiring and discharging workers in
these departments.
ARTICLE 35

The Administrative Director as proxy for the Institute Director shall
manage the assets and shall be responsible for the correct expenditure of
Institute funds as outlined in the budget approved by· the Finance Committee.
The Administrative Director shall be subordinate to and responsible for
his actions to the Institute Director.
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SECTION IX

Concerning Personnel at the Joint Nuclear Research Institute
ARTICLE

36

All persons on the Institute staff shall be employees of the said international scientific organization and under obligation to further its aims
and undertakings.
ARTICLE

37

Institute employees shall be recruited from member-state citizens.
The Institute's Board shall consider the proposed contingents from each
member-state, and the Scientific Council shall approve them.
The question of scientific workers sent by member-states for short-term
work at the Institute shall be decided by the Institute Board.
ARTICLE

38

The obligations and rights of Institute personnel shall be determined by
a Code of Regulations for personnel of the Joint Nuclear Research Institute. Personnel of the Institute shall be subject to the laws of the country
in which the Institute is located.

39
The Institute Board may take university students or graduates who are
citizens of member-states for practical study in the Institute's Laboratories.
In such cases, the states shall stand the expenses incurred by their students
or novices. The form and term of this practical study shall be determined
by the Institute Board.
ARTICLE

SECTION X

Liquidation of the Joint Nuclear Research Institute
ARTICLE 40

The Joint Nuclear Research Institute can be liquidated by agreement of
the member-states' governments.
Upon liquidation, all Institute equipment and all principal, subsidiary
and administrative buildings shall become the property of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, wherein the Institute is located. Other memberstates shall receive monetary reimbursement proportionate to the amount
of participation assigned each of these states in capital outlay for the
Institute.
Upon liquidation all Institute monetary assets on hand, except those
portions required to pay Institute obligations, shall be distributed among
those states who are members of the Institute at the time of its liquidation,
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in proportion to the amounts of monetary payments actually contributed
by these states during their participation in the work of the Institute.
SECTION XI

Ratification of the Charter
ARTICLE 41

This Charter shall be ratified by the Council of Plenipotentiary Representatives of the member-states.
The ratified copy of the Charter shall be kept at the Institute.
SECTION XII

Amendments to the Charter
This Charter may be amended or changed.
Proposals to change the Charter shall be directed to the Institute Board.
The Board shall also have the right to propose changes in the Charter.
Upon the acceptance of such proposals by a majority of the member-states,
the Institute Board shaH consider those changes as part of the Charter.
This Charter for the Institute has been drawn up in the Russian language
_on the 23d of September, in the year 1956. Witnessed copies of this
document shall be sent by the Institute Board to aU Institute member-states.
In witness whereof the plenipotentiary representatives of the Institute
member-states' governments have signed this document and certified it
with the Institute's seal.
Authorized by the Government of the People's Republic of Albania
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Prifmi, Mihal
Authorized by the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Gerasimov, Lyuben
Authorized by the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Kish, Arpad
Authorized by the Government of the Democratic Republic of VietNam
.................................................. Chan Dai, Ngia
Authorized by the Government of the German Democratic Republic
............... : . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Rambusch, Karl
Authorized by the Government of the Chinese People's Republic .....
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Wan Gan, Chan
Authorized by the Korean Popular-Democratic Republic ............ .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Kim Khen, Bon
Authorized by the Government of the Mongolian People's Republic ...
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sod nom, N amsrain
Authorized by the Government of the Polish People's Republic ..... .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Billig, Wilhelm
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Authorized by the Government of the Rumanian People's Republic ...
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Khulubei, Khoriya
Authorized by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ........................................ Slavsky, Efim Pavlovich
Authorized by the Government of the Czechoslovakian Republic ..... .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Kozheshnik, Y aroslav

ITEM 3 *
SoviET GovERNMENT STATEMENT ON GENERAL EuROPEAN
COOPERATION IN THE PEACEFUL UsE OF ATOMIC ENERGY

On July 12, the USSR Foreign Affairs Ministry sent to the Governments
of Austria, Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Great Britain, Hungary, the German Democratic Republic, Greece, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg,
the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Rumania, the Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, France, Czechoslovakia, Switzerland, Sweden, Yugoslavia,
and to the Government of the United States, through their embassies and
legations in Moscow, the text of the Soviet Government statement: "On
general European cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy."
The text of the aforementioned statement was simultaneously brought
to the attention of the Government of the Chinese People's Republic, the
People's Democratic Republic of Korea, the Mongolian People's Republic,
and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, through their embassies m
Moscow.
Here is the text of the statement of the Soviet Government.
The great discoveries in the sphere of atomic energy have considerably
expanded the opportunities for technical progress, development of power,
industry, agriculture, transport, science, and culture, and for improving the
welfare of the people. Further development in the field of atomic energy
and its practical application in science and engineering call for an appropriate industrial and scientific-technical base, call for collective efforts of
states in organizing production and utilizing atomic energy for peaceful
aims ..
At present, when the Cold War· and mutual. nonconfidence in relations
between states, which hampered the development of general international
cooperation are receding into the past, more favorable conditions are appearing for the efforts of scientists, engineers, and other atomic specialists
to be .directed not toward military uses of atomic energy, but toward its
use for peaceful aiins, for the benefit of. mankind.
*The English text of this statement was published in a TASS pr~ss ~elease dat~d
July IJ, 19$6.
. .
.
.
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The Soviet Government considers that the attainment of an international agreement on the unconditional prohibition of atomic and hydrogen
weapons and on their withdrawal from the armaments of the states would
open wide prospects for the peaceful uses of atomic energy and make it
possible to switch over the huge material-scientific-technical and other
resources from the production of means of destruction to the creation of
material benefits and spiritual values.
Working consistently for unconditional prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons and for the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, the
Soviet Government is already taking the necessary steps for a general
development of international cooperation in the field of the peaceful uses
for atomic energy. Moreover, the Soviet Government bases itself on the
fact that international cooperation in this field must completely exclude the
use for military aims of atomic materials which are provided on the basis
of corresponding agreements.
It goes without saying that cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of
atomic energy can be effective only under conditions of equality of all the
interested parties, in the presence of strict respect of national sovereignty
of the states and noninterference in their internal affairs, in the strict
observance of the high principles expressed in the U. N. Charter. Such
cooperation can be fruitful only if it will not harm the security of any of
the states, and the assistance granted is not conditioned by any kind of
demands of a political or military nature.
· The Soviet Union, as one of the states which is developing the production
of atomic energy and which possesses atomic raw material, is actively
taking part in the development of international cooperation in the cause
of the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. The USSR, together
with other states, is taking part in the measures for the creation of an
international agency for the peaceful uses of atomic energy.
The Soviet Government considers that the possibilities for development
of international cooperation in the field of application of atomic energy·
are far from exhausted. In particular, this refers to development of
cooperation in this field on a regional basis.
At the present moment the attention of broad public circles is being more
and more attracted to the question of the organization of cooperation in the
field of peaceful uses of atomic energy between the European states. The
development of such cooperation between the European countries would
have contributed considerably to the strengthening of confidence among
them and ·would have been in accord with the interests of general European
security. In present conditions it is the European states, together with the
United States, which have the most favorable prospects, including the
existence of highly-developed industry, qualified manpower, well-trained
scientific and engineering cadres, and the necessary reserves, for the devel-
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opment of cooperation in the field of the peaceful uses of atomic energy
between European countries; and to render corresponding assistance to
other states.
Nevertheless, one must but note that lately in some of the Western
European states definite attempts are being made to exploit the understandable aspirations of the peoples for development of international cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of atomic energy, for the creation
in this field of a closed grouping of a few states-which will hamper the
broad cooperation in this field on a general European basis. Such a grouping is envisaged by the plans for setting up the so-called Euratom, an
atomic merger of six European countries-France, the Federal Republic
of Germany, Italy, Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg.
According to the plan for the establishment of Euratom, drawn up by a
special inter-governmental committee of the aforementioned six states, a
monopoly of rights is to be given to this organization for the possession
of all the nuclear materials as well as the right to distribute these materials
among states of the group. The authors of this plan propose to grant the
executive organs of Euratom rights and authority which would enable this
organization to control, in fact, the whole atomic industry, and, to a considerable extent, branches of national economy connected with if in the
states participating in this merger. Thus, in substance, a supranational
character has been contemplated for this organization.
One cannot fail to see that the creation of such an organization under
circumstances in which several West European states are members of
closed military blocs which oppose other European states would result in
the fact that the activity of the Euratom would be subject to the militarystrategic aims of these blocs. By the nature of the organization of Euratom,
it naturally could not be expected to carry out its activity in the interest of
those states which have no opportunity to develop the production of atomic
energy in their countries.
This means that economically stronger states and, in fact, the corresponding large monopolies of these countries, will have an opportunity to use
Euratom to impose conditions on other countries which are much weaker
economically. Obviously, this could lead only to the increasing of distrust
in relations between states and would create additional difficulties in the
organization of a system of effective European security.
One must also take into consideration the fact that the creation of this
organization, to which only a part of Germany will belong, would lead to
an even greater consolidation of the division of Germany into two parts
and would make more difficult the achievement of measures for the creation
of a single peace-loving and democratic German state.
One must also note the circumstance that the creation of Euratom would,
in fact, lead to the remo~l of any restrictions in the production of atomic
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energy, which are now being contemplated in relation to West Germany.
This would permit the revenge-seeking West German circles to organize
in their country production of atomic weapo~s, which would create a
serious threat to the cause of peace in Europe.
The Soviet Union has always stood and continues to stand for wide
international cooperation in the peaceful use of atomic energy. It does not
make a secret of its achievements in the peaceful application of atomic
energy and willingly shares it with all countries. It is giving effective
assistance to several countries in the development of research in the fields
of nuclear physics and the uses of atomic energy for peaceful aims, in the
construction of atomk reactors, trai~ing of specialists, a·nd so forth.
To bring about the cooperation of scientists in various countries in theoretical and experimental research in the field of nuclear physics and to
broaden the possibilities for the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,
on the initiative of the Soviet Union a conference was convened in Moscow
in March 1956 of representatives of eleven countries of Europe and Asia
who concluded an agreement on setting up an international scientific research organization under the name of the Joint Institute of Nuclear
Research. In accordance with the agreement, the Soviet Government has
handed over to the Joint Institute of Nuclear Re-search, the Institute Of
Nuclear Problems and the ·Electro-Physical Laboratory with all their
unique equipment.
It is clearly provided for in the agreement that other ·states, wishing in
·the future to take part in the work- of the Institute,- can state their agreement with the articles of the agreement, and, following a decision of the
majority of the members of the Institute, become members of the latter,
with equal rights. Thus, the-Joint Institute of Nuclear Research, open to
other countries for participation, is-destined to become an important center
of cooperation between -scientists of different states.
Proceeding from the fact that exchange of knowledge and experience
in the field of the peaceful utilization of atomic energy will be a powerful
incentive for the further development of atomic science and will contribute
to the elimination of suspicion and distrust in this field, the Soviet Union
submitted in April 1956, for examination by the I rth session of the European Economic Commission, a proposal on creating, within the framework
of this organization, a body to deal with questions of the utilization of
atomic energy for peaceful purposes.
Introducing this proposal, the Soviet Government proceeded from the
fact that some countries, especially smaJl countries, do not have the ability
to- solve by themselves the complex questions connected with the peaceful
utilization of atomic energy. Such questions as the training of scientific
cadres, the creation of a material base for the development of scientific
research work, the setting up and development of the production of atomic
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energy for peaceful purposes are very complex matters which demand huge
expenditures and the existence of a corresponding technical base. Without
doubt, the broad cooperation of all European states in this field will speed
up the development of the production of atomic energy for peaceful purposes and will to a large extent, contribute to raising the well-being of the
peoples.
Attributing great importance to cooperation in the field of peaceful
utilization of atomic energy, the Soviet Government holds that the time
has come for convening a conference of the countries of Europe for the
discussion of the question of setting up a general European regional body
for the peaceful utilization of atomic energy. Such a body could be set up
o~ an inter-government basis, with the participation of all the European
states wishing to join. The United States could also participate in such
a body.
In the opinion of the Soviet Government, such a conference could discuss the question of the rights and powers of the above-mentioned body,
while bearing in mind that its competence should include such questions as,
for instance, the study of the economic aspects of the peaceful utilization
of atomic energy ; study of the possibility of coordinating the utilization
of raw material resources ; the rendering of technical assistance ; exchange
of information; granting of technical and scientific consultation by !)tates
advanced in the atomic field, to other states ; assistance through cadres ;
discussion of the question of maintaining permanent relations between the
international and national organizations existing in Europe in the field of
the utilization of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.
The conference could, of course, examine any other proposals of states
regarding the extension of international cooperation in the field of peaceful
·
utilization of atomic energy.
It goes without saying that a broad development of general European
cooperation in the task of peaceful utilization of atomic energy by no
means excludes bilateral agreements in this field. On the contrary, bilateral
agreements, concluded on the basis of equality and without imposing on
one of the parties any political, economic, military, or other demands incompatible with the principles of respect for the sovereignty and independence of states, will contribute to the unification of the efforts of the
states ;md to cooperate between them in the field of utilization of atomic
energy for peaceful purposes.
The Soviet Government expresses its conviction that the governments
of all interested countries will respond with suitable attention to the appeal
of the Soviet Union for uniting their efforts in this important field. It
expresses its conviction that such cooperation of all European states would
contribute to a large extent to reaching an agreement on banning the atomic
and hydrogen weapons and eliminate them from the armaments of the
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states-which, in its turn, would secure the utilization of all nuclear materials exclusively for peaceful purposes, for the progress of science and
technology, for the use of the people.
-

ITEM 4
DECLARATION OF THE U.S.S.R. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
oN PLANS To CREATE EuRATOM AND A "CoMMON MARKET"*

At the present time the governments of France, the German Federal
Republic, Italy, Belgium, Holland and Luxemburg are preparing the creation in Western Europe of two new closed organizations, a "partnership"
of the six named countries in atomic energy (the so-called "Euratom")
and a "common market," within whose framework is planned the gradual
abolition of customs duties in the economy of each of the countries, "free"
movement of labor force and capital, and joint exploitation by the participating countries of French, Belgian and Dutch colonial domains.
In view of the fact that the plans to create Euratom and the "common
market," which concern ·problems of economic cooperation and cooperation'
in the use of atomic energy (problems which are important ones for all
European countries), envisage measures whose fulfillment will entail dangerous consequences for the peoples of Europe, the U.S.S.R. Ministry of
Foreign Affairs has been authorized to make the following declaration.
The Soviet Union has constantly sought, and now seeks, the fullest
_development of international economic cooperation, including cooperation
in the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, since such cooperation
corresponds to the interests of all countries, strengthens confidence between
peoples, and creates a solid basis for the peaceful co-existence of states.
'rhe Soviet Union attaches special importance to the establishment of
such cooperation in Europe on an all-European basis, inasmuch as it would
contribute to overcoming the division of Europe into opposed military
groupings, which (division) has been the result of the Western powers'
policies, and would contribute to European peace.
The development of peaceful production of atomic energy on a wide
scale in European countries would open up favorable perspectives for the
development of economy, science and culture, and for the increased wellbeing of the peoples. The use -of the tremendous opportunities which
peaceful utilization of atomic energy gives naturally requires a corresponding productive and scientific-technical base, and the united efforts of the
states in organizing the broad industrial production of atomic energy.
Therefore the Soviet government regards with understanding the aspira• Pravda, March 17, 1957, p. 3·
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tions of various European states, especially those which do not have sufficient resources and technical experience at their disposal to carry out work
in this field, to unite their efforts and opportunities for peaceful use of
atomic energy and to make use of the scientific and technical experience
which has been accumulated by other countries.
The Soviet government understands equally well the interest of European countries in establishing broad economic cooperation in all other
fields. The broadening of economic cooperation between European countries would have a highly favorable effect on the development of these
countries' economy, on increased employment, and on the improvement of
the living standard of the population. It would exert a positive influence
on the world economic situation as a whole. Economic cooperation on an
all-European basis would assist in restoring traditional trade ties and
scientific-technical ties which have been destroyed; it would help overcome
artificial obstacles and limitations in the area of commercial and other
economic relationships; it would bring European states closer to one another, and would increase the European peoples' sense of security and
faith in the morrow.
However, the plans to create Euratom and the "common market" stand
in clear _contradiction to these aims. One's attention is drawn first of all
to the fact that all the members of Euratom and the "common market" are
members of the military grouping, NATO. It is obvious that_ the entire
activity of Euratom and the "common market" will be subordinated to the
aims of NATO, whose aggressive character is widely known.
Under such conditions the fulfillment of plans to create Euratom and
the "common market" will inevitably lead to a further deepening of the
division which splits Europe, to the increase of tension in Europe; it will
greatly complicate the establishment of economic and political ·cooperation
on an all-European basis ; it will create new difficulties in solving the problems of European security.
New and serious obstacles will also arise in the path of restoring the
national unity of the German people, since Western Germany will be still
more deeply drawn into the system of closed military groupings of the
Western powers which are opposed to other European states. In this
connection it is necessary to note the understandable concern expressed by
the Social Democratic Party through its lead~r Ollenhauer in his declaration of March 6th of this year, in which he pointed out a number of
dangerous consequences for the German people in the plans to create
Euratom and the "common market."
The affiimations of certain leading statesmen in the Western countries
to the effect that Euratom and the "common market" will concern themselves exclusively with problems of peaceful cooperation among the participating countries represent nothing more than a concealment of the actual
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plotting of their organizers and originators. One must not forget that
certain United States circles which actively support the creation of Euratom
are seeking the earliest possible restoration of German militarism and the
equipment of the already-created West German army with all types of
modern arms, including atomic arms. As is known, it was on the initiative
of the United States that a decision was made on this question at a NATO
Council session in December, 1956. The creation of Euratom will be a
practical step in the fulfillment of these aggressive plans, so dangerous for
all peoples.
There can be no doubt that revenge-seeking circles in Western Germany
will miss no opportunity to use Euratom for accumulating atomic materials
and raw materials in order more quickly to prepare for the production of
their own atomic weapons. In this way, the creation of Euratom will clear
the way for German militarism to prepare for new military adventures ;
in the middle of Europe there will again arise a dangerous center of unrest.
In this connection, however, it must again be noted that the equipment of
the West German army with nuclear weapons will be pregnant with dangerous consequences, above all 'for the population of West Germany itself,
which may find itself the object of a retaliatory atomic blow.
Concerning the plans of the ruling circles of certain West European'
coun~ries to use Euratom as · a means of controlling the production of
atamic eriergy in Western Germany, such plans have been shown by experience to be without foundation. It is well known that when the European
Coal and Steel Union was created, the French government, seeking to
ensure ratification of the agreement to create this Union by the French
parliament, also declared that it would be possible by way of this Union
to gain control over Western Germany's war-industry potential. Seeking
the ratification of the Paris agreements, the French government asserted
that these agreements would be a means of achieving military control over
Western Germany. It is now clear to all that these calculations proved
illusory. The creation of Euratom-regardless of others' wishes-will
inevitably lead to the removal of all limitations in the field of atomic arms
production in Western Germany, and this will create a direct threat to the
people of France as well as to the peoples of other West European nations.
Equally without foundation are the plans of certain circles in France,
Italy, and other West European states that the creation of Euratom wilt
contribute to a lessening of these countries' economic dependence on the
United States. On the contrary, their dependence on the U.S.A. will only
increase, to the detriment of the national sovereignty of the countries participating in this grouping, since the United States-and nobody attempts
to conceal this fact-will in reality control Euratom, acting in the capacity
of chief supplier of fissionable materials and of equipment for atomic
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production in Euratom countries. It is not by accident that influential
circles in England have come out against England's joining Euratom,
realizing full well the consequences which participation in it would have
for England.
The plan to create a "common market" likewise represents a serious
threat for the peoples of European countries. . . ~
. . . Proceeding from these considerations, the Soviet Union has already
put forth a number of suggestions aimed at establishing genuinely allEuropean cooperation:
I. In April, 1956, at the eleventh session of the European Economic
Commission of the United Nations, the Soviet Union introduced a proposal
to create, within the framework of this commission, an organ dealing with
questions of utilizing atomic energy for peaceful purposes. This proposal
is included in the agenda of the twelfth session of the United Nations'
European Economic Commission, whicli operied on April 29th of this year.
2. In its declaration "On All-European Cooperation in ·Peaceful Utilization of Atomic Energy" of July 12, 1956, the Soviet government proposed
that a conference of all the European· countries be ·convened to discuss the
question of creating an all-European organization on peaceful utiHzatioh of
atomic energy, bearing in mind that this organization would be'a regional
division or department of the International Atomic Energy Agency. In the
opinion of the Soviet government, such an organization could be founded
on an inter-governmental ·basis, with participation in it by all interested
European states, and also by the United States.
This regional organization for peaceful use of atomic energy, as suggested by the Soviet Union, would not be directed against any state
or group of states and would not act counter to any national interests
whatever.
Cooperation in the framework of an all-European regional organization
on atomic energy would, beyond any doubt, be able to contribute to the
progress of each of the European countries in the peaceful utilization of
atomic energy and to the raising of the European peoples' living standards,
not to mention the fact that it would be an important means of improving
the situation in Europe generally.
The establishment of all-European cooperation in peaceful utilization of
atomic energy would contribute in many respects to a solution of the most
urgent modern-day problem: the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen
weapons as weapons of mass destruction.
Guided by its desire to contribute to a positive solution of the problem
of all-European cooperation in the peaceful utilization of atomic energy,
the Soviet government proposes that certain supplementary problems be
considered, including the following:
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a) the creation of a scientific-research institute or institutes in atomic
energy, on an all-European basis;
b) cooperation in creating enterprises for pr~ducing atomic energy for
industrial and scientific-research purposes, including problems of ensuring
a supply of raw materials for these enterprises.
It goes without saying that, when cooperation in peaceful utilization of
atomic energy is made possible on an all-European basis, European countries will have the opportunity to take advantage of the Soviet Union's
experience in this field. . . .
. . . The Soviet government is ready to consider any other proposals
concerning principles and forms of all-European economic cooperation, as
well as cooperation in the peaceful use of atomic energy.
The Soviet government believes that the proposals outlined above for
all-European economic cooperation and cooperation in peaceful use of
atomic energy may be considered at the twelfth session of the United
Nations' European Economic Commission.
The Soviet government hopes that the governments of · all interested
lands will give due attention to 'the Soviet Union's proposal on the question
of all-European economic cooperation and of cooperation in the field of
peaceful use of atomic energy.

